

**Security Council**

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**Letter dated 21 April 2009 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council**

With reference to Security Council resolution 1778 (2007), I have the honour to convey the attached letters which I received from the Secretary-General and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, Javier Solana, transmitting the two reports on the activities of the European Union military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic covering the period from 15 March to 15 September 2008 and from 15 September 2008 to March 2009, respectively (see annexes).

I should be grateful if you would bring these letters and attachments to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Ban Ki-moon**



**Annex I**

**Letter dated 22 September 2009 from the Secretary-General and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union addressed to the Secretary-General**

In accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1778 (2007), I attach the first six-monthly report on the activities of the European Union military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (see enclosure). The report covers the period from 15 March to 15 September 2008. I should be grateful if you would transmit this report to the President of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* Javier Solana

## Enclosure

### **Report of the Secretary-General and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union on the activities of the European Union military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic**

#### **I. Introduction**

1. This report covers the period from 15 March to 15 September 2008.
2. In its resolution 1778 (2007) the Security Council requested the European Union to report to it on how its operation will fulfil its mandate.

#### **II. Political background**

3. In Chad, the period under review has been characterized by attacks by rebel movements, launched from Sudanese territory at the beginning of April and in mid-June 2008. The unresolved Darfur crisis has produced a refugee influx, and contributed to increased levels of banditry in eastern Chad.
4. The internal political situation in Chad has been dominated by the consequences of the rebel attack of February 2008 on N'Djamena. In April 2008, a new Government was put in place with four opposition politicians as members, contributing to the resumption of the political dialogue in the framework of the agreement of 13 August 2007, notably with a first meeting of the Comité de suivi in July 2008, encouraged by the international community.
5. Important political developments in the Central African Republic during the period under review include the signing of comprehensive peace agreements in May and June 2008. However, some rebel movements have since withdrawn and indicated a return to armed rebellion. The Government has expressed its desire to combine political progress with increased resources for security and development.
6. The European force (EUFOR) and the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) have, during the period, established good working relations with the Chadian authorities through the Chad coordinating body CONAFIT, and directly with the authorities of the Central African Republic.
7. Maintaining humanitarian space in the area continues to be a challenge, as does the militarization of refugee and internally displaced person camps. In addition, the international humanitarian community is facing security threats hampering its efforts.
8. The regional political situation during the period has been dominated by the tense relations between Chad and the Sudan, which escalated further after the attacks on N'Djamena and Omdurman in February and May 2008, respectively. Diplomatic efforts to reconcile Chad and the Sudan followed those events, including regional and African Union initiatives. The Dakar Agreement of 13 March 2008 between Chad and the Sudan contains provisions relating to normalizing relations between the two countries. Regular meetings at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs allow the parties to exchange views within a structured format in the presence of regional and other countries. Diplomatic relations, broken after the

Omdurman attack in May 2008, were re-established between Chad and the Sudan in August 2008.

### **III. Security situation and EUFOR activities**

9. The rebel offensive in June 2008 sparked fear and caused disruption to humanitarian activity. In addition, following most of the rebel attacks, the uncontrolled withdrawal of defeated rebels back to the Sudan produces a significant increase in criminality. The onset of the rainy season has reduced the rebels' mobility, consequently their focus has switched to consolidation and political activity.

10. Criminality is endemic and widespread, and non-governmental and humanitarian organizations are targeted for vehicles and cash. The head of Save the Children UK was murdered in such an incident on 1 May 2008. Such acts of violence have led some non-governmental organizations to either withdraw, suspend, relocate or downsize their activities. The presence of large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons results in a degree of resentment among the local population.

11. Despite sporadic rebel activity, the overall security situation during the period has remained relatively calm, with no major incidents involving EUFOR. The principal threats to a safe and secure environment are rebel activity, criminality and banditry that primarily affect the civilian population and humanitarian efforts.

12. During the period the main effort of EUFOR has been the deployment of the force, developing situational awareness and providing a comprehensive footprint across the area of operations. Since the declaration of its initial operational capability on 15 March 2008 the force strength has increased to more than 3,300 personnel.

13. The logistic challenges have been considerable and focused on the establishment of operational bases, improvements to existing enabling infrastructure, the provision of water and stockpiling resources prior to the onset of the rainy season. Cooperation between EUFOR, the Chadian authorities and contractors has been effective. A reliable infrastructure network is now established, including six permanent operations bases in N'Djamena, Abeche, Forchana, Goz Beida, Iriba and Birao; and enhancements to the airport infrastructure in N'Djamena and Abeche.

14. Building on the efforts of the initial entry forces, EUFOR has continued to develop its situational awareness. The key to its success has been the development of an effective liaison and coordination network with the numerous other actors in theatre. In Chad the early creation of CONAFIT as a venue for de-conflicting issues has been an essential instrument in improving information sharing.

15. The presence of EUFOR has had a tangible effect on improving the overall security and perceptions of security in the region. EUFOR has been generally welcome and is seen as credible, professional, impartial and dedicated to the preservation of a safe and secure environment. A major surge operation in May following the murder of the head of Save the Children UK and the evacuation of humanitarian aid workers during a rebel offensive in the vicinity of Goz Beida and

Abeche in mid-June served to highlight EUFOR capabilities and effectiveness. However, the situation remains fragile and could change rapidly.

16. While MINURCAT is deploying and working towards a full operating capability, EUFOR has had to broaden its operating and security concept. Initially postured to face a military-style threat, EUFOR has had to expand its security remit to the contribution to the protection of the local population and humanitarian community against criminality.

17. MINURCAT is now establishing its footprint and will be in a position to take over the above-mentioned tasks related to the rule of law. The *Détachement intégré de sécurité* training process has begun, and the first recruits will graduate early in August. EUFOR and the United Nations have signed a technical arrangement for the provision of logistics support to MINURCAT. Over the coming months, MINURCAT will develop its own vertical infrastructure in EUFOR camps through independent contracts.

18. Improvements in security have contributed to a limited return of internally displaced persons in some locations. However, it is clear that this aspect will be achieved in a consistent way only through a comprehensive approach that provides good governance and effective social structures in addition to security. The European Commission is in the process of establishing programmes to encourage the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and EUFOR is supporting such initiatives through its civil-military operations.

19. The onset of the rainy season has affected the mobility of EUFOR and its military effectiveness, particularly in southern Chad and the Central African Republic. However, the rainy season also has an impact on “spoilers” in the region and, owing to their limited mobility and seasonal farming commitments, there has not been an increase in violence or rebel activity. This enforced “operational pause” has provided an opportunity for reassessment, planning and coordination with other stakeholders.

20. EUFOR has successfully overcome many challenges and achieved considerable success in the first six months of the operation. EUFOR is currently a guarantor of security for the local population, including refugees and internally displaced persons, and the humanitarian community, against rebel activity, criminality and banditry.

#### **IV. Outlook**

21. While the security situation is expected to remain stable but fragile, the underlying causes are not expected to change significantly during the life of the current EUFOR mandate.

22. The EUFOR deployment is scheduled to be complete by September, and the force will be well poised to exploit its considerable achievements to date. Maintaining a positive perception of the force and continuing to ensure a safe and secure environment in which humanitarian actors can operate effectively and which provides the conditions for MINURCAT to fully deploy will be critical to success.

23. The focus for planning has turned to the recovery phase of the current EUFOR mandate. The decision of the Security Council scheduled for the end of September will clarify the focus and thrust of this planning effort. In the interim, the operation is on track to set the conditions for a successful transition to any possible follow-on arrangement.

**Annex II****Letter dated 2 April 2009 from the Secretary-General and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union addressed to the Secretary-General**

In accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1778 (2007), I attach the final six-monthly report on the activities of the European Union military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (see enclosure). The report covers the period from 15 September 2008 to 15 March 2009. I should be grateful if you would transmit this report to the President of the Security Council.

*(Signed)* Javier Solana

## Enclosure

### **Report of the Secretary-General and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union on the activities of the European Union military operation in Chad and the Central African Republic**

#### **I. Introduction**

1. This report covers the period from 15 September 2008 to 15 March 2009.
2. In its resolution 1778 (2007) the Security Council requested the European Union to report to it on how its operation fulfils its mandate.

#### **II. Political background**

3. The recurrent tensions in the region (Darfur and the EUFOR area of operations in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic continued to be driven by a multitude of different but inter-linked factors. The spillover of the Darfur crisis with the protracted humanitarian emergency in the refugee camps and sites for internally displaced persons continued. It has been aggravated by local criminality and banditry, as well as by tensions between ethnic groups living on both sides of the border. Though there were no major attacks during the period under review, ongoing cross-border activities of rebel groups (including reorganization and rearming) have continued to contribute to uncertainty and insecurity on the ground.

4. The challenges posed by the continued volatile security situation made tangible progress in the political domain relatively difficult. Owing to the threat by rebel groups, the Government of Chad has been compelled to focus on military and security measures, whereas improvements in the area of governance and the rule of law have experienced additional delays. The fragile situation has also contributed to slow down progress in the overall political agenda. Therefore, international support for the implementation of the agreement of 13 August 2007 between the Government and the political opposition remained one of the priorities. Strongly encouraged by the international community, the meetings of the Comité de suivi continued, as did the preparations for the legislative elections scheduled for 2009. The two important pieces of legislation were adopted, the Electoral Code and the law for the establishment of an Electoral Commission.

5. Despite the resumption of diplomatic relations between Chad and the Sudan, the overall mistrust between the two countries has prevailed, significantly affected by the cross-border activities of rebel groups, for which mutual accusations of support continued. In the framework of the Dakar process, the latest Contact Group meeting in N'Djamena has not yet been followed up, as envisaged, by a meeting in Khartoum.

6. There have been important political developments in the Central African Republic during the period under review, in particular agreements with regard to the establishment of a broad-based government, commitment to organize municipal, legislative and presidential elections in 2009, as well as an agreement to implement security sector reform, including the immediate start of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. However, recent demonstrations of

force by rebel groups in the north of the country and the influx of refugees from the Central African Republic at the Chad border are worrying signs of the still fragile situation. Dissident rebel groups were encouraged to re-join the inclusive political dialogue as the only option for a peaceful development.

### **III. Security situation and EUFOR activities**

7. The deployment of the EUFOR operation has contributed positively and tangibly to an improved overall security environment for international and humanitarian aid workers as well as the local population in its area of operations. However, this region is still blighted by multi-dimensional conflicts yet to be resolved.

8. Generally, the security situation in Chad has remained relatively calm over the past six months. The prevalence of inter-ethnic clashes between rival tribes, an ongoing concern for all stakeholders, diminished owing to the high visibility operations of EUFOR. This was a significant factor in reducing such clashes over the past six months.

9. In the Central African Republic, the expectations of the inclusive political dialogue have not yet been met and some groups have returned to armed opposition, resulting in clashes with Government forces. This has led to some 7,000 refugees crossing the border into the southern region of Chad. Criminal activity is common for this period of the dry season, especially in the Ouanda-Djallé area, where an increase has been observed. There are recent reports of banditry against humanitarian actors and clashes among armed actors present in the area. There is a risk that the security situation in the country will deteriorate further.

#### **EUFOR activities**

10. EUFOR has been generally welcomed and viewed as a credible and professional force that is credited with contributing to the preservation of a safe and secure environment. EUFOR, in observance of its mandate, has acted in an impartial, neutral and independent manner.

11. The establishment and maintenance of a high tempo and broad-spectrum operational profile throughout the area of operations since full operating capability was reached on 15 September 2008 has been one of the key contributing factors to the success of the EUFOR operation.

12. Ground operations remained focused on designated areas of interest, while air operations, including unmanned aerial vehicles, continued to provide valuable visibility of the area of operations. By way of example, the support to the recent UNHCR mission to Doha on the Chad/Central African Republic border was an important contribution to overall security in that area.

13. The impact on the security environment through the conduct of more than 260 long-range patrols into areas that required an extended EUFOR presence was effective in contributing to a safe and secure environment and also provided a significant deterrent. Those patrols have been crucial in extending the EUFOR presence far beyond the immediate environs of its main bases. Moreover, with bases located on the main internal displaced person sites and refugee camps, the total of

over 2,300 short-range patrols conducted played a vital part in stabilizing those districts.

14. The conduct of combined joint operations, using air and ground assets, enabled EUFOR to establish a high-visibility presence in areas where criminal activity had been identified. Those operations resulted in a significant reduction in criminality, inter-ethnic clashes and spoiler activity and enhanced the credibility of EUFOR.

15. Throughout the operation the use of fixed-wing and rotary aircraft was a key enabler for the successful accomplishment of the mission. In particular, during the end of the rainy season when land mobility was still restricted, the use of air assets was of critical importance. The helicopter capability in theatre was enhanced significantly from early 2009, enabling EUFOR to react swiftly to situations and project forces to remote areas in a short time frame. In this regard, the extraction of non-governmental organization personnel from Ouandja in the Central African Republic by helicopter in November 2008 enhanced the standing of EUFOR within the humanitarian community.

16. The operation's situational awareness, achieved through the use of multiple sensors including satellite imagery, air and ground reconnaissance, human intelligence, geographical and civil-military cooperation teams, greatly benefited all international actors including MINURCAT and the humanitarian community. The increased awareness and understanding enabled EUFOR to concentrate its operations on the more vulnerable and insecure areas of the area of operations.

17. EUFOR performed some 260 visits to internally displaced person sites and conducted more than 750 surveys of internally displaced person/refugee sites. The active engagement with over 70 international and non-governmental organizations, through formal coordination mechanisms and information-sharing structures, ensured a coherent and joined-up approach to the humanitarian and security issues. This led to confidence-building among international actors and the work of the civil-military cooperation teams greatly enhanced this process. Furthermore, the integration of human rights issues and the protection of women and children in armed conflict into the conduct of the operation, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1612 (2005), has been an important aspect of the work of EUFOR.

18. The provision of medical care for the local population was not a primary task for EUFOR. However, the practical assistance afforded through over 1,600 local consultations and 30 local surgical interventions played a key role in demonstrating the goodwill and concern of the operation for the local community in Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic. This intent was further enhanced by the removal of some 350 unexploded ordnance devices within the EUFOR area of operations, contributing to the safety of the local population.

19. The construction of six spacious and fully fledged military compounds in theatre is testament to the capabilities of the operation. Their transfer, including the new aircraft aprons with cargo facilities in N'Djamena and Abeche, to the Government of Chad on 15 March 2009 for onwards transfer to MINURCAT has provided the United Nations force with an immediate and first-class bridgehead in theatre.

20. The engagement with MINURCAT has been very significant since the beginning of the operation and has further intensified as handover approached. The

real life support that EUFOR has provided to MINURCAT helped it in the development of its capabilities to train and deploy the United Nations-trained Chadian police *Détachement intégré de sécurité* in the area of operations. The visible presence of the *Détachement intégré de sécurité* throughout the area of operations is improving the security situation around the refugee camps and internally displaced person sites.

21. During the last stages of the EUFOR mandate the planning effort was progressively focused on the handover to MINURCAT and recovery of EUFOR. To this end efficient joint and collaborative planning with the United Nations was undertaken immediately following the mid-mandate review, in order to ensure a seamless handover to MINURCAT. The adoption of Security Council resolution 1861 (2009) on 14 January 2009 enabled EUFOR and MINURCAT to finalize planning. As part of the joint efforts, EUFOR sent technical teams to work alongside the United Nations, covering all aspects of planning. A joint EUFOR/MINURCAT seminar was held late in February in Chad where outstanding issues were successfully dealt with. Parallel to that process, the EUFOR focus was on the recovery of those troops that would not come under United Nations command.

22. Finally, the transfer of authority between EUFOR and MINURCAT was effected as planned, on 15 March 2009, one year after the declaration that EUFOR had achieved its initial operating capability, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 1778 (2007), 1834 (2008) and 1861 (2009).

#### **IV. Outlook**

23. The broad acknowledgement of the EUFOR contribution to a safe and secure environment both by the local populations in the area and by the international actors working in the area has underpinned a feeling of a new sense of confidence among the various actors in the area of operations. Moreover, the operation's deterrent effect reinforced the message that the parties should not seek military solutions to the conflicts. This has further enhanced the positive perception of EUFOR as being credible, impartial and multinational.

24. EUFOR has set the conditions for a successful transition to MINURCAT and ensured through data transfer, contractual arrangements and reverse support that MINURCAT will inherit an effective operational apparatus, thus ensuring a seamless transition in sustaining and contributing to a safe and secure environment.

25. The EUFOR presence has had a tangible effect on improving overall security in the region but the unpredictable political environment both within the area of operations and outside will continue to make the mission of MINURCAT challenging.

26. The issue of the arrest warrant for President Al-Bashir of the Sudan, indicted by the International Criminal Court, might contribute to increased regional instability, although, during the period under review, there has been no direct impact within the EUFOR area of operations. However, the expulsion of a number of humanitarian organizations from Darfur and the subsequent reduced capacity to deliver humanitarian aid could raise the perspective of large numbers of new refugees crossing the border into Chad. This would present significant security challenges and consequences for MINURCAT.

27. The European Union followed a regional and comprehensive approach in planning and conducting this operation. The actions of EUFOR, the activities in the political and diplomatic fields, on the one hand, and in the humanitarian and development fields, on the other, have been both complementary and coordinated, thereby maximizing the European Union's impact on the ground.

28. The redeployment of EUFOR does not mark the end of the European Union's involvement in Chad, in the Central African Republic or in the region. Around 2,000 troops who served under EUFOR are now under the MINURCAT banner. Moreover, the European Union will remain active at a political and diplomatic level in Chad, in the Central African Republic and especially in the Sudan, where the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Darfur peace process is crucial to the stabilization of the region. The European Union will also continue to be active in the region in the field of humanitarian and development activities.

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