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REPORT ON THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (UNSCR) 2320 (2016) ON UNITED NATIONS ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS FOR AU-LED PEACE OPERATIONS AUTHORIZED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL
REPORT ON THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION (UNSCR) 2320 (2016) ON UNITED NATIONS ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS FOR AU-LED PEACE OPERATIONS AUTHORIZED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Key References

A. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (2002);
C. Report of the AU-UN Panel on Financing African Peacekeeping Missions (Prodi Panel, 2008);
D. 24th Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly Decision on Alternative Sources of Financing the African Union Assembly/AU/Dec.561(XXIV) (2015);
G. Joint African Union–United Nations Review of available mechanisms to finance and support African Union peace support operations authorized by the United Nations Security Council (2016);

Liste of Annexes

- Annex 1: List of Peace Support Operations in Africa (2003 to Date);
I. INTRODUCTION

1. This report constitutes the update requested from the African Union (AU) by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2320 of 18 November 2016. UNSCR 2320, welcomed the AU’s request to start discussions on “the provision of UN assessed contributions for AU-led peace operations authorized by the Security Council”.

2. In the resolution, the UNSC invited the AU to update the Security Council by May 2017, on three key issues: (a) the details of the proposed scope of peace operations to be considered; (b) the progress, benchmarks, and timelines for implementation of the AU Peace Fund, and (c) the accountability, transparency, and compliance frameworks for AU peace support operations.

3. In order to address these three questions, this report:
   a) Provides a brief overview of the current security context and the evolution of Peace Support Operations in Africa in order to address the question of the ‘scope of operations’;
   b) Summarises the various political, institutional and operational lessons that have been learned in the deployment of AU PSOs that will inform the approach to strengthening the effectiveness of AU PSOs; and
   c) Outlines the AU’s key priorities for strengthening the overall effectiveness, management and oversight of AU PSOs. These include: securing predictable PSO financing within the framework of the Peace Fund, strengthening AU PSO planning and management capacities, strengthening the AU’s PSO partnership with the UN, and establishing a robust accountability and compliance framework for AU PSOs.

II. BACKGROUND

4. It is a well-established fact that strengthening the African Union’s (AU) comparative advantage in responding rapidly to some of the most complex and challenging crises can only enhance the overall credibility and effectiveness of the international peace and security architecture.

5. Yet, the financing of AU mandated or authorized peace support operations (AU PSOs) in a predictable and sustainable manner remains one of the most important strategic challenges facing the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN).

6. In 2015, the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO)\(^1\) called for stronger partnerships emphasizing that a more resilient global and regional architecture for international peace and security is required for the future. It called on the United Nations to lay out a vision for such partnerships and to help enable others. In this respect, the HIPPO report noted that:

\(^1\) A/70/95-S/2015/446
7. The UN’s regional partnerships in Africa must be intensified and made more predictable through mechanisms for collaboration and by optimizing the use of limited resources. This is a partnership that should be made deeper and more collaborative. The UN should take the decisive step to invest in and commit to the success of the African Union as a partner in addressing shared concerns.

8. The Panel went on to recommend that: UN Assessed contributions be provided on a case-by-case basis to support Security Council-approved African Union peace support operations including the costs associated with deployed uniformed personnel to complement funding from the African Union and/or African Member States.

9. This is in line with Article 17(1) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (the PSC Protocol) which cites Chapter VIII of the UN Charter as the basis of its relationship with the UN. The PSC Protocol directs the PSC to cooperate with the UNSC, “...which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

10. In a direct reference to burden-sharing, Article 17(2) of the PSC Protocol states that: “Where necessary, recourse will be made to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the African Union’s activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter”.

11. The UN Secretary-General’s 2015 report on the Future of United Nations peace operations, prioritized the need to put in place a global-regional framework to manage today’s peace and security challenges – stating that this should start with a reinforced partnership between the United Nations and the African Union.

12. Over the past two years significant progress has been made in addressing predictable and sustainable financing for AU PSOs:

July 2016 AU Assembly Financing Decision (Assembly/AU/Dec.605 (XXVII)

13. In 2015, the Assembly of African Union Heads of State & Government decided to finance 25% of the AU’s peace support operations budget. In January 2016, the Chairperson of the AU Commission appointed Dr. Donald Kaberuka, former President of the African Development Bank, as her High Representative for the Peace Fund. A key element of the High Representative’s mandate was to develop a credible roadmap for financing the 25% of the AU PSO budget by the year 2020.

14. The High Representative submitted a Progress Report to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government Retreat on the Financing of the Union on the margins of the 27th Ordinary Session of the AU Summit held in July 2016 in Kigali, with proposals on how to finance the African Union as a whole and reinvigorate the Peace Fund.

\[\text{2 A/70/357/-5/2015/682}\]
15. Based on this report, the AU Assembly decided to institute a universal levy of 0.2% on eligible imports to finance the African Union. The decision included provisions to reinvigorate the Peace Fund and appropriately endow it with up to $400m by 2020 to finance preventive diplomacy, mediation activities, build critical institutional capabilities, finance 25% of the AU peace support operations budget and maintain a Crisis Reserve Facility.


16. In July 2015, following a UN lessons learned study on transitions from AU peace support operations to UN peacekeeping mission in Mali and Central African Republic, the UN Secretary-General proposed that the UN and AU undertake a joint UN-AU Review on available mechanisms to support to AU PSOs. The Joint Review was an opportunity to advance the goal of improving the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for AU PSOs.

17. The August 2016 Joint Review concluded that the AU is an effective first responder and that access to the United Nations assessed contributions has provided a reliable, predictable and sustainable means of financing support requirements for African Union peace support operations.


United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2320

19. On 18 November 2016, following a briefing by the AU Commission and the AU High Representative for the Peace Fund to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), UNSCR 2320 was unanimously adopted. UNSCR 2320 welcomed the July 2016 AU Assembly Decision and in it the UNSC expressed, for the first time, its readiness to consider the AU’s proposals for future authorization and support by the Security Council for AU peace support operations authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

20. The 2016 AU Assembly Financing Decision on the Peace Fund and UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2320, signal a shift towards a new phase of AU-UN partnership that must move beyond statements of principle and towards a partnership that delivers real improvements in the overall predictability, sustainability and effectiveness of AU PSOs.

21. In this phase, attention must now turn to (a) how to operationalize the AU-UN partnership principles articulated in the Common African Position giving practical effect to the spirit of ‘comparative advantage’, and (b) how to strengthen and align AU and UN institutional policy and practice to address existing and future PSO partnership challenges. There is enough collective experience and a range of lessons to draw on from the past decade of AU-UN partnership to inform this process.

3 S/2015/3
III. THE SECURITY CONTEXT IN AFRICA

22. There has been considerable progress in consolidating peace and security in Africa over the past decade. Nonetheless, a number of structural drivers of conflict still remain, making the continent vulnerable to violent conflict and insecurity.

23. While the number of armed conflicts between and among states has reduced, armed conflicts between state and non-state rebel and insurgent groups remain a key feature of crises in Africa. This pattern of armed conflict is often rooted in a complex and interrelated set of political, economic, social and environmental root causes involving the use of a combination of conventional and guerrilla warfare. The adverse consequences for civilian populations due to deliberate targeting by some forces, humanitarian crises, the circulation of light arms across regions, displacements and the proliferation of refugees to neighboring countries and beyond, are some of the enduring manifestations of these conflicts.

24. Africa’s security landscape has been further challenged by the rise of transnational threats. These crises transcend national boundaries and have regional and international consequences. They include organized crime, environmental conflicts, terrorism and health pandemics amongst others. They are not necessarily rooted in the same historical causes but have, in some cases, similar general characteristics in terms of actors, patterns of violence, and prospects for political settlement.

25. Today, the non-state actors involved are diverse, ranging from criminal networks to rebel groups and terrorists, criminal gangs, traffickers and armed groups or militia. Groups such as the M-23 in the Great Lakes; Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al Mourabitoune in the Sahel-Sahara region, the Islamic State (ISIS) in Libya and some countries in the North Africa, Al Shaabab in Somalia, Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin region and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the East and Central African regions fall within some of these categories. The deliberate targeting of civilians through asymmetric warfare is also an increasingly common feature.

26. Against this backdrop, and in response to the most serious threats to peace and security, the deployment of AU mandated or authorized Peace Support Operations (AU PSOs) will remain a key requirement.

27. Given the enduring traditional and evolving contemporary security challenges outlined above, the effectiveness of AU PSOs is directly dependent on our collective ability to deliver more effective regional and international responses based on enhanced strategic partnerships, collaborative action, and our respective institutional comparative advantages.

IV. EVOLUTION OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN AFRICA

28. The African Union’s (AU) institutional experience in deploying PSOs dates back to the Organization for African Unity (OAU). However, it was after the creation of the AU in 2002, that the deployment of PSOs and regional security initiatives by the AU, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) as well as coalitions of states in response to crises, gained prominence.
29. This is in part a reflection of the legal instruments, and institutional arrangements put in place by the AU within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). As such, the AU’s Constitutive Act, and the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (PSC Protocol) have significantly contributed in strengthening the mandate and powers of the AU in relation to the maintenance of peace and security in Africa.

30. The AU has mandated or authorized thirteen (13) PSOs since 2003. These have ranged from observer and political missions, to complex multidimensional and counterterrorism operations. Regional blocs such as the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have also deployed PSOs, as observed in the Central African Republic (CAR), Guinea-Bissau and most recently in The Gambia. Annex 1 provides a summary of PSOs mandated or authorized by the AU PSC as well as those deployed by the RECs/RMs.

31. The types of operations and missions mandated or authorized by the OAU/AU can be classified into seven categories. Some of these categories are not mutually exclusive. These illustrate the evolution of the AU’s own institutional experience and its relationship with the United Nations (UN):

   a) **The first category:** These cover classic Observer missions are deployed in the case of conflicts that have not reached a level of severity that they pose an immediate threat to regional or international peace and security. In these situations, the presence of a third party in the form of an Observer mission can help de-escalate tensions and contribute to generating the basic confidence-building conditions required for a follow-on political settlement or the implementation of an existing agreement. The various operations carried out in the Comoros (Observer Mission of the OAU in the Comoros MIOC I in 1997, as well as MIOC II and MIOC III in 2002) fall within this framework. Other cases, also include the OAU Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB in 1993), as well as the AU Mission deployed in South Sudan, from 2007 to monitor the implementation of the 2006 Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, between the Ugandan government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).

   b) **The second category:** relates to situations in which the AU acts as ‘first responder’ and launches a PSO, based on its ability to deploy swiftly and pending the deployment of the UN. These missions are typically complex multidimensional operations comprising, of civilian, police and military components. Their range of responsibilities often span from peace enforcement operations to the initial stages of stabilization operations aimed at supporting national authorities in the maintenance of territorial integrity as well as restoration and extension of state authority, to the protection of civilians. In all these cases, the AU needs to rapidly identify and deploy significant personnel, as well as mobilize complex logistics support packages and substantial funding. The AU Missions deployed in Burundi (AMIB 2003), Darfur (AMIS in 2004), Somalia (AMISOM since 2007), in Mali (AFISMA in 2013) and in the Central African Republic (MISCA, end 2013) fall into this category.

   c) **The third category:** This covers situations in which the UN is unable to undertake the mission tasks envisaged, on the grounds that these tasks fall outside their traditional
peacekeeping mandate. This was the case, for example, in Burundi in 2006, where the United Nations considered that ensuring the safety of political leaders was not in their mandate. The AU had therefore had to appeal to South Africa to constitute a Special Protection Force to undertake this task as part of AMIB’s existing mandate.

d) **The fourth category**: relates to missions which involve a deliberate use of force in the context of deployments undertaken pursuant to Articles 4(h) and 4(j) of the Constitutive Act of the Union. These represent cases for which it may not be easy to mobilize the political will required at the international level. In these circumstances, and in the absence of any international consensus/action, the AU may decide to act on its own. The intervention "Democracy in the Comoros", in 2008, exemplifies this case. The objective of the operation was to support the efforts of the Government of the Comoros in restoring its authority on the Anjouan Island. The initial attempt to deploy an African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU) under Article 4(h), in January 2016, is also an example of this category.

e) **The fifth category**: relates to situations in which the AU co-deploys a mission alongside a UN mission. This occurred in 2000, with the AU Observers and Liaison Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (OMLME). The objective was to demonstrate a close partnership between the AU and the UN in the implementation of the peace process. Significantly, it was explicitly stated in the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities of June 2000 that the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) would be deployed under the auspices of the OAU.

f) **The sixth category**: The AU/UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur was established in this form because the Government of Sudan was only willing to accept an AU/UN hybrid Mission on its territory. Indeed, for various complex reasons related to domestic policy and/or history, some countries may be reluctant to accept the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation. In this case, the AU’s engagement provided the requisite legitimacy to the international effort. Some observers believe that the hybrid form offers new perspectives to meet the challenges of peace, and that the international community would benefit from building on this experience.

g) **The seventh category**: reflects a growing trend. It relates to threats and low intensity conflicts that have the potential to escalate into violent confrontations between national defense and security forces and transnational criminal and/or terrorist groups. The Regional Cooperation Initiative against the LRA (RCI-LRA), deployed since 2011 under a PSC mandate and involving countries directly affected by the LRA, is one example of this sort of action. In a similar vein, the PSC requested the Commission, in 2012, to support the member countries of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in their initial planning to deploy a regional Neutral Intervention Force (NIF) against the M23 and other “negative forces” in north and south Kivu, Eastern DRC. Follow-on discussions with the UN led to the creation of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) currently deployed as part of MONUSCO. More recently, in 2015, at the request of Member States of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and the Benin, the AUC helped coordinate the strategic and operational levels planning for a regional counter-terrorism mission and the PSC authorized the deployment of the Multinational
Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to combat the Boko Haram terrorist group. The AU is responsible for the strategic direction and resource mobilization aspect of this operation, as well its political oversight.

V. SCOPE OF OPERATIONS

32. On the 18 November 2016, the UN Security Council through its Resolution (UNSCR) 2320, invited the AU to update the UN Security Council on the ‘detail of the proposed scope of operations to be considered’ for support from UN Assessed Contributions to AU mandated or authorized PSOs with a Security Council mandate.

33. In the same way that the UNSC will take decisions on support to AU PSOs on a case-by-case basis, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) will also decide on a case-by-case basis which operations it intends to request UN support through assessed contributions. It is clear that UN support through assessed contributions may not be required in some instances.

34. What is, therefore, more important is the following:

a) Having clarity on the types of operations that the AU or other sub-regional bodies with conflict prevention, resolution and management mandates are likely to undertake,

b) Establishing financing, mission planning, management, support and compliance models, that are fit for purpose and adapted to the requirements of each type of operation,

c) Putting in place the appropriate partnership and mutual accountability frameworks, and

d) Ensuring that consultative planning and decision-making takes place in a timely and predictable way.

35. Rather than pre-defining a particular ‘scope of operations’, this section focuses on the ‘types of operations’ that the AU is likely to mandate or authorize.

36. The historical account presented in section IV above shows the rapid evolution of a set of innovative and dynamic PSO capacities that the OAU/AU has developed through a variety of operations. Based on this, the following four broad types of operations have been identified (with the provision that these do not preclude the possibility of the emergence of new trends and types of operations based on an evolving security context):

A. Observer Missions

i) AU or Regional Security Advisory Support to an AU Political Mission.

ii) AU or Regional Observer/Political Mission operating alongside a UN Mission.

iii) AU or Regional Observer/Political Mission co-deployed with a UN mission (e.g. category 5 above).

iv) Stand-alone AU or Regional Observer Mission.

B. Preventive Deployment and Peace Enforcement Missions

i) AU or Regional Preventive Deployment Missions, which would prioritise tasks depending on the context and requirements.
ii) Peace Enforcement Missions mandated and implemented by the AU.

iii) Peace Enforcement Missions mandated or authorized by the AU and implemented by Regional Economic Communities (RECs) or Regional Mechanisms (RMs) for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.

iv) Peace Enforcement Missions mandated or authorized by the AU and implemented by a coalition of Member States.

v) Peace Enforcement Missions mandated or authorized by the AU, operating alongside other national forces under a UN mandate.

vi) Peace Enforcement Missions mandated or authorized by the AU, operating alongside a UN Mission.

C. **Stabilization Missions following Peace Enforcement Missions**

37. The AU envisages a limited bridging stabilization role, focused on multi-dimensional tasks within its comparative advantage, in the period immediately following peace enforcement operations and in advance of the deployment of a UN Peacekeeping Operation.

i) Stabilization Missions mandated and implemented by the AU.

ii) Stabilization Missions mandated or authorized by the AU and implemented by RECs or RMs.

D. **Missions and Security Initiatives in response to complex national/transnational security threats**

i) Regional Security Initiatives mandated or authorized by the AU and implemented by RECs or RMs.

ii) Security Initiatives mandated or authorized by the AU and implemented by a coalition of Member States.

iii) Security Initiatives mandated or authorized by the AU and implemented by a coalition of Member States and operating alongside a UN Mission.

iv) Security Initiatives mandated and implemented by the AU and operating alongside a UN Mission.

VI. **LESSONS LEARNED**

38. This section highlights some of the key issues that will need to be addressed as part of the process of strengthening the overall effectiveness, management and oversight of AU PSOs. Many of these issues were highlighted in the Joint AU/UN Review of available mechanisms to support AU PSOs.

39. **At the political level**

a) *Improving coordination of international actions and initiatives:* Crisis situations often become the “scene” for a plurality of interventions by various actors, each more eager than the other to assist in the search for a solution. Yet, the absence of a common approach based on shared analysis and coordination contributes to further
complicating already complex situations and results in dispersed efforts and limited overall impact. The AU and the United Nations have drawn lessons from some of the mistakes made, for example, during the transition process from the AFISMA to MINUSMA in Mali. In other cases, the lessons have still not been learned, e.g. Somalia where the proliferation of numerous unco-ordinated bilateral military training and equipment programmes remains a significant challenge and limits the prospects of a successful AMISOM exit.

b) Maintaining coherence of action within the framework of “Subsidiarity”: Typically, RECs and RMs are the first line of response to crises. Yet their actions must necessarily fit within a broader continental and international framework. This has sometimes proven challenging. For example, in the case of AFISMA, in Mali, planning had been initiated by ECOWAS in April 2012, without real involvement of the AU or the UN. It is only as a result of the October 2012 UNSCR 2071 that the AU and the UN became involved in the process. It was subsequently difficult to determine which organization (ECOWAS, the AU or the United Nations) would take the lead in planning. Efforts are underway to improve the co-ordination of planning, decision-making and strategic management issues between the AU and RECs/RMs. This will in turn lead to improved co-ordination and planning between the AU and the UN.

40. At the institutional level

a) Ensuring predictable and sustainable financing for AU PSOs: There is general agreement that the current financing arrangements for peace support operations are neither reliable nor predictable, especially in the context of missions/operations deployed in highly volatile threat environments. While partners have, over the years, demonstrated much flexibility and innovation, there is consensus that the current AU financing arrangements are unsustainable.

b) Adopting the AU’s Financial and Administrative rules and procedures to PSO requirements: The AU’s experience in deploying PSOs has highlighted the need to review the existing administrative and financial procedures (disbursement of funds, recruitment, procurement, facility management etc.). The complex requirements of PSOs calls for greater flexibility while ensuring accountability at different levels. The current AUC procedures allow limited freedom of action to respond to crises in a timely manner in rapidly evolving and difficult environments.

c) Strengthening strategic mission planning and management capacity: The proper management of PSOs requires reinforced capacity at the AUC level. Almost all AU missions have suffered from this lack of dedicated capacity and the AU has typically had to rely on ad hoc structures financed by international partners. These include the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), in 2004, for AMIS in Sudan and the Strategic Planning and Management Unit for Somalia (SPMU), in 2007 with regard to AMISOM.

d) Strengthening capacity to operationalize the AU framework on integrating human rights and IHL in AU PSO and support compliance: The AU/UN Joint Review noted the progress that the AU had made in implementing a compliance framework but also identified the
lack of dedicated capacity in this area as a challenge. Since the publication of the AU/UN Joint Review there has been progress in reinforcing staff capacity at the AUC level, but additional resources will be required to fully operationalize the compliance framework.

41. **At operational level**

a) *Strengthening the preparation and operational readiness of contingents availed by Troops and Police Contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs):* It is not unusual to see contingents being deployed to the mission, particularly in the critical phase of the first entry of the Force into the theatre, without having received the adequate training, or the individual and collective equipment necessary to fulfil their mission. The operational readiness of TCC/PCC contingents must be significantly improved and closely monitored, including through standby arrangements. This should also take into account the readiness of troops from a human rights perspective. Strengthening the effectiveness of pre-deployment verification and visits is also a key aspect of addressing these issues.

b) *Ensuring the timely establishment of the Headquarters at all levels:* The lack of infrastructure dedicated to the establishment of Headquarters at the mission and sector levels which results in slow deployments into the mission’s sectors. There is also a lack of harmonized Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), particularly in the areas of operational communications and administration. The lack of readily deployable and usable operational HQ modules (infrastructure and communications), is a clear handicap for interventions by the AU and sub-regional organizations.

c) *Ensuring timely production and dissemination of key mission documents:* Strategic guiding documents, including the Directives to the Heads of Mission and those to the Heads of components are sometimes not issued on time to the mission. Such delays can contribute to a lack of clarity in the command, control and management of the mission. In some cases, many of the key strategic documents are not available in the appropriate mission language.

d) *Strengthening command, control and co-ordination of the mission:* the challenges exist at two levels. First, it is essential that the AU and the RECs/RMs agree on a coherent command and co-ordination system, as well as a clearly defined management structure for missions. In the case of AFISMA in Mali, even though the Special Representative of the Chairperson of AU Commission was theoretically entrusted with the functions of the Head of the Mission, it was difficult for him to practically exercise direct authority over the military and police components, which were in reality receiving their support and instructions from ECOWAS. Second, Similar command and co-ordination challenges have been identified in the case of high intensity combat operations such as AMISOM and MNJTF.

e) *Strengthening information and communications infrastructure and links:* between the strategic level (AUC) and the mission HQs, as well as between the Heads of components (Force Commander, Police Commissioner. Limited information and communications capabilities often handicap effective command, management and control of the mission particularly at the mission start up phase.
f) **Harmonizing management procedures:** The absence of harmonized management procedures between the AU and the RECs/RMs is often a real handicap. The mission components are sometimes managed in a differentiated way, which can permit neither an optimization nor a pooling of means, nor an effective management and control. In the case of AFISMA, there was the added challenge that the Mission had three different sources of funding (an AU Trust Fund, a UN Trust Fund and ECOWAS funding) that were not coordinated and as a result operating costs were duplicated. An accountability mechanism for all these funds was not defined.

g) **Strengthening logistical support:** Inadequate logistical support often handicaps AU missions. In some cases, logistical support has been provided in an erratic and incomplete manner by the TCCs themselves with the support of bilateral partners. The medical support is often problematic, and has proven particularly deficient with respect to medical treatment and evacuations. Supplies (rations, water and stationary) to the troops at contingent level remain major challenges during the life-span of most missions. The case of MISCA is a typical example where proper supply chain management proved particularly difficult for the mission to handle.

h) **Timely deployment of air transportation assets:** The absence of predictable strategic airlift capabilities as well as that of in-theater air assets is also a serious limiting factor for rapid deployment and re-deployment, quick reaction, as well as logistics support and other in-theater movements. These critical enablers are at the heart of any PSOs success. Their absence emanates from the overall lack of predictable funding and, in cases where funding does exist, the highly caveated nature of partner support.

i) **Timely deployment of effective HR/IHL risk management and compliance mechanisms/capacities:** In order to be effective, it is imperative that these capacities are systematically factored into the mission start-up phase, adequately resourced and well integrated into the mission level structures.

VII. STRENGTHENING THE PERFORMANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF AU MANDATED/ AUTHORIZED PSOS

42. Strengthening the performance and effectiveness of AU PSOs is a global strategic imperative, given the complex and interconnected nature of threats to collective peace and security. It is also a key part of creating a more responsive international peace and security architecture. Sections IV and V of this report illustrate the key roles the AU, RECs, RMs and AU Member States have played in taking the lead in confronting challenges that other institutions are not able to address.

43. AU PSOs have a unique comparative advantage in their ability to act as ‘first responder’ often, but not exclusively, in situations where the conditions for peacekeeping are not yet achieved. In some of these contexts, the subsequent deployment of a UN operation often provides the exit strategy for the AU. In these cases, identifying the key objective criteria and benchmarks to be attained by an AU PSO at the very early stage of its planning and deployment and creating the right conditions for a smooth transition is absolutely critical. The lessons of
the transitions from AFISMA to MINUSMA in Mali in 2013 and from MISCA to MINUSCA in CAR in 2015 have highlighted the dangers of pursuing rushed transitions.

44. There are clear lessons to show that the failure to invest in the establishment of a strong AU footprint and the achievement of key objectives during the initial phases of the deployment of a PSO, has had a direct impact on the quality and effectiveness of follow-on UN missions. In these cases, the follow-on UN missions lost considerable time and resources in consolidating and making additional gains.

45. The lessons have been identified and there is now a clear understanding that we need to develop a system of collective security adapted to the realities of the current world with a focus on preserving respective institutional comparative advantages. There have been some innovations but it is now time to move away from ad hoc interventions and find systemic solutions to today’s peace and security challenges. These are complex issues, ranging from funding, to crafting new partnerships with the UN and others. They will require political will and a paradigm shift.

46. As part of this process, the AU will ensure its efforts in improving the effectiveness of AU PSOs are focused on preserving the comparative advantage of AU mandated or authorized PSOs. In practice, this will involve the following:

(i) Mobilizing and targeting its own resources on the areas that ensure AU mandated or authorized PSOs are able to maintain an effective ‘first responder’ role thus preserving its ownership and political credibility.

(ii) Developing Peace Fund financial and administrative rules and procedures adapted to the requirements of AU mandated or authorized PSOs while ensuring overall accountability, that enable the AU, RECs, RMs or coalitions of Member States to deliver their mandates effectively and facilitate a transition to UN mission in some cases.

(iii) Forging predictable and strategic partnerships that reinforce the comparative advantage of AU mandated or authorized PSOs.

(iv) Enhancing its planning and consultative decision-making processes with a focus on improving co-ordination with the UN and RECs/RMs so as to ensure more timely and effective joint action where this is required.

(v) Strengthening its institutional capacities and compliance framework in line with international humanitarian law, human rights and conduct and discipline requirements.

47. These five core priorities are explored in more detail below:

A. **Financing AU PSOs**

48. To address the chronic lack of financial predictability and sustainability for AU-led PSOs, in 2015, the 25th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly decided to take responsibility for 25% of PSO budget by 2020. Increasing the predictability of financing from AU Member States is expected to strengthen overall AU oversight and management of AU PSOs and help target resources in improving critical PSO capacities such as logistics planning and supply support.
49. As part of the Progress Report of the AU High Representative for the Peace Fund to the 27th Ordinary Session, held in Kigali in July 2016, a number of scenarios, were developed to analyze the financial implications of the 2015 Assembly decision to finance 25% of the PSO budget:

Table 1: AU PSO (Peace Fund Window 3) Scenarios

<table>
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<th>Scenario</th>
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<th>2016 5%</th>
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<th>2018 15%</th>
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</table>

50. Ultimately, it was agreed that the scenario described as "Middle Scenario" is the most realistic. This includes the Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA), the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram (MNJTF) and the AU Military Experts’ and Human Rights Observers’ Mission deployed in 2015, in Burundi. In addition, it assumes the potential deployment of two new missions, totaling 15,000 uniformed personnel. The scenario also includes a 5% adjustment for inflation over the 5-year period.

51. Under this scenario, the estimated cost of all AU PSOs in 2016 would be US$772m (the baseline on which this is determined remains an estimate).

52. In July 2016 AU Assembly also decided to institute a universal levy of 0.2% on eligible imports (Assembly/AU/Dec.605 (XXVII) to finance the African Union.

53. The Assembly decision on Financing the Union included provisions to reinvigorate the Peace Fund, structure it into three thematic windows and appropriately endow it to cover preventive diplomacy, mediation activities Window 1), build critical institutional capacities (Window 2), contribute to AU PSOs (Window 3) and maintain a Crisis Reserve Facility.

54. The 0.2% levy will endow the Peace Fund with a total of $400m by 2020 against an estimated overall Peace Fund budget of $302m in 2020. Any unutilized balances will be held in the Crisis Reserve Facility to enable rapid response to unforeseen crises.

55. A Committee of Ten Finance Ministers was established to oversee the implementation of the Kigali Financing Decision. Following two meetings, the Committee agreed that 2017 will serve as a ‘transitional’ year in which countries will undertake the various national legislative and administrative measures required to implement the Kigali Decision in line with national and international obligations.

56. As part of this transition period, the 2017 (Year 1) target for the Peace Fund is $65m. Of this amount, up to $38m will be allocated to Window 3. The balance of $27m will cover Windows 1 and 2 of the Peace Fund, based on requirements and any unutilized balances will be held in the Crisis Reserve Facility.
57. By May 2017, 14 AU Member States had made their contribution to the Peace Fund. These contributions represent just over 12% of the of the target amount for 2017.

58. With respect to Window 3 of the AU Peace Fund, decisions on the specific AU PSO mission costs to finance, will be taken on a case by case basis taking into account the type, size and expected duration of the mission.

59. A Peace Fund Instrument, setting out the detailed governance arrangements and terms of reference for the Board of Trustees, Peace Fund Secretariat, Independent Fund Manager and Independent Evaluation Panel, as well as fund eligibility criteria has been developed. The target for the adoption of the Instrument in July 2017. This will be followed by the nomination of the Board of Trustees and recruitment for the various entities established under the new governance arrangements (December 2017).

60. In May 2015, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission expanded the mandate of the AU High Representative for the Peace Fund to cover the overall Financing of the Union. Under his expanded mandate the AUHR is tasked with supporting the AU and its Member States in accelerating the implementation of the Kigali Financing Decision.

B. Strengthening the AU-UN PSO Partnership

Comparative Advantage

61. As highlighted in the Joint AU/UN Review, it is well understood that as the nature of international peace and security threats has evolved, no single organization has the legitimacy and capabilities required to act alone. Within this context, the AU’s proven ability to act as ‘first responder’ is a critical element of the evolving international peace and security architecture.


63. In line with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and Articles 7 and 17 of the PSC Protocol, the Common African Position called for an enhanced form of partnership based on (a) the two organizations’ respective authorities, competencies and capacities, and (b) the principles of burden-sharing, consultative decision-making, and a mutually-acceptable division of labor.

Operationalizing the AU-UN PSO partnership principles

64. Political level PSC-UNSC discussions are now required to reach final agreement on an acceptable framework for consultative decision-making and mandating in this area.

65. Division of labor: There is consensus that the AU plays a critical and unique role as first responder within the international architecture. The gaps and limitations, particularly in sustaining this role over any extended period of time, are also well understood. Developing predictable financing and mission support models that enable the AU to enhance the
effectiveness of its first responder role and create the right conditions for a successful exit strategy or transition to a UN mission is the top priority. The findings of the recent Joint AU-UN Review provide a useful starting point for taking this forward.

66. **Burden-sharing:** The Common African Position identified AU PSOs as local responses to international problems which represent a significant contribution to the global common good. The financing arrangements for AU PSOs have been ad hoc, lacked predictability, and used instruments and modalities that are not well adapted to supporting PSOs particularly in the context of high-tempo operations. Financing AU PSOs on a sustainable basis is a global strategic imperative, given the complex and interconnected nature of threats to international peace and security.

67. The July 2016 AU Assembly Decision on the Peace Fund is a powerful demonstration of the determination and commitment of the AU and its members to addressing the lack of predictability and sustainability in PSO financing by implementing its decision to finance 25% of AU PSOs. Agreeing on the principle that UN assessed contributions should be used to support AU mandated or authorized missions that are mandated by the UNSC will be an important complementary step.

68. **Predictability and Harmonization:** As outlined in the lessons learned section, the AUC’s administrative and financial management systems require strengthening and are not adapted to enabling flexible and timely responses to peace and security requirements. As a result, overall support is not harmonized and is delivered through multiple channels each with their own onerous reporting requirements, diffuse delivery channels and high transaction costs. There is also a sense that the real cost of AU Member States’ contributions to PSOs are not adequately captured and are therefore frequently under-valued. At the same time, there is a lack of consensus on the specific costs that can be legitimately reflected as a contribution. As a result of all the multiple instruments, it is virtually impossible to estimate the real cost of AU PSOs.

69. The revitalized Peace Fund will establish an Instrument for financing operational peace and security activities in a flexible and adaptive manner within a strong governance and fiduciary accountability framework. The Peace Fund will provide the platform for the harmonization of all Member State and partner support and the reduction of multiple reporting lines. Work is already underway on the operationalization of the Peace Fund in line with the Kigali Decision.

70. **Mutual Accountability:** Ensuring all AU missions are compliant with international human rights and humanitarian law as well as accepted international norms of conduct and discipline, is an obligation applicable to the AU and all its Member States. Progress has already been made within the AU to ensure that its missions are in compliance with international legal obligations. The AU has begun work to address the remaining policy and institutional gaps in this area.

C. **Adapting Financial, Procurement and Administrative rules and procedures to the requirements of AU PSOs**
71. In 2016, the AU made progress in factoring in the unique requirement of AU PSOs in its new financial rules and regulations. It has also taken steps to strengthen its financial management and accountability framework with the adoption of International Public Sector Accounting Standard (IPSAS) in 2013. The new Procurement manual launched in October 2016 also included amendments to allow for speedier procurement processes for PSOs.

72. Despite these important steps there is still significant work required to develop operational rules and procedures to strengthen the effectiveness of AU PSOs.

73. Alongside this, and despite innovations in recent years, the UN’s internal administrative framework is not fully adapted to the specific requirements of high-tempo operations associated with the three of the four types of missions that an AU PSO is likely to undertake: Preventive deployment and peace enforcement operations; Stabilization Missions and Regional Security Initiatives against national/transnational threats.

74. With the adoption of the Peace Fund decision, there is now an opportunity to take a comprehensive look at how to adapt overall financial, procurement and administrative procedures to the specific requirements of AU PSOs. These would include:

   (i) Putting in place a dedicated rapid recruitment and deployment procedure to respond to the Mission Start up staffing requirements and timelines. The current recruitment process takes an average of six to twelve months,
   (ii) Developing SOPs to handle the procurement and define the dedicated framework contract to effectively support the logistics and supply requirements of AU PSOs,
   (iii) Developing an Integrated manual including SOPs on AU PSOs facilities management,
   (iv) Developing a PSO Accounting manual an AU Reimbursement framework adapted to the specific requirements of AU PSOs.

75. The new Peace Fund rules and procedures will be developed ensuring the comparative advantage of AU PSOs is maintained. In practice, this would mean ensuring that the Peace Fund focuses on financing priority areas and mission costs that ensure the AU retains its rapid deployment capabilities. More broadly there is an opportunity for innovation, avoiding some of the pitfalls of UN rules and procedures which, as numerous reports have identified, are increasingly unsuited to the requirements of UN peacekeeping requirements let alone those of AU PSOs. These adapted rules and procedures will sit within an overall Peace Fund accountability framework that meets the requirements of AU Member States and its partners.

76. One of the outcomes of the two AU – UN Consultative meetings on the implementation of UNSCR 2320 was an agreement that the UN Secretariat would provide technical assistance to support the AUC in the development of the rules and procedures where the AUC has identified the need for additional support and where the UN can add value. Moreover, in cases where financial support will be provided by the UN, ensuring compatibility between UN and AU budgetary and financial procedures is required. Requests for resources from UN assessed contributions would require budgetary review by, approval of and reporting to the UN General Assembly.
77. The Peace Fund’s governance structures will be in place by July 2017. A management structure will be in place by September 2017 and a set of dedicated Peace Fund financial, procurement and administrative rules and procedures will be developed by October 2017.

D. **Strengthening the AU’s PSO planning and management capacities**

78. Window 2 of the Peace Fund, is intended to support the development of the critical institutional capacities required to effectively implement Windows 1 and 3 of the Peace Fund. With respect to Window 3 (PSOs), a number of the institutional gaps identified in the lessons learned section of this report will be prioritized for support under the initial Peace Fund allocations.

79. This represents an opportunity to move away from a reliance on ad hoc and interim capacity support to a more structured and enduring form of institutional development of both the AUC’s and REC/RM PSO capacities.

E. **Strengthening AU PSO Human Rights/International Humanitarian Law & Conduct & Discipline Compliance**

80. This section (a) outlines the steps that have been taken to enhance human rights and compliance standards in AU peace support operations (PSOs), as well as steps being undertaken in the areas of force preparation, force employment and post-force employment towards enhancing AU compliance regime, and (b) identifies what remains to be done at the policy, institutional and operational levels building on the August 2016 AU High Representative for the Peace Fund’s Report. It is hoped that in the next 2-3 years, the AU will have in place robust implementation strategies and response mechanisms for compliance issues at both the strategic and mission levels. A detailed work plan is included as Annex 3.

81. In operationalizing this framework, there are two key points two note: First, is that the AU will have differentiated accountabilities in line with who is delivering the different types of missions identified, i.e. the AU, a REC/RM or coalition of member states and whether it is AU mandated or authorised. Most of the AU’s institutional experience is derived from AU mandated and implemented missions. Identifying the specific AU accountabilities in cases where it has authorised a mission that is implemented by a REC/RMs or coalitions of Member States and putting in place the appropriate compliance measures will be an important part of the implementation plan.

82. Second, the AU has put in place an ambitious timeline for the full operationalization of its HR/IHL/CD framework. Nonetheless, and bearing in mind the experiences from the UN system, it is important to note that the full implementation of the compliance framework can be expected to take several years and will evolve continuously.

*Progress in the Enhancement of Human Rights and Conduct and Discipline Compliance in Peace Support Operations*

83. Despite many challenges, the African Union has been deploying efforts to address human rights and conduct and discipline compliance in PSOs in line with African and
international instruments. The progress made is most discernible in the following areas: the
development of policy/guidelines and relevant Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs);
mainstreaming International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights as part of mission
planning and management; ensuring the establishment of protection mechanisms as part of
mission structures, and enhancing human resources capacity in human rights and compliance.
Some of the highlights include:

   Operations and the Aide-Mémoire on the Protection of Civilians (PoC)** drafted in order
to provide guidance on developing a consistent and effective strategy to implement
protection objectives and ensure that these actions are conforming to relevant
international law, including IHL and human rights law.

b. **AU Guidelines on detention and DDR** have been developed in order to provide direction
   on how to deal with detainees in compliance with international law and standards. In
   2011, AMISOM also developed an **Indirect Fire Policy** in order to limit the level of
   unintentional harm to civilians due to the use of indirect fire weapons.

c. Even though AU Member States have the primary responsibility to train their troops
   prior to deployment in AU PSOs, the standards for effective and appropriate training
   are detailed in an MoU signed between the AU and P/TCCs. TCCs also receive Guidelines,
   which inter alia, provide for common training requirements (with special attention on
   IHL, protection of IDPs, DDR, appropriate reaction to riots, civil disturbances etc.).

d. The **AU** already has extensive experience in pre-deployment verification visits (PDV)
during which it is verified, among other things, whether the troops have been trained
on IHL and human rights obligations. Additionally, the partnership between the AU and
relevant partners including the UN, EU, US, UK, amongst others, has proved to be
effective in ensuring a robust pre-deployment and in-mission training programs in PSOs,
and these partnerships can be further explored in order to adequately address
IHL/human rights obligations.

e. IHL/Human rights and protection capacities were not always integrated as part of AU
mandated or authorized PSOs at mission level. In that regard AMISOM, even though a
very particular AU mission, has been the most advanced. For example, AMISOM has
established a **Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis, and Response Cell (CCTARC)** as well as
the office of **Boards of Inquiry (BOI)**. CCTARC captures and records reported events and
incidents of civilian casualties within AMISOM area of operation through a
comprehensive electronic database. AMISOM is also set to begin the process of making
ex-gratia payments for civilian harms in Somalia. In that regard, an SOP on making of ex-
gratia payments to civilian casualties of AMISOM operations is being finalized (final
approval remains). BOI office, on the other hand, has been playing an investigative role
in the Mission, in response to incidents of possible misconduct or violations during
AMISOM operations. Different personnel working on protection issues (Conduct and
Discipline officer, IHL adviser, etc.) are part of the **AMISOM protection cluster**. While all
these bodies and mechanisms are instrumental in dealing with IHL/Human rights and
conduct and discipline matters, the AU is aware of the challenges in making them fully
operational and effective. In that regard, an assessment of the best practices, challenges and gaps within these mechanisms is ongoing. This will ensure that existing and future AU missions will benefit from AMISOM experiences in order to better address IHL/Human rights and conduct and discipline issues.

84. As part of its commitment to enhance compliance with international norms and standards, a Conduct and Discipline Officer and Legal Affairs Officer specialized in human rights issues were recruited to PSOD in February 2017. The strengthening of AUC capacity in these areas will significantly complement existing efforts by the AUC to enhance human rights and IHL in peace support operations. The enhancement of capacities at both AUC and at the mission level will facilitate better policy dissemination and regular monitoring and reporting on conduct and discipline, IHL/human rights and related matters. While recognizing the differences between conduct and discipline and IHL/human rights issues as well as the differentiated responses to these two areas in case of violations, the AU has opted for an integrated approach on these matters. These are understood as protection-wide issues that should be addressed through the same framework but with distinct policies and procedures and systems to address each.

**Addressing Existing Gaps in AU Human Rights and Conduct and Discipline Compliance Framework**

85. Some AU PSOs differ in terms of mandate, command and control and there is no “one size fits all” approach to protection and compliances issues. This means the AU will have to deploy discrete efforts to address some of the specific challenges and gaps of IHL/human rights and conduct and discipline compliance in the areas of force preparation, force employment and post-force employment. These phases are in accordance with the recently developed draft Five Year Maputo Workplan on the Enhancement of the African Standby Force (2016-2020).

86. The recent reinforcement of AU capacities in terms of expertise on conduct and discipline, human rights and IHL has been helpful in enabling the AU to implement some of the activities outlined in the work plan in order to further enhance AU PSOs’ compliance with international law and standards. Additional resources will, however, be required to fully implement the workplan. During this process, the AU will also, where appropriate and based on their areas of expertise, consult its strategic partners in the finalization of the relevant policies and other documents.

87. In terms of timelines, 2017 will be dedicated to developing additional policies and other key guiding documents that are critical for establishing the compliance framework. This will include identifying key positions at the strategic level to monitor and respond to violations and abuses.

88. The AU is dedicated to further strengthening its pre-deployment verification, selection and screening, and training of the troops. It has been observed that often pre-deployment training (PDT) on IHL issues depends on the provision of training by partners (e.g. ICRC) and AU intends to be more exigent in terms of PDT requirements from P/TCCs by including these requirements in the MoU. It is important to keep in mind that because of the offensive nature of conflicts in which the AU PSOs are involved, in-mission training is often quite difficult to
organize. In that regard, adequate PDT becomes even more important. A number of harmonized training standards, including on PoC, are being developed by the AU for future use in PDT and in-mission trainings.

89. The AUC will develop a Policy/SOP on selection and screening in the coming months and the work is underway to develop models for Certification of Contingents and Troop/Police Contributing Countries and Human Rights screening of Senior Mission Leadership Teams. The inclusion of a Conduct and Discipline officer and/or a Human Rights officer in PDVs is also envisaged.

90. With respect to strategic documents on compliance issues, the AU has prioritized the development and adoption of the following key policy documents, all of which already exist in a draft form:

(i) Conduct and Discipline Policy;
(ii) Policy on Prevention and Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peace Support Operations; and
(iii) Policy for Whistleblowers in Peace Support Operations.

91. The AUC is working towards ensuring that the policies are adopted by the end of September 2017. Following their adoption, the focus will be on the dissemination of the rules captured in the polies and putting in place of appropriate mechanisms to investigate and address any misconduct.

92. When missions have been deployed to the area of operations, the AU will institutionalize the following:

(i) Mainstreaming of human rights and compliance standards in all Mission documents (RoE, FC, SRCC and PC Directives) when they are being drafted;
(ii) In Mission Contingent welfare and support;
(iii) In-Mission training needs assessment and provision of adequate training accordingly;
(iv) Existence of effective compliance mechanisms in all PSOs (CCTARC, PoC, BOI);
(v) Investigation and response of incidents of civilian harm. In that regard, the AU is currently developing a Third Party Claims Policy;
(vi) Periodic reporting on compliance standards through reports of the Chairperson to the AU PSC.

93. According to the MoU that the AUC has concluded with P/TCCs, the P/TCC government retains exclusive criminal jurisdiction in relation to offenses committed by its members. However, the government is supposed to keep AUC informed about the progress and outcomes of the case and the AU should be able to follow up on disciplinary measures taken by P/TCCs on specific cases. These requirements will be reinforced in the revised MoUs between P/TCCs and AUC. Good practices, such as the establishment of in-court martials by TCCs in AMISOM, have proved to be an important model for promoting greater compliance, accountability and transparency in the promotion of human rights and IHL in PSOs. The AU will also need to reflect on possible ways of creating an independent monitoring and investigation capacity that would be able to do independent investigations alongside P/TCCs.
94. Finally, the welfare of uniformed and civilian peacekeepers including psycho-social support, when required, should be prioritized as a preventive and mitigation measure against misconduct and abuse in AU peace support operations.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS AND WAY FORWARD

95. In order to strengthen its ability to respond to the emergence of increasingly complex peace and security threats and challenges, the AU Assembly took some important financing decisions in 2015 and 2016. The implementation of these AU decisions on Financing and the Peace Fund will significantly strengthen the international peace and security architecture.

96. To drive forward the implementation of these decisions, the following key actions should be prioritized:

*On Financing*

a) Accelerate the revitalization of the AU Peace Fund in line with the AU Assembly’s July 2016 Kigali Decision: Securing Member State financing in line with the Year 1 Peace Fund target, while delivering the transitional requirements at national and AUC level for the full financing of the Peace Fund ($400m by 2020) in line with the targets, benchmarks and timelines set out in this report will be a top priority in 2017.

b) A UNSC resolution in 2017 establishing the principle that UN Assessed contributions should, on a case by case basis, finance, AU mandated or authorized PSOs authorized by the UN Security Council. This will address the chronic problem of the lack of predictable and sustainable financing for AU mandated or authorised PSOs.

*On Consultative Decision-making*

c) Adopt the Joint planning and Consultative Decision-making Framework: A draft proposal on AU-UN joint planning and consultative decision-making for AU mandated or authorized PSOs authorized by the UN Security Council and financed through UN Assessed Contributions is included in this report. It is recommended that the PSC endorses this framework as a basis for ensuring predictable and co-ordinated decision-making and oversight within the context of the AU-UN partnership.

*On Institutional Strengthening*

d) Finance critical institutional development priorities. We recommend that Window 2 of the Peace Fund prioritises the following institutional capacities for financing in 2017 and 2018:

i. Mission planning and management capacity: The Joint AU/UN Review and the lessons learned section of this report have highlighted the key AU PSO capacities that need to be enhanced. It is recommended that a priority action plan to strengthen these core planning and management capacities be developed and costed.
ii. **Developing Peace Fund Financial and Administrative Rules and procedures that ensure the timely and effective prevention and management of, and responses to, conflict and insecurity**: The report has outlined the various policies, rules and procedures, covering issues such as financial management and accounting, human resources, procurement, and an AU Reimbursement Framework, that will need to be developed. Additional human resources will be required to undertake much of this work. Some aspects of this work will require close co-operation with the United Nations. For these elements, a joint action plan with clearly identified benchmarks and timelines will be put in place.

iii. **Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law, Conduct & Discipline Compliance**: The workplan contained in Annex 3 of this report sets out the key targets, milestones and timelines to address the outstanding institutional and policy gaps in this area. Implementing the various actions in the work plan in a timely manner will require additional resources and the establishment of clear partnership agreements with UN and other relevant organisations based on the AU’s requirements.
Annex 1: List of Peace Support Operations in Africa (2003 to Date)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Years active</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>African Union-authorized Missions</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Operation Democracy in the Comoros</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Coordination Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA)</td>
<td>CAR, DRC, South Sudan, Uganda</td>
<td>2011-present</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)</td>
<td>Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin</td>
<td>2015-present</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Deployments by Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Togo, Senegal, Niger</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL)</td>
<td>Nigeria, Mali, Senegal</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational Force for Central African Republic (FOMAC)</td>
<td>Republic of Congo, Chad, Cameroon and Gabon</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission of the Conseil de Paix et Sécurité de la CEEAC (MICOPAX)</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon</td>
<td>2008 to 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS Intervention Mission in The Gambia</td>
<td>Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, and Togo</td>
<td>2017 to Date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 1: Legal Basis for AU PSOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Provision</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Charter</td>
<td>Chapter 8, Articles 53 and 54</td>
<td>Requires UNSC authorisation. UNSC must be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional</td>
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<td></td>
<td>arrangements or agencies <strong>for enforcement action</strong> under its authority.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or</td>
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<td></td>
<td>by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Article 53, 5). And the UN Security Council shall at all times be kept</td>
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<td><strong>fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation</strong> under</td>
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<td>regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of</td>
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<td></td>
<td>international peace and security (Article 54). Chapter 7, provides</td>
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<td></td>
<td>enforcement parameters.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Article 4 (h), the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State</td>
<td>Article 7 (1), the Assembly shall take its decisions by consensus or, failing which, by a two-thirds majority of the Member States of the Union.</td>
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<tr>
<td>African Union Constitutive</td>
<td>pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Act</td>
<td>namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Article 4 (j), the right of Member States to request intervention from the</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Article 7(c), the PSC authorizes the mounting and deployment of peace</td>
<td>Article 8 (13) Decisions of the Peace and Security Council shall generally be guided by the principle of consensus. In cases where consensus cannot be reached, the Peace and Security Council shall adopt its decisions on procedural matters by a simple majority, while decisions on all other matters shall be made by a two-thirds majority vote of its Members voting.</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU Peace and Security Council</td>
<td>Article 7 (f), approve the modalities for intervention by the Union in</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protocol</td>
<td>a Member State, following a decision by the Assembly, pursuant to article</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4(j) of the Constitutive Act.</td>
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<td>Article 7 (k), promote and develop a strong “partnership for peace and</td>
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<td>security” between the Union and the United Nations and its agencies.</td>
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<td>Article 17 (2), where necessary, recourse will be made to the United</td>
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<td>Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military</td>
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<td>support for the African Unions’ activities in the promotion and</td>
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<td>maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with</td>
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<td>the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of</td>
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<td>Regional Organizations in the maintenance of international peace and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>security.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This work plan looks at steps that need to be taken to ensure effective implementation of IHL/Human Rights and Conduct and Discipline obligations, in terms of policy development, mainstreaming of IHL/Human Rights in the planning processes of PSOs, as well as strengthening training, monitoring and accountability capacities at the level of the AUC and AU mission levels.</td>
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#### Workshops on compliance issues

**Overall objective:** Learning from experiences of AU and UN PSOs on compliance issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Assessment of AU mandated or authorised PSOs HR/IHL compliance practice and approaches</td>
<td>Recruit consultant/AUCHPR to undertake assessment and develop evidence based and field informed recommendations for mission and HQ level institutional capacity development</td>
<td>Report would feed into approach on enhancing AU compliance with IHL/Human Rights in future PSOs</td>
<td>May/Jue 2017 (TBD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Exchange of experiences from AU and UN PSOs on the continent on practical measures to be taken in PSOs in order to ensure respect for IHL</td>
<td>Event organized by the ICRC on the Operationalization of the obligation to ensure respect of IHL in multinational operations</td>
<td>Practical recommendations that will guide AU and UN PSOs in better ensuring respect for IHL</td>
<td>30-31 May 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Policies

**Overall objective:** Provide strategic guidance for AU PSOs regarding issues of IHL and human rights compliance as well as matters of conduct and discipline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Finalise the <strong>Conduct and Discipline Policy</strong>, including <strong>Policy on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse</strong> and <strong>Whistle-blower Policy</strong></td>
<td>- Meeting of Interdepartmental Task Force - Consultation with Partners/Stakeholders - Consultative Workshop on the Finalization of the 3 policies - Approval of the Policies by the Chairperson</td>
<td>Finalised and adopted Policies on conduct and discipline-related matters</td>
<td>September 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>The revised ASF/PSO doctrine addresses compliance issues in an appropriate matter</td>
<td>- Inclusion of IHL/human rights compliance in the ASF/PSO revised doctrine</td>
<td>ASF/PSO revised doctrine</td>
<td>December 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Develop a framework within which decisions on compensation to civilians and other third parties, including ex-gratia payments, can be made. | Develop Third Party Claims Policy | Third Party Claims Policy adopted | October 2017

6. AU takes adequate steps to deploy only PSO personnel that meets international law compliance standards. | Develop SOP on screening and selection | SOP on screening and selection adopted | December 2017

7. AU is able to undertake risk assessment, and elaborate conditions and mitigating measures of providing support to AU authorised PSOs (MNIJF, RCI-LRA). | Develop Policy and guidelines on Due Diligence | AU Policy on Due Diligence | December 2017

8. Develop a Legal Framework Aide-Memoire for AU PSOs. | Capture legal obligations of AU PSOs, as well as steps that need to be taken in order to ensure compliance with these obligations in a consolidated Legal Framework Aide-Memoire | Legal Framework Aide-Memoire for AU PSOs | November 2017

### Selection and Screening

**Overall objective:** Strengthening pre-deployment verification, including selection and screening in order to ensure that contingents and individuals deployed in AU PSOs satisfy compliance criteria

9. MOUs between AUC and P/TCCs, as well as with RECs/RM include compliance requirements. | • Revise MOUs that AU has concluded with P/TCCs in AU-led PSOs | Draft model MOU | September 2017
| • Draft a model MOU for future PSOs | | |
| • Add an addendum to existing MOUs if needed | | |

10. Verify effective provision of IHL/Human Rights training before deployment. | • PDVs to include verification whether appropriate training on IHL/human rights has been provided; | PDV reports include a paragraph on the fulfilment of compliance requirements | To be discussed within PSOD
<p>| • Ensure systematic participation of the | | |</p>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conduct and Discipline officer and/or Human Rights officer in PDVs</td>
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<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Certification of Contingents and Troop/Police Contributing Countries</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Develop a model note in which the P/TCC Government certifies that it has conducted screening for violations and misconduct for the contingent being deployed in an AU PSO</td>
<td>CV form for contingent members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Human Rights screening of all Senior Mission Leadership Team (from P5 and above).</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Develop a model note for certification of individuals in order to ensure that they have not committed, been convicted of, nor prosecuted for, any criminal offence, and/or been involved, by act or omission, in the commission of any violation of IHRL/IHL</td>
<td>Member State Note of Certification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>Overall objective: to ensure harmonized and contextualized PDT on IHL and Human Rights, including other cross-cutting issues, as well as training needs assessments and in-mission trainings after the deployment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Completion of the Comprehensive AU PSO pre-deployment and Specialisation/in-mission and management training standards for all three components that adequately covers on IHL/ Human Rights and related protection frameworks</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Finalize and publish the AU PoC Training Standards</td>
<td>AU PoC Training Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Revise the Standards Foundation, underlying PDT requirements on IHL/Human Rights and other protection related issues</td>
<td>Revised Harmonized Standards for pre-deployment and Specialisation/in-mission training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Revise ASF/AU PSO Training Policy in order to take into account compliance related issues</td>
<td>ASF/AU PSO Strategic Training Policy revised, disseminated and utilised</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Ensure that AU Training Standards are complementing and cross-referring to each other</td>
<td>Mission specific Training Policies in place and utilised</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 14. Continue ensuring that P/TCCs and AU PSOs personnel are trained on IHL/Human Rights and conduct and discipline issues

- Ensure development and implementation of mission-specific training policies that take into account specificities of the mandate and mission requirements
- AU continues to work with APSTA to ensure and guarantee coordinated and harmonised training support to ASF/AU PSO personnel at the strategic, operational and tactical levels
- AU provides additional support to National and Regional Training Centres – for instance through the conduct of Conduct training of trainers (ToT), in accordance with Annual ASF Training Directives
- AU continues to work with APSTA to ensure and guarantee coordinated and harmonised training support to ASF/AU PSO personnel at the strategic, operational and tactical levels
- AU provides additional support to National and Regional Training Centres – for instance through the conduct of Conduct training of trainers (ToT), in accordance with Annual ASF Training Directives

### 15. In-mission training on IHL/human rights takes into account the specificities of the mission’s mandate and challenges

- AU continues to work with APSTA to ensure and guarantee coordinated and harmonised training support to ASF/AU PSO personnel at the strategic, operational and tactical levels
- AU provides additional support to National and Regional Training Centres – for instance through the conduct of Conduct training of trainers (ToT), in accordance with Annual ASF Training Directives
- AU continues to work with APSTA to ensure and guarantee coordinated and harmonised training support to ASF/AU PSO personnel at the strategic, operational and tactical levels
- AU provides additional support to National and Regional Training Centres – for instance through the conduct of Conduct training of trainers (ToT), in accordance with Annual ASF Training Directives

### Monitoring, tracking and reporting

**Overall objective:** Appropriate mechanisms are put in place at both strategic and mission levels in order to address allegations and abuses in PSOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16. Establishment of an AU “compliance capacity” with tasks of monitoring and reporting on IHL/Human Rights and conduct and discipline issues</th>
<th>Positions needed for the “compliance capacity” and modalities of its work are discussed at the PSD level</th>
<th>All AU personnel working on compliance issues are coordinating their activities in order to monitor and report on compliance by AU PSOs</th>
<th>TBD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Legal Affairs Officer and any other expert on protection issues
- Field reports, including incident reports are sent to the “compliance capacity” where they are analysed and action is proposed
- “compliance capacity” reports on compliance are provided regularly to the Chairperson by AU PSO personnel
- A confidential database of all cases of misconduct and IHL/human rights violations is created => this can be used in the future for screening purposes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>17.</th>
<th>Inclusion of human rights, IHL and conduct and discipline compliance in reports of the AUC Chairperson</th>
<th>AUC Chairperson reports to UNSC and AUPSC</th>
<th>Ongoing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| 18. | Appropriate mechanisms in place at the mission level – e.g. Protection cluster, CCTARC, BOI etc. | | Depends on the mission |

**Accountability**

**Overall objective:** ensure effective response and accountability mechanisms at strategic and mission levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>19.</th>
<th>Reinforced MOU with compliance requirements and consequences of non-compliance</th>
<th>Model MOU</th>
<th>August 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Revise the existing MOUs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Draft a model MOU</td>
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</table>

<p>| 20. | Consultations with P/TCCs on the feasibility of deploying court martials in the mission area | Organize a working level meeting with P/TCCs and REC/RMs | An internal report that reflects P/TCCs opinions on the matter | February 2018 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AU established independent monitoring and investigation capacity</th>
<th>Drafting of a communication strategy on ways to respond in case of allegations of violations of IHL/human rights and misconduct</th>
<th>Communication strategy</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Communication strategy on responding to allegations of violations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>December 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>