Twenty-eighth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire

I. Introduction


II. Update on major developments

2. Following my last report, the situation in Côte d’Ivoire continued to deteriorate until former President Gbagbo was apprehended on 11 April 2011. As Mr. Gbagbo rebuffed all efforts for a peaceful solution to the violent crisis, the Forces républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), which were established by a decree issued by President Ouattara on 17 March, continued their military offensive towards Abidjan, capturing towns in the west, centre and east. The former Forces de défense et de sécurité (FDS), including police and gendarmerie, fled in large numbers, with some joining the ranks of FRCI, while others surrendered or sought refuge in UNOCI camps.

3. By 30 March, FRCI had encircled Abidjan. President Ouattara ordered the force to hold its positions outside the city in order to give Mr. Gbagbo a last chance to leave peacefully and to avoid further fighting. He also reached out to FDS commanders to join FRCI. The FDS Chief of Staff, General Mangou, sought refuge with his family at the residence of the Ambassador of South Africa on 30 March. He rejoined the pro-Gbagbo forces on 3 April. On 31 March, the Abidjan Air Force Base Commander and 100 troops surrendered to FRCI. UNOCI and the French Operation Licorne force secured the airport. FDS also abandoned its checkpoints around the Golf Hotel, the temporary seat of the legitimate Government.

4. As FDS continued to disintegrate, the Republican Guard and the Centre de commandement des opérations de sécurité (CECOS), which remained loyal to Mr. Gbagbo, concentrated their presence and heavy weapons in strategic locations in Abidjan. They escalated attacks against the civilian population, including with heavy weapons, which prompted FRCI to enter Abidjan. Pro-Gbagbo forces targeted...
UNOCI headquarters with intense heavy calibre sniper fire and mortars, wounding four peacekeepers and seven others during several heavy weaponry attacks on UNOCI patrols. One international UNOCI staff member and one national World Health Organization staff member were killed during the fighting in Abidjan.

5. In light of these developments, I instructed UNOCI to take all necessary measures in keeping with paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1975 (2011) of 30 March 2011 to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population. Pursuant to Council resolution 1962 (2010), I also wrote to President Sarkozy of France seeking the assistance of the Licorne force. On 4 April, UNOCI and Licorne conducted military operations in Abidjan to prevent the continued use of heavy weapons against civilians. Fighting subsequently subsided on 5 April. The same day, Alcide Djédjé, Mr. Gbagbo’s “minister of foreign affairs”, initiated negotiations with the Government on ending the crisis, while leaders of the security forces loyal to Mr. Gbagbo claimed they had ordered their troops to lay down their arms. In a statement later that day, however, Mr. Gbagbo insisted that he had won the election and called for a recount.

6. On 6 April, the fighting resumed with pro-Gbagbo forces again using heavy weapons against civilians in various neighbourhoods. UNOCI headquarters and patrols were again targeted, including by heavy weapons. Diplomatic premises were also targeted and one of them was occupied by the pro-Gbagbo forces. The situation escalated on 9 April when Mr. Gbagbo’s forces launched an attack on the Golf Hotel, including with mortars and heavy machine guns, which was successfully repelled. One peacekeeper was wounded during the attack.

7. During the fighting, United Nations personnel, staff of diplomatic missions and foreign nationals were trapped in insecure areas in Abidjan. Many of them, including 400 foreign nationals, were extricated by UNOCI, in cooperation with Licorne. UNOCI relocated most United Nations international staff from Abidjan to Bouaké. Throughout the fighting, it provided medical services to civilians in need.

8. In light of the continued use of heavy weapons against the civilian population and peacekeepers, I again instructed UNOCI, on 10 April, to take all necessary measures to prevent their use against the civilian population. On the same day, UNOCI, with the support of the Licorne force, conducted further military operations targeting heavy weapons in areas around the presidential palace and residence, and several military camps.

9. On 11 April, Mr. Gbagbo, his wife and members of his family, staff and “cabinet” were apprehended by FRCI in a bunker in the presidential residence. On 13 April, former President Gbagbo was transferred to a location in northern Côte d’Ivoire, while his wife was brought to a separate location. Their initial hearings were started by a State prosecutor in May. Some 70 of the family and staff members arrested with Mr. Gbagbo were released on 16 April. Some were transferred to the Bouna prison, while others, citing security concerns, moved to the Pergola Hotel in Abidjan, where the Government requested UNOCI to assist in providing security for them. The Government later announced that those individuals were under house arrest. Mr. Gbagbo’s Front populaire ivoirien (FPI) party stated that many of its supporters had fled to Ghana.

10. Many commanders of the security forces, including General Mangou and the CECOS and Air Force Commanders, pledged allegiance to President Ouattara.
senior officers of the security institutions have been arrested by FRCI, including the Commander of the Republican Guard, and are being detained. The whereabouts of Blé Goudé remained unknown, although recorded statements allegedly by him were broadcast in late May. The Prosecutor of the Military Tribunal launched an investigation on 12 May into crimes committed by the military and the police.

11. Meanwhile, during a press conference on 19 April, Ibrahima “IB” Coulibaly announced that his forces, known as the “Invisible Commandos”, who had taken up arms against pro-Gbagbo forces in Abidjan’s Abobo neighbourhood, were at the disposal of President Ouattara. However, Mr. Coulibaly declined to attend a meeting with representatives of the Government on 26 April. On 27 April, after his forces clashed with FRCI, he refused to leave Abobo, although he had earlier that day requested a UNOCI escort to assist him to leave the area. Later that day, the Government announced that Mr. Coulibaly had been killed during the fighting. Many of his supporters went into hiding. Some 800 of them were registered and disarmed by UNOCI on 4 June. Only about 30 serviceable weapons and a limited amount of ammunition were handed over.

12. Although fighting abated in Abidjan after 11 April, pro-Gbagbo militias, mercenaries and FDS elements held out and continued to fight in Yopougon district. Serious human rights violations were committed and mass graves were discovered before FRCI dislodged the remaining elements from Yopougon on 4 May. Some 50 of those elements surrendered to FRCI on 29 April. The rest fled towards the Liberian border area, where they continued to kill civilians and loot property in south-western Côte d’Ivoire. Clashes between the FRCI and pro-Gbagbo militias and mercenaries continued to be reported there, as well as violence against civilians in the west and south-west.

13. In mid-April, UNOCI started joint patrols with FRCI. UNOCI has also assisted in collecting and registering some 500 weapons, including heavy weapons, and 65,000 rounds of ammunition. Most are being secured by UNOCI, while some have been handed over to FRCI. Most materiel collected appears to have been imported prior to the arms embargo. UNOCI is also clearing unexploded ordnance in Abidjan.

14. Serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law occurred throughout the fighting, including the killing and abduction of civilians, enforced disappearances, extortion, sexual violence and looting of property. Several hundred people were killed in Duékoué and the surrounding villages on 28 and 29 March. The state broadcaster, Radiodiffusion-Télévision ivoirienne (RTI), continued to broadcast hate messages and incite violence until it went off the air on 5 April. The Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, Ivan Simonovic, visited Côte d’Ivoire from 2 to 9 April and the International Commission of Inquiry, established by the Human Rights Council on 25 March, visited the country from 4 to 28 May.

15. The humanitarian situation further deteriorated during the reporting period, with an increase in populations displaced inside the country as well as to neighbouring countries, primarily Liberia. On 4 and 5 April, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Valerie Amos, visited western Côte d’Ivoire to highlight the immense consequences of the conflict.

16. As the situation slowly began to stabilize following Mr. Gbagbo’s apprehension, the Government took a number of initiatives to restore normalcy. On
1 May, President Ouattara announced the establishment of the Dialogue, Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, with former Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny as
its Chair. The announcement was made during a visit by a delegation of The Elders
comprised of former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Archbishop
Desmond Tutu of South Africa and former President Mary Robinson of Ireland,
during which they also met with Mr. Gbagbo. On 5 May, the President of the
Constitutional Council reversed the election results he had announced on
3 December and President Ouattara was sworn-in by the Constitutional Council on
6 May. I visited Côte d’Ivoire to attend President Ouattara’s inauguration ceremony
in Yamoussoukro on 21 May, which was attended by some 20 Heads of State. The
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Alain Le Roy, visited the
country from 18 to 22 May.

17. President Ouattara appointed the governors of Abidjan and Yamoussoukro on
28 April, and replaced other senior officials, including two members of the
Constitutional Council and the Presidents of the Supreme Court and the Economic
and Social Council, on 12 May. On 1 June, President Ouattara announced his new
Government, headed by Prime Minister Soro and comprising 36 ministers, including
5 women. The Government includes 14 members of President Ouattara’s
Rassemblement des républicains (RDR) party, 8 from former President Bédié’s Parti
démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), 5 from the Forces nouvelles and 5 from civil
society. The remaining portfolios are held by smaller parties. Mr. Gbagbo’s FPI
party declined the offer to join the inclusive Government, demanding that former
President Gbagbo be released from detention first. President Ouattara presided over
the first meeting of the Council of Ministers on 8 June.

18. Commercial activity has gradually resumed in Abidjan. To date, some 20
banks have reopened and financial services have been progressively restored
throughout the country. On 27 April, the branches of the Banque Centrale des États
de l’Afrique de l’Ouest reopened in Abidjan and the West African Economic and
Monetary Union appointed a new Governor on 30 May. On 13 April, President
Ouattara announced the resumption of cocoa exports and on 21 April, the African
Union lifted the sanctions it had imposed on Côte d’Ivoire, while the European
Union followed in part on 29 April.

III. Assessment mission

19. As requested by members of the Security Council, I dispatched an assessment
mission to Côte d’Ivoire from 1 to 14 May 2011. Participants included
representatives of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of
Field Support, the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Safety and
Security as well as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United

20. The assessment mission received detailed briefings from UNOCI and the
United Nations country team, the World Bank, the African Development Bank and
the Licorne force, and consulted with President Ouattara, Prime Minister and
Minister of Defense Soro, the Ministers of the Interior, Justice and Human Rights,
Finance, Planning, Civil Service and Employment, General Soumaila Bakayoko of
FRCI as well as the President of the Independent Electoral Commission, the
leadership of the national security, the diplomatic community, civil society, political parties, including FPI, and international and national non-governmental organizations. Members of the mission visited Daloa, Duékoué and Man in the west, and Bouaké in the north.

IV. Findings of the assessment mission

21. The assessment mission’s discussions with the President, the Prime Minister and his Government, as well as other national and international stakeholders, provided a clear picture of the main challenges the Government is facing. All interlocutors identified the stabilization of the security situation, in particular in Abidjan and the west, as the highest priority. The other immediate priorities included: fostering national reconciliation while, in parallel, addressing impunity and accountability; the reconstitution and reform of security and rule of law institutions; the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups; the collection of illicit weapons from civilian communities; the re-establishment of State administration throughout the country; the protection of civilians; addressing the humanitarian situation; the development of a subregional strategy to address the threat of mercenaries, militias and the cross-border movement of weapons; and the holding of legislative elections.

A. Security situation

22. The security situation in the country, especially in Abidjan and the west, remains extremely precarious. There is still a high risk of renewed armed conflict and attacks against the civilian population continue. These could be initiated by the many ex-Republican Guard soldiers who have melted into the civilian population in Abidjan together with their weapons, as well as the pro-Gbagbo militias, mercenaries and former FDS personnel routed from Abidjan, who are attempting to regroup in the west, Young Patriots and Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de Côte d’Ivoire (FESCI) members who still have access to arms and elements of the “Invisible Commandos” who have gone into hiding with their weapons. FDS, including the police and gendarmerie, have disintegrated and FRCI is the only national security institution that is currently undertaking security, law enforcement and public order maintenance tasks. However, FRCI could become a threat itself if urgent steps are not taken to address its basic needs, command and control issues, and discipline-related challenges. Furthermore, civilian communities were systematically militarized by the former regime and are awash with weapons. The escape from prisons of more than 12,000 prisoners since March presents another serious challenge.

23. The recent fighting in the west has brought to the surface long-standing ethnic, citizenship and land ownership issues, and the attempted regrouping of pro-Gbagbo elements in this traditionally volatile area could reignite conflict there. There have also been reports of unexploded ordnance in the west and landmines in Tiébissou and Abidjan, which pose a danger to the population.
B. State of security and rule of law institutions

24. FDS, including the police and gendarmerie, were detrimentally politicized during the crisis and have effectively disintegrated, though some have rejoined under the auspices of FRCI. The prison institutions have also essentially collapsed in the south and have not been fully operational in the north since 2002. Most of the police, gendarmerie, judicial and prisons infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed.

25. The Government has indicated that FRCI will be the institution around which the new armed forces will be reconstructed, while the formation of the police, gendarmerie and corrections system will be based upon the old services. In this regard, there is an urgent need for the Government to conduct a comprehensive review of the security institutions and devise a national security strategy and plan for its implementation. There is also a need to develop and implement a national justice sector strategy, which will be coordinated through a Comité de pilotage et suivi presided by the Ministry of Justice. Many bilateral partners have expressed an interest in providing support for the rebuilding, reform and development of the security and rule of law institutions. The Government is planning to hold a national seminar in July to discuss issues pertaining to security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and national reconciliation. Prime Minister Soro has requested that the United Nations assign a security sector reform adviser to support his office, while some bilateral partners have also been requested to do the same.

26. Initial assistance from UNOCI will be required, while long-term assistance should be provided by bilateral partners and relevant United Nations agencies. United Nations assistance will complement the efforts of other partners. As foreseen in the Ouagadougou Agreements, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Facilitator, President Compaoré of Burkina Faso, will continue to support the reunification of the armed and police forces.

1. Armed forces

27. FRCI remains an unconventional, amorphous and poorly resourced force. It is comprised of a mixture of former Forces armées des Forces nouvelles (FAFN) personnel, some former FDS personnel who defected before Mr. Gbagbo’s arrest and many untrained young men who were recruited during the FRCI offensive. Its current size is yet to be confirmed. As a result of the lack of regular salary payments, some FRCI elements were resorting to extortion and looting in Abidjan and other parts of the country. However, the Government started paying salaries to FRCI in May. The various mixes of military uniforms project a negative image and are exploited by criminals who impersonate FRCI personnel. Some interlocutors noted the current lack of confidence of parts of the population in FRCI. The Government welcomed the suggestion that it approach bilateral partners to request them to donate uniforms for FRCI. With regard to reunifying the future army, President Ouattara advised that the framework and the quotas provided for in the Ouagadougou Agreements remained valid and would be maintained.

28. While the Government has already taken a decision to eventually send FRCI to the barracks and deploy the police and gendarmerie to maintain law and order, there are still a number of serious dilemmas. First, the Government’s efforts to reconstruct
the crumbled police and gendarmerie will take time to gain traction. Secondly, despite the shortcomings of FRCI, a premature complete withdrawal of the force to the barracks could lead to serious setbacks to efforts to stabilize the security situation.

2. Police and gendarmerie

29. The police and gendarmes, of whom there were some 30,000 before the crisis, are only slowly returning to work, despite the confidence-building measures by UNOCI to encourage law enforcement personnel to return to duty. To date, 85 per cent have registered to resume duty but very few are actually working. They undertake very limited activities, mostly jointly with FRCI. Many interlocutors assessed these law enforcement institutions negatively, even without the impact of the crisis, pointing to impunity, lack of accountability, politicization, corruption, absenteeism and lack of training and equipment.

30. The Government highlighted the lack of weapons for the police. In a letter dated 3 May, the Minister of the Interior requested UNOCI to hand over weapons that it has collected to the Ivorian police. However, UNOCI is obliged to verify, in coordination with the Group of Experts, if these weapons were imported in violation of the arms embargo regime before handing them over to the authorities.

3. Judicial and corrections institutions

31. As a result of the crisis, the judicial system practically ceased to function, with the judiciary collapsing in the south. Seventeen of the 26 courts in the south were partially damaged or looted during this period. In the north, many of the redeployed judges and prosecutors abandoned their posts. In addition, the judiciary suffers from a lack of independence, insufficient material and financial resources, inefficient proceedings, politicization of its personnel, inadequate case management systems, corruption and poor public perception. The impact of the crisis on the corrections system was equally dire. Prisons ceased to function in the south and were damaged; all prisoners escaped from the 22 prisons in the south and have yet to be recaptured. In the north, only 3 of the 11 prisons were operational prior to the crisis.

32. The European Union signed a project in the amount of €18 million with the Government on 6 May for the reform and modernization of the judicial and prison systems with a view to reinforcing the capacities of the Government to improve access to justice, reform courts and improve detention conditions. UNOCI is assisting in the renovation of some prisons in Abidjan and other locations in the south.

C. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, and dismantling of militias

33. The post-elections crisis has significantly increased the magnitude of the disarmament and demobilization challenge as a result of new recruitment and the proliferation of armed groups. The caseload of combatants has increased, but the numbers remain unclear at this stage, with estimates ranging from 50,000 to 100,000 cases. Given the diverse caseload, agreeing on appropriate eligibility criteria for participation in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and managing expectations will be key challenges in developing a new programme. National stakeholders also emphasized the pressing need for reintegration and youth employment programmes.
D. Collection of weapons from civilian communities

34. A very high number of weapons remain in civilian communities, in particular in Abidjan and the west. It was a policy of the former regime to systematically arm sympathetic communities and thousands of weapons were distributed to militias, youth and other groups throughout the country, which intensified during the crisis. FDS stockpiles of weapons were also looted, including by civilians, as FDS disintegrated. As a result, the threat of local armed violence remains across Côte d’Ivoire owing to the availability of a large number of weapons.

E. Redeployment of State administration and extension of State authority

35. The post-elections crisis further curtailed the reach of State authority and its administration. National stakeholders expressed the view that the reunification of the country, including the centralization of the Treasury, should now be easier to achieve owing to the changed political context. In the west and south, the crisis brought to the fore the weakness of State institutions, including the politicization of State officials and inability to deliver services. Civil servants are slowly returning to work, but remain largely absent in the west, while most Government ministries and territorial State administrations will take some time to become fully operational because public buildings were vandalized, records were destroyed and equipment was looted. The Government is undertaking an inventory of the physical destruction of State premises and equipment. Many interlocutors stressed the need to strengthen institutions by addressing issues of corruption, transparency and governance.

F. Political situation and legislative elections

36. The inauguration of President Ouattara in Yamoussoukro marked a major step towards the full restoration of constitutional order. Although, FPI declined to participate in the Government, FPI members and associates of former President Gbagbo who are currently held at the Pergola Hotel confirmed that they recognized President Ouattara as the legitimate President, stating that they were willing to contribute to the process of national reconciliation and reconstruction. They also advocated for the adoption of an amnesty law covering all acts and offences committed during the post-elections crisis.

37. All national stakeholders, except FPI members of the National Assembly, stressed the need to hold legislative elections as soon as possible and before the end of the year. They emphasized that those elections were important for the full restoration of constitutional order in Côte d’Ivoire, national reconciliation and inclusive governance. Formidable challenges will need to be overcome to meet the envisaged timeline. The headquarters of the Independent Electoral Commission and its offices throughout the country were vandalized, equipment and vehicles were looted and records were destroyed. Funding needs to be mobilized; displaced populations and refugees need to return; outstanding cases of identification of eligible voters need to be addressed; the electoral roll needs to be updated; and the electoral districts need to be delimited. The security situation has to stabilize sufficiently and a political environment conducive for the elections must be created.
With regard to the composition of the Independent Electoral Commission, President Ouattara advised that the formula that had been agreed to in the Pretoria Agreement would be maintained. This, however, could become a contentious issue. Meanwhile, most interlocutors expected the certification mandate of my Special Representative to continue. A United Nations electoral needs assessment mission is visiting Côte d’Ivoire from 18 to 30 June.

G. National reconciliation and transitional justice

38. President Ouattara has established a Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission but also stressed that national reconciliation will not mean impunity. Although Côte d’Ivoire is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, former President Gbagbo had accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in 2003. This was confirmed by President Ouattara in a letter dated 3 May 2011, in which he also asked the Court Prosecutor to conduct an investigation into the most serious crimes committed since 28 November 2010 and to bring those responsible to justice. After a preliminary examination, the Prosecutor concluded that there is a reasonable basis to believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court have been committed in Côte d’Ivoire since 28 November 2010. In a letter dated 19 May 2011, the Prosecutor informed the President of the Court of his intention to request the Pretrial Chamber to authorize him to open an investigation into the situation in Côte d’Ivoire. On 20 May 2011, the International Criminal Court announced that the President of the Court had assigned the situation in Côte d’Ivoire to Pretrial Chamber II.

39. However, a comprehensive transitional justice approach that includes prosecutions, truth-telling, reparations, vetting and institutional reforms is essential. In light of issues relating to land ownership and citizenship in the west, many stakeholders emphasized the importance of interventions that address the root causes of the conflict and foster social cohesion at the community level, in particular since the return of displaced persons to their respective communities in the west is likely to exacerbate tensions further.

H. Human rights situation

40. The post-elections violence triggered widespread human rights violations, sexual-based violence and serious violations against children. The International Commission of Inquiry submitted its report to the Human Rights Council on 15 June. It concluded that serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law were committed during the crisis, when some 3,000 persons were estimated to be killed. The Commission stressed that national reconciliation without justice would not be sustainable and recommended that the Government conduct complete, impartial and transparent investigations of human rights violations and bring those responsible to justice.

41. While human rights violations have decreased in terms of intensity, formidable challenges remain: the population continues to be vulnerable owing to the fragile security situation and the security vacuum in certain areas, the proliferation of arms and armed groups, the presence of explosive remnants of war, the severe weakening of institutions responsible for the protection of human rights and the legacy of
impunity. There is also the continuing risk of reprisals, which could undermine efforts in support of social cohesion and reconciliation. UNOCI has received reports of several cases involving FRCI elements, which are being investigated. All interlocutors, including the President and the Prime Minister, recognized that addressing impunity and ensuring accountability and the effective protection of human rights will be essential.

1. **Sexual and gender based violence**

42. Sexual violence remains pervasive throughout the country and is particularly acute in the west. More than 300 cases of sexual- and gender-based violence, of which 118 are rape cases, have been reported since January 2011. Although some of those attacks were committed by men in uniform, the majority of the perpetrators were known to the victim.

2. **Children**

43. Children were victims of large-scale violations during the crisis. There was a sharp rise in the recruitment of children into militia groups and other armed groups loosely affiliated with FRCI, while the incidence of child recruitment was relatively low in the regular armed forces. Some children were seen carrying arms, while others reportedly supported armed groups at checkpoints. A total of 77 cases of killing and maiming of children during the crisis, as well as cases of sexual violence against children perpetrated by the pro-Gbagbo militia, mercenaries and FRCI, have been documented.

I. **Protection of civilians**

44. The current state of the Ivorian security and law enforcement agencies compromises their ability to protect civilians, and they will take time to be reconstituted. This will require UNOCI and the United Nations country team to continue to protect civilians within their respective mandates.

J. **Role of the media**

45. President Ouattara stressed the urgent need for the media, which has been heavily politicized and partisan, to play a more positive role in future and to contribute to national reconciliation. In this regard, the President and many other national stakeholders called for measures to ensure the effective functioning of the regulatory bodies, notably the National Press Council (CNP) and the recently established High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HACA).

K. **Humanitarian situation**

46. Some 300,000 persons have been displaced within Côte d’Ivoire, mainly in Abidjan and the west, and over 200,000 persons have fled to neighbouring countries, primarily Liberia. Given the prevailing insecurity and the continuing fear of retaliation, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons remains slow, and there could be a protracted situation caused by displacement. In the west, the
return of displaced persons to their respective communities is likely to raise unresolved issues related to the root causes of the crisis, in particular access to land and ownership of property. There is therefore an urgent need to link humanitarian assistance with a strong recovery programme, address social cohesion at the national and community levels, especially in the west, and promote peacebuilding activities.

47. The crisis also disrupted livelihoods and basic social services, which worsened living conditions. Apart from addressing immediate recovery priorities, including the delivery of basic public services, the economic empowerment of women and youth will be critical to facilitate their participation in the stabilization and peace processes. The Government has started to address the most pressing needs of the population through its $100 million programme d’urgence aimed at relaunching basic social services with funding from the European Union and France. The revised Emergency Humanitarian Action Plan remains seriously underfunded, with only 25 per cent of its $180 million requirements covered as at 8 June.

L. Economic situation

48. The Ivorian economy was hit hard by the crisis and a negative growth rate of real gross domestic product is expected for 2011. Côte d’Ivoire was scheduled to reach the completion point for debt relief this year under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. As a result of the crisis, this has now slipped until at least 2012. As international sanctions were lifted, economic activity has resumed, with the reopening of banks and businesses. The Government has cleared its debt service arrears to the World Bank and the African Development Bank. The World Bank is preparing a budget support operation of at least $100 million and the African Development Bank has recently approved budget support of some $150 million, while the International Monetary Fund plans to provide a loan amounting to $125 million under its emergency credit facility. In order to reach the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries completion point, the Government will need to revise its strategy regarding the cocoa sector and make progress towards implementing the poverty reduction strategy.

M. Subregional aspects and resumption of the Facilitator’s role

49. The pro-Gbagbo mercenaries, militias and former FDS elements in the west pose a serious threat not only to Côte d’Ivoire but also to its neighbours. Most of Côte d’Ivoire’s neighbours are vulnerable to destabilization, given the porous borders and the track record of former combatants and militias in the subregion acting as freelance combatants. The President and the Prime Minister have called for a stronger United Nations role in addressing the cross-border movement of mercenaries, armed groups and weapons into Liberia. However, many stakeholders pointed out that the focus should not just be on the Liberian mercenaries because other neighbouring countries were also at risk. A subregional strategy to address this challenge is therefore essential.

50. The role of the subregion will remain critical. President Ouattara has requested the Facilitator to continue to assist the Government in implementing the unfinished aspects of the Ouagadougou Agreements and Prime Minister Soro has written to me, requesting the United Nations to extend support to the Office of the Special Representative of the Facilitator in Abidjan.
N. Safety and security of personnel

51. The safety and security of United Nations personnel has improved since direct attacks on Organization personnel ceased following the apprehension of former President Gbagbo. However, challenges persist, in particular owing to the volatile security situation and the limited capacity of the Ivorian security forces to ensure effective protection of the population and of United Nations personnel.

V. Recommendations of the assessment mission

52. National stakeholders, including the President and the Prime Minister, presented a common view on the nature of assistance they expect the Organization to provide in specific areas, stressing that the continued UNOCI presence and United Nations assistance were essential to stabilize the security situation and rebuild the country.

53. On the basis of the priority areas identified by the Government and requests made by it, and taking into account the role that other partners will play, it is recommended that the United Nations focus on the areas set out below in order to effectively support the Government in addressing the most pressing challenges, with a view to stabilizing the security situation, preventing a relapse into renewed conflict and creating space for the Government to regain lost capacity.

A. Support for efforts to stabilize the security situation

54. It is recommended that UNOCI play a greater role in helping the national authorities to stabilize the security situation, with particular focus on Abidjan and the west, including the border areas. UNOCI will therefore increase joint patrols with FRCI, the police and the gendarmerie, facilitate the resumption of law enforcement responsibilities by the police and the gendarmerie, deter the activities of militias, former FDS personnel, mercenaries and other armed groups, and assist in the protection of civilians. UNOCI will also continue to collect, secure and dispose of weapons, and assist in clearing explosive remnants of war, as appropriate.

55. It is recommended that UNOCI, in close coordination with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), in keeping with Security Council resolutions 1980 (2011) and 1981 (2011), enhance its support to the Ivorian and Liberian authorities to monitor and address cross-border security challenges. UNOCI, in coordination with UNMIL, will increase its presence and patrols in the border areas, in particular “hot spots”, conduct a joint assessment of, and share information on, the cross-border movement of armed elements and weapons, and the displacement and abuse of civilian populations, accord priority to providing support for the operations of the national security institutions in the border areas, including through joint patrols with them and capacity-building, and undertake contingency planning together with national authorities. At the same time, a broader subregional strategy is required and I will encourage ECOWAS to develop such a strategy, to which UNOCI and other United Nations presences in the subregion will contribute. The United Nations Office for West Africa should coordinate the actions of the United Nations presences in the subregion to provide support for the development of the subregional strategy.
B. Support for the reconstitution and reform of security and rule of law institutions

56. It is recommended that UNOCI, in coordination with relevant United Nations agencies and bilateral partners, support the Government in reconstituting and reforming the security and rule of law institutions, in particular the armed forces, police, gendarmerie, judiciary and prisons. This would include providing support for a national dialogue process to facilitate the creation of a national security vision, assisting the Government to conduct a sector-wide review of the security institutions and developing a comprehensive national security strategy and plans for their reform, including mechanisms for governance and civilian oversight, as well as developing and implementing a national justice sector strategy. UNOCI, in coordination with the United Nations country team, should also provide training in human rights, child protection and sexual- and gender-based violence for the security and law enforcement forces, offer support with regard to the development of a vetting mechanism for personnel that will be absorbed in the services and promote respect for human rights.

57. It is further recommended that UNOCI, together with the United Nations country team, provide support for the development and implementation of a multi-year joint United Nations justice support programme in order to develop the police, judiciary, prisons and access to justice in Côte d’Ivoire, as well as the initial emergency rehabilitation of relevant infrastructure and the provision of equipment, taking into account the assistance to be provided by other partners in these areas. UNOCI should also provide support for capacity development, including through the provision of specialized training, co-location and mentoring programmes, for the police and gendarmerie, and corrections officers.

58. To ensure effective coordination, transparency and harmonization of efforts, and a clear division of labour among the many partners who are interested in assisting the security sector reform process, it is recommended that the support for such reform be coordinated on the basis of a master plan setting out key tasks and the division of responsibilities, for example through the working group established within the Office of the Prime Minister, and with my Special Representative playing a key role in harmonizing the support provided by international partners. UNOCI should also deploy an expert to work in the Office of the Prime Minister on security sector reform, as requested by the Prime Minister.

C. Support for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, and dismantling of militias

59. UNOCI and the United Nations country team, in close coordination with other international partners, should assist the Government in developing a new national programme for demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of combatants, and dismantling of militias, which is tailored to the new context, builds on lessons learned from the past and takes into account the rights and needs of different categories of persons to be demobilized, including children and women. UNOCI should also continue to support the registration and profiling of former combatants, assist the national authorities to collect and secure weapons, and support the disarmament and repatriation of foreign armed elements. The 1,000 microprojects
initiated by UNOCI and the United Nations Development Programme prior to the elections with voluntary and quick-impact-project funding will continue to provide sustainable alternative livelihoods for some former combatants. It is recommended that the United Nations country team, in consultation with the Government and other interested partners, support the development of a plan to implement such projects as part of the reintegration of former combatants.

D. Support for the collection of weapons from civilian communities

60. UNOCI and the United Nations country team, in coordination with other partners, should support the Government to develop and implement community weapons collection programmes, which should be linked to community violence reduction and reconciliation so as to contribute to community security and social cohesion.

E. Support for the redeployment of State administration and the extension of State authority

61. It is recommended that UNOCI and the United Nations country team reinforce their support to the Ivorian authorities for extending and re-establishing effective State authority, and strengthening public administration and the delivery of public services in key areas throughout the country at the national and local levels, as well as for implementing the unfinished aspects of the Ouagadougou Agreements as they relate to the reunification of the country, which will continue to require the eight seconded customs officers previously authorized by the Security Council.

F. Support for efforts to create a positive political environment and legislative elections

62. UNOCI and the United Nations country team will play an important role in promoting an inclusive political process and supporting the creation of a political environment conducive to the upcoming elections, including by liaising with political parties, monitoring their activities and supporting their development. Specific efforts should be made to enhance women’s participation in political life. UNOCI and the United Nations country team should support the organization and conduct of the legislative elections, provide appropriate logistical and technical assistance, and assist the national authorities to put in place effective security arrangements, taking into account the findings of the United Nations electoral needs assessment mission. The certification mandate of my Special Representative should be maintained, with the necessary adjustments to take into account the specificity of legislative elections.

G. Support for efforts to promote national reconciliation and transitional justice

63. UNOCI, in coordination with the United Nations country team, should support the Government in developing a comprehensive transitional justice approach that includes prosecutions, truth-telling, reparations and institutional reforms. It is also
recommended that the United Nations support the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission with a view to ensuring that it will function in accordance with internationally recognized principles and standards. Support should also be provided for community reconciliation, including the establishment and functioning of mechanisms to prevent, mitigate or resolve conflict, in particular at the local level.

H. Support for efforts to promote and protect human rights

64. UNOCI should support the implementation of the recommendations of the International Commission of Inquiry and the strengthening of national human rights institutions and relevant national human rights organizations. It should also continue strengthening its human rights monitoring, investigation and reporting capacity, including public reporting. In this regard, UNOCI and the United Nations country team should ensure more systematic monitoring and reporting on sexual- and gender-based violence, as requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1960 (2010). The country team should also assist the Government in finalizing a nationally owned multisectoral strategy for combating sexual- and gender-based violence. The monitoring and reporting mechanism provided for in Council resolution 1612 (2005) should be reactivated.

I. Protection of civilians

65. UNOCI and the United Nations country team continue to work with other partners to assist the national authorities to protect the civilian population through presence, deterrence and, where necessary, direct intervention within their respective mandates, taking into account the specific needs of vulnerable groups. It is further recommended that UNOCI and the country team review the mission’s strategy regarding protection of civilians to take into account the new realities on the ground, enhance coordination and include measures to prevent gender-based violence pursuant to resolution 1960 (2010), establish a protection working group and develop specific protection measures, such as early warning systems, joint protection teams and community liaison.

J. Support for the media

66. It is recommended that UNOCI continue to closely monitor the Ivorian media and provide assistance, as appropriate, to media and regulatory bodies, including through the provision of training, with a view to enabling them to play a more constructive role. UNOCI should also continue to use its broadcasting capacity, ONUCI FM, to contribute to the overall effort to create a peaceful environment, including for the legislative elections.

K. Support for efforts to address the humanitarian situation

67. The United Nations country team and UNOCI should further strengthen the provision of humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected and vulnerable populations, and facilitate the transition to recovery by supporting identified national priorities and programmes. To this end, the country team and UNOCI should support the
authorities in developing and implementing a durable solutions strategy for internally displaced persons and refugees, support the implementation of the President’s programme d’urgence, especially in relation to basic social services, develop a contingency plan to prepare for the return of displaced persons and support the establishment of a humanitarian inter-ministerial coordination structure.

L. Support for the economic recovery process

68. While the bulk of support to the Government in the area of economic development will be provided by multilateral and bilateral partners, it is recommended that the United Nations system assist the Ivorian authorities to improve development and reconstruction planning by supporting the revision of the poverty reduction strategy and the strategy to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, and by supporting capacity development for planning and aid coordination. The United Nations country team should also support economic revitalization through livelihood and employment generation interventions.

M. Support for subregional efforts

69. It is recommended that UNOCI and the United Nations country team continue to work with the Facilitator and his Special Representative in supporting the implementation of the unfinished aspects of the political process. As requested by the Prime Minister, UNOCI should also provide appropriate logistical support for the Office of the Special Representative of the Facilitator.

VI. Recommendation on the configuration and deployment of UNOCI

70. In light of the continuing security challenges and the impact of the crisis on the national security institutions, it is recommended that the mandate of UNOCI be extended for an additional 12 months. The troop and police strength, configuration and deployment of the mission will be further reviewed after the legislative elections, taking into account the prevailing security situation and progress towards reconstructing the national security and rule of law institutions. Successful legislative elections will be a critical milestone for adjustments to the future role and configuration of UNOCI. Regarding the capacities temporarily redeployed from UNMIL to UNOCI, I submitted the recommendations requested by the Security Council in its resolution 1981 (2011) in a letter dated 10 June to the President of the Council (S/2011/351).

A. Military component

71. The current strength of the military component of UNOCI, as at 20 June, is 8,684 personnel, including 8,402 troops, 186 military observers and 96 staff officers, against an authorized ceiling of 9,792 personnel. Of the additional 2,000 troops authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 1967 (2011), 1,024 troops have deployed and the remainder will deploy shortly.
72. During the crisis, up to five companies and the Force Reserve were redeployed from the north and the east to Abidjan. As the security situation stabilizes in Abidjan and additional troops arrive, these units are returning to their prior locations. UNOCI is reinforcing its troops in the west with deployments to Tabou, Toulépleu and Tai, and reconstituting its Force Reserve, while maintaining the flexibility to execute any further redeployment. In light of the disintegration of the national security and law enforcement services, the military and police components of UNOCI will also have to further reinforce their role in protecting United Nations personnel, facilities and assets, including the mission’s protection arrangements for Ivorian stakeholders and key installations. It is recommended that the previously authorized additional 2,400 troops and 100 police be maintained until after the legislative elections.

73. The strength of the Licorne force, which had been increased during the crisis, has since been brought back to 900 troops. They are deployed primarily in the Abidjan area. By its resolutions 1962 (2010) and 1981 (2011), the Security Council had extended its authorization for the Licorne force to provide support to UNOCI, within the limits of the force’s deployment and capabilities, until 31 July 2011. The support from the Licorne force remains essential.

B. Police component

74. The current strength of the police component of UNOCI, including reinforcements, as at 20 June, is 1,265 police personnel, composed of 6 formed police units comprising 959 officers and 306 individual police officers, against an authorized ceiling of 1,350 personnel. The police component includes 18 women.

75. In addition to conducting joint patrols with FRCI and being posted in police stations as a confidence-building measure, UNOCI police are providing static security at some key installations and continue to undertake human rights investigations and assist with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration operations. In light of the diminished capacity of the Ivorian police and gendarmerie, it is recommended that the Security Council authorize the reconversion of 100 formed police personnel back to individual police officers, as well as the conversion of an additional 120 personnel, while increasing the overall authorized police strength by 205 individual specialists in the areas of crowd control, community policing, judiciary policing, criminal investigation, forensics, sexual- and gender-based violence, organized crime and border management to assist in building the capacity of the Ivorian law enforcement agencies.

VII. Support issues

76. The post-elections crisis required UNOCI to put in place alternative measures in order to ensure an unhindered supply chain, including establishing an alternative logistics base in Bouaké, a new logistics support strategy, a parallel supply chain from Ghana and Burkina Faso, new suppliers and undertaking deliveries through a combination of air and ground transportation, including from other peacekeeping missions. The normalization of the situation allowed UNOCI to reactivate its usual supply chain, while maintaining an alternative logistics base in Bouaké. Looking ahead, the major support challenges will include the redeployment of military and
police personnel to new locations, supporting training activities, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, clearing of explosive remnants of war and logistical support to the legislative elections. These challenges may need to be met through additional resources in most areas, including logistics.

VIII. Financial aspects

77. The proposed budget for UNOCI for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 has been submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration at the second part of its resumed sixty-fifth session. Pending the intended consideration by the Security Council of the assessment and adjustment of the Operation’s mandate indicated in paragraphs 18 and 19 of its resolution 1962 (2010) and paragraph 2 of its resolution 1981 (2011), the proposed budget for 2011/12 is based on the deployment of 192 military observers, 7,200 military contingent personnel and 1,250 police personnel (including 800 personnel in formed units). The cost of the various measures proposed in the present report will be advised to the Council as soon as possible. As at 20 June 2011, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for UNOCI amounted to $53.6 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $1,599.3 million. Reimbursement to contributing Governments for troop and formed police costs, and for contingent-owned equipment costs has been made for the period up to 30 April 2011 and 31 December 2010, respectively.

IX. Observations

78. The apprehension of former President Gbagbo closed a painful chapter in the history of Côte d’Ivoire that should never have occurred. The inauguration of President Ouattara represented the culmination of the struggle of the people of Côte d’Ivoire against the attempt to foil their democratically expressed will. I would like to commend the Government and the people of Côte d’Ivoire for their resilience in this regard. I would also like to express my gratitude for the steadfast support and active engagement of the international community, in particular ECOWAS and the African Union, as well as the many individual world leaders who were unwavering in their support for Côte d’Ivoire during a very difficult time.

79. During my visit to Côte d’Ivoire on 21 and 22 May, I was encouraged by the steady progress that is being made by the Government of President Ouattara and the increasing signs of a return to normalcy, albeit gradual. However, the security situation is still extremely precarious and the destroyed national capacity will take some time to recover. The challenges of re-establishing lasting peace and stability are daunting, as the post-elections crisis exacerbated and multiplied old problems, unravelled the progress previously made in the peace process and created new problems. I am concerned about the high risk of a return to armed conflict. The most pressing task is to assist the Government to address the factors that could reignite conflict, as identified in section IV of the present report. The coming 6 to 12 months will be critical in determining whether Côte d’Ivoire will continue on a steady recovery from the crisis or slip back into renewed conflict. I am convinced that the continuing threats to the stability of Côte d’Ivoire and the subregion can be mitigated, but the Government will need strong support, including from the United Nations.
80. While stabilizing the security situation remains the first priority, as a stable security environment creates the space necessary to advance efforts in the other priority areas identified by the President and the Government, establishing sustainable peace and security cannot be limited to security measures alone. It will be equally important to promote reconciliation while addressing impunity and accountability, protect human rights, build strong and independent institutions, ensure inclusive governance, address the root causes of the conflict and promote economic development. Meanwhile, the legislative elections must be held in a timely, inclusive, transparent and credible manner, while the immediate needs of the people are addressed, including enabling the return of those displaced.

81. These immediate challenges notwithstanding, Côte d’Ivoire appears to be on the right track. The President is aware of the heavy responsibilities before him. Moreover, the President and his Government have a clear vision regarding the ways to restore peace and stability, and to rebuild the country so that Côte d’Ivoire will in future reclaim its historic role as the pillar of stability and prosperity in the subregion. The commitment and determination of so many individuals with whom I met during my visit to Côte d’Ivoire to confront the challenges that lie ahead was encouraging. However, it is clear that this will not happen overnight. But it can be accelerated if all Ivorians unite behind a common vision, redouble their efforts in the interest of their country and exercise the necessary patience for these measures to produce tangible change for the better. At the same time, the continuing violence must stop and I call upon the authorities to take appropriate measures in this regard.

82. The crisis has taken a massive toll on Côte d’Ivoire and the country cannot be expected to bounce back swiftly to a level where it is able to contribute significant resources of its own towards addressing the immediate threats and priorities. The country will need our help at this critical time to enable it to get back on its feet. I discussed with President Ouattara when I was in Côte d’Ivoire how the United Nations system can best support his Government and stressed to him the commitment of the Organization to stay the course, provide the support requested by the Ivorian authorities and work closely with all partners to assist the Government in this endeavour in the critical months that lie ahead. The main areas identified for support by the United Nations family are all essential to avert serious setbacks that could reignite renewed conflict.

83. On the basis of the priorities identified by the President and his Government, I recommend that the Security Council endorse the priority areas for the engagement of the United Nations in Côte d’Ivoire, as set out in section V of the present report, and to extend the mandate of UNOCI for one year, with the tasks outlined in sections V and VI. In light of the critical security challenges and the risks that another election will bring to the country, I also recommend that the Council authorize maintaining the strength of the military component of UNOCI at 9,792 personnel, comprising 8,402 troops, 186 military observers and 96 staff officers. With regard to the police, I recommend an increase of 205 individual police officers, with the appropriate language skills, which would bring the authorized levels to 1,555 police officers, comprising 780 formed police unit personnel and 775 individual police officers, as well as the 8 customs officers previously authorized. The military and police strength of the mission will be reviewed after the legislative elections, at which time further adjustments could be recommended that take into account the progress in rebuilding national capacities and the prevailing security challenges.
84. The support of the United Nations alone will not be enough. Strong bilateral and multilateral support will be essential and the regional partners will continue to play an important role. I welcome the continued engagement of the Facilitator, President Compaoré, in support of the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire. I also call upon all international partners to work with the Government and the United Nations in a concerted and cohesive effort in order to maximize our support for the priorities identified by the Government. It will be important to delineate, to the extent possible, the division of labour between UNOCI, the United Nations country team, bilateral and other partners in this regard. At the same time, it is imperative to ensure full national ownership of the peace process and in the process of rebuilding the country.

85. I would like to conclude by expressing my sincere gratitude to my Special Representative, Y. J. Choi, and to the men and women of UNOCI for their courage and dedication in working for a more peaceful and stable Côte d’Ivoire during an especially difficult phase in the country’s history. I express my heartfelt and deepest condolences to those who lost their loved ones, colleagues and friends. I would also like to extend my appreciation to the countries contributing troops and police to UNOCI, and to those men and women who put their lives at risk in the performance of their duties. I am particularly grateful to the uniformed personnel in UNOCI and the French Licorne force for their professionalism in carrying out their respective mandates under extremely challenging circumstances. I am also grateful to the United Nations country team, the humanitarian organizations and the multilateral and bilateral donors as well as the multilateral and non-governmental organizations for their important contributions and steadfast commitment. Finally, I would again like to extend my appreciation to ECOWAS, the African Union and the international community in general for maintaining their firm and principled position.
### Annex

**United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire: military and police strength as at 20 June 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Military component</th>
<th>Police component</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military observers</td>
<td>Staff officers</td>
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