



Security Council

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Eleventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1603 (2005), by which the Council requested me to keep it regularly informed of developments in Côte d'Ivoire and in the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). The report covers developments since my report of 17 October 2006 (S/2006/821).

II. Political developments

2. While it was welcomed in the subregion as a major step forward, Security Council resolution 1721 (2006) received mixed reactions from the Ivorian parties. On 2 November, President Laurent Gbagbo delivered an address to the nation in which he welcomed the resolution, but added that those of its provisions that were "inconsistent with the Constitution" of Côte d'Ivoire would not be implemented. Subsequently, the President announced that he was conducting a series of consultations with various segments of Ivorian society, including religious and traditional leaders, youth and women's organizations, and the business community, with a view to developing an "alternative framework" for resolving the Ivorian crisis. In that regard, the President expressed the view that all the peace plans devised by the international community since the conflict started had failed and that the Ivorian people therefore had the responsibility to find "their own solution". This course of action was generally perceived as an attempt to walk away from resolution 1721 (2006).

3. On 3 November, the Chief of Staff of the National Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FANCI), General Philippe Mangou, made a radio/television broadcast in which he assured President Gbagbo of the support of the Defence and Security Forces. General Mangou also welcomed the President's initiative to hold consultations with the various segments of the population and called upon the Forces nouvelles to return to the negotiation table. On 18 November, supporters of President Gbagbo, united under the umbrella group, the National Resistance Council for Democracy (CNRD) issued a statement presenting their views on the resolution of the crisis. The statement called for the appointment of a new prime minister by the President; the separation of the identification process from the preparation of the electoral rolls; the lifting of the zone of confidence; and the withdrawal of the French Licorne force.



4. For their part, the Forces nouvelles issued a statement on 2 November 2006 in which they welcomed resolution 1721 (2006), saying that it addressed their major concerns. The coalition of the opposition parties, Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix, similarly welcomed the resolution and called on its supporters to boycott the consultations initiated by President Gbagbo.

5. In an address to the nation on 8 November, Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny expressed his determination to implement resolution 1721 (2006) and stated that there was no need for another framework to resolve the Ivorian crisis. He also announced that he intended to focus on the outstanding tasks assigned to him, in particular disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion; identification of the population; dismantling of the militia; restructuring of the army; redeployment of state administration; and preparations for the elections. In that regard, the Prime Minister indicated that he would take all necessary measures to relaunch as soon as possible the disarmament programme and to establish a new structure for the military dialogue between the Forces nouvelles and FANCI.

6. The opposition parties and the Forces nouvelles commended the resolve shown by the Prime Minister in his 8 November statement and pledged their full support to him in the implementation of his peace mission. Similar sentiments were expressed by several civil society groups, who urged the Prime Minister to move expeditiously to implement resolution 1721 (2006).

7. On 7 November, I sent letters to President Denis Sassou-Nguesso of the Republic of the Congo and President Mamadou Tandja of the Republic of the Niger, the current chairmen of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), respectively, requesting them to intervene personally in order to secure the acceptance of the resolution by all the parties and avert the new developing stalemate. I also emphasized that it was imperative for the Ivorian political leaders to immediately open a dialogue aimed at reaching consensus on a flexible way to implement resolution 1721 (2006).

8. My Special Representative, Pierre Schori, along with the High Representative for the elections, Gérard Stoudmann, and the Special Representative of the African Union Mediator, General Jean-Marie Mokoko, engaged in extensive consultations with the main Ivorian parties and the local media to impress upon them the need to implement resolution 1721 (2006) in good faith and in full. They also met with the Prime Minister in Yamoussoukro on 12 November to discuss the next steps. The Prime Minister reaffirmed his determination to implement the resolution, but stressed that this required the necessary political will from all the parties. The Prime Minister also requested UNOCI and other international partners to assist the Government to develop a plan for the implementation of the new transition process. President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Banny held a private meeting on 23 November, facilitated by the Special Representative of the International Organization of la Francophonie, Lansana Kouyaté, to discuss the way forward in setting the new transition process into motion.

9. In keeping with paragraph 21 of resolution 1721 (2006), the day-to-day mediation group met on 8 November, under the chairmanship of the Special Representative of the African Union Mediator and with the participation of my Special Representative, the High Representative for the elections, the Special Representatives of the ECOWAS Executive Secretary and of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, and a representative of the International Organization

of la Francophonie. The mediation group has so far held four meetings since the adoption of resolution 1721 (2006). The meetings discussed how best to assist the Prime Minister in preparing a road map for the new transition period. To that end, the mediation group decided to develop a new draft implementation schedule, which will be presented to the Prime Minister and the next ministerial meeting of the International Working Group established by the Security Council under resolution 1633 (2005), scheduled to take place on 1 December.

10. Despite the efforts to encourage the Ivorian leaders to open a constructive dialogue and work together to relaunch the implementation of the identification and disarmament processes and the re-establishment of state authority throughout the country, the political atmosphere appeared to be deteriorating, with deepening disagreements between the President and the Prime Minister. On 23 November, the national commission of inquiry into the toxic waste scandal submitted its final report, in which it confirmed that the Minister of Transport, the General Manager of the Port of Abidjan, the Director-General of Customs and the Governor of the District of Abidjan, should be held accountable for the dumping of toxic waste from a foreign vessel in July 2006. Those officials had already been suspended from their respective posts by the Prime Minister on 6 and 14 September.

11. However, on 26 November, President Gbagbo issued presidential decrees limiting the suspension of the officials to three months, until 16 December. On 27 November, the Office of the Prime Minister broadcast a statement on national television stating that the Prime Minister had not been consulted on the decrees, that the matter should have been discussed within the Government and that the President's decisions were contrary to the principles of good governance, transparency and justice and would represent a major impediment in the fight against impunity. On 26 November, President Gbagbo also dismissed the Director-General and the entire board of the government newspaper *Fraternité Matin*, after the newspaper printed an article expressing the view that resolution 1721 (2006) was the only way out of the crisis.

12. In the early hours of 28 November, elements of the Defence and Security Forces entered the premises of the state-owned Radio Télévision Ivoirienne (RTI) by force and prevented a repeat broadcast of the Prime Minister's statement. On the same day, in a major confrontational step, President Gbagbo issued a decree dismissing the Director-General and the management board of the RTI. The situation deteriorated, with demonstrations organized in several towns to protest against the President's decisions. In addition, on 1 December, the Republican Guard blocked the UNOCI unit in charge of the Prime Minister's security from access to the Prime Minister's compound.

13. The International Working Group met in Abidjan on 1 December. The Group noted with deep concern the delays in implementing resolution 1721 (2006). It also condemned the dismissals at the RTI, noting that they were contrary to the Pretoria Agreement, as undermining the neutrality and impartiality of the public media as well as freedom of expression. It considered indispensable the reinstatement of the officials.

14. The Working Group also set out the main timelines for relaunching the disarmament and identification processes, the preparations for the elections, as well as the commencement of the reform of the security sector. It further condemned obstructions to the freedom of movement of the impartial forces, in particular the

refusal by the Republican Guard to grant the UNOCI unit in charge of the Prime Minister's security access to his compound. Reacting to the communiqué of the Working Group on 3 December, President Gbagbo said that it strengthened his resolve to develop an alternative solution to the Ivorian crisis. He added that he would inform me and the Security Council of the "dangerous stance" taken by the Working Group.

III. Security situation

15. The security situation has remained relatively calm following the adoption of Security Council resolution 1721 (2006). However, violent clashes, unrelated to reactions to the resolution, occurred in Yopougon, near Abidjan, on 1 and 3 November 2006, when the local population reacted to criminal harassment by the Groupement des patriotes pour la paix (GPP) militia and the support the militia was receiving from the Defence and Security Forces. At least five people were killed during the clashes, including two militiamen who were burned alive by Yopougon residents. The situation calmed down after the Defence and Security Forces relocated the militia elements, numbering about 200, to the gendarmerie barracks in another part of Abidjan.

16. On 10 November, in Yamoussoukro, a group of youth affiliated with the Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix blocked a convoy of supporters of the presidential camp en route to Abidjan to attend President Gbagbo's consultations. Clashes broke out and two people were wounded. The Defence and Security Forces used tear gas to disperse the crowd. On 20 November, a few days before the release of the report of the national commission of inquiry into the toxic waste scandal, elements of the Young Patriots blocked the access to the Abidjan autonomous port, demanding that the Director-General of the port, suspended by the Prime Minister in September, be reinstated. The Defence and Security Forces dispersed the group.

17. On 6 November 2006, in the western town of Duékoué, militias who were demonstrating to demand payment of the first instalment of their disarmament benefits (safety net allowance) from the National Programme for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (PNDDR), seized a UNOCI vehicle. The incident was resolved following the intervention of UNOCI and the local authorities. Obstruction to the freedom of movement of the impartial forces by militias in the west was reported during the period under review. Meanwhile, in the north, a significant rise in the crime rate was reported, in particular in Bouaké and Korhogo, while ethnic tensions rose in the zone of confidence and in the south-west of the country, leading in particular to the killing of five persons around the village of Blodi during clashes between Burkinabé and Géré, prompting increased patrolling by UNOCI and the French Licorne force in those areas.

IV. Deployment of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

Force deployment and activities

18. As at 20 November, the troop strength of UNOCI stood at 8,042 military personnel, consisting of 11 battalions (5 in Sector West, 4 in Sector East and 2 in Abidjan), one aviation unit, three engineering companies and one transport company

providing support to the battalions. In order to minimize the risk of escalation of the prevailing political tensions in the country, in particular in Abidjan, the force is actively engaged in extensive operational activities, in close cooperation with the French Licorne force. The force conducts an average of 120 patrols per day over the entire theatre of operations, as well as large-scale operations in Abidjan and in the western part of the country, aimed at dominating their areas of responsibility and monitoring the security situation. The force has also undergone a training programme aimed at enhancing its crowd control capacity, in close coordination with the Operation's formed police units. The UNOCI and Licorne force commanders continue to hold monthly meetings with the Chief of Staff of the FANCI, General Mangou. In the meantime, UNOCI and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) continue to conduct simultaneous patrols of the border areas in order to prevent illegal cross-border movements of arms and combatants.

19. Enhanced cooperation between the UNOCI and French Licorne forces in the whole theatre, and notably Abidjan, has culminated in several quick reaction force rehearsals conducted with the Licorne force, which were repeated after each rotation of contingents. At the end of October, as part of the tripartite monthly meetings involving representatives of UNOCI, the Licorne force and the Defence and Security Forces of Côte d'Ivoire, the Chief of Staff of the FANCI agreed, in principle, to resume joint patrols in Abidjan.

20. During the new transition period, it will be essential to adjust the overall posture of the UNOCI military component. In particular, the Force will gradually reduce its presence in the zone of confidence, as appropriate, shift from the current emphasis on separating the armed groups and increase its presence and mobility throughout the country, with a view to enhancing its role in providing security for the resumption of the mobile courts and to the cantonment, demobilization and disarmament sites, securing the electoral process, providing technical assistance to the restructuring of the armed forces, strengthening the protection of civilians and facilitating freedom of movement, especially between the north and the south. To that end, and for the reasons provided in my eighth report, of 3 January 2006 (S/2006/2), I once again urge the Security Council to authorize the deployment of the remaining three battalions out of the four recommended in that report. In addition, the Sous-Groupement de sécurité, which provides security to the signatories of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and members of the Government will be required to provide security for the members of the Electoral Commission and for the High Representative for the elections. It is therefore imperative to reinforce this unit by 250 additional gendarmes.

Police deployment

21. As at 20 November, the strength of the police component of UNOCI stood at 1,004 personnel, including 379 United Nations police officers and 625 personnel from five formed police units, against an authorized police effective of 1,200 personnel. The shortfall is due to the delayed deployment of one formed police unit, which is expected to arrive in the area in January 2007. The United Nations police officers are deployed throughout the country at 22 team sites, in the north and south of the zone of confidence, and within the zone. Two formed police units are deployed in Abidjan, one in Bouaké, one in Daloa and one in Yamoussoukro, while the fifth will be deployed in Guiglo.

22. During the period under review, the joint patrols conducted between United Nations police and the internal security forces (police and gendarmerie) of Côte d'Ivoire, which resumed in June 2006, have been gradually extended to the entire area controlled by the Government, south of the zone of confidence. In the near future, UNOCI intends to launch similar patrols in the area controlled by the Forces nouvelles jointly with the auxiliaries of police who have been trained by UNOCI. During the period ahead, the United Nations police will also continue to interact with the internal security forces of Côte d'Ivoire involved in police training at the various police and gendarmerie schools and academy centres and will be involved in the restructuring of the security sector.

23. With the anticipated resumption of the mobile court hearings, the United Nations police will continue to provide assistance to the UNOCI Electoral Division, including by participating in UNOCI observer teams deployed at the mobile court sites. The formed police units will also continue to provide security at mobile court sites in their five main areas of deployment in Abidjan, Daloa, Guiglo, Yamoussoukro and Bouaké. Formed police units will also continue to provide enhanced security for UNOCI personnel and premises and to conduct joint training and exercises on crowd control management with the mission's military contingents, in close collaboration with elements from the mobile gendarmerie unit of the Licorne force.

V. Steps needed to relaunch the key processes under the road map

24. Security Council resolution 1721 (2006) provided a sound framework for the relaunching of the key processes that had been stalled since August 2006, including the disarmament process, the dismantling and disarmament of the militias, the mobile court hearings, the re-establishment of state authority and the technical preparations for the elections. In this regard, the parties should focus, in a pragmatic manner, on resolving the outstanding issues in order to facilitate the resumption of the key processes without any further delay.

Concomitant resumption of identification and disarmament processes

25. The resumption of the identification and disarmament processes should build upon the experience gained during the pilot project launched by Prime Minister Banny in May 2006 and the subsequent initial concomitant operations of the mobile courts and the pre-cantonment process in July 2006. That experience demonstrated the feasibility of the approach developed during this important phase. In order to relaunch the mobile courts, the outstanding disagreements on the procedures for issuing certificates of nationality must be resolved expeditiously. In this regard, the decree issued by President Gbagbo on 5 October, which increased the number of jurisdictions competent to deliver certificates of nationality to 147, should form the basis for resolving this matter. The final call for bids for the operator who will be responsible for implementing the technical aspects of the identification process (data collection and sorting, production of identification cards and voter cards) is also an encouraging step towards relaunching the identification process.

26. However, further steps are necessary. For instance, it should be recalled that, with only 23 courts currently functioning, the Government is facing the daunting task of organizing the work of the new courts. Technical delays have already put a

tight timeline under further stress. It is unfortunate, for example, that the selection of the operator mentioned above has still not been made. It will also be essential to provide adequate funding and the requisite logistical resources to ensure sustained operation of the mobile courts and other aspects of the identification process, once they resume. In this regard, UNOCI could contribute to the successful conduct of the identification process by providing limited logistical support, as appropriate and within currently available resources, especially for the operation of the mobile courts.

27. In order to ensure that the identification process is conducted in a transparent, credible and coordinated manner and is consistent with international standards, the working group on the identification of the population and the registration of voters provided for in resolution 1721 (2006) should be established without delay under the authority of the Prime Minister. The participation of representatives of all the Ivorian parties, as well as UNOCI and the High Representative for the elections in this important working group will be critical to ensuring the transparency of the identification process.

28. The principle of conducting the disarmament and identification processes concomitantly, agreed upon by the Ivorian parties, should be preserved. In order to expedite the disarmament process and in view of the assurances given by the respective forces that the pre-cantonment of their troops was completed in July 2006, it has been proposed that the disarmament process should be relaunched at the cantonment phase. In this regard, the verification, screening and profiling of combatants and the listing of their weapons would now be carried out during the cantonment phase of the programme. This proposal is aimed at avoiding the logistical difficulties that plagued the implementation of the pre-cantonment phase in July 2006. The cantonment operations would be conducted at 17 cantonment sites, including 9 in the area controlled by the Forces nouvelles and 8 in the area controlled by the Government. The PNDDR had planned to complete the physical rehabilitation of the facilities at the cantonment sites by the end of December. However, the Programme is facing a shortfall of approximately \$10 million for the procurement of the necessary equipment for those sites.

29. The initial pilot phases of the disarmament process, which were conducted between May and August 2006, exposed capacity and resource constraints in the PNDDR, which could be addressed by strengthening UNOCI's role in the implementation of the Programme. I therefore recommend that UNOCI be authorized to provide direct assistance to the PNDDR in refurbishing and equipping the cantonment sites. Such assistance would ensure the timely relaunching of the Programme and thus preserve the politically sensitive principle of conducting the disarmament of combatants and the identification of the population concomitantly. The proposed enhanced role of UNOCI would have financial implications for the mission. In addition, as indicated in my ninth progress report on UNOCI (S/2006/532), the World Bank continues to withhold the \$80 million it had pledged to contribute towards the cost of the reintegration of demobilized combatants, because of the Government's unpaid arrears. This issue has been outstanding for some time and is not likely to be resolved in the foreseeable future. I therefore appeal to Member States to contribute individually the funds required to meet that shortfall, which could jeopardize the effective implementation of the Programme. In this regard, it should be noted that any delays in the implementation of the

disarmament and identification processes could have a negative impact on the election schedule.

30. In order to facilitate the timely resumption of the disarmament process, it is also imperative that the PNDDR and UNOCI receive the lists of combatants and weapons from the Forces nouvelles and the FANCI before the resumption of the disarmament programme. To that end, Prime Minister Banny should set a deadline for the submission of this critical information, to be followed by a quick verification phase, conducted by the parties together with the impartial forces. Work on reintegration opportunities to be provided to ex-combatants should also begin without delay, so as to ensure that there is no gap between the disarmament and reintegration programmes. In this regard, the PNDDR should pursue its plan to establish a network with local authorities and civil society, which would enhance the sustainability of the reinsertion process.

Dismantling and disarmament of militias

31. As reported in my tenth progress report on UNOCI (S/2006/821), the dismantling and disarmament of the militias was suspended in early August by the PNDDR as a result of a low weapon-to-combatant ratio and the high number of unserviceable weapons surrendered by the 981 disarmed militia members. In addition, the leaders of the militias in the west were demanding the inclusion of 3,000 additional individuals in the disarmament programme, under which they would be entitled to receive a safety net allowance of \$900. However, the PNDDR rejected that demand, stressing that the eligible 2,000 militias should surrender a credible number of weapons, in keeping with the established weapons-to-combatant ratio. Once these outstanding issues are resolved and if the outstanding caseload of eligible militia members remains at 1,000, based on the previously agreed framework, it would take only two weeks to disarm the militias in the west. The establishment of two additional disarmament sites in Toulépleu and Bloléquin, as proposed by UNOCI, would help expedite this process.

32. In order to facilitate the early relaunching of the process, the PNDDR, in consultation with UNOCI, should expeditiously issue clear criteria and procedures for the disarmament of the remaining armed militias. In addition, the status of the militias in Abidjan, in particular the GPP, whose command and control structure remain intact, despite claims that they were dismantled by the Defence and Security Forces in 2005, needs to be clarified by the PNDDR and subsequently verified. Effective sensitization on the criteria for dismantling the militias should be conducted for all concerned groups and adequate measures, involving in particular the Defence and Security Forces, should be envisaged to prevent the re-emergence of the militia groups. The early establishment of the military unit intended to provide direct support to the Office of the Prime Minister for this purpose would also contribute to progress on the issue.

Restructuring of the Defence and Security Forces

33. As envisaged in resolution 1721 (2006), the disarmament programme should be placed in the broader context of the restructuring of the armed forces. The Prime Minister has yet to announce the establishment of the working group provided for in resolution 1721 (2006) to prepare the plan for the restructuring of the Defence and Security Forces. The envisaged plan is expected to address such issues as the overall

role and strength of the armed forces and their deployment throughout the country, criteria for recruitment and assignments, career development and entitlements for soldiers and their families, as well as the integration of elements from the Forces nouvelles. The restructuring programme should also include other components of the Defence and Security Forces (gendarmerie, police and intelligence services), while a review of the legislative and executive framework governing the security sector should be addressed in a holistic and transparent manner. UNOCI is expected to provide technical assistance to the restructuring programme. I urge Member States in a position to do so to offer the Government assistance in developing and implementing its plans in this vital area.

Redeployment of state administration

34. The National Committee for the Restoration of State Authority (CNPRA) has indicated that at least half of the 24,437 civil servants displaced by the crisis had been redeployed by October 2006, with 3,962 civil servants redeployed in the west and 8,424 civil servants in the central, eastern and northern parts of the country. The redeployment of the remaining 12,091 civil servants was impeded in part by the funding gap of \$30 million needed for the rehabilitation of infrastructure and the payment of allowances to the civil servants concerned. In addition, the Forces nouvelles should not place any preconditions for the return of civil servants to the north and should guarantee their security. In this connection, the CNPRA is expected to submit a revised redeployment plan. During preliminary consultations, the Minister for Territorial Administration submitted a provisional \$25 million budget to support the redeployment of civil servants to the north.

35. To be sustainable, the redeployment of state administration should also include the redeployment of the judiciary in the zone of confidence and in the north. UNOCI intends to increase the presence of civil affairs and rule of law officers throughout the country to support this process.

Technical preparations for the elections

36. The Chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission has informed UNOCI and the High Representative for the elections of his intention to establish all 430 local structures of the Commission (24 regional, 48 departmental and 358 local) as soon as possible, regardless of whether all parties eligible will be in a position to nominate their representatives to those bodies as currently envisaged. He has also created 10 technical subcommissions within the central electoral commission in order to begin detailed planning for the elections, with the support of 10 experts from UNOCI.

37. Within a short time frame, the Chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission is also expected to determine the dates for the holding of the first round of presidential elections. In the meantime, UNOCI and the High Representative for the elections will continue to assist their Ivorian counterparts in the efforts to streamline the processes leading to the elections, in particular with regard to the number of commissioners in the local commissions to be established by the Independent Electoral Commission throughout the country. UNOCI and the High Representative for the elections will also support the fund-raising efforts of the Government in order to ensure that adequate resources are made available for the

preparations for the elections in Côte d'Ivoire. The budget for the elections is estimated at \$95 million.

38. In view of the inadequate resources received from donors for the office of the High Representative for the elections, I had indicated in my tenth progress report on UNOCI (S/2006/821) my intention to seek the approval of the General Assembly to fund his office from assessed contributions. I am pleased to report that an alternative source of funding has been identified, through the United Nations Trust Fund for Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Activities. However, continued support to the activities of the High Representative will be needed from donors through contributions to the Trust Fund.

VI. Humanitarian situation

39. The humanitarian situation continues to be a source of concern. The health situation continues to be deteriorating, with new reports of cholera and yellow fever outbreaks as well as continued shortages of water and sanitation in the northern part of the country. In addition, a census conducted by the United Nations Population Fund and the Government concluded that 710,000 internally displaced persons lived in five regions of the area controlled by the Government, putting the overall numbers of internally displaced persons in the country at approximately 800,000.

40. During the period under review, UNOCI and the United Nations country team continued to provide coordinated assistance to the Government's efforts to mitigate the humanitarian and health consequences of the dumping of toxic waste from a foreign ship, in Abidjan, at the end of August. As at 23 October 2006, 10 people were reported to have died, 64 persons had been hospitalized and 104,000 patients had sought health consultations. Following the deployment of a United Nations disaster assistance and coordination team in response to a request by the Government for international assistance, a joint mission was fielded by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Environment Programme and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme, from 22 to 29 November 2006, to identify the support needed by the Government in establishing a toxic waste contingency plan and an action plan.

41. On 12 and 13 October 2006, a workshop on the protection of civilians took place in Abidjan, with the participation of 80 representatives of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, UNOCI, entities of the United Nations system, humanitarian organizations, donors and civil society, to take stock of the key protection challenges and to agree on action to be taken. Participants agreed on the urgent need to develop coherent and complementary protection strategies, taking into consideration the regional dimension of protection challenges, such as small arms, and to take immediate action in priority areas, such as the establishment of security in the west, in particular in the zone of confidence, introducing justice systems to end impunity and improving assistance to vulnerable groups.

42. The protection network, composed of United Nations entities and non-governmental organizations, has since established working groups to address: (a) protection of refugees, internally displaced persons and host families; (b) protection of children and gender-based violence; (c) physical protection of civilians, humanitarian staff and humanitarian access; (d) justice and the rule of law;

and (e) disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion of ex-combatants and rehabilitation of infrastructures. I encourage UNOCI, the French Licorne force, United Nations entities and the humanitarian community to jointly develop a comprehensive operational plan for the protection of civilians.

VII. Financial aspects

43. By its resolution 60/17 B, the General Assembly appropriated a total amount of \$420.2 million for the maintenance of UNOCI for the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007. I am requesting an additional amount of \$52.7 million in the revised budget for the Operation for the period ending 30 June 2007 in response to the increase by 1,500 in the strength of the military and police components of the Operation authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 1682 (2006). It is expected that the General Assembly will take action on my proposal during the main part of its sixty-first session. The total resources approved for the mission would support 8,115 military personnel, 450 United Nations police personnel and 750 formed police personnel, authorized by the Security Council in its resolutions 1609 (2005) and 1682 (2006).

44. Should the Council decide to endorse my recommendations in paragraphs 29, 35 and 54, as well as to increase the military and police strength of UNOCI as recommended in paragraph 55, I shall seek additional resources for the Operation from the General Assembly.

45. As at 30 September 2006, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for UNOCI amounted to \$186.6 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to \$2,080.2 million. As at 30 September 2006, amounts owed to the UNOCI troop and formed police contributors totalled \$17.9 million. Reimbursement of troop and contingent-owned equipment costs has been made for the period up to 31 July 2006.

VIII. Observations

46. Although the Ivorian parties have failed to meet the election deadline for the second time, the successful launching of the initial phases of the PNDDR, the identification of the population and the restoration of state authority in the north provided a practical basis for meaningful progress. The experience in the operation of the mobile courts, including the consensus on the principle of conducting identification and disarmament concomitantly, as well as the lessons drawn from the pre-cantonment phase, the dismantling of militias in the west, the return of civil servants to the north and the reunification of the school examinations system, have all demonstrated the feasibility of the road map adopted by the Prime Minister.

47. Recent Security Council decisions provide a sound framework for carrying forward these initial, but precious gains, in order to bring the peace process to a successful conclusion in the coming 12 months. Resolution 1721 (2006) offers the necessary tools and safeguards that should make it possible to overcome the technical issues that have hitherto impeded progress. Most of these obstacles and the resultant series of stalemates witnessed in the past 12 months were clearly contrived. I am convinced that the main Ivorian political leaders can rise above

narrow partisan and personal interests and make the compromises needed to take their country out of crisis. They have already demonstrated this at the two meetings in Yamoussoukro on 28 February and 5 July 2006. I therefore appeal to President Gbagbo, Henri Konan Bedié, Alassane Ouattara and Guillaume Soro to muster the necessary political will, seize the opportunity offered by the final extension of the transition period and work together with Prime Minister Banny to build on the initial positive steps they have taken on disarmament, identification and the restoration of state authority.

48. The framework offered by Security Council resolution 1721 (2006) must be complemented by efforts from both Ivorian and international stakeholders to nurture a security and political environment in which trust can take root among the main Ivorian political leaders. Sustained dialogue can play a crucial role in building confidence among the leaders. I urge President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Banny to provide the necessary leadership in this regard, eschew confrontation and maintain a constructive working relationship. International mediators, in particular regional and other leaders, should also assist in building confidence among the Ivorian parties. As recognized by the Security Council, Ivorian civil society, which has so far been marginalized, must be brought into the mainstream of the peace process. At the same time, if civil society is to play a credible role, it too must eschew political agendas and put the national interest first.

49. Ivorian political leaders and civil society should together take a hard and honest look at Côte d'Ivoire's political dispensation, with a view to addressing the factors that underlie the inclination to maintain the status quo. They must together cultivate a culture of political accommodation and tolerance, fight impunity, tackle the hate media, rid the nation of xenophobia, pay attention to the insidious local land and ethnic conflicts in the west and contribute, as called for by the international community, including the African Union and ECOWAS, to put in place a mechanism to guarantee the credibility and transparency of the crucial identification of the population. Above all, for Côte d'Ivoire to emerge from conflict, all Ivorian stakeholders must recognize and accept the need for exceptional measures during and immediately following the transition period, including the possibility of power-sharing arrangements.

50. In the meantime, the most pressing task is to relaunch the implementation of the key outstanding tasks. Regrettably, the Ivorian parties have already lost precious time. Moreover, some of them are pursuing actions that could further polarize political discourse, exacerbate current tensions and lead to widespread violence. Considering that the current 12-month extension of the transition process is final, the situation brooks no further delay. I therefore appeal to all Ivorian parties to extend full cooperation to the Prime Minister in the implementation of the road map for the new transition.

51. This is particularly needed in view of the current political stalemate, which could easily lead to a deterioration of the situation and possibly develop into a long-term stand-off that would be very damaging to the resumption of the key processes. I am, however, pleased to note that some technical preparations for the disarmament and identification processes have continued in spite of the stalemate. The PNDDR is refurbishing cantonment sites, the Prime Minister has drafted ordinances on the hearings in the mobile courts and the establishment of the working groups called for in resolution 1721 (2006). The Ivorian stakeholders now need to open urgent

dialogue and consultations among the Ivorian stakeholders should focus on the resumption of disarmament, the hearings in the mobile courts, the dismantling of the militia and the restoration of state authority, within the framework established by Security Council resolution 1721 (2006). There is ample room for the necessary flexibility and accommodation as regards the concerns of each party. All Ivorian stakeholders should therefore avoid courses of action that depart from the existing and already tested frameworks, discard the gains already made, exacerbate divisions and tensions and risk the renewal of hostilities.

52. For its part, the international community should act in unity in supporting the peace process. It must offer appropriate incentives to the parties, while at the same time it should be ready to act against individuals and parties who deliberately obstruct the peace process, as well as the operations of the impartial forces, and those who commit crimes against the civilian population. In this connection, it is my fervent hope that regional leaders will remain fully engaged with the Ivorian parties, including by impressing on them the need to fulfil, in good faith, all their obligations under the various peace agreements, as well as the decisions and resolutions of the African Union and the Security Council.

53. The peace process cannot succeed without adequate resources. I therefore appeal to Member States to contribute generously the funds needed to support the peace process, in order to ensure sustained implementation of the key processes once they are relaunched. The costs of the key processes are estimated at \$24 million for the operation of the mobile courts, \$25 million for the redeployment of state administration, \$76 million for the elections, \$150 million for the PNDDR and \$2.5 million for the dismantling and disarmament of the militias. In addition, the costs of the identification process and the restructuring of the Defence and Security Forces are yet to be determined.

54. In the light of the above and mindful of the fact that the current transitional period is expected to be completed by 31 October 2007, I recommend that the Security Council authorize the renewal of the mandate of UNOCI for an additional year, until 15 December 2007. Furthermore, in order to enable UNOCI to effectively support the key tasks in the transition process, I urge the Council to approve the recommendations contained in paragraphs 21-34 of the present report, related to the United Nations contribution in support of the key processes. In addition, I seek the Council's support for an expanded presence of the civil affairs, political affairs, human rights and the rule of law components of UNOCI in the northern and western parts of the country, to support the restoration of state administration, which is expected to gather momentum during this final transition period. UNOCI's public information component also plans to develop a robust sensitization campaign in close collaboration with relevant counterparts (Government, the media, civil society and so on) and in coordination with the office of the High Representative for the elections, in its continuing efforts to combat hate media and to sensitize the population on the key processes, including the elections. To that end, the Operation will expand the coverage of its radio to allow widest possible access by the Ivorian people especially those in such remote areas as Aboisso, Bouna, Korhogo and Odienné.

55. The conduct of the politically sensitive identification of the population, as well as the preparations for the elections, will require effective security from the impartial forces. For this reason, and in view of the need to adjust the overall

posture of the UNOCI military component and to enhance its role in facilitating freedom of movement and protecting civilians, I once again appeal to the Security Council to approve the remaining three battalions for UNOCI, out of the four recommended in my seventh progress report (S/2006/2). In that regard, and pursuant to Security Council resolution 1609 (2005), the Council may wish to consider taking advantage of the adjustment in the strength of UNMIL, in particular the envisaged departure of one battalion at the end of 2006, to reinforce UNOCI.

56. The activities of the office of the High Representative for the elections are expected to expand, as this final transition period is expected to yield the long-awaited elections. Although an alternative funding mechanism has been identified, which should go a long way towards addressing some of the difficulties mentioned in my letter to the Security Council dated 16 October 2006 (S/2006/820), the funding of his office from voluntary contributions continues to pose significant challenges. I therefore, once again, appeal to potential donors to urgently provide the resources required to sustain the critical work of the High Representative.

57. In conclusion, I would like to commend my Special Representative, Pierre Schori, and the High Representative for the elections, Gérard Stoudmann, as well as the civilian and military staff of UNOCI for their continued efforts in support of sustainable peace in Côte d'Ivoire. Similarly, I would like to express my gratitude to the United Nations country team, humanitarian and development organizations and bilateral donors and the countries that are contributing troops and police personnel to UNOCI, as well as to the African Union and ECOWAS, for their invaluable contribution to the peace process.

