REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON HIS MISSION
OF GOOD OFFICES IN CYPRUS

1. The present report on my mission of good offices concerning Cyprus is being submitted pursuant to the request contained in the note by the President of the Security Council of 22 February 1990 (S/21160). In that note, I was requested to inform the Council of the results of the meeting I was proposing to hold with the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus and to give my assessment of the situation thereafter.

2. The members of the Council will recall that in my statement of 22 February 1990 I had informed them that both leaders had accepted my invitation to hold meetings for an indefinite period of time, beginning on 26 February, and to make a determined effort to arrive at an agreed outline of an overall agreement. In the above-mentioned note, the members of the Council had called upon the two leaders to demonstrate the necessary goodwill and flexibility and to co-operate fully with me so that the talks would result in a major step towards the resolution of the Cyprus problem.

3. My talks with the two leaders began on Monday, 26 February and ended on Friday, 2 March 1990. Joint meetings were held in the mornings and afternoons of the first three days, and again on Friday afternoon. Separate meetings were held with each leader on Friday morning. I was present throughout these meetings, as was my Special Representative.

4. In my opening statement (see annex I), I stressed that if we were to achieve the agreed objective, both sides should be prepared to take into account each other's concerns and be willing to harmonize their respective interests. I said that the meetings would fail if either side insisted on limiting the scope of the work to those issues that it considered important. Solutions to all issues of the Cyprus problem had to be found that were acceptable to both sides.

5. In this connection, I stated that the task of arriving at an agreed outline could be facilitated if both leaders agreed at the outset to reflect appropriately under the overall objectives of the agreement the following understandings, which I read to them in these terms:
"Cyprus is the common home of the Greek Cypriot community and of the Turkish Cypriot community. Their relationship is not one of majority and minority, but one of two communities in the State of Cyprus. The mandate given to me by the Security Council makes it clear that my mission of good offices is with the two communities. My mandate is also explicit that the participation of the two communities in this process is on an equal footing. The solution that is being sought is thus one that must be decided upon by, and must be acceptable to, both communities. It must also respect the cultural, religious, social and linguistic identity of each community.

"The 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements between the two communities, as well as the mandate entrusted to me by the Security Council, have set out the framework within which a solution must be found. The two communities and the Security Council have committed themselves to a solution that will ensure the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of Cyprus. The two communities have, in the 1979 high-level agreement, specifically rejected as options union in whole or in part with any other country and any form of partition or secession. The two communities have stated that they wish to establish a federation that is bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects."

6. In anticipation of their discussion of the outline of an agreement, I, inter alia, recalled the following: the political equality of the two communities in, and the bi-communal nature of, the federation need to be acknowledged; the bi-zonality of the federation should be clearly brought out; the unity of the State must be ensured; the powers and functions of the federal Government will need to ensure the effective participation of the two communities as well as the effective functioning of the Government; the fundamental rights of all citizens, including the three freedoms, as well as political, economic, social and cultural rights must be safeguarded; arrangements to ensure the security of each community need to be worked out; considerations for dealing with territorial adjustments; the need to resolve the issue of displaced persons in a manner that is sensitive to the interests of both communities; measures need to be devised to promote the development of a balanced economy benefiting both communities; and transitional arrangements will also need to be worked out.

7. Continuing, I mentioned that the headings that had emerged from earlier meetings lent themselves to the consideration of all the issues and concerns expressed by each side, and suggested that they be used as the basis for organizing the talks. These headings were:

(a) Overall objectives of the agreement;

(b) Guiding principles of the federation:

(i) Federal union;

(ii) Bi-communality;

(iii) Bi-zonality;

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(c) Constitutional aspects of the federation:

(i) Powers and functions to be vested in the federal Government;

(ii) Structure, composition, and functioning of the federal Government;

(iii) Fundamental rights, including the three freedoms, and political, economic, social and cultural rights;

(d) Security and guarantees;

(e) Territorial adjustments;

(f) Displaced persons;

(g) Economic development and safeguards;

(h) Transitional arrangements.

8. I suggested that our work be organized in two parts. The first part would be devoted to a discussion of the issues under each of the headings and the second part would be devoted to the actual preparation of an outline. In the event, it did not prove possible to proceed along the lines I had suggested, for reasons I shall explain below, and that resulted in an impasse.

9. When, despite my various suggestions and appeals, the difficulties that had emerged from the very outset of the meeting on Monday morning remained unresolved on Wednesday afternoon, I proposed that we should not meet on Thursday to allow me to reflect and to weigh carefully the views expressed by both leaders. In a further effort to overcome the difficulties, I met each leader separately on Friday morning. Regrettably, no progress was possible.

10. When we reconvened in a joint meeting on Friday afternoon, I made a statement (see annex II). In that statement I recalled that paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 367 (1975), inter alia, called upon the parties concerned to refrain from any action which might prejudice the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of Cyprus, as well as from any attempt at partition of the island or its unification with any other country. Further, paragraph 7 of the same resolution called on the representatives of the two communities to co-operate closely with the Secretary-General in the discharge of his mission of good offices and asked them to accord personally a high priority to their negotiations.

11. I stated that, in drawing up its mandate for the Secretary-General's good offices on Cyprus, the Security Council had thus posited a solution based on the existence of one State of Cyprus comprising two communities.

12. Continuing, I said that in line with the mandate entrusted to me by the Security Council and the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements, the objective of the exercise of good offices was a new constitution for the State of Cyprus that would regulate the relations between the two communities in Cyprus on a federal,
bi-communal and bi-zonal basis. In this effort, each community would participate on an equal footing and would also have the opportunity to express separately its consent to the arrangements reached.

13. Further, I recalled that, in the course of the discussion, Mr. Denktaş had stated that the term "communities" be used in a manner that was synonymous with the term "peoples", each having a separate right to "self-determination". Mr. Denktaş also proposed certain other terms for the word "communities". I stated that, in the context of the intercommunal talks, the introduction of terminology that was different from that used by the Security Council had thus posed more than a semantic problem and that, unless acceptable to both sides, any change in terminology could alter the conceptual framework to which all had thus far adhered. In the circumstances, I came to the conclusion, regretfully, that we faced an impasse of a substantive kind, which raised questions regarding the essence of the mandate of good offices given to me by the Security Council and, therefore, regarding the basis of the talks.

14. While upon my suggestion Mr. Vassiliou and Mr. Denktaş made certain substantive comments regarding the outline of an overall agreement, these could not be pursued for the reasons I explained above.

15. In my concluding statement therefore, I again recalled the understandings I had suggested in my opening statement (see para. 5 above). I also appealed to both leaders not to say or do anything that could aggravate the situation in Cyprus, and to remain committed to finding a solution of the problem of Cyprus in the framework of the intercommunal talks. Both leaders assured me that they remained committed to this objective. I informed them that I would be in touch with them again after reporting to the Security Council and seeking its guidance.

16. On Monday, 5 March, I received a letter from Mr. Denktaş, dated 4 March 1990, in which he inter alia stated that:

"The difficulties which confronted us during our meetings relating to the use of the word communities or peoples have not been correctly reflected in your statement. Whatever terminology is used, it is clear that the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots are two distinct and separate peoples with the right to freely determine their political status. The insistence on use of the word community in a restrictive sense and the refusal to accept any other proposed alternative is tantamount to a rejection of this right. Security Council resolution 367 (1975) was never intended to build a conceptual framework which would restrict or take away any right of the two parties in Cyprus which they already possessed and exercised both before and after this resolution. This right will be expressed once again to transform the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus into one of the constituent republics of the future federation in Cyprus following the current negotiations, if they result in an acceptable solution to my people. It is only after this process that a solution based on one State in the form of a federal union comprising two peoples will have been achieved."

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17. In concluding, I should like to stress that it is important that this process, in which we have been so diligently engaged, not be allowed to collapse. Despite my disappointment that it did not prove possible to advance in drafting an outline of an overall agreement, I remain of the view that a basis for effective negotiations exists provided both leaders are prepared to take into account each other's concerns and that both are willing to proceed within the framework of the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements.

18. It will be recalled that, in those agreements, the leaders of the two communities pledged themselves to establish a bi-communal and bi-zonal Federal Republic of Cyprus that would safeguard its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment and exclude union in whole or in part with any other country as well as any form of partition or secession. As I have repeatedly indicated to the parties, the solution that is being sought is one that must be decided upon by, and must be acceptable to, both communities.

19. It is important that the two leaders agree to pursue seriously the current effort in accordance with their 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements as well as Security Council resolution 367 (1975), to reach freely a solution providing for a political settlement and the establishment of a mutually acceptable constitutional arrangement and to co-operate on an equal footing with me to complete, as the next step, an outline of an overall agreement, as they had agreed to do in June 1989.

20. I, for my part, will continue to spare no effort in carrying out the mission of good offices in accordance with the mandate entrusted to me by the Security Council and shall assist the two communities to arrive at an agreed solution by helping them to find ways of harmonizing their respective interests and concerns.

21. I thought it important to report to you in some detail about what transpired last week to help you to assess the situation and to provide me with such guidance as you might consider appropriate.
Annex I

Opening statement delivered by the Secretary-General on Monday, 26 February 1990, at 12.15 p.m.

I am pleased to welcome you once again to the Headquarters of the United Nations. As you know, the objective of our meeting is to prepare a draft outline of an overall agreement as you had agreed to do when we met on 6 April and again on 29 June 1989.

The world today is very different from what it was when we last were together. We are witnessing changes that not long ago were unthinkable. These events have created both the expectations and the conditions for the resolution of problems that were thought to be intractable. As a result, leaders throughout the world are now encouraged to look at problems anew and to move forward with a degree of confidence and determination not seen since the foundation of the United Nations. Recent developments have shown that disputes can be resolved if problems are addressed reasonably and with goodwill, and if attention is paid to the legitimate concerns and interests of all the parties involved. The Cyprus problem should not be an exception.

The international environment in which this meeting is taking place has heightened the expectations about what it should achieve. This is clearly reflected in the position expressed a few days ago by the members of the Security Council that these talks should result in a major step towards the resolution of the Cyprus problem. I believe that this can be accomplished provided both leaders are prepared to reach a solution.

If we are to achieve the objective of our meeting, both sides must be prepared to take into account each other's concerns and be willing to make a joint effort to find a way to harmonize their respective interests. This meeting will fail if either side insists on limiting the scope of the work only to those issues that it considers important. The Cyprus problem cannot be solved through a selective approach of the issues involved. Solutions acceptable to both communities must be found for all those issues. This calls for both moderation and a willingness to reach a mutually acceptable agreement, for it is your joint responsibility, as the leaders of the two communities, to arrive at an agreed outline through direct talks. My responsibility, emanating from the Security Council, is to help you achieve this objective.

The three rounds of talks since August 1988 have clearly identified the issues that comprise the Cyprus problem and the ramifications of these issues. The ground has thus been prepared for addressing unequivocally all the issues, including the understandings that underlie a solution.

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Cyprus is the common home of the Greek Cypriot community and of the Turkish Cypriot community. Their relationship is not one of majority and minority, but one of two communities in the State of Cyprus. The mandate given to me by the Security Council makes it clear that my mission of good offices is with the two communities. My mandate is also explicit that the participation of the two communities in this process is on an equal footing. The solution that is being sought is thus one that must be decided upon by, and must be acceptable to, both communities. It must also respect the cultural, religious, social and linguistic identity of each community.

The 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements between the two communities, as well as the mandate entrusted to me by the Security Council, have set out the framework within which a solution must be found. The two communities and the Security Council have committed themselves to a solution that will ensure the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of Cyprus. The two communities have, in the 1979 high-level agreement, specifically rejected as options union in whole or in part with any other country and any form of partition or secession. The two communities have stated that they wish to establish a federation that is bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects.

The task of arriving at an agreed outline could be facilitated if both leaders agreed to reflect these understandings appropriately in the section of the outline concerning the overall objectives of the agreement, a subject with which I shall shall deal shortly.

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An outline of an overall agreement, and therefore this meeting, must cover all the issues that make up the Cyprus problem. As you will recall, in our separate meetings last November and December, I had asked you to agree to the headings that had clearly emerged from your talks. These headings lend themselves to the consideration of all the issues and concerns expressed by each side, and thus provide a good basis for organizing our work.

Since August 1988, you have had the opportunity to exchange ideas that are relevant to each of the headings. When we last met on 29 June 1989, I referred to ideas that had been explored with each of you on a non-committal basis and that I thought would be helpful during the direct talks phase of your effort. It would be useful to recall them as you begin your work.

The political equality of the two communities in and the bi-communal nature of the federation need to be acknowledged. While political equality does not mean equal numerical participation in all federal government branches and administration, it should be reflected inter alia in various ways: in the requirement that the federal constitution of the State of Cyprus be approved or amended with the concurrence of both communities; in the effective participation of both communities in all organs and decisions of the federal Government; in safeguards to ensure that the federal Government will not be empowered to adopt any measures against the interests of one community; and in the equality and identical powers and functions of the two federated States.
The bi-zonality of the federation should be clearly brought out by the fact that each federated State will be administered by one community which will be firmly guaranteed a clear majority of the population and of the land ownership in its area. It will also be clear from the fact that the federal Government will not be permitted to encroach upon the powers and functions of the federated States.

The unity of the State must be ensured. This should be reflected in the single international personality and sovereignty of the federation of Cyprus, as well as in its single citizenship.

The powers and functions of the federal Government, including the structure, composition and functioning of its three branches, will need to ensure the effective participation of the two communities as well as the effective functioning of the Government, which will require an appropriate deadlock-resolving machinery. It was also suggested that all powers not vested in the federal Government be under the jurisdiction of the two federated States, and that each federated State decide on its own governmental arrangements.

The fundamental rights of all citizens, including the three freedoms, as well as political, economic, social and cultural rights, must be safeguarded. It has been suggested that these rights be recognized in the federal constitution and that they be regulated by the federated States in a manner to be agreed upon and consistent with the federal constitution. It was mentioned that freedom of movement could be exercised as soon as the federal republic is established. Freedom of settlement and the right to property will be implemented taking into account the ceilings to be agreed upon concerning the number of persons from one community who may reside in the area administered by the other and the amount of property which persons of one community may own in the federated State administered by the other. These rights would be implemented after the arrangements concerning the displaced persons have been completed.

Arrangements to ensure the security of each community are, of course, of great importance. In line with the 1979 high-level agreement, it has been suggested that the demilitarization of the federation will remain an objective. In the meantime, a series of measures have been suggested to reduce drastically the presence of foreign troops and to achieve a military balance between the two sides at the lowest possible level by the time the federation is established. Arrangements have also been identified to prevent any paramilitary activities. It was envisaged that the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance would remain a valid framework, and that they be updated keeping in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In this context, it was suggested that the presence of Greek and Turkish contingents of reasonable and equal size is an essential feature of security in Cyprus.

As concerns territorial adjustments, the 1977 high-level agreement was recalled. Arrangements were mentioned that would enable a substantial number of Greek Cypriot displaced persons to return under Greek Cypriot administration and that these arrangements would take into account, on a priority basis, the Turkish Cypriot persons that would be affected.

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The issue of displaced persons must be resolved in a manner that is sensitive to the interests of both communities. Ideas were explored for recognizing and implementing the rights of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot displaced persons. It was mentioned that priority should be given to the displaced persons returning to the area that will come under Greek Cypriot administration and to the Turkish Cypriot persons living there. It was also mentioned that displaced persons from both communities would be given the option to decide, within an agreed time-frame, whether they wish or not to return to their former residence under the administration of the other community. Those deciding not to return, as well as all those who owned property other than their primary residence, would be compensated fairly and promptly for their properties. It was mentioned that arrangements for those who wish to exercise the option to return would begin to be implemented after the resettlement of those returning to the area that will come under Greek Cypriot administration has been essentially completed. Such arrangements should be consistent with the provisions envisaged for the three freedoms, including the ceilings, and will provide for measures to safeguard the security and interests of both communities.

Measures also need to be devised to promote the development of a balanced economy benefiting both communities. Transitional arrangements will also need to be worked out.

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I now propose to turn to a number of organizational matters.

As you know, I have proposed that you accept the headings which have emerged from the earlier talks as a basis for organizing our work. You will recall that these headings and sub-headings are the following:

(a) Overall objectives of the agreement;

(b) Guiding principles of the federation:
   (i) Federal union;
   (ii) Bi-communality;
   (iii) Bi-zonality;

(c) Constitutional aspects of the federation:
   (i) Powers and functions to be vested in the federal Government;
   (ii) Structure, composition, and functioning of the federal Government;
   (iii) Fundamental rights, including the three freedoms, and political, economic, social and cultural rights;

(d) Security and guarantees;
(e) Territorial adjustments;
(f) Displaced persons;
(g) Economic development and safeguards;
(h) Transitional arrangements.

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When I invited you to meet with me, I wrote that our meeting should be of such reasonable duration as may be necessary to enable you to engage in serious discussion of all the issues and make a determined effort to arrive at an agreed outline. Much will, of course, depend on how the meeting evolves. Nevertheless, in order to organise our work, we should proceed on the basis of an indicative timetable.

I would suggest that we organise our programme into two parts. The first part would be devoted to a discussion of the issues under each of the aforementioned headings, in the order that I have mentioned them. No papers will be presented. I propose that we devote the first three days, that is through Wednesday, to such a discussion - a first reading as it were of all the headings. While the discussion under each heading will not require the same amount of time, it is, of course, important that all headings receive serious attention. The second part of our meeting would be devoted to the actual preparation of an outline. Of course, we will review our schedule and the time we require in the light of experience. I propose to keep informal summary notes of our discussion.

If you agree, I would suggest that this afternoon we proceed with the discussion of issues relevant to the first two headings, that is the overall objectives of the agreement and the guiding principles of the federation. As I said before, I believe that the discussion on these and other headings would be facilitated if you could agree to reflect appropriately in the section of the outline concerning the overall objectives of the agreement the understandings I have suggested.

I propose that the format for our meeting be the same as in previous joint meetings. I suggest that, beginning tomorrow, we meet from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m. and again from 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. I shall endeavour to be present much of the time and I will arrange, if absent, to return at short notice. I have asked Mr. Camillón to be present throughout.

To allow for the most productive discussions possible, it is important that we commit ourselves to a few ground rules. Firstly, since an agreement can be achieved only as an integrated whole, agreement on any issue will be committing only when agreement is reached on all issues. Secondly, while the talks are in progress, I would suggest that we refrain from making any public statement about the talks, the manner in which the work is proceeding or about the views expressed by either side. Thirdly, as an expression of your commitment to a serious effort, I would suggest a moratorium on any negative campaigns against each other, here or
elsewhere. As I have often stressed, negotiations are unlikely to succeed without an improved atmosphere, and an improved atmosphere cannot endure without meaningful negotiations.

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The meeting that is beginning today is of the utmost significance. Its outcome is likely to have a major bearing on the future of the dialogue as well as on the perception of the international community. The expectations, not least among the members of the Security Council, are that the talks should produce results that will effectively advance the resolution of the Cyprus problem.

You are here as Cypriot leaders who share a historical responsibility to both communities and to Cyprus as a whole. If you approach your task not face to face but side by side and commit yourselves to moderation and a willingness to compromise, you will succeed. I need hardly remind you, given my many years of dealing with this problem, that it is only at your level that real progress can be made.
Annex II

Statement delivered by the Secretary-General on Friday, 2 March 1980, at 4 p.m.

I wish you to know that, since we last met on Wednesday, I have reflected deeply on our discussions. I have weighed most carefully the views that were expressed by Dr. Vassiliou and Mr. Denktash. In addition, I have met with you both individually this morning.

It will be recalled that paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 367 (1975) requested, inter alia, the parties concerned to refrain from any action which might prejudice the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of Cyprus, as well as from any attempt at partition of the island or its unification with any other country. Further, paragraph 7 of the same resolution called on the representatives of the two communities to co-operate closely with the Secretary-General in the discharge of his mission of good offices and asked them to accord personally a high priority to their negotiations.

In drawing up its mandate for the Secretary-General's good offices on Cyprus, the Security Council thus posited a solution based on the existence of one State of Cyprus comprising two communities.

In line with the mandate entrusted to me by the Security Council and the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements, the objective of the exercise of good offices is a new constitution for the State of Cyprus that will regulate the relations between the two communities in Cyprus on a federal, bi-communal and bi-sonal basis. In this effort, each community will participate on an equal footing and will also have the opportunity to express separately its consent to the arrangements reached.

In the course of our discussion, Mr. Denktash stated that the term "communities" be used in a manner that is synonymous with the term "peoples", each having a separate right to "self-determination". Mr. Denktash also proposed certain other terms for the word "communities". In the context of the intercommunal talks, the introduction of terminology that is different from that used by the Security Council has thus posed more than a semantic problem. Unless acceptable to both sides, any change in terminology could alter the conceptual framework to which all have thus far adhered. In the circumstances, I have come to the conclusion, regretfully, that we face an impasse of a substantive kind, which raises questions regarding the mandate of good offices given to me by the Security Council and, therefore, regarding the basis of the talks.

In view of this, I must inform the Security Council of the situation as it exists at present and seek the Council's guidance on how to proceed.

For my part, in my opening statement in the present talks, I have said:

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"Cyprus is the common home of the Greek Cypriot community and of the Turkish Cypriot community. Their relationship is not one of majority and minority, but one of two communities in the State of Cyprus. The mandate given to me by the Security Council makes it clear that my mission of good offices is with the two communities. My mandate is also explicit that the participation of the two communities in this process is on an equal footing. The solution that is being sought is thus one that must be decided upon by, and must be acceptable to, both communities. It must also respect the cultural, religious, social and linguistic identity of each community."

I have also said:

"The 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements between the two communities, as well as the mandate entrusted to me by the Security Council, have set the framework within which a solution must be found. The two communities and the Security Council have committed themselves to a solution that will ensure the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of Cyprus. The two communities have, in the 1979 high-level agreement, specifically rejected as options union in whole or in part with any other country and any form of partition or secession. The two communities have stated that they wish to establish a federation that is bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects."

In light of the present situation, given the high expectations which will have been disappointed by the inability to make progress, and the possible consequences for Cyprus, I must appeal to both of you not to say or do anything that could aggravate the situation of Cyprus. I must also appeal to you to remain committed to finding a solution to the problem of Cyprus in the framework of the intercommunal talks. The process in which we have been so diligently engaged must not be allowed to collapse. I shall therefore be in touch with you again after reporting to the Security Council and seeking its guidance.