Overview

Peru has the presidency in July. It is planning a briefing under the agenda item “peacebuilding and sustaining peace” focused on strengthening partnerships for nationally owned transitions. Peru’s Foreign Minister Néstor Popolizio is expected to chair the session. In addition, Peru plans to hold an open debate on the link between terrorism and organised crime and a debate on strengthening cooperation between the Council, the Secretariat and the troop- and police-contributing countries in peacekeeping operations. There will also be a briefing on implementing the “youth, peace and security” agenda.

There will be an annual debate on the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, which was established in 2010 to carry out the remaining essential functions of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia after their respective closures. A visiting mission to Colombia is planned for the middle of the month, with a briefing and consultations by the head of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia on the Secretary-General’s 90-day report scheduled for later in the month.

There will be consultations on Haiti on the 90-day report and the transition of MINUJUSTH to the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), a special political mission that will start on 16 October. Regarding Europe, the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus will be renewed this month, ahead of which there will be a TCC meeting and consultations. There may also be a briefing on Ukraine.

African issues that will be considered this month are:
- Democratic Republic of the Congo, an update on MONUSCO; and
- Libya, an update on UNSMIL and the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee.

Regarding Middle East issues, an update on Yemen on the UN Mission to support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) is anticipated in July. The Council is also expected to renew the mandate of UNMHA, which expires on 16 July.

Other Middle East issues this month include:
- Israel/Palestine, the quarterly open debate on the Middle East;
- Lebanon, an update on the implementation of resolution 1701, which called for a cessation of hostilities between the Shi’a militant group Hezbollah and Israel in 2006; and
- Syria, the monthly briefings on the humanitarian situation, the political process and the use of chemical weapons.

Regarding UN regional offices, there will be updates on UNRCCA in Central Asia and UNOWAS in West Africa.

In Hindsight: The Relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly

In June, the General Assembly elected five new members to serve two-year terms on the Security Council. This event highlights the interactions between these political organs of the UN system, which also include the election of the UN Secretary-General by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Council, and the simultaneous voting of both organs for members of the International Court of Justice, among other forms of engagement. It seems useful, in the wake of the elections to the Council, to consider how the relationship between the Council and the General...
Assembly can be strengthened.

Improving the quality of the interactions between these two organs would provide the Council with additional information and insights to inform its work. In turn, when the member states in the General Assembly feel that they have been consulted and that their views are heard on matters of international peace and security that affect them, the transparency, accountability and legitimacy of the Council are enhanced at a time when the Council is perceived to be struggling to discharge its responsibilities on a number of issues.

Building on existing practices for a stronger Council/General Assembly relationship could include:
- addressing the disconnect between the Council’s mandating of peacekeeping operations and the General Assembly Fifth Committee’s budgeting procedures;
- improving the process by which the Council’s annual report is submitted to the General Assembly and considered by the wider membership;
- convening more Council open debates on country-specific situations;
- promoting enhanced interaction between the presidents of the General Assembly and the Council; and
- holding more analytical and interactive monthly Council wrap-up sessions with the wider membership.

An unresolved issue in the relationship between the General Assembly and the Council is how to address the disconnect between the mandating process for peacekeeping missions in the Council and the budgeting process in the General Assembly Fifth Committee. At times, some Council members have acquiesced to language in Council negotiations regarding human rights or gender matters, while later advocating in the Fifth Committee to defund some of the positions needed to carry out these functions. The review process of peacekeeping budgets by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, which holds hearings and makes recommendations to the Fifth Committee, and by the Committee itself, can border on a review of the mandate of a particular mission. Better planning—including the possibility of informal discussions among Council members and key financial contributors, who overlap significantly—could help create a more coherent mandating and funding process, which would save countless hours of negotiations for diplomats and help peacekeeping missions more effectively to translate Council mandates into action on the ground. (For more on the mandating process for UN peace operations, please see our February 2019 research report, Is Christmas Really Over? Improving the Mandating of Peace Operations.)

Additional thought could also be given to the process by which the annual report is submitted by the Council and considered by the General Assembly. Under the UN Charter, the Security Council’s only clear obligation to the UN General Assembly is to submit an annual report for its consideration, as set out in Article 24 (3). The longstanding complaint that the report is not particularly analytical still holds true. The report is supposed to be “adopted by the Council in time for consideration by the General Assembly in the spring”, under the most recent Note 507 (S/2017/507), but by late June 2019, the Council had yet to adopt the 2018 annual report. The need for more timely submission of the annual report was underscored during the open debate on working methods on 6 June by Argentina, Costa Rica, India, Singapore, Slovenia and Switzerland (S/PV.8539). Submitting the annual report to the General Assembly earlier gives the wider membership more time to prepare for the annual debate, which is their primary vehicle to underscore their views and expectations of the Council. In this regard, the participation of the Secretary-General in the General Assembly’s annual debate might invigorate it, while also enhancing the report’s profile.

The Council often holds open thematic debates—most recently on working methods, on 6 June—but rarely holds such debates on country-specific situations. It is over seven years since the Council’s last country-specific open debates, which were on Somalia: in March 2011 at the initiative of China, and in March 2012 at that of the UK. In the context of strengthening the Council’s relationship with and accountability to the wider UN membership, scheduling open debates in a strategic way would allow the wider membership to express views on pressing country-specific situations, which constitute the lion’s share of the Council’s work, and perhaps result in the emergence of new options for addressing long-term conflicts.

More regular meetings between the monthly president of the Council and the president of the General Assembly would present an opportunity for the two presidents to share information on matters of common concern to the two organs. While there have been calls by the General Assembly for greater interaction between the two presidents, this has not become routine. At particular times, for example during the Secretary-General selection process, the two presidents met regularly to discuss the steps being taken in the selection process.

Finally, the Council could review its use of monthly wrap-up sessions with the wider membership. These sessions are an opportunity for the wider membership to assess the Council’s work during the month, to discuss lessons learnt, and to generate ideas for improving working methods. Formal wrap-up sessions, which first emerged in the Council’s practice in 2001, have not become a consistent feature on the Council’s programme of work. Informal sessions are held more regularly and could be more analytical and interactive. With better execution, these sessions, whether formal or informal, could serve as a useful vehicle for the Council to obtain feedback on its performance over the month, as well as address the UN membership’s desire for greater transparency and accountability of the Council.

(Some of these options for strengthening the relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council were outlined by Security Council Report Executive Director Karin Landgren during the Council’s 6 June open debate on working methods.)
Status Update since our June Forecast

Children and Armed Conflict
The Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict met on 3, 10 and 28 June for negotiations on its conclusions on the Secretary-General’s report on children and armed conflict in Myanmar (S/2018/956).

UNOCA (Central Africa)
On 4 June, François Louncény Fall, Special Representative and head of UNOCA, briefed the Security Council (S/PV.8538) on the Secretary-General’s semi-annual report on UNOCA (S/2019/430). The briefing was followed by consultations.

Working Methods
On 6 June, Kuwait, the chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions (IWG) in 2018-2019 organised its second open debate on working methods (S/PV.8539). James Cockayne of UN University and Karin Landgren, the Executive Director of Security Council Report, briefed. For the first time in an open debate, all ten elected Council members decided to have a joint statement, delivered by Ambassador Jerry Matthews Ayow, Director of the Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security; and Ms. Kurbia-Maries Questelles, a youth activist from Trinidad and Tobago.

Kosovo
On 10 June, the Council held the second of three briefings on Kosovo scheduled for this year (S/PV.8541). In his briefing, Zahir Tanin, Special Representative and head of UNMIK, noted that the current situation in Kosovo is fragile and there has been no progress in Belgrade-Pristina dialogue for over a year. Despite the international condemnation, Tanin said that Kosovo still maintains the 100 percent tariffs on imports from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Foreign Minister of Serbia, Ivica Dačić emphasised the importance of maintaining the UN presence in Kosovo given the risk of a worsening situation. On the other hand, Ambassador of Kosovo to the US, Florina Çitaku said that there is no justification for a continued presence of UNMIK given that Kosovo is an independent state which is no longer in crisis. Several Council members called on the parties to refrain from the protection of civilians from further escalation of tensions.

Protection of Civilians
On 11 June, the Security Council unanimously adopted standalone resolution 2474 on persons reported missing during armed conflict (S/PV.8543). The resolution, drafted by Kuwait, called on parties to the conflict to prevent people from going missing and to maintain records of those that have, among other provisions. The same morning, the Council held a briefing on protection of civilians in armed conflict with a focus on missing persons. The briefers were ICRC President Peter Maurer (via video teleconference) and Reena Ghelani, director of OCHA’s Operations and Advocacy Division. Both briefers stressed the impact of the unknown: unknown numbers missing, unknown causes, and an unknown future for those left behind. On 20 June, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2475, co-authored by Poland and the UK, which focused on protection of persons with disabilities in conflict. This resolution, like resolution 2474, was the first standalone resolution on its subject.

UNDOF (Golan Heights)
On 11 June, the Council met with UNDOF troop-contributing countries and were briefed by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix (S/PV.8544). Lacroix briefed Council members in consultations on 17 June. On 26 June, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2477, renewing UNDOF’s mandate until 31 December 2019.

Sudan (Darfur)
On 11 June, Council members issued a press statement which strongly condemned the recent violence, called for respect for human rights, and encouraged the Secretary-General to continue to support regional and international efforts, in particular, those led by the AU, to facilitate and agree on a national transitional process (SC/13836). On 14 June, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix briefed (S/PV.8549) the Council on UNAMID and the special report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the UN Secretary-General on the strategic assessment of UNAMID (S/2019/445). Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights Andrew Gilmour also briefed. The briefing was followed by consultations. On 19 June, the Council received the semi-annual briefing of the ICC Prosecutor related to the court’s work on Darfur (S/PV.8554). On 26 June, Ambassador Joanna Wronecka (Poland), chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, provided the quarterly briefing to Council members on the committee’s work. The Council renewed the mandate of UNAMID on 27 June.

Conflic Prevention and Mediation
On 12 June, the Security Council held a briefing on “Conflict prevention and mediation” (S/PV.8546). Kuwait circulated a
concept note in preparation for the meeting (S/2019/456). Secretary-General António Guterres and Mary Robinson, the chair of The Elders, a diverse and independent group of global leaders working to promote peace and human rights, briefed, as did Ban Ki-moon, The Elders Deputy Chair. Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Sabah Khaled Al-Hamad Al-Sabah presided.

Mali
On 12 June, the Council was briefed on developments in Mali by Mahamat Saleh Annadif, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of MINUSMA (S/PV.8547). The Malian Foreign Minister, Tiébilé Dramé, participated in the meeting, at which the 31 May report of the Secretary-General was presented (S/2019/454). At press time, the Council was expecting to renew MINUSMA’s mandate before the end of the month.

Iran
On 13 June, the Council held a meeting under “any other business” to discuss attacks on commercial ships in the Gulf of Oman. The US, which initiated the meeting, briefed Council members on some of the findings that the US alleges point to Iran’s responsibility for the attacks. On 24 June, at the request of the US, Council members held consultations to discuss the most recent attacks on commercial ships in the Gulf and the downing of an unmanned aerial vehicle, which the US alleges was shot in international airspace. Iran has denied the allegation, claiming that the incident took place in Iranian airspace. Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo briefed.

Cooperation with Regional Organisations
On 13 June, the Security Council held a briefing on cooperation between the Council and the League of Arab States (LAS) (S/PV.8548). Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kuwait Sheikh Sabah Khaled Al-Hamad Al-Sabah chaired the meeting.

Secretary-General António Guterres and LAS Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit briefed. Guterres announced the opening of the UN liaison office to the LAS later in the month. The Council adopted a presidential statement, encouraging the holding of an annual briefing by the Secretary-General of the LAS and the holding of an annual informal meeting between members of the Security Council and the Council of the LAS (S/PRST/2019/5).

South Sudan
On 25 June, Special Representative and head of UNMISS David Shearer briefed the Council on UNMISS and the 90-day report of the Secretary-General (S/2019/491). Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights Andrew Gilmour and civil society representative Lydia Minagano (via video teleconference) from Juba, South Sudan also briefed. The briefing was followed by consultations.

Somalia
On 26 June, the chair of the 751 Somalia Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve (Belgium), briefed the Council in consultations.

Non-proliferation
On 26 June, the Council held its semi-annual briefing on the implementation of resolution 2231, which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme. Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo presented the latest Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of resolution 2231. The Council’s facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231, Ambassador Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve (Belgium), briefed on the work of the Council related to resolution 2231, and the Head of the EU delegation, João Pedro Vale de Almeida, briefed on the work of the JCPOA’s Joint Commission. After the meeting, the current five EU members of the Council and one incoming (Estonia) made a joint statement at the media stakeout emphasising the importance of preserving the JCPOA, while expressing regret over the US withdrawal from the agreement. They stressed that the EU’s support for the agreement depends on full implementation of the JCPOA by Iran.
Libya

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council is expecting briefings by the Special Representative and head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Ghassan Salamé, and the chair of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee, the Deputy Permanent Representative of Germany, Ambassador Jürgen Schulz.


Key Recent Developments
On 4 April, General Khalifa Haftar, head of the eastern-based militia known as the Libyan National Army (LNA), launched an offensive towards Tripoli and against the internationally recognised and UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) located there. After initial military gains by the LNA around Tripoli, the frontlines have remained mostly static, with increasing air strikes and indiscriminate artillery shelling of densely populated civilian areas. Reports indicate that individuals listed for targeted sanctions by the Council have participated in the fighting. An attempt to adopt a UK-drafted resolution calling for a ceasefire failed in mid-April mainly due to last-minute US resistance. As the LNA’s focus has shifted to Tripoli, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has conducted attacks in LNA-dominated areas of the country, including on infrastructure. Haftar continues to present himself as fighting against terrorists and violent extremists, which has brought him support from a number of UN member states, including some Council members. Haftar’s offensive halted a UN-supported political process and caused indefinite postponement of the National Conference, originally scheduled for September 2019, and the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee as well as the measures related to the illicit export of crude oil from Libya until 15 February 2020; it was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia). S/RES/2437 (3 October 2018) renewed the authorisation for member states to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya bound to or from the country that have reasonable grounds to believe are violating the arms embargo. S/RES/2441 (5 November 2018) renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee as well as the measures related to the illicit export of crude oil from Libya. On 10 June, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2473, renewing the authorisation for member states, acting nationally or through regional organisations, to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya bound to or from the country that they have reasonable grounds to believe are violating the arms embargo. Ahead of the renewal, Council members held an informal interactive dialogue with the Deputy Secretary-General for Common Security and Defence Policy and Crisis Response at the European External Action Service, Pedro Serrano de Haro Soriano. The EU military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA) is the only regional arrangement operating under the authorisation. Belgium, Côte d’Ivoire, France, Germany, Indonesia, South Africa and the UK made statements after the vote, focusing on the ongoing armed conflict in Libya and related violations of the UN’s arms embargo.

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 7 June, a spokesperson for the High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed deep concern over the conditions in which migrants and refugees are being held in detention in Libya as well as the ongoing reports of disappearances and human trafficking after people are intercepted at sea by the Libyan Coast Guard. According to the statement, more than 2,300 people have been detained after interception at sea since the start of the year. The spokesperson also said that conditions at Zintan Detention Centre in Tripoli “amount to inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, and may also amount to torture.” Some 3,400 migrants and refugees remain detained in Tripoli, according to UN figures.

Sanctions-Related Developments
On 31 May, the 1970 Committee was briefed in informal consultations by the Secretary-General’s Deputy Special Representative in Libya Stephanie T. Williams and by Lipika Majumdar Roy Choudhury, the coordinator of the Panel of Experts assisting the committee. Williams discussed possible violations of the arms embargo since the launch of the LNA’s attack on Tripoli. Choudhury presented the interim report of the Panel of Experts as well as later developments, including acts by individuals that met the designation criteria for targeted sanctions.

On 26 March, German-Tunisian national Moncef Kartas, one of the panel’s arms experts, was arrested and detained on espionage charges by Tunisian authorities “in violation of the privileges and immunities that have been granted to Mr. Kartas,” according to the UN Spokesperson. On 21 May, a Tunisian appeals court decided to release Kartas, and he was able to return to Germany. The case against him is still open.

Key Issues and Options
An ongoing issue is the military escalation, which threatens to exacerbate long-standing political and economic divisions between the east and west of Libya. The conflict is fuelled by military support channelled to both the GNA and the LNA, in violation of the arms embargo, and militia members that are on the sanctions committee’s list of individuals designated for targeted sanctions participate in the fighting. Reports of mercenaries being part of the conflict are increasing as well. Progress on the political track as well as the question of a more equitable distribution of Libya’s wealth have stalled.

As long as the Council is unable to agree on an outcome on Libya, Council members could use the open briefing to make statements either in their national capacity or in some joint configurations to show their dissatisfaction with the blocked Council and their concern about the situation on the ground.
**Libya**

Individual Council members could use their influence to put pressure on the parties and countries to adhere to the arms embargo. In the longer term, visiting missions to Libya by the Council or the sanctions committee could be an option.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

The Council remains deeply divided on the question of any Council action on Libya. The US seems to be opposed to any Council call for a ceasefire. Council resolutions and presidential statements routinely call upon UN member states to cease support for parallel institutions in Libya, but some countries, including permanent members of the Council, fail to respect these calls and also continue to support Haftar militarily. Militias affiliated with the GNA also receive military support from abroad. Reportedly, Turkey and Qatar support the GNA militarily while Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates provide military support to the LNA. Political support for Haftar comes from France, Russia, and the US.

The UK is the penholder on Libya, sharing the pen with Germany on the sanctions file. Schulz chairs the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee.

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**Colombia**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council is planning a visiting mission to Colombia in July, to be led jointly by Peru and the UK. Later in the month, the Council will receive a briefing by Carlos Ruiz Massieu, the Special Representative and head of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia, with consultations expected to follow the briefing.

The mandate of the verification mission expires on 25 September.

**Key Recent Developments**

Challenges and uncertainties persist in the implementation of the November 2016 Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace in Colombia, on matters such as the proper inclusion of the agreement in national planning and resource allocation or the fate of the Territorial Areas for Training and Reintegration to which former Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) members and their families were relocated when the current governmental programmes end in August.

There have, however, been positive recent developments regarding some of the most controversial issues. In his 26 March report to the Council, the Secretary-General highlighted polarisation and divisions over the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP), the judicial component of the transitional justice system established by the peace agreement. The mandate of the SJP has continued to be a divisive issue and while it started its operations in March 2018, various amendments to its statutory law were being presented by different actors and, in turn, reviewed by the parliament and the Constitutional Court. In March, President Iván Duque—who took power in August 2018, succeeding Juan Manuel Santos, a key architect of the peace agreement—lodged six objections to the statutory law of the SJP. Briefing the Council on 12 April, Ruiz Massieu praised the “impressive results” of the SJP’s work and echoed the Secretary-General’s call for prompt action by all concerned to ensure that a statutory law consistent with the peace agreement is adopted as soon as possible. On 16 April, Council members issued a press statement reiterating their call for full respect for the independence and autonomy of the SJP. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate voted to reject Duque’s objections, but controversy arose regarding whether in the Senate an absolute majority—needed to overrule the objections—had been reached. The matter was then referred to the Constitutional Court. In his latest report, issued on 26 June, the Secretary-General stated that on 29 May the Constitutional Court ruled that both chambers of the Colombian parliament had reached the required threshold. On 6 June, Duque signed the statutory law of the SJP, and it entered into force.

A related issue is the case of one of the former leaders of FARC-EP, Seuxis Pausías Hernández (aka Jesús Santrich). He had been chosen for one of the ten congressional seats granted to former FARC-EP members by the peace accord and was supposed to take up his post in July 2018. In April 2018, Hernández was detained on drug trafficking charges following a federal indictment in the US. There is a no-extradition guarantee for crimes committed during the armed conflict and prior to the signing of the peace agreement, and it is the SJP’s responsibility to review the applicability of this guarantee. The SJP decided not to authorise Hernández’s extradition and ruled that he be freed, citing insufficient evidence. Following this decision, the justice minister and the deputy attorney general resigned. Hernández was released on 17 May and re-arrested that same day based on new evidence. On 28 May, the State Council upheld Hernández’s status as a member of the House of Representatives. Colombia’s Supreme Court, which has jurisdiction over the country’s legislators, ordered his release on 29 May, and on 11 June, having been sworn in, Hernández took his seat in the House of Representatives.

Attacks against human rights defenders and community leaders continue. For the first time in a meeting on Colombia, the Council was briefed on 12 April by a civil society representative, Rosa Emilia Salamanca, co-director of the NGO Corporación de Investigación y Acción Social y Económica. She highlighted how the defence of human rights “is a high-risk activity that sometimes costs lives”.

The guerrilla group known as Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) continues to engage in hostilities. Furthermore, other armed groups remain active, including former members of the FARC-EP, who are frustrated with shortcomings in the peace
process and have taken up arms again, and the criminal group Clan del Golfo. Fighting among some of these groups led to the displacement of some 40,000 civilians, including indigenous people, in the first quarter of 2019. Despite the governmental plan “Peace with Legality”, limited access to economic opportunities for former combatants, including access to land and markets, continues to hamper the reintegration process.

While the Council’s 16 April press statement recognised the achievements of the peace process over the past three years, it also acknowledged significant challenges. In addition to some of the issues highlighted above, a particular concern has been guaranteeing a smooth transition of the 24 Territorial Areas for Training and Reintegration where former FARC-EP members were relocated with their families following the peace accord. The current arrangements include some forms of government support, such as health and education services and the provision of monthly allowances, but they are due to expire in August. According to the Secretary-General’s 26 June report, the Government’s four-year National Development Plan, approved on 3 May, identifies peace-related activities within a broader set of public investments in conflict-affected regions. It also, according to the report, “provides authority for the Government to continue basic monthly allowances to former FARC-EP members in the reintegration process and to facilitate access to land for their income-generating activities”.

The Council visited Colombia once previously, from 3 to 5 May 2017, in an effort to demonstrate support for the peace process, gain a better understanding of the challenges, and encourage the parties to maintain their cooperation in implementation of the peace agreement.

**Women, Peace and Security**

During the 12 April Council meeting on Colombia, civil society briefers Salamanca highlighted aspects of the situation that particularly affected women. She said a “culture that attacks bodies, goods and dignity” is what “women human rights defenders, leaders and peacebuilders” are facing when they seek participation. According to Salamanca, a future entailing “peace in everyday life” for women would mean for them to be able to walk “alone free from danger of being raped” and to participate “in the country’s decision-making without feeling threatened”. The Secretary-General’s March report on Colombia said that in 2018, a woman leader was killed every 18 days, on average. Between 27 December 2018 and 26 March, there was a reported increase in the percentage of female leaders killed, according to the report. The Secretary-General’s March report further said that sexual violence remains a driver of forced displacement. The Secretary-General expressed his deep concern about the lack of implementation of the gender provisions of the peace agreement that are related to security guarantees and reintegration. In his 26 June report, the Secretary-General noted “some progress on gender-related issues”. He listed under this rubric several recent meetings conducted by the Special Forum on Gender and the holding on 1-2 June of the first national forum by the FARC Gender Committee that gathered more than 400 women former combatants. A positive step, according to the report, was the development by the government’s High-Level Forum on Gender of an action plan that assigns responsibilities to government entities for each of the 51 gender indicators of the Framework Plan for Implementation of the Peace Agreement. The report, nevertheless, reiterated the need for prompt implementation of the elements of the agreement related to security guarantees for women leaders.

With respect to the UN Mission, it is on track to reach its target of 46 percent female staff in the professional and field service categories on fixed-term, continuing and permanent contracts by the end of 2019, according to the report.

**Key Issues and Options**

A key issue is addressing the mistrust among political actors in Colombia and ensuring that the peace agreement is fully implemented. The Secretary-General highlighted in his 26 March report the importance of promoting the implementation of the agreement in its entirety “as an interlocking set of commitments”. Three months later, the Secretary-General described the situation as a “mixed picture” adding “and I deeply regret once again the continued atmosphere of polarization over elements of the Peace Agreement”. Council members may use the upcoming visiting mission to demonstrate their full commitment to the peace process and support for the peace agreement. Meetings with members of the Duque Administration may help clarify some concerns that the new government has expressed regarding the accord. Through meetings with different sectors of the Colombian political scene, including former members of the FARC-EP, as well as civil society, Council members are likely to deepen their understanding of the current problems and potentially help build some bridges between different actors. The visit may also help reassure Colombians about the irreversibility of the process and emphasise that any adjustments proposed by the government cannot be applied retroactively to commitments accepted by the parties.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

Council members are unified in their support for the peace process in Colombia. Several members have viewed engagement in Colombia as a rare bright spot for the Council as it struggles to play an effective role in several other conflict situations. While Council members have generally been deferential towards the government since Colombia was first brought to the Council’s agenda in January 2016, recent developments regarding the SJP led most Council members to criticise the objections to the statutory law and express their support for the SJP in the Council chamber on 12 April. Negotiations among Council members on the 16 April press statement reflected differences in tone among them, with most Council members stressing the need for balance in acknowledging achievements and outstanding challenges. The situation in neighbouring Venezuela and the differences in positions on this situation among Council members may also have affected the recent dynamics with respect to Colombia.

Venezuela broke off diplomatic relations with Colombia on 23 February as a result of the crisis in which Colombia supported an attempted delivery of aid to Venezuela against the wishes of its government. According to UNHCR, Colombia hosted 1,174,000 Venezuelan refugees and migrants by the end of 2018 and is expected to host almost 2 million by the end of 2019. During the visiting mission, members of the Council are likely to be interested in the impact of the presence of Venezuelan refugees in the country.

The UK is the penholder on Colombia.
UNRCCA (Central Asia)

Expected Council Action
In July, the Special Representative and head of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA), Natalia Gherman, is expected to brief the Council in consultations on UNRCCA’s activities.

UNRCCA is a UN special political mission, established by the Secretary-General in 2007 for an open-ended period based on a proposal by the five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). It is headquartered in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, with offices in all Central Asian states, and its mandate includes a liaison function, monitoring and analysis of the situation on the ground, maintaining contact with regional organisations, offering a political framework for prevention activities of the entire UN system in the region, and maintaining contact with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to ensure a comprehensive overview of the regional situation. Its budget for 2019 from assessed contributions, the regular UN budget, is around $3 million (with additional project-specific funding), and it has a staff of 30 (22 national, eight international). It is established practice that the Special Representative reports orally to the Council twice a year.

Key Recent Developments
Gherman last briefed Council members in consultations on 24 January. She updated them on the activities of UNRCCA in priority areas, such as transboundary water management, countering terrorism, the role of youth, the shrinking of the Aral Sea, foreign terrorist fighters, and UNRCCA’s involvement in the new Central Asia strategy of the EU.

In line with UNRCCA’s mandate to cooperate with UNAMA, the Special Representative hosted a meeting in Ashgabat with Special Representative for Afghanistan and head of UNAMA Tadamichi Yamamoto during his visit to Turkmenistan on 4 February. On 6 February, also in Ashgabat, Gherman met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and discussed matters of cooperation between Central Asian states. On 15 April, Gherman attended a ministerial-level conference in Bucharest, under the Romanian Presidency of the EU Council, focusing on the new EU strategy for Central Asia.

On 18 and 19 June, UNRCCA organised a meeting on water cooperation in Almaty, with representatives of all Central Asian states and Afghanistan participating. On 16 and 17 May, a high-level conference on “Countering Terrorism and its Financing Through Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime” took place in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. Gherman attended the conference, which was co-organised by the UN, the EU, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Issues and Options
One issue for the Council is what more it can do to support UNRCCA’s work. An option would be to hear Gherman’s briefing in an open meeting, followed by closed consultations. This would allow Council members publicly to express support for the work of UNRCCA and to raise awareness of its activities, and then have a potentially less formal, more detailed and frank exchange with Gherman.

Council Dynamics
Council members are generally supportive of the work of UNRCCA. Until early 2015, Council members issued a press statement following each briefing, encouraging increased cooperation and coordination among the Central Asian countries, UNRCCA, and “relevant regional organisations”. In September 2015, Russia, the penholder on UNRCCA, sought to add specific references to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO), as well as the OSCE and the EU. The P3 (France, the UK and the US) opposed these additions, seeing the CIS, the CSTO and the SCO as vehicles for enhancing Russian influence in the region. No press statements could be agreed upon for more than two years.

As a Central Asian state, Kazakhstan sought to overcome those differences during its 2017-2018 term on the Council. In February 2017, Council members agreed on press elements that welcomed the Special Representative’s briefing, reaffirmed the importance of conflict prevention tools, acknowledged the role of UNRCCA, and encouraged greater cooperation between the states in the region, UNRCCA, and relevant regional organisations. Under the Kazakh Council presidency in January 2018, the Council found consensus on a press statement, again referring to “relevant regional organisations” without naming them. In light of its close relationship with Kazakhstan, Russia apparently found this acceptable, with the addition of “including those organizations of which the Central Asian States are members”. In the statement, Council members reaffirmed the importance of preventive diplomacy and acknowledged UNRCCA’s role in that regard. They further expressed support for UNRCCA’s role in regional counter-terrorism activities, welcomed its engagement related to border management, and commended efforts over transboundary water management and combatting drug trafficking. Following the last meetings on UNRCCA in June 2018 and January 2019, no press statement was issued.
**Expected Council Action**

In July, the Council will receive the monthly briefings on the humanitarian situation, the political process, and the use of chemical weapons in Syria.

**Key Recent Developments**

The situation in north-western Syria, particularly in southern Idlib, northern Hama and western Aleppo, continues to deteriorate. Although this area was considered one of the four “de-escalation” areas agreed by the Astana guarantors (Iran, Russia and Turkey) in 2017, this has not prevented an increase in Syrian and Russian airstrikes and a ground offensive. Despite attempts to broker a new ceasefire, the escalation has continued, leading to incidents of direct confrontation between Turkey and Syria and retaliation by the Council-listed terrorist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.

In May and June, there were five Council meetings on the humanitarian situation in Syria that focused particularly on developments in the north-west. At the request of the humanitarian penholders on Syria (Belgium, Germany and Kuwait), the Council was briefed on 18 June by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mark Lowcock. He said that since 1 May, an estimated 330,000 people had been internally displaced by the hostilities, which had resulted in more than 230 civilian deaths and hundreds injured. Furthermore, he conveyed reports of continuous attacks having severe impact on civilian infrastructure, including schools and hospitals, highlighting that “some have drawn the conclusion that hospital bombings are a deliberate tactic aimed at terrorizing people”. Many of these sites had been deconflicted—their locations shared through the UN’s deconfliction mechanism. He stressed that counter-terrorism efforts cannot absolve states of their obligations to uphold international humanitarian law. At a 12 June press conference, Fernando Arias, the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), announced that Syria had denied visas and refused to submit confidential information to the members of the OPCW’s Identification and Investigation Team, established to identify perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks in Syria following a decision of the Conference of State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWCC) in June 2018.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

During its 41st session, the Human Rights Council is expected to receive an oral update from the Commissioner of Inquiry on Syria on 2 July.

**Key Issues and Options**

Despite international engagement on the establishment of the constitutional committee, it remains an open question whether efforts on the political process will yield results, considering the divisions in the Council, the trajectory of the conflict, and the consolidation of control by the Syrian government. Council members could organise a retreat to hold an informal and frank discussion with Pedersen to consider how, individually and collectively, they can best support the prospects for a political process based on resolution 2254.

Given the crucial role of the Astana guarantors on both the political and humanitarian fronts, Council members could seek an informal interactive dialogue with their representatives to have a more action-oriented discussion regarding efforts to prevent a full-fledged military offensive in Idlib. Furthermore, they could meet in a private setting with OCHA to discuss the wave of recent attacks on medical facilities and schools, many of them in settings deemed as deconflicted.

The Council could suggest that the working group on detainees, abductees, handover of bodies and identification of missing persons, which was set up in December 2017 and includes the Astana guarantors and the UN, meet in Geneva in the near future and move beyond one-for-one exchanges to focus instead on the simultaneous release of unequal numbers of detainees/abductees. (This idea was floated by DiCarlo in a 27 March briefing.) The Council could hold a meeting specifically to shed light on this little-discussed issue and call on the guarantors to use their influence with the government to engage in good faith on this matter.

The Council could request a briefing in consultations by the Secretariat to focus on the threats of instability in north-eastern Syria, call on the actors involved to exercise restraint, and support good-offices efforts to address long-standing grievances.

Council members could invite the Director-General of the OPCW to participate in an informal interactive dialogue on the work of the organisation on Syria.

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Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council is scheduled to hold an open debate on the linkages between terrorism and organised crime. The briefers are expected to be Under-Secretary-General Yuri Fedotov, Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) Michèle Coninsx; and Tamara Makarenko, chief operating officer of Sibylline, a strategic risk consultancy firm based in the UK.

A resolution may be adopted during the open debate or later in the month.

Background and Key Recent Developments
The issue of organised crime and its relationship to international peace and security has been a point of discussion—and certainly disagreement—among Council members over the last few years.

On 19 December 2014, during the presidency of Chad, the Council held an open debate that focused on the linkages between transnational organised crime and terrorism. Chad’s concept note for the open debate focused on the intersection of those two phenomena in Africa, but they would also consider their broader impact on international peace and security. The Secretary-General’s report on the work of the UN in fighting terrorism in Africa of 9 January 2014 was also considered during the meeting. Chad’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Moussa Faki Mahamat, presided over the meeting, and Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman and the AU Permanent Observer to the UN, Téte António, briefed.

Resolution 2195, stressing the need to work collectively to prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including terrorism benefiting from transnational organised crime, was adopted during the debate. It called on states to strengthen border management to prevent the movement of terrorists and terrorist groups. Among other things, it encouraged member states to enhance cooperation and strategies to prevent terrorists from benefiting from transnational organised crime, and to build the capacity to secure their borders and investigate and prosecute terrorists and the criminals working with them. It also stressed the importance of strengthening transregional and international cooperation, and for UN entities and other relevant international and regional organisations to support the development and strengthening of the capacities of national and regional institutions, particularly law enforcement and counter-terrorism agencies, to address terrorism benefiting from transnational organised crime.

Throughout its term on the Council, Peru has focused on the nexus between organised crime and terrorism. During its previous presidency, it organised an Arria-formula meeting on 9 April 2018 on “enhancing synergies between the United Nations and regional and subregional organisations to address the nexus between terrorism and transnational organised crime”.

On 8 May 2018, the Council adopted a presidential statement expressing concern about the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organised crime. It called on states to prevent terrorists from benefiting from the financial proceeds of transnational organised crime and recalled their obligations to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism for any purpose. It further called on states, as well as international, regional, and subregional organisations, to continue conducting research to better understand the nature and scope of the links that may exist between terrorists and criminal networks. The statement also requested the 1267/1989/2253 Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, the CTC and the 1988 Afghanistan Sanctions Committee to hold a joint meeting on this issue within 12 months.

Ambassador Gustavo Meza-Cuadra Velásquez (Peru), chair of the 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), briefed the wider membership on 8 October 2018 to help strengthen the understanding of the intersections between terrorism and organised crime, notably in connection with human trafficking, committed for the purpose of supporting terrorism. He also spoke about links between both drug trafficking and arms trafficking with terrorism.

On 26 April 2019, the CTC, the 1267/1989/2253 Sanctions Committee and the 1988 Afghanistan Sanctions Committee held a special joint meeting on the nexus between international terrorism and organised crime, which was open to member states. The meeting focused on regional strategies, responses, and lessons learned in addressing the linkages between terrorism and organised crime, and it underlined the need for strengthened domestic, regional and international cooperation on the issue.

Resolution 2462 adopted on 28 March on the financing of terrorism also addresses the linkages between terrorism and transnational organised crime. It recognises that the nature and scope of these linkages vary by context, and emphasises the need to coordinate efforts.

in north-western Syria and in the Council’s inability to react unequivocally to serious violations of international humanitarian law. The clear divisions on the three areas through which the Council engages on the conflict—humanitarian situation, political process and chemical weapons—continue to hamper an effective Council response.

Belgium, Germany and Kuwait are co-penholders on humanitarian issues in Syria.

at all levels to respond to this challenge, in accordance with international law. It also encourages states, as well as the UN, to continue conducting research and collecting information to better understand the nature and scope of the links that may exist between terrorism, in particular the financing of terrorism, and transnational organised crime.

Key Issues and Options
The Council may adopt a resolution reiterating its previous decisions on the nexus between terrorism and transnational organised crime. While acknowledging that terrorist groups and criminal groups differ in their nature, actions and incentives, and thus should not be conflated, the Council may emphasise that in order to address properly the threat of terrorism, these two types of groups should not be viewed in isolation. In this context, the Council may stress the importance of interagency cooperation between states’ intelligence agencies, which deal with counter-terrorism, and law enforcement agencies, which deal with transnational organised crime. It may also encourage cooperation between the public and private sectors to curtail criminal activities that assist terrorist activities.

Council and Wider Dynamics
In general, counter-terrorism enjoys the support of all Council members, but there are some differences in approach to the relevance of transnational organised crime for the Council’s work on counter-terrorism. Some members see transnational organised crime as a law enforcement issue and are wary of the Council’s encroaching on matters that are within the mandate of other UN organs, such as the General Assembly and UNODC. Others stress that where criminal groups and networks enable or assist terrorist activities, whether financially, logistically, or in other ways, the Council should consider how to curb such actions as part of its counter-terrorism agenda.

**Expected Council Action**
In July, the Council is expected to hold a debate on improving triangular cooperation between the Council, the Secretariat, and troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs). The Council will be briefed by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Pierre Lacroix; the Force Commander of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, Lieutenant General Dennis Gyllensporre; and Dr. Alexandra Novosseloff, a non-resident Senior Fellow at the International Peace Institute.

Furthermore, Council members are expected to hold an informal interactive dialogue on challenges and opportunities related to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in peace operations.

**Background**
Before most mandate renewals, Council members hold a private meeting of TCCs/PCCs and the Secretariat. Since this practice began in the 1990s, triangular cooperation has been consolidated both institutionally with the establishment of the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations in 2001 and normatively with several decisions. Chiefly, resolution 1353, adopted on 13 June 2001, contained the recommendations of the working group on this issue and stipulated the formats in which consultations with TCCs would take place.

These meetings are supposed to encapsulate the collective nature of peacekeeping but have been criticised as lacking interactivity and for not resulting in advice from TCCs/PCCs being incorporated in mandates. Some Council members have also criticised the unreadiness of TCCs/PCCs to discuss substantive issues during these meetings.

The 2015 report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) noted how the lack of effective triangular consultations had generated frustration on all sides and affected mandate implementation. It advocated forging “a common and realistic understanding of the mandate and what is needed to implement it” through enhanced engagement.

That same year, to address some of the limitations of the established formats, New Zealand and then France started convening informal meetings of the main TCCs/PCCs, Council members and the Secretariat on some peacekeeping operations, with the objective of enhancing the frankness of the discussions with TCCs/PCCs. Although this practice has continued on some files, it is far from systematic and relies on the willingness of the penholder or another particularly engaged elected member to host these meetings.

On 31 December 2015, at the initiative of Chad, the Council adopted a presidential statement recognising that, despite the existence of a broad array of mechanisms, current consultations among these three stakeholders “do not meet their expectations and have yet to reach their full potential”. The statement recognised that the experience and expertise of TCCs/PCCs can greatly assist the planning of operations; stressed the importance of substantive, representative and meaningful exchanges; and underscored the importance of full participation by the three stakeholders so that meetings are useful and productive.

In the 2018 session of the General Assembly’s Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations (C34), Pakistan and the UK presented a non-paper on triangular cooperation that highlighted the importance of keeping a mix of formal and informal meetings and improving existing mechanisms instead of creating new ones. These conclusions were incorporated into the 2018 report of the C34. The Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN peacekeeping operations, which was endorsed by 151 member states and four organisations in late 2018, included the commitment to strengthen consultation between...
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peacekeeping stakeholders on mandates and their implementation as well as to implement existing intergovernmental commitments on triangular cooperation.

Most Council members’ discussions on this issue have taken place in the context of the working group, including meetings on 11 December 2015 and 10 November 2017 solely dedicated to this issue. In the Council, the need to improve triangular cooperation is regularly raised in discussions on working methods. The latest iteration of Note 507, which compiles the Council’s working methods, for the first time includes a section on consultations with troop- and police-contributing countries, rather than deferring to resolution 1353.

The Council discussed the use of UAVs in June 2014 in an open debate on new trends in peacekeeping held at the initiative of Russia. Since the first deployment of UN UAVs to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2013, other operations, including in Mali and the Central African Republic, have used these unarmed assets to identify armed movements, monitor camps for internally displaced persons, and provide timely reconnaissance over vast and sensitive areas.

Yemen

Expected Council
In July, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths, is expected to brief the Council on the implementation of resolutions 2451 and 2452. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mark Lowcock and General Michael Lollesgaard, the chair of the Redeployment Coordination Committee (RCC) and head of the UN Mission to Support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA), are also likely to brief. The Council is also expected to renew the mandate of UNMHA, which expires on 16 July.

Key Recent Developments
Diplomatic efforts focused on fixing the damaged relations between the special envoy and the Yemeni government following the UN’s overseeing the Houthi rebel group’s “unilateral” redeployment from Hodeidah, Saleef and Ras Isa ports from 11 to 14 May.

On 10 June, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo met in Riyadh with Yemeni President Abdo Raboo Mansour Hadi, whose 22 May letter to the Secretary-General had been highly critical of Griffiths, outlining a list of alleged offenses that ranged from Griffiths’ handling of the Houthi redeployments to his seeking to transcend resolution 2216 by adopting a political framework for the negotiations outside the scope of relevant resolutions and neglecting the Stockholm Agreement’s prisoner exchange and statement of understanding on Taiz. (Resolution 2216, adopted by the Council in April 2015, demanded the Houthis withdraw from all seized territory and relinquish all seized arms.) DiCarlo also met with Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister, Ibrahim Abdulaziz Al-Assaf, and Assistant Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Abdel Aziz Hamad Aluwaisheg. Both expressed their support for the efforts of the Special Envoy, according to the UN.

In a press statement that same day, Council members underlined their support for Griffiths and called on the parties to engage constructively and continuously with the special envoy. Members “noted positively” the initial progress achieved towards phase one of the redeployments, a reference to the withdrawal of Houthi forces from the ports.

While the ceasefire in Hodeidah governorate has largely held, fighting continued on other fronts, including the northern Hajjah governorate and the southern al-Dhale governorate. The Houthis escalated attacks against Saudi Arabia amid rising tensions between the US and Iran. On 12 June, the Houthis claimed that they fired a missile that struck Abha International Airport, in south-western Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, which leads a military coalition supporting the Yemeni government, reported in a letter to the Council that the attack injured 26 civilians. On 23 June, a Houthi drone attack on the airport killed one Syrian civilian and injured 21 people, according to the coalition.

At a 17 June Council meeting, Griffiths, briefing via video teleconference, reaffirmed his personal commitment and that of the UN to pursue an impartial and inclusive political process. Yemen’s ambassador, Abdullah Ali Fadhel al-Saadi, expressed the Yemeni government’s willingness to continue to cooperate with the special envoy. The executive director of the World Food Programme (WFP), David Beasley, who participated in the session, accused the Houthis of selling food aid for profit. He said that without assurances by the Houthis that they would start to implement agreements brokered last December regarding beneficiary registration, beneficiary targeting and biometrics, the WFP would most likely start a phased suspension of food assistance by the end of that week.
Yemen

On 20 June, the WFP announced a partial suspension of aid, affecting 850,000 people in Sanaa, though nutrition programs for malnourished children, pregnant and nursing mothers would be maintained.

Following the 17 June meeting, Council members issued “press elements” in which they expressed full support for the Special Envoy. They condemned in the strongest terms the attacks by the Houthis on 12 June on Abha international airport and condemned Houthis misappropriation of humanitarian assistance and aid, as reported by the WFP executive director.

Key Issues and Options
Implementing the December 2018 Stockholm Agreement remains a key issue. The agreement established a ceasefire in Hodeidah governorate and called for the mutual redeployment of forces from Hodeidah city and the ports of Hodeidah, Saleef and Ras Issa; an agreement for a prisoner exchange; and a mutual statement of understanding on Taiz to de-escalate fighting and increase humanitarian aid to this frontline city. Resolving the question of the composition of local security forces to take over from Houthi and government troops is the most contentious issue impeding implementation of the Hodeidah agreement.

Another priority is to resume talks between the parties on a comprehensive political solution, though this appears unlikely without significant progress in implementing the Stockholm Agreement. Fighting elsewhere, increased Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, and heightened regional tensions risk undoing the agreement and deepening Yemen’s civil war.

The humanitarian crisis created by the war remains a key concern, with ten million people at risk of famine and more than 24 million people requiring assistance. Reported Houthi diversions of food, bureaucratic impediments by the parties, lack of donor funding for aid operations, and economic conditions, including the decline in the Yemeni rial, contribute to the challenge of addressing the crisis. An issue, increasingly flagged by OCHA, is the potential for an environmental disaster in the Red Sea because of the deteriorated condition of the SAFER oil tanker. This floating storage and offloading facility off the Ras Isa oil terminal holds 1.1 million barrels of oil and is at risk of exploding or rupturing because of its age and its lack of maintenance since 2015.

During the Council’s 17 June briefing, Low-cock said that the Houthis recently provided written approval for the UN to proceed with a technical mission to inspect the tanker.

For the mandate renewal of UNMHA, a Secretariat review of the mission, reported in a 12 June letter to the Council, noted that UNMHA “serves as a credible and effective conflict prevention tool at a critical entry point for humanitarian assistance in Yemen and an impartial arbiter of conditions on the ground”. It found that the mission’s mandate continues to be achievable and appropriate for the situation on the ground. The composition and operational aspects of UNMHA were also assessed as remaining valid, while requiring significant flexibility in their application, according to the review.

The Council may renew the mandate of UNMHA for six months or one year. That includes leading and supporting the functioning of the RCC to oversee the governorate-wide ceasefire, redeployment of forces, and mine action operations, and monitoring the compliance of the parties to the ceasefire in Hodeidah governorate and the mutual redeployment of forces from the city of Hodeidah and the ports of Hodeidah, Salif and Ras Issa.

Members may invite Griffiths and Lollesgaard to New York to participate in an informal discussion to brainstorm ideas for how to generate momentum for the Stockholm process and broader political negotiations.

Council members could consider adopting a resolution focusing on the humanitarian situation, perhaps with the more prescriptive elements that were dropped during last December’s negotiations on resolution 2451 on steps that the parties should take, such as ending diversion of assistance, removing bureaucratic restrictions within prescribed timeframes, and introducing measures for strengthening the economy.

Council Dynamics
Council members have maintained strong support for Griffiths and want to preserve the Stockholm Agreement despite the shortfalls in its implementation to date. Members view the agreement as the best possible outcome that could have been struck when the parties went to Sweden last December after almost two and a half years without meeting.

The Council is expected to renew the mandate of UNMHA, which, as indicated in the Secretariat’s review, has contributed to a de-escalation around the port city that is vital for alleviating the humanitarian crisis.

Kuwait is part of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition and champions coalition positions. It has sought to facilitate political efforts, hosting peace talks in 2016 and providing aircraft to transport the Houthis to last December’s consultations in Sweden. Germany announced at the 15 May briefing that it would be willing to host a new round of consultations. Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Germany, Peru and Poland will often seek to coordinate their positions on Yemen, especially on humanitarian issues.

The US shares coalition concerns about— and at times seeks to highlight—Iran’s role, which it views as destabilising.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council is scheduled to hold a briefing and consultations on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Ambassador Mansour Al-Otaibi (Kuwait) will brief in his capacity as chair of the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee.

The mandate of the UN Organization for the Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) expires on 20 December 2019.

UN DOCUMENTS ON THE DRC Security Council Resolution S/RES/2478 (26 June 2019) renewed the 1533 sanctions regime until 1 July 2020. S/RES/2363 (29 March 2019) renewed the mandate of MONUSCO until 20 December and called for a strategic review. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.8498 (29 March 2019) was the adoption of resolution 2463, with explanations of votes by some countries.
Key Recent Developments
At press time, the second-largest outbreak of Ebola on record has surpassed 2,120 confirmed cases in the DRC since August 2018. More than 1,400 people have died. On 12 June, the World Health Organisation (WHO) confirmed the first Ebola deaths outside the DRC during the current epidemic, of a five-year-old boy and his grandmother who had recently crossed the border into Uganda. Other members of their family have also become sick and died, leading to increased fears in Uganda and other neighboring states. WHO said the family most likely did not cross through official border points. On 14 June, WHO declined, for the third time, to declare this outbreak a global health emergency. Attempts to address Ebola in eastern DRC continue to be hampered by the vastness of the territory, ongoing violence, and the population’s distrust of authorities.

Meanwhile, there has been renewed violence in north-eastern DRC. According to reports, fighting between militias of the Lendu and Hema ethnic groups has resulted in many deaths: local officials have stated that over 161 people have been killed, but exact numbers are extremely difficult to confirm. The fighting has also destroyed around 40 villages and displaced more than 300,000 people in Ituri province since mid-June. In the late 1990s, thousands were killed in a war between these two groups, and it seems that the current violence stems from decades-long tensions and disputes over land and resources. A spokesman for UNHCR told reporters on 18 June that there is evidence of “both communities forming self-defence groups and being involved in revenge killings”. The Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), the Congolese armed forces, have attempted to exert control, and MONUSCO has also taken the step of setting up three temporary military bases in the area of Djugu and Mahagi.

Sanctions-Related Developments
In June, the Council renewed the sanctions regime for the DRC until 1 July 2020. It continues to affirm that sanctions will apply to individuals and entities designated by the committee that meet such criteria as engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security of the DRC and planning, directing, sponsoring or participating in attacks against MONUSCO peacekeepers or UN personnel, including members of the Group of Experts. Sanctions also apply to individuals who engage in serious violations of international law involving the targeting of children or women in situations of armed conflict. According to the committee’s December 2018 report, there were 35 individuals and nine entities on the committee’s sanctions list.

The resolution added language, evidently recommended by Special Representative Leila Zerrougui, that requested the Group of Experts to circulate information every 12 months on “relevant additions or modifications” to the listings, such as deaths. The provision apparently stems from the urgent need to have accurate information listed and the difficulties of getting such updates in the past. While such requests are often listed in the Guidelines of the Committee for the Conduct of its Work, it is unusual to see them included in the operative paragraphs of the resolution itself. Their inclusion should ensure that the list is examined every year for necessary updates.

From 27 April to 6 May, the sanctions committee chair led a visiting mission by the committee to the DRC, Uganda and Dubai.

The resolution reiterates the need for the DRC government to “swiftly and fully investigate the killing” in March 2017 of Michael Sharp and Zaida Catalan, members of the Group of Experts of the 1533 Committee, and the four Congolese citizens hired as motorbike drivers and a translator. A military tribunal in DRC charged Colonel Jean de Dieu Mambweni with the murders on 17 June. He was reportedly in contact with those who killed Catalan and Sharp. A date for his trial has not been set.

Human Rights-Related Developments
During its 41st session, the Human Rights Council (HRC) is expected to hold an enhanced interactive dialogue on 9 July with the two international experts on the situation of human rights in the Kasai region and to consider their report (A/HRC/41/31). The report sets out recommendations to combat impunity in the Kasai and emphasizes the urgent need for reconciling communities, disarming and integrating members of all militia groups, and reducing the military presence in Kasai, among other recommendations. The HRC will also receive an oral update from the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in the DRC.

Key Issues and Options
With MONUSCO’s mandate renewed until December, the Council will continue to monitor the situation on the ground, including the continued instability of DRC politics, ongoing violence, and the Ebola outbreak. The Council will also await the outcome of the independent strategic review of MONUSCO, which is due in September, as well as any new developments connected to the murders of Catalan and Sharp, and the four Congolese assisting them.

Council Dynamics
Despite their divergent reactions to the elections in the DRC in January, Council members appear to now have a united front, at least on some items. All members want to see the DRC strengthen its institutions. Previously, members have also welcomed the efforts taken by the DRC government to restore the trust of the people. Likewise, members have applauded President Félix Tshisekedi’s efforts to improve relations with MONUSCO and the UN.

When the time comes to renew MONUSCO’s mandate in December, however, differences may once again surface. Some members are ready to begin the process of drawing down MONUSCO. Others, including those in the region, are urging caution and want to determine how to move forward based on the situation on the ground. In the meeting in which MONUSCO was renewed on 29 March, South Africa, which has played a significant role on this file, noted the recent peaceful elections and transfer of power in the DRC while also underlining the destabilising security situation in the east. South Africa expressly highlighted the “vital role” of MONUSCO.

France is the penholder on the DRC, and Kuwait chairs the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee.
International Criminal Tribunals

Expected Council Action
In July, the Security Council expects to hold its semi-annual debate on the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT), which was established in 2010 to carry out the remaining essential functions of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) after their respective closures. The IRMCT’s president, Judge Carmel Agius, who assumed the presidency on 19 January, is expected to brief during the debate and to meet with the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals prior to this. The IRMCT’s prosecutor, Serge Brammertz, may also brief the Council. No outcome is expected.

The mandate of the IRMCT expires on 30 June 2020.

Key Recent Developments
The IRMCT, with branches in The Hague and Arusha, Tanzania, focuses on the completion of trials and appeals from the ICTY, which closed in December 2017, and the ICTR, which closed in December 2015; locating and arresting the eight remaining fugitives indicted by the ICTR; and assisting national jurisdictions in handling requests related to prosecuting international crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. It was established in 2010 by resolution 1966, which says that “the Mechanism shall continue the jurisdiction, rights and obligations and essential functions of the ICTY and the ICTR”, and that it “should be a small, temporary and efficient structure, whose functions and size will diminish over time, with a small number of staff commensurate with its reduced functions”.

According to resolution 1966, the IRMCT was mandated to operate for an initial period of four years and for subsequent periods of two years thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise. The Council most recently extended the IRMCT’s operating period in resolution 2422, adopted on 27 June 2018, extending Brammertz’s term until 30 June 2020, with 14 votes in favour and Russia abstaining. The resolution requested the IRMCT to continue to take steps to enhance efficiency and effective and transparent management, including “more focused projections of completion timelines and disciplined adherence thereto”; “enhancement of the geographic diversity and gender balance of staff, while ensuring continued professional expertise”; and “further reduction of costs, including through, but not limited to, flexible staff engagement”. It requested that the IRMCT update the Council in its semi-annual reports on progress achieved in implementing the resolution.

Although the semi-annual debate is typically held in June, Peru, as chair of the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals, requested that it be held during its presidency in July. Peru intends to hold the debate on 17 July, World Day for International Justice. Council members received the assessment reports of the president and the prosecutor on 20 May. According to the president, the reporting period was a particularly busy and significant one, including the conclusion of the appeal proceedings in the case of Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić on 20 March. The appeal proceedings in the case of Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić remain ongoing. The assessment also details several challenges faced by the IRMCT as a result of budgetary reductions approved by the General Assembly in July 2018, including reductions in staffing, non-post resources, and other aspects of the IRMCT’s operations.

According to the prosecutor’s assessment, the Office of the Prosecutor continued to focus on its three priorities: the expeditious completion of trials and appeals, locating and arresting the eight remaining fugitives, and assisting national jurisdictions prosecuting international crimes committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. During the reporting period, the Office of the Prosecutor worked on one case at the pretrial stage, one trial, and two appeals proceedings. Regarding the eight fugitives, the assessment expressed deep regret at the lack of cooperation from South African authorities, stating that the “tracking efforts of the Office of the Prosecutor have been directly and negatively affected, preventing results from being achieved”. According to the assessment, the Office of the Prosecutor submitted an urgent request for assistance to South Africa on 16 August 2018 on the basis of a confirmation provided by the INTERPOL National Central Bureau for South Africa. However, no response was received to that request, nor to a second urgent request for assistance on 15 March.

The last semi-annual debate on the IRMCT was held on 11 December 2018, with briefings by then-President of the IRMCT, Judge Theodor Meron, and Brammertz.

Key Issues and Options
A key issue is for members to continue monitoring the work of the IRMCT and the implementation of its mandate, including the areas specified in resolution 2422.

Council Dynamics
With the exception of Russia, all other Council members generally assess positively the IRMCT and the progress it has made. Russia, which had also been consistently critical of the ICTY, said in its statement at the briefing on 11 December 2018 that the IRMCT is “increasingly reminiscent of the ICTY in the worst periods of its existence” and criticised the selection of judges in the Karadžić and Mladić appeal cases. Russia has also repeatedly emphasised the temporary nature of the IRMCT and called for increased efficiency and transparency.

Peru is the chair of the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals.
Youth, Peace and Security

Expected Council Action
In July, the Security Council expects a briefing on the implementation of the youth, peace and security agenda. Jayathma Wickramanayake, the Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth, is likely to brief the Council.

Key Recent Developments
The Council first addressed the issue of youth, peace and security at the initiative of Jordan during the country’s April 2015 presidency when it organised an open debate on the “role of youth in countering violent extremism and promoting peace”. On 9 December that year the Council adopted resolution 2250 that mandated a progress study on youth, peace and security. The study in turn served as the basis for the second resolution on the issue, resolution 2419, adopted unanimously on 6 June 2018. This adoption was also preceded by an open debate, convened during the first Peruvian Council presidency in April 2018. Peru and Sweden were the co-penholders for resolution 2419. It recognised the role youth can play in conflict prevention and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on the implementation of both resolutions no later than May 2020. While the resolution, like its 2015 predecessor, was adopted unanimously, negotiations appeared to have been difficult, with members divided on the usefulness of having youth, peace and security on the Council’s agenda.

Key Issues and Options
An option for briefers and Council members may be to focus their statements on the implementation of resolutions 2250 and 2419. Issues that could be addressed include whether the Council has considered youth perspectives during its visiting missions, whether the Peacebuilding Commission has included engagement with youth in its efforts, whether the Secretary-General and his Special Envoys have facilitated the inclusion of youth at decision-making levels, and whether the Secretary-General has included information on youth, peace and security in his reporting to the Council. Ahead of the elaboration of the 2020 Secretary-General’s report, members could speak about ways they implement the agenda and how young peacebuilders can be protected, as well as what partnerships with them could be formed.

Resolution 2419 expressed the Council’s intention to invite youth representatives to brief during meetings. Accordingly, in addition to the Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth, such a brief from civil society might be appropriate.

Council Dynamics
Council members have differing views on youth, peace and security as an area of Council focus. During the negotiations on resolution 2419, it seemed that mainly China and Russia argued that the matter should be dealt with by other parts of the UN system, saying that it is not directly relevant to the agenda of the Council. At the other end of the spectrum, it seemed that other members would have preferred even stronger language about the positive role youth can play on peace and security matters.

Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace

Expected Council Action
During its July presidency, Peru is planning a briefing on strengthening partnerships for nationally owned transitions. Peru’s Foreign Minister Néstor Popolizio is expected to chair the session, which will include briefings by the Secretary-General and the chair of Peacebuilding Commission, Ambassador Guillermo Fernández de Soto Valderrama (Colombia). Representatives of the World Bank and African Development Bank may also brief.

Background and Recent Developments
The Security Council and the UN system overall have increased the priority they place on the management of transitions during the drawdown and subsequent closure of UN peace operations and their evolution toward non-mission settings.

The report of the independent Advisory Group of Experts, prepared for the ten-year review of the UN peacebuilding architecture in 2015, said that the UN system needed to pay more attention to transitions, which are “frequently poorly timed and poorly managed”. It flagged that the drawdown of a peace operation usually comes with visibly diminished political attention and a rapid drop-off in financing to continue UN engagement through a country team.

The General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on the review reflected these concerns. The Council expressed its intention regularly to request and consider the advice of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) during the drawdown of peacekeeping operations and special political missions, and both resolutions recognised the importance of adequately resourcing the peacebuilding components of relevant peace operations, including during mission transitions and drawdowns.

When the Council renewed the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) for a final 15-month period in December 2016, it requested, for the first time, the Secretary-General to prepare a “peacebuilding plan” for Liberia. The UN sought to consult with the government and other relevant partners in developing the plan, which divided responsibility for supporting Liberia after UNMIL’s departure among the UN country team, the
Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace

UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel, the Economic Community of West African States, and the World Bank. The plan then proved useful in identifying capacity and financial gaps once the mission left and has guided the PBC’s continued support.

Transitions for mission drawdowns have more recently gotten underway in Sudan, Haiti and Guinea-Bissau. The AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) has been preparing to exit by June 2020, although it is possible that the deadline will be extended. According to the Secretary-General’s 30 May report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace, UNAMID and the country team have been working with the government on transition priorities, and, in a novel approach, $15 million from the mission’s assessed budget has been made available for the transfer of activities to the UN country team. In Haiti, transition planning has been ongoing since the preparation of the benchmarked exit strategy for the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti in early 2018, which is expected to be followed by the establishment of a special political mission and a strengthened country team, according to the report. In February, the Council endorsed the Secretary-General’s recommendations for the “prospective” completion of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Operation in Guinea-Bissau by the end of 2020.

At a broader policy level, the Secretary-General’s Action for Peacekeeping Initiative and the endorsement by 151-member states and four organisations of a Declaration of Shared Commitments on Peacekeeping Operations last year highlighted the importance of the PBC, partnerships and coherent and forward-looking support for UN mission transitions.

The Secretary-General’s 30 May report further describes UN system activities and reforms linked to improving transitions and enhancing the coherence of international peacebuilding efforts. These include a joint project between the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Department of Peace Operations to provide transition-related support to the following six priority countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Mali and Sudan. UN development system reforms have sought to strengthen the UN resident coordinator offices, which are responsible for coordinating country teams, including their conflict analysis and management capacities. In February, the Secretary-General issued a new planning directive on transition processes to support early joint planning and to ensure financing, operational assistance and adequate staffing.

On financing, the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) established a transitions window in 2018 to alleviate the impact of the often sharp decline in available funding to continue peacebuilding activities after the closure of a UN mission by covering two years before and five years after a mission drawdown. The aim is for the PBF to invest at least 40 percent of its funding (which totalled over $183 million in approved projects in 2018) in transition settings.

The Secretary-General’s report encouraged member states to consider voluntarily committing the equivalent of 15 percent of the final full-year budget of the closing peacekeeping mission for each of the first two years following the end of the mission’s mandate. The money would be used for existing peacebuilding projects or to create a country-level pooled fund. The proposal was one of the options for increasing financing for peacebuilding that the Secretary-General provided in a January 2018 report.

Further examples of the Council’s increased focus on transitions include a 14 February round-table discussion in Abidjan, during which Council members discussed with the resident coordinators of Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia best practices and current challenges in those countries’ ongoing transitions following the withdrawal of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire in 2017 and UNMIL in 2018. The subject also featured prominently at a 24 May Arria-formula meeting on “the impact of peacekeeping on peacebuilding and sustaining peace”.

Key Issues

A key issue for the session is how to strengthen partnerships with host governments and regional and international financial organisations during transitions, especially considering the new wave of anticipated mission departures in Darfur, Guinea-Bissau and Haiti. Related to this is the challenge of resource mobilisation for transitions and peacebuilding. Another important issue is to identify actions that the Council should consider when planning transitions from peace operations to a non-mission setting. No Council product is planned.

Council and Wider Dynamics

The concept of sustaining peace, which emerged from the 2015 peacebuilding architecture review, has generated scepticism among some member states that are wary of it leading to interference in matters of state sovereignty. However, there is consensus about the need for the Council and the UN to improve its management of transitions as well as increased interest among Council members, including the P5, to see how the PBC can provide support in such settings. The PBC is often spotlighted for its convening role and its mandate to improve the coherence of peacebuilding activities by bringing together representatives of the UN system, host governments, regional organisations, international financial organisations, and civil society.

Lebanon (1701)

Expected Council Action

In July, the Council expects to receive the Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of resolution 1701, which called for a cessation of hostilities between the Shi’a militant group Hezbollah and Israel in 2006. Briefings are expected from Ján Kubiš, Special Coordinator for Lebanon, and possibly a representative of the Department of...
Peace Operations.

The mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) expires on 31 August.

**Key Recent Developments**

Six months after it was formed, the new Lebanese government led by Prime Minister Saad Hariri continues to face a wide range of challenges. In 2018, the Lebanese economy grew by a meagre 0.2 percent, while government debt stood at 150 percent of gross domestic product. Upon taking office, Hariri signalled that financial sector reforms would be one of the main priorities of the new government. Lebanon is under pressure from the International Monetary Fund to conduct reforms, which are also a condition for its access to the more than $11 billion pledged at the 2018 Paris donor conference which focused on infrastructure investments and economic development.

In May, the government agreed on a draft budget that would decrease public spending and increase taxes. In a 27 May press statement, Kubiš welcomed the draft budget and said that its adoption would create an opportunity to reduce the country’s deficit to promote further reforms. Fearing the loss of some of their benefits, public sector employees, including the armed forces, have criticised the proposed spending cuts. They have also organised strikes and protests throughout Lebanon. At press time, the parliament had yet to approve the draft budget.

Thousands of Syrian refugees have returned from Lebanon to Syria as hostilities have subsided and the government has regained control of most of the territory. Nonetheless, Lebanon still carries the burden of hosting more than a million Syrian refugees. Over the past year, the Lebanese leadership has become more adamant in calling for further refugee repatriation to Syria. Recently, some human rights organisations have criticised the Lebanese government for instigating the involuntary return of refugees to Syria. Lebanese authorities have denied these allegations.

Earlier this year, Israeli authorities said they had uncovered six tunnels crossing the border between Israel and Lebanon, which they allege were built by Hezbollah. In his March report on the implementation of resolution 1701, the Secretary-General said that UNIFIL verified the existence of five tunnels and that three of them cross the Blue Line, a border demarcation between Israel and Lebanon. After a military operation lasting several months, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) declared in June that it had destroyed all tunnels.

UNIFIL head and force commander Major General Stefano Del Col chaired a trilateral meeting on 11 June with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the IDF to discuss the situation along the Blue Line and issues related to the implementation of resolution 1701. Despite heightened tensions in the region, Del Col said that the UNIFIL area of operations has remained generally stable.

He urged all parties to ensure that stability is maintained.

Media reports over the past weeks suggest that Israel and Lebanon have agreed in principle to start negotiations on the demarcation of their maritime border. While this is a long-standing dispute, the US has recently become increasingly active in efforts to mediate a resolution. Acting US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Satterfield has engaged in shuttle diplomacy between Israel and Lebanon to outline the parameters for eventual talks. There are still questions over the role of UNIFIL in this process and a timeframe for the negotiations. The Lebanese side seems to prefer open-ended negotiations and involvement of UNIFIL, while the Israeli side favours a defined timeframe for the talks and mediation by the US. The maritime border has become a more prominent issue in recent years after the discovery of hydrocarbon resources.

**Key Issues and Options**

Despite the volatile security environment in the region, the situation in UNIFIL’s area of operations has remained relatively calm. The Council is concerned about the lack of progress in implementing the main objectives of resolution 1701, however, including a permanent ceasefire and disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon.

A principal problem for the Council is that Hezbollah and other non-state actors still maintain significant amounts of weaponry. This inhibits the government’s ability to exercise full authority over its territory, poses a threat to Lebanon’s sovereignty and stability, and contravenes its obligations under resolutions 1559 and 1701. A related issue is Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian civil war and the movement of arms from Syria to Hezbollah.

The Council will continue to monitor developments related to the US-mediated talks between Israel and Lebanon on maritime border demarcation. An issue for the Council is to consider whether the mission could play a role in this process.

**Council Dynamics**

The Council is united in its support for Lebanon’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security. The Council has also continued to emphasise that the LAF should play a critical role in addressing security challenges in the country.

Council members’ positions diverge on the security dynamics in the region and the role of the mission. The US has indicated that the mission should play a more active role in confronting the threats it considers as the most serious in this context: those posed by Iran, Hezbollah and the proliferation of weapons in southern Lebanon. On the political front, the US has raised concerns about Hezbollah’s growing role in the new Lebanese government.

On the mission’s configuration, the US has strongly advocated for a reduction of UNIFIL’s Maritime Task Force, leading towards its eventual termination. During the 2018 negotiations on the draft UNIFIL resolution, Russia emphasised that no changes should be made to the mandate of the mission. Most other members, including France, the penholder, also support the view that the mission’s tasks and mandate should not change and that the mission contributes to the stability in the region. These members are cautious about drastic changes in the mission’s mandate because of their potential impact on the fragile calm that has been maintained in southern Lebanon for over a decade.

France is the penholder on Lebanon.
Haiti

Expected Council Action
In July, the Security Council is expected to hold consultations to discuss the transition of the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) to a special political mission that will start on 16 October. It will also be briefed on the Secretary-General’s 90-day report which is due on 11 July. The mandate of MINUJUSTH expires on 15 October.

Key Recent Developments
Tensions have been rising in Haiti in recent weeks, once again in response to the ongoing PetroCaribe scandal involving oil from Venezuela. Money saved from deferred payments for oil—reportedly some $4 billion—was supposed to be used on social programmes and infrastructure improvements in Haiti, but recent investigations show that it was embezzled. Protests have been occurring off and on for months, and the most recent outbreak of protests that began in June occurred after another investigation into the scandal specifically cited the involvement of President Jovenel Moïse, which he has denied in the past. The protesters called for Moïse to resign. On 10 June, Pétion Rospide, a radio journalist, was shot and killed after reporting on anti-corruption protests; Moïse called it a “heinous act”. Journalists have also been attacked recently. According to police reports, two people were killed and five were injured in the most recent riots.

The economic situation in Haiti remains difficult, keeping tensions high. In a briefing by Stephane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General, on 20 June it was reported that there are twice as many food insecure people in Haiti in 2019 as in 2018: an estimated 2.6 million people. He attributed this to the “significant deterioration of the economic situation” and “a reduction of agricultural production brought about by two dry spells”. Additionally, ahead of hurricane season, it was noted that more resources are needed to prepare Haiti. As for the 2019 humanitarian response plan for Haiti, around $126 million is required. It stands currently at 11 percent funded.

The Secretary-General submitted additional operational details of the proposed special political mission (SPM), including objectives, structure and size, in a 13 May letter to the president of the Council.

The US, as penholder, began negotiations on a text for the SPM in mid-June. The resolution was adopted on 25 June by 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and the Dominican Republic). The text incorporated most of the Secretary-General’s recommendations and established the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) for an initial period of 12 months. It is to be headed by a special representative at the Assistant Secretary-General level who will “play a good offices, advisory, and advocacy role at the political level”. BINUH’s mandate will include advising the government on issues related to promoting and strengthening political stability and good governance, the rule of law, an inclusive inter-Haitian national dialogue, and protecting and promoting human rights. It will also assist the government in planning and conducting free, fair and transparent elections. The resolution changes the reporting period from 90 to every 120 days. It also requests that the Secretary-General provide strategic benchmarks for achieving the tasks given to the SPM.

The draft resolution was one of the subjects of discussion with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Dominican Republic during a 21-23 June Council trip to the Dominican Republic.

Key Issues and Options
The key issue for the Council will be to watch closely the situation on the ground and monitor how it aligns with the benchmarks for the withdrawal of MINUJUSTH.

If warranted by the situation, the Council could adopt a statement signalling its concern, as it did in July 2018 when it issued a press statement condemning ongoing violence and called on all parties to exercise restraint.

Council Dynamics
Members remain apprehensive about the situation on the ground, especially given the timing of the planned UN withdrawal in October which may coincide with Haiti’s possible elections. During the adoption of a MINUJUSTH resolution in April, some members expressed concern that the withdrawal process was being rushed. Some were worried about increased criminality in the country and deteriorating economic conditions, along with the continued protests.

The Dominican Republic expressed its concern that MINUJUSTH’s withdrawal could coincide with Haiti’s scheduled elections and potential instability. Peru said that any exit strategy must consider the security conditions on the ground and the ability of Haiti to ensure security throughout its territory. These worries were echoed during negotiations on the resolution for the SPM. Several members of the Council responded to the penholder’s first draft by suggesting additional language on corruption, rule of law, gender, an inclusive national dialogue, and recognising Haiti’s vulnerability to climate change and natural disasters. A group of like-minded Council members—Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Germany, Peru and Poland—submitted several edits jointly on these issues. While ultimately successful with most of their language, the US, supported by China and Russia, disagreed with any explicit reference to climate change. Instead, the text recognises “the adverse effects of natural disasters on the stability of Haiti, including earthquakes, hurricanes, and other weather phenomena and their impact on land degradation and food insecurity” and calls for adequate response capabilities. In their explanation of the vote on 25 June, France and Germany expressed regret that the resolution did not refer explicitly to climate change.

Speaking after the vote, China explained that it abstained because it felt that the final draft did not adequately reflect the amendments China proposed during the negotiations. It stressed, nevertheless, that China would support BINUH. The Dominican Republic said it had wanted to see a more robust, multidimensional mandate especially since it believes that Haiti is experiencing deepening economic and social instability. It abstained because it felt that the BINUH mandate did not go far enough.

The US is the penholder on Haiti.
Middle East (Israel/Palestine)

Expected Council Action
In July, the Security Council is expected to hold its quarterly open debate on the Middle East, focusing on Israel/Palestine. Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Nickolay Mladenov is likely to brief. There may also be a briefing from civil society.

Key Recent Developments
The Council discussed the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question, during its regular monthly meetings in May and June. During this period there was also an Arria-formula meeting entitled “Israeli Settlements and Settlers: Core of the Occupation, Protection Crisis and Obstruction of Peace” held on 9 May to discuss Israel’s construction of settlements. Indonesia, Kuwait, and South Africa co-sponsored the meeting.

A US-led “Peace for Prosperity” workshop was held in Bahrain on 25-26 June. It was intended to unveil the economic portion of the American peace plan for Israel-Palestine by raising tens of billions of dollars in pledges from the international community to help the Palestinian economy. The political question was not on the agenda. Many countries in the region sent delegations to the conference: Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia (Finance Minister Mohammed al-Jadaan), and United Arab Emirates. China, Russia, and the EU were also represented. From the UN, deputy Middle East envoy Jamie McGoldrick was present. Additional guests included Christine Lagarde of the International Monetary Fund and former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. There was no official Palestinian delegation; however: they refused to take part, angered by US President Donald Trump’s recent actions, including ending aid to the Palestinian Authority, closing the Palestine Liberation Organisation’s office in Washington, eliminating financial support to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and endorsing Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights. On the day of the conference, there were protests across the West Bank and a general strike in Gaza. Israel, too, had no official government representation: according to the US, since the Palestinian Authority did not attend, Israeli officials did not do so either.

On 23 June, two days before the Bahrain “Peace to Prosperity” conference, the US posted portions of the economic plan on the White House website. The website says that “with the potential to facilitate more than $50 billion in new investment over ten years, Peace to Prosperity represents the most ambitious and comprehensive international effort for the Palestinian people to date”. It continues by highlighting that “Peace to Prosperity will establish a new foundation for the Palestinian economy, generating rapid economic growth and job creation”. It seems that the main pillars of the economic plan are opening the West Bank and Gaza, constructing essential infrastructure, promoting private sector growth, and strengthening regional development and integration. This will reportedly involve the creation of a $50 billion global investment fund. At the conference, White House Senior Advisor Jared Kushner gave opening remarks, calling the Peace to Prosperity plan a “modern framework” for Palestinian development. He reminded participants that the goal of the workshop is not to discuss political issues, saying “we will get to those at the right time.” He did not indicate when that time would be.

In response to the conference, one of Saudi Arabia’s representative said that “there is hope of peace” with the inclusion of the private sector. Bahrain’s foreign minister Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa called the conference “an opportunity not to be missed”. He reiterated Bahrain’s support for a two-state solution. Meanwhile, Oman, while not in attendance, announced that it will be opening an embassy in Ramallah, West Bank.

UNRWA held a donor conference in New York on 25 June. Secretary-General António Guterres attended and President of the General Assembly Maria Fernanda Espinosa Garcés presided. Ahead of the conference, Pierre Krähenbühl, Commissioner-General of UNRWA, stated at a meeting in New York that UNRWA remains a crucial contributor to regional stability. He thanked member states for their significant contributions in 2018, when UNRWA “was confronted with its most severe funding crisis ever.” Krähenbühl noted that UNRWA itself took measures to reduce expenditure by $92 million. However, as of 22 May, UNRWA had funding to run operations only until mid-June. Further donations would be crucial to continue supplying food and reopening schools in August. Overall for 2019 UNRWA requires $1.2 billion for all operations, and ahead of the conference Krähenbühl called for those who assisted in 2018 to donate again.

At the conference, those in attendance heard from two Palestine student parliamentarians who stressed the critical role UNRWA schools play in their lives. Afterwards, close to 40 member states took the floor to announce their donations and support for UNRWA’s continued existence. For example, the EU announced an additional contribution of 21 million euros, bringing their total contribution to 107 million euros in 2019. China also said it would increase its assistance to UNRWA in 2019. Others reiterated that they will stand by their 2019 commitments. Krähenbühl welcomed all the statements of support to UNRWA and reported that announcements of support during and in the run-up to the conference totalled just over $110 million, which he described as a step towards avoiding a summer funding crisis. He urged early disbursement of the funds. When asked, Krähenbühl said that there was no competition between the UNRWA and Bahrain conferences and that he is not worried that the Bahrain conference will impede UNRWA’s ability to raise the necessary funds.

Israel will hold its second election in less than six months on 17 September, due to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s inability to form a governing coalition. This may be cited as a reason for further delay in the presentation of the political part of the US peace plan for Israel-Palestine.

At the Council’s June meeting on the issue, Mladenov gave his tenth report on the implementation of resolution 2334, which called on Israel to end its settlement activity, which constitutes a “flagrant violation under international law”. It was an oral presentation only, which remains a contentious issue for member states. Mladenov shared his fears about the fiscal viability of the Palestinian Authority under the continued withholding of tax revenue by Israel, as well
as UNRWA’s severe financial problems. If these financial problems are not resolved, 25 years of international assistance to the Palestinians could be undone, he said. He noted serious movement and access constraints in Gaza on the staff of UN agencies and NGOs. Hundreds have been prohibited from obtaining travel documents, which is a marked escalation from 2017 when 40 individuals faced such restrictions.

On settlements, Mladenov said that Israel had taken no steps to comply with resolution 2334 in the reporting period. Instead, the largest settlement advancement in two years has taken place. Demolitions and seizures of Palestinian property also continued: according to his report, 92 Palestinian-owned structures were recently demolished or seized. The 58 such cases in April was, according to Mladenov, the highest monthly number since OCHA started monitoring in 2009.

In his conclusion, Mladenov noted in connection with the Bahrain workshop that humanitarian and economic support are crucial to creating the environment for negotiations. He said that no amount of humanitarian or economic support will resolve the conflict: these can only be complementary to a legitimate political process in line with UN and other international frameworks. In that vein, he remained deeply concerned about the weakening of international consensus and efforts on this issue.

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 20 June, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian Territory occupied since 1967 in a press release that “statements by senior Israeli political leaders and US diplomats in support of the annexation of parts or all of the occupied West Bank by Israel fly in the face of the absolute prohibition against the annexation of occupied territories”. He added that “annexation and territorial conquest are forbidden by the Charter of the United Nations…[and] the Security Council, beginning with resolution 242 in November 1967, has expressly affirmed the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war or force on eight occasions, most recently in 2016”. He also warned that “[i]f annexation proceeds, the chances for a genuine and just peace in the foreseeable future will have gone from implausible to unimaginable”.

Key Issues and Options
The Council has been in a holding pattern while awaiting the details of US President Donald Trump’s peace plan. Long-held positions continue to be voiced, which for many members include calls to lift the blockade on Gaza, concern about the humanitarian situation there, and the desire to see progress on intra-Palestinian reconciliation process steered by Egypt. Recently, the financial struggles of UNRWA have been a topic of discussion at the Council. During the Council’s 22 May meeting, Jason Greenblatt, co-architect of the Trump peace plan and special representative for international negotiations who represented the US at the meeting, responded to the briefing by UNRWA’s Secretary-General by strongly suggesting that it was time to close UNRWA. The US believes that UNRWA’s operations have failed the Palestinians. This was a clear red line for other members, who expressed their support for UNRWA’s actions and existence in their statements. UNRWA is expected to be a continued topic of divergence for the Council.

It seems unlikely that any outcome will be forthcoming from the open debate. Russia, Kuwait, and others have suggested a Council mission to the region, but nothing concrete has been explored. Such a proposal is expected to face heavy resistance from the US.

Council and Wider Dynamics
The quarterly open debates always highlight the stark differences between the US and the other UN member states on this file, which continue to cause tension. It is expected that in July, many speeches will focus on the outcomes of the Bahrain and UNRWA conferences. Many Council members are likely to bring up the need to continue on the path toward a two-state solution in line with international frameworks. Some may criticise the US approach to pursuing an economic plan before a political one; some have already commented that the order should be reversed.

At the Council’s June meeting ahead of the Bahrain and UNRWA conferences, the US representative urged member states to keep an open mind about upcoming proposals. He said that a full plan would address all final status issues, but that Bahrain would be an important opportunity to share ideas, discuss strategies, and galvanise support for economic initiatives to develop human capital. However, many members indicated that economic policies alone would not bring peace. France said it would be dangerous to see the current stalemate as the time to move away from international parameters to a unilateral solution, adding that such actions are doomed to failure.

UNOWAS (West Africa)

Expected Council Action
In July, Mohammed Ibn Chambas, Special Representative and head of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), will brief the Council on developments in the region and the semi-annual UNOWAS report.

Key Recent Developments
The security situation deteriorated further in the Sahel, with spillover effects on neighbouring non-Sahel countries, including Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo. An insurgency by extremist groups in central Mali has led to worsening intercommunal violence. On 23 March, at least 160 Fulani civilians were killed in the village of Ogosagou, reportedly by armed elements of the Dogon ethnic group. At least 95 people were killed in a Fulani raid on a Dogon village the evening of 9 June.

Since the start of the year, attacks by extremist groups in Burkina Faso have spread rapidly throughout the country and have increased ethnic tensions. On 31 March, armed attackers raided the town of Arbinda in the north, killing a religious leader and six members of his family. That triggered
inter-communal clashes that claimed more than 60 lives. Starting in April, insurgents began a series of attacks on churches in what appeared to be a bid to foment inter-religious violence. The developments have caused an unprecedented humanitarian emergency in Burkina Faso. According to OCHA, 170,000 people had been displaced by 6 June, a three-fold increase since the start of the year.

Following the 1 May kidnapping of two French tourists in northern Benin, French forces conducted a raid on 10 May in northern Burkina Faso, freeing the French nationals, an American and a South Korean. Two French commandos were killed during the operation.

On 14 May, militants killed 28 Nigerien soldiers during an ambush near Tongo Tongo, Niger, which has also been plagued by the presence of extremist groups. The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) claimed responsibility.

Efforts continued to stand up the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (FC-G5S, made up of units from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger), but as discussed during a 16 May Council briefing, the force faces persistent challenges that prevent it from becoming fully operational. Renewing the mandate of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on 28 June, the Council authorised the expansion of MINUSMA life consumables support, such as food and fuel, to all contingents operating in the framework of the FC-G5S, and not just those in Malian territory, on the condition that the joint force or other partners deliver this assistance.

Chambas led a UN inter-agency review on the situation in Burkina Faso, resulting in a decision by the Secretary-General’s Executive Committee in late March to reinforce the office of the UN Resident Coordinator and increase the reach of UN agencies, funds and programmes throughout the country to address the humanitarian crisis, promote inter-community dialogue and advance security sector reform. Council members met with Chambas and the UN resident coordinator in Burkina Faso, Metsi Makhetha, who along with representatives of the UN Country Team shared their assessment of the fragility of the situation while in Ouagadougou on 24 March during a Council visiting mission to Mali and Burkina Faso. Following a briefing on the FC-G5S, a 16 May Council press statement encouraged the Secretary-General swiftly to pursue the current assessment process aimed at adapting UN support in Burkina Faso to the evolving needs of the population.

In the Lake Chad basin region, the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) continued to inflict heavy casualties on the Nigerian military. ISWAP splintered from Boko Haram in 2016, adapting its tactics and policies to reduce civilian casualties and increase attacks on military targets. On 16 June, a triple suicide bombing in Konduga, Nigeria, most likely carried out by a Boko Haram faction led by long-standing leader Abubakar Shekau, killed at least 30 civilians. Council members condemned the attack in a press statement. Boko Haram/ISWAP attacks further escalated in the Diffa region of Niger and the Lac region of Chad. There have been reports that links between ISWAP and armed groups in the broader Sahel may be increasing.

The violence in the Lake Chad basin displaced tens of thousands of people during the first half of 2019. In total, 2.5 million people are displaced due to the ten-year running Boko Haram insurgency. The UN’s 2019 humanitarian response plan seeks $1.3 billion for the four affected countries, including Cameroon. By May, donor funds received totalled 18 percent of that amount.

**Women, Peace and Security**
The 28 December 2018 Secretary-General’s report on UNOWAS calls “the continued under-representation of women in senior government positions in West Africa and the Sahel” a “matter of concern”. The Secretary-General goes on to urge governments to “redouble their efforts to implement existing measures or, in their absence, to adopt new ones” in order to “enhance the empowerment and political inclusion of women in decision-making and leadership roles”. On the systematic violation of women’s rights by terrorist groups in the region, the report lists violations such as sexual violence, abduction, corporal punishment, arbitrary detention, and restriction of movement. On 17 May, UNOWAS, in cooperation with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and other partners, organised a “Training of Trainers” workshop designed to provide participants with the knowledge and skills to support female peacebuilders.

**Key Issues and Options**
The worsening security situation in West Africa and the Sahel, especially Burkina Faso, and the growing risk of spillover into non-Sahel countries, are key issues. To complement security responses, an important issue is progress in implementing the UN’s Sahel Strategy and Support Plan for the Sahel, developed to address structural causes of instability such as underdevelopment, poor governance and climate change. In this regard, there is uncertainty over whether the UN will appoint a new Special Adviser to the Sahel to replace Ibrahim Thiaw. The post was established last year to support fund-raising and programmatic activities. If no successor is named, UNOWAS would again assume primary responsibility for the strategy.

In accordance with resolution 2349 from March 2017 on the Lake Chad Basin, which requested such updates during the briefings on UNOWAS, the Boko Haram insurgency and progress in addressing the humanitarian crisis and drivers of the conflict will be a key issue.

Chambas’ good offices activities around election-related tensions are usually a focus of the biannual update. This includes current tensions in Benin, where security forces have repressed protests since March after five opposition parties were banned from participating in the 28 April parliamentary elections. Chambas was closely involved in supporting Nigeria’s presidential and parliamentary elections held in February amid tensions.

Depending on the contents of the Secretary-General’s report and the discussion with Chambas, the Council might adopt a presidential statement that would, among other elements, express its support for the conflict prevention and good offices roles of UNOWAS while reiterating support for initiatives to address the threat of terrorism.

In light of continued Boko Haram-related violence, Council members could organise an informal interactive dialogue with representatives of Lake Chad Basin countries in order to be updated on the activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force (which comprises forces from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria to fight Boko Haram), discuss the region’s stabilisation strategy, and explore ways the Council and UN can provide more support.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**
Members view UNOWAS as playing a
UNOWAS (West Africa)

significant conflict-prevention role and have valued the good offices activities undertaken by Special Representative Chambas in addressing political crises and electoral tensions. As part of such efforts, Chambas frequently seeks close coordination with ECOWAS and the AU in UNOWAS messaging and actions.

Despite the worsening situation in Burkina Faso, the Council’s role appears limited to supporting initiatives related to the G5 Sahel joint force, while being kept updated on developments in Burkina Faso by UNOWAS.

The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) held a meeting on 16 May with Burkinabe Foreign Minister Alpha Barry on the situation, and the Council’s press statement issued later that day on the G5 Sahel joint force encouraged future such interactions between the PBC and Burkina Faso.

Côte d’Ivoire is the penholder on West Africa and the Sahel. The UK is the penholder on the Lake Chad Basin.

Cyprus

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) ahead of its 31 July expiry. Special Representative and head of mission Elizabeth Spehar is expected to brief on the latest UNFICYP report and recent developments. A representative from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs might also brief.

Key Recent Developments
The exploration for hydrocarbon resources off the coast of Cyprus continues to be a sensitive issue. In February, ExxonMobil announced the discovery of significant new natural gas reserves in those waters. In May, Turkey announced that it would start drilling for hydrocarbons in areas that the internationally recognised Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus considers its territorial waters. Turkey has maintained that it would protect the rights of Turkish Cypriots and that they should also benefit from the hydrocarbon resources. The EU, of which Cyprus is a member, called on Turkey to show restraint and respect the sovereign rights of Cyprus in its exclusive economic zone.

There have been no significant developments on the political front in the last months. Negotiations have remained at an impasse since summer 2017, when the most recent round of unification talks broke down in Crans-Montana, Switzerland. Despite the lack of progress on the political front, the Council has refrained from altering the mission’s mandate or its configuration.

A year ago, the Secretary-General appointed a consultant, former senior UN official Jane Holl Lute, to engage with the parties and seek their reflections on the negotiating process. In the latest report on his good offices issued in April, the Secretary-General said he would request Lute to continue discussions with the parties to obtain a better understanding of the extent of their convergence on core issues and the willingness of the sides to integrate new proposals. Prospects for a negotiated settlement exist, he said, noting that “the horizon of an endless process without results lay behind us”. He stressed that, before starting negotiations, the leaders should agree on terms of reference to represent a starting point for a negotiated solution.

The Council held closed consultations on 2 May to discuss the report and recent developments in Cyprus. Following the meeting, Council members issued press elements in which they welcomed the Secretary-General’s decision to ask Lute to continue her consultations. They emphasised the urgent need to work toward a political settlement and urged both sides to agree on terms of reference for result-orientated negotiations. Council members also stressed the need to avoid any actions that could jeopardise the chances of success and urged the implementation and further development of confidence-building measures.

Cypriot leaders held one meeting this year under UN auspices, on 26 February. The leaders agreed on further confidence-building measures, which the Council welcomed in a press statement issued a day later.

Key Issues and Options
A central issue for the Council remains the lack of tangible progress in unification talks and whether the Council should play any role in stimulating this process. Given the prolonged hiatus in the political process, an option for the Council is to consider changes to the mission’s mandate, including downsizing, and a possible exit strategy.

Although Lute has been engaged in consultations with the parties for almost one year, the Council has yet to receive substantial information on these discussions. Developments surrounding the political process are likely to play a major role in guiding the Council’s discussions during the mandate renewal negotiations. In this context, the Council could consider requesting a briefing by Lute on the prospects for a political settlement.

The Council will follow closely developments surrounding hydrocarbon resources in Cyprus’ coastal waters, given that they could also have an impact on the island’s political process.

Council Dynamics
Cyprus remains an issue of low intensity on the Council’s agenda. Among the members with a special interest in Cyprus that follow the issue closely are France, Russia, and the UK. The latter is also one of the guarantor powers under the 1960 treaty guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity, and security of Cyprus.

Cyprus

The 2011 discovery of hydrocarbon resources off the coast of Cyprus has brought increased attention to the island over the past several years. The US has become more engaged in finding a political solution to the Cyprus problem, given the island’s location and strategic importance in the fight against terrorism in the Middle East as well as the growing overall concerns about security in the eastern Mediterranean region.

The members of the Council are united in their support for a negotiated solution to the Cyprus issue. Members seem to diverge however, on the conditions and timeframe for reunification talks. With the protracted impasse in those talks, some members appear to share the view that this process cannot be open-ended and that the Council could apply pressure on the parties to revive the negotiations. On the other hand, Russia has strongly opposed any attempt to exert pressure on both sides and affect negotiations in any way, maintaining that the process must be Cypriot-led and Cypriot-owned in order to achieve lasting results.

During the negotiations on the mandate renewal in 2018 and 2019, the US appeared to advocate for a comprehensive strategic review of the mission and timed benchmarks for an exit strategy tied to the political process. These proposals were not included in any of the recent resolutions, however. Some members are still wary of initiating drastic changes to the mission’s mandate and size. In the absence of progress on the political front, it is likely that the US position will gain more support from other members who have so far been cautious about this issue. Russia is likely to oppose any changes to the status quo.

The UK is the penholder on Cyprus.