

**Security Council**

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Letter dated 16 July 2007 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 1698 (2006), I have the honour to submit herewith the report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

I would appreciate it if the present letter, together with its enclosure, were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Jorge **Voto-Bernales**
Chairman



Letter dated 13 June 2007 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004)

The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Group, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1698 (2006).

(Signed) Ibra Déguène **Ka**
Chairman

(Signed) Enrico **Carisch**

(Signed) Abdoulaye **Cissoko**

(Signed) David **Huxford**

Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1698 (2006)

[Original: English/French]

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I. Introduction

1. The Security Council, by its resolution 1493 (2003), imposed an arms embargo on the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular on the Ituri district and the two provinces of North and South Kivu. By its resolution 1596 (2005), the Council extended the embargo to the entire country, clarified the exemptions to the embargo, strengthened the monitoring mechanism and decided that all governments in the region, especially those of neighbouring States, should ensure that the measures set forth in the resolutions were implemented.

2. The mandate of the Group of Experts, reiterated by the Security Council in resolution 1698 (2006), encompasses investigations of the illicit transfer of embargoed materials, of assistance rendered in connection with such violations, including that related to cross-border movements, civil aviation and financial activities, of violations of international civil aviation standards, as well as of individuals who recruit or use children in violation of international law and leaders of armed groups who prevent their combatants from disarming.

3. The Council, by the same resolution, requested the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible with a view to extending the mandate of the Group of Experts for a period expiring on 31 July 2007 and requested the Group to provide regular updates on its work to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereafter referred to as the Committee). Interim reports were presented to the Committee by the Chairman of the Group in New York on 24 January 2007 (see S/2007/40) and on 2 May 2007. By paragraph 4 of resolution 1698 (2006), the Security Council also requested the Group to report to the Council in writing, through the Committee, by 10 July 2007.

4. By letters addressed to the President of the Security Council dated 7 August 2006 (S/2006/624) and 28 August 2006 (S/2006/693), the Secretary-General informed the Council of the reappointment of the members of the Group of Experts. Chaired by Ibra Déguène Ka (Senegal), the Group was composed of: Enrico Carisch (Switzerland, finance expert), Abdoulaye Cissoko (Mali, aviation expert), David Huxford (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, arms trafficking expert) and Jean Luc Gallet (France, customs and immigration expert).

5. By a letter dated 15 December 2006 (S/2006/984), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of the appointment of the current membership of the Group of Experts. Chaired by Ibra Déguène Ka (Senegal), the Group at present is composed of Enrico Carisch (Switzerland, finance expert), Abdoulaye Cissoko (Mali, aviation expert) and David Huxford (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, arms trafficking expert).

6. During its current mandate, the Group was assisted by two consultants, Alcinda Honwana (in November 2006) and Caty Clement (from May to July 2007), and by Manuel Bressan, Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Secretariat.

7. The Group of Experts wishes to express its thanks, in particular, to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, William Lacy Swing, and the staff of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) for their support and continued collaboration. The Group also expresses its thanks to the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) for the

facilities it offered the Group during its stay in Bujumbura and to the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) for the assistance it provided in southern Sudan.

II. Methodology

8. The Group of Experts had nine months at its disposal for field investigations before preparing its final report and three weeks for investigations following the submission of the draft final report.

9. Within the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Group met with governmental authorities and institutions and pursued its enquiries in the field. The Group has visited and analysed the security situation in many of the areas in which activities by illegal armed groups have been reported. It conducted as many missions to the Ituri district and Province Orientale, North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema as were possible within logistical and security constraints. In the west of the country, the Group investigated the situation in Kinshasa and Gbadolite.

10. Throughout its work, the Group concentrated on conducting investigations into areas in which armed groups were active, integrating all aspects of the relevant mandates in a coordinated manner. Thanks to the length of its mandate, the Group had the opportunity to conduct further missions in the field, with the assistance of MONUC.

11. In the immediate region, the Group met with authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya and southern Sudan.

12. At the international level, the Group met with representatives of the Governments of Belgium, France, Germany, South Africa, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

13. Notes verbales were sent in advance to the countries to be visited by the Group, together with a list of the information requested. A list of entities and organizations contacted by the Group is contained in annex I to the present report.

III. Context

14. The Group of Experts began its work on 22 August 2006. It held a preparatory meeting in Paris from 4 to 7 September 2006 and arrived in Kinshasa on 23 September 2006, the day after the issuance of the statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2006/40), in which the Council deplored the violence that had erupted in Kinshasa during the period from 20 to 22 August 2006 and invited the Committee to examine the situation in that city, if appropriate, in the context of the arms embargo.

15. The Group's arrival coincided with the signing by representatives of the camps of the two candidates (Joseph Kabila and Jean Pierre Bemba) of an *acte d'engagement*, by which they undertook not to resort to the use of arms prior to or following the second round of the presidential election and the provincial elections scheduled for 29 October 2006. The two candidates also declared Kinshasa a weapon-free city.

16. The publication on 15 November 2006 of the provisional results of the second round of the presidential election confirmed the victory of President Kabila.

17. Following the discussion by the Committee on 24 January 2007 of the interim report (see S/2007/40), the Group of Experts resumed its investigations in the field, arriving in Kinshasa one day after violence had erupted in the province of Bas-Congo between the Congolese security services and the movement Bundu dia Kongo, resulting in many casualties.

18. On 5 February 2007, the list of the new Congolese Government, headed by Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga, was officially announced and, on 24 February 2007, its programme adopted by the National Assembly. With the new institutions now in place, the Group of Experts has within the authorities of Government interlocutors who are fully responsible for the implementation of the sanctions regime.

19. On 22 March 2007, disagreements concerning the size of the *Détachement de protection présidentielle* of former Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba erupted in armed confrontation in Kinshasa. The conflict resulted in many casualties, especially among civilians. The intervention of MONUC helped to avoid further casualties.

20. Across the whole country, insecurity created by the remaining domestic and foreign armed groups, the incomplete integration process, the misconduct of the armed forces, police and security services, the continued weakness of State authority in the eastern part of the country and, in particular, the presence of armed groups, some of which still operate in areas in which there is a dense concentration of natural resources, represent serious threats to physical and economic security.

21. The situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that the sanctions regime continues to address is characterized by continuing violence, insecurity, and instability in both the east and the capital. The road to peace in the country is punctuated by frequent incidents of deadly violence, as witnessed in Kinshasa in August and October 2006 and again in March 2007, Sake in November 2006, Bas-Congo in January 2007 and Kanyola in May 2007 — a list that is not exhaustive. Ongoing deficiencies and delays in the integration process of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) result in a lack of State authority to secure the territory. The combination of these elements threatens peace and security not only in the Democratic Republic of the Congo but in the region as a whole.

IV. Cooperation between Member States and the Group of Experts

22. The Group of Experts has made constant efforts to maintain an open dialogue and strengthen its cooperation with the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and with those of the neighbouring countries.

23. During the first part of the Group's mandate, cooperation with the Government was not at the level expected by the Group owing to the electoral period. A new focal point, charged with facilitating cooperation with the Group, was subsequently appointed. In spite of its established channels of communication with the

authorities, the Group notes that all sanctioned individuals and entities on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo continue their activities with impunity despite Security Council sanctions. The Government has yet to respond to the requests for updated information concerning the implementation of targeted sanctions. Requests transmitted to the Government concerning the security situation and arms flows in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remain unanswered.

24. In connection with paragraph 20 of Security Council resolution 1698 (2006), the Group has noted that cooperation with Uganda has improved consistently, notably the meeting that President Yoweri Museveni accorded the Chairman of the Group, the visit to the facilities of Luwero Industries in Nakasongola, Uganda, on 23 February 2007, and the appointment of a focal point in the person of the late Brigadier Noble Mayombo.

25. Requests for information regarding the transit of precious and semi-precious materials and stones from the Democratic Republic of the Congo have been addressed to Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and the United Republic of Tanzania. No information has been provided in response to those requests.

26. The Group has requested information on civil aviation from Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Moldova, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone and Ukraine. While Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Moldova and Sierra Leone have not conveyed any information to the Group, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe and Ukraine have provided partial responses. Ukraine has not yet provided the serial numbers and identities of the proprietors of certain Antonov airplanes, São Tomé and Príncipe has not responded to the request for a visit by the Group, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo has yet to provide registration data on all airplanes currently operating within its territory.

27. The Group frequently contacts manufacturers and suppliers of arms and ammunition to request the information needed to identify the point of diversion of material from the licit to the illicit supply chain. Requests made include those for technical details and tracing information. Of the 17 requests transmitted by the Group during its current mandate, only the United States has responded.

28. The participation of the Congolese authorities in monitoring flows of embargoed material would be of much assistance to the Group of Experts. Requests for assistance concerning embargoed material captured by or transferred to FARDC, as well as access to FARDC personnel for interviews, have been conveyed to the Congolese authorities but there has been no response.

29. There are also outstanding requests for information addressed to the Governments of Angola and Belgium that date back to previous mandates of the Group. These include the absence of an official response to a request conveyed in a number of e-mails and following meetings held with the Belgian authorities from 22 to 24 May 2006 in connection with the attempted sale of pyrochlor by individuals based in and operating from Belgium. A request to the Government of Angola concerning a transfer of military material, cited in a previous report of the Group (see S/2006/525), also remains unanswered.

V. Cooperation between the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Group of Experts

30. The Group of Experts is grateful to MONUC for the support received during its current mandate. Nonetheless, the Group experienced some difficulties with respect to information-sharing as part of its collaboration with the Mission.

31. At the request of the Group, two focal points have been appointed within MONUC. The secretariat, in cooperation with the Group, has prepared a background paper which is being conveyed to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and MONUC, describing the mandate of the Group and its information needs vis-à-vis the Mission.

VI. Summary of investigations

32. The Group of Experts has focused on the main means of transferring arms in violation of the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council in resolutions 1493 (2003), 1596 (2005) and 1698 (2006). These include the smuggling, illicit internal circulation and stockpiling of embargoed material and the diversion of items from legitimate stocks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to illicit recipients. The Group has also paid attention to transfers of items made under the exemption to the arms embargo that have failed to meet the required reporting standards.

33. Although much has been done to monitor such transfers, the Group is aware that the arms embargo could be more effectively monitored if the Group were to receive assistance and input on a more regular basis from the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and if there were a more coordinated system of information-gathering and analysis concerning the embargoed material found in the country.

34. The Group of Experts was tasked to assist the Committee in the identification of individuals found to be violating international laws concerning children in armed conflict. During the course of its work, the Group has found the violation of these laws by armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to be endemic.

35. The Group has continued its investigations to identify political and military leaders who impede the disarmament and the voluntary repatriation or resettlement of combatants (resolution 1649 (2005), para. 2). Foreign armed groups operating in Ituri and the Kivus continue to violate this resolution.

36. Sanctions imposed by the Security Council in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are rarely enforced and thus have rarely had the intended coercive effect. Few sanctioned individuals and entities have demonstrably modified their activities as a consequence of the original listing of November 2005. As a result, investigative requests made by the Group are often ignored because sanctions are frequently perceived to be ineffective.

37. The Group can confirm that the most profitable financing source for armed groups remains the exploitation, trade and transportation of natural resources. The tightly intermingled economic interests of illegal armed groups with those of legitimate businesses and of local populations do not allow a clear demarcation to

be made between embargo violators and legitimate actors. All supply chains from areas controlled by armed groups are compromised.

38. With regard to civil aviation, the Group of Experts continued its investigations in order to identify the illicit transport of arms and ammunition and monitor airports and aircraft operation. The Group of Experts has drawn up a list of aircraft found in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and their status.

39. The Group recognizes that it is the responsibility of the elected and fully empowered Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to improve its weak control of embargoed materials, customs, immigration and civil aviation operations, and its oversight of natural resources and banking.

40. The authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo can no longer attribute lack of capacity to their inability to manage properly the needs of the country. There is an abundance of potential international assistance that includes advice and funding for technical and administrative improvements. It is for the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to request this assistance. The Government is now in a strategic position to choose between addressing the country's ills in an effective manner or allowing violence, corruption and the absence of rule of law to continue to hinder the country and the development of its population.

VII. Province Orientale and Ituri district

A. Armed groups

41. The Front des nationalistes et intégrationnistes (FNI), under the leadership of Peter Karim and his fellow officers, has consistently recruited and used children within its ranks. The majority of children identified are in their early teenage years. Peter Karim has now attained the rank of Colonel in FARDC along with a number of other FNI leaders and, to date, no action has been taken by FARDC against these officers for their violations of both domestic and international law.

42. Arms and ammunition stocks recovered from FNI show close similarities with embargoed items recovered from other Ituri armed groups. Two groups of items recovered from FNI are distinguishable for their type and age. Assistance has been requested from the manufacturers and suppliers of these embargoed items in order to trace the chain of ownership and the point of diversion.

43. There is a disparity between the number of former combatants, information gathered through interviews with former FNI combatants and the number of arms and amount of ammunition handed in during the disarmament processes. Some embargoed items previously under the control of FNI appear to remain outside the disarmament process.

44. The Group of Experts has also interviewed former combatants from the Front de résistance patriotique en Ituri (FRPI) and gained access to some recovered arms and ammunition. Under the leadership of "Cobra" Matata and his fellow officers, this group has continued to use children within its ranks.

45. At the time of writing, the apparent reluctance of FRPI to disarm fully seems to be linked to demands that its officers be assured of positions in FARDC similar to

those given to members of the Mouvement révolutionnaire congolais (MRC) and FNI.

46. The Group of Experts has interviewed former MRC combatants and gained access to arms and ammunition recovered from this group. Under the leadership of Matthieu Cui Ngudjolo and his fellow officers, the group has used children in violation of international law.

47. Attempts by the leadership of MRC to disassociate itself from the children within its ranks by expelling them prior to integration do not reduce the leaders' culpability. A number of the former MRC leaders now occupy officer positions in FARDC in accordance with arrêté ministériel MDNDAC/CAB/016/2006 of 2 October 2006.

48. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) re-entered the Democratic Republic of the Congo late in 2005 from southern Sudan and took up positions in the north-west of Garamba National Park. LRA positions remain in the Azande hunting domain in the west of the Park.

49. A number of meetings and interviews have been held with LRA delegations on Congolese soil. Although the total number of LRA forces on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is unknown, the presence of the forces and their leaders is confirmed.

50. Unconfirmed reports have been received of LRA having been resupplied on the Congolese territory. Supplies of arms and related materiel or technical training and assistance, including financial assistance, to this foreign armed group would be in violation of the arms embargo.

B. The situation of civil aviation in Province Orientale of the Ituri district

51. On its arrival in Kisangani, Isiro and Bunia, the Group of Experts noted the presence of MONUC military observers at the airports and discovered that certain airlines were carrying freight and passengers in the same compartment in violation of Congolese regulations.

52. The Isiro airport — an airport where there are no customs authorities — is used by Air Navette for direct flights to Entebbe.

53. The Bunia airport, the entry and departure point for the Democratic Republic of the Congo designated in the memorandum of understanding between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is a veritable gateway to the goldmines of Mongwalu and Doko.

Recommendation

54. Flights by all airlines, whether national or international, that are found to be violating regulations must be suspended until the airlines comply with operating standards.

VIII. The Kivus

A. South Kivu and border with Maniema

1. Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda-Forces combattantes abacunguzi

55. As at 1 June 2007, the MONUC disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement or repatriation process has repatriated 5,230 Rwandan combatants and 4,947 of their dependants. The majority of the 10,177 repatriations have been individuals associated with the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda-Forces combattantes abacunguzi (FDLR-FOCA). MONUC estimates that only around 6,000 FDLR-FOCA combatants remain in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

56. Former combatants cite a continued policy within FDLR-FOCA of discouraging or prohibiting the MONUC process. Deserters frequently recount how they feared leaving because of retribution by their leadership if caught. FDLR-FOCA leaders repeatedly assert that all members who return to Rwanda are either killed or imprisoned. High-ranking members of the FDLR-FOCA leadership have repeated these false assertions to the Group of Experts.

57. Child combatants and children associated with FDLR-FOCA have been repatriated. Interviews conducted by the Group of Experts with both adult and former child combatants confirm the continued use of children, in violation of international law.

58. The Group has continued its investigations into the arms and ammunition recovered from FDLR. In spite of the repatriation of 10,177 Rwandans, the number of arms and amount of ammunition recovered from FDLR-FOCA is comparatively low. A comparison of information gathered from deserters concerning the armament of FDLR-FOCA, the levels of supply prior to the embargo, the numbers of weapons handed in during the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement or repatriation process and the current low level of ammunition expenditure by FDLR indicates the retention of significant amounts of stock acquired prior to the embargo.

59. Interviews with FDLR-FOCA members confirm a continued, low-level acquisition of ammunition from individual FARDC soldiers.

60. FDLR-FOCA has hierarchical political and military structures with common policies. The impediments put in place in respect of voluntary repatriation, the continued use of children as combatants and the illicit acquisition of ammunition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo makes the leadership of FDLR-FOCA possible targets for sanctions.

2. South Kivu field investigations

61. In the investigations reported in the present section of its report, the Group confirms that there are close linkages among the activities of the FDLR-FOCA 2nd Division, the exploitation of small-scale miners, and the civil aviation industry which connects the regions visited with Bukavu.

62. Banro Corporation, a Canadian junior mining company with exploration and exploitation permits for gold deposits in Namoya (Maniema province) and South Kivu province, has the largest holdings of potential gold deposits in the region. The company has stated that it does not at present mine or export any minerals. It has

also declared that, as a matter of company policy, it will not purchase any minerals from the small-scale miners or other persons who are active on its properties. Investigation by the Group of Experts confirms the accuracy of these assertions and, during visits to artisanal mining areas, the Group discovered that FARDC and the Police nationale congolaise provide security to the concession areas in which Banro is currently active.

63. Saramabila and Namoya are under the control of a non-integrated FARDC unit. FDLR-FOCA does not have a permanent presence in Namoya, yet its 3rd Battalion remains active in and around Kilembwe. Members of the Battalion extort their share of the local trade, including general merchandise, cassiterite and gold. Road access east of Kilembwe means that this area does not depend on the Namoya airstrip as its main means of access. Trade is directed towards Fizi, Baraka and Uvira.

64. Thanks to special arrangements with the local military leadership, Yuma Mukwala (also known as Haras) who consolidates the gold from the 40 traders in Namoya, is able to sell the entire output of this area in Bukavu.

65. The extent of local exploitation of cassiterite, wolfram and other semi-precious minerals, while not known, is sufficient to justify around six flights each week, with a cargo of 2,000 kg transported to Bukavu per rotation.

66. Route national 2 connects Kamituga with Bukavu but there is limited overland commerce owing to road conditions and security concerns. The Kamituga airstrip remains the main access for trade in this area.

67. The FARDC 122nd Infantry Brigade is in control of Kamituga and of the mining areas close to the population centres, and is deployed along the main road towards Mwenga and Kitutu. Away from these FARDC positions along the main roads and in outlying villages in the forests of Itombwe and Shabunda, the territory is controlled by elements of the FDLR-FOCA 4th Battalion, sometimes co-located with remnant Mai-Mai elements. This territory encompasses significant areas of small-scale natural resource exploitation and trading routes used by civilians to access population centres. There are consistent reports of FDLR-FOCA deployments in the areas around points of natural resource extraction, as well as of taxation and control structures on the smaller trading routes and FDLR-FOCA combatants trading in those resources.

68. The small-scale exploitation of substantial gold, cassiterite and coltan deposits in and around Kamituga supports a finely networked buying system that is operated by three companies which act as traders and airfreight forwarders: Atral, Delta Force and Zalia.

69. The Group has interviewed dozens of small buying agents for these three main companies who operate from small stalls along Route national 2, and has determined that the gold extracted each month in the Kamituga area amounts to several kilograms.

70. According to the proprietors of the airfreight companies, all gold is bought by either Etablissement Namukaya (Congocom) or Etablissement Panju. The Group is of the view that unknown quantities of gold are delivered to other Bukavu-based gold traders.

71. The Group has documented 22 tons of cassiterite flown from Kamituga to Bukavu during 2006. While this quantity is far too modest to reflect the actual total output of the area, the Group has no basis on which to provide an accurate estimate. The production justifies one to three aircraft rotations, four times a week, to Bukavu.

72. The FARDC 11th Integrated Brigade has its headquarters in Shabunda and a position in the village of Lulingu. Its 2nd Battalion is deployed in Shabunda territory, with a concentration north of Lulingu. Although FARDC controls the main population centres and is deployed along some roads and the main airstrips, FDLR-FOCA and remnant Mai-Mai groups are active outside the areas of FARDC influence. The areas under the control of armed groups include points of small-scale extraction of cassiterite and gold.

73. According to the authorities of both Shabunda and Lulingu, small-scale extraction of gold and cassiterite is the principal source of income for the local inhabitants and for the FDLR-FOCA units operating in the surrounding areas. The principal buyer of the gold from these two regions is Etablissement Namukaya. Some local traders allege that Etablissement Panju is still buying gold.

74. An estimated 636.3 tons of cassiterite and 682.05 tons of wolfram were transported from the area surrounding Shabunda and Lulingu area in 2006. The buyers of these products were the trading companies Mujeje, Olive, WMC, MDM, Sakima, Kitambala, Panju and others.

3. Increased air transport of commodities at the Bukavu/Kavumu airport

75. The Bukavu/Kavumu national airport is the hub of the major South Kivu airline network. The former Sominki runways located in the mining area (see annex II) are the terminal airports.

76. Traffic at the Bukavu/Kavumu national airport averages about 35 movements per day.

77. Although all the Government monitoring services are in place, this airport remains a veritable sieve; each of those services collects fees from the airlines, passengers and freight forwarders and closes its eyes to anything abnormal. These practices have also been observed at the arrival airports.

78. Airlines based in Bukavu (see annex III) carry ores for comptoirs that are located there and have correspondents in the mines for the purchase and direct extraction of those ores through freight forwarding agencies, the main ones being Delta Force, Atral and Zalia (for flights to Kamituga); Agefreco Air, Congocom Air and Stellavia (for flights to Namoya); and Agefreco Air, Congocom Air, Grace Express, Lokole and Acocha (for flights to Shabunda and Lulingu). Outbound flights carry various goods. Every return flight carries, on average, 2,000 kg of ore. In the most favourable conditions, 1,700 kg is the maximum tonnage that should be carried by this type of aircraft. The aircraft are thus stretched to the limits of their capacities.

79. Moreover, contrary to air transport regulations, which require a detailed description of the aircraft's cargo in the air waybill, the airline's cargo manifest merely gives the total tonnage of all the goods to be shipped.

80. It should also be noted that, most of the time, passengers are boarded in addition to freight in the same compartment, in violation of the regulations in force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

4. Gold traders based in Bukavu

81. Gold extracted from the South Kivu mining sites is consolidated in Bukavu by Etablissement Namukaya which in turn delivers its gold to Bujumbura. Guy Liongola, based in Tessengerlo, Belgium, imports the gold to Belgium on a regular basis. According to records that the Group was able to inspect, Mr. Liongola received 34,933 kg of gold between 11 August 2006 and 10 February 2007.

82. Zulfa Karim Panju is alleged to be a significant buyer and exporter of gold, despite the fact that, officially, he let his trading licence expire on 16 September 2006. The Group is not prepared to draw conclusions on Mr. Panju's status as a gold trader. On the one hand, there are still unresolved judicial proceedings against him dating back to 19 November 2002 when he was arrested in Belgium for suspected money-laundering. According to media reports Mr. Panju is accused of being part of a conspiracy involving Aziza Kulsum, also known as Mrs. Gulamali, who allegedly sold weapons to the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Goma (RCD-GOMA).

83. On the other hand, Mr. Panju's past declarations of gold exports suggest a higher degree of transparency than the declarations made by his successor Namukaya. From April 2005 to February 2006, the Panju company declared gold exports of 549.95 kg, while Namukaya, during a comparable period one year later, only declared 109.11 kg. Because substantially higher world market prices for gold during the period from 2006 to 2007 would actually encourage higher export figures, officials of the South Kivu branch of the Division of Mines and the Centre d'évaluation, d'expertise et de certification consider that these discrepancies indicate significant smuggling.

B. North Kivu

1. Forces loyal to the former General of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

84. Since August 2006, the forces loyal to former FARDC General Laurent Nkundabatware (Nkunda) have comprised the non-integrated 81st and 83rd brigades of FARDC, the military wing of the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP), loyalist elements of FARDC mixed brigades, and a number of smaller alliances of disaffected combatants in North Kivu, including remnant Mai-Mai elements.

85. In November 2006 MONUC peacekeeping forces intervened militarily in Sake (North Kivu province), when combatants loyal to rebel General Nkunda clashed with FARDC integrated brigades. Following these clashes, negotiations were conducted between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the rebel forces. It was agreed that combatants loyal to Nkunda would not immediately go through the system of brassage, set up for the process of integrating FARDC and through which all other integrated brigades in the Democratic Republic

of the Congo had passed. A process of mixage was initiated whereby other non-integrated units were brought into North Kivu and mixed with rebel units.

86. In January 2007, the process of mixage began and five FARDC mixed brigades were created. In only one mixed brigade have soldiers been mixed below the battalion level. In the other brigades, the individual battalions co-exist within the new brigades and retain the internal structures that they had prior to the process. Following this process, the mixed brigades have remained in North Kivu.

87. The CNDP politico-military organization, under the chairmanship of Nkunda, has a military wing containing a number of disaffected military officers, including individuals already subject to Security Council sanctions. One of them, Bosco Taganda, holds the position of CNDP commander of operations. Mr. Taganda does not hold an official position in FARDC but is involved in the planning and direction of FARDC mixed brigade operations.

88. At the time of writing, the FARDC 8th Military Region has weak command and control over Nkunda loyalist elements in the mixed brigades. Nkunda and CNDP retain a certain level of command and control of these loyalist units, as well as of other unmixed, non-integrated forces in North Kivu.

89. In the past 10 months, there has been extensive recruitment of combatants into the ranks of forces loyal to Nkunda.

90. Within the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congolese adults and children have been both voluntarily and forcibly recruited. Networks sympathetic to Nkunda and with ties to CNDP have also recruited individuals in both Rwanda and Burundi. Among the new recruits are Burundian and Rwandan civilians, demobilized combatants and Congolese citizens, some of whom were recruited from Congolese refugee camps in Rwanda. Some of those recruits have been children.

91. Transport for new recruits from outside the Democratic Republic of the Congo was provided and paid for by the recruitment networks. Some recruits claim to have openly crossed the official border posts and others have crossed on foot in groups away from official checkpoints and into military camps in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In those camps, military training, arms, ammunition and, occasionally, uniforms and salaries were provided.

92. A number of cases have been recorded of recruits with military training being brought to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to instruct forces loyal to Nkunda.

93. Forces loyal to Nkunda have recruited and used children, in violation of international law. In spite of an order given by FARDC that all children were to be demobilized, there are numerous cases of this order having been disobeyed by Nkunda loyalist forces within the mixed brigades.

94. Children have deserted or been demobilized from each of the mixed brigades. Some children have been threatened and attacked by officers of these units to prevent them from leaving, or have been physically removed from the care of child protection agencies. Children who remain in the FARDC mixed brigades have been deployed with their units, some of which have been subsequently involved in active combat against FDLR in North Kivu.

95. Deserters from Nkunda loyalist forces recount how they have received on an irregular basis cash payments ranging from US\$ 5 to US\$ 25. Even while in

rebellion against the chain of command of the 8th Military Region, the 81st and 83rd brigades continued to receive money for salaries from FARDC. The collection of taxes by forces loyal to Nkunda has been widely reported. Some logistical supply has been provided to the mixed brigades by the 8th Military Region, and sources within the brigades claim that this has included ammunition for operations against FDLR-FOCA.

96. Interviews with deserters from forces loyal to Nkunda have yet again illustrated the ease of access to illicit stocks of ammunition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Access to arms caches in both North and South Kivu have contributed to the logistical supply of these forces. The use of porters, including children, to recover and move ammunition stocks from within the Kivus for the benefit of Nkunda's forces has been recorded.

97. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been requested to assist the Group of Experts in its investigations into the stocks of military material in North Kivu that remain outside the control of FARDC. Information has also been requested regarding stocks of recovered armaments, weaponry held by the mixed brigades and heavy weaponry handed in by armed groups. The Government has yet to respond.

98. Considering the limited command and control by the 8th Military Region of forces loyal to Nkunda, it is difficult to see how supplying these forces with arms and related materiel or technical training, including financial assistance, can be done within the terms of the Security Council arms embargo in its current form.

2. Mai-Mai and Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda-Forces combattantes abacunguzi

99. Mai-Mai groups continue their armed activities in the northern part of North Kivu, known as the Grand Nord, and are sometimes co-located with units of foreign armed groups. Their use of children in violation of international law is endemic.

100. Members of interviewed FDLR-FOCA splinter groups claim to be part of National Army-Imboneza, the armed wing of the Ralliement pour l'unité et la démocratie (RUD)-Urunana presided over by Jean Marie Higiroy, a resident of the United States. The political leaders of RUD-Urunana stated that they had no information on armed group leaders in the Democratic Republic of the Congo who claimed to be part of RUD-Urunana.

101. Mai-Mai, FDLR-FOCA and FDLR-FOCA splinter groups operate in artisan mining areas in the north of North Kivu and control some transportation routes to trading centres.

3. Allied Democratic Forces and National Army for the Liberation of Uganda

102. In December 2005, joint FARDC-MONUC operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo led to the destruction of many camps and the scattering of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU). Between May and July 2006, ADF/NALU recovered some of its former positions within Congolese territory.

103. Clashes between FARDC and ADF/NALU in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have become more numerous. ADF/NALU cross-border movements have

resulted in clashes between their forces and the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) in Uganda.

104. In March 2007, UPDF units in the Bundibugyo district of Uganda killed and captured a number of ADF/NALU combatants crossing from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group of Experts obtained access to some of the ammunition captured in that attack.

105. Throughout the current mandate of the Group, cases of child recruitment and re-recruitment in violation of international law have been confirmed.

4. Non-integrated units of the 85th Brigade of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo: update

106. Following up on the case study on cassiterite (tin oxide) production in Walikale presented in the Group's interim report (see S/2007/40, annex, sect. II.A) the presence, nature of abuse and illegal exploitation by members of the non-integrated FARDC 85th Brigade have not substantially changed. A small number of soldiers under the direct command of the 8th Military Region and the mining police who were recently deployed in the Walikale area were not able to break the 85th Brigade's control of the mining sites and the transit routes to and from the mining areas. Extortion and illegal taxation of producers and transporters have become even more profitable to the members of this armed group because of the increase in the world market price of tin oxides (cassiterite), accelerating the demand for transport, local trade and frequency of flights to and from Walikale.

107. Evidence that the control of the 85th Brigade of this mining economy remains profitable became apparent with a contract signed on 28 August 2006 with Dieudonne Tshishiku Mutoka, Administrator of the Walikale territory. The Administrator commits to supporting and ensuring the security of Groupe Minier Bangandula (GMB), a company that is competing for the cassiterite deposits in the area. In exchange for the security services provided by the Administrator, the company guaranteed Mr. Mutoka 10 per cent of the weekly production of the Bisie mine, US\$ 0.05 per kilogram of all cassiterite extracted by the company at Bisie and 50 per cent of the receipts generated at the intermediary cassiterite selling stations at Njingala, Isanga and Maynana. The only possible provider of security in the area which is allied with the Administrator is the 85th Brigade and its leader, Colonel Sammy.

108. An additional mechanism that GMB can use to undermine the legitimate concessionaire is the Cooperative minière de Mpama Bisiye (Comimpa), whose membership is supposed to comprise local artisan miners. However, a review of the 22 names listed as founders of Comimpa reveals that 11 are also shareholders of GMB. The dominance of GMB is further revealed given that 10 GMB shareholders signed the statutes of Comimpa compared to only 5 non-shareholders.

109. The principal issue for the Group of Experts is that GMB and, by association, Comimpa, are financially enabling the potentially sanctionable activities of the 85th Brigade and its Colonel Sammy through its protection arrangement with Mr. Mutoka. The responsibility lies with the shareholders of GMB, who registered the company in Goma on 23 September 2005. Fifty per cent of the shares are owned by Saphir Society, with the remainder distributed among minority shareholders. Alexis Makabuza Rusenga, who represents the Society, is the General Manager and

main beneficiary of GMB. Mr. Makabuza was also one of the original signers of the Comimpa statutes.

5. Violations of civil aviation operating standards at the North Kivu airports

110. The Walikale runway, a segment of the national route built at the time of the rebellion by RCD-Goma, although it does not meet approved safety standards, is used for short take-offs and landings by aircraft such as the LET410UVP, the AN-28, AN-32 or AN-2, and even the C208 Caravan. There are 10 to 20 movements per day, depending on the season. In view of the accidents that have occurred here in the past three months, especially since the resumption of flights on the Walikale-Goma route, a request to close down the runway has been submitted to the relevant Ministry.

Photograph 1: Section of the road used as an airstrip in Mobi, Walikale



111. The Goma airport, with an average of nearly 40 movements per day, has become the leading airport in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo from the standpoint of air traffic. Registered traffic at Goma includes nearly 40 aircraft of all types (Twin Otter DHC-6, Cessna Caravan, AN-12, LET410, AN-24, AN-32, DHC-8, CASA 212, Partenavia 68 CTC).

112. Airlines based at that airport (see annex III) are chartered by comptoirs located in Goma, mainly for the transport of ores (cassiterite, coltan, wolfram, etc.).

113. The Goma airline network has practically the same terminal airports as Bukavu. In addition, Walikale is its main destination. The same holds true for Bukavu.

114. Airlines based in Beni (see annex III) are mainly present in the mining areas of the Ituri district and the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu.

115. The Ben airstrip is often used for non-stop international flights to and from Entebbe, as there are no Customs authorities there. Sanctions should be imposed on the chief culprits in this type of fraud — KFTC and COZA Airways.

116. The same goes for the Butembo airstrip, which was home to Butembo Airlines; however, this airline has ceased to operate for lack of aircraft. When it was still operating it had provided a weekly air bridge between Butembo and Mongwalu, the gold mining zone, and also non-stop service to Mwana (United Republic of Tanzania) while Butembo was a non-Customs airport.

6. Consequences of compromised gold and cassiterite supply chains

117. Based on the investigations described in paragraphs 61 to 74 above, the Group has established that the supply chains of all major precious and semi-precious minerals originating from North and South Kivu are compromised by diversions that benefit armed groups.

118. In 2006, total cassiterite exports by the 17 North Kivu-based traders with export licences (comptoirs) amounted to approximately 2,904 tons, the semi-refined export quantity of the approximately 5,306 tons of tin oxide delivered to Goma. Collected from hundreds of small-scale excavation sites in the following provinces, the quantity of cassiterite sent to Goma is as follows:

<i>Province</i>	<i>Tons</i>
Katanga	186.4
Maniema	722.5
North Kivu and South Kivu	4 255.6
Orientale	142.1

119. Comptoirs based in Goma require their suppliers to indicate the origin of the cassiterite. In fact, the locations indicated are in most cases merely an approximation of its true origin. Suppliers do not know the precise origin and do not have a full understanding of a supply chain that begins with small-scale mining operations and continues through several stages before the bags of cassiterite arrive at the airport of Goma.

120. Even if buyers were to know the precise location of all cassiterite mining sites, there is no sure way of ascertaining whether the sites and access to them are controlled by armed groups.

121. Consequently, buyers in end-user markets do not practice credible due diligence in the Kivus, Maniema, Katanga and Province Orientale that entitles them to claim that they are not buying from compromised sources.

122. Shown below is the total cassiterite bought or brokered in 2006 by entities based in six countries:

<i>Country</i>	<i>Tons</i>
Belgium	2 296
Hong Kong (China)	10.2
Kazakhstan	27.4
Malaysia	73.8
Rwanda	429
United Kingdom	67.5

123. On 28 December 2005, the Division of Mines of South Kivu, through the diplomatic representation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, informed the authorities of Burundi of individuals who were trading and smuggling natural resources in conjunction with arms traders. The list covers persons of both Congolese and Burundian origin and includes Mzee Mazee and Rama Mwhite, the two most important buyers of gold in Uvira (see annex IV).

124. With the exception of the exports to Belgium by Mr. Liongola, all supply chains of gold from South Kivu pass through Bukavu and Uvira and end up with the Bujumbura representative of the Kampala gold trading firm of Machanga Ltd. This firm has a virtual monopoly over the approximately 0.5 to 1 ton of Burundian gold that is mixed with about 2 tons of gold, mostly illegally imported, from South Kivu. Until Machanga Ltd. was blocked with targeted financial sanctions, it sold all of this gold to Emirates Gold in Dubai.

125. During a visit to the gold refineries in Dubai in June 2005, the Group discussed industry standards of due diligence procedures that would be applied to gold consignments originating from Central African countries. Representatives of Emirates Gold assured the Group that proper checks were always carried out with sellers of raw gold, particularly if such materials might originate from countries in which armed groups operate.

126. Emirates Gold has provided the Group with documentation showing that, since 2005, it has purchased 10.17 tons of gold from the Kampala and Bujumbura offices of Machanga Ltd., 6.61 tons from UCI, 1.39 tons from A. P. Bhimji Ltd. and 0.03 tons from Congomet, companies that are known to trade in gold originating from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The total gold intake from Machanga Ltd. and UCI amounts therefore to 16.78 tons.

127. Emirates Gold no longer accepts gold from UCI and Machanga Ltd. and has blocked their accounts on the instructions of the authorities of the United Arab Emirates.

Recommendation: certification of natural resources by the Centre d'évaluation, d'expertise et de certification

128. New investigations by the Group into the widespread diversion of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have reconfirmed the need for enhanced controls of natural resources. The urgency of this need was also recognized by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo when

the Minister of Mines signed *arrêté ministériel* No. 2503, dated 5 February 2007. This decree mandates the Centre d'évaluation, d'expertise et de certification to proceed with the development of a certification system for precious and semi-precious minerals and stones, as well as other mineral substances produced by small-scale miners. The Group of Experts recommends that the international community lend its technical, administrative and financial support to this project.

IX. Other investigations

A. Luwero Industries (Nakasongola, Uganda)

129. The visit of the Group of Experts to the ammunition production lines of Luwero Industries in Nakasongola, Uganda, on 23 February 2007 has greatly advanced the work of the Group.

130. Information provided on the date of manufacture, evolution of the manufacturing processes and post-production treatment and marking of the product are necessary elements in advancing the investigations of the Group into the supply of unmarked ammunition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the ammunition found in the hands of armed groups.

131. The Group of Experts considers this to be a good example of how technical cooperation among the manufacturer, the supplier and the monitoring mechanism can advance investigations into violations of an embargo.

B. Non-integrated units of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo: *Détachement de protection présidentielle* and Republican Guard

132. Following the violence in Kinshasa from 22 to 25 March 2007, the Group of Experts interviewed personnel and leaders of the *Détachement de protection présidentielle* who had surrendered, and examined recovered arms and ammunition. Some anomalies in the data are yet to be explained to the satisfaction of the Group. Tracing requests have been initiated and the response of manufacturing States and the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is necessary for the Group to reconcile the data.

133. The Group of Experts has observed Republican Guard units across the Democratic Republic of the Congo. During its current mandate, the units have prevented the free movement of United Nations staff, including the Group of Experts. The units are involved in activities as diverse as controlling access to airports and borders in the Kivus, and participating in the above-mentioned violence in Kinshasa.

134. Support given to these units, which are not under the control of the *Etat-major intégré* or of the *Police nationale congolaise*, or fully integrated, raises the question of whether they can be considered to be in compliance with paragraph 2 (a) of Security Council resolution 1596 (2005).

C. Hussar Limited

135. The Group has learned that, in connection with the findings contained in paragraphs 78 to 80 of its report of July 2005 (see S/2005/436), Hussar Limited's long established relationship with a particular gold refinery had come to an abrupt end in the summer of 2004. Reportedly, all customers of the refinery were informed about changes to disclosure laws, including the introduction of the much more intrusive due diligence procedures under which raw gold was to be accepted for refining. One of the new disclosure requirements was the identification of the origin of raw gold. Rather than providing this information, Hussar Limited chose to switch to another refinery.

136. The Group has also recently learned that, subsequent to the publication of the above-mentioned report, Hussar Limited accused its supplier, the Kampala-based UCI, of not having disclosed the true origin of its gold. As a consequence, Hussar Limited proceeded to block payment of an outstanding balance of over US\$ 700,000 owed to UCI. Hussar Limited has confirmed to the Group that since September 2005, long before UCI was placed on the list of individuals and entities subject to targeted financial sanctions and a travel ban, Hussar has retained US\$ 780,057.52 that would have been due UCI and that this has now become subject to paragraphs 13 and 15 of resolution 1596 (2005).

D. Success of targeted sanctions against gold traders

137. The updated list of individuals and entities subject to targeted financial sanctions released on 29 March 2007 together with the announcement of a travel ban, which encompassed the major gold buyers in the region (UCI, Machanga Ltd., and Kambale Kisoni), has halted most gold-buying activities in Ituri and North Kivu. No alternative buyers have yet emerged and, as a result of the trading interruptions, gold was offered for sale on the local markets at a discount of as much as 15 to 20 per cent.

138. Two of those sanctioned, Mr. Kisoni and UCI, have already initiated consultations with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to determine how they could become a positive force in the gold exports of the country and possibly obtain a legal export licence.

E. Lack of enforcement of targeted sanctions (assets freeze and travel ban)

139. The Group of Experts is not aware of enforcement actions taken by Member States in connection with the list of individuals and entities established pursuant to paragraphs 13 and 15 of resolution 1596 (2005).

140. The Group has learned informally that the Government of the United Arab Emirates has advised Emirates Gold to block the accounts of UCI and Machanga Ltd.

F. Suspected violations of the arms embargo in civil aviation

141. A suspected violation of the arms embargo was behind the cases the Group of Experts investigated at the beginning of its mandate, including:

- (a) The intentional diversion to Entebbe of a Service Air Antonov 12 ER-AXI aircraft which, at the time, was providing service between Goma and Kinshasa;
- (b) The refusal by the Congolese military to inspect the cargo of a Ugandan Showa Trade aircraft arriving in Kinshasa from Entebbe on 23 September 2006.

142. However, since all the clues had vanished, all that could be proved by looking into these cases was the intentional diversion of the Service Air aircraft, for which the airline must be held accountable, and the observation, yet again, that the Congolese army was obstructing the proper monitoring of the Showa Trade flight by MONUC.

G. Monitoring of the operation of aircraft in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

1. Aircraft that no longer meet the airworthiness criteria continue to operate in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

143. On the basis of its investigations, the Group of Experts was able to establish that:

- (a) The aircraft in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are largely obsolete leased aircraft;
- (b) Aircraft continue to operate in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in defiance of international standards and national regulations. Others use fake registration numbers.

2. Aircraft leasing companies

144. The Group identified three aircraft leasing companies in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Doren Air Congo, Aerolift and Midlands Logistics.

145. Doren Air Congo leases aircraft and air transport services on request for cargo flights. Its fleet is composed mainly of LET aircraft. None of the Doren Air Congo LET410s or those that the Group of Experts identified in the Democratic Republic of the Congo meets the Joint Aviation Requirements (JAR) or Federal Administration Requirements (FAR) (see annex III).

146. There are no approved LET maintenance centres in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The BenAir approved maintenance centre established in Mombasa (Kenya) and certified, inter alia, to maintain LET aircraft, says that, during the year, it only worked on a Swala Aviation Congo aircraft and terminated the maintenance contract it had with Doren Africa when the airline became Doren Air Congo.

147. Nor have the airlines that operate LET aircraft managed to furnish evidence that their aircraft are periodically serviced at a certified centre.

148. Aerolift, an aircraft leasing company based in South Africa, was renting and operating LET and Antonov aircraft in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Following a number of accidents involving those aircraft and the shutdown of the airlines operating them, the company ceased to carry on business in this country.

149. The Midlands Logistics aircraft found in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, generally Antonovs, are rented to Galaxy, Mango Mat and TRACEP Aviation Congo. With regard to accidents involving some of these aircraft that have already occurred (see annex III), Midlands appears to be a broker that brought old Antonovs into the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

3. Antonov aircraft

150. The Group counted eight Antonov aircraft registered for the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the Antonov Design Bureau's list of its aircraft that no longer meet airworthiness criteria, designed to help civil aviation authorities ground them for retrofitting.

151. In the course of its investigations, the Group of Experts was able to establish that aircraft continue to operate in the African Great Lakes region in defiance of international standards (see S/2007/40, annex, para. 68).

152. Air Navette, long cited for illicit transport of arms and especially for assistance to armed groups, is one of them. It is registered under No. AN-12 3C-AAG in Equatorial Guinea, which is no longer in compliance with international operating standards.

153. Equatorial Guinea has not yet replied to the Group's request for authorization to visit that country to verify whether the Equatorial Guinea registration numbers found in the Great Lakes region, including AN-12 3C-AAG, are valid. Equatorial Guinea has not yet replied to this request.

154. Air Navette has just leased another AN-12 registered in Burundi under the number 9U-BHS in place of the AN-12 3C-AAG immobilized in Entebbe.

155. Burundian cooperation requested by the Group of Experts in order to find out the status of this aircraft has not been forthcoming either.

156. Aigle Aviation and Blue Airlines, by using both AN-28 registered 9XR-KI and 9XR-KV, respectively, are violating the provisions of paragraph 6 of resolution 1596 (2005).

Recommendations

157. Accordingly, all aircraft found to be in violation of paragraph 6 of resolution 1596 (2005) must be grounded and the airlines operating them should have their licences revoked.

158. The Group also wishes to propose:

(a) **Tighter supervision of aircraft security by requiring airlines to comply with the conditions for importing and servicing aircraft on penalty of having their aircraft grounded;**

(b) **The establishment of an aircraft servicing shop in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to deal with the existing fleet. The idea would be to reduce operating expenses and the time the aircraft are immobilized, and to**

ensure compliance with the necessary servicing programmes for maintaining the airworthiness of these aircraft;

(c) The restructuring of government civil aviation services with a view to providing much greater incentives to agents;

(d) The organization of a round table comprising government and private-sector aviation professionals, financial organizations and economic operators. The round table would be aimed at restructuring the air transport market and even downsizing airlines and their fleets.

4. Aircraft accidents continue to cast a pall over the Democratic Republic of the Congo

159. A number of aircraft accidents have occurred in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since the last mandate of the Group of Experts.

160. Three accidents caused by inadequate air control in the Democratic Republic of the Congo occurred in Walikale on 9 September 2006, 14 February 2007 and 17 May 2007.

161. On 9 November 2006, the LET410 registered under number 9Q-CBQ operated by Goma Express, carrying 2,000 kg of cassiterite (tin oxide) failed after technical difficulties; its emergency landing in Walikale destroyed houses and vehicles, killing one person and injuring others. There were two pilots and a passenger on board.

Photograph 2: Accident of LET410, operated by Goma Express and owned by Doren Air Congo (Walikale, 9 November 2006)



162. This accident is a clear example of non-compliance with runway maintenance standards, the overweight limit on the aircraft which, in the best of conditions, can safely carry only 1,700 kg, and non-compliance with Civil Aviation Authority Circular No. 416/DAC/TC/SEC/370/2003 of 2 May 2003 prohibiting the transport of passengers and freight in the same compartment.

163. On 14 February 2007, a Kenyan aircraft — a Cessna 208 Caravan registered under No. 5Y-BNN — was caught in bad weather as it was approaching Walikale and disappeared in the forest, never to be found again to this day. Poor judgement concerning weather conditions seems to be at the bottom of this tragedy.

164. Lastly, on 17 May 2007, again in Walikale, the LET410 registered under No. TH-AHE operated by Safe Air Company crashed at take-off after the right-side engine burst into flames and its speed dropped, killing two pilots and the passenger on board. An investigation under way has revealed technical shortcomings due to poor reconditioning of the aircraft before use.

165. As we see, in all three cases, air transport operating standards were disregarded.

166. Moreover, the Group of Experts examined the licences of the pilots and none of them was valid. Indeed, periodic inspections by flight personnel were not carried out properly. None of them mentioned type rating, which means that pilots could take advantage of this gap to go from one aircraft to another as the opportunity arose.

Recommendation

167. Convinced that no helpful solution could be reached with the officials currently in place, the Group of Experts suggests launching a technical assistance project to provide advanced on-the-job training in the supervision of aviation security in order to lift the Democratic Republic of the Congo out of this illegal situation. The International Civil Aviation Organization usually conducts these projects.

H. Confusion in regard to due diligence obligations

168. During its research into small-scale, semi-industrial and industrial mining, as well as local, regional and international trading operations, the Group of Experts has encountered considerable confusion among its interlocutors about what are considered legal, illegal or sanctionable activities.

169. These uncertainties have been created in part by confusion between the mandate of the Group and that of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. There is a perception among some stakeholders that the companies and individuals listed in annexes to the final report of the Panel of Experts (see S/2002/1146) were sanctioned. There are also significant discrepancies among States and their application of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. All of these factors result in confusing guidance on the conduct of business in regions with weak governance.

170. One of the risks resulting from these uncertainties is that banks might close the accounts of companies as a precautionary measure even if there were no clear evidence implicating those companies in sanctions violations.

171. Such risks have led one junior mining company to refuse all business relationships with artisan communities and an international refining company to

refuse any materials originating from small-scale mining communities in other African countries, even if the country is not a neighbour of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

172. In contrast to these over-conscientious compliance efforts, a number of leading European trading companies have simply declined to provide the Group with any information on their business operations, the origin of the natural resources that they are trading and the identity of their suppliers and stockholders. Essentially, the Group is asked to simply believe, sometimes against all evidence, that the due diligence efforts of these companies prevent possibly sanctionable transactions.

Recommendation: improved due diligence procedures

173. As noted in paragraphs 61 to 74 and 168 to 172 above, widely compromised supply chains and the lack of adequate due diligence systems undermine the measures authorized by the Security Council to prevent financial assistance to illegally armed groups. The Group recommends that, in future, companies which cannot demonstrate adequate due diligence practices be sanctioned. The definition of what would be considered adequate due diligence practices would have to be elaborated.

I. Transfers of embargoed material

174. The three main areas of transfers of weapons in violation of the arms embargo and which are of concern to the Group of Experts are: (a) the smuggling of embargoed material from outside the Democratic Republic of the Congo to unauthorized recipients within the country; (b) the illicit internal circulation and stockpiles of arms and ammunition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and (c) the diversion of embargoed material from legitimate stocks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to illicit recipients.

175. The risk of embargoed material being smuggled into the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains high. This is due to the demand for this material in the ongoing activities of both domestic and foreign armed groups and is facilitated by conditions which allow both large and small-scale smuggling with a relatively low risk of detection.

176. The internal circulation of embargoed material in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains a significant source of illicit resupply to armed groups. Although much has been done to bring stocks of weapons under FARDC or United Nations control, innumerable illicit caches of embargoed items remain. MONUC continues to uncover hidden arms caches of this nature.

177. The diversion of embargoed material from legally held security force stocks to the illicit market in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is of concern to the Group. The sale of arms and ammunition by individual FARDC soldiers to supplement their income, poor stockpile control combined with endemic corruption within the security services, acquisition of embargoed material on the battlefield and transfers to armed groups by sympathetic individuals are all means of supply confirmed by members of armed groups during the Group's current mandate.

178. Based upon its work in small arms tracing initiated during the mandates authorized by the Council in resolutions 1616 (2005) and 1654 (2006), the Group of

Experts has expanded its activities to address the many types of embargoed material encountered in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Most large stocks of both illicit and licit arms and ammunition encountered in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by the Group are either of pre-embargo provenance or their point of diversion has proved to be untraceable. Circulation and recirculation of these stocks has further blurred the chain of ownership.

179. The task of identifying the component of post-embargo arms deliveries within the high levels of pre-embargo supplies found in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a major challenge to the monitoring bodies of the sanctions regime.

180. The Group does not have the capacity to be present each time embargoed material is encountered in the Democratic Republic of the Congo either through seizure, disarmament programmes, or during attacks. The MONUC arms embargo training session and the MONUC reporting system have done much to address autonomous information collection on this subject. There is a need for more detail in the collection of these data.

181. The monitoring mechanism does not at present have the means to effectively store and analyse these data. There is a need for a centralized database specific to the arms embargo imposed on the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the purposes of monitoring and analysing information on the embargoed material collected from armed groups, post-attack data, information on armed group weapon stocks transferred to FARDC, and deliveries made under the exemptions to the arms embargo.

182. Access to technical data specific to the embargoed material found in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has proved to be fundamental to the success of the investigations carried out by the Group of Experts. This has included access to commercial technical databases on arms and ammunition and technical information requested directly from manufacturing or supplying countries.

183. The Group has conducted initial trials on elements of an embargoed material information system tailored to the unique needs inherent in monitoring the arms embargo imposed on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Initial results in identifying trends and anomalies in these data so as to enable the Group to target its limited resources on further investigation have been encouraging.

Recommendations

184. The Group of Experts recommends that, in order to ensure continued institutional knowledge on the embargo and to improve its capacity to investigate potential violations, a database specific to the arms embargo imposed on the Democratic Republic of the Congo be created and maintained by the Group. This database should contain information collected by all three tiers of the United Nations monitoring mechanism, with the computing capacity necessary to process that information.

185. In order to improve data collection by monitoring partners in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Group recommends that the authority of the MONUC mechanism for collecting and reporting information on embargoed material be extended to include additional technical details. The Group suggests that this be set up with the assistance of the Group, taking into account the proposed database on embargoed material.

186. The Group suggests that the information feedback mechanism be reinforced between the Group of Experts and the MONUC units collecting these data in the field.

187. In cases in which the Group has requested technical information from embargoed material manufacturers and suppliers, the Group requests the Sanctions Committee to use its good offices to encourage prompt replies by Member States to those requests.

J. Measures to be taken in combating the illicit transport of arms and ammunition

188. To disclose the techniques used by transport agents, which have been described in previous reports, the Group of Experts believes that screening is necessary to ensure preventive management of the threat. First of all, the obligation of all contracting States to incorporate international standards in their legislation must be stressed. In addition, measures must be taken to ensure absolute transparency in the transport of arms until they reach their destination.

189. In view of the foregoing, the Group of Experts suggests the following:

(a) Prior authorization must be obtained for non-government air transport of arms;

(b) Operators transporting weapons must file an application for a special licence;

(c) At the time of delivery, brokers must notify the competent authorities of the name of the agents and airlines as well as the itinerary to be followed;

(d) States must take measures against individuals or companies within their jurisdiction who transport arms to destinations and entities subject to a Security Council embargo (adoption of legislation criminalizing the violation of United Nations embargoes). They might also resort to the preventive attachment of aircraft cited in United Nations reports on violations of United Nations embargoes;

(e) There should be systematic control, where possible and depending on the capacities of States, of cargo coming from the territory of States or transiting through them that is known to contain arms and/or ammunition or where the flight plan of the aircraft includes countries subject to United Nations embargoes or States located in a conflict zone;

(f) The air transport sector should be encouraged, through a public or private dialogue, to adopt and promote a code of conduct setting out the measures to be taken in order to ensure that the documents accompanying arms shipments contain complete and accurate information on the goods being shipped and the flight plans.

K. Continuing weakness in Customs and immigration controls

190. With regard to Customs and cross-border migratory flows, the Group of Experts examined the evolution of certain administrative reforms concerning the Office of Customs and Excise and the difficulties encountered in this area. During visits to border control stations and the border crossings, the Group noted that the

presence of agents of the Centre d'évaluation, d'expertise et de certification had been strengthened.

191. Requests for Customs statistics on precious and semi-precious materials that transit through countries neighbouring the Democratic Republic of the Congo have been transmitted to the States concerned, but not yet answered.

192. In the course of its investigations in land, airport and lakeside areas, the Group of Experts uncovered irregularities with regard to Customs procedures that could entail misappropriation of public funds.

193. With regard to migratory flows, the Group of Experts continued to gather information on the movements of businessmen who might be implicated in the illicit trade of natural resources from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Recommendation: enhanced international assistance to improve border security

194. The continued weakness of the border and immigration controls of the Democratic Republic of the Congo presents a security risk to the nation and the region and a significant drain of financial resources. The Group recommends the strengthening of all agencies in charge of border control, to be supported by further assistance from the international community. Such strengthening would also contribute to the enhanced enforcement of Security Council sanctions.

L. Children and armed conflict

195. The extension of the Group's mandate to cover investigations into the recruitment, use or targeting of children in armed conflict has introduced new investigative challenges. Research into the area of children in armed conflict necessitates certain safeguards and modifications of the Group's reporting in order to protect sources and their families. Its detailed research on individual cases will be kept confidential.

196. In cases in which sanctioned individuals may remain in contact with the children they have recruited or used, the protection of child witnesses should be taken into account before sanctions are published.

197. The integration of many violators into the officer ranks of FARDC during the present mandate period, including the cases of the Ituri armed groups, some former Mai-Mai officers and the FARDC mixed brigades, does increase the potential of financial and travel sanctions having a coercive effect on the behaviour of these individuals if sanctions were properly implemented by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

198. While the Group of Experts conducts its work independently of child protection agencies, it is greatly concerned about the levels of harassment and threats against child protection staff. In Ituri and the Kivus, threats against these staff members by members of armed groups and FARDC officers have been reported to the Group.

Recommendations

199. **The Committee should engage child protection actors to address issues of protection of vulnerable witnesses before it considers imposing individual sanctions in pursuance of paragraph 13 of resolution 1698 (2006).**

200. **If travel and financial sanctions are to be imposed on members of FARDC who have violated paragraph 13 of resolution 1698 (2006), the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should be made responsible for their enforcement, and this responsibility should include a reporting obligation to the Committee.**

M. Enhancing investigations pursuant to Security Council resolution 1649 (2005)

201. The Group has interviewed a number of former combatants whose leaders have prevented them from joining disarmament programmes in pursuance of resolution 1649 (2005). It has asked questions on financial issues, arms transfers and the use of children in violation of international law, and these interviews have proved to be very valuable in advancing the Group's investigations (see paras. 41-50, 55-74 and 84-105 above). Should its mandate be further extended, the Group would require assistance in the conduct of interviews with former combatants and witnesses concerning the arms embargo.

N. Lack of compliance with sanctions

202. The predominant experience of sanctioned individuals and entities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is that Member States do not enforce the implementation of Security Council sanctions. In Goma, for example, businessman Douglas Mpamo and his company GLBC continue to operate with impunity. Since sanctions were first applied on Mr. Mpamo, GLBC has increased its business activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Mr. Mpamo's business activities are illustrated by the number of movements of his aircraft from Goma airport (see annex V) and as shown in photograph 3.

Photograph 3: Presence of Antonov 12, owned by GLBC, in Goma during the week of 20 to 26 May 2007



203. As mentioned in previous reports of the Group (e.g., S/2006/525, annex, paras. 119 and 215), Mr. Mpamo continues to travel in violation of the travel ban imposed by the Security Council. Also in Goma, the sanctioned non-governmental organization Tous pour la paix et le développement continues to operate with impunity.

Recommendation: assistance in regard to enforcement of sanctions

204. If lack of enforcement is an expression of political will by Member States, it is the prerogative of the Committee to address this rather than the Group of Experts. If, however, non-enforcement is a result of a lack of capacity of Member States, the Group recommends that its mandate include the task, in cooperation with those countries, of assessing their capacity needs and, where possible, suggesting ways to improve their ability to enforce targeted sanctions.

Annex I

Entities and organizations contacted by the Group of Experts¹

Austria

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Australia

Private sector: Moto Goldmines Ltd., BHP Billiton Limited, Gravity Diamonds, Council for Responsible Jewellery Practices Ltd.

Belgium

Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Federal Police, Justice Department

Organization: Antwerp World Diamond Centre

Private sector: A & M Minerals, Tony Goetz & Zonen, Groupe Forrest, Traxys

Burundi

Government: Ministry of External Relations and International Cooperation

Organization: United Nations Office in Burundi United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi

Canada

Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Organization: International Civil Aviation Organization

Private sector: Banro Corporation, BRC Diamond Corporation, Anvil Mining

Czech Republic

Private sector: Doren Air

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Government: Office of the Special Adviser to the President, Delegation générale du Gouvernement chargée de liaison avec la United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ministry of Mines, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Energy, Direction de l'aéronautique civile, Régie des voies aériennes, Commission for Reconstruction and Development, Ministry of Internal Security, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lubumbashi International Airport, Administration of Province Orientale, Mining Cadastre, Customs and Excise Office, Centre d'évaluation, d'expertise et de la certification, Commission d'évaluation, Central Bank, Vice-Commissioner of Ituri District, General Prosecutor of Ituri District

¹ For security reasons, the names of certain individuals who have provided information or statements to the Group of Experts cannot be listed.

Organizations: European Union, European Union security mission (EUSEC), Peacekeeping Force of the European Union (EUFOR), Pact-Congo, United States Agency for International Development, United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre, United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Diplomatic missions: African Union, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, China, European Union, France, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America

Private sector: George Forrest International Afrique, Chemaf sprl, MIBA, Gécamines, Safricas, Okimo, Service Air, Sonas, Central African Resources, Mining Processing Congo, Banro Congo Mining, Société Kotecha, Swala Aviation, Service Air, Aurex, Taacep Aviation Congo, Air Navette, Safe Air Co.

France

Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Organization: International Civil Aviation Organization (regional office)

Germany

Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources

Private sector: Danzer AG, Heraeus Holding

Israel

Private sector: DGI Group of Companies

Italy

Organization: World Jewellery Confederation

Kenya

Government: Kenya Customs

Organization: International Crisis Group

Private sector: Mombasa Air Safari, BenAir

Russian Federation

Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Private sector: Norils Nickel

Rwanda

Government: Special Representatives of the Office of the President, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Civil Aviation Authority, Customs and Immigration Office, Ministry of Internal Affairs

Organization: United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Diplomatic missions: France, Germany, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Private sector: Mining Processing Congo

Senegal

Organization: International Civil Aviation Organization, Agence pour la sécurité de la navigation aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar

South Africa

Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, South African Police Services, Civil Aviation Authority

Organization: Institute for Security Studies, Chamber of Mines of South Africa

Private sector: AngloGold Ashanti, Metorex Limited, SouthernEra Diamonds Inc., Rand Refineries, Aerolift, Harmony, Sentinelle Global Investment

Switzerland

Private sector: Société generale de surveillance SA, Argor-Heraeus

Uganda

Government: Office of the President, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Civil Aviation Authority, Customs Authority, Immigration Authority, Police

Organization: United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Diplomatic missions: Belgium, France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Private sector: Machanga Limited, A.P. Bhimji Limited, Uganda Commercial Impex, Luwero Industries, Showa Trade

Ukraine

Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Administration of Ukraine for Aviation Safety Oversight

Organizations: United Nations Development Programme, European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM)

Private sector: Antonov Design Bureau

United Arab Emirates

Private sector: Dubai Multi Commodities Centre, Emirates Gold

United Republic of Tanzania

Government: Customs Office

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department for International Development, Treasury Department, All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes Region

Organizations: Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, International Alert, Human Rights Watch, International Council on Mining and Metals

Private sector: Anglo American, Central African Mining & Exploration Company, First Quantum Minerals Ltd., Tullow Oil plc, Heritage Oil, A&M Group, Crown Agents, ICMM, Group 4 Securicor plc, ArmorGroup International plc, Afrimex, Kroll, Alex Stewart, De Beers, Control Risks

United States of America

Government: Department of the Treasury, Department of State, National Security Council, U.S. Geological Survey


Diplomatic Missions: Democratic Republic of the Congo

Organizations: United Nations (Department of Political Affairs, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), WWF International (Mining Certification Evaluation Project), World Bank, World Diamond Council

Private sector: Phelps Dodge, OM Group, Alex Stewart International, Kroll Corporation, Boeing Company

Annex II

Aviation network around Bukavu



Annex III

Aircraft found in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

N	Immatriculation	No Enregistr	Date enreg	Type acft	No serie	Proprietaire	Exploitant	Base	CDN	Assurance	Remarques
1	9Q-CER	1113	14/01/04	AN-12	2340805		AEROLIFT RSA	BENI	?		
2	9Q-CVE	1116		AN-26	5301		MIDDLELAND	BENI	21/07/06		
3	9Q-CSA	1137		AN-26	5005		AEROLIFT RSA	BENI	07/-6/06		
4	9Q-CGM	0146A	17/05/1985	AN-26 B	6401		MANGO AIRLINES	BENI	?		
5	9Q-CAZ	1090	02/05/1991	Let 410 UVP	790205		CETRACA	Beni Wageni	24/02/2007		
6	9Q-CKQ	1093	26/06/85	AN-26	5210		CETRACA	BENI-WAGENI	24/02/07		
7	9Q-CKX	1094	26/6/84	LET 410 UVP-E	790303		CETRACA	BENI-WAGENI	24/02/07		
8	9Q-CBP	606	10/10/1995	Cessna 205	2050118		VAC	BUKAVU	?		
9	9Q-CBL	620	03/01/1994	Partenavia	131		SCIBE AIRLIFT	BUKAVU	?		
10	9Q-CDS	1095	03/11/2005	C 401 A	401A-0129		SWALA	BUKAVU	?		
11	9Q-CXF	1123		SC7 SKYVAN	SH1915		SWALA	BUKAVU	19/08/06		
12	9Q-COL	1149		AN-28	1AJ002-09		MIDDLELAND	BUKAVU	17/11/06		
13	9Q-CSW	1150		LET 410 A	730209		SWALA	BUKAVU	?		
14	9Q-COM	1156		AN-28	1AJ008-21		MIDDLELAND	BUKAVU	06/12/2006		
15	9Q-CFX		16/03/1978	SKYVAN			SWALA	BUKAVU	?		
16	9Q-CKC		24/01/94	AN-28			AIGLE AVIATION	BUKAVU	?		
17	ER-AJC			AN-28			SWALA	BUKAVU	?		
18	3B-GFI	1	04/04/2001	N-26	1019		AIGLE AVIATION	BUKAVU	?		
19	3C-AAG			AN-12			AIGLE AVIATION	BUKAVU	?		
20	3C-AAL			AN-12			TRAMUNCO	BUKAVU	?		
21	3C-BAA			AN-26			BARON CONGO MINING	BUKAVU	?		
22	3C-DDB			AN-28			BARON CONGO MINING	BUKAVU	?		
23	9Q-CAX	1101	02/10/1989	AN-28	1A100208		Butembo Airlines	Butembo	?		
24	9Q-CAW	1117	08/09/1989	AN-26	2206		MIDDLELAND	Butembo	?		
25	9Q-CBO	886	04/02/1995	DHC-6-300	735		TMK	ENTEBBE	RADIE		
26	9Q-CHE	856	18/3/88	KING AIR 90	LJ969		TMK	GOMA	?		
27	9Q-COI	932		CESSNA CARAVANE	345		TMK	GOMA	?		
28	9Q-CBP	961	07/05/1995	F 27 MK 600	10410		TMK	GOMA	?		
29	9Q-CJU	1085	22/6/98	AN-32	1408		AEROLIFT RSA	GOMA	?		
30	9Q-CCW	1104	07/11/2003	CASA 212-20	263		KIVU AIR	GOMA	?		
31	9Q-CCX	1105	12/11/2003	PIPER PA 30	30308		KIVU AIR	GOMA	?		
32	9Q-CAC	1129	12/11/1977	AN-32 B	1407		GLBC	Goma	?		
33	9Q-CCM	1134	12/03/2003	AN-28	IAJ010-04		COMAIR	GOMA	?		
34	9Q-CKC	1135	23/12/1997	AN-28	1AJ009-18		COMAIR	GOMA	23/05/06		
35	9Q-CBQ	1141	12/04/1996	Let 410 UVP	851338		DOREN CONGO	Goma	11/09/2006		
36	9Q-CQZ	1153		LET 410 UVP-E	851339		DOREN AIR CONGO	GOMA	05/11/2006		
37	9Q-CEL	1160	13/1/01	DHC-6-300	719		TMK	GOMA	03/01/2007		
38	9Q-CUB	1167		LET 410 UVP	790325		SAFE AIR COMPANY	GOMA	28/11/06		
39	9Q-CAM		07/11/1978	DC-3			VAC	Goma	?		
40	9Q-CAM		06/12/1978	DC-3	Nil		VAC	Goma	?		
41	9Q-CBO		10/03/1995	DHC-6-300	735		TMK	GOMA	?		
42	9Q-CCX		07/11/2003	DHC-6-300			KIVU AIR	GOMA	?		
43	9Q-CDF		08/05/2004	CESSNA 402B	510		VAC	GOMA	?		
44	9Q-CDM		10/06/2005	B727			BLUE AIRLINES	GOMA	?		
45	9Q-CIA		19/3/04				VAC	GOMA	?		
46	9Q-CIP		20/12/04	AN-32			AEROLIFT RSA	GOMA	?		
47	9Q-CIY		20/7/04				GOMAIR	GOMA	?		
48	9Q-CLV		29/10/02	DC8			LAC	GOMA	?		
49	9Q-CMG		29/4/97	AN-32			GLBC	GOMA	?		
50	9Q-CTN			PARTENAVIA			VAC	GOMA	?		

51	9Q-CTW			C-172		VAC	GOMA	?	
52	9Q-CZH ou HG					VAC	GOMA	?	
53	3D-			LET 410 UVP		GR AVIATION	GOMA	?	
54	3D-ATH			DC-3		AIR LINK	GOMA	?	
55	3D-BOE	CI No 269	06/09/2003	B727	18933	GLBC	GOMA	?	
56	3D-BOZ			HELICO	2160	SAFE AIR COMPANY	GOMA	?	
57	3D-DEN			LET 410 UVP	892325	ECHO FLIGHT	GOMA	?	
58	3D-ERS			LET 410 UVP		DOREN AIR AFRICA	GOMA	?	
59	3D-KMJ			B727	19892	MANGO MAT	GOMA	?	
60	3D-PFI			VISCOUNT		MANGO MAT	GOMA	?	
61	3D-SBZ			IL 18 D		MANGO MAT	GOMA	?	
62	5N-BCB	4	15/05/01	Fairchild FH 227	558	MANGO MAT	GOMA	?	
63	5Y-ARB			C-206		SERVICE AIR	GOMA	?	
64	5Y-BKA			BE-200		VAC	GOMA	?	
65	5Y-BTP			TWIN OTTER	104		GOMA	?	
66	5Y-EOE			BE 1900C	UC-90		GOMA	?	
67	9L-LBM			LET 410 UVP			GOMA	?	
68	9L-LEM			LET 410 UVP		GLBC	GOMA	?	
69	9U-BHM			AN-26		ECHO FLIGHT	GOMA	?	
70	9U-BHN			AN-12			GOMA	?	
71	9U-BHO			AN-12			GOMA	?	
72	9U-BHR			AN-28			GOMA	?	
73	9XR-EJ			LET 410 UVP			GOMA	?	
74	9XR-KI			AN-28			GOMA	?	Radie
75	9XR-KV			AN-28		AIR SERV	GOMA	?	Radie
76	EL-WVA			AN-8		AIR SERV	GOMA	?	
77	3C-QQT			AN-32		GLBC	GOMA	?	
78	3C-AAL			AN-12		CHC STELLAVIA	GOMA	?	
79	3C-AAG			AN-12		Air Navette	KISANGANI	?	Base a Entebbe

Annex IV

Diplomatic note on natural resource smugglers and arms traffickers

