CONSENSUS PAPER
ON PREDICTABLE, ADEQUATE, AND SUSTAINABLE FINANCING FOR
AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES
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<td>A3</td>
<td>African Representatives at the United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>ACSRT</td>
<td>African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism</td>
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<td>AFRIPOL</td>
<td>African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>AUPSC</td>
<td>African Union Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>ATMIS</td>
<td>African Union Transition Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AUC</td>
<td>African Union Commission</td>
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<td>AUPF</td>
<td>African Union Peace Fund</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common African Position</td>
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<td>CRF</td>
<td>Crisis Reserve Facility</td>
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<td>FRR</td>
<td>Financial Rules and Regulations</td>
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<td>GS</td>
<td>Group of Five Sahel Joint Force</td>
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<td>HIPPO</td>
<td>High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations</td>
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<td>LSP</td>
<td>Logistics Support Package</td>
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<td>MNJTF</td>
<td>Multinational Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>Member States</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>PSOs</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
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<td>PTCC</td>
<td>Police/Troop Contributing Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>REC/RMs</td>
<td>Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SAMIM</td>
<td>SADC Mission in Mozambique</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>African Union – United Nations Mission in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UNSOA</td>
<td>United Nations Support Office for AMISOM</td>
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<td>UNSOS</td>
<td>United Nations Support Office in Somalia</td>
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I. Overview

1. The nature of global peace and security threats is constantly evolving. The international peace and security architecture is now confronted with new and more complex security challenges, crises and conflicts that are regional and transnational in scope compounded by increasing geostrategic competition. Africa has emerged as the key battleground for many of these threats and challenges. This has been amplified by the COVID-19 pandemic and the global financial crisis which have thrown already fragile economies and livelihoods on the continent into even greater turmoil and uncertainty.

2. The international peace and security architecture is in urgent need of adaptation and regeneration if it is to remain relevant, fit for purpose and better able to anticipate and respond to global trends and evolutions. Against this backdrop, three key points of consensus have emerged:

   a. No single organization can provide the appropriate response.

   b. The African Union (AU) and its regional organizations have demonstrated a clear comparative advantage as first responders with the political will to undertake offensive operations in high-risk environments; and

   c. There is a need for financing mechanisms that are predictable and sustainable rather than voluntary and ad hoc.

3. These key elements in the international security landscape make genuine and systemic partnerships that support effective regional responses to global security threats a strategic interest and necessity. In this regard, a well-funded African peace and security architecture is not simply an African priority, it is a global public good. This report therefore provides an update on progress achieved in implementing the various AU Policy Organ decisions on predictable and sustainable financing for peace and security; and makes proposals in relation to consolidating strategic partnerships in relation to the deployment of peace support operations.

II. Key AU Policy Organ Decisions

4. In response to these issues and challenges, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government (the Assembly) took a number of key decisions between 2015 and 2017 to enhance predictable financing for peace and security in Africa. This includes Assembly/AU/Dec.561(XXIV) and Assembly/AU/Dec.578(XXV) adopted in January 2015 in Addis Ababa and June 2015 in Johannesburg respectively directing that Member States would fund 100% of the operational budget, 75% of the program budget and 25% of the peace support operations budget/peace and security activities of the AU. The decision, Assembly/AU/Dec.605 (XXVII) was also adopted in July 2016 in Kigali for the revitalized Peace Fund to be endowed with $400m by Member State contributions, as part of efforts to achieve the AU’s endeavor to finance 25% of its peace and security activities.

5. In 2015, the AU Peace and Security Council, at its 502nd and 532nd meetings adopted the Common African Position on the UN Review of Peace Operations and noted the four strategic shifts identified in the HIPPO Report. Additionally, the AUPSC Communiqué adopted during its 689th meeting held on 30 May 2017 requested the UN Security Council (UNSC) to take practical steps towards the adoption of a substantive resolution that establishes the principle that AU mandated and/or authorized Peace Support Operations authorized by the UNSC should be financed through UN assessed contributions, with decisions on the financing of specific missions to be taken on a case by case basis.
III. **Progress in the implementation of AU Policy Organ decisions**

**Operationalizing the AU Peace Fund**

6. The 2016 Report of the AU High Representative (AUHR) on Financing the Union and the Peace Fund, Dr. Donald Kaberuka, proposed a revitalized Peace Fund which would be endowed with $400m through Member State contributions in order to deliver on the Assembly’s decision to finance 25% of the AU’s peace and security activities. The report set out proposals for the structure governance and management of the Fund and provided the basis for pursuing partnership with the UNSC in securing a resolution on the use of assessed contributions to finance AU mandated PSOs.

7. The AUHR's proposals were adopted by the AU Assembly in July 2016 in Kigali, Rwanda which clarified the strategic objectives and scope of the Peace Fund by establishing three thematic windows providing a clear basis for monitoring results and impact as well as ensuring that funding decisions are made in line with strategic priorities. This enabled establishment, for the first time, a dedicated budget and associated budget process for operational peace and security activities in line with identified strategic priorities as well as enhanced governance, oversight and fiduciary management arrangements for the Fund.

8. The Fund’s governance and management structure is also currently being operationalized with a Board of Trustees in place comprising representatives from the five AU regions as well strategic partners such as the European Union and the United Nations and is overseeing the full operationalization of the Fund. Professional fund management services have also been procured to manage the endowment in line with investment guidelines established by the Board and reviewed by the Committee of Ministers of Finance (F15). Following the merger of the legacy Peace Fund and the revitalized Peace Fund, and the receipt of interest earned on investments, as of 1 September 2022, Member States contributions to the Peace Fund was at $321,504,709.15 including $279,069,008.43 of Member State assessed contributions.

**Financing AU mandated or authorized PSOs and the importance of a UN Security Council Resolution**

9. There are clear doctrinal, political and operational effectiveness arguments in favor of AU PSOs, especially in contexts where UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are unable to undertake peace enforcement activities. More effective AU mandated/authorized rapid deployments will undoubtedly provide a more solid foundation for any accompanying bilateral security interventions or follow-on stabilization interventions. These arguments were well covered in the 2015 Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Support Operations (HIPPO) which stated the following:

> “There is a clear sense of a widening gap between what is being asked of UN peace operations today and what they are able to deliver. This gap can be – must be – narrowed to ensure that the Organization’s peace operations are able to respond effectively and appropriately to the challenges to come. With a current generation of conflicts proving difficult to resolve and with new ones emerging, it is essential that UN peace operations, along with regional and other partners, combine their respective comparative advantages and unite their strengths in the service of peace and security”.

10. The lessons from ongoing international responses/posture to the crises in the Sahel, the Great Lakes, Mozambique and the Central African Republic are clear illustrations of the inadequacy of the current international peace and security architecture. The financing of AU mandated or authorized peace support operations (AU PSOs) in a predictable and sustainable manner thus remains one of the most important strategic challenges facing the AU and the UN. In this regard, and without the necessary financial means, the AU has had to rely on contributions from Troop Contributing Countries.
(TCCs) and external partners to implement the 13 (PSOs) mandated and authorized by the PSC. With the exception of AMISOM, these AU PSOs transitioned to the UN, typically within 12 to 36 months, but continue to pose challenges that UN peace operations is not designed to address.

11. Within this context, failure to take the bold action required to adapt the current peace operations framework by addressing gaps and strengthening critical partnerships will only accelerate the retreat from multilateralism. As a result, strengthening the AU’s comparative advantage in responding rapidly to some of the most complex and challenging crises in Africa will strengthen the overall credibility and effectiveness of the international peace and security architecture, which current remains largely ad hoc and unpredictable.


12. In line with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and Articles 7 and 17 of the PSC Protocol, the Common African Position adopted by the AUPSC in 2015 called for an enhanced form of partnership based on (a) the two organizations’ respective authorities, competencies and capacities, and (b) the principles of burden-sharing, consultative decision-making, and a mutually-acceptable division of labor. In response, the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) stressed the need for an enhanced strategic-level AU-UN partnership. In this regard, the Panel recommended the use of UN Assessed contributions, on a case-by case basis, to support UNSC-authorized AU PSOs, to complement funding from the African Union and/or African Member States.

13. This is in line with Article 17(1) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (the PSC Protocol) which cites Chapter VIII of the UN Charter as the basis of the relationship between the AUPSC and UNSC “...which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” It is also consistent with Article 17(2) of the PSC Protocol states that: “Where necessary, recourse will be made to the UN to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the AU’s activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter”.

V. Key UN Security Council Resolutions

14. Through the adoption of UNSCR 2320 (2016) and 2378 (2017) the UNSC acknowledges the need for more support to enhance AU peace operations and encourages further dialogue between the UN and AU to achieve this. Within this context, the UNSC encourages the AU to finalize its human rights and Conduct and Discipline Compliance frameworks for AU peace support operations, enhance its financial accountability systems and report on progress, benchmarks, timelines for implementation of the AU Peace Fund as well as the details of the proposed scope of peace operations to be considered. In this regard, the UNSC expressed its readiness to consider the proposals of the AU, for future authorization of AU PSOs authorized by the UNSC and under its authority under Chapter VIII of the Charter to be partly financed through United Nations assessed contributions, on a case by case basis.

15. This approach would be more cost effective with respect to the UN peacekeeping budget, other bilateral partnerships and would ultimately deliver better security outcomes. The UNSC thus directed that such PSOs should be in compliance with relevant agreed standards and mechanisms to ensure strategic and financial oversight and accountability.
VI. Key Issues

Implementing the Human Rights Compliance Framework for AU Peace Support Operations

16. Since the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2320 (2016), the Commission continues to record significant progress in its effort to enhance the AU Compliance Framework (AUCF) for PSOs through the implementation of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) Communiqué (PSC/PR/CDLXXXIX) adopted at its 689th Meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 30 May 2017. This includes adoption of a number of additional policies, guidelines and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) as well as facilitation of processes and mechanisms at AU Commission and mission levels to ensure prevention, response and remedial actions as required. Within this context, implementation of the policies and processes are facilitated through mainstreaming of International Human Rights Law (IHRL), International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as well as applicable Conduct and Discipline (C&D) standards into the MoUs between the AU and its P/TCCs, pre-deployment training and verification exercises, the planning and implementation as well as management and liquidation processes of PSOs.

17. Importantly, the AU entered into a Tripartite Project with the EU and UN on the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework for PSOs to enhance ongoing efforts. Through this project, the AU now has additional staff and technical capacity as well as programmatic funds and support to continue enhancing and facilitating its progress on compliance and accountability, including using lessons from the UN in ensuring harmonization of its processes and mechanisms. This project serves as a demonstration of the AU’s commitment as well as an assurance that the AU and UN will continue working together to ensure that the AU Compliance Framework continues to be an iterative process and is also aligned and/or harmonised with the standards and approaches of the UN as required.

What is meant by 25%?

18. The Member State Endowment of $400m to the Peace Fund authorized through the 2016 Kigali decision represents the 25% commitment and was based on the cost of operational peace and security activities the AU was undertaking in 2016. That is 25% of the peace support operations budget (minus the cost of AMISOM, but including two medium sized missions of approximately 10,000 personnel in total) plus the cost of mediation, preventive diplomacy and institutional capacity support. The figure also provided for the creation of a Crisis Reserve Facility to enable timely responses to unforeseen crises. Details of the simulations and assumptions guiding the endowment figure can be found in the AUHR’s 2016 report. As such, the 2015 AU Assembly decisions does not mean that the AU makes a systematic commitment to financing 25% of each AU mandated or authorized PSO. The decisions mean that the AU Assembly committed to financing 25% of its overall peace and security activities, and not only peace support operations. In this regard, any forward discussions with the UNSC must reiterate and clearly state this fact to ensure there is no ambiguity.

19. Additionally, and in the same way that the UNSC will take decisions on support to AU PSOs on a case-by-case basis, the AU PSC will also decide on a case-by-case basis which of its PSOs it intends to request UN support for through assessed contributions. In this context, it should be understood that UN support through assessed contributions may not be required at times, for instances, for small AU Observer Missions.

What financing model will be used to provide UN assessed contributions to AU mandated missions?

20. The 2017 Report of the UN Secretary General, proposed five potential financing options and models to the UNSC as follows: (i) Trust Fund; (ii) Subvention; (iii) Joint Financing of a jointly developed
budget; (iv) United Nations Support Office; (v) Joint financing of a Hybrid Mission. All, but one, of these five proposed models would be governed (and managed) by the UN’s own endorsed fiduciary reporting requirements, and the UNSC is yet to pronounce itself on which financing model(s) it believes should underpin any future AU-UN partnership. Additionally, it is widely believed that the hybrid mission used to support the AU-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the UN Support Office through Logistics Support Package (LSP) currently used to support the AU Mission in Somalia (ATMIS – previously AMISOM), provides the best starting points for discussions on financing options for support to AU PSOs.

21. Whilst both financing options have their shortcomings, they can be adapted based on key experiences and lessons learned over the years. It will also be important to draw lessons from the financing models that have been used to support regional interventions such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin, the Joint Force of the Group of Five in the Sahel (G5 Sahel), and the ongoing bilateral and regional interventions in Mozambique and the East African Regional Force in Eastern DRC. In this regard, and pursuant to UNSC Presidential Statement (PRST/2022/6) on capacity building in Africa, adopted on 31 August 2022, the Report of the UN Secretary General that is due by 30 April 2023 is expected to be very clear in its proposals on the appropriate financing models through which assessed contributions could support AU PSOs - taking into account the need for enhanced categories and scales of support as well as existing lessons and evolving needs.

22. The use of UN Assessed Contributions to support AU mandated peace operations authorized by the UN Security Council is not new. It has been done in Darfur and in Somalia- yet the Council has always regarded these cases as ‘exceptions’, even though they represent an enduring requirement. If the UNSC fails to recognize them as such, we will lose the opportunity that the UN Secretary General’s report that is due by 30 April 2023 to build partnerships to support the effectiveness of these interventions in a systematic and institutionalized manner.

II. BACKGROUND


2. A significant element of the AU reform process was the need for predictable, adequate, flexible, and sustainable financing to increase the Union’s financial autonomy and reduce dependency on development partners. The 2016 Report on Predictable and Sustainable Financing argues that the AU Commission’s primary challenge is its continued dependency on partner funding. The report states that “the high levels of donor dependency have weakened ownership of the AU’s mandate”. It further stresses that “the multiplicity of donor financing channels led to the fragmentation and high transaction costs related to the numerous reporting requirements”. It is against this backdrop that in 2013 and again in 2015, the AU Assembly prioritized the mobilization of African resources to finance continental priorities.
3. The imperative to attain predictable and sustainable funding not only for the Union but also for the AU’s peace and security activities, became a priority. In January 2015, the Assembly in Addis Ababa through Decision [Assembly/AU/Dec.561(XXIV)] directed that “the Member States would fund 100% of the operational budget, 75% of the program budget and 25% of the peace support operations budget”. In June 2015, the AU Assembly in Johannesburg through Decision [Assembly/AU/Dec.578(XXV)] reiterated this commitment by the Member States.

4. In implementing Assembly Decisions, the AU PSC at its 502nd meeting on 30 April 2015, through communique [PSC/PR/COMM.2(DII)], adopted the Common African Position on the UN Review of Peace Operations. The 2015 CAP highlights that the “AU is committed to increasing the proportion of the cost of AU peace operations covered by the AU and its Member States”. The CAP further stresses that the “AU’s preferred model is the use of UN-assessed contributions to support AU-led missions, premised on the conviction that the UNSC retains the primacy for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

5. Further, the PSC at its 532nd meeting through communique [PSC/PR/BR. (DXXXII)], acknowledged the Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO) which provided a comprehensive approach to strategic and operational aspects of peace operations. In this regard, Council took due note of the four (4) strategic shifts identified in the HIPPO Report and emphasized “the need to forge partnerships with regional organizations, to exploit the comparative advantages of each organization fully”.

6. On 30 May 2017, the PSC during its 689th meeting [PSC/PR/COMM.(DCLXXXIX)] requested that “the UN Security Council (UNSC) takes practical steps towards the adoption of a substantive resolution that establishes the principle that AU mandated or authorized Peace Support Operations, authorized by the UN Security Council should be financed through UN assessed contributions, with decisions on the financing of specific missions to be taken on a case-by-case basis”.

7. More recently, African Heads of State and Government at the 16th Extraordinary Summit on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government, held in May 2022 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, underscored the need for adequate, sustainable, and predictable financing for Peace Support Operations (PSOs).

8. The African Consensus Paper is a product of the inputs from the AU Commission Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security, the Office of the High-Representative on Financing of the Union, and the AU Peace Fund, as well as the consultations with Members of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the African Representatives at the UN Security Council (A3), the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) and African think tanks and other stakeholders.

III. THE RATIONALE: THE COMPELLING AGENDA FOR FINANCING PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA

9. The rationale for this Paper is reinforced by the current state of peace and security on the Continent. Furthermore, the African Consensus Paper seeks to provide a two-pronged approach to the quest for predictable and sustainable financing. These are; African ownership which is buttressed by the revitalization and operationalization of the AU Peace Fund, while the other is the need to effectively consolidate partnerships. The African Consensus Paper thus outlines key messages from Africa, reflecting Africa’s position on predictable and sustainable financing.

10. Africa has made considerable progress in consolidating peace and security on the continent. Despite these efforts, a number of structural drivers of conflict still remain, making the continent vulnerable to intractable cycles of violent conflict and insecurity.
In the last decade, while the amount of inter-state conflicts have reduced, the number and intensity of armed conflicts between state and non-state actors have increased. This pattern of armed conflict is often rooted in a complex and interrelated set of political, economic, social, and environmental causes and more often than not, includes a combination of conventional and guerrilla warfare. Adverse consequences for civilian populations due to deliberate targeting by armed groups, humanitarian crises, the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons across regions, internal displacements, and an influx of refugees into neighboring countries and beyond are only some of the enduring manifestations of these conflicts.

Africa’s security landscape has been further challenged by the rise of transnational threats. These crises transcend national boundaries and have regional and international consequences. They include but are not limited to transnational organized crime, environmental conflicts, terrorism, and violent extremism, the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons. While these threats may not necessarily be rooted in the same historical causes, they, in some cases, display similar characteristics in terms of actors, patterns of violence, and prospects for a political settlement.

In light of this, and in response to both the emerging and traditional threats to the continental peace and security landscape, the AU employs various tools in preventing, responding, and managing these threats. AU frameworks such as the Constitutive Act and the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (PSC Protocol) have significantly contributed to strengthening the mandate and powers of the AU in relation to the maintenance of peace and security in Africa.

The AU has also established specialized institutions like the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) and the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) to strengthen the desired coordinated response to common threats to peace and security in the Continent.

The adoption of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) also provides a holistic institutional response to the peace, security, and governance challenges on the Continent. The five pillars of APSA provide for a comprehensive continental response at every stage of the conflict cycle, making it an effective mechanism, leveraging the institutional proximity to its Member States, as crucial first responders to emerging threats.

The effectiveness of the response to these challenges is directly dependent on the collective ability to deliver more robust regional and Continental action based on enhanced strategic partnerships, collaborative action, and our respective institutional comparative advantages. In this regard, the AU’s comparative advantage in responding rapidly to some of the most complex and challenging crises enhances the overall credibility and effectiveness of the international peace and security architecture.

This consensus reaffirms the declaration of the 16th Extraordinary Summit on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government held in May 2022 in Malabo which called for adequate, sustainable, and predictable financing for peace and security efforts on the Continent, particularly access to United Nations assessed contributions for AU-mandated Peace Support Operations (PSOs);
IV. THE AFRICAN POSITION


i. Context - Establishment and Purpose

18. The AU Peace Fund was established as an autonomous Fund pursuant to and in accordance with Article 21 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union adopted by the 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union on 9 July 2002. Originally created in June 1993, the purpose of the AU Peace Fund is to mobilize and pool resources from African Union Member States and other partners in order to finance the African Union’s operational peace and security activities, and to serve as a focused, predictable, sustainable, flexible, and responsive resource for the African Union’s support to eligible operational activities in the areas of conflict prevention, mediation, institutional capacity, peace support operations, and any other relevant activities in the area of peace and security in Africa.

19. The African Union Assembly, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, and the Chairperson of the AU Commission, in line with their mandates as contained in the Constitutive Act and the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, shall have the power to direct the use of the resources of the Fund, consistent with the provisions of its Instruments, including the AU Financial Rules and Regulations.

20. The Fund is part of the broader African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) that, together with the Peace and Security Council, the African Standby Force, the Military Staff Committee, the Continental Early Warning System, and the Panel of the Wise, works to support the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts, and facilitates timely and effective responses to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.


ii. Guiding Principles

22. The operation of the Peace Fund is to be guided by the principles of predictability, sustainability, transparency, flexibility, responsiveness, timeliness, effectiveness, and accountability in line with the AU Financial Rules and Regulations. Its procedures are based on core African ownership with enhanced advisory support and oversight from contributing partners. The fund is further guided by the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the Charter of the United Nations, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as set forth in Article 4 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. These principles seek to demonstrate African ownership and leadership in the implementation of its peace activities in line with the operational principle of African solutions to African problems.

iii. The Revitalized AU Peace Fund

23. The Peace Fund was revitalized in 2018 as part of the larger AU institutional reform process toward predictable and sustainable financing for peace in Africa. In the 2016 report of the AU High Representative for financing the Union, H.E. Dr. Donald Kaberuka proposed developing the revitalized
Peace Fund, which would be endowed with $400m in Member State contributions to deliver on the Assembly’s decision to finance the AU’s peace and security activities. The report also set out proposals for the structure, governance, and management of the Fund and the basis for pursuing partnership discussions with the UN Security Council (UNSC) on securing a resolution on the use of assessed contributions to finance AU-mandated Peace Support Operations in line with agreed operational windows. Hence, financial autonomy in the 2016 Report has been translated into the revitalization of the AU Peace Fund with the aim of creating single-source funding for AU peace and security activities.

24. It is pertinent to highlight that the revitalization of the AU Peace Fund was taken within the framework of more comprehensive financial reforms set out in a number of AU Assembly decisions taken between 2015 and 2017. The Revitalized Peace Fund responds to the challenges that previously hindered institutional engagement in attaining predictable and sustainable financing for peace and security activities. The targeted reforms include: financial autonomy and reduced dependency; prudent management of resources and improved accountability; timely and predictable payment of all Member State assessed contributions to the African Union based on the principles of ability to pay, solidarity, and equitable burden-sharing to avoid risk concentration.

iv. **Scope of the Peace Fund-General Regulation on Eligibility**

25. The Peace fund will finance activities that have been authorized by the PSC, within the following three windows:

**Window 1: Mediation and Preventive Diplomacy**

Eligibility for funding under this window will be based on the following functions:

a) Early warning and preventive diplomacy which aim to prevent the outbreak or escalation of violent conflict (Article 6(b) of the PSC Protocol);

b) Peace-making, including the use of good offices, mediation, conciliation, and enquiry which aims to prevent, manage or resolve intra- or inter-state conflict (Article 6(c) of the PSC Protocol).

**Window 2: Institutional Capacity**

Activities financed through this window should represent critical institutional requirements for the effective delivery of the operational activities financed through Windows 1 and 3. These could include:

a) Support to AU Liaison Offices: To strengthen their early warning, conflict prevention, mediation, and preventive diplomacy capacities;

b) Cross cutting: Support to RECs/RMs in strengthening financial and reporting systems as part of the Peace Fund Partnership.

**Window 3: Peace Support Operations**

The Fund shall finance the following types of Peace Support Operations and actions mandated or authorized by, as the case may be the Assembly or PSC and delivered by the AU, Regional Economic
Communities/Regional Mechanism (RECs/RMs) for Peace and Security; or a coalition of member states:

- Observer Missions;
- Preventive Deployment and Peace Enforcement Missions;
- Stabilization Missions following Peace Enforcement Missions;
- Missions and Security Initiatives in response to complex national and transnational security threats;
- All assessment and planning activities related to the consideration or preparation of an observer or preventive deployment mission PSO or national/transnational security initiative.

**Crisis Reserve Facility**

26. The Peace Fund also includes a CRF which is intended to enable the AU to address unforeseen crisis that occur in year. The PSC should consider proposing a CRF allocation for 2021 to respond to requests for support to countries that a confronted with particular crises, e.g. Mozambique. The recent fact-finding mission following events in Chad is a good example of an unforeseen in-year event that triggered a PSC decision to dispatch a fact-finding mission which had not been budgeted for.

27. The Commission will generate budgets and report on the use of Crisis Reserve Facility funds.

v. **AU Assembly Decision on 25% Budget**

28. It is recalled that the Assembly in January 2015 in Addis Ababa *(Assembly/AU/Dec.561(XXIV)* and reiterated in June 2015 in Johannesburg, South Africa, decided to outline its determination for Member States to work towards progressively funding:
   - 100% of the Union’s Operational budget;
   - 75% of the Union’s Program budget; and
   - 25% of the Union’s Peace support operations budget.

29. This means that the Union will endeavor to pay up to 25% of PSO budgetary component of the AU annual budget as approved by Member States to supporting priority initiatives of the AU in support of peace and security efforts on the continent. This is part of efforts of the Union to reduce its over dependence on development partners to implement the Peace and Security Agenda. This would therefore enhance African ownership for priority peace and security initiatives of the Union.

30. This implies that as the AU increases its contribution to, and starts utilizing, the AU Peace Fund, it will be able to fund some of its own priority initiatives according to the three (3) approved windows of the Peace Fund. In this regard, support may then only be required for fewer peace and security initiatives that will require burden sharing, as well as financial and logistics support by partners. Also expected is the support of the UN - as part of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and in line with Articles 24 and 52-54 of the UN Charter, as well as Article 17 of the AU PSC Protocol.

31. Within this same context, the Union will work towards ensuring that the budget target of 25% of PSO budgetary component of the AU annual budget as approved by Member States progressively covers in large part the preparation stage of AU-Led PSOs especially effective assessment, planning, and readiness for efficient mandate implementation. In addition, this will cover costs related to
strategic planning, mission-specific pre-deployment training, mission-specific technical assessments and fact-finding missions, recruitment and selection process of mission personnel, pre-deployment verification of personnel and equipment, negotiations and signing processes for the MoU between the AU and Police/Troop Contributing Countries (PTCC), negotiations and signing processes for AU-Host Country Status of Forces/Mission Agreements, negotiations and signing processes for Letters of Assists between the AU and Countries Contributing capabilities for AU-Led PSOs. Within this context, the AU will require the support of the UN, through its Assessed Contribution, to guarantee predictable, adequate, and sustainable resourcing and funding for the employment and post-employment stages of AU-Led PSOs.

**b. Institutionalizing Existing and Potential Models to Financing Peace Support Operations in Africa**

32. It is to be understood that no single organization has the required capabilities and legitimacy to respond to the peace and security needs of the African Continent effectively and sustainably. In this context, and as noted in the Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), the UN’s regional partnerships in Africa must be intensified and strengthened through mechanisms for collaboration and by optimizing the use of limited resources. This partnership should be made deeper and more collaborative, with the UN taking decisive steps to invest in and commit to the success of the African Union as a partner in addressing shared concerns. As a result, the need for stronger partnerships as well as a more resilient global and regional architecture for international peace and security is required now than ever before. This is consistent with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and takes into account Article 17(2) of the PSC Protocol which states that: “Where necessary, recourse will be made to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the African Union’s activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security, and stability in Africa.”

33. Pursuant to UNSCR 2320 (2016), the 2017 Report of the UN Secretary-General to the UN Security Council proposed five (5) potential financing models for the use of UN-assessed contributions to support AU-Led PSOs – (i) Trust Fund; (ii) Subvention; (iii) Joint Financing of a Jointly developed budget; (iv) United Nations Support Office; (v) Joint financing of a Hybrid Mission. Of the five options presented, it is widely believed that the hybrid mission used to support the AU-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and the UN Support Office through Logistics Support Package (LSP) currently used to support the AU AMISOM and now ATMIS in Somalia, provide the best starting points for discussions on financing options for support to AU mandated missions. Whilst both financing options have their shortcomings, they can be adapted based on key experiences and lessons learned over the years.

34. Within this context, and noting that the efforts of the AU are in contribution to the primary responsibility of the UN for the maintenance of international peace and security, the UN needs to consider the potential financing options through which UN-assessed contributions can be used to support AU PSOs. This takes into account that UN Assessed Contributions is the most predictable and sustainable resourcing options to support AU-Led PSOs at adequate levels. In this regard, the following options are proposed:

   i. **UN Assessed Contribution for the Hybrid Mission Model:** In line with the UN’s primary responsibility for international peace and security, access and utilization of the UN Assessed Contribution for Africa-Led PSOs should be ascertained and clearly determined. This can take the form of the AU-UN Hybrid model that can promote and further enhance the AU-UN partnership. Pursuant to Article 24(1) of the UN Charter, the UNSC will be the mandating authority of such a hybrid mission. Given the limitations of the UN in terms of its doctrine (no peace enforcement/offensive missions), the AU’s role in this context will include providing oversight and guidance for offensive operations in line with its doctrine and experience.
Building on previous experiences, such as the AU-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and also taking note of the experiences of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the DRC; dedicated integrated strategic headquarters teams will facilitate daily management, with the use of UN policies and processes aligned to current AU’s practice and context of such missions. Briefings by the Joint Special Representative and the Force Commander will also be done to the AUPSC with the outcomes transmitted to the UNSC for consideration and decisions as required.

ii. **UN Assessed Contributions through the UN Support Office Model:** A second and preferred financing option for consideration is an Enhanced UN Support Office Model through the provision of UN Logistics Support Package (LSP) financed through UN Assessed Contributions, to undertake specific tasks determined by the Security Council to support AU PSOs. The UN Support Office Model and LSP financing option has been used in Somalia since 2009 to support AMISOM (now ATMIS). This model has the benefit of clear accountability for the management of United Nations resources but requires strong coordination at all levels to ensure the overall coherence and coordination of the support. However, and noting the AMISOM/ATMIS experiences, there is a need for this financing option, to (in addition to current categories of support provided to ATMIS) incorporate support in the form of monthly stipends to the police and military components, as well as death and disability compensation, whilst the AU and its P/TCCs can cover the cost for ammunition to support the highly kinetic operations.

iii. **UN Assessed Contribution in Support of Sub-Regional Peace Support Operations:** the financing of sub-regional interventions such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin, the Joint Forces of the Group of Five in the Sahel (G5 Sahel) and the SADC Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) should benefit from the current UN Support Office Model and LSP financing option. The provision of much-needed non-lethal logistics support, through UN Assessed Contributions, to these operations can enhance their effectiveness and mandate delivery. These operations take note of the proximity and readiness of sub-regional organisations in addressing current security threats that requires more robust responses to stabilize conflict situations and prevent further escalations.

35. A careful examination of these financing options as well as their categories and scales of support will enable the consideration for UN Assessed contributions to be provided on a case-by-case basis to support UN Security Council-authorized African Union peace support operations. This is to ensure a shift from the current practice wherein current partner support to AU-Led PSOs is unpredictable, unsustainable and inadequate, which thus affects the effectiveness of mandate implementation.

### c. Strengthening Partnerships for Global Good

36. The African Consensus Paper notes that the prevailing security challenges are amplified by the lack of strategic coordination between the AU and partner institutions. As outlined in the UN Secretary-General’s report to the UNSC (S/2010/514), “the complex challenges in the world today require a revitalized and evolving interpretation of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations”. The Secretary-General asserted that “we have thus entered an era of “partnership peace-keeping”, where close cooperation among multiple multilateral actors throughout every phase of a crisis is becoming the norm — and an essential component of each organization”.

37. Partnership on peacekeeping is further necessitated by emerging challenges that require adaptive, creative, and rapid solutions. The growing threat of terrorism, for example, has seen a shift from traditional peacekeeping operations to the emergence of ad-hoc coalitions that are primarily focused on peace enforcement. The UN’s limitation in engaging in peace enforcement is, however, self-evident. Reflected in the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations Report
(HIPPO) (A/70/95-S/2015/446), the HIPPO Report argues that "there is a clear sense of a widening gap between what is being asked of UN peace operations today and what they can deliver. This gap can be must be narrowed to ensure that the organization's peace operations can respond effectively and appropriately to the challenges to come. With a current generation of conflicts proving difficult to resolve and with new ones emerging, it is essential that UN peace operations, along with regional and other partners, combine their respective comparative advantages and unite their strengths in the service of peace and security".

38. Furthermore, Article 17(1) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council cites Chapter VIII of the UN Charter as the basis of its relationship with the UN. The PSC Protocol directs the PSC to cooperate with the UNSC, "...which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." In direct reference to burden-sharing, Article 17(2) of the PSC Protocol states that: "Where necessary, recourse will be made to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the African Union’s activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter”.

39. Ultimately, the need for predictable and sustainable financing in responding to the evolving challenges highlighted is underpinned by the principles of complementarity and subsidiarity; comparative advantage and political legitimacy; burden sharing and division of labour among institutions are also key.

40. Therefore, the AU argues that its peace support operations are a global good undertaken on behalf of the UN Security Council which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Accordingly, in instances where the UN authorizes the AU to undertake a peace support operation in lieu of the UN, the UN should provide the means to undertake such missions.

d. Interface Between Peace Enforcement, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding

41. Most importantly, the AU seeks to construct, nurture and maintain a Common Partnership Front for building integrated African Peace Enforcement Operational Capabilities in the context of the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the Operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF) and in global adherence to the Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

42. Driven by the prevailing security situation in Africa where peace agreements are rare with militant non-state armed groups/terrorists and implementation is complex or elusive, the extant global peacekeeping approach by the international community demands a total overhaul and recalibration. This position is in furtherance of the Malabo Declaration arising from the 16th Session of the AU Extraordinary Assembly of Heads of State and Government on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government, which underscored robust response, deepening democracy and collective security.

43. The very nature, structure, and scope of peacekeeping as presently constituted is outdated and grossly inadequate to be impactful in tackling the myriad of security challenges facing Africa. The consensus is that African collective security interests are not fully served by the sole preoccupation with peacekeeping operations. While recognizing that combat missions alone may not yield the desired stabilization and peace restoration goals, direct peace enforcement operations against non-state armed groups will be more effective in promoting peace and stability on the continent.

44. To this effect, the compelling need is for stronger partnership engagements by the AU and principal partner countries and institutions towards the due recognition of the paramountcy of the
benefits of a holistic interface between peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding.

45. However, while simultaneously canvassing to engage in kinetic operations, the AU supports an inclusive whole-of-society approach and reversing the governance deficits to address the preponderance of insecurity in the African continent. Convincingly, the AU promotes the essence of its PSOs to mobilize funding support that is predictable, flexible adequate and sustainable, to accomplish Peace Enforcement and make the prospects for enduring peace more realistic.

   **e. African Union Efforts in Upholding Human Rights Compliance in Peace Support Operations:**

46. The Commission continues to record significant progress in its effort to enhance the AU Compliance Framework (AUCF) for PSOs through implementation of the PSC Communiqué (PSC/PR/CDLXXXIX) adopted at its 689th Meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 30 May 2017. This includes adoption of the AU Policy on Conduct and Discipline for PSOs and the AU Policy on the Prevention and Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse for PSOs. Additionally, compliance and accountability is fully mainstreamed into the AU Doctrine on PSOs (2021). The Policy on Child Protection in AU PSOs as well as the Policy on Mainstreaming Child Protection into APSA were also adopted by the 14th meeting of the Specialised Technical Committee on Defence Safety and Security (STCDSS) on 12 May 2022. Furthermore, the Commission has finalized for adoption by the STCDSS the revised draft AU Guidelines for the Protection of Civilians, AU Policy on the Selection and Screening of Personnel for PSO, AU Strategic Framework for Compliance and Accountability.

47. Efforts to ensure adherence to International Human Rights Law (IHRL), International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as well as applicable Conduct and Discipline (C&D) also continues to be facilitated. This includes through mainstreaming these international norms, standards and obligations into AU decisions, policies and processes for the planning implementation, management, and liquidation of PSOs. Within this context, the Commission has been facilitating series of Training of Trainers, Pre-Deployment and in-mission training on the Compliance and Accountability curriculum for personnel of AU-mandated and authorized PSOs, P/TCCs and RECs/RMs to ensure replication of required training programmes. The Commission has also mainstreamed compliance and accountability into its Pre-Deployment Verification processes for ATMIS P/TCCs as well as in the MoU between the AU and its P/TCCs for ATMIS. All these efforts are parts of steps taken in line with provisions of UNSCR 2320 (2016) and 2378 (2017) on the continuous enhancement of the AUCF.

48. Importantly, in February 2021 the AU entered into a Tripartite Project with the EU and UN on the AU Compliance and Accountability Framework for PSOs to enhance ongoing efforts to ensure that all its PSOs are planned, conducted and managed in compliance with IHL, IHRL, as well as applicable standards of conduct and discipline. Through this project, the AU now has additional staff and technical capacity, as well as programmatic funds and support to continue enhancing and facilitating its progress on compliance and accountability, including using lessons from the UN in ensuring harmonization of its processes and mechanisms. Within this context, the AU will continue to enhance its efforts to more effectively facilitate preventive, response and remedial actions pursuant to its commitments with international norms and standards.

**V. LESSONS LEARNED FROM PREVIOUS ENGAGEMENTS WITH KEY STAKEHOLDERS**

49. The AU’s engagement in accessing UN Assessed Contributions for AU PSOs saw successive negotiations with the UN Security Council. The three phases of negotiations with the UNSC took place between 2016 and 2019 and brought to light various lessons.
50. **Common African Position on Predictable and Sustainable Financing:** The need for coherence and coordination among the African block is a crucial pillar in attaining a UNSC resolution that speaks to Africa’s wants. The insufficient coordination has largely been attributed to the lack of a clear African position on predictable and sustainable financing.

51. **Coordination and Policy Coherence:** While the various UN and AU normative frameworks buttress the African case for predictable and sustainable financing, the lack of sufficient coordination between the AU and the UN might prove to be challenging to this quest. The adoption of the UNSCR 2320 (*S/RES/ 2320(2016)* adopted in November 2016, and subsequently, UNSCR 2378 (*S/RES/2378 (2017)* adopted in September 2017, have laid the foundation for a coordinated approach. The 2017 UN–AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security has also provided additional coordination mechanisms between the two institutions.

52. **Strategic and Partnership-based Dialogue:** The shift in political landscape has continued to be a challenge to this discussion. The shrinking multilateral space has significantly short-changed the scope and depth of the discussion around financing. This was made evident by the reduction in funding for key organizations including the UN. Despite these challenges, the reality of the security landscape continues to demand a robust partnership, with provisions for rapid response.

53. **African Ownership:** The establishment of the Revitalized Peace Fund indicates that Africa is taking ownership of its agenda, especially in relation to mediation and preventive diplomacy. The AU continues to work towards making the Peace Fund the single source of funding for the AU Peace and Security activities. Therefore, partners of Africa need to support African-led solutions in the form of African decision-making and African priorities. African normative instruments pronounced through the various legal decision-making bodies of the AU will continue to serve as the reference point for African priorities.

54. **Strategic Partnerships:** Distilling from the 2015 CAP, this African Consensus Paper reaffirms Africa’s belief in strategic and mutually beneficial cooperation. While the concept of collective security outlined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter reiterates the primacy of the UNSC in the maintenance of international security, the AU underscores that, when it intervenes in conflict and crises on the continent, it is doing so on behalf of the UNSC. Thus, in the case of AU-led missions that the UNSC authorizes, the UN has a duty to provide UN Assessed Contributions.

55. **Complementarity and Subsidiarity:** The African Consensus Paper reaffirms that Regional and sub-regional entities like the AU and its Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) have continued to demonstrate a clear comparative advantage as first responders with the political will to undertake offensive operations in high-risk environments. Support for these regional efforts needs to be bolstered through the provision of sustainable and predictable financing, rather than voluntary and ad-hoc support mechanisms that have been used in the past.

56. **Collective Response to Emerging Crises:** As the nature of global peace and security threats continue to evolve, the international peace and security architecture is increasingly confronted with emerging and more complex transnational threats. Against this backdrop, this African Consensus Paper highlights that the shift in international security landscape makes genuine and systemic partnerships that support effective regional responses to global security threats a strategic and compelling necessity. Therefore, a well-funded African peace and security architecture is not simply an African priority, but a matter of international concern.

57. As was reiterated at the Inaugural Lessons Learned Forum on AU Peace Support Operations and the African Standby Force, held from 1 to 3 November 2022 in Abuja, Nigeria, enhanced relations between the AU and RECs/RMs, as well as increased strategic partnerships between the AU and UN is
critical and in the interest of all, including ensuring a workable and practical roadmap to achieve predictable, adequate and sustainable funding for Africa-led PSOs to guarantee that resources fully match the mandates of PSOs.

VI. CONCLUSION

58. This African Consensus Paper lays the foundation for the Member States and international development partners to appreciate and develop a common understanding of the importance of securing predictable and sustainable funding for AU peace support operations toward contributing to silencing the guns in Africa, in line with the AU Agenda 2063, particularly aspirations 3 and 4, promoting good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law aspiration, as well as a peaceful and secure Africa. The paper is also in line with goal 16 of the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals towards promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, providing access to justice for all, and building effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions at all levels.

59. The AU Member States remain committed to consolidating AU ownership of its peace and security activities in general. Although, a revitalized Peace Fund is essential to ensuring predictable and sustainable financing towards a peaceful and secure continent, it would, however, be inadequate to rely solely on this facility, particularly, taking into consideration emerging peace and security challenges. Furthermore, while the speedy operationalization of the Peace Fund is critical, complementary UN-assessed contributions for AU-led PSOs and committed partner funding, remain key to ensuring this predictability, adequacy and sustainability of financing. This African Consensus Paper would therefore serve as a guide to the African Members in the UN Security Council, and other relevant stakeholders, as they continue to advocate and promote Africa’s position on financing PSOs through access to UN-Assessed contribution.
ANNEX I: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

1. **Policy Context and Legal Basis**

1. Which legal framework(s) and policy instruments guide the establishment and operations of the AU Peace Fund?

The AUPF is an autonomous fund, established in 1993 by the then OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The legal basis of the AUPF is Article 21 of the PSC Protocol. Other AU normative and structural frameworks guiding the establishment and operations of the AUPF include the Instrument relating to the AUPF, policy decisions including those by the AU Assembly on the financing of the Union, decisions of the PSC, the Report on Predictable and Sustainable Financing by the High-Representative for the Peace Fund and the 2015 Common African Position (2015 CAP) on the UN Review of Peace Support Operations (PSOs).

2. Is the Fund a once-off financing mechanism?

No, the AUPF is not a once-off financing mechanism. The AUPF will remain in place until when the Assembly decides otherwise.

3. What is the Fund expected to be used for?

It is intended to mobilize resources to finance the AU’s operational peace and security activities based on three windows:

   (a) Window 1: Mediation and Preventive Diplomacy;
   (b) Window 2: Institutional Capacity; and
   (c) Window 3: Peace Support Operations.

4. Will the Fund better serve the aspirations of the AU Agenda 2063 and the implementation of APSA and AGA?

Yes. The predictability and sustainability will ensure the strategic priorities of the Continent will contribute to a peaceful and prosperous Africa as contained in Agenda 2063, particularly the flagship programme of Silencing the Guns.

5. What principles guide the operations of the Fund? How does the Fund ensure transparency and accountability?

According to the Instrument Relating to the AUPF, operations of the AUPF are guided by the following principles: predictability, sustainability, transparency, flexibility, responsiveness, timeliness, effectiveness and accountability.

6. Who are the beneficiaries of the Peace Fund?

The beneficiaries of the Peace Fund are:

   (a) AU Member States;
   (b) RECs/ RMs; and
   (c) AU stakeholders.
II. Governance and Management Structures- Roles and Responsibilities

1. How is the Fund governed?

The structure of the Fund reflects international best practice in terms of Fund governance arrangements. It has been adapted to reflect the fact that the African Union is an inter-governmental organization. The governance structure of the AUPF has a Board of Trustees, an Executive Management Committee, an Independent Evaluation Panel and a Secretariat.

2. What are the roles and responsibilities of the governance and management structures of the Peace Fund?

- The Board of Trustees – plays an oversight and monitoring role;
- The Executive Management Committee – provides executive management and oversight of the Fund, and directs its activities;
- The Independent Evaluation Panel – provides periodic reviews and evaluations on the use, impact, speed and appropriateness of the Peace Fund activities. It also examines performance and financial reports on its use in order to ensure accountability;
- The Fund Manager(s) – ensure fund administration, investment, accounting and reporting on behalf of the Peace Fund Secretariat;
- Peace Fund Secretariat – a structure within the Commission, and reporting to the Chairperson of the Commission. It is responsible for the overall management and administration of the Peace Fund.

3. How was the membership of the AUPF Board of Trustees determined?

The Board is comprised of five African eminent persons selected by the Chairperson of the AU Commission with due consideration to gender balance and regional representation and includes two non-African strategic partners (UN and EU).

4. What is the role of the AU F15 in the AUPF?

The Committee of Fifteen Finance Ministers (F15) participates in the review and endorsement of the draft budget proposals for consideration by the relevant AU Policy Organs.

5. What is the role being played by the AUC Chairperson’s High Representative on sustainable financing of the Union/Peace Fund?

The High Representative’s role is to work with the Commission on the full operationalization of the AU Peace Fund and to support resource mobilization efforts and the development of strategic partnerships.

6. What is the statutory role of the AUPSC?

The PSC determines strategic priority peace and security activities that will fall within the scope of the AUPF in line with the three windows.
III. Resourcing / Contributions to the Fund

1. Is the AUPF only resourced by AU MS?

No. The AUPF is resourced through Member-State assessed contributions. Additional voluntary contributions from Member States are also possible. The Fund also accepts contributions from other sources including development partners, the private sector, civil society, donations from individuals and revenue from the investment of the Peace Fund.

2. What role do development partners and international financial institutions play in contributing to the Fund?

Development partners and international financial institutions are expected to make significant contributions to the Fund.

IV. Peace Fund Budget process

1. Do the new AU Financial Rules and Regulations (FRR) apply to the Peace Fund?

The Peace Fund’s budget is guided by the regular AU budget approval process. The financial resources of the Peace Fund shall also be utilized in accordance with appropriations made in the Budget of the AU. These processes are governed by the AU Financial Rules and Regulations which has made Specific provisions for the management of and reporting on Peace Fund resources.

2. What is the role of the AU policy organs in the budget process of the PF?

No expenses shall be charged to the Peace Fund without prior approval of AU Policy Organs.

3. Should the AU start utilizing the Fund now or wait until the threshold/target of USD 400m is attained?

Pilot utilization of the Fund is necessary even when the threshold has not been realized. This is because of the increasing transnational emerging security threats that the Continent is facing. This necessitates timely and robust response by Member States.

V. Financials of the Fund

1. Will the Fund be dissolved after it reaches the endowment target of USD 400m?

No. The fund will not be dissolved upon reaching the endowment target of USD 400m. Member States will only be assessed for the amount required to replenish the fund to its full level.

2. Does the Fund yield interest? If yes, do we have the accrued interest and principal as part of the Fund?

Yes. The accrued interest and the principal amount are part of the fund as per AU Assembly Decision 605 and Article 36.1 (a) of AU Financial Rules.

3. What’s the difference between the Revitalized AUPF and the defunct Peace Fund tagged the Legacy Fund?

The Legacy Peace Fund has been merged with the Revitalized Peace Fund as per Executive Council Decision 1057. There is only one African Union Peace Fund.
VI. **Functioning of the Fund**

1. **Is the Fund mandated to finance peace enforcement operations or peacekeeping on the African continent?**

   The AUPF is not a peace keeping facility. It is a Fund focused on the three windows including peace support operations with options for peace enforcement.

2. **Can the Fund be used to subsidize UN Peacekeeping missions’ budget?**

   No. The Fund shall finance the actions mandated or authorized by the AU Assembly, the PSC, RECs/RMs or a coalition of Member States.

3. **Can the Fund support peace projects outside the mandated 3 windows?**

   No. However, the Board of Trustees has been given the mandate to consider the need for additional windows and facilities. The Board of Trustees has also been entrusted with the authority to add, modify and remove support windows and facilities, as appropriate and in accordance with the Instrument Relating to the AUPF.

VII. **International linkages to the Fund**

1. **Does the AUPF symbolize African ownership and leadership as well as self-reliance in AU peace domain?**

   Yes. The procedures for the Peace Fund are based on core African ownership with enhanced advisory support and oversight from contributing partners. The utilization of the Peace Fund will demonstrate African ownership and leadership in the implementation of its peace activities in line with the principle of African solutions to African problems.

2. **Will the Fund impact positively in reducing over-dependence on development partners for AU PSOs?**

   The Fund will promote financial autonomy for the AU towards reducing dependency on partners as it is expected to contribute to the provision of timely, predictable and sustainable financing of AU peace activities.

3. **Are some members of the UNSC considering a resolution for the AU through its Peace Fund to contribute 25% to all peace operations in Africa?**

   No, the discussions in the UN Security Council are focused on the financing of AU mandated and authorized peace support operations. The AU Peace Fund is not intended to finance United Nations Peace support operations in Africa. Such Operations are financed by UN member state assessed contributions. The Assembly and PSC, on the Common African Position on the UN Review of Peace Operations of 2015, highlights that the “AU is committed to increasing the proportion of the cost of AU peace operations covered by the AU and its Member States”.

4. **Is the totality of the resources in the Fund (at current or full capacity of USD 400m) adequate to impact Africa’s peace aspirations as envisaged in Silencing the guns by 2030?**

   The $400m endowment peace fund is a significant contribution, but not adequate to silence the guns by 2030. Strategic partnership in support of the AU Peace Fund and its activities will be pursued.
ANNEX II: Explanatory Note on 3 Windows of the Peace Fund

The following eligibility criteria were adopted by the PSC during its 689th Meeting on 30 May 2017.

Window 1: Mediation and Preventive Diplomacy

Eligibility for funding under this window will be based on the following functions:

a) Early warning and preventive diplomacy which aim to prevent the outbreak or escalation of violent conflict (Article 6(b) of the PSC Protocol);

b) Peace-making, including the use of good offices, mediation, conciliation, and enquiry which aims to prevent, manage or resolve intra- or inter-state conflict (Article 6(c) of the PSC Protocol.

Window 2: Institutional Capacity

Activities financed through this window should represent critical institutional requirements for the effective delivery of the operational activities financed through Windows 1 and 3.

These could include:

a) Support to AU Liaison Offices: To strengthen their early warning, conflict prevention, mediation, and preventive diplomacy capacities;

b) Establish better financial rules, procedures and fiduciary standards to support AU PSOs.

   • The AU’s experience in Peace Support Operations has demonstrated the inadequacy of its existing administrative and financial procedures (Disbursement process, recruitment, procurement, logistics and supply chain etc), in force until now, with the complex requirements of PSOs and the need for greater flexibility, while ensuring accountability at different levels. The current procedures in place in the AU only allow a limited freedom of action to respond to crises situations in a timely manner, in constant and rapidly evolving and difficult operational environments.

c) Enhancing AU capacities in assessment and mission planning.

   • The AU will enhance its own human resources in the areas of planning, management and accountability as these are critical requirements in the processes for mandating and deploying PSOs.

NB: This window is not to be viewed as a substitute for financing routine institutional activities that should ordinarily be financed out of the AU’s Regular Operating or Programme Budget.

Window 3: Peace Support Operations

The Peace Support Operations window shall finance the following types of peace support operations and actions mandated or authorized by a competent AU policy Organ and delivered by the AU, RECs/RMs or a coalition of member states:

- Observer Missions
- Preventive Deployment and Peace Enforcement Missions
- Stabilization Missions following Peace Enforcement Missions
- Missions and Security Initiatives in response to complex national and transnational security threats

While the full financing of small-scale observer missions through the AU Peace Fund may be possible, the Fund is **not intended to fully finance certain categories of AU-led PSOs**, e.g. peace enforcement and stabilization missions. Improving the quality and effectiveness of AU partnerships, especially with the United Nations, in support of AU PSOs is therefore a top priority.

With the resources available, and following the approval of specific mission budgets by a competent AU Organ, the AU will focus on enhancing critical capacities that maintain its comparative advantage as ‘first responder’.

All assessment and planning activities related to the consideration or preparation of an observer or preventive deployment mission, peace support operation or national/transnational security initiative will be financed by the Peace Fund.