



# Security Council

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## Twentieth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

### I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 1865 (2009), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the French Licorne force until 31 July 2009, and requested me to report on the situation in Côte d'Ivoire and on progress towards achieving the benchmarks for a possible phased drawdown of the troop levels of UNOCI. The present report provides an update, since my nineteenth report on UNOCI of 8 January 2009 (S/2009/21), on major developments as at 2 April 2009. The benchmarks and indicators of progress are set out in annex I to the present report.

### II. Security situation

2. The overall security situation in Côte d'Ivoire has remained stable, with largely unhindered freedom of movement of people, goods and services throughout the country, although several incidents during the reporting period highlighted the continuing fragility of the security situation in the country. Violent clashes between members of the Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire and rival student groups frequently disrupted public order. In March 2009, the Young Patriots staged demonstrations against the sanctions regime imposed on their leader, Charles Blé Goudé. However, the situation remained peaceful, including further to calls by the Young Patriots in San-Pédro for the withdrawal of UNOCI forces from the town. Meanwhile, identification agents on strike in several areas seized sensitive voter registration materials, including data collected during identification and voter registration operations. A group of demonstrators seized identification equipment from a UNOCI vehicle in Duékoué.

3. The continued presence of armed militias, the incomplete disarmament of former combatants of the Forces nouvelles, the proliferation of small arms and the difficulties faced in the efforts to move forward the reunification of the security forces and the restoration of effective State authority throughout the country have the potential to adversely affect the peace process, if not addressed carefully and urgently.

4. Strikes in several public service branches, including education, civil administration and health services, disrupted the effective functioning of State



administration and delivery of basic services. On 23 March, the leader of the opposition party, Mouvement des forces de l'avenir, Innocent Anaky Kobena, made a public statement urging the overthrow of President Laurent Gbagbo, following which he was briefly detained and interrogated by security services.

### **III. Status of implementation of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement**

5. In the two years since the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement in March 2007 significant progress has been made towards restoring normalcy in Côte d'Ivoire. The main achievements include the end of hostilities between the Forces nouvelles and the national defence and security forces; the removal of the zone of confidence that had previously physically divided the country; the restoration of free movement of people and goods throughout the country; the ongoing successful conduct of a credible process to identify the population and register voters; the overall improvement of the human rights situation throughout the country; sustained dialogue among the main political leaders; the gradual return to the north of State officials displaced during the conflict; the encouraging rebounding of the economy; and technical preparations for the elections.

6. Côte d'Ivoire is now at a stage where only two critical processes need to be completed in order to restore normalcy: reunification and elections. As noted in my previous report, the fourth supplementary agreement to the Ouagadougou Agreement, signed on 22 December 2008, outlined the way forward to the completion of the reunification process and the conduct of the elections. The agreement set out the modalities and provided a timeline for completing the following key tasks: (a) the disarmament of the former combatants of the Forces nouvelles and the dismantling of the militias, two months before the elections; (b) the reunification of Ivorian defence and security forces; and (c) the effective redeployment of State administration throughout the country, including the corps préfectoral (local authorities), the judiciary and the fiscal and customs administration. The fourth supplementary agreement thereby reversed the sequence previously established in the third supplementary agreement, which had provided for elections to be conducted before the completion of the reunification processes.

#### **A. Reunification**

7. The parties have not been able to meet the deadlines set for completing the processes set out in the fourth supplementary agreement and have made very limited progress towards their implementation. My Special Representative has actively engaged with key Ivorian leaders to exchange views on ways to advance the peace process. He also consulted with the Facilitator, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, who has reaffirmed his commitment to help accelerate the peace process with a view to holding elections in 2009. Discussions are also continuing among the parties on ways to overcome the differences that are impeding progress. The leadership of the Forces nouvelles held a seminar in January to discuss the implementation of the fourth supplementary agreement. Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, in turn, conducted sensitization visits to areas controlled by the Forces nouvelles in February.

8. The meeting of the Permanent Consultative Framework scheduled to take place on 11 March was postponed until April. However, on 16 March, the Facilitator, President Compaoré of Burkina Faso, met with President Laurent Gbagbo and Prime Minister Soro to discuss ways of resolving the issues impeding progress in the implementation of the fourth supplementary agreement. President Gbagbo subsequently convened a series of meetings on 23 and 24 March with high-ranking officers of the national defence and security forces and the Forces nouvelles to discuss ways of breaking the impasse on the reunification of the country, including the reunification and redeployment of the defence and security forces, the transfer of authority from the Forces nouvelles zone commanders to the corps préfectoral and the redeployment of the administration, including magistrates, customs and financial institutions. A joint working group was established by the integrated command centre to review a series of proposals on modalities for the reunification.

9. Uneven progress was made in the efforts to restore State authority throughout the country, including the fiscal, customs and judicial administration. On 4 March, Prime Minister Soro inaugurated a “guichet unique” in Bouaké, collocating customs, fiscal and registration services. However, a ceremony to mark the transfer of authority from the Forces nouvelles zone commanders to the corps préfectoral, expected to take place on the same day, was postponed owing to the differences between the parties over the implementation modalities. The Forces nouvelles zone commanders therefore remain, de facto, in control of the local administration.

10. Meanwhile, nearly all judges and prosecutors were nominated and redeployed to the north, with the exception of six key positions, for which a presidential decree is still pending in spite of an agreement reached between the Ministry of Justice and the Conseil supérieur de la magistrature. The redeployment of court clerks and penitentiary personnel has yet to be completed, although nearly 100 corrections officers have been trained and are available for redeployment. Other factors continue to hamper the effective functioning of the judiciary in the north, including the insufficient presence of police and gendarmerie forces, poorly equipped or secured court premises and the need to rehabilitate court buildings. Eleven detention facilities in the north were rehabilitated and handed over to Ivorian authorities in January 2009. However, conditions of detention, including food and medicine shortages and overcrowding, remained of grave concern throughout Côte d’Ivoire. Public safety continued to be adversely affected by frequent prison breaks, as illustrated by the escape of 98 prisoners from Abengourou prison on 22 February.

11. No further major progress was made in disarming Forces nouvelles combatants beyond the regrouping operations described in my last report. The adoption of a presidential decree to operationalize the provisions of the fourth supplementary agreement pertaining to the future of Forces nouvelles rank and file in the national army remains outstanding. However, some progress has been made in the reinsertion of the already registered combatants. The national civic service programme launched its training programme for youth at risk and ex-militias in the west of the country. Operations to profile and dismantle pro-Government militias, conducted by the integrated command centre and the national programme for reinsertion and community rehabilitation, have been launched in the western, eastern and southern parts of the country. Disarmament of militia elements in this phase is being carried out on a voluntary basis, and although sensitization efforts are ongoing to promote

the handover of weapons, ammunition and other military items, almost none have been surrendered.

12. The national institutions established to implement the disarmament and reintegration of former combatants and militias continue to face financial and operational capacity constraints which have hindered their activities. In addition, the parties are yet to formally endorse the results of the profiling operations as there are persisting differences on the number of former combatants and militias in the country. The availability of funds and payment modalities of the \$1,000 demobilization package to eligible Forces nouvelles and militia elements remains unclear. Meanwhile, UNOCI, in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and with resources from the Peacebuilding Fund, continued to support the reintegration process through the implementation of 335 microprojects benefiting a total of 1,180 ex-combatants, women and youth-at-risk.

## **B. Elections**

13. As of 31 March, a total of 5.9 million Ivorians had been identified and registered as voters at the 10,730 registration centres opened, out of the 11,133 planned, countrywide. The identification and voter registration operations, including for Ivorians living abroad, continued to be marred by significant logistical, financial and procedural obstacles. Launched on 15 September 2008, the process was due to end on 31 March after several extensions, but required further prolongation to allow for the conduct of remedial operations to include areas not yet sufficiently covered and to register those affected by the reconstitution of lost or destroyed civil registers. The administrative phase of the operation for the reconstitution of lost or destroyed civil registers was launched on 27 January, and all but one of the 255 commissions were operational throughout the country by the end of March. Out of a total of 105,000 petitions received, some 41,000 have been approved and some 5,000 rejected thus far. The requests approved by the administrative commissions will be reviewed by judicial commissions following the end of the administrative phase.

14. On 29 March 2009, the Independent Electoral Commission announced the postponement of the registration of Ivorians abroad to an unspecified date owing to financial constraints encountered by SAGEM, a private French company and technical operator. Moreover, the Commission specified that remedial identification operations countrywide, initially planned for the beginning of April 2009, would take place in mid-April. The Commission also indicated that it had developed a draft electoral timeline during its meeting on 27 February 2009. This timeline is contingent, however, on several prerequisites, which, according to its Chairman, are not within the purview of the Commission, including the need to fill the funding gap in its budget for the holding of the elections, the timeline for completing the reconstitution of lost and destroyed registers and the effective functioning of the first instance tribunals in the Forces nouvelles-held areas in order to settle legal disputes.

15. As indicated in my previous report, and as emphasized by my Special Representative, this electoral timeline should consist of five key stages: (a) the publication of the provisional voters list at the end of the voter registration operations; (b) the publication of the final voters' list after the conclusion of the

electoral appeals process; (c) the production of identification and voter cards; (d) the distribution of identification and voter cards; and (e) the electoral campaigning period. During the last meeting of the Permanent Consultative Framework of the Ouagadougou Agreement on 10 November, the Chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission was requested to develop and announce, by 31 December 2008, a new timeline for the completion of the identification and voter registration processes, as well as a new date for the elections. During the sixth meeting of the Evaluation and Monitoring Committee in Ouagadougou on 16 February, participants, with full support from my Special Representative, urged the Commission to make public a realistic timeline for elections in 2009. No progress has been made in this regard, however, due, in particular, to the fact that the follow-up meeting of the Permanent Consultative Framework that was initially scheduled to convene in January to discuss the new timeline was postponed on two occasions. The meeting is now expected to take place in April.

16. At the request of the Independent Electoral Commission and other technical operators, and to help address the many logistical challenges, UNOCI continued to provide substantial airlift capacity as well as maritime and ground transportation for identification agents and equipment in the framework of “operation transport”. However, in mid-March, identification and voter registration operations started to encounter serious setbacks when staff of SAGEM went on strike to protest arrears in the payment of their allowances, a situation caused by delays in the payment of approximately \$70 million to the company by the Ivorian Government. Furthermore, delays in the effective redeployment of the judiciary to Forces nouvelles-controlled areas meant that a large number of registration applicants were unable to obtain their registration documents.

17. Meanwhile, UNOCI’s international observation coordination cell, created pursuant to Security Council resolution 1765 (2007), has become fully operational. Thus far only the Carter Center has deployed staff to observe the identification and voter registration processes. In February, the European Union conducted an assessment mission to prepare for a possible large-scale observation mission. It is expected that the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the International Organization of la Francophonie will also establish international election observation missions.

#### **IV. Financial support for the implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement**

18. Efforts to mobilize funds to support the implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement continued. The two basket funds established and administered by UNDP to support the electoral process and post-crisis peace consolidation activities are fully operational and continue to receive external funding from an increasingly diverse donor base. To date, UNDP has raised over \$95 million for the two funds from the Governments of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as well as from ECOWAS and the European Union. Of the \$73 million earmarked for the basket fund for elections, some \$11 million has been disbursed thus far. Meanwhile, the \$22 million raised for the basket fund dedicated to supporting the Government’s “programme de sortie de crise” have already been disbursed in support of various

programmes implemented under the Ouagadougou Agreement, including for the redeployment of State administration, the return of internally displaced persons and the reinsertion programmes for former combatants. As of 31 March 2009, no further contribution had been made to the second basket fund.

## **V. Deployment of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire**

### **A. Military component**

19. As at 31 March, UNOCI's military strength stood at 8,024 personnel, comprising 7,745 troops, 187 military observers and 92 staff officers, including 102 women. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1865 (2009), UNOCI has developed a reconfiguration plan under which one battalion from Bangladesh has been earmarked for repatriation. The repatriation, which is scheduled to take place before the end of June, would leave UNOCI's troop level at 7,450. Meanwhile, the French Government has decided to withdraw its engineering company deployed within UNOCI by the end of April. Efforts to generate new engineering capabilities are under way.

20. Under UNOCI's force reconfiguration plan, a reserve of one rapidly deployable battalion will be based in Yamoussoukro in the form of an airborne quick reaction detachment, while the main component of the force will remain deployed in Abidjan and in the west. In addition, UNOCI and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) have started discussions, within the framework of Security Council resolution 1609 (2005), on arrangements for the temporary deployment of military and air capability reinforcements from UNMIL to UNOCI should the need arise during the election period.

21. As announced by the French Government in January, the French Licorne force, while maintaining its quick reaction capability to support UNOCI, is currently in a drawdown process, due to be completed in June, when the strength of the force is expected to be reduced to 900 personnel from its previous level of 1,800.

22. In the interim, the redeployment of UNOCI troops to consolidate their position in 24 camps was completed by the end of February 2009. The force increased its mobility to better contribute to securing and supporting the implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement, including the identification and voter registration operations and, thereafter, the elections. The force also continued to support the integrated command centre in order to enhance its capabilities to plan and conduct security operations through its mixed units, which consist of national defence and security forces and elements of the Forces nouvelles. In addition, the UNOCI force regularly conducted simultaneous and coordinated patrols with UNMIL along the border with Liberia.

### **B. Police component**

23. As at 31 March, UNOCI's police strength stood at 1,112 personnel against an authorized ceiling of 1,200, comprising 362 United Nations police officers and 750 personnel in six formed police units. Of these, 18 were female officers. The police

component continued to assist Ivorian police forces in the conduct of their operations throughout the country and to provide strategic advice and overall security for the peace process. The 600 auxiliary personnel from the Forces nouvelles trained by UNOCI in 2006 and the six mixed police units deployed along the former zone of confidence were assisted by UNOCI in the conduct of investigations. In addition, more than 30 capacity-building projects for Ivorian law enforcement agencies were initiated in collaboration with various stakeholders, including in the areas of crowd control and training in forensics. UNOCI police officers also supported the mission's integrated embargo monitoring activities. Finally, as part of its efforts to reinforce its presence throughout the country, UNOCI's police component opened deployment sites in Adzopé and Daoukro in the east and Divo in the west.

## **VI. Humanitarian situation**

24. While an estimated 76,671 internally displaced persons have voluntarily returned to their areas of origin, land disputes and an overall weak social fabric pose a threat to the sustained pace of return and resettlement of the remaining internally displaced in the west. Meanwhile, critical humanitarian needs, requiring an overall \$37 million, face considerable funding shortfalls. The Central Emergency Response Fund allocated \$2 million towards meeting humanitarian needs arising from return of internally displaced persons and reintegration processes and towards activities aimed at addressing malnutrition and food insecurity in the north.

## **VII. Human rights**

25. Intercommunity tensions, mainly in the west, and social unrest persisted throughout the country. Insecurity, in particular in western and northern parts of the country as well as in the former zone of confidence, resulted in grave human rights violations, including extortions, armed attacks against civilians, rape and killings. Government-controlled areas continued to witness political tensions and social unrest among socio-professional groups. Law enforcement officials continued to use disproportionate force against civilians. Violations of the freedom of opinion and expression and persisting dire conditions in overcrowded prisons have also been documented. In Forces nouvelles-controlled areas, frequent instances of property destruction, arbitrary arrest, unlawful detention, torture and ill-treatment were reported.

26. Violence against women and girls, including rape, female genital mutilation and trafficking, remained a serious cause of concern, particularly in the western part of the country and in the Vavoua region. Most perpetrators of violence against women enjoyed impunity countrywide due to corruption and the failure of the judicial system to address the issue adequately. UNOCI human rights officers continued to provide assistance to victims of violence with counselling and medical care, in collaboration with external partners.

## **VIII. Gender**

27. UNOCI carried out activities to strengthen the capacity of the Ivorian national police to mainstream gender aspects in recruitment practices and overall integration of female personnel in the police force. The mission also provided financial and technical support to women associations addressing sexual and gender-based violence. UNOCI continued its efforts to mainstream a gender perspective in its programmes and activities by sensitizing staff on gender issues, training gender focal points and developing a mission-wide action plan for the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008).

## **IX. Child protection**

28. UNOCI continued to monitor and report on child protection issues, as well as to advocate with the parties to the conflict, pursuant to the provisions adopted by the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict in Côte d'Ivoire. In view of the prevalence of sexual violence against children, the mission called upon all parties to comply with applicable international obligations, to end impunity and to protect children from sexual violence. UNOCI welcomed an action plan submitted on 19 January 2009 by the Forces nouvelles, in which they committed themselves to combating sexual violence in areas under their control. Meanwhile, in a letter addressed to my Special Representative on 30 January 2009, militia groups in the west of the country expressed their willingness to join efforts to combat sexual violence. UNOCI continues to sensitize its staff on child protection concerns.

## **X. HIV/AIDS**

29. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1308 (2000), UNOCI continued to include HIV/AIDS awareness in its programmes and activities. From January to March 2009, 2,256 mission personnel received such training, 105 peer educators were trained to conduct sensitization activities and 491 mission personnel received voluntary counselling and testing services. In the framework of a joint prevention project targeting sex workers, the Government, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and UNOCI are formalizing arrangements with the local non-governmental organizations that are expected to implement the project. Finally, UNOCI continued to cooperate with the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), UNDP and UNFPA to mainstream HIV/AIDS issues in the context of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes.

## **XI. Economic recovery**

30. Economic growth in Côte d'Ivoire in 2009 is projected at 3.7 per cent. So far, Côte d'Ivoire's economy has shown considerable resilience to the global downturn, but there are indications of a slowdown in certain economic sectors, including mining and non-traditional exports, that is products other than coffee and cocoa. The Government has achieved progress on a range of structural measures in the public finance areas, as emphasized by a recent mission of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that focused on the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility preparations. The



mission positively assessed the macroeconomic and fiscal framework and provided a basis of the African Development Bank to approve an interim strategy for Côte d'Ivoire as well as an arrears clearance operation and budget support.

31. On 27 and 31 March 2009, respectively, the boards of IMF and of the World Bank endorsed the agreements signed between these institutions and the Ivorian Government under which the latter is expected to benefit from immediate budget support of \$100 million from the Fund and \$150 million from the Bank. In addition, the acknowledgement of the completion of the decision point under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Debt Initiative (HIPC) will allow the Ivorian Government to benefit from a debt cancellation of \$3 billion of its \$12.8 billion in public foreign debt in the coming years. Meanwhile, in January 2009, the Ivorian Government finalized its poverty reduction strategy paper, with the objective of reducing the country's poverty rate from 48.9 per cent in 2008 to 16.2 per cent in 2015. The \$35.29 billion strategy covers key aspects of development and emphasizes the main challenges in the areas of peace, security and governance; job creation, rural development and promotion of the private sector; and access to basic social services.

## **XII. Personnel conduct and discipline**

32. In my fifteenth (S/2008/1) and seventeenth (S/2008/451) reports on UNOCI, I indicated that investigations were under way by the United Nations and troop-contributing countries into serious allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by personnel of UNOCI military contingents previously stationed in Bouaké and Logoualé. These investigations have been completed and their findings have been shared with the concerned troop-contributing countries for consideration and appropriate action. Meanwhile, UNOCI continued to sensitize its staff members and the Ivorian public on my zero-tolerance policy regarding sexual exploitation and abuse.

## **XIII. Media monitoring and public information**

33. UNOCI increased its outreach, including through the mission's radio station, ONUCI-FM, and local community radios, on the mission's role in supporting the peace process. Two new transmitters were installed in Adzopé and Divo as part of UNOCI's deployment to the area. In addition, UNOCI continued to sensitize the population on the identification and voter registration operations and to train local journalists in investigative journalism and conflict-sensitive reporting.

## **XIV. Safety and security of personnel**

34. Despite the overall stable security situation in Côte d'Ivoire, recent incidents in both urban and rural areas indicated that substantial challenges persist in upholding the safety and security of United Nations personnel. On 8 January, armed robbers burglarized the residence of three staff of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Guiglo. On 20 February, a group of demonstrators seized identification equipment from a UNOCI vehicle in Duékoué. During the same month, Ivorian authorities impounded and later released a UNOCI

truck in Yamoussoukro. On 12 March, UNOCI staff members travelling in a United Nations vehicle in Abidjan were slightly injured when unidentified armed elements opened fire during an attempted robbery. On 26 March, a UNHCR staff member was also a victim of an attempted car jacking in Abidjan. During the same period, youth groups staged demonstrations against the sanctions regime imposed on the leader of the Young Patriots, Charles Blé Goudé, in front of UNOCI sites in Abidjan and upcountry. All security measures applicable to United Nations staff continued to be strictly enforced with a view to reducing exposure of staff to criminal and other dangerous situations.

## **XV. Observations**

35. In my last report, I welcomed the adoption, on 22 December 2008, of the fourth supplementary agreement to the Ouagadougou Agreement, which set timelines for the completion, before elections, of key processes pertaining to the reunification of the country, including the restoration of State authority throughout the country, the disarmament of former combatants, the dismantling of militias and the reintegration of eligible Forces nouvelles elements into the Ivorian defence and security forces.

36. I regret that implementation of key elements of the fourth supplementary agreement has stalled. The processes set out in that agreement would lay the foundation for lasting peace and stability in Côte d'Ivoire and would create conditions conducive to the organization of credible and secure presidential elections if they are effectively implemented. I strongly encourage the signatories to the Ouagadougou Agreement, under the able stewardship of the Facilitator, President Compaoré of Burkina Faso, to show the necessary resolve and commitment to find ways to overcome persistent obstacles on this final leg of the journey towards reunifying the country.

37. I welcome the initiatives taken in recent weeks by President Compaoré, President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Soro to intensify consultations with the concerned parties, and urge all stakeholders to reach a consensus on arrangements, including a realistic timeline, to implement the reunification and restoration of State authority agendas. In particular the integration of eligible Forces nouvelles elements into the new army, the completion of credible disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and dismantling of militias and the full and effective transfer of authority from the Forces nouvelles zone commanders to the *corps préfectoral* should be focused on.

38. At the same time, I am greatly encouraged by the significant progress made in the identification and voter registration operations and I urge the Independent Electoral Commission and the technical operators to remain focused on bringing these sensitive operations to a successful close. In spite of daunting technical and logistical challenges, which were partly addressed through the support provided by UNOCI and other international partners, the identification and voter registration processes have now reached 5.9 million people, which represents a significant achievement. While there are still critical stages to be reached on the way towards credible and transparent elections before the end of 2009, including the publication of provisional and final lists of voters, the production and distribution of identification and voters cards and the electoral campaign, it is my assessment that

the weakened momentum for elections must be recovered in order to expedite the completion of these crucial operations, thereby putting in place the essential technical arrangements that would make elections possible before the end of this year.

39. It is now important that the Independent Electoral Commission, without further delay, make public a realistic and comprehensive electoral timeline with clear milestones. In this regard, I would like to underline the importance of setting clear timelines for the five key stages (provisional electoral list; definitive electoral list; production of the identification and electoral cards; distribution of the cards and preparation of 11,000 electoral sites; and official electoral campaign) defined by my Special Representative, as these will be essential in ensuring the transparency, efficiency and proper planning of the electoral process. The signatories of the Ouagadougou Agreement and its supplementary agreements must, on their part, honour their commitments towards resolving the outstanding reunification issues as these will be crucial in creating the conditions for a credible, secure and transparent election.

40. The Ivorian parties, including key opposition leaders and the Facilitator, must harness the political momentum that resulted in the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement and must safeguard the gains made so far. Major hurdles have already been cleared through continued dialogue between the parties who own the peace process. This has resulted in restored freedom of movement and significantly improved security conditions throughout Côte d'Ivoire, including the remarkable progress made in the identification and voter registration operations. I am confident that President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Soro, as well as other key Ivorian stakeholders, with sustained support from the Facilitator, will work towards avoiding a prolonged impasse in the peace process, which would undermine the trust, time and resources invested by the Ivorian people in charting a way out of the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. If they do, the Ivorian leaders and people can count on continued support from the United Nations, and in particular from my Special Representative, who will remain by their side to help them overcome technical and logistical challenges.

41. However, if the momentum is lost and the challenges and obstacles described above are not addressed during the course of 2009, there is a risk of an unacceptably prolonged status quo. In the event that the parties fail to resolve their current differences and the lack of clarity on a new date for the elections continues, the future of the country would be adversely affected and the suffering of the Ivorian people unnecessarily prolonged. Côte d'Ivoire urgently requires credible and transparent elections that will bring to a successful conclusion the current transitional arrangements and give a newly elected Government the legitimacy to capitalize on the gains achieved so far in the peace process and work towards the long-term stability and recovery of the country with the continued support of the international community.

42. Despite the slow progress towards the elections and the divergent views of the parties on how to resolve the issues pertaining to the reunification of the country, Côte d'Ivoire has generally maintained a steady course of recovering from the conflict since the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement. The economy is rebounding, the Government is now able to meet most of the costs of the peace process and the capacity of national institutions to implement the Ouagadougou

Agreement is increasing. In this regard, should the security situation continue to improve in the coming months, and if progress is made on reunification and the preparations for the elections, it will be necessary to consult the parties in order to determine which areas UNOCI should focus its support. Based on these consultations and the Secretariat's assessment, I intend to propose to the Security Council, in my upcoming reports, possible adjustments in the role and configuration of UNOCI.

43. In the interim, the mission will continue to contribute to the ongoing peaceful environment in the country through its deterrent presence and to monitor and investigate human rights violations, with a view to helping the efforts to end impunity, with particular focus on helping to combat violence against women and children, as well as any incidents that have an impact on the security of the electoral process. I call on the Ivorian parties to develop the necessary confidence-building measures to prevent human rights violations, in particular electoral violence, which could undermine the credibility of the results.

44. In conclusion, I would like to thank my Special Representative for Côte d'Ivoire, Young-Jin Choi, and all UNOCI military, police and civilian personnel for their continued commitment to supporting the peace process. I am also grateful to the Facilitator of the Ivorian peace process, Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso, and his Special Representative in Abidjan, Boureima Badini, for their tireless facilitation efforts. Finally, I thank all troop- and police-contributing countries, the Economic Community of West African States, the African Union, the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, humanitarian organizations and multilateral and bilateral donors, as well as international and local non-governmental organizations, for their important contributions to the return of peace and stability to Côte d'Ivoire.

## Annex I

### **Benchmarks and indicators of progress in key areas of the Ouagadougou Agreement and its supplementary agreements**

1. With the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement on 4 March 2007, the Ivorian parties assumed full ownership of the peace process. Supported by the Facilitator, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union and the United Nations, the Ivorian parties have made progress over the past two years on key sensitive areas set out in the present report.

2. In its resolution 1865 (2009), the Security Council endorsed the four benchmarks proposed in my nineteenth report, which should guide assessments of progress in the peace process and inform decisions on the drawdown of UNOCI and its exit strategy: (a) the complete disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and dismantling of the militias; (b) the holding of elections; (c) the complete restoration of State authority; and (d) the commencement of security sector reform. In the same resolution, the Council also requested that I establish a strategic workplan containing indicative timelines and indicators of achievement for monitoring progress under each of the above benchmarks.

3. While these indicators are proposed below, under each benchmark, it is worth recalling that, given the fact that the Ivorian parties have full ownership of the peace process, and the prerogative to set timelines for implementing the remaining tasks under the Ouagadougou Agreement, UNOCI has no control over the pace of the entire process towards attaining these benchmarks. In addition, Côte d'Ivoire controls the financing of key aspects of the peace process, including restoration of State authority, the electoral process and the disarmament of former combatants and the dismantling of the militias, with UNOCI and other international partners helping to meet the shortfalls. In light of the above, the indicators of achievement listed below are to be considered as tentative in nature. They can be expected to evolve in the course of implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement. I will therefore continue to refine and adjust them in my upcoming progress reports.

#### **Elections**

4. As mandated by the Security Council, UNOCI will continue to provide political, financial, technical and logistical assistance to the Ivorian electoral process in the coming months. My Special Representative will also continue to implement his certification mandate, which is critical for enhancing the credibility of the electoral process. The key stages leading to the holding of credible and transparent elections have already been defined by the parties in the Ouagadougou Agreement and its supplementary agreements. The following indicators of progress should therefore be retained for measuring progress on the electoral process: (a) completion of identification and voter's registration; (b) successful reconstitution of lost or destroyed civil registers; (c) arrangements put in place for the provision of security during the electoral process by the integrated command centre with the support of UNOCI; (d) establishment of the provisional and final voters lists; (e) production and distribution of national identity and voter's cards; (f) publication of the final voters list and elaboration of the new electoral map; (g) preparation of the 11,000 voting sites, including transportation of the sensitive

and non-sensitive electoral cargo to the sites; and (h) electoral campaign and the polling process itself, including the announcement of the results.

#### **Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants and dismantling of the militias**

5. Under the Ouagadougou Agreement and its supplementary agreements, the Ivorian parties have resorted to models for conducting disarmament, demobilization and reintegration operations that depart from traditional disarmament processes. In its resolution 1865 (2009), the Security Council requested UNOCI to continue to support the Ivorian institutions responsible for conducting disarmament, demobilization and reintegration operations and operations to dismantle militias. In doing so, UNOCI will be guided by the tasks set out in the Ouagadougou Agreements, in particular the fourth supplementary agreement.

6. The following indicators of achievement were retained to assess progress in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, as well as in the dismantling and demobilization of the militias: (a) profiling and cantonment of 5,000 Forces nouvelles elements at four sites in the north; (b) deployment of 3,400 Forces nouvelles police and gendarmerie elements under supervision of the integrated command centre; (c) storage of weapons by the integrated command centre under the supervision of the impartial forces; (d) profiling and dismantling of militia groups; (e) payment of \$1,000 demobilization package to former combatants and militias; and (f) reinsertion of demobilized combatants and militias.

#### **Restoration of State authority**

7. Since the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement in 2007 the main achievement in restoring State authority was the return of most of the 24,400 civil servants displaced during the conflict. However, the redeployed civil servants do not yet have effective control over local administration. The Forces nouvelles zone commanders are yet to hand over control to the *corps préfectoral*.

8. Based on the specific objectives set out in the fourth supplementary agreement to the Ouagadougou Agreement, the following are the key indicators of achievement in this area: (a) effective and complete redeployment of the *corps préfectoral*; (b) transfer of authority from zone commanders to the *corps préfectoral*; (c) centralization of the treasury in the north; (d) deployment of mixed police and gendarmerie units in the north; (e) deployment of magistrates and court clerks supported by the judicial police, expected to play a role in adjudicating electoral disputes; (f) deployment of correction officers and prison directors; and (g) deployment of other civil servants, including agents of line ministries.

#### **Commencement of Security Sector Reform**

9. Under the Ouagadougou Agreement, eligible Forces nouvelles elements are expected to join unified Ivorian defence forces, police and gendarmerie before and after the elections. In its resolution 1865 (2009), the Security Council requested UNOCI, together with other international partners, to assist the Ivorian parties in their efforts to launch security sector reform, including by putting in place confidence-building measures within a broader framework of democratic governance and oversight of the security sector, reunification of the army and establishment of functional and republican Ivorian armed forces and security

services that will be key for the long-term stability of Côte d'Ivoire. At the same time, security sector reform is inextricably linked to the ongoing discussions among the signatories of the Ouagadougou Agreement on outstanding issues pertaining to reunification, including the future of the Forces nouvelles zone commanders.

10. The following proposed indicators of progress mainly derive from the fourth supplementary agreement: (a) completion of negotiations on reunification issues; (b) adoption of all relevant decrees governing the reunification of the two armies; (c) full operationalization of the integrated command centre; (d) integration of Forces nouvelles elements recruited in 2001 in the new national army; and (e) deployment of mixed police and gendarmerie units for securing the electoral process.

11. The matrix below condenses under each of the endorsed benchmarks the proposed indicators of achievement, and will be attached to my upcoming reports in order to update members of the Security Council on progress made under each item.

<i>Benchmarks</i>	<i>Indicators of progress</i>
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants/ dismantling of the militias	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Profiling and cantonment of 5,000 Forces nouvelles elements at four sites in the north</li> <li>• Deployment of 3,400 Forces nouvelles police and gendarmerie elements under supervision of the integrated command centre</li> <li>• Storage of weapons by the integrated command centre under the supervision of the impartial forces</li> <li>• Profiling and dismantling of militia groups</li> <li>• Payment of \$1,000 demobilization package to former combatants and militias</li> <li>• Reinsertion of demobilized combatants and militias</li> </ul>
Elections	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Completion of identification and voter registration</li> <li>• Successful reconstitution of lost or destroyed civil registers</li> <li>• Arrangements in place for the provision of security during the electoral process by the integrated command centre with the support of UNOCI</li> <li>• Establishment of the provisional and final voters lists</li> <li>• Production and distribution of national identity and voter's cards</li> <li>• Publication of the final voters list and elaboration of the new electoral map</li> </ul>

Benchmarks	Indicators of progress
Complete restoration of State authority	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preparation of the 11,000 voting sites, including transportation of the sensitive and non-sensitive electoral cargo to the sites</li> <li>• Electoral campaign and the polling process itself, including the announcement of the results</li> <li>• Effective and complete redeployment of the <i>corps préfectoral</i></li> <li>• Transfer of authority from zone commanders to the <i>corps préfectoral</i></li> <li>• Centralization of the treasury in the north</li> <li>• Deployment of mixed police and gendarmerie units in the north</li> <li>• Deployment of magistrates and court clerks, supported by the judicial police, expected to play a role in adjudicating electoral disputes</li> <li>• Deployment of correction officers and prison directors</li> <li>• Deployment of other civil servants, including agents of line ministries</li> </ul>
Commencement of security sector reform	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Completion of negotiations on reunification issues</li> <li>• Adoption of all relevant decrees governing the reunification of the two armies</li> <li>• Full operationalization of the integrated command centre</li> <li>• Integration of Forces nouvelles elements recruited in 2001 in the new national army</li> <li>• Deployment of mixed police and gendarmerie units for securing the electoral process.</li> </ul>



## Annex II

### United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire: military and police strength as at 31 March 2009

Country	Military component				Police components	
	Military observers	Staff officers	Troops	Total	Formed police units	Civilian police
Argentina						3
Bangladesh	14	10	2 709	2 733	250	4
Benin	8	7	420	435		38
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	4			4		
Brazil	4	3		7		
Burundi						18
Cameroon						27
Canada						9
Central African Republic						10
Chad	3			3		24
China	3			3		
Croatia	2			2		
Djibouti						45
Democratic Republic of the Congo						20
Ecuador	2			2		
El Salvador	3			3		
Ethiopia	2			2		
France	2	9	171	182		10
Gambia	3			3		
Ghana	6	7	535	548		4
Guatemala	5			5		
Guinea	3			3		
India	8			8		
Ireland	2			2		
Jordan	4	11	1 050	1 065	375	9
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya						2
Morocco		3	722	725		
Namibia	2			2		
Nepal	3	1		4		
Niger	6	4	382	392		59
Nigeria	8			8		
Pakistan	11	11	1 126	1 148	125	1
Paraguay	8	2		10		
Peru	3			3		

<i>Country</i>	<i>Military component</i>				<i>Police components</i>	
	<i>Military observers</i>	<i>Staff officers</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Formed police units</i>	<i>Civilian police</i>
Philippines	4	3		7		
Poland	2			2		
Republic of Moldova	3			3		
Romania	7			7		
Russian Federation	11			11		
Rwanda						3
Senegal	8	7	321	336		36
Serbia	3			3		
Switzerland						4
Togo	7	6	309	322		9
Tunisia	7	3		10		
Turkey						18
Uruguay	2			2		3
Uganda	3	2		5		
United Republic of Tanzania	1	2		3		
Yemen	7	1		8		6
Zambia	2			2		
Zimbabwe	1			1		
<b>Total</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>7 745</b>	<b>8 024</b>	<b>750</b>	<b>362</b>

