Overview

During its presidency in July, Sweden plans to hold a high-level open debate on children and armed conflict with Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven chairing and briefings by Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict Virginia Gamba; Executive director of UNICEF Henrietta Fore; and Yenny Londoño, a civil society representative from Colombia. A resolution is expected to be adopted. Sweden will also hold a debate on climate-related security risks.

There will be a briefing on the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin focused on women, peace and security by Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed and AU Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security Bineta Diop following their joint mission to the region.

The mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus will be renewed this month, ahead of which there will be a TCC meeting and consultations. The authorisation of the AU Mission in Somalia is also expected to be renewed.

An adoption is also scheduled on the South Sudan sanctions regime and the mandate of the South Sudan Sanctions Committee’s Panel of Experts. Ahead of this, the Council will receive a briefing in consultations on South Sudan sanctions.

The AU will be a focus this month with a briefing on the Secretary-General’s annual report on ways to strengthen the partnership between the UN and AU as well as the annual consultative meeting between members of the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council.

Other African issues that will be considered this month are:
• Democratic Republic of the Congo, an update on MONUSCO;
• Libya, an update on UNSMIL and the 1970 Sanctions Committee; and
• West Africa and the Sahel, on recent developments and the UNOWAS semi-annual report.

In July, the Council will receive the monthly briefings on political and humanitarian developments in Syria and on the use of chemical weapons. Also with regard to the Middle East, in addition to the quarterly open debate on Israel/Palestine, the Council will hear a briefing on Lebanon.

Other meetings that are expected in July include briefings on Myanmar and on the UN Verification Mission in Colombia.

In Hindsight: Competing Texts on Israel/Palestine

In recent months, the usual divisions in the Security Council on Israel/Palestine have been exacerbated, largely resulting from different interpretations of the violence that has occurred along the Gaza fence, where Palestinians began protesting against Israel on 30 March. Regarding these events, Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Nickolay Mladenov has said in his recent briefings to the Council that Israel must exercise restraint and use lethal force only as a last resort “under imminent threat of death or serious injury”, while Hamas must refrain from committing acts of violence and creating provocations (S/PV.8265 and S/PV.8256).

These tensions within the Council came to a head on 1 June, when competing draft resolutions, offering starkly contrasting views of the situation in Gaza and how to protect Palestinian civilians, failed to be adopted. The first, a Kuwaiti draft, was vetoed by the US; the second, a US draft, received only one positive vote—from the US itself.

Kuwait circulated a draft resolution on 17 May focused on the protection of Palestinian civilians. The draft was initiated shortly after more than 60 Palestinians lost their lives along the Gaza fence on 14 May, the same day the US held a public event to open its new embassy in Jerusalem. During the ensuing two weeks, Kuwait attempted to balance...
the language in its draft in order to garner as much support as possible while also striving to maintain the substance of the original draft. Some Council members felt that the initial draft needed to be more even-handed in its assessment of Israel’s responsibility for the violence in Gaza. As a result, many of the proposed amendments were designed to balance the text and soften criticism of Israel. A paragraph “condemning the use of force by the Israeli occupying forces” was replaced by one “condemning all acts of violence against civilians, including acts of terror, as well as all acts of provocation, incitement and destruction”. In another instance, language was added calling for “all actors to ensure that protests remain peaceful”. This complemented other language in the text reaffirming the right of peaceful assembly and protest.

On the morning of Thursday, 31 May, Kuwait put its draft in blue. The draft had three main elements. First, it called for the “dispatch of an international protection mission”, a non-starter for several members who were concerned about the potential use of force by such a mission, which would almost certainly not have the consent of Israel. Second, it called for “immediate steps towards ending the closure and the restrictions imposed by Israel on movement and access into and out of the Gaza Strip”. Third, the draft welcomed and urged further steps towards ending the closure and the restrictions imposed by Israel on movement and access into and out of the Gaza Strip”. In this regard, it asked for the Secretary-General to make recommendations regarding “an international protection mechanism” in the context of a report to be submitted to the Council within 60 days. This was a significant departure from the initial version, which had called for the “dispatch of an international protection mission”, a non-starter for several members who were concerned about the potential use of force by such a mission, which would almost certainly not have the consent of Israel. Second, it called for “immediate steps towards ending the closure and the restrictions imposed by Israel on movement and access into and out of the Gaza Strip”.

The vote, scheduled for Thursday at 6 p.m., was delayed until the following day after the US proposed late amendments to the Kuwaiti draft, already in blue. Kuwaiti Ambassador Mansour Al-Otaibi told the press that afternoon that Kuwait was “open and transparent” and would consider the late US amendments, which he had yet to see. The US proposed 31 amendments, although it characterised them as a single amendment. While the Kuwaiti draft did not mention Hamas by name, the US amendment(s) sought to focus responsibility for the violence in Gaza “on terrorist organizations such as Hamas”. The US asked for its amendment(s), which were clearly unacceptable to Kuwait, to be put into blue as an “amended text” to be voted on prior to the Kuwaiti draft.

Voting on amendments to a text is governed by Rule 33 of the provisional rules of procedure, which says that amendments “shall have precedence in the order named over all principal motions and draft resolutions”. Thus, according to this rule, the US amendment(s) would need to be voted on before the Kuwaiti draft. Votes on amendments are considered non-procedural matters, meaning that they require nine or more votes, without a veto, to be approved. What was unusual in this case was the large number of amendments proposed and the fact that the US was depicting them as one amendment, rather than as several amendments or a separate draft resolution.

Late in the morning on Friday, 1 June, the elected members met to receive an update from Kuwait on its interactions with the US the evening before and for a discussion of the US amendment(s). The conversation focused on possible scenarios for how members might consider the US proposal that afternoon: as one amendment, several amendments, or as a separate draft resolution. A number of elected members requested that Kuwait meet with the Council president, Russia, and the US prior to the Council meeting in the afternoon, given questions on how to proceed with the voting on the US and Kuwaiti texts. This meeting did not occur, apparently because of a US scheduling conflict. When Russian Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia presented the June programme of work to the media that afternoon, as Russia had just assumed the Council’s monthly presidency, he said that as Council president he would “uphold the rules and procedures of the Security Council.” Members gathered in the chamber for the vote at 3 p.m., but given some confusion on how to proceed, they eventually decided to hold consultations. In the consultations room, the US said that it wanted its amendments to be voted on as one single amendment, rather than individually as separate amendments. Russia and the UK noted that this could set an unfortunate precedent. In particular, putting forward multiple amendments as a single amendment and presenting as an amendment what was essentially a draft resolution could prove problematic in future.

In retrospect, some Council members have questioned why the US did not request a vote on its 31 amendments individually. As would soon become clear, the US document as a whole was not acceptable to the other 14 Council members. Nevertheless, it is possible that some of the individual amendments would have passed, which would have meant their incorporation into the Kuwaiti draft prior to it being voted on.

Instead, the Kuwaiti draft remained intact and was voted on as presented (S/2018/516). The US vetoed the text, which received ten affirmative votes and four abstentions (Ethiopia, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK).

The US cast the sole affirmative vote on its own draft resolution (S/2018/520); three members (Bolivia, Kuwait and Russia) voted against the draft while the remaining members abstained. This marked the first time since February 1961 that only one vote was cast in support of a draft resolution, which previously occurred on a Soviet draft on the Congo (S/4706).
Status Update since our June Forecast

Residual Mechanism
On 6 June, the Council held the semi-annual debate on the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT) at which its president, Judge Theodor Meron, and prosecutor, Serge Brammertz, briefed (S/PV.8278) on the IRMCT’s progress report (S/2018/347) and their respective assessments (S/2018/471). On 27 June, the Council adopted resolution 2422 extending Brammertz’s term until 30 June 2020 (S/PV.8295). The resolution welcomed the IRMCT’s progress report and the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (S/2018/206). It also requested the IRMCT to further enhance efficiency and effective and transparent management in five areas as set out in the resolution.

Ukraine
On 6 June, the Council adopted (S/PV.8276) a presidential statement on the situation in Ukraine (S/PRST/2018/12). This is the first formal Council outcome since 17 February 2015, when it adopted resolution 2202 endorsing the Minsk agreements. The statement expressed concern over the worsening security situation in eastern Ukraine and condemned continuous violations of the ceasefire, including the use of heavy weapons. It expressed support for the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission; called on all parties to facilitate its work; and emphasised the need for full compliance with resolution 2202. The Council also reaffirmed its full support for resolution 2166 on the downing of flight MH17.

Youth, Peace and Security
On 6 June, following the 23 April open debate on Youth, Peace and Security (S/PV.8241) the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2419, reaffirming the important role that youth and youth-led civil society can play in peacebuilding and sustaining peace (S/PV.8277). The Secretary-General is requested to submit a report on the implementation of resolution 2419 as well as the previous resolution 2250 no later than May 2020.

Guinea-Bissau
On 8 June, the 2048 Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Committee held informal consultations to discuss the sanctions regime. The chair of the Committee Ambassador Anatolio Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea) briefed on a mission to Guinea-Bissau and Guinea he was planning to undertake from 25 to 29 June.

Sudan (Darfur)
On 11 June, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix briefed the Council (S/PV.8283) on the special report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the Secretary-General on the strategic review of UNAMID (S/2018/530). With the security situation in Darfur remaining largely stable, the further proposed drawdown of UNAMID should be coupled with increased peacebuilding efforts focused on addressing the root causes of conflict, as set out in the special report, Lacroix said. On 13 June, Ambassador Joanna Wroncka (Poland) briefed the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee in her capacity as chair on her April visit to Sudan. The following day she provided the chair’s 90-day briefing to the Council (S/PV.8287). At press time, the Council was expected to adopt a resolution on 29 June providing for a technical rollover of UNAMID’s mandate until 13 July, to allow more time to consider possible changes to the mandate.

Yemen
The Council met on 11 June due to concerns over an impending Coalition attack on the Hodeidah. UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths briefed via VTC on efforts to negotiate a deal to forestall an offensive, while Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mark Lowcock briefed on the potential humanitarian consequences. Members issued a one-paragraph set of press elements, which “reiterated that only a negotiated political settlement can bring the war to an end”. On 14 June, after the start of the offensive, Griffiths briefed again in consultations via VTC. OCHA’s Ursula Mueller also briefed. Members issued press elements, expressing deep concern about the humanitarian situation and reiterated that Hodeidah and Saleef ports should remain open and called for the implementation of all Council resolutions, including resolution 2216. They urged all sides to uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law. On 18 June, Griffiths and Lowcock briefed in consultations as part of the Special Envoy’s regularly scheduled update. Speaking from Sana’a, Griffiths provided an update on his ongoing efforts to broker a deal to have Houthi rebels turn over Hodeidah port to UN control, indicating his belief that an agreement between the sides was possible. He also presented a framework to resume political negotiations, outlining the principles it would be based on. Council members issued press elements, noting that the Special Envoy’s efforts on Hodeidah remained ongoing and that they asked to be kept updated in real time. They further welcomed his briefing on his proposals to restart the political process.

UNOCA (Central Africa)
On 13 June, Special Representative for Central Africa and head of UNOCA Francois LounçénY Fall briefed the Council (S/PV.8284) on the latest UNOCA report (S/2018/521).

Maritime Crime
On 13 June, an Arria-formula meeting on maritime crime as a threat to international peace and security was convened by Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, the Netherlands, and the US, jointly with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The co-organisers made introductory statements, followed by presentations by four panelists: Sagala Ratnayake, Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister and Minister of Youth Affairs and Southern Development in Sri Lanka; Enrico Credendino, Commander of the EU Naval Force Mediterranean Operation Sophia; Hajara Yusuf, Public Prosecutor in the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Justice; and Alan Cole, head of the UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme. Council members, followed by some non-Security Council member states, made interventions following the opening presentations.

Mali
On 14 June, the Council was briefed on the situation in Mali by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix (S/PV.8288). Mali’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Tieman Hubert Coulibaly, participated in the meeting. The discussion was based on a 6 June Secretary-General’s report (S/2018/541), which was on recent developments in the country, the upcoming presidential elections,
and the renewal of the mandate of MINUSMA. On 28 June the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2423 renewing the mandate for one year (S/PV.8298).

**Iraq**

On 14 June, the Council voted unanimously to renew the mandate of UNAMI through resolution 2421 until 31 May 2019 (S/PV.8285). Set to expire on 31 July, UNAMI’s mandate was renewed for ten months in order to align it with the UN’s budget cycle. For the first time since UNAMI’s role was expanded in 2007, its mandate was changed and the text streamlined by cutting the preamble-ary portion from several pages to just three paragraphs. UNAMI’s role in advancing an inclusive political dialogue and reconciliation was prioritized. Language was added on UNAMI’s role in advising, supporting and assisting Iraq in facilitating regional dialogue and cooperation on issues of environment and water; promoting accountability; supporting the work of the investigative team; assisting Iraq and the UN Country Team in strengthening child protection; approaching gender as a cross-cutting issue; and assisting Iraq in ensuring the participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels. The resolution encourages all relevant UN actors to implement the recommendations of the independent external assessment of UNAMI, and requests that the Secretary-General report on the relevant actions taken in his quarterly reports.

**UNDOF (Golan Heights)**

On 14 June, Council members met in consultations with troop-contributing countries to UNDOF. On 19 June, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix briefed Council members in consultations on the latest report of the Secretary-General and the activities of UNDOF (S/2018/550). At press time, Council members were expected to adopt a resolution renewing UNDOF’s mandate on 29 June.

**Central African Republic**

On 11 June, Council members issued a press statement, condemning a 10 June attack against a MINUSCA patrol in Bambari, resulting in one Burundian peacekeeper killed and another injured (SC/13378). On 21 June, Special Representative for the CAR and head MINUSCA, Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, briefed the Council (S/PV.8291) on the latest MINUSCA report (S/2018/611). Special Representative of the AU to the CAR Bédializoun Moussa Nébié, and Brigadier General Hermínio Teodoro Maio, force commander of the EU Military Training Mission in the CAR also briefed, both by video teleconference. An informal interactive dialogue with Onanga-Anyanga and Nébié followed. The CAR Sanctions Committee held an informal meeting on 22 June, where representatives of the National Commission to Combat the Illicit Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Côte d’Ivoire, the UN Mine Action Service, and the UN Institute for Disarmament Research briefed on weapons and ammunition management.

**Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions**

On 21 June, the IWG held a formal meeting to continue to discuss a non-paper with proposals for further improvements to working methods, prepared by its chair, Ambassador Mansour Al-Otaibi (Kuwait). The IWG also started discussions on a Russian proposal regarding changes in the penholder system. Both documents will be discussed further during the next meeting, planned for late July. During the 21 June meeting, Hasmik Egian, the Director of the Security Council Affairs Division, updated members on the work being done to revamp the Council’s website.

**International Court of Justice**

On 22 June, the Council met independently from but concurrently with the General Assembly, to fill a vacancy following the resignation of Judge Hisashi Owada (Japan) as a member of the Court, effective on 7 June 2018 (S/PV.8292). The Council and the General Assembly elected the sole candidate Yuji Iwasawa (Japan), for a term beginning that day, until 5 February 2021.

**AFGHANISTAN**

On 26 June, the Council held its quarterly debate on UNAMA. Special Representative of the Secretary-General Tadamichi Yamamoto, Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime Yury Fedotov; and Under-Secretary-General of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism Vladimir Voronkov briefed (S/PV.8294). The Council issued press statements in relation to terrorist attacks (SC/13386) and the temporary ceasefire announced by the Afghan government and the three-day partial ceasefire announced by the Taliban (SC/13376 and SC/13385).

**Peacekeeping Operations**

On 26 June, the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations held a meeting on strategic force generation.

**Iran**

On 27 June, the Council held a semi-annual briefing on the implementation of resolution 2231 which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme (S/PV.8297). Briefers included Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo; Council’s 2231 facilitator, Ambassador Karel van Oosterom (the Netherlands); and the head of the EU delegation, Ambassador João Pedro Vale de Almeida. DiCarlo presented the latest Secretary-General’s report on implementation of resolution 2231 (S/2018/602). The report indicated that Iran has continued to comply with the JCPOA, but also that the US’s withdrawal from the agreement represents a setback. With an exception of the US, other signatories to the agreement have reiterated that they would continue to comply with it. Almeida in his briefing noted that preserving the JCPS is a key priority for the EU and the international community as a whole. He also briefed on the recent report of the Procurement Working Group (S/2018/601). Van Oosterom briefed on the fifth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (S/2018/624). At the meeting, the US restated its claims that Iran has violated the spirit of the agreement because of its involvement in the conflicts in the Middle East.

**UNRCCA (Central Asia)**

On 28 June, Special Representative and head of UNRCCA Natalia Gherman briefed Council members in consultations about the activities of the UNRCCA. At press time, Russia was expected to propose a press statement following the consultations.

**Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace**

At press time, the Council was expected to hold a briefing on peacebuilding and
sustaining peace on 29 June, with Ambassadors Ion Jinga (Romania) and Cho Tae-yul (Republic of Korea), the current and former chair, respectively, of the PBC, presenting its annual report (S/2018/83). Immediately following the briefing, the Council was to convene an informal interactive dialogue on the PBC’s advisory role to the Council.

**Mine Action**

At press time, the Council was expecting a briefing on 29 June by Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions Alexander Zuev on the report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/623) regarding the implementation of resolution 2365 on mine action.

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**Myanmar**

**Expected Council Action**

In July, Council members expect to hold consultations on Myanmar. Possible briefers include the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy to Myanmar, Christine Schraner Burgener, who was in Myanmar from 12 to 21 June, and High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi.

**Key Recent Developments**

Members of the Council visited Bangladesh and Myanmar from 28 April to 2 May. Following the visit, on 9 May, Council members agreed on a press statement that encouraged increased support to the Bangladesh government and urged access for UN agencies to Rakhine state and the conclusion of a tripartite memorandum of understanding (MOU) among UNHCR, the UNDP, and the Government of Myanmar. It also urged the Myanmar government to hold accountable perpetrators of violence.

The Council was briefed on 14 May by Ambassadors Mansour Al-Otaibi (Kuwait), Gustavo Meza-Cuadra Velásquez (Peru) and Karen Pierce (UK), the three co-leads on the visiting mission. During consultations that followed, Grandi briefed by video teleconference.

On 1 June, the president of the Council sent letters to the permanent representatives of Myanmar, Bangladesh and the Secretary-General on the Rohingya situation. The letter to Myanmar, which asked for a response within 30 days, highlighted the need for concrete action in three areas: access for UN agencies, the need for an independent investigation into alleged human rights violations, and full implementation of the report of the Rakhine Advisory Commission, which was mandated to make recommendations to improve the situation in Rakhine State. The letter to Bangladesh expressed the Council’s gratitude to the Bangladesh government and people for providing protection to the refugees and its determination to continue supporting the Bangladesh government in providing assistance to them. The Secretary-General’s letter encouraged him to remain personally engaged and continue to provide his good offices. It also requested that the UN continue to provide assistance to Bangladesh in handling the refugee situation and to Myanmar in implementing the Council’s 6 November 2017 presidential statement.

UNHCR and UNDP signed the tripartite MOU with Myanmar on 6 June. The MOU, which took about four months to negotiate, is seen as the first step in establishing a framework for cooperation between the UN and the Myanmar government regarding the repatriation of refugees from Bangladesh. Although the details of the MOU were not made public, it seems that it will give UNHCR and UNDP access to Rakhine state, allowing them to assess whether conditions are conducive to voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable repatriation.

On 31 May, the Myanmar government announced that it was launching an independent commission of inquiry to investigate human rights violations and related issues following the 25 August attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) on security posts. The commission will be composed of three members, including an international representative. The Myanmar government has characterised the commission as a “national initiative to address reconciliation, peace, stability and development”, but civil society groups have criticised it as inadequate and an attempt to deflect real justice. A Human Rights Council fact-finding mission created in 2017 has not been allowed into Myanmar.

During her visit to Myanmar, Burgener met with State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, military commander-in-chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, as well as senior members of government, Rakhine state officials, internally displaced persons (IDPs), civil society organisations, religious leaders, and members of the diplomatic community. Among the areas discussed were the situation in Rakhine state and the peace process.

According to OCHA, there are about 240,000 IDPs in camps in Kachin, Kayin, Shan and Rakhine states, and $183.4 million, of which about 40 percent has been funded, is needed to address humanitarian needs in Myanmar.

Myanmar refugees in Bangladesh continue to face a possible humanitarian catastrophe when the peak monsoon season arrives in July. UNHCR and its partners are preparing for the monsoons in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, where Myanmar refugees could be severely affected. Families deemed to be at greatest risk have been relocated to higher ground, but 80,000 people remain vulnerable to flooding and 23,000 to landslides.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has asked Myanmar to submit written observations by 27 July on whether the court has jurisdiction and the circumstances around the alleged deportation of Rohingya civilians from Myanmar into Bangladesh. Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda has asked the judges to look into the crime of deportation, and possible prosecution based on its territorial
jurisdiction over Bangladesh, which is an ICC member, unlike Myanmar.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

In a 1 May statement, special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar Yanghee Lee expressed grave concern about a sharp escalation in hostilities in Kachin state, where at least ten civilians were killed, several were wounded, and thousands have been forced to flee their homes. Lee said in the statement that she had received reports that the military had carried out aerial bombings and used heavy weapons and artillery fire against civilian areas. In a 15 May press briefing, a spokesperson for the High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed concern about the escalation in attacks by military forces and armed groups in Kachin and Shan states. According to the spokesperson, some 7,400 people had been internally displaced since early April, adding to the 100,000 already displaced. During its 38th session, the Human Rights Council (HRC) held an interactive dialogue with Lee on 27 June. At press time, the HRC was expected to adopt a resolution at the end of the session, renewing the mandate of the special rapporteur for an additional year.

**Key Issues and Options**

A key issue for the Council is to continue to engage with the Myanmar government in order to encourage concrete measures to address issues around the return of Rohingya refugees. Following the recent signing of the MOU, a related issue is the timely and full implementation of the MOU and how the Council can support this. One option would be regular briefings from the Special Envoy in order to monitor progress.

Council members saw clearly in Cox’s Bazar the effect of sexual violence on women and the impact of the violence on children. There may be interest in briefings from the Special Representatives on Children and Armed Conflict and Sexual Violence in Conflict in this regard, particularly as both have visited the region recently.

There are a number of important issues related to the return of refugees from Bangladesh. An immediate issue is creating the conditions for a safe, voluntary and dignified repatriation of refugees and building trust among stakeholders. Related to this is ensuring a fair investigation into allegations of human rights violations and that perpetrators be held accountable. An option is for the Council to continue to press the Myanmar government on its commitment to hold perpetrators to account, and push more publicly for cooperation with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. If little real action is taken, the Council may consider a resolution suggesting stronger measures, including a referral to the ICC or targeted sanctions.

A continuing issue is getting more funding for the humanitarian needs of the refugees in Bangladesh and the IDPs in Myanmar.

Full implementation of the Rakhine Advisory Commission’s recommendations continues to be an issue. This is closely linked with the need to address the root causes of the crisis, including issues around citizenship and poverty.

While the Council’s recent focus has been on the Rohingya situation, there are also issues around the peace process that the Council may need to remain alert to. If there are signs of deterioration in Kachin state the Council may wish to stress the need for a peaceful solution to the conflicts in other parts of the country during the briefings next month.

**Council Dynamics**

The negotiations over the press statement and the letter to the Myanmar government showed that while the experience of the visiting mission may have had a personal impact on Council members, some red lines remain. Adopting a resolution following the visit became unlikely after China and Russia made clear their view that with the visit, the press statement and the briefing on the visit, the Council had paid enough attention to Myanmar for the moment. In order to get agreement on the letter to Myanmar, the tone of the letter had to be softened, particularly regarding accountability. Sending it to the permanent representative rather than head of government was another necessary concession. However, even with the changes, it was felt that the letter allowed the Council to convey its principal concerns to the Myanmar government, including the importance of accountability and the involvement of the international community. There are still some who would like to see the Council take stronger action, particularly regarding accountability, and they may push for a resolution if there is little real progress made in the near future.

Members who returned from the visiting mission with renewed energy to address the Rohingya situation are keen to keep the spotlight on the issue and would like to have more regular updates on the situation.

The UK is the lead on Myanmar in the Council.

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**Climate and Security**

**Expected Council Action**

In July, the Council will hold a debate on climate-related security risks. Expected briefers include a senior Secretariat official, a representative of a member state facing climate-related security challenges, and a civil society representative.

Sweden, which is chairing the debate, may produce a summary to capture the key elements of the discussion.

**Key Recent Developments**

The Council is increasingly being exposed to evidence of the linkages between climate change and security, and has taken some steps in recent years to reflect these linkages in its work. During a visiting mission to the Lake Chad region in March 2017, Nigerian President Mahamadou Issoufou told members that he did not believe that Boko Haram would have “taken root” without the
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shrinking of Lake Chad, which has lost 90 percent of its surface area since the 1960s with a devastating effect on local livelihoods. Shortly after this visiting mission, the Council adopted resolution 2349, which addressed the multi-faceted dimensions of the Boko Haram conflict. Among its many elements, the resolution recognised the “adverse effects of climate change and ecological changes among other factors on the stability of the Region, including through water scarcity, drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity, and emphasised the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by governments and the United Nations relating to these factors”.

During a briefing on 22 March, Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed, a representative of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, Mohammed Bila; and Chitra Nagarajan, a senior conflict advisor with the think tank Adelphi, briefed the Council on the root causes of conflict in the Lake Chad region. All three briefers noted the adverse security-related impact of climate change in the region. Bila and Nagarajan, in particular, emphasised the need for the Council to receive improved analysis of climate-induced risk factors to help inform its work.

In January, the Council adopted a presidential statement that addressed activities undertaken by the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) with regard to conflict prevention, mediation, and good offices and welcomed the efforts of countries in the region to combat terrorism and transnational crime. The statement used language from resolution 2349 that recognised the adverse effects of climate change and ecological changes among other factors on the stability of West Africa and Sahel, thus reflecting the security implications of these factors for the region.

In recent years, other Council members, in addition to Sweden, have also chosen to use their presidency of the Security Council to address the link between climate and security. New Zealand convened an open debate on 30 July 2015 on the “peace and security challenges facing small island developing states”, which included a discussion of climate-related security threats. On 22 November 2016, Senegal held an open debate on “water, peace and security”, which explored such issues as the relationship between climate change and water scarcity, the management of transboundary waters, and the harmful impact that conflict can have on access to clean water. Japan chaired an open debate on 20 December 2017 on the theme “addressing complex contemporary challenges to international peace and security” that included a discussion of climate change, among other issues.

In 2017, there were also two Arria-formula meetings on climate change. On 10 April, a meeting organised by Ukraine, with cooperation from Germany in preparing the session, focused on the security implications of sea level rise. The second meeting, held on 15 December, was co-organised by a wide array of Council members and other member states and focussed on the theme of “preparing for security implications of rising temperatures”.

Key Issues and Options

One key issue is how this debate can contribute to advancing the Council’s engagement with climate change. Producing a chair’s summary could provide useful suggestions for future action. Over the longer term, members could focus on integrating the issue into the Council’s work by having climate-related security risks incorporated into all relevant outcomes (resolutions and presidential statements). The language in recent outcomes on the Lake Chad Basin and UNOWAS could serve as useful precedents.

Another important matter is how to improve the analysis that the Council receives on how and where climate-related factors are a driver of conflict and insecurity. In its 2011 presidential statement on climate change, the Council called for conflict analysis and contextual information on the possible security implications of climate change in the reports of the Secretary-General. Consequently, one option is for members to advocate for enhanced analysis and information on this issue from the Secretariat, the provision of which has been limited to date.

Perhaps most fundamental over the long term is what the end objective of Council engagement on this issue should be, as the Council currently focuses on the symptoms of climate change but does not address its underlying causes. The Council plays an important role in political messaging, and it could galvanise increased attention around the security implications of climate change.

It seems important for Council members to consider what other precise steps the body could take in tackling the linkages between climate change and peace and security and how the Council’s efforts in this regard would relate to those of other parts of the UN system, as well as those of national and regional actors. Some member states—including Belgium, which has been elected to serve on the Council in 2019-2020—have advocated the appointment of a special envoy on climate change. If such a position comes into being, the individual appointed could generate ideas for the Security Council’s role in dealing with climate change within the context of efforts pursued by the broader UN system, national governments, and regional organisations.

Council and Wider Dynamics

During the past decade, it has been a matter of some controversy whether or not the Council is an appropriate body to discuss climate change. China, Russia and other countries have expressed concern that the Council’s engagement on this matter encroaches on the prerogatives of other UN organs, notably the General Assembly and ECOSOC. Nevertheless, in recent years, a growing number of UN member states, both inside and outside the Council, have underscored the security risks of climate change. Despite the political tensions associated with addressing climate change, the Council has over time managed to engage with this issue in open debates, in other formal meetings covering a wide range of emerging threats to peace and security, in outcomes such as resolution 2349, and in Arria-formula meetings.
Expected Council Action
In July, the Council expects to receive the monthly briefings on political and humanitarian developments in Syria and on the use of chemical weapons.

Key Recent Developments
Military logic continues to drive developments in Syria. The government has consolidated its territory and has continued to target areas that were supposed to be part of the de-escalation zones established by the Astana process. Aerial bombardments in Idlib by the government and its allies, as well as military operations in the country’s southwest, have the potential for further escalation given the strategic importance of these areas near Syria’s borders for external actors.

Despite limited traction, Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura has been exploring options for a re-launch of the UN-facilitated political process. He has focused particularly on facilitating the establishment of a constitutional committee, which was the main outcome of a January conference hosted in Sochi by Russia, along with Iran and Turkey. It was agreed at the meeting that the UN would help in forming a constitutional committee, including defining its mandate, terms of reference, powers, rules of procedure, and selection criteria for its composition. Although the Syrian government had repeatedly questioned the committee’s legitimacy, de Mistura announced at a press conference on 14 June that Syria had provided a list of 50 candidates to be members of the committee. He told reporters that opposition groups are working on providing their list as well. He also emphasised the importance of including civil society and the aspiration of having women make up 30 percent of the committee. On 18-19 June, de Mistura convened a meeting in Geneva with senior officials from Iran, Russia and Turkey to discuss the formation of the constitutional committee. On 25 June, he held a similar meeting with senior members of the so-called Small Group (France, Germany, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UK and the US).

The humanitarian situation in Syria remains critical. The lack of safe, unimpeded and sustained humanitarian access has been an ongoing factor in the conflict. By imposing bureaucratic hurdles and removing crucial items from the convoys that are allowed to proceed, the government has been able to limit humanitarian access. On 29 May, Mark Lowcock, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, briefed the Council on the humanitarian situation in Syria. He described how, after taking control of Eastern Ghouta and Yarmouk, the government had continued to prevent access by UN humanitarian actors, which is required in order for needs to be assessed and assistance and protection scaled up. In his 20 June monthly report on the humanitarian situation, the Secretary-General reiterated that UN humanitarian agencies continue to be denied access to these formerly besieged areas, which are now considered hard-to-reach locations.

Council members received a 19 June Secretary-General’s report containing a review of the UN’s humanitarian cross-border operations. The report, which had been requested by Russia in the negotiations of resolution 2393 in December 2017, explains the processes in place to ensure accountable, effective and transparent cross-border operations, based on assessments of needs and with prior notification to the Syrian government. Three key areas covered in the report are the technical functioning of the operations; the impact of the operations on people in need in the country; and the accountability mechanisms for projects that are managed remotely. The review also emphasises that there are 2.67 million people in need in areas accessed solely through cross-border operations and that these deliveries remain critical. Council members considered the review in a meeting on 27 June.

On 13 June, the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) concluded that sarin was very likely used as a chemical weapon in the south of Lataminah on 24 March 2017. The FFM also concluded that chlorine was very likely used as a chemical weapon at the Lataminah Hospital and the surrounding area the next day. So far, similar conclusions have been reached about attacks with chemical weapons on 20 March 2017 also in Lataminah and on 4 February 2018 in the rebel-held Al Talil neighbourhood of Saraqib. Efforts persist to bring about an attribution mechanism for chemical weapons attacks to ensure accountability. A conference of state parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention held on 26-27 June mandated the OPCW to help identify those responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Ahead of the meeting, Russia had asked for meetings under “any other business” after consultations on 11 and 14 June to express its concerns about the prospect of such a tasking of OPCW by the conference of state parties.

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 20 June, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria published a report on the siege of Eastern Ghouta, which it characterised as marked by war crimes and crimes against humanity. During its 38th session, the Human Rights Council (HRC) held an interactive dialogue on the report on 26 June. The HRC also considered the summary report on the high-level panel discussion on violations of the human rights of children in Syria that took place during its 37th session (A/HRC/38/29). At press time, the HRC was expected to adopt a resolution at the end of the session on the human rights situation in Syria.

Key Issues and Options
The current level of P5 divisions raises the question of whether the Council will be able to work constructively on Syria in the foreseeable future. If the paralysis continues, those with even a limited capacity to act—whether elected members, the Secretary-General, or key members of the General Assembly—may seek to take the initiative. The Secretary-General could provide options for the Council to consider, or he could directly mobilise the mechanism for the investigation of alleged use of chemical and biological weapons which was developed in the 1980s and was activated previously in the Syrian context in March 2013. Given the lack of unanimity among permanent members and the Council’s failure to exercise its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, members of the...

UN DOCUMENTS ON SYRIA

Security Council Resolutions
S/RES/2401 (24 February 2018) demanded that all parties cease hostilities in Syria. S/RES/2393 (19 December 2017) renewed the authorisation for cross-border and cross-line aid delivery. S/RES/2254 (18 December 2015) was on the political solution to the Syrian crisis. S/RES/2118 (27 September 2013) was on chemical weapons. Secretary-General’s Reports
S/2018/620 (19 June 2018) contained a report of the Fact-Finding Mission of the OPCW determining that sarin was very likely used as a chemical weapon in the south of Lataminah on 24 March 2017 and that chlorine was very likely used as a chemical weapon at the Lataminah Hospital and the surrounding area the next day. S/2018/523 (1 June 2018) was an OPCW report on progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons programme. Security Council Meeting Record
S/PV.8269 (29 May 2018) was a briefing by Lowcock.
General Assembly could consider tabling a “Uniting for Peace” resolution.

While divided on Syria for more than seven years, the Council has been able to unite around some aspects of the conflict during some of that time, such as setting the agenda for a political process, investigating the use and providing for the destruction of chemical weapons, and authorising cross-border deliveries. As the political climate deteriorated, the mandate of the OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism was discontinued in late 2017 and there is a risk of further undermining of Council decisions. Council members could hold informal, unscripted and forward-looking discussions at the ambassadorial level to seek ways to increase pressure on the parties to the conflict and strive for a compromise that is both realistic and acceptable to all.

Since it was established in August 2011, the HRC’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria has briefed Council members in an Arria-formula meeting seven times. Council members could hold a meeting to be briefed on the Commission’s most recent report, on the siege of Eastern Ghouta, which could also be transmitted to the Council as an official document. The last Arria-formula meeting with the Commission took place on 21 April 2017.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

Council dynamics on Syria continue to be characterised by increased polarisation on the three files through which the conflict is discussed: political, humanitarian and chemical weapons. In May, P5 members started meeting regularly on Syria at the ambassadorial level, but it seems that these discussions have now subsided.

In December 2017, the adoption of resolution 2393, drafted by Egypt, Japan and Sweden, renewed for a year the authorisation for cross-border and cross-line humanitarian access to Syria. It was adopted with the abstentions of Bolivia, China and Russia. In explaining their vote, China and Russia highlighted the importance of working through the government and eventually rolling back a provision that had been devised originally as a temporary measure. It is unclear whether their concerns are addressed by the recent review of the UN’s humanitarian cross-border operations, which describes the procedures in place for these operations to be accountable, effective and transparent.

Kuwait and Sweden are the penholders on humanitarian issues in Syria.

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**South Sudan**

**Expected Council Action**

In July, the Council expects to adopt a resolution renewing the South Sudan sanctions regime and the mandate of the South Sudan Sanctions Committee’s Panel of Experts, both of which expire on 15 July. Prior to this, the Council will hold consultations on South Sudan sanctions.

The mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) expires on 15 March 2019.

**Key Recent Developments**

The situation in South Sudan remains a cause for grave concern. The country is on the brink of famine, and the humanitarian crisis continues to intensify amidst widespread insecurity and violence despite the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) on 21 December 2017. According to the Secretary-General’s most recent report, conflict has intensified in parts of Unity and Central Equatoria, with government forces seeking to dislodge opposition forces ahead of the rainy season. The report calls for expedited publication of reported violations documented by the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM), the body mandated to monitor violations of the CoHA, which has not released a public report since January. On 26 June, a Bangladeshi UNMISS peacekeeper was killed during an armed attack on a UN convoy that was supporting the delivery of humanitarian aid to vulnerable civilians in the Central Equatoria region. The Council issued a press statement condemning the attack and calling for a swift investigation to hold those responsible accountable.

The third round of the South Sudan High-Level Revitalization Forum (HLRF), convened by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, took place from 17 to 23 May. It involved the continuation of discussions about governance and security arrangements that began in February but ended with the parties not able to agree on a power-sharing proposal put forward by IGAD. Since then, intensive, interlinked consultations have been held in Addis Ababa in an effort to bring the parties closer together. IGAD also put forward a “Bridging Proposal”, seeking to outline a middle ground on the various negotiating positions related to key governance and security issues.

On 31 May, the IGAD Council of Ministers held an extraordinary session on South Sudan, at which it adopted a communiqué calling for a meeting between South Sudanese President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Riek Machar before the 31st Summit of the AU Assembly on 1 and 2 July. The communiqué also directs the IGAD facilitation team to develop a revitalised text of the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan, to be endorsed by the Council of Ministers and submitted to the AU Assembly Summit for final approval. The communiqué further states that the Council of Ministers has decided to submit proposed punitive measures against violators of the CoHA for the approval of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, and to request the IGAD Assembly to delegate to the Council of Ministers decisions on actions to be taken against violators of the CoHA.

Also on 31 May, the Council adopted resolution 2418 renewing the sanctions regime and mandate of the Panel of Experts until 15 July. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to report by 30 June on whether any fighting had taken place since the adoption of the resolution and whether the parties had come to “a viable political agreement”. It decided that the Council “shall consider
South Sudan

applying” targeted sanctions to the six individuals identified in an annex to the resolution or an arms embargo, or both, within five days of the Secretary-General’s report. The resolution was adopted with nine votes in favour and six abstentions (Bolivia, China, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Kazakhstan and Russia). (For more details, see our What’s In Blue story of 30 May.)

On 20 June, Machar met with Kiir in Addis Ababa, for the first time in almost two years, for a broad discussion of the prospects for peace in South Sudan and outstanding issues in the HLRF process. Discussions continued the following week in Khartoum, resulting in the signing on 27 June of the “Khartoum Declaration of Agreement”, which among other things declared a permanent ceasefire within 72 hours.

The Council received a briefing on 28 June on the Secretary-General’s most recent 90-day report. (For more details, see our What’s In Blue story of 27 June.)

Sanctions-Related Developments
Ambassador Joanna Wronecka (Poland), chair of the South Sudan Sanctions Committee, conducted a visit to South Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya from 16 to 26 June.

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 14 June, the Human Rights Council (HRC) announced the appointment of Barney Afako of Uganda to the three-person Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan established by the Human Rights Council in March 2016. He replaces Godfrey Musila and joins Yasmin Socka of South Africa and Andrew Clapham of the UK to continue the commission’s mandate “to determine and report the facts and circumstances of, collect and preserve evidence of, and clarify responsibility for alleged gross violations and abuses of human rights and related crimes”. The Commission will present an oral update to the HRC at its 39th session in September and a comprehensive written report at its 40th session in March 2019.

Key Issues and Options
An immediate issue for the Council is renewing the South Sudan sanctions regime and the mandate of the South Sudan Sanctions Committee’s Panel of Experts, both of which expire on 15 July.

Another key issue is whether to impose targeted sanctions against the six individuals identified in the annex to resolution 2418, establish an arms embargo, or do both. A likely option is for Council members to consider the report of the Secretary-General requested in resolution 2418; steps taken by regional actors as set out in the IGAD Council of Ministers 31 May communiqué; the assessment of Ambassador Wronecka following her visit; the actions and level of commitment of the parties to the peace process; the extent of violations of the CoHA; and next steps in the HLRF process announced by IGAD.

Council Dynamics
The timing of imposing targeted sanctions was a particular area of disagreement during negotiations about resolution 2418. Several members who might otherwise be inclined to support additional targeted sanctions expressed reservations during negotiations about pursuing such measures unless the region is on board. These members—including Bolivia, China, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Kazakhstan and Russia, all of which abstained on the 31 May resolution—are of the view that the position of countries in the region, most notably Ethiopia as a member of IGAD and convener of the HLRF, and regional bodies, such as IGAD and the AU, is critical in determining whether the Council should pursue targeted sanctions. While IGAD and the AU have expressed their willingness to consider punitive measures against those who obstruct the peace process and violate the CoHA, action imposing such consequences has to date not taken place in the region.

In its explanation of vote on 31 May, Ethiopia said resolution 2418, and the inclusion of the annex identifying six individuals for possible targeted sanctions, “is manifestly harmful to the peace process [and] undermines the efforts of the subregion, the region, IGAD and the AU”. Ethiopia added that “a Council divided on this issue will not be helpful to the peace process, and it will not send the right message to the parties”. This position is contrary to that of the US in particular, which sought to impose targeted sanctions against the six individuals in an earlier draft resolution it circulated in May. In its explanation of vote, the US said it “has lost its patience [and]... the status quo is unacceptable”.

The US is the penholder on South Sudan. Poland chairs the 2206 South Sudan Sanctions Committee.

Children and Armed Conflict

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council will hold a high-level open debate on children and armed conflict with the theme, “Protecting Children Today Prevents Conflict Tomorrow”. Sweden, the chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, has chosen to focus on how armed conflict can contribute to conflict prevention and sustaining peace. The meeting will be chaired by Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven. Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict Virginia Gamba will present the Secretary-General’s annual report on children and armed conflict circulated on 27 June. Other speakers include the executive director of UNICEF, Henrietta Fore, and Yenny Londoño, a civil society representative from Colombia. A resolution is expected to be adopted during the debate.

Key Recent Developments
The Secretary-General’s annual report documents a large increase in violations against children in 2017, largely brought about as a result of deterioration in several situations, including the Central African Republic, the
Children and Armed Conflict

Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen. There were over 21,000 grave violations of children’s rights verified by the UN from January through December 2017, a 31 percent increase over 2016. Regarding the annexes listing parties that had committed violations against children, there were new listings of non-state armed groups in the DRC, Mali and Yemen. Parties that had been previously listed had additional violations added, including the Myanmar security forces; Al-Shabaab in Somalia; and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in South Sudan. Two parties were delisted: the FARC-EP in Colombia and the Sudan government security forces, which had both been listed for recruitment and use of children. The Saudi-led coalition in Yemen has been delisted for attacks against schools and hospitals although it remains on the annex for killing and maiming. For the last three years, these listings have been particularly controversial, with strong reactions from member states and civil society regarding parties that had been omitted or credited with more progress than appeared merited. Following the release of the latest report, there has been strong criticism from civil society organisations that have raised concerns about double standards.

The last children and armed conflict debate was held on 31 October 2017. Seventy-three delegations spoke at the meeting with many highlighting issues around better reporting and monitoring on the ground, a credible listing of perpetrators of violations, more effective implementation of action plans and greater accountability. A presidential statement was adopted, expressing concern at the scale and severity of violations in 2016, welcoming the enhanced engagement of the Secretary-General with parties and reiterating that the protection of children should be part of a comprehensive strategy to resolve conflict and sustain peace.

On 7 May, an Arria-formula meeting was held on “Ending and Preventing Grave Violations Against Children Through Action Plans: Best Practices from African States”. Co-sponsored by Poland, Côte d’Ivoire, France and Sweden, it included representatives from Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan, who shared their experiences of implementing action plans.

On 6 June, the Office of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict held an event on “Reintegration of children formerly associated with armed groups and armed forces”, co-sponsored by Poland, Belgium, France, Germany, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Switzerland, Liberia, and UNICEF. Representatives from Sierra Leone and Liberia shared their experiences in implementing reintegration programmes and how the programmes supported peacebuilding efforts.

The Special Representative has initiated a lessons-learnt exercise meant to be used to prevent violations at national and regional levels, and stressed closer cooperation with regional and sub-regional organisations and civil society to raise awareness of violations against children.

From 25 February to 1 March, Gamba visited Sudan, where she discussed the Sudan Government Security Forces’ implementation of the action plan to prevent the recruitment and use of children, signed in 2016. Upon her return, Gamba briefed the Council in consultations as well as the Sudan sanctions committee. From 27 to 29 May, Gamba visited Yangon and Naypyitaw, where she discussed the implementation of the action plan to stop recruitment of children by the national army, which has made some progress. She raised the issue of access to Rakhine state for those monitoring and reporting on violations against children; there have been reports of killing, maiming and sexual violence in the state.

In the Central African Republic, the UN and the Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC), part of the ex-Séléka coalition, signed an action plan on 17 March to end and prevent grave violations against children. The action plan covers all four violations for which the group is listed in the annexes of the Secretary-General’s annual report: recruitment and use, killing and maiming, sexual violence, and attacks on schools and hospitals.

Key Issues and Options
A key issue is how to recalibrate the Council’s approach to the issue of children and armed conflict. There is a growing awareness that protection of children needs to be better connected to conflict prevention and sustaining peace efforts. An option for the Council is a resolution which clearly connects the protection of children to conflict prevention and sustaining peace efforts while retaining the monitoring and reporting core of the children and armed conflict mandate. Related to this is how to use the children and armed conflict monitoring and reporting mechanism within a conflict prevention framework, along with the Secretary-General’s annexes as tools for engagement with parties that could potentially find themselves listed there.

Having better reintegration of children in post-conflict situations understood as part of the work to prevent conflict from recurring is also an issue. Connected to this is the need for long-term funding for more effective reintegration. The Council could encourage support for the Office of the Special Representative’s efforts in setting up a global fund in cooperation with the World Bank.

Developments in the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict
The working group visited Sudan from 26 to 29 November 2017. The delegation, led by Ambassador Olof Skoog (Sweden), visited Khartoum and an IDP gathering site in Soronty. The main objectives of the visit were to follow up on the working group’s conclusions adopted on 31 July 2017 and assess progress in the action plans signed by parties to the conflict in Sudan. The delegation was also able to gain a better understanding of the challenges faced in monitoring and reporting on violations against children and impact of the conflict on children. Following the visit Skoog issued a statement on the mission.

The Working Group adopted five conclusions in 2017 (on Colombia, Somalia, the Philippines, Sudan and Nigeria). For the first time, the Working Group has been able to consistently maintain the two-month timeframe for adopting conclusions envisaged when it was set up in 2006.

In 2018, the Working Group has so far considered two reports and adopted one set of conclusions. The Secretary-General’s report on children and armed conflict in Myanmar, which was published on 22 December 2017 and covered the period from 1 February 2013 to 30 June 2017, was formally presented to the working group on 22 January. Although the working group discussed the report, it did not issue conclusions, as it was decided that a follow-up report was needed, covering the period after the attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army on 25 August 2017, and that one set of conclusions would be issued on the two reports.

On 12 March, the Secretary-General’s report on Mali was presented to the working group. Following two rounds of negotiations, the working group adopted conclusions on the Mali report on 4 May.
An ongoing issue is how to encourage the integration of child protection issues in peace processes. Council members could make it a habit to ask about commitments to child protection in ongoing peace negotiations during relevant country-specific briefings.

Continuing issues include more effective implementation of action plans signed with armed forces and groups included in the annexes to the Secretary-General’s annual reports; engaging with non-state actors; and greater accountability for perpetrators of violations against children.

Issues may arise around the accuracy and credibility of the list of perpetrators in the annexes of the report. More detailed reporting of measures taken by parties on the list may help address questions around impartiality.

**Council Dynamics**

Sweden has been an active and effective chair of the working group since January 2017. Its open and collaborative style has allowed for the smooth adoption of all the conclusions within a two-month period. Several members of the working group appear engaged and open to ways of improving the group’s working methods. France, which has been a strong supporter over the years, has continued to be active, together with other members such as Poland, which has initiated meetings outside the Council to highlight particular aspects of the children and armed conflict agenda. While members generally agree that there is no need to change the core of the mandate, there is awareness that with the changing nature of conflict and the overlap with other issues in the Council, some refinements are needed. The negotiations on a draft resolution, which at press time had just begun, may reveal some divisions on specific aspects of the agenda.

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**Women, Peace and Security: Sahel and Lake Chad Basin**

**Expected Council Action**

In July, the Council will hold a briefing on the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin focused on women, peace and security. Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed and AU Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security Bineta Diop are expected to brief following a joint mission that they are undertaking to the region earlier in the month. A civil society representative is also expected to brief.

**Key Recent Developments**

The impact of the terrorist group Boko Haram in Lake Chad Basin countries on women and girls has been well-documented. The kidnapping of the 276 Chibok schoolgirls in Nigeria in April 2014 first began to focus international attention on the Boko Haram insurgency that started in 2009, which until then had been under-reported and viewed as an internal matter to Nigeria. The Chibok students represented only a small percentage of the thousands of people, including women and girls, whom Boko Haram has kidnapped. Despite losing most of the territory that it once held, Boko Haram has continued to conduct abductions. On 19 February, Boko Haram took 110 girls from their school in Dapchi, Yobe state, in Nigeria. Most were released a month later, though five had died and one girl who refused to convert to Islam remained in captivity.

The crisis has affected women and girls with particular intensity: women and girls have been subjected to forced marriage; and after being freed or escaping from Boko Haram, returnees often face stigmatisation. Sexual exploitation has been commonplace among the 2.4 million displaced persons, including by the security forces and authorities, often involving transactional sex to access food and non-food items. An August 2017 study by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point and Yale University found that of the 434 suicide bombings by Boko Haram from 2011 to 2017, a majority (56 percent) were carried out by women and girls, including two-thirds of suicide attacks in 2017. Young women and girls have carried out nearly all recent suicide attacks in the Far North region of Cameroon. Resolution 2349 of March 2017, adopted following the Council’s visit to the Lake Chad Basin, highlighted these different aspects of the Boko Haram crisis.

The Council’s Informal Expert Group on Women, Peace and Security (IEG) met on 30 January to discuss the Lake Chad Basin crisis with then-UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Nigeria Edward Kallon and representatives of the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWAS) and the UN Office for Central Africa.

Regarding the wider Sahel, a high-level conference on women, violence and terrorism in West Africa and the Sahel was organised from 10 to 11 April in Dakar by UNOWAS in partnership with the Economic Community of West African States; the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel); the Mano River Union; the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism; UN Women; and the Working Group on Women, Youth, Peace and Security in West Africa and the Sahel. The conference resulted in a Call to Action, which urged West African and Sahel governments to increase women’s participation in all social, political and economic initiatives aimed at preventing violent extremism and combatting terrorism.

Since being appointed to her post in 2017, Deputy Secretary-General Mohammed has led UN efforts to improve implementation of the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, including the recent development of a support plan for the strategy to trigger investment in the region. The “recalibration” of the UN’s Sahel strategy and support plan focus on priority areas for implementation. These priorities include not only empowering women and youth but also cross-border cooperation; conflict prevention and sustaining peace; inclusive economic growth; and climate action and renewable energy.

On 5 June, the IEG met on Mali and the Sahel, organised in order to contribute recommendations ahead of Mohammed and Diop’s upcoming mission. Special
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Representative and head of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), Mahamat Saleh Annadif, and a representative of the Department of Political Affairs’ Sahel team briefed. Among the issues on the agenda were the under-representation of women in the Malian peace process; the importance of the G5 Sahel joint force recruiting a gender advisor; and the need to complement security responses with actions that address the structural drivers of instability and insecurity in the Sahel, where poverty rates are some of the highest in the world and gender equality is among the lowest.

Key Issues and Options
The Council briefing is being organised in connection with the visit to the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin by Mohammed and Diop. Also expected to participate in the visit are Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström, Executive Director of UN Women Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, Executive Director of the UN Population Fund Natalia Kanem, the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Africa Bience Gawanas, and heads of UN regional and country offices. The session follows up on Mohammed and Diop’s visit to Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo last July, about which they subsequently briefed the Council in August 2017.

With the forthcoming trip providing the basis for the discussion, key issues for the session will be how the crises in the Sahel and Lake Chad basin have affected women, including livelihoods; the prevention of violent extremism; issues related to the UN Sahel Strategy, as well as other women, peace and security issues such as the importance of women’s participation in political processes.

As part of the concept note that is being prepared for the meeting, an option is to encourage Council members to ask specific questions during their interventions that the briefers can then respond to, as was done last year.

A further option is to incorporate key elements from this meeting into a possible presidential statement on West Africa and the Sahel as the Council will also hold its semi-annual meeting on the region and the activities of UNOWAS in July. This may include emphasising the importance of gender-sensitive research, data and responses in the context of counter-terrorism operations.

Council Dynamics
Women, peace and security issues, particularly around women’s participation and sexual violence, are raised consistently during the Council’s discussions on Mali and the Lake Chad Basin partly due to the work of the IEG. Sweden’s organisation of this briefing as the July Council president and as co-chair with Peru of the IEG is part of an effort to have Council discussions of women, peace and security thematic issues as they relate to specific geographical countries and regions.

The UK is the penholder on Women, Peace and Security. Côte d’Ivoire is penholder on West Africa and the Sahel and worked closely with Sweden in preparing the Council’s January presidential statement on West Africa and the Sahel. Peru and Sweden co-chair the Informal Expert Group on Women, Peace and Security.

Libya

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council is expected to receive briefings by the Special Representative and head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Ghassan Salamé, and the chair of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Olof Skoog (Sweden), followed by consultations.

UNSMIL’s mandate expires on 15 September, and the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the sanctions committee expires on 15 November.

Key Recent Developments
Deep divisions remain between the competing institutions of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) and the Tripoli-based and UN-supported Presidency Council. Little progress has been achieved in implementing the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), signed on 17 December 2015 and designed to establish unified and legitimate institutions with the capacity to deliver basic services to the Libyan population. Special Representative Salamé has been focusing on implementing a UN action plan that the Council endorsed in October 2017. This plan includes parallel efforts to amend the LPA, finalise a new constitution, and prepare for parliamentary and presidential elections.

At a meeting in Paris on 29 May that was hosted by the French president and held under the auspices of the UN, Fayez al-Sarraj, President of the Presidency Council; Aguila Saleh, President of the HoR; Khaled al-Meshri, President of the High State Council; and General Khalifa Haftar, Commander of the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA), adopted the Paris declaration, agreeing to fulfil the necessary preconditions for the successful holding of elections as laid out by Salamé. These include a prior commitment by the parties to accept the results and the finalisation by 16 September of legislation to regulate the holding of elections. The date selected for the elections was 10 December. The declaration was not signed, however, as

UN DOCUMENTS ON LIBYA Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2420 (11 June 2018) renewed the authorisation for member states, acting nationally or through regional organisations, to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya bound to or from the country that have reasonable grounds to believe are violating the arms embargo. S/RES/2380 (5 October 2017) renewed the authorisation for member states to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya that have reasonable grounds to suspect are being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking. S/RES/2376 (14 September 2017) extended UNSMIL’s mandate until 15 September 2018. S/RES/2362 (29 June 2017) renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee and the measures regarding attempts to illicitly export oil from Libya. S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011) referred the situation in Libya to the ICC, imposed an arms embargo and targeted sanctions (assets freeze and travel ban), and established a sanctions committee. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2018/11 (6 June 2018) welcomed the momentum generated by the international conference on Libya in Paris. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2018/451 (11 May 2018) was on the implementation of resolution 2357. S/2018/429 (7 May 2018) was on UNSMIL. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.8263 (21 May 2018) was a briefing by the Special Representative and head of UNSMIL, Ghassan Salamé, and the chair of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Olof Skoog (Sweden). S/PV.8250 (9 May 2018) was the semi-annual briefing by ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda on recent developments concerning cases in Libya.

**Libya**

the actors represent competing institutions and do not recognise each other’s legitimacy. The Council adopted a presidential statement on 6 June welcoming the momentum gained by the conference and taking note of the commitment of the parties to follow the set timeframe.

The security situation in many parts of Libya remains precarious. Notably in the south, inter-tribal tensions reinforce existing rivalries among supporters of the LNA and those nominally affiliated with the Tripoli-based Presidency Council. In Derna in north-eastern Libya, General Haftar’s forces launched an offensive in May and continue to fight for control of the only city in eastern Libya not under his control.

Migrants and refugees in Libya continue to suffer from human rights violations and abuse, including arbitrary detention and forced labour, reportedly inflicted by state officials, armed groups, smugglers, traffickers and criminal gangs.

**Sanctions-Related Developments**

On 7 June, the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee designated six leaders of transnational trafficking networks for sanctions (travel ban and asset freeze). This was the first time that individuals were listed for human trafficking within any UN sanctions regime and the first time names were added to the committee’s list since June 2011. The four Libyans and two Eritreans were targeted for serious human rights abuses against migrants and refugees in Libya.

With the adoption of resolution 2420 on 11 June, the Council unanimously renewed the authorisation for member states, acting nationally or through regional organisations, to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya bound to or from the country that they have reasonable grounds to believe are violating the arms embargo.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

On 22 May, the UN Human Rights Office and UNSMIL published a joint report, covering May 2017 to May 2018, detailing 36 attacks on medical facilities, personnel or patients. During its 38th session, the Human Rights Council held a clustered interactive dialogue on 21 June with the special rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, to discuss her report on her mission to Libya from 25 to 31 January (A/HRC/38/39/Add.2). According to the report, the humanitarian situation facing internally displaced persons in Libya and the lack of protection of their human rights are of great concern, with an estimated 2 to 3 percent of the total Libyan population currently internally displaced.

**Key Issues and Options**

The key issue for the Council is how it can contribute to compelling the parties to adhere to the UN Action Plan. Generally, the Council could discuss and devise ways in which Council members could support, collectively and bilaterally, the UN-led mediation efforts in Libya. At the appropriate time, and in support of Salamé’s work, they might consider a visiting mission to Libya and neighbouring countries to engage with key stakeholders.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

Overall, Council members are united in their support of Salamé’s mediation efforts, but they have often had different sensitivities regarding the way forward to achieve a solution. During negotiations for the presidential statement, some members, including the US, appeared to be more cautious towards endorsing a concrete timeline for the electoral process, considering the challenges to establish an environment conducive to holding successful elections.

The UK is the penholder on Libya, and Sweden chairs the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee.

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**Cyprus**

**Expected Council Action**

In July, the Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) ahead of its 31 July expiry. Special Representative and head of mission Elizabeth Spehar is expected to brief on the latest UNFICYP report and recent developments.

**Key Recent Developments**

Following the breakdown of the unification talks in the summer of 2017, there have been no significant developments towards a solution of the Cyprus question. When the Council last met on Cyprus in January, it urged the parties and other participants to renew their commitment and political will towards a settlement. In resolution 2398 it extended the mandate of the mission and endorsed implementing the recommendations of the strategic review that was concluded in the fall of 2017. The resolution did not alter the mandate of the mission or make any significant changes to the troop numbers.

Also in January, the Republic of Cyprus held presidential elections. The incumbent president, Nicos Anastasiades, garnered the most votes in the first round but failed to secure the majority necessary to win outright. Nonetheless, he emerged victorious in the second round on 4 February. Leading up to the elections, Anastasiades had on several occasions voiced optimism that reunification talks would resume after the presidential elections. The impasse in settlement talks has continued, however.

The tensions arising from a long-standing dispute over hydrocarbon resources off the coast of Cyprus escalated again this year. Since the internationally-recognised Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus awarded drilling licenses to French and Italian energy companies Total and Eni several years ago, the companies have been conducting exploratory work off the coast of Cyprus. In February, the companies announced the discovery of commercially valuable natural gas reserves there. The same month, Turkey deployed naval warships to prevent planned drilling activities by Eni in Cyprus’ exclusive economic zone.

Turkey has opposed drilling off the coast of Cyprus, because it claims control of some of the areas in question and because it says that it is protecting the rights of Turkish Cypriots, who are excluded from the process. The Turkish Cypriots have emphasised that both communities on the island should...
benefit from Cyprus’ hydrocarbon resources. This controversy has had an effect on unification talks and political dynamics on the island since the hydrocarbon resources discovery in 2011. In 2014, negotiations between the Cypriot leaders came to a standstill because of disagreement over this issue.

During remarks to the media following a 24 May meeting with Secretary-General António Guterres, Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias said that unification talks would not resume before the 24 June Turkish elections. He also expressed confidence in the Secretary-General’s appointment of the new Special Adviser who will facilitate the talks. Espen Barth Eide relinquished the post in August 2017 after the collapse of the most recent round of talks. In the interim, Spehar took on his responsibilities in her capacity as the Deputy Special Adviser. The Secretary-General has reiterated on several occasions that the UN stands ready to provide its good offices and facilitate the negotiations between the Cypriot leaders if they so request.

The Secretary-General published his report on progress towards a settlement in Cyprus on 14 June. As noted in the report, Spehar met with Cypriot leaders separately on several occasions, but the leaders have met directly only once, in April. The report said that there has been no further progress towards a settlement and that trust between the Cypriot leaders and their respective communities has declined. The Secretary-General has stated his intention to send a senior UN official to conduct consultations with the parties and get their reflections on the negotiation process. This would help determine whether there are conditions at the moment for a meaningful process.

Key Issues and Options
Among the current issues facing the Council, the most prominent is the renewal of UNFICYP’s mandate. An underlying issue remains the lack of progress in the unification talks and what role, if any, the Council should play to stimulate this process. Given the longevity of the mission and the inability of Cypriot leaders to achieve a final settlement in over 50 years, an issue for the Council is whether to consider significant changes to the mission’s mandate and examine downsizing options.

The Council has continued to be cautious in initiating or even discussing any significant changes to the mandate or the size of the mission, fearing a negative impact on the situation on the ground and on the political process. In January, the Council endorsed the recommendations from the strategic review of UNFICYP and made only minor adjustments to the mission’s size while maintaining the same mandate. Given the lack of progress in talks between the parties, the Council could consider options for scaling down the troop presence and even shortening the mission’s mandate to a period of three months to add a sense of urgency and send a message to the parties that the negotiation process should not be open-ended.

In the upcoming period, the Council will follow closely developments in the exploration of hydrocarbon resources off the coast of Cyprus, given that this issue has caused periodic tensions on the island and in the region.

Council Dynamics
Only Council members with a particular interest in this issue, most notably the UK, France and Russia, follow the situation in Cyprus closely. The US has become more engaged in efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem as the island gained more prominence because of its hydrocarbon resources and the strategic value of the location in relation to the fight against terrorism in the Middle East, as well as due to the growing overall security concerns in the eastern Mediterranean region.

The Council is united in its support for negotiations that would lead to the settlement of the Cyprus problem. Members differ somewhat, however, on the conditions and time-frame for the reunification talks. Some members, the UK in particular, seem frustrated by the protracted process. These members appear to share the view that this process cannot be open-ended and that the Council could stimulate the negotiations by putting some pressure on both sides. However, Russia has strongly opposed any attempt to exert pressure on both sides and affect negotiations in any way as it maintains that the process must be Cypriot-led and Cypriot-owned for the results to be effective.

The UK is the penholder on Cyprus.

UN-AU Cooperation on Peace and Security

Expected Council Action
In July, the Security Council will receive a briefing on the Secretary-General’s annual report on ways to strengthen the partnership between the UN and AU on issues of peace and security in Africa, including on the work of the UN Office to the AU. Following this, Council members will hold their 12th annual consultative meeting with the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC). Members of both bodies will hold informal consultations ahead of this meeting.

Key Recent Developments
Security Council members and PSC members have held annual joint consultative meetings since 2007, alternating between their respective headquarters. A joint communiqué has generally been issued following these annual meetings. The last meeting between members of the two Councils was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 8 September 2017, at which the situations in Somalia, South Sudan and the Lake Chad Basin were discussed. Other issues discussed included funding for AU peace and security activities and ways of further strengthening cooperation in the area of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction and development in Africa. The important role of women and youth in
the prevention and resolution of conflicts and peacebuilding was also reaffirmed, as was the importance of their meaningful participation in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace. Members of both bodies also resolved to forge a more coherent and effective partnership. The joint communiqué for the September 2017 meeting was transmitted to Council members on 7 June. It seems that during negotiations on the communiqué, there were considerable differences, particularly over language on the financing of AU missions and on South Sudan. There was a similar delay following the tenth annual joint meeting on 23 May 2016, the communiqué for which was not issued until 23 March 2017.

The agreed agenda for this year’s consultative meeting will be the situations in South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The informal consultation preceding the meeting is expected to cover various thematic issues, including partnerships between the two bodies, financing, and progress on the AU’s “Silencing the Guns by 2020” initiative and its related roadmap.

On 12 September 2017, the Council was briefed on the 2017 annual report of the Secretary-General on strengthening the partnership between the UN and the AU by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the AU, Haile Menkerios. During the briefing, Menkerios highlighted several points arising from the joint consultative meeting earlier that month, including that the partnership between the Security Council and AU PSC could be deepened through more frequent interactions, such as joint field missions to conflict situations on both Councils’ agendas; that the two Councils could interact ahead of mandate decisions to facilitate common approaches; and that Security Council briefings could be enriched by briefings from AU special representatives and envoys alongside their UN counterparts. He also stressed the need for the AU and UN to strengthen their collaboration with regional economic communities and by engaging nonstate actors. Financial burden-sharing should be in line with Security Council resolution 2320, he said, recalling that African countries had argued that they already carried the heavy burden of deploying to areas that the UN was unable to reach.

**Key Issues and Options**

A key issue continues to be the need for sustainable and predictable funding for AU peace support operations. A frank discussion of the limitations of the current structures in supporting AU peace support operations could help clarify positions on both sides and develop a better understanding of next steps, along with assessments of the observations and recommendations related to financing contained in the Secretary-General’s annual report.

An issue over the years has been the scripted nature of the joint consultative meeting. However, the informal session ahead of the consultative meeting has allowed for more substantive discussion, particularly on more controversial topics. Interaction during the formal session may be improved by moving away from statements to a more free-flowing discussion.

Sensitivities in the past regarding the agenda of the consultative meeting have related to the inclusion of more controversial issues, such as Western Sahara. Reaching agreement on the agenda this year appears to have been relatively smooth, but some members may want to raise more controversial country-specific situations in the informal session. A related issue is how to mutually strengthen the two Councils’ work on issues common to their respective agendas and allow for mutual reinforcement and more effective and timely interaction on specific African conflicts.

Another difficult issue is the inability over the past few years for the two Councils to agree on a joint communiqué in a timely manner and the effect this has had on the relevance and usefulness of the joint communiqué once issued. An option would be to reconsider this approach with a view to adopting a different outcome.

A further issue is revisiting the option of conducting joint field missions. As with the communiqué from the 2016 meeting, the most recent one does not refer to conducting joint field missions. The 2015 communiqué agreed to conduct a joint field mission that year, but it was never carried out.

**Council Dynamics**

Although there has been increasing acknowledgment of the importance of working with regional organisations in the area of peace and security, particularly in relation to conflict prevention, agreeing to and implementing joint communiqués has not always been easy.

The African members of the Council have been proactive about keeping alive matters of importance to the AU despite sometimes having divergent views on specific issues. They have consistently made clear that pursuing a substantive resolution on financing of AU support operations is a priority, with the possibility of proposing such a resolution before the end of this year.

Council members have disparate views regarding operations carried out by the AU. Those who are major financial contributors have concerns about committing UN assessed contributions to AU peace support operations, and are likely to take a cautious position on anything related to financing. Of the permanent members, China has been particularly supportive of the need to strengthen the capacity of the AU in peace and security.

At the 12 September 2017 briefing, the US emphasised it would not consider the use of UN assessed contributions for AU peacekeeping operations without the necessary financial, human rights and accountability benchmarks. While the Secretary-General’s most recent annual report was not available at press time, it is expected to focus on steps the AU has taken in developing and implementing such benchmarks. The extent of positive findings reflected in the report in this regard, as well as recent significant contributions made by AU member states, may influence Council members to reconsider their positions on the long-standing issue of financing.
Expected Council Action
In July, Mohammed Ibn Chambas, Special Representative and head of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), will brief the Council on recent developments and the semi-annual UNOWAS report.

Key Recent Developments
Terrorist and armed groups remain a major regional threat, particularly in the Sahel. The Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel)—comprising Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger—has continued working to deploy fully the joint force known as the FC-G5S that these countries created last year to combat terrorism and drug and human trafficking in the Sahel. The Secretary-General’s 8 May report on the FC-G5S said that the force’s establishment and the mobilisation of funding have “been slow and, at times, cumbersome”, maintaining that its operationalisation is not progressing fast enough, particularly against the backdrop of a worsening security situation. Following a 23 May briefing on the joint force, Council members issued a press statement expressing appreciation for the continued efforts of the G5 Sahel states towards the full operationalisation of the FC-G5S and insisting on the critical need for the swift disbursement of donors of all pledges.

In a 12 June statement, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mark Lowcock warned that the humanitarian situation in the Sahel had seen a “rapid deterioration” triggered by scarce and erratic rainfall in 2017. Lowcock said that nearly six million people were struggling to meet their daily food needs in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal, and that the situation was the worst it had been since the region’s extreme food crisis of 2012. He highlighted the increased likelihood of conflict between farmer communities and pastoralists, who had been forced to undertake their seasonal movement of livestock much earlier and further than usual.

In the Lake Chad Basin, terrorist group Boko Haram also remains a serious threat. On 1 May, two suicide bombers killed themselves and more than 60 others in Mubi South, Adamawa state, in north-eastern Nigeria. During Eid al-Fitr celebrations on 16 June, Boko Haram killed 43 in the town of Damboa in an attack using two suicide bombers, followed by militants firing rocket-propelled grenades into the crowds that had gathered at the scene. UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Nigeria Myrta Kaulard said in a statement condemning the incident that over 200 civilians had been killed in indiscriminate attacks in north-eastern Nigeria since the beginning of the year.

The humanitarian crisis created by the protracted conflict is among the most severe in the world, according to OCHA. At 25 May, there were 2.4 million people displaced by Boko Haram-related violence in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria and five million people at crisis and emergency levels of food insecurity.

Resolution 2349 on the Lake Chad Basin stressed the need to address development challenges and the root causes of the crisis. From 10 to 13 April in N’Djamena, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the AU held their second conference to develop a regional stabilisation strategy intended to address such issues as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; resettling internally displaced persons; the region’s socio-economic revitalisation; and education. A new platform called the Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum for Regional Cooperation on Stabilization, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Development held its inaugural meeting from 8 to 9 May in Maiduguri in order to foster cooperation among state and regional governors of the four countries affected by Boko Haram and to address common problems.

Herder-farmer violence in Nigeria—which killed 2,500 people in 2016, according to the International Crisis Group, and has been linked to demographic pressures and ecological changes—has continued. On 23 June, Fulani herders raided several towns in Plateau state, killing at least 86 people, prompting authorities to impose a curfew in parts of the state. Previously, Chambas participated in a 26 April meeting of ECOWAS Ministers of Security and Agriculture/Livestock on transhumance conflicts. UNOWAS has sought to increase its support to the regional body in addressing the problem since the ECOWAS Authority in December 2017 characterised the issue as constituting a new threat to regional security.

In other regional developments, Sierra Leone conducted general elections on 7 March and a presidential run-off on 31 March, electing as president Julius Maada Bio of the opposition Sierra Leone People’s Party. Chambas undertook several trips to the country and issued a number of statements during the electoral process, working closely with the different electoral observer missions, including the AU, ECOWAS and the EU.

The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) ended its operations at the end of March after almost 15 years. In a 19 April presidential statement on the completion of UNMIL, the Council requested UNOWAS to make available its good offices, as necessary, to the government of Liberia and the UN Resident Coordinator.

Key Issues and Options
The terrorism threat to West Africa and the Sahel and instability linked to transnational organised crime, such as human smuggling, are key issues for the Council. Initiatives to address these threats include the FC-G5S and the Multinational Joint Task Force, established by Lake Chad Basin countries to fight Boko Haram. They also include efforts to improve implementation of the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, including through a new Support Plan developed this year, which together seek to address structural causes of instability in the Sahel, such as poor governance, underdevelopment and climate change.

Following the Council’s 30 January presidential statement on West Africa and the Sahel, which reiterated its call for an assessment of the implementation of resolution 2349 to be integrated into regular UNOWAS reporting, the Lake Chad Basin crisis is expected to be covered in greater detail in the upcoming Secretary-General’s report.

Political tensions or forthcoming elections across the region, which have been triggers for violence in West Africa, continue to be important issues for UNOWAS.

Depending on the content of the Secretary-General’s report and the discussion
with Chambas, the Council may adopt a presidential statement that would, among other elements, express its support for the conflict prevention and good offices role of UNOWAS while reiterating support for initiatives to address the terrorism threat. Such a statement might further draw from the discussions during a Council meeting planned for earlier in July on Women, Peace and Security issues in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, such as emphasising the importance of gender-sensitive research, data and responses in the context of counter-terrorism operations.

Council Dynamics
Members view UNOWAS as playing a significant conflict-prevention role and have valued the good offices activities undertaken by Special Representative Chambas in addressing political crises and electoral tensions in recent years. Chambas frequently seeks close coordination in the messaging and actions of ECOWAS, the AU and the UN as part of such efforts. In considering the terrorism threat to the region, Council members often stress the importance of a holistic approach to the challenges facing Sahel and Lake Chad Basin countries, in addition to military action.

Côte d'Ivoire is the penholder on West Africa and the Sahel. It worked closely with Sweden in preparing the Council’s January presidential statement on West Africa and the Sahel.

Israel/Palestine

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council will hold its quarterly open debate under the agenda item “the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”, which will focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Key Recent Developments
Violence on the ground and political tensions continue to characterise developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At press time, 135 Palestinians have been killed in Gaza protests by Israeli security forces using live fire, rubber bullets and tear gas since 30 March. At least 60 Palestinians were killed along the Gaza fence on 14 May alone, the day the US held a public event to open its new embassy in Jerusalem. In his recent briefings to the Council, Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Nickolay Mladenov has said that Israel must exercise restraint and use lethal force only as a last resort “under imminent threat of death or serious injury”, while Hamas and other militants must refrain from committing acts of violence and creating provocations.

Tensions have been exacerbated by recent exchanges of mortar and rocket fire between Gaza and Israel and the use of incendiary balloons by Gazan militants. On 29 May, Hamas and Islamic Jihad launched nearly 200 mortars and rockets into Israel, which prompted Israel to attack targets belonging to the two groups in Gaza. On 19 June, Hamas launched 45 missiles into Israel in retaliation for Israeli strikes on Hamas facilities, reportedly prompted by the dispatch of flammable balloons into Israel by Hamas.

In recent months, the Council has been actively engaged on Israel-Palestine issues. Mladenov briefed the Council on 15 and 23 May regarding violence along the Gaza fence. On 30 May, he briefed on mortar and rocket attacks on Israel the day before. On 19 June, he presented to the Council the sixth quarterly report on the implementation of resolution 2334, covering the period from 26 March to 12 June. (Resolution 2334 called for an end to all Israeli settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territory and for immediate steps to prevent all acts of violence against civilians, including acts of terror.)

Mladenov’s 19 June briefing represented the first time that a written report served as a basis for the briefing, as all previous reports had been provided orally. In his briefing, Mladenov indicated that no steps had been taken by Israel during the reporting period to cease settlement activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

On 1 June, the Council voted on but failed to adopt two competing draft resolutions offering starkly contrasting views of the situation in Gaza and how to protect Palestinian civilians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The first, a Kuwaiti draft, contained three main elements: the protection of Palestinian civilians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, immediate steps to end restrictions imposed by Israel on movement and access into and out of Gaza, and engagement by the Secretary-General and Mladenov to assist in immediate efforts to de-escalate the situation and address urgent infrastructure, humanitarian and economic development needs in Gaza.

The US vetoed the text, which received ten affirmative votes and four abstentions (Ethiopia, the Netherlands, Poland and the UK). The second, a US draft, sought to focus responsibility for the violence in Gaza “on terrorist organizations such as Hamas”. This initially took the form of a text containing 31 proposed amendments to the Kuwaiti draft resolution, which the US agreed to convert into a draft resolution following consultations among members. The Council voted on the US draft following the vote on the Kuwaiti draft. The US cast the sole affirmative vote for its resolution; three members (Bolivia, Kuwait and Russia) voted against the draft, while the remaining members abstained.

On 13 June, Kuwait tabled a draft resolution in the General Assembly identical to the one vetoed in the Council. The General Assembly adopted the resolution by a vote of 120 to 8 with 45 abstentions. A US amendment that would have condemned Hamas for firing rockets into Israel and for inciting violence along the Gaza fence failed to pass: 59 member states supported the amendment, 78 voted against, and 26 abstained.

On 19 June, the US withdrew from the UN Human Rights Council, citing anti-Israel bias. A pledging conference was held for the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees (UNRWA) in New York on 25 June. The precise amount pledged had yet to be determined at press time. UNRWA currently faces a significant funding gap.

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 18 May, the Human Rights Council (HRC) held a special session on the deteriorating human rights situation in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem. At the special session, the HRC adopted resolution S-28/1 by 29 votes to two, with 14 abstentions. The resolution demanded that Israel "immediately and fully end its illegal closure of the occupied Gaza Strip" and decided to dispatch an independent, international commission of inquiry "to investigate all alleged violations and abuses of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory...to establish the facts and circumstances of the alleged violations and abuses, including those that may amount to war crimes; to identify those responsible; and to make recommendations, in particular on accountability measures". The resolution further requested the commission to present an oral update at the HRC’s 39th session in September and a final, written report at its 40th session in March 2019. (Of the six Security Council members on the HRC at the time of the vote, China, Côte d’Ivoire, and Peru voted yes; Ethiopia and the UK abstained; and the US voted no. Incoming Security Council members in 2019 Belgium and South Africa voted yes, and Germany abstained.)

Key Issues and Options
The overarching issue is determining what role the Council can play in de-escalating tensions and encouraging the resumption of peace talks between the parties in an increasingly difficult political and security context, defined by inflammatory rhetoric, heightened violence, mistrust, ongoing settlement activities, and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Five failed press statements and two failed draft resolutions on this issue since 30 March reflect longstanding gridlock, limiting options for Council action. Since all of these documents were proposed by either Kuwait or the US—which hold strongly contrasting views on Israel/Palestine—one possible option is for other members to take the lead in drafting outcomes, perhaps contributing to the perception that initial versions of drafts serve as a more balanced, objective basis for negotiation.

Council Dynamics
It is likely that tensions over Israel/Palestine will persist and that the US will continue to prevent any outcome in the Security Council that it believes challenges Israel. While there is a strong contrast in the views of the US and Kuwait on this issue, most members express viewpoints somewhere in between these two positions. One notable aspect of the recent discussions on Israel-Palestine is the differences among EU members with regard to the recent developments in Gaza. France and Sweden voted in favour of the Kuwaiti draft in the Security Council, while the Netherlands, Poland, and the UK abstained.

Somalia

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council is expected to renew its authorisation of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which expires on 31 July.

Somalia, and most particularly funding for AMISOM, may also be raised during the briefing on the Secretary-General’s annual report on ways to strengthen the partnership between the UN and AU on issues of peace and security in Africa (as it was last year), and possibly will be discussed during the annual joint meeting of Council members with the AU Peace and Security Council, also planned for July.

Key Recent Developments
On 30 August 2017, the Council adopted resolution 2372, renewing the authorisation of AMISOM until 31 May 2018. The resolution decided to reduce the number of uniformed AMISOM personnel in two phases. First, to a maximum level of 21,626 troops (a reduction of 500 from the previous authorisation) by 31 December 2017. The resolution also stipulated that this figure should include a minimum of 1,040 AMISOM police personnel including five formed police units. The second drawdown phase was outlined in the resolution, calling for a further reduction to 20,626 personnel by 30 October 2018, unless the Council decides to “accelerate the pace of the reduction, taking into account the capabilities of the Somali security forces thus far”.

The resolution also requested the AU and the UN to conduct a joint comprehensive assessment of AMISOM’s concept of operations by 15 April including recommendations on the progressive transition from AMISOM to Somali security responsibility, taking into account the capacities of the Somali security forces. The review was delayed until June. In order to allow for the consideration of the assessment report before a longer reauthorisation, the Council adopted resolution 2415 on 15 May, extending the mandate of AMISOM until 31 July in a “technical rollover”.

On 2 March, a summit of troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to the mission was held in Kampala. In a communiqué, the TCCs urged the Security Council to reconsider the draw-down of AMISOM, restore the mission to previous levels, and stop any further reduction of troops. They asserted that the timeframes and troop levels outlined in resolution 2372 were not realistic and would lead to a reversal of the gains made by AMISOM.

The government of Somalia adopted a transition plan for the Somali National Security Forces to take over security responsibilities from AMISOM, which includes provisions for institutional development and capacity building of Somali forces, support for activities relating to stabilisation and the prevention and countering of violent extremism, and identifying geographical areas where transition to Somali forces can be prioritised. The plan was endorsed by the AU and by international partners at the Somalia Security High-Level Meeting in Brussels on 2 May. The Somalia Partnership Forum will meet in Brussels on 26 June to discuss the plan further and, among other things, make
commitments to sustain progress in Somalia, including with regard to predictable funding for AMISOM and support for Somali security forces.

The Council adopted a presidential statement on Somalia on 7 June, welcoming the “conditions-based transition plan with clear target dates for the progressive transfer of security responsibilities” and calling for its effective implementation. The statement further reiterated the need to enhance “the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for African Union-led peace support operations” authorised by the Council and called for new and existing donors to support AMISOM.

In the regional context, tension between Somalia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) persists against the backdrop of accusations that the UAE’s relationship with the states that make up Somalia is undermining the federal government. On 8 April, Somali security services seized a $9.6 million cache of money at the Mogadishu airport that had arrived from Abu Dhabi. The UAE asserted that the money was to pay the salaries of Somali soldiers and trainees. The UAE has since ended its military training mission in Somalia and closed a hospital it operates in Mogadishu. On 9 May, the UAE sent a letter to the president of the Council, reaffirming its respect for Somali sovereignty. It added that its agreements with the Somali states were concluded on the basis of the powers vested in those states, and that the federal government should engage with the states to clarify the nature of those agreements. In this context, the 7 June presidential statement expressed concern over “internal and external pressures” undermining Somalia’s political unity.

The armed group Al-Shabaab continues to be a potent threat, as was highlighted by Special Representative and head of UNSOM Michael Keating in his briefing to the Council on 15 May. (The head of AMISOM, Francisco Madeira, also briefed.) On 6 June, for example, at least eight people, including two members of the Hirshabelle State parliament, were killed when Al-Shabaab militants ambushed a convoy near Mogadishu. On the same day, five police officers patrolling the Kenyan border were killed when their vehicle hit an improvised explosive device. A US soldier advising Somali and AMISOM forces was killed in an Al-Shabaab mortar attack in Jubaland on 8 June.

Sanctions-Related Developments
The Chair of the 751/1907 Somalia and Eritrea Sanctions Committee, Kairat Umarov (Kazakhstan), briefed the committee on 7 June on his 4-10 May visit to Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia, during which he was accompanied by representatives from Ethiopia, Kuwait, the Netherlands and Sweden. The delegation was unable to visit Eritrea. Umarov is expected to present his observations to the Council in August.

Human Rights-Related Developments
In a 4 May statement following a six-day trip to the country, the independent expert on human rights in Somalia, Bahame Tom Mukirya Nyanduga, condemned recent terrorist attacks in the country and called for the immediate release of all children kidnapped or recruited as fighters. “The abduction of children by the Al-Shabaab group and their recruitment and use by Government security forces in the armed conflict constitute a grave violation of the children’s rights”, he said. During the trip, Nyanduga met with Somali ministers, members of the judiciary, and civil society. He is expected to submit a report to the Human Rights Council at its 39th session in September.

Key Issues and Options
A key issue is ensuring that AMISOM retains the capability and means to strengthen and assist the Somali forces so that they can progressively take the lead in providing security while avoiding a premature handover of security responsibilities. Close-related is the need to secure predictable and sustainable funding for AMISOM and Somali security institutions throughout this process. The Council may choose to adopt language in support of direct UN funding for AMISOM during this transition period, or express the willingness to consider this possibility in the future.

On troop levels, the Council may choose to refrain from further troop reductions beyond those already scheduled in resolution 2372.

Council Dynamics
On Somalia generally, Council members are united in supporting state-building and in their support for AMISOM, as demonstrated by unified messages in the 7 June presidential statement. With respect to AMISOM, however, some Council members—such as Ethiopia, which is a TCC—have expressed concern over a premature drawdown of troops. Others, such as France and the US, have pushed in the past for shorter timeframes for reductions.

The AU continues to press the Council to do more to ensure predictable and sustainable funding for AMISOM. It appears that several Council members are in favour of providing direct funding to AMISOM through UN assessed contributions, on top of the logistical support given through the UN Support Office in Somalia and voluntary contributions through the UN trust fund for AMISOM. The US, however, remains opposed to the idea, with other members on the fence. Thus, including formulations in support of using assessed contributions in the upcoming resolution remains unlikely. During negotiations over the latest presidential statement, Council members were unable to agree on specific language on this issue beyond general support for sustainable funding, without committing the Council to any position.

The UK is the penholder on Somalia.
Democratic Republic of the Congo

Expected Council Action
In July, Special Representative Leila Zerrougui will brief the Council on the latest report on the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). The Secretary-General may brief the Council after his planned July visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); a civil society representative may brief as well. Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix is expected to attend the consultations that follow.

The DRC is also expected to be discussed during the joint annual meeting of Council members with the AU Peace and Security Council.

MONUSCO’s mandate expires on 31 March 2019.

Key Recent Developments
The deplorable security situation in the east persists. The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) Islamists rebel group continues to wreak havoc in North Kivu. Between 24 and 26 May, the ADF reportedly killed 11 civilians in the localities of Mbau-Kamango and Eringeti. In clashes with the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) that followed, five soldiers and 14 rebels were killed.

In Ituri, notably in the Djugu area, more than 260 people have died and more than 200,000 have fled their homes since December 2017 amid conflict between the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups. Between 1 January and 4 June, nearly 84,000 Congolese fled to Uganda, though the flow of refugees has slowed considerably since April.

There continue to be serious concerns on the political front in the DRC. President Joseph Kabila, whose second and final term (under the country’s constitution) ended in December 2016, remains in office. According to an agreement reached between Kabila and the opposition on 31 December 2016, elections were to be held by the end of 2017, and Kabila was not to run for a third term nor initiate amendments to the constitution. Citing logistical difficulties that prevented the elections from being held on 5 November 2017, the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) published a new electoral calendar for combined presidential, legislative and provincial elections to take place on 23 December 2018.

Kabila has refrained from declaring his intentions over the last year. On 7 June, parties from the ruling coalition formed a “grand political electoral coalition” named the Common Front for Congo (FCC), designed to “provide support for a single candidate for the presidential elections.” Kabila was named the FCC’s “moral authority”. On 12 June, however, Prime Minister Bruno Tshibala said that Kabila would respect the constitution and not seek another term. According to the electoral calendar, presidential candidates must register between 23 July and 8 August. Another figure who may re-enter politics in the DRC is former Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba. The ICC convicted Bemba in 2016 for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed as the leader of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo when his forces fought in an attempted coup in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2002 and 2003. On 8 June, the ICC overturned the verdict on appeal. Bemba was released from custody while he awaits his sentence on separate charges of bribing witnesses, expected on 4 July.

The latest Secretary-General’s report on political and technical progress towards the holding of elections in the DRC was released on 1 June. It noted considerable progress in respect to technical and legislative preparations for elections. At the same time, it expressed concern over the lack of implementation of confidence-building measures and in opening political space, considered critical to building consensus and creating an environment conducive to credible, transparent and inclusive elections. It called on the DRC government to lift its ban on political demonstrations to allow people to freely exercise their political and civil rights. Zerrougui briefed the Council on the report on 19 June under “any other business” via video teleconference.

The Council also urged the DRC to lift the ban on political demonstrations in resolution 2409 of 27 March and called on the DRC to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, especially those of peaceful assembly, and to exercise maximum restraint in responding to protests.

At press time, the Council was negotiating a presidential statement focused on the electoral process.

An ongoing issue of concern is the outbreak of Ebola in the DRC, with 59 suspected cases and 28 deaths reported by 20 June. Some of the confirmed cases occurred in Mbandaka, a city of over one million people. On 13 June, the Director-General of the World Health Organization said the situation has stabilised but is far from over.

Sanctions-Related Developments
At press time, the Council was negotiating a resolution on 29 June, renewing the sanctions regime until 1 July 2019 and the mandate of the Group of Experts assisting the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee until 1 August 2019.

Human Rights-Related Developments
A 4 June joint statement by the special rapporteur on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, the special rapporteur on human rights defenders, and the special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression urged the DRC to conduct a comprehensive review of a draft bill aimed at reducing the number of non-governmental organisations operating in the country. The statement voiced concern over provisions that impose burdensome requirements on NGOs for registration, as well as restrictions on access to domestic and foreign funding and on the possibility for foreign organisations to engage in political activities. During its 38th session, which began on 18 June and is scheduled to run until 6 July, the Human Rights Council (HRC) held an enhanced interactive dialogue to consider the report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation in the Kasai regions (A/HRC/38/31). At press time, the HRC was expected to adopt a resolution at the end of the session on technical assistance to the DRC and accountability concerning the events in the Kasai regions.

Key Issues and Options
The primary political issue for the Council in the upcoming period is ensuring that the elections take place as scheduled and that they are free and fair. The Council may choose to issue a presidential or press statement calling on the DRC to take action to guarantee that elections are held in a safe environment conducive to full public participation in the political process, including...
Democratic Republic of the Congo

reiterating its message on lifting the ban on political demonstrations.

Additionally, the Council may, in coordination with regional actors and particularly the AU, reiterate its call on all stakeholders to remain committed to the electoral calendar as the only way forward, and to refrain from violence.

The Council can utilise the sanctions regime by amending the listing criteria to include acts that hinder a free and fair electoral process and move to sanction actors who undermine the electoral process.

The Council is looking to visit the DRC later this summer to reinforce the importance of free, fair and timely elections and to assess the security situation and MONUSCO’s response to it. The Council has visited the DRC 13 times, with the first visit in 2000 and the most recent in November 2016.

Council and Wider Dynamics
All Council members remain concerned about the ongoing political crisis and the dire security situation. There is consensus about the imperative of holding elections on 23 December without further delays, in alignment with the position of regional actors. There is also general agreement that the Council should remain focused on the DRC throughout the year, including through a possible Council mission, which may take place late this summer.

Differences between Council members persist, however, regarding their assessment of the nature of the political crisis, with some seeing it as a constitutional issue and others as one with wider national and regional implications. Some of these latter Council members, such as France and the US, have publicly called on Kabila to step down. Some Council members are concerned that while logistical preparations for the elections are, on the whole, progressing as scheduled, the DRC has done little to guarantee that elections will be free, fair and inclusive.

France is the penholder on the DRC, and Kuwait chairs the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee.

Colombia

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council will receive a briefing from Special Representative Jean Arnault on the Secretary-General’s 90-day report on the UN Verification Mission in Colombia. Consultations are expected to follow the briefing.

The mandate of the verification mission expires on 26 September 2018.

Key Recent Developments
The UN Verification Mission has continued to implement its mandate to verify the political, economic and social reintegration of the former members of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP), as well as the upholding of security guarantees. The implementation of the peace-related legislative agenda has been slowed down by the holding of legislative elections in March and presidential elections in May and June.

On 17 June, Iván Duque—the candidate of Centro Democrático, which has been critical of the peace agreement—won with 54 percent of the vote in the second round of the presidential elections. The other candidate, Gustavo Petro—a former member of the M-19 guerrilla group, which was demobilised in 1990—received 41.8 percent. During the campaign, Duque said he was committed not to terminate the peace agreement but to propose certain “corrections”. Areas that the new administration, which will take office in August, may aim to modify include provisions related to the reach of transitional justice, land reform and how to deal with the cultivation of coca.

Political divisions have prevented rapid approval by Congress of the procedures of the justice component of the transitional justice system, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP). Another controversial issue has been the April detention of one of the leaders of the FARC-EP, Seuxis Hernández (aka Jesús Santrich), on drug-trafficking charges following an indictment by the US. On 17 May, the SJP requested more information regarding the timing of the alleged crimes, which could be subject to amnesty if they took place before the signing of the agreement in December 2016. The US stated that the crimes were allegedly committed afterwards, and formally requested his extradition on 7 June.

Fragile security conditions for former FARC-EP members outside some of the 26 territorial areas for training and reintegation continue to pose a challenge to the former fighters’ reincorporation into civilian life. Attacks against former members and their family members have persisted. FARC-EP dissident groups have continued attacks, including trans-border operations into Ecuador. Other armed groups that are filling the vacuum left in the large areas formerly under the influence of FARC-EP continue to be a threat to communities. Human rights defenders have been targeted as well, with 121 killed in 2017, according to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia.

Speaking to the Council on 17 April, Vice President Oskar Naranjo highlighted the contradiction that, although the country has achieved the lowest murder rate in 42 years, there has been an increase in the number of rural leaders killed.

The socioeconomic reintegration of the 14,000 former combatants through the establishment of productive projects and other forms of income generation continues to be a challenge. Briefing the Council on 17 April, Arnault stressed the need to prioritise the reintegration of former combatants before the end of the current government’s mandate to prevent the drift of some ex-combatants into criminal groups. In a press statement adopted
Colombia

later that day, Council members welcomed positive developments and expressed concern about the continued insecurity in some of the conflict-affected areas, in particular the killings of community and social leaders.

Talks between the government and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) resumed in Cuba on 10 May after Ecuador refused to continue to host them after actions by another militia resulted in the kidnapping and killing of two Ecuadorian journalists in the Colombia border region. Although the ELN upheld unilateral ceasefires for the legislative and presidential elections, the parties have failed to agree to a new bilateral ceasefire, such as the temporary one from October 2017 to January 2018. During the campaign, Duque expressed the need for preconditions for the government to remain at the negotiating table with the ELN. Given the role that the UN Verification Mission played in the monitoring and verification of an earlier bilateral ceasefire with the ELN, Council members are expected to follow these negotiations closely.

Human Rights-Related Developments

In a 26 May statement, High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein welcomed the signing by all five Colombian presidential candidates of The Agreement on Human Rights, in which they pledge that “there will be a special emphasis to respect, protect, and guarantee human rights.” “We believe this is the first time ever, anywhere, that every single presidential candidate has signed up to such an unequivocal formal pledge to uphold human rights”, Zeid said. The pledge, facilitated by the UN Human Rights Office in Colombia, also notes the need to avoid “the assassination of leaders, rural leaders and human rights defenders”, to lead to “true political, economic and social inclusion in the country”.

Key Issues and Options

An important issue is ensuring that the peace agreement is implemented in its entirety despite the change in government. When Council members visited Colombia in May 2017, they expressed unanimous support for the agreement and during meetings with representatives of the main political parties stressed the need to ensure its irreversibility.

The government’s ability to develop a well-resourced strategy for reintegrating FARC-EP members into society and to provide safety and security in areas formerly occupied by the FARC-EP continue to be critical issues in ensuring successful implementation of the agreement. Once the new administration takes office, Council members could consider holding an Arria-formula meeting with government representatives and former FARC-EP members, who could brief by video teleconference, on their assessment of how the commitments made in the agreement are to be carried out in this new phase.

Council Dynamics

Council members are unified in their support of the peace process in Colombia. Several members have viewed engagement in Colombia as a rare bright spot for the Council as it struggles to play an effective role in several other conflict situations. However, some members have expressed concerns in private about the future of the agreement following the elections.

The current context represents a significant change in the role that the two successive UN missions have been playing since the government of Colombia requested the Council’s involvement in January 2016. The mission, with the Council’s close attention and support, could be in a position to use its leverage to sustain key provisions of the agreement in a moment of uncertainty in order to reassure Colombians about the irreversibility of the process.

The UK is the penholder on Colombia.

Lebanon (1701)

Expected Council Action

In July, Acting UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Pernille Dahlker Kardel and Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix will brief Council members in consultations on the latest Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of resolution 1701, which called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006.

The mandate of the UNIFIL expires on 31 August.

Key Recent Developments

On 6 May, Lebanon held its first parliamentary elections since 2009. For almost nine years, the parliament had retained the same composition by extending its mandate and postponing elections, mainly because of security concerns. In this context, the 6 May elections represented a milestone for the country. The International Support Group for Lebanon, which consists of the UN, China, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK, the US, the EU and the Arab League, welcomed the elections and emphasised their significance in renewing the democratic mandate of the parliament.

The Future Movement led by Prime Minister Saad Hariri suffered a significant setback in the elections, retaining only 20 of the 33 seats held previously. While Hezbollah won 12 seats, the parties and individuals that are aligned with it to varying degrees secured another 58 seats. This will translate into substantial parliamentary influence for this grouping of parties, given that they now control 70 of the 128 seats in the parliament. Among the parties that are closely aligned with Hezbollah, the Free Patriotic Movement led by President Michel Aoun won 20 seats and the Amal Movement led by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri won 13 seats.

Berri, who has served as the speaker of the parliament since 1992, was re-elected on 23 May after winning the support of 98 representatives. The same day, they elected Elie Ferzli, also an ally of Hezbollah, to the post of deputy speaker. On 24 May, President Aoun, backed by 111 out of 128 representatives, designated Hariri as prime minister and put him in charge of creating the new government.

Lebanon (1701)

In addition to an array of socio-economic issues facing Lebanon, the country continues to carry the burden of hosting more than one million refugees from Syria. Last year, President Aoun warned that Lebanon lacked the capacity to cope with the vast number of refugees from Syria and said that he wanted to explore ways to facilitate their return. On 7 June, Lebanese Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil accused UNHCR of hindering the voluntary return of Syrian refugees by disseminating the information that the situation in Syria is still not secure. The following day, Bassil initiated a freeze on residency permits for UNHCR staff in Lebanon. UNHCR has denied Bassil’s claims and emphasized that it does not seek to influence refugees’ decisions about returning to Syria but only tries to make sure that they are well informed prior to making decisions.

On 28 May, UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) head of mission and force commander Major General Michael Beary presided over a meeting with senior officials from the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Israel Defense Forces. Among the issues discussed was UNIFIL’s liaison and coordination activities along the Blue Line, the border demarcation between Israel and Lebanon. At the meeting, Beary said he was pleased by the ongoing commitment by both parties to act in accordance with resolution 1701 and to preserve stability along the Blue Line. He also emphasized the importance of holding tripartite meetings to find solutions for emerging issues and prevent misunderstandings that could lead to increased tensions.

Key Issues and Options

The situation in UNIFIL’s area of operations has remained generally calm; however, the Council remains concerned about the lack of progress towards implementing the main objectives of resolution 1701, including a permanent ceasefire, more than a decade after its adoption. A principal problem for the Council is that Hezbollah and other non-state actors still maintain significant amounts of weaponry. This inhibits the government’s ability to exercise full authority over its territory, poses a threat to Lebanon’s sovereignty and stability, and contravenes its obligations under resolutions 1559 and 1701. A related issue is Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian civil war and the movement of arms from Syria to Hezbollah.

Last year’s UNIFIL renewal resolution requested the Secretary-General to look at ways to enhance the mission’s visible presence, patrols and inspections. Some Council members might be interested to hear more on this issue. The Council could brief by a resolution focusing on whether and how UNIFIL’s work has changed since the adoption of the renewal resolution and what impact this has had on the overall security situation.

Council Dynamics

While the Council continues to support UNIFIL and values its contribution to stability in the region and between Israel and Lebanon, some members differ in their perception of the mission’s role. The US in particular has become increasingly critical of UNIFIL. It has been vocal about what it believes is the rising threat of Hezbollah and its proliferation of weapons, and has advocated for a more proactive role for the mission in confronting this threat. At the last mandate renewal, France and some other members were cautious about the prospects for a more proactive approach by the mission, afraid that this could threaten the fragile calm in southern Lebanon that has been maintained for more than ten years. There is a general consensus among Council members, however, in favour of supporting Lebanon’s territorial integrity and security, condemning acts of terrorism, and recognizing the crucial role the LAF plays in responding to security challenges.

France is the penholder on Lebanon.

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**The Security Council Veto, 1998-Present**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Vote</th>
<th>Veto(es)</th>
<th>Abstention(S)</th>
<th>Affirmative votes</th>
<th>Meeting Record</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 June 2018</td>
<td>The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question ([S/2018/516])</td>
<td>10-1-4</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Netherlands, Poland and UK</td>
<td>Bolivia, China, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Peru, Russia and Sweden</td>
<td>S/PV.8274</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 April 2018</td>
<td>Middle East (Syria) ([S/2018/321])</td>
<td>12-2-1</td>
<td>Russia (Bolivia voted against)</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, UK, US</td>
<td>S/PV.8228</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 December 2017</td>
<td>Israel/Palestine: reaffirmed that any decisions and actions that purport to have altered the status of Jerusalem have no legal effect, are null and void and must be rescinded ([S/2017/1060])</td>
<td>14-1-0</td>
<td>US</td>
<td></td>
<td>China, Bolivia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Italy, Japan, Russia, Senegal, Sweden, Ukraine, UK, US, Uruguay</td>
<td>S/PV.8139</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Vote</td>
<td>Veto(es)</td>
<td>Abstention(S)</td>
<td>Affirmative votes</td>
<td>Meeting Record</td>
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<td>17 November 2017</td>
<td>Middle East (Syria) (S/2017/970)</td>
<td>12-2-1</td>
<td>Russia (Bolivia voted against)</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Italy, Japan, Senegal, Sweden, Ukraine, UK, US, Uruguay</td>
<td>S/PV.8107</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 November 2017</td>
<td>Middle East (Syria) (S/2017/979)</td>
<td>11-2-2</td>
<td>Russia (Bolivia voted against)</td>
<td>China, Egypt</td>
<td>Ethiopia, France, Kazakhstan, Italy, Japan, Senegal, Sweden, Ukraine, UK, US, Uruguay</td>
<td>S/PV.8105</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 October 2017</td>
<td>Middle East (Syria) (S/2017/884)</td>
<td>11-2-2</td>
<td>Russia (Bolivia voted against)</td>
<td>China, Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Italy, Japan, Senegal, Sweden, Ukraine, UK, US, Uruguay</td>
<td>S/PV.8073</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 April 2017</td>
<td>Middle East (Syria) (S/2017/315)</td>
<td>10-2-3</td>
<td>Russia (Bolivia voted against)</td>
<td>China, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Egypt, France, Italy, Japan, Senegal, Sweden, Ukraine, UK, US, Uruguay</td>
<td>S/PV.7922</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 February 2017</td>
<td>Middle East (Syria) (S/2017/172)</td>
<td>9-3-3</td>
<td>China, Russia (Bolivia voted against)</td>
<td>Egypt, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan</td>
<td>France, Italy, Japan, Senegal, Sweden, Ukraine, UK, US</td>
<td>S/PV.7893</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 December 2016</td>
<td>Syria: called for an end to all attacks in Aleppo for 7 days (S/2016/1026)</td>
<td>11-3-1</td>
<td>China, Russia (Venezuela voted against)</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Egypt, France, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Senegal, Spain, Ukraine, UK, US, Uruguay</td>
<td>S/PV.7825</td>
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<td>8 October 2016</td>
<td>Middle East (Syria) (S/2016/846)</td>
<td>11-2-2</td>
<td>Russia (Venezuela voted against)</td>
<td>Angola, China</td>
<td>Egypt, France, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Senegal, Spain, Ukraine, UK, US, Uruguay</td>
<td>S/PV.7785</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 July 2015</td>
<td>MH17 Tribunal (S/2015/562)</td>
<td>11-1-3</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Angola, China, Venezuela</td>
<td>Chad, Chile, France, Jordan, Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Spain, UK, US</td>
<td>S/PV.7498</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 July 2015</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina: the 20th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide (S/2015/508)</td>
<td>10-1-4</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Angola, China, Nigeria, Venezuela</td>
<td>Chad, Chile, France, Jordan, Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, Spain, UK, US</td>
<td>S/PV.7481</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 May 2014</td>
<td>Syria: referred Syria to the ICC (S/2014/348)</td>
<td>13-2-0</td>
<td>China, Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Argentina, Australia, Chad, Chile, France, Jordan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, US</td>
<td>S/PV.7180</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 March 2014</td>
<td>Declared as invalid a referendum in Crimea, Ukraine</td>
<td>13-1-1</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Argentina, Australia, Chad, Chile, France, Jordan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, US</td>
<td>S/PV.7138</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 July 2012</td>
<td>Syria: endorsed the 30 June 2012 Geneva communique on a Syrian-led political transition, renewed UNSMIS for 45 days and threatened sanctions if the Syrian government did not cease the use of heavy weapons and withdraw from population centres within 10 days (S/2012/547/Rev.2)</td>
<td>11-2-2</td>
<td>China, Russia</td>
<td>Pakistan, South Africa</td>
<td>Azerbaijan, Colombia, France, Germany, Guatemala, India, Morocco, Portugal, Togo, UK, US</td>
<td>S/PV.6810</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 February 2012</td>
<td>Syria: condemned human rights violations and supported the Arab League's 22 January 2012 decision for political transition (S/2012/777)</td>
<td>13-2-0</td>
<td>China, Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Azerbaijan, Colombia, France, Germany, Guatemala, India, Morocco, Pakistan, Portugal, South Africa, Togo, UK, US</td>
<td>S/PV.6711</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<td>Vote</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 October 2011</td>
<td>Syria: condemned human rights violations by the Syrian authorities (S/2011/612)</td>
<td>9-2-4</td>
<td>China, Russia</td>
<td>Brazil, India, Lebanon, South Africa</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, France, Gabon, Germany, Nigeria, Portugal, UK, US</td>
<td>S/PV6627</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 February 2011</td>
<td>Israel/Palestine: condemned Israeli settlement activities (S/2011/24)</td>
<td>14-1-0</td>
<td>US</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, China, Colombia, France, Gabon, Germany, India, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, UK</td>
<td>S/PV6484</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>No Vetoes</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>15 June 2009</td>
<td>Georgia: on the extension of the UN observer mission's mandate in Georgia and Abkhazia (S/2009/310)</td>
<td>10-1-4</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>China, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Uganda, Viet Nam</td>
<td>Austria, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Japan, Mexico, Turkey, UK, US</td>
<td>S/PV6143</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 July 2008</td>
<td>Zimbabwe: condemned the violence by the Government of Zimbabwe against civilians after the elections of 27 June and demanded an immediate end to attacks against and intimidation of opposition members and supporters (S/2008/447)</td>
<td>9-5-1</td>
<td>China, Russia (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, South Africa, Viet Nam voted against)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Belgium, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Italy, Panama, UK, US</td>
<td>S/PV5933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 January 2007</td>
<td>Myanmar: called on Myanmar to cease military attacks against civilians in ethnic minority regions and to put an end to the associated human rights and humanitarian law violations (S/2007/14)</td>
<td>9-3-3</td>
<td>China, Russia (South Africa voted against)</td>
<td>Congo, Indonesia, Qatar</td>
<td>Belgium, France, Ghana, Italy, Panama, Peru, Slovakia, UK, US</td>
<td>S/PV5619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 November 2006</td>
<td>Israel/Palestine: on the Israeli military operations in Gaza, the Palestinian rocket fire into Israel, and called for immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from within the Gaza Strip to positions prior to 28 June 2006 (S/2006/878)</td>
<td>10-1-4</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Denmark, Japan, Slovakia, UK</td>
<td>Argentina, China, Congo, France, Ghana, Greece, Peru, Qatar, Russia, United Republic of Tanzania</td>
<td>S/PV5565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 July 2006</td>
<td>Israel/Palestine: demanded the unconditional release of an Israeli soldier captured earlier, as well as Israel's immediate withdrawal from Gaza and the release of dozens of Palestinian officials detained by Israel (S/2006/508)</td>
<td>10-1-4</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Denmark, Peru, Slovakia, UK</td>
<td>Argentina, China, Congo, France, Ghana, Greece, Japan, Qatar, Russia, United Republic of Tanzania</td>
<td>S/PV5488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>No Vetoes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5 October 2004</td>
<td>Israel/Palestine: demanded Israel halt all military operations in northern Gaza and withdraw from the area (S/2004/783)</td>
<td>11-1-3</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Germany, Romania, UK</td>
<td>Algeria, Angola, Benin, Brazil, Chile, China, France, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Spain</td>
<td>S/PV5051</td>
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## The Security Council Veto, 1998-Present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Vote</th>
<th>Veto(es)</th>
<th>Abstention(S)</th>
<th>Affirmative votes</th>
<th>Meeting Record</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 April 2004</td>
<td>Cyprus: on the termination of the mandate of UNFICYP and its replacement with UNSIMIC (S/2004/313)</td>
<td>14-1-0</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Algeria, Angola, Benin, Brazil, Chile, China, France, Germany, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Spain, UK, US</td>
<td>S/PV.4947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 March 2004</td>
<td>Israel/Palestine: on the condemnation of the killing of Ahmed Yassin, the leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas (S/2004/240)</td>
<td>11-1-3</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Germany, Romania, UK</td>
<td>Algeria, Angola, Benin, Brazil, Chile, China, France, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Spain</td>
<td>S/PV.4934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 October 2003</td>
<td>Israel/Palestine: on the security wall built by Israel in the West Bank (S/2003/980)</td>
<td>10-1-4</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Cameroon, Germany, UK</td>
<td>Angola, Chile, China, France, Guinea, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Spain, Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>S/PV.4842</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 September 2003</td>
<td>Israel/Palestine: on the Israeli decision to “remove” Palestinian Authority leader Yasser Arafat (S/2003/891)</td>
<td>11-1-3</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Germany, UK</td>
<td>Angola, Cameroon, Chile, China, France, Guinea, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Spain, Syrian Arab Republic</td>
<td>S/PV.4828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 December 2002</td>
<td>Israel: on the killing by Israeli forces of several UN employees and the destruction of the WFP warehouse (S/2002/1385)</td>
<td>12-1-2</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Cameroun</td>
<td>China, Colombia, France, Ireland, Mauritius, Mexico, Norway, Russia, Singapore, Syrian Arab Republic, UK</td>
<td>S/PV.4681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June 2002</td>
<td>Bosnia: on the renewal of the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and the immunity of US peacekeepers from ICC jurisdiction (S/2002/712)</td>
<td>13-1-1</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Cameroon, China, Colombia, France, Ireland, Mauritius, Mexico, Norway, Russia, Singapore, Syrian Arab Republic, UK</td>
<td>S/PV.4563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 December 2001</td>
<td>Israel/Palestine: condemned acts of terror against Palestinian and Israeli civilians (S/2001/1939)</td>
<td>12-1-2</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Norway, UK</td>
<td>Bangladesh, China, Colombia, France, Ireland, Jamaica, Mali, Mauritius, Russia, Singapore, Tunisia, Ukraine</td>
<td>S/PV.4438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 March 2001</td>
<td>Israel/Palestine: on establishing a UN observer force to protect Palestinian civilians (S/2001/270)</td>
<td>9-1-4</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>France, Ireland, Norway, UK</td>
<td>Bangladesh, China, Colombia, Jamaica, Mali, Mauritius, Russia, Singapore, Tunisia</td>
<td>S/PV.4305</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>No Vetoes</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 February 1999</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: on the extension of UNPREDEP in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (S/1999/201)</td>
<td>13-1-1</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, France, Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia, Namibia, Netherlands, Slovenia, UK, US</td>
<td>S/PV.3982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>No Vetoes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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* A complete table of Security Council vetos since 1946 can be found on our website at www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php.