New Zealand will hold the Council’s presidency in July and is planning an open debate on the peace and security challenges facing small island developing states, to be presided over by its Foreign Minister, Murray McCully, with Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the prime ministers of Samoa and Jamaica and the finance minister of the Seychelles expected as briefers. There will also be the quarterly open debate on Israel/Palestine, with Foreign Minister McCully presiding and a briefing by Special Coordinator Nickolay Mladenov.

Briefings are expected:
- on Bosnia and Herzegovina, marking the 20th anniversary of the genocide at Srebrenica and other locations in the region, by Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson and High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein; and
- possibly also on the Secretary-General’s most recent report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.

Briefings, followed by consultations, are expected on:
- the situation in Burundi, by High Commissioner Al Hussein and Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman;
- Libya by the head of the UN Support Mission in Libya, Bernardino León, and by Ambassador Ramlan Ibrahim (Malaysia) on the work of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee (postponed from June);
- the implementation of resolution 2046 on Sudan/South Sudan issues by Special Envoy Haile Menkerios;
- the implementation of resolution 1701 regarding Lebanon, by Special Coordinator Sigrid Kaag and Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet;
- the situation in Cyprus, by Lisa Buttenheim, head of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and Espen Barth Eide, the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Cyprus; and
- the work of the 751/1907 Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee by its chair, Ambassador Rafael Darío Ramírez Carreño (Venezuela).

Formal sessions will be needed to adopt resolutions to renew the mandates of:
- UNSOM in Somalia;
- UNISFA in Abyei;
- UNAMI in Iraq; and
- UNFICYP in Cyprus.

Throughout the month members will be following developments in South Sudan, Ukraine, Yemen, the Boko Haram-affected areas of Africa and the migrant crisis, and additional meetings may be scheduled. The Council may also begin discussions of the reports by the panels reviewing UN peace operations and UN peacebuilding.
Yemen
On 2 June, Council members issued a press statement expressing disappointment that the 28 May Geneva talks were postponed (SC/11915). The statement urged Yemeni stakeholders to engage in talks without preconditions and in good faith, and endorsed the Secretary-General’s call for humanitarian pauses. The next day, Special Envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed (via video teleconference) and Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs Stephen O’Brien briefed Council members on Yemen under “any other business” in consultations. On 18 June, Council members issued a press statement condemning the 17 June terrorist attacks in Sana’a (SC/11935). On 24 June, Ould Cheikh Ahmed and OCHA Operations Director John Ging briefed Council members in consultations following the conclusion of the Geneva talks. The next day, Council members issued a press statement taking note of the ‘principles’ for advancing UN-brokered consultations, and again endorsing the Secretary-General’s call for humanitarian pauses (SC/11944).

Iran
The final report under resolution 2159 from the Panel of Experts assisting the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee was issued as a public document on 2 June (S/2015/401). On 9 June, the Security Council adopted resolution 2224, extending the mandate of the Panel for another 13 months until 9 July 2016. On 23 June the chair of the Committee, Ambassador Román Oyarzun (Spain), presented his quarterly report to the Council on the work of the Committee (S/2015/7469). While reiterating the Committee’s support for the ongoing negotiations between Iran and the P5+1, Oyarzun emphasised that the sanctions measures imposed by the Council remained in full effect, reminded states of their obligations to implement them and said the Committee remained fully committed to the implementation of all relevant resolutions. On 11 June, the latest report from the IAEA on Iran was circulated as a Council document (S/2015/425).

International Criminal Tribunals
On 3 June, the Council held its semi-annual debate on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in which the respective presidents and prosecutors of these bodies briefed, as well as the president and prosecutor of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (S/PV.7455). The meeting focused on the completion strategy reports submitted by both Tribunals (S/2015/340 and S/2015/342) and the report from the Residual Mechanism (S/2015/341), the handover of activities to the Residual Mechanism, the need to find a satisfactory solution to the relocation of persons released or acquitted by the ICTR and the need to ensure individuals indicted by the ICTR, but not yet arrested, are apprehended.

Ukraine
On 5 June, the Council was briefed on the situation in Ukraine by Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman and the Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Alexander Hug (S/PV.7457). Lithuania requested the meeting following the significant increase in violence in the Donetsk region in the town of Marinka. Feltman updated the Council on the Secretary-General’s visits to Ukraine and Russia as well as the humanitarian situation in Ukraine. Hug briefed the Council on violations and the current state of the implementation of the Minsk package of measures adopted on 12 February.

Côte d’Ivoire
On 9 June, the Council held a briefing (S/PV.7459), followed by consultations, to consider the UNOCI report (S/2015/320). During the briefing, Special Representative and head of UNOCI, Aïchatou Mindaoudou, expressed the importance of “the creation of a peaceful and enabling environment in the lead-up to, during and after the presidential elections” scheduled for October. On 25 June, the Council adopted resolution 2226 extending the mandate of UNOCI for an additional year.

Sudan (Darfur)
On 10 June, the Council held a briefing (S/PV.7460), followed by consultations, on the situation in Darfur and the UNAMID report (S/2015/378). During the briefing, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet told the Council that there had been “limited progress in the peace process” and described the “devastating impact that the security situation…had on innocent civilians”. On 29 June, the Council adopted resolution 2228 renewing the mandate of UNAMID for an additional year. A closed Arria-formula meeting was held on 19 June on the human rights situation in Darfur, which was intended to mark the 10th anniversary of the Commission of Inquiry report on Darfur, submitted to the Council on 31 January 2005 (S/2005/60). Former Commission member Hina Jilani; Abdelrahman Gasim of the Darfur Bar Association; and Hawa Abdalla, an IDP camp leader and activist on women’s issues, briefed. ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda provided the semi-annual briefing on the Court’s work with respect to Darfur on 29 June (S/PV.7478).

UNOCA/LRA
On 11 June, the Council was briefed by Special Representative Abdoulaye Bathily on the UNOCA report (S/2015/339) and the implementation of the regional strategy to combat the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) (S/PV.7461). The Council adopted a presidential statement expressing its concern at the grave security situation in parts of Central Africa, in particular the ongoing crisis in the Central African Republic and its regional impact, the continuing threat of the LRA and the terrorist activities of Boko Haram (S/PRST/2015/12).

Counter-Terrorism
On 16 June, the Council received the semi-annual joint briefing by the chairs of its three counter-terrorism-related committees (S/PV.7463). The briefers were Ambassador Gerard van Bohemen (New Zealand), chair of the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee; Ambassador Raimonda Murmokaitė (Lithuania), chair of the 1373
Counter-Terrorism Committee; and Ambassador Román Oyarzun (Spain), chair of the 1540 Committee on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In a press statement on the comprehensive review of the implementation of resolution 1540 following the briefing, Council members welcomed the 1540 Committee’s process for the comprehensive review (SC/11929). They noted that the review process started on 28 April when the modalities were formally approved by the Committee and must be completed before 30 November 2016 as decided by resolution 1977. On 18 June the Council received a letter from the informal group of like-minded states on targeted sanctions (Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) expressing concern about the risk of a vacancy in the Office of the Ombudsperson of the 1267 Committee if a successor to Kimberly Prost was not appointed in a timely manner. The group also noted that its request to speak at the 16 June briefing had been refused and therefore submitted the statement it had wanted to deliver as an attachment to the letter (S/2015/459).

**Children and Armed Conflict**

On 18 June, the Security Council held an open debate focused on the Secretary-General’s annual report on children and armed conflict (S/2015/409) and the issue of abduction of children (S/PV.7466). It adopted resolution 2225 which added abductions as an additional violation to trigger inclusion of a party in the annexes of the Secretary-General’s annual report. Malaysian Foreign Minister Dato’ Sri Anifah Aman presided with briefings by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict Leila Zerrougui and Deputy Executive Director of UNICEF Yoka Brandt, as well as Director of Facilitation for Peace and Development Eunice Apio. The concept note suggested the debate focus on how the international community’s response can be strengthened to address abduction of children in armed conflict (S/2015/402).

**Mali**

On 18 June, Council members issued a press statement reiterating their support to the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and looking forward to its signing by the Coordination armed groups (SC/11934). On 23 June, the Council was briefed by Special Representative Mongi Hamdi on the Secretary-General’s MINUSMA report (S/2015/426) and the 20 June signing of the peace agreement by the Coordination, thereby completing the signing process (S/PV.7468). The Foreign Minister of Mali, Abdoulaye Diop, also participated in the meeting. On 29 June, the Council adopted resolution 2227 renewing MINUSMA.

**Afghanistan**

The Council held its quarterly debate on UNAMA on 22 June with Special Representative Nicholas Haysom briefing (S/PV.7467) on the situation in Afghanistan and the UNAMA report (S/2015/422). Haysom said that political progress had been achieved with the appointment of all cabinet members, but expressed concern with the challenging security situation, describing the infiltration of foreign terrorist fighters into the country. A press statement was issued by Council members on 22 June condemning the terrorist attack by the Taliban on the parliament in Kabul (SC/11937).

**Peacebuilding**

On 25 June, the Council was briefed by Olof Skoog (Sweden) and Antonio de Aguiar Patriota (Brazil), the current and former chairs of the PBC on the eighth annual Peacebuilding report (S/2015/174). After the briefing, Council members held an informal interactive dialogue with all six chairs of the PBC country-configurations and representatives of the PBC agenda countries. Also participating were Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support Oscar Fernandez-Tarranco and UN Women Executive Director Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka. Members of the Advisory Group of Experts on the 2015 Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and the High-Level Panel on Peace Operations also participated, as did representatives from DPA, DPKO and UNDP.

**Terrorism**

On 26 June, Council members issued a press statement condemning terrorist attacks against a chemical products factory in France; a bomb attack in a Shi’a mosque in Kuwait; and gunmen attacking a tourist hotel in Tunisia (SC/11947).

**UNDOF (Golan Heights)**

On 29 June, the Council adopted resolution 2229 renewing UNDOF for six months after considering the Secretary-General’s latest report on the observer mission during 23 June consultations (S/2015/405). Separately, Major General Michael Finn briefed the Council on peacekeeping on 17 June on how national caveats impact UNTSO’s ability provide UNDOF with military observers able to deploy to the Syrian side of the area of separation (S/PV.7464).

**Climate Change**

On 30 June, Malaysia and Spain organised an Arria-formula meeting on the role of climate change as a threat multiplier for global security. The panel featured Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson and the President of Kiribati Anote Tong.

**Egypt**

Burundi

Expected Council Action

Burundi is likely to be watched closely by the Council during July. A briefing by High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein has been scheduled and the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs is also expected to brief. Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland), the chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), may also brief the Council.

Key Recent Developments

Council members met six times to discuss the situation in the country after incumbent President Pierre Nkurunziza’s 25 April announcement that he would run in the presidential election. During this period, they received 16 communications from the Burundian government. The constitutionality of Nkurunziza’s running for a third term has been widely questioned. During the Council’s visit to Burundi on 13 March, several Council members stressed to Nkurunziza that a third term would be very divisive and a risk to Burundi’s stability.

Violence has indeed prevailed in Burundi since late April. According to the Association for the Protection of Human Rights and Detained Persons, a Burundi-based group, at least 77 civilians have been killed in clashes with security forces, over 1,000 people have been arrested and dozens of prisoners tortured. Burundi police, who have also suffered casualties, have denied torture allegations. The crisis has resulted in some 100,000 Burundians fleeing to neighbouring countries. There have been reports of reprisals against the protestors by the Imbonerakure, the youth wing of Burundi’s ruling party, which the government has been accused of arming. A failed 13 May coup attempt by Burundi’s former head of intelligence Major-General Godefroid Niyombare, sacked in February for his opposition to Nkurunziza’s third term, has added to the tensions in the country, as have the fleeing of several high-level officials.

Council members were last briefed about Burundi on 4 June by the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Great Lakes, Said Djinnit, and by Adama Dieng, the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide. Djinnit updated Council members on the East African Community (EAC) emergency summit on Burundi on 31 May in Dar es Salaam. A communiqué issued after the meeting called for a postponement of the elections for 45 days. (In response, Burundi announced a new electoral calendar, with parliamentary and local elections scheduled for 29 June, presidential elections for 15 July and senatorial elections on 24 July. Burundi informed the Council in a letter on 16 June that it will not postpone the elections further.) Dieng briefed on his recent visit to the country, and warned that violence may escalate into an ethnic conflict.

Council members released a press statement that day taking note of the EAC communiqué and calling on all Burundian parties to reach agreement on a new electoral calendar; urging protection of civil and human rights, respect for the rule of law, and urgent disarmament of all armed youth groups allied to political parties.

On 11 June, Djinnit stepped down as UN mediator after several opposition parties requested his removal, alleging that he was biased. The head of the UN Office for Central Africa, Abdoulaye Bathily, has succeeded him. On 22 June, Bathily briefed the Security Council’s Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa when it discussed the prospects of mitigating pre- and post-electoral challenges in Africa. He said, in the case of Burundi, the EAC is best placed to provide support.

On 13 June, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) issued a communiqué in support of the EAC efforts. It called for the date of the election to be set by consensus between the Burundian parties and based on a technical assessment undertaken by the UN. The AU also decided to deploy human rights observers and military experts to verify the process of disarming the militias and other armed groups. In addition it indicated its willingness to take measures against those perpetuating violence and impeding a political solution, and explicitly asked the Security Council to endorse the communiqué.

On 26 June, the Secretary-General also called for the postponement of the elections, after the opposition announced a boycott of the polls, in order to create an environment conducive for inclusive elections. On the same day, a joint international facilitation team comprising the EAC, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the AU and the UN proposed that the various elections be held simultaneously on 30 July. The AU has announced it will not observe the 29 June parliamentary and municipal polls.

In response to the AU communiqué, on 21 June, France circulated a draft presidential statement taking note of the conclusions in the AU communiqué. The draft expressed a concern shared with the EAC and AU that the political dialogue has not produced the expected results and that conditions are currently not conducive for holding elections. Like the AU communiqué, the draft statement emphasised that the Burundian political parties should all agree on the date of the election. It further stressed that the Burundian dialogue should address concerns over the protection of civil and human rights, including the freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, release of detainees, respect for the rule of law and disarmament of youth groups, prior to the elections.

However, Russia, supported by China, did not want to mention the lack of success in the political dialogue or to state that conditions for elections have yet to be met. Significantly, Russia suggested that there is no room for further delays and for a new schedule to be adopted by consensus. In essence, their position entailed noting the AU and EAC statements but not adopting them as the Council’s own position. The African members were also opposed to the text as they see a consensus-based election date as an infringement of the Burundian constitutional order (notwithstanding that both Chad and Nigeria are currently members of the AU PSC).

The presidential statement was eventually adopted on 26 June, calling on the parties to participate in inclusive dialogue in the “spirit of the Arusha Agreements, and the Constitution” on what is needed to create conducive conditions for the elections.

Developments in the PBC

The Burundian configuration has been following the situation in the country closely, meeting five times since late April. On 5 June, the configuration released a press statement expressing its full support for Djinnit and calling on the opposition to reconsider its position against his mediation efforts.

Seger is scheduled to visit Burundi for the last time between 1-3 July before finishing his posting as the Swiss permanent representative to the UN.

UN DOCUMENTS ON BURUNDI

Burundi (con’t)

Key Issues
An immediate issue is ensuring that Burundi does not descend into chaos and further violence.

Should the political situation take a significant turn for the worse, an issue for the Council will be how to act quickly in order to prevent the situation from developing into an acute crisis.

Ensuring that the 2015 elections are free and fair, with the participation of opposition parties unhindered by the government and its youth wing, will be a further issue for the Council.

Options
The Council may continue to monitor the situation throughout the election period to ensure that its recent presidential statement is implemented by Burundi.

If the political situation fails to improve or worsens, the Council might consider adopting targeted sanctions against spoilers of the political dialogue and those responsible for human rights violations.

Council and Wider Dynamics
After the termination of the UN Office in Burundi in 2014 at the request of Burundi (and against the will of UN officials, civil society groups and some Council members) and the downsizing of the UN presence to an electoral mission, as well as the UN Country Team, and the continued presence of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Council has been somewhat marginalised in its role and has essentially let regional and subregional actors take the lead in addressing the current crisis.

There is disagreement between those Council members who, such as Russia and China, see this as an internal constitutional issue, and those such as France and the US, who wish to take a hard line against Nkurunziza’s third-term bid, the crackdown on the opposition and the quashing of civil and political rights by the government. This disagreement has resulted in relatively weak messaging from the Council which has not gone beyond reiterating the need for dialogue, disarmament of youth groups and upholding the rule of law. This difference of opinion continues to dominate Council dynamics, as evidenced by the negotiations over the 26 June presidential statement, resulting in a rather passive monitoring role for the Council during the current crisis and lack of endorsement of the AU communiqué. In contrast to the Council’s passivity, Burundi has sent the Council several letters over the last few months conveying its position as to the ongoing crisis. It seems at this point that there is general acceptance by Council members (albeit reluctantly by some) of the inevitability of Nkurunziza’s running for a third term, and the focus has shifted to minimising the violence and improving the conditions for the holding of free and fair elections.

UN DOCUMENTS ON SREBRENICA

Security Council Resolutions
S/RES/369 (15 November 1999) assessed the events dating from the establishment of the “safe area” on 6 July. When NATO airstrikes against the BSA, which started shelling the “safe area” on 11 July. Around 20,000 Bosnian Muslims fled to the UN contingent’s headquarters at Potočari, located north of the town, coming under Bosnian Serb artillery fire on the way. Meanwhile, an estimated 15,000 Bosniak men gathered to the northwest of the town, whence they would try to cross Bosnian Serb lines and make their way through the forest to Bosnian government-controlled territory 50 kilometres west in Tuzla.

The ensuing days saw the killing of an estimated 8,000 Bosnian men by Bosnian Serb forces. At the UN base at Potočari, men were separated from women and children and later executed. Thousands died during the attempted escape through the forest while coming under Bosnian Serb fire or were killed in mass executions after surrendering. Most were buried in mass graves and later reburied in more dispersed sites to hide the crimes. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice would later determine that the mass murder at Srebrenica amounted to an act of genocide.

The UN and the Security Council both came under heavy criticism for the Srebrenica massacre. The Dutch peacekeepers who had been assigned to protect the town were criticised for not defending the enclave from the Bosnian Serb advance and for ordering all the men who had sought refuge at Potočari out of the compound and handing them over to the BSA. A reluctance to use force and a series of errors led to delays by the UN in approving requests from the Dutch commander at Srebrenica for NATO air strikes against the BSA, which started shelling the “safe area” on 6 July. When NATO airstrikes finally occurred on 11 July, they were limited to dropping only two bombs.

Greater responsibility for the events at Srebrenica on 11 July. Around 20,000 Bosnian Muslims fled to the UN contingent’s headquarters at Potočari, located north of the town, coming under Bosnian Serb artillery fire on the way. Meanwhile, an estimated 15,000 Bosniak men gathered to the northwest of the town, whence they would try to cross Bosnian Serb lines and make their way through the forest to Bosnian government-controlled territory 50 kilometres west in Tuzla.

The ensuing days saw the killing of an estimated 8,000 Bosnian men by Bosnian Serb forces. At the UN base at Potočari, men were separated from women and children and later executed. Thousands died during the attempted escape through the forest while coming under Bosnian Serb fire or were killed in mass executions after surrendering. Most were buried in mass graves and later reburied in more dispersed sites to hide the crimes. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice would later determine that the mass murder at Srebrenica amounted to an act of genocide.

The UN and the Security Council both came under heavy criticism for the Srebrenica massacre. The Dutch peacekeepers who had been assigned to protect the town were criticised for not defending the enclave from the Bosnian Serb advance and for ordering all the men who had sought refuge at Potočari out of the compound and handing them over to the BSA. A reluctance to use force and a series of errors led to delays by the UN in approving requests from the Dutch commander at Srebrenica for NATO air strikes against the BSA, which started shelling the “safe area” on 6 July. When NATO airstrikes finally occurred on 11 July, they were limited to dropping only two bombs.

Greater responsibility for the events at
Srebrenica Anniversary (con’t)

Srebrenica, however, lies with the Council and the international community more broadly because of the lack of political will during the war to confront the Bosnian Serb campaign of ethnic cleansing. A significant part of the problem had been the resort to the untested concept of a “safe area”. Srebrenica was the first location designated as a “safe area” on 16 April 1993, when the Council adopted resolution 819. Subsequently, the Council adopted resolution 824, expanding the safe-area designations to Sarajevo, Tuzla, Žepa, Goražde and Bihać. Though the UN Secretariat advised that effectively protecting these safe areas would require 34,000 additional troops, the Council authorised only 7,600 additional peacekeepers in resolution 844. In July 1995, the Dutch contingent in Srebrenica numbered 450 peacekeepers. They were lightly armed and therefore no match for the BSA’s artillery and tanks.

In addition to failing to provide the safe areas with a credible military deterrent, the Council resolutions, though adopted under Chapter VII, left unclear whether UN troops could use force to defend the zones and population from attack or only in self-defence. Thus it was left up to the Secretariat and UNPROFOR’s commander to interpret how they should protect the enclaves. The tragedy at Srebrenica became a classic example of the Council’s failure to match mandates with the means to fulfil them. It also demonstrated the risks of deploying a peacekeeping mission into areas of open conflict.

The Council later sought a full investigation into violations committed at Srebrenica, Žepa, Banja Luća and Sanski Most in resolution 1034. Nearly a year later, in a 10 October 1996 presidential statement, the Council condemned obstruction of the investigations, and requested the Secretary-General to keep it regularly informed on the matter. The issue of the investigation remained on the Council’s “Tentative Forecast of Work” for the next ten years, though it seems it was never revisited.

A self-critical report on Srebrenica was produced by the UN in 1999, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/33. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who had been the head of UN peacekeeping at the time, gave strong backing for an assessment of UN actions in the context of the tragedy. This report documented the decisions and events from the creation of the safe area policy in 1993 to the eventual genocide.

Key Issues
The Council is expected to commemorate those who lost their lives at Srebrenica, and to reaffirm its determination to prevent genocide. A key issue is how to do this in a resolution amidst the sensitivities and divisions in BiH.

Reflecting on the failures of the Security Council and the UN that led to the massacre in a Council-proclaimed “safe area” is an additional issue.

Options
The Council may adopt a resolution that:
• condemns in the strongest terms the genocide at Srebrenica;
• condemns all crimes committed by all sides during the war;
• underscores the importance of reconciliation; and
• reaffirms the importance of learning from the failures of the international community to prevent the genocide at Srebrenica for future preventive action.

Holding the commemoration without adopting a resolution is another option.

Council and Wider Dynamics
A plan to adopt a Council resolution to mark the 20th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide is a very sensitive issue within BiH as well as Serbia. Since the war, BiH continues to face divisions along ethnic lines. The president of Republika Srpska—the predominantly Bosnian Serb entity of BiH—has criticised the planned resolution and reportedly intended to ask Russia to veto it. (On BiH issues, Russia usually supports the positions of Republika Srpska.) In initial discussions on the text, Russia and China have apparently expressed opposition to a resolution.

Some members see adopting a resolution on Srebrenica as a logical follow-up to last year’s resolution 2150 on the prevention of and fight against genocide to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The UK has taken the lead in the Council on drafting a resolution. The 17-member Preparatory Committee for the Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of the Srebrenica Genocide in New York includes Council members Chile, France, Jordan, Malaysia, New Zealand, the UK and the US.

UN Office for West Africa

Expected Council Action
In July, Mohammed Ibn Chambas, the head of the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), will brief the Council, followed by consultations. Members will be considering the semi-annual UNOWA report. No outcome is expected.

Key Recent Developments
The Boko Haram threat has continued to impact the situation in Nigeria and the region. In February, forces from Chad and Niger intervened in Nigeria’s northeast, while Nigeria, reportedly assisted by South African mercenaries, launched an offensive against Boko Haram after announcing the postponement of presidential and legislative elections scheduled for 14 February due to security conditions. Over the next six weeks, most cities and towns previously seized by Boko Haram were recaptured.

Nigeria’s elections were held on 28 March, and were conducted relatively peacefully. Mohammadu Buhari of the All Progressives Congress and a former general and head of state, who promised to defeat Boko Haram
and fight corruption, prevailed over the incumbent, President Goodluck Jonathan. Buhari’s inauguration on 29 May marked the first time that the Nigerian presidency was transferred democratically to an opposition leader. Buhari travelled to Niger and Chad on 3 and 4 June to discuss efforts to combat the group and then attended the 7-8 June G7 summit in Germany to request increased international assistance for such efforts.

At an 11 June summit in Abuja, leaders of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria met to finalise plans for the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) has authorised to total 10,000 military personnel. Buhari announced Nigeria would provide the MNJTF with $100 million, and the five countries committed to the force’s deployment by 30 July. The summit communiqué also called on the Security Council to adopt “a declarative statement in support of the MNJTF”. Previously, on 29 May, the MNJTF’s new headquarters was inaugurated in N’Djamena, Chad, and Nigerian general Tukur Buratai was installed as force commander.

Despite some progress fighting Boko Haram, the group remains a significant threat. Since late May there has been an uptick in Boko Haram terrorist attacks. These include the killing of 26 people on 30 May by a suicide bomber at a mosque in Maiduguri; a bomb explosion killing 45 in Yola, Adamawa state; and the killing of 43 people in six villages in Damboa, Borno state, on 10 June. Boko Haram is also believed responsible for suicide bombings at two police facilities in N’Djamena on 15 June that killed at least 25 people, representing the group’s first attacks in the Chadian capital. On 17 June, Boko Haram attacks on two towns in Niger killed at least 40. Nigeria also continues to cope with a major humanitarian crisis, with more than 1.5 million internally displaced persons due to the conflict, 200,000 refugees in the region and as many as 5 million Nigerians needing assistance.

Internal turmoil has continued in several other countries in the region. In Guinea, opposition protests have been ongoing since the electoral commission announced on 10 March that presidential elections would take place in October and local elections would be postponed until 2016. Local elections, last held in 2005, have been repeatedly delayed. Chambas travelled to Guinea several times to facilitate political dialogue, while UNOWA deployed a technical team.

In Burkina Faso, transitional president Michel Kafando announced on 22 January that presidential and legislative elections would be held on 11 October. On 4 February, members of the presidential guard called for interim Prime Minister Isaac Zida to resign amidst plans to reduce the unit’s size. A 7 February compromise resolved the brief threat to Burkina Faso’s transition. Tensions have also reverted around changes to the electoral code that ban candidates who supported a constitutional amendment to presidential term limits last year, which would have allowed former President Blaise Compaoré to run for a third term.

At a 19 May summit of the Economic Community of West African States, a proposal to ban presidential third terms was deferred, as Togo—whose president won a third term in April—and Gambia—whose president has ruled since 1994 and defeated a coup attempt in December 2014—opposed it.

Regarding the Ebola epidemic in the region, almost two months after being declared free of Ebola by the World Health Organization (WHO), Liberia announced its first new case on 30 June. In Guinea and Sierra Leone, WHO raised concerns following an increase in Ebola cases for two consecutive weeks in late May and June.

**Developments in the Council’s Subsidiary Bodies**

The Security Council’s Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa met on 22 June to discuss the prospects of mitigating pre- and post-electoral challenges in Africa. Chambas, briefing via video teleconference, highlighted elements important for successful democratic elections, including: the independence of national electoral commissions, the role of civil society groups, freedom of the press and access to media for candidates, and the impartiality and neutrality of security forces. He referred to Nigeria’s elections as a success amidst concerns over the potential for violence.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

The Human Rights Council held a special session on Boko Haram on 1 April. It adopted a resolution requesting a report on human rights violations committed by Boko Haram for submission at its 30th session (A/HRC/RES/S-23/1). In a statement on 5 June, High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein said that interviews conducted by the Human Rights Office with individuals who had fled or were rescued from towns held by Boko Haram painted a picture of “absolute terror and grave human rights violations” by the insurgents, including wanton killings, summary executions, forced participation in military operations (including the use of children to detonate bombs), forced labour, forced marriage, sexual violence and rape. The statement also highlighted reports of violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law by Nigerian armed forces. The High Commissioner urged the new Nigerian administration to take urgent measures to bring perpetrators, whether non-state or state actors, to justice and called on the authorities to ensure that counter-insurgency operations do not result in furthering the human rights devastation in the country’s northeast.

**Key Issues**

How the Council can support regional efforts to address the Boko Haram threat remains a key issue.

The current electoral cycle in West Africa, including presidential elections this year in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea, is also a key issue.

**Options**

The Council may issue a statement highlighting its intention to pay close attention to electoral processes in West Africa and stressing the importance for all actors to create conducive conditions for free, credible and peaceful elections that are scheduled later this year or in 2016.

In considering Boko Haram, the Council may adopt a presidential statement that:

- welcomes regional efforts to address the threat of the group;
- urges international support of the MNJTF;
- stresses that the MNJTF conduct operations in accordance with international humanitarian and human rights law; and
- appeals for the international community to scale up support to address more adequately the humanitarian crisis caused by the conflict.

**Council Dynamics**

Members seem to value the role that Chambas, who is also the Secretary-General’s High-Level Representative to Nigeria, has played. As Council members were negotiating a resolution last March on Boko Haram, the US asked Chambas to brief on the group’s impact in the region, a meeting held the day after Nigeria completed voting in the presidential election.

The Council’s last meeting on UNOWA in January also focused heavily on Boko Haram and risks to Nigeria’s elections.

Earlier this year, the Council seemed poised to become more involved in addressing...
the conflict. The 30 March briefing was the Council’s first specifically on Boko Haram. At that time, Council members were considering a draft resolution circulated by Chad on behalf of the African Council members, Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) members and the AU that sought Council backing of the MNJTF, including financial support. Four expert-level meetings were held but negotiations stalled after Nigeria changed its position and opposed a resolution under Chapter 7. P3 members said that they would not impose a Chapter 7 resolution against the will of Nigeria as the country most affected by the conflict. Chad, which has pushed for stronger Council engagement on the issue, eventually ended its efforts to have the resolution adopted. Chad realised it would be unable to obtain a resolution that included the funding support it thought requisite. The P3 would only support establishing a trust fund, which Chad felt would not provide significant enough resources. Furthermore, there was less need for a resolution after Nigeria offered to provide most of the MNJTF’s funding. Following the request by LCBC countries for a Council statement in support of the MNJTF, members may start negotiating a draft presidential statement. Chad circulated an initial draft of such a statement in late May, but Council members have yet to start negotiations on the text.

Nigeria is the penholder on West Africa.

UN Office for West Africa (con’t)

Sudan and South Sudan

Expected Council Action
In July, Council members will hold consultations on the implementation of resolution 2046 on Sudan/South Sudan issues, as well as on the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). Haile Menkerios, the Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, is expected to brief on Sudan/South Sudan, while the head of UNISFA, Haile Tilahun Gebremariam, will brief on the mission’s activities. The Council is expected to renew UNISFA’s mandate prior to its 15 July expiration.

Key Recent Developments
In recent months, Sudan and South Sudan have not made progress in addressing unresolved issues—including, in particular, the demarcation of their mutual border, the final status of the disputed Abyei area and the establishment of temporary administrative units in Abyei. They continue to exchange periodic accusations of support for rebel groups in each other’s country.

On 14 and 15 June, Sudanese aircraft reportedly dropped bombs across the border in Maban and Renk counties, located in South Sudan’s Upper Nile state. Peter Hoth Tuach, a South Sudanese official, alleged that a woman and four children had been injured in the bombing of Maban, while a South Sudanese soldier had been killed in the bombing of Renk.

From 17 to 29 May, UNISFA and the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support conducted an assessment of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) along the Sudan-South Sudan border. The concept of operations and support concept of the JBVMM were analysed by the assessment team, but the Secretary-General’s current report said that “the findings of this technical review could not be discussed with the Governments of Sudan and South Sudan before the publication of this report and will be presented in my next report”. The Secretary-General stated that the UN’s investment in the JBVMM “cannot continue if the parties do not invest themselves in the success of this mechanism”. Among other things, the parties have not been able to come to agreement on a centre line of the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone, and several areas along the border remain disputed. Furthermore, they have yet to make progress in demarcating those areas of the border on which there is agreement.

A meeting of Abyei’s traditional leaders to promote reconciliation between the Ngok-Dinka and the Misseriya communities had been scheduled for 20-24 June in Addis Ababa. According to a 24 June AU press statement, the meeting did not take place, with “South Sudanese community leaders…requesting an indefinite postponement to resolve internal challenges relating to their participation.”

Council members last met to discuss implementation of resolution 2046 on 24 March, with Menkerios briefing. He told members that Khartoum would be willing to continue the “national dialogue” following the April elections. (President Omar al-Bashir was re-elected president with 94 percent of the vote in an election boycotted by the major opposition parties and marked by low voter turnout.)

Menkerios reported that the humanitarian situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states remained grave amidst persistent fighting.

On 6 May, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous briefed Council members in consultations on UNISFA. He said that polling was held in Misseriya ethnic areas in northern Abyei during Sudan’s 13-16 April elections, adding that there had been no violent incidents during the electoral process. Ladsous said that the reconvening on 29-30 March in Addis Ababa of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee (AJOC), designed to provide administrative and political oversight to the area, had been an encouraging development. (The AJOC had not met since May 2013, when Ngok-Dinka paramount chief Deng Kuol Deng was assassinated by a Misseriya.)

Key Issues
Given the internal turmoil in Sudan and South Sudan, a key question is whether both countries are in position to work toward a resolution of their outstanding differences at the current time. The fact that the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM) has not convened in more than two years is not an encouraging sign, although the AU High-Level Implementation Panel is currently trying to organise a meeting of this body.

There are several ongoing, unresolved challenges that contribute to insecurity in Abyei. The instability of Sudan and South Sudan to establish temporary security and administrative units—the Abyei Area Council, the Abyei

Sudan and South Sudan (con’t)

Area administration and the Abyei Police Force—has created a law and order vacuum in the region. Meanwhile, the presence of Sudanese security forces at the Diffra oil facility in northern Abyei and of South Sudanese troops in the southern part of the region represents a potential source of instability and violates numerous Security Council resolutions, as well as the 20 June 2011 agreement signed by the government of Sudan and the then government of Southern Sudan. (South Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011.)

The future of the JBVMM, which the Council authorised UNISFA to support in resolution 2024 of 14 December 2011, is another important matter for the Council. The Secretary-General wrote in his recent report that “investment [in the JBVMM] cannot continue if the parties do not invest themselves in the success of this mechanism.” To date, more than $26 million has been expended to build infrastructure and support the mechanism, which is barely operational.

Options

Regarding Sudan/South Sudan, the Council could consider adopting a statement that:
- expresses support for the AU High-Level Implementation Panel’s efforts to reconvene the JPSM;
- condemns aerial bombardments across the border in South Sudan; and
- suggests that bilateral donors consider offering debt relief to Sudan in exchange for substantive political reforms and a credible peace process.

The Council could consider requesting a report from the Secretariat investigating allegations that Sudan and South Sudan are supporting rebels in each other’s territories.

With respect to UNISFA, the Council could consider:
- renewing the mandate for an additional six months without any fundamental changes;
- renewing the mandate and determining at an interim moment in the mandate cycle whether UNISFA should continue supporting the JBVMM, once the JBVMM review team’s findings are available to them;
- requesting a greater focus on human rights issues in the Secretary-General’s reporting to the Council; and
- encouraging more regular meetings of the AJOC.

Council Dynamics

Most Council members remain frustrated that Sudan and South Sudan, engaged in their respective domestic crises, have made little headway in addressing issues of mutual concern, such as border demarcation, the establishment of temporary administrative units in Abyei and the final status of the region. While encouraged that the AJOC finally met at the end of March, most members are concerned about the political fragility and potential volatility of the region. At the most recent UNISFA consultations on 6 May, Angola mentioned the need for the parties to avoid violence against women and children, while Venezuela underscored that the lack of economic development in Abyei was a source of conflict in the region.

Many of the briefings on the implementation of resolution 2046 touch on domestic political issues in Sudan, such as the national dialogue process and the elections. While most members are amenable to a discussion of such issues, Russia has expressed discomfort with this, believing that domestic politics in Sudan are outside the purview of resolution 2046.

The US is the penholder on Sudan/South Sudan issues and on UNISFA.

Lebanon

Expected Council Action

In July, Special Coordinator for Lebanon Sigrid Kaag and Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet will brief Council members in consultations on the Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of resolution 1701, which called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006.

The mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) expires on 31 August.

Key Recent Developments

Lebanon has been facing substantial challenges in its domestic political situation as well as external threats. Thirteen months after Michel Sleiman’s presidential term expired, the Lebanese parliament has still not been able to elect a new head of state. This power vacuum has impaired Lebanon’s capacity to deal with a range of political and social challenges. Furthermore, the influx of 1.2 million registered Syrian refugees and fighting along Lebanon’s northeastern border with Syria continue to threaten the country’s stability.

Kaag issued a press release on 25 May calling on Lebanese leaders to resolve the issue of the election of a head of state for the sake of Lebanon’s stability. Kaag also pointed out that the executive-level vacuum adds to the country’s political polarisation during a time when Lebanon “must make a unified effort to safeguard the country from the impact of the Syrian crisis.”

On 8 June, as part of her regular regional outreach, Kaag visited Tehran, where she met with Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif. The discussion was primarily focused on the current political situation in Lebanon, outstanding issues related to resolution 1701 and the impact of the Syrian crisis. Kaag reiterated the importance of electing a president without further delay.

The war in Syria continues to have destabilising political and social effects on Lebanon, with Hezbollah fighting openly alongside government forces in the Syrian conflict. In an address on 25 May to mark the 15th anniversary of Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah again acknowledged that Hezbollah has been...
Lebanon (con’t)

fighting throughout Syria and said that it will expand its presence there as needed.

During the last two months, Hezbollah has been engaged in heavy battles in the Qalamoun mountain range in Syria along the border with Lebanon, where it captured territory from Al-Nusra Front. On 9 June, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) attacked Hezbollah’s positions around the Lebanese town of Ras Baalbek along the northeastern Lebanon-Syria border. Hezbollah managed to fend off the attack, killing several ISIS militants, including a Saudi national who was the leader of the group in the Qalamoun region. According to some reports, the Lebanese army carried out airstrikes in the same area though it was unclear if those were coordinated with Hezbollah.

The security situation on the Israel-Lebanon border has remained relatively calm since the conclusion of hostilities in January which resulted in the death of one peacekeeper and two Israeli soldiers. According to media reports, however, Israeli military officials have identified numerous Hezbollah military sites located within civilian populated areas in southern Lebanon. Speaking on condition of anonymity, a senior Israeli military official said that Israel would try to limit civilian causalities in a possible confrontation with Hezbollah. According to the same reports, Israel has implied it would give civilians in southern Lebanon notice prior to launching an offensive against Hezbollah. On 5 June, Nasrallah responded that Hezbollah would displace millions of Israelis should Israel launch a war on Lebanon. Despite this increase in rhetoric, the only recent Israeli airstrike that has been carried out was on 21 June in western Lebanon, allegedly to destroy one of its own drones that crashed in the area.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is the impact of the Syrian conflict on the situation in Lebanon.

An increasingly worrying issue is Lebanon’s inability to elect a president, which has deadlocked the country’s parliament and could threaten the country’s stability.

An ongoing issue for the Council is the increasing involvement of Hezbollah and other non-state actors in the Syrian conflict, as well as the growing burden of hosting over 1.2 million registered refugees from Syria.

Options
The likely option for the Council is to receive the briefing and take no action. Council members are only expected to discuss the substantive issues related to UNIFIL’s mandate ahead of the renewal in August.

Council Dynamics
There is consensus in the Council that UNIFIL contributes to stability between Israel and Lebanon and has become even more critical in light of the ongoing Syrian crisis. A presidential statement issued on 19 March outlined the main issues on which the Council stands united in its support of Lebanon. Among those are the Council’s concerns about the continued power vacuum caused by the vacancy in the presidency; support for Lebanon’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and security; and unity in condemning the acts of terrorism on Lebanese territory and in recognising the crucial role of the Lebanese Armed Forces in responding to security challenges. France is the penholder on Lebanon in the Council.

Syria

Expected Council Action
In July, Council members expect to receive their regular monthly briefings on the chemical weapons and humanitarian tracks in Syria. Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura is also expected to report back to Council members on the political track.

At press time, several initiatives by various Council members on the issues of chlorine bombs, violation of medical neutrality, besieged communities and aerial bombardment were ongoing. However, it was unclear which, if any, of these would gain traction in the coming weeks and months.

Key Recent Developments
On 12 June, the Syrian deputy foreign minister acknowledged that the government had recently lost more ground to various armed opposition groups and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). These losses to opposition groups are attributed to increased coordination between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, with support from the West. However, he said Damascus was secure as were other key areas, such as Homs, Hama and Qalamoun. He added that Iran, Russia and the Tehran-backed Lebanese Shi’a militia, Hezbollah, would continue to support the Syrian government. Indeed, on 2 June—the same day the anti-ISIS coalition met in Paris—Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said his country would stand by the government of Syria to the end and characterised Syria as the front line of defence against Sunni extremism. Meanwhile, in early June, rebel groups accused the government of supporting ISIS expansion in Syria. Analysts note that the Syrian regime has prioritised rebel defeat over targeting ISIS.

Regarding the military situation, a joint offensive by Kurdish and Free Syrian Army (FSA) forces, supported by US-led airstrikes, seized the ISIS-held town of Tel Abyad near the Turkish border on 15 June, cutting off a major supply line to ISIS’s stronghold in Raqqa. On 29 June, Ankara—concerned that the consolidation of Kurdish gains in Syria could ignite Kurdish separatist sentiment in Turkey—debated its military options. President Tayyip Erdogan’s office said any security measures Turkey takes will be aimed at protecting the border and not intervening in Syria.

Northwest Syria has also seen a significant upsurge in fighting around Aleppo and in Idlib province. On 4 June, OCHA Operations Director John Ging briefed Security Council members under “any other business” on the 30 May
barrel bomb attacks by government helicopters targeting a civilian market in Aleppo. The same day, de Mistura said it was “totally unacceptable that the Syrian air force attacks its own territory in an indiscriminate way, killing its own citizens, as brutally happened today in Aleppo”. De Mistura condemned ongoing government attacks again on 8 June and rebel shelling of government-held Aleppo on 16 June.

Some Council members had also raised the issue of aerial bombardment during the 3 June consultations on the chemical weapons track as chlorine attacks have allegedly been carried out via barrel bombs dropped from government helicopters.

On 5 June, Council members issued a press statement expressing outrage at indiscriminate attacks against civilians, including those involving shelling and aerial bombardment. On 18 June, 71 member states that strongly believe the protection situation in Syria is getting worse—including Council members France, Jordan, Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, Spain, the UK and the US—sent a letter to the Security Council expressing outrage at the continued indiscriminate use of weapons, such as barrel bombs. These members stated that the case under the Security Council to ensure implementation of its own resolutions on Syria as well as to prevent future aerial bombardment by the government (without specifying how).

The focus on indiscriminate attacks against civilians continued with an Arria-formula meeting on 26 June and a briefing by Deputy Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Kyung-wha Kang that also focused on this issue during her 29 June briefing to the Council.

On the political track, de Mistura visited Damascus between 15 and 17 June. He met with President Bashar al Assad and reportedly raised the issue of barrel bombs with government officials. He is expected to report back to the Council in late July on the UN-facilitated negotiations launched in Geneva on 5 May. These consultations were convened to find areas of commonality for implementing the Geneva Communiqué, a political transition plan agreed in June 2012 that has been continually stymied over the role of Assad and Iran’s support for the regime, and has been further complicated by the presence of ISIS in Syria.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

On 23 June, the head of the Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry on Syria, Paulo Pinheiro, reported that civilians are the main victims of an accelerating cycle of violence and that all parties deliberately attack civilians. He added that the government’s superior firepower and control of the skies inflicts the most damage. The Commission’s June update said that the Security Council has nourished a deeply entrenched culture of impunity and called for it to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC (A/HRC/29/CRP.3).

**Key Issues**

The main issue for the Council—in the fifth year of a war that has exacted a death toll of 220,000, injured one million and displaced half of the Syrian population—is to find ways to show leadership, particularly in supporting a cessation of violence and resuscitating efforts for a political solution.

Ongoing issues include how to get agreement to follow up on the violations of resolutions 2139, 2165 and 2191 on the humanitarian situation and 2118 and 2209 on chemical weapons—in particular aerial bombardment and the use of chlorine bombs.

**Options**

While the Council has many tools at its disposal—such as imposing an arms embargo or targeted sanctions, referring Syria to the ICC and authorising a no-fly zone to deter Syria from using its aerial capacity—P5 divisions have made it impossible for the Council to fulfill its role in maintaining international peace and security in the case of Syria. While some feel that such action might be the leverage the Council requires to shift the parties’ priorities towards a negotiated solution, the Council has a history of not escalating pressure in the midst of other sensitive processes, such as the P5+1 negotiations on the Iran nuclear file.

An option for Council members concerned about the government’s continued use of chlorine bombs would be to put forward a resolution determining that Syria has breached resolutions 2118 and 2209 and impose targeted sanctions. Given that chlorine is delivered in barrel bombs, such an outcome could be an opportunity to address the broader and more pervasive issue of aerial bombardment and indiscriminate attacks on civilians that was addressed in resolution 2139.

Another option is to follow up on the US suggestion for an “attribution mechanism” on the use of chemical weapons since resolution 2209 was adopted in March. It seems the US draft would give this task to the Secretary-General and would request the findings be reported back to the Council. However, Russia is opposed to such a mechanism and has proposed that any response could instead be formulated in a presidential statement. The US draft has not been discussed beyond the P5 and, in fact, was being negotiated exclusively between Russia and the US. At press time, it was unclear how active these bilateral negotiations were.

Although unlikely, the Council could vote to refer Syria to the General Assembly under “Uniting for Peace” so that the General Assembly may recommend collective action, including sanctions and the use of force. This would be a procedural vote and therefore cannot be vetoed by the P5 and only requires nine affirmative votes. A “Uniting for Peace” resolution by the General Assembly can confer legitimacy on international collective action, but it would carry no binding obligation for such action.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

Despite overwhelming indications that various resolutions threatening consequences for lack of implementation have continually been breached, it is unlikely that Council members will push for follow-up measures, such as targeted sanctions or another attempt at an ICC referral. The assumption that Russia would veto any effort specific to the government remains a deterrent. Any discussion of a Council-authorised no-fly zone is also a non-starter among Council members, due to Russia’s veto power but also because of the lack of US interest in pursuing this course of action.

On the political track, Council members assume de Mistura will likely want to limit expectations about whether conditions on the ground have shifted enough to untangle what has become known as the “Assad knot” enshrined in the Geneva Communiqué—i.e. trying to find openings between Iran’s and Russia’s support for the Assad regime and the position of the P3 and their Arab allies that Assad must go. Council members acknowledge that the Geneva consultations may be little more than a place holder until there is a major shift on the part of the US or Russia to tilt the balance toward a political solution.

On the chemical weapons track, fundamental differences remain. The US has maintained that it views resolution 2209 to be a final warning to Damascus before consequences are sought for its use of chlorine bombs. Russia insists that the Council cannot apportion blame to Damascus since only the OPCW has the capacity to fully assess the situation. While the OPCW fact-finding
mission can investigate whether chlorine has been used as a weapon, its mandate prohibits it from attributing responsibility.

France is the penholder on Syria overall. Jordan, New Zealand and Spain lead on humanitarian issues. In practice, however, most texts need to be agreed between Russia and the US prior to seeking agreement by the broader Council.

Somalia and Eritrea

Expected Council Action
In July, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM), Nicholas Kay, is expected to brief the Council. A resolution renewing the mandate of UNSOM, which expires 7 August, is scheduled for adoption.

Additionally, Ambassador Rafael Ramirez (Venezuela), chair of the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanctions Committee, will brief Council members in consultations on the work of the Committee since his last 120-day briefing.

Key Recent Developments
Al-Shabaab continues to be active in Somalia and Kenya. On 13 May, Al-Shabaab kidnapped 14 Iranian fishermen whose boat washed ashore in the Galgugud region of central Somalia. On 23 May, at least 45 people were killed in fighting in the Lower Shabelle region south of Mogadishu when Al-Shabaab launched a surprise attack on government forces. According to a local government official, the casualties included 26 Al-Shabaab fighters and 19 government soldiers. On 25 May, Al-Shabaab attacked two police patrols near Garissa, Kenya, and claimed to have killed 25 policemen, while a police spokesman said 13 officers had gone missing. On 11 June, an Ethiopian contingent of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army forces defending a convoy of relief supplies clashed with Al-Shabaab in the Bay region. According to AMISOM, the attack by Al-Shabaab was repelled, and its forces were defeated in the battle. The insurgency, however, claims to have killed 30 soldiers. Al-Shabaab attacked a humanitarian convoy in Mogadishu on 24 June and an AMISOM base camp in Leego on 26 June. Council members condemned both attacks in press statements.

Kay and Maman Sidikou, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and head of AMISOM, briefed the Council via video teleconference on 19 May. Kay spoke on the 12 May Secretary-General’s report on UNSOM, while Sidikou previewed the findings and recommendations of a forthcoming AU-UN report requested in resolution 2182. The report, based on a joint assessment from 14 to 25 April, concerns benchmarks for UN peacekeeping, the AMISOM troop surge authorised in resolution 2124 and future military strategy in Somalia. It was due 30 May but delayed one month, apparently because of consultations with AMISOM troop-contributing countries. On 26 May, the Council adopted resolution 2221, extending the mandate of UNSOM until 7 August. This rollover was meant to enable the Council to first consider the findings and recommendations of the AU-UN report, particularly with respect to UNSOM’s mandate.

On 8 June, Council members met in an informal interactive dialogue on AMISOM with Sidikou and Kay. Under-Secretary-General for Field Support Atul Khare participated in the meeting, particularly with respect to the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). Council members discussed a wide range of issues related to AMISOM, including benchmarking for UN peacekeeping, a review of UNSOA’s operations, AMISOM’s sectors of operation and whether they should be extended to incorporate semi-autonomous Puntland, aspects of command and control for troop-contributing countries, policing and potential police-contributing countries, and allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. Although the meeting was substantive and two hours long, its effectiveness regarding future planning was perhaps reduced by the delayed release of the joint AU-UN report that was intended to inform the discussion.

Sanctions-Related Developments
On 1 May, the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanctions Committee held a meeting regarding maritime interdiction of illegal charcoal exports and illicit arms imports. Resolution 2182, which authorised the maritime interdiction, stipulated a review within six months of adoption on 24 October 2014. The coordinator of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, a representative of the Combined Maritime Forces conducting anti-piracy operations and a representative of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime attended the meeting. Options discussed at the meeting include either updating the implementation assistance notice regarding charcoal issued on 7 May 2014 or drafting a second implementation assistance notice.

On 23 May, Hassan Mahat Omar, a Kenyan Muslim cleric listed since 28 July 2011 under the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea sanctions regime for recruiting and fundraising for Al-Shabaab, and who had been arrested on 18 April for allegedly inciting the 2 April Al-Shabaab attack in Garissa, Kenya, was released on bail in Nairobi. Omar’s trial is scheduled for 30-31 July.

On 28 May, Al-Shabaab announced the death of Hassan Abdullah Hersi Al-Turki, a militia leader aligned with Al-Shabaab. Al-Turki was listed under the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea sanctions regime on 12 April 2010. Al-Shabaab claims he died of natural causes, but his death has not been independently confirmed. At least four others on the 751/1907 sanctions list have been reported as dead: Aboud Rogo Mohammed (unknown gunmen, Nairobi, 27 August 2012); Omar Hammami (Al-Shabaab infighting, Somalia, 12 September 2013); Abubaker Shariff Ahmed (unknown gunmen, Nairobi, 1 April 2014); and Ahmed Abdi Aw-Mohamed (US airstrike, Somalia, 1 September 2014).
Human Rights-Related Developments

The Commission of Inquiry on human rights in Eritrea released a report on 8 June, documenting systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations committed under the authority of the government, with some violations possibly constituting crimes against humanity. The report details how the government has created and sustained repressive systems to control, silence, and isolate individuals, depriving them of their fundamental freedoms. Individuals are routinely arrested and detained arbitrarily, tortured, disappeared or executed extra-judicially. According to the report, Eritreans are subject to systems of national service and forced labour, which “involves the systematic violation of an array of human rights on a scope and scale seldom witnessed elsewhere in the world”. Although the Commission was unable to visit Eritrea, its report was based on first-hand testimony and written submissions. The report was presented to the Human Rights Council on 23 June.

Key Issues

Regarding UNSOM, the principal focus will be on re-evaluating the special political mission’s mandate while considering the findings and recommendations of the forthcoming AU-UN report.

With respect to sanctions, implementation of the partial arms embargo and the charcoal export ban remains a challenge. Eritrea’s lack of cooperation with the Monitoring Group is another long-standing issue.

Options

The implications of the joint AU-UN review of AMISOM for UNSOM’s mandate will remain unclear until release of the report, but a few options can nonetheless be inferred from preliminary discussions on 19 May and 8 June:

- establishing joint UNSOM-AMISOM operational planning and civilian presences in regional states of Somalia;
- expanding non-lethal support (currently provided by UNSOA to the Somali National Army) to 3,000 Punland troops and the Somali Police Force;
- requesting the Secretary-General to increase the operational capacity of the UN Guard Unit, including a geographic expansion beyond Mogadishu to the regional states of Somalia; and
- modifying UNSOM’s “good offices” functions to include a specific reference to mediating inter-ethnic and clan-based violence. One option regarding sanctions, which is apparently under consideration, would be for the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Committee chair to visit the countries in the region, including Eritrea.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Since the establishment of UNSOM just over two years ago, policymaking regarding Somalia has been more collaborative than contentious within the Security Council (with the singular exception of the abstentions of Russia and Jordan on resolution 2182). Since the adoption of resolution 2124, which increased AMISOM’s authorisation from 17,731 to 22,126 troops (and thus also increased the number of troops eligible for salaries paid by the EU and logistical support provided by the UN), relations between the AU and UN have also improved with respect to Somalia. However, underlying sources of tension may resurface within the context of how the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council respond to the forthcoming AU-UN report, particularly regarding the financial and material resources provided to AMISOM for military operations and the division of labour with UNSOM for civilian tasks.

The US has shown greater engagement when US Secretary of State John Kerry made a surprise visit to Somalia on 5 May. It was the first visit of a US secretary of state to Somalia.

The UK is the penholder on Somalia, and Venezuela is chair of the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanctions Committee.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Expected Council Action

In July, the Council will be briefed by Martin Kobler, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).

The Chair of the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Dina Kawar (Jordan), will brief the Council on her May visit to the region.

MONUSCO’s mandate expires on 31 March 2016.

Key Recent Developments

Rebel groups continue to spread violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). A joint MONUSCO and Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) offensive was launched against the Force de résistance patriotique en Ituri (FPRI) from the Ngiti ethnic group in Orientale Province on 3 June. In the first 10 days of the offensive 34 militants and four FARDC soldiers were killed. Of all the armed groups, the FRPI were reportedly responsible for the highest number of human rights violations committed during the month of April 2015 (33 violations and 102 victims), according to the UN Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO). Other armed groups such as the Ugandan Islamist group Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) remain active as well. Violence in North Kivu has led to 50,700 additional internally displaced people according to OCHA.

On 26 March, the Council adopted resolution 2211, which renewed the mandate of MONUSCO, including its force intervention

**Other Relevant Facts**

- Special Representative of the Secretary-General Martin Kobler (Germany) MONUSCO Force Commander Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz (Brazil) MONUSCO Size, Composition and Cost of Mission Strength as of 31 March 2015 20,878 troops (including 473 military observers and 1,113 police), 889 international civilian personnel, 2,612 local civilian staff and 463 UN volunteers. Approved budget (1 July 2014-30 June 2015): $1.46 billion Mission duration July 2010 to present.
bride (FIB), until 31 March 2016. MONUSCO is authorised to “carry out targeted offensive operations through the FIB in cooperation with the whole of MONUSCO,” either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC, to neutralise armed groups. The resolution asks MONUSCO to maximise its inter-operability, flexibility and effectiveness in the implementation of its mandate. (The report of the Secretary-General on the strategic review of MONUSCO, requested by the Council, contained criticism regarding the poor performance of some of MONUSCO’s contingents, recommended a more proactive approach and called for all contingents to show willingness to use force to protect civilians [S/2014/957].)

Following the calls by the DRC for a significant withdrawal of troops, the resolution endorsed the recommendations made in the strategic review, downsizing the mission by 2,000 troops. The resolution notes that this reduction will become “permanent” once significant progress in the DRC is achieved, including in fighting the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR). (The DRC continues to operate unilaterally against the group as MONUSCO will not cooperate with the FARDC generals leading the operation, who are suspected of human rights abuses, in accordance with the UN human rights due-diligence policy.) The resolution further encourages the DRC to enter into a strategic dialogue with MONUSCO to develop a joint road map for an exit strategy.

Starting in April, Council members and troop-contributing countries have been receiving monthly updates at the expert-level from the Secretariat on MONUSCO and the FIB. The third such update meeting was on 10 June, during which Council members and TCCs were briefed by the DPKO Team Leader for the Great Lakes Integrated Operational Team, Herve Lecoq. Lecoq informed them that cooperation with the FARDC regarding the FDLR is still at an impasse. Apparently, the FDLR has retaken some positions from the FARDC, and only a minimal number of FDLR fighters have surrendered, mainly child soldiers. On other fronts, he noted some cooperation between MONUSCO and the FARDC in operations against the ADF in North Kivu and successful cooperation in operations against the FRPI.

This latter operation involves the participation of non-FIB contingents, in accordance with MONUSCO’s attempt to become more proactive in its overall operations. Lecoq also noted that the strategic dialogue with the DRC called for in resolution 2211 is proceeding successfully and that currently a joint security assessment was being consolidated.

Sanctions-Related Developments
On 6 March, the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee held an exchange of views on the final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2015/19) with the representatives of Angola (who in addition to attending the meeting as a Council member was also representing the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region), Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda and Tanzania. Kawar asked the Committee members and these countries for priorities to focus on during her visit to the region. During the meeting, a representative of the UN Mine Action Service briefed the Committee regarding efforts to assist the DRC authorities in the management and storage of arms and ammunition.

Kawar visited the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda between 24 and 29 May, the first 1533 Committee Chair to do so. She focused on receiving first-hand information pertaining to improving the effectiveness and implementation of the sanctions regime. The visit also followed up on requests for capacity-building, discussed on 6 March in the Committee. An issue raised during the visit was that there has been little success in curbing the illegal smuggling of natural resources. Regarding this, various actors told Kawar that new designations by the Committee might be useful.

The Committee will receive a report from Kawar on her visit and will discuss it in the Committee prior to the Council briefing.

Human Rights-Related Developments
The UNJHRO published a report on 14 May, detailing grave violations of international humanitarian law committed by combatants of the ADF against civilians in the territory of Beni, North Kivu province, between 1 October and 31 December 2014. The violations may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. The UNJHRO was able to confirm the summary executions of at least 237 civilians, including at least 65 women and 35 children, the injury of 47 civilians, the rape of two others, the kidnapping of at least 20 civilians, the recruitment of children and the looting and systematic destruction of dozens of houses during this period. The report also refers to allegations that members of the FARDC were involved in grave human rights and humanitarian law violations, including the extrajudicial execution of 15 civilians. According to the report, the civilian population in Beni remains extremely vulnerable to attacks, and the threat has now extended to the Irumu territory, also in eastern DRC, where violations committed by ADF combatants have been reported since the beginning of 2015.

Key Issues
An ongoing issue is the continuing tension in the working relationship between MONUSCO and the government, which is crucial for the overall success of the mission. In particular, the breakdown in cooperation against the FDLR is an immediate concern.

Follow-up on the information gathered and the interaction in the region during the Chair’s visit is an important issue for the Sanctions Committee.

Options
The DRC has not been the focus of Council members’ attention since the adoption of resolution 2211, but Council members may wish to adopt a statement reiterating the need for the DRC’s full cooperation with MONUSCO and, in particular, for a significant joint operation to eliminate the FDLR threat. It may also welcome receiving the conclusions of the joint strategic dialogue.

In the Sanctions Committee, the membership may consider further designations against individuals, as designations have not been made since December 2012.

Council and Wider Dynamics
During the negotiations on resolution 2211, New Zealand suggested including a request to receive informal briefings on the work of the intervention brigade in neutralising armed groups. Several Council members agreed that due to the uniqueness of the brigade’s mandate, a more hands-on approach and close monitoring by the Council is warranted. However, others thought that including such a request in the resolution would result in a rigid schedule of formal briefings that would not add value to current reporting. As a compromise, it was agreed that Council members and troop-contributing countries will receive informal monthly updates at the expert-level from the Secretariat on the intervention brigade. Following three such briefings thus far, the general consensus among members is that these meetings have been informative and helpful.

Council members continue to be concerned about the need to neutralise the FDLR, and what so far appears to be a lacklustre effort by the FARDC to engage with the FDLR. However, they are encouraged by the resumption of cooperation between the DRC and MONUSCO on some issues, after a complete breakdown in communication at the beginning of the year.

There also seems to be a general agreement that the monthly informal updates by DPKO have been a useful exercise in providing up-to-date and reasonably detailed
Republican of the Congo (con’t)

information to Council members on the operations of MONUSCO and the FIB. It is also proving to be a useful platform for Council members and the troop-contributing countries to inquire and interact with DPKO and each other about MONUSCO operations.

Cyprus

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for another six months ahead of its 31 July expiry. Lisa Buttenheim, Special Representative and head of mission, will likely brief on the latest UNFICYP report. Special Adviser Espen Barth Eide is expected to brief on the progress in the negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Key Recent Developments
The political environment surrounding the unification talks in Cyprus has changed significantly in the past three months. Following runoff elections on 26 April, Mustafa Akinci was elected the new leader of Turkish Cypriots after overwhelmingly defeating incumbent Dervis Eroglu. Akinci is considered a moderate and, according to his campaign platform, a leader who would seek peace and reconciliation with Greek Cypriots.

The unification talks had come to a halt in October 2014 when Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades unilaterally decided to suspend the talks due to Turkey’s decision to conduct offshore seismic surveys in Cyprus’ exclusive economic zone. Turkey’s actions were a reaction to the decision by the Greek Cypriot Republic to start issuing oil exploration licenses to foreign companies without taking into account Turkish Cypriots’ claims that offshore natural resources should benefit both communities on the island. Anastasiades and Akinci met on 15 May, marking the resumption, after more than seven months of stalemate, of the unification talks.

Ahead of this month’s renewal of the UNFICYP mandate, Council members are likely to view the situation on the ground in Cyprus with a degree of optimism. On 15 May, Council members issued a press statement welcoming the resumption of the talks. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon commended the commitment of the leaders to move forward and called on both leaders to “seize this opportunity to achieve tangible progress towards a comprehensive settlement that would clearly benefit both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots”.

On 23 May, leading up to their next formal meeting, Anastasiades and Akinci met in the divided city of Nicosia, where they walked through both sides of the city. The leaders used this opportunity to send a strong message of peace and optimism ahead of the continuation of unification talks. This was the first time that Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders spent time together interacting on both sides of Nicosia.

In their second meeting on 28 May, the leaders agreed to intensify the negotiations and set the dates for their next four meetings, which will be held by the end of July. Leading up to this meeting between Anastasiades and Akinci, the negotiating teams met five times in an effort to find comprehensive understanding on the positions of both sides. The leaders agreed to put particular emphasis on the issue of missing persons. In addition, they agreed on five concrete steps: working to open more crossing points, interconnecting the electricity grids, making mobile telephone networks interoperable, working on the prevention of radio frequency interferences and establishing a committee on gender equality. As a part of confidence-building measures that would benefit both communities in Cyprus, the leaders agreed to open two new crossing points, in Lefka and Dherynia.

The leaders met for the third time on 17 June, when they reviewed the progress made by the negotiators. They agreed to enter into substantive negotiations on unresolved issues of governance, property, territory and security. The substantive negotiations will be based on the convergences and divergences identified by the negotiating teams. At the meeting, Anastasiades and Akinci agreed to focus on negotiations in a comprehensive manner while the negotiating teams continue to work on specific issues and make preparations for the next meeting of the leaders.

Regarding the confidence-building measures, the leaders defined the mandate of the newly established committee on gender equality and appointed its members.

Key Issues
In addition to renewing UNFICYP’s mandate, the main issue for the Council remains how to help maintain the current momentum and facilitate a more substantial process of unification talks between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders.

In the absence of significant progress for more than 50 years since the mission was established, a recurring issue for the Council is whether to consider reconfiguring and downsizing the mission.

Options
The most likely option for the Council is to renew UNFICYP’s mandate in its current configuration for another six months.

Another option is for the Council to recognise the current positive atmosphere resulting from the resumption of unification talks and add a sense of urgency to the issue by emphasising that this process cannot be open-ended considering that UNFICYP has been present for more than 50 years.

Should there be tangible progress in negotiations, the Council could consider issuing a press or presidential statement welcoming the progress.

Council Dynamics
Cyprus has been a low-intensity issue on the Council’s agenda, followed closely by only a few Council members, such as France, Russia and the UK. There seems recently to be increased interest by the US in finding a solution to the Cyprus problem.

Russia tends to support the Greek Cypriot...
position that the Council should not impose any conditions or timeframe on the negotiations. The UK and other Council members, frustrated by the longevity of the process and the mission, are of the view that negotiations should be encouraged further by applying some form of pressure on both sides. Though the Council adopted the last UNFICYP resolution in January unanimously, several members, most notably Russia, expressed their dissatisfaction at the way the negotiations of the draft were conducted by the penholder (the UK). Russia seemed concerned by the way unification talks were addressed in the draft as well as the delayed consultations on the draft resolution. In the recent past, resolutions renewing the UNFICYP mandate were not always adopted unanimously. Turkey cast negative votes on the UNFICYP resolutions during its Council membership in 2009-2010.

In 2012 and 2013, then members of the Council Azerbaijan and Pakistan, who were prominently sympathetic to the Turkish Cypriot side, abstained on UNFICYP resolutions citing disagreement over both substance and procedure. Considering the positive political environment in Cyprus at the moment, it is likely that negotiations of the current draft will be less contentious.

Cyprus (con’t)

UN DOCUMENTS ON IRAQ Security Council Resolution S/RES/2169 (30 July 2014) renewed UNAMI for a year. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV/7443 (14 May 2015) was the regular quarterly briefing on Iraq, Secretary-General’s Reports S/2015/305 (1 May 2015) was the UNAMI report. S/2015/298 (29 April 2015) was the Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property report.

Iraq

Expected Council Action
In July, Special Representative Ján Kubiš will brief the Council on the Secretary-General’s reports on the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and on Iraq’s compliance with resolution 1284 regarding the repatriation or return of Kuwaiti missing persons or property. UNAMI’s mandate, which expires on 31 July, will likely be renewed for a year.

Key Recent Developments
The surprise takeover of Mosul by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) over a year ago has led to a widespread protection crisis that, according to UN officials, has left Iraq on the “verge of collapse”. Valerie Amos, the then-head of OCHA, briefed the Council on 14 May, reporting that three million people were internally displaced and 8.2 million people required assistance, an increase of three million in five months. According to OCHA, needs over the past year have grown by nearly 400 percent.

Kubiš also briefed on 14 May and said that for military gains against ISIS to hold, the government would have to restore civilian authority in areas liberated from ISIS—a reference to the Sunni western provinces, which have a strained relationship with the Shi’a-led government in Baghdad. Kubiš welcomed the government’s commitment to exert control over all elements taking part in liberation operations across Iraq (a reference to Shi’a militias). He also welcomed the extension of Iraq’s parliamentary session so that lawmakers could continue to discuss de-Baathification and a proposed national guard. (In February, parliament approved the draft national guard law—envisioned as a way for the government to arm Sunni fighters against ISIS—but the exclusion of former Baath party members from public service has stalled the legislation.)

Three days after the briefing by Kubiš, Ramadi fell to ISIS as government forces fled, leaving behind US-supplied military equipment. There were subsequent reports that Iraqi authorities were blocking civilians fleeing Ramadi from entering Baghdad. On 8 June, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Stephen O’Brien visited Iraq in his first mission as the new head of OCHA. He urged the government to ensure freedom of movement for all Iraqis fleeing violence.

The fall of Ramadi spurred the US-led anti-ISIS coalition to meet in Paris on 2 June. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi attended and argued for more help to fight the well-equipped and well-organised ISIS. In addition to arms, he requested more intelligence and surveillance support. Many of the Western members of the coalition said there was no military solution without a political one, and suggested that reclaiming territory from ISIS could not be done without the Sunni population joining the fight alongside the Iraqi Army (which is majority Shi’a). Abadi said Iraq would like to purchase arms from Iran and Russia. France and the US agreed to send more weapons, such as anti-tank rockets powerful enough to counter ISIS’s use of armoured trucks as suicide vehicles.

The US agreed to send more trainers and weapons despite ongoing tension between Baghdad and Washington over anti-ISIS strategies. In late April, Abadi criticised a bill in the US Congress to directly arm Sunni and Kurdish fighters, bypassing the Shi’a-led government in Baghdad, as an attempt to further divide Iraq along sectarian lines. The US said it supported a unified Iraq and that military assistance is delivered through the government. (The draft provision was inserted into a bill authorising funding to train Iraqi forces. There were concerns that Baghdad was withholding weapons from Kurdish peshmerga forces. Baghdad has also been reluctant to provide arms to Sunni fighters in provinces controlled by ISIS.)

Baghdad relies upon US airpower, but control on the ground has been sustained by the Kurdish peshmerga and Shi’a militias known as the popular mobilisation forces, which are widely believed to be supported and directed by Tehran. Regarding the peshmerga, the US had hoped they would eventually help Iraqi forces retake Mosul. But Kurds have focused on defending their semi-autonomous provinces from further ISIS encroachment rather than participating in a broader offensive against ISIS. Meanwhile, the US fears that Iraq’s use of Shi’a militias in Sunni areas stokes sectarian tension, deepens the distrust of the Shi’a-led government among Sunni leaders in the western provinces and entrenches support for ISIS. The air support provided by the US-led coalition has been conditioned on the withdrawal of Shi’a militias. However, Abadi has not been able to exert the same level of control over the deployment of Shi’a militias in Sunni western provinces as he did prior to the fall.
of Ramadi. While some Sunni fighters recognise the effectiveness of the Shi’a militias against ISIS, they remain unconvinced that their deployment will lead to stabilisation in areas recaptured from ISIS.

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 15 May, the special rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons (IDPs) urged the government of Iraq to step up its efforts to assist IDPs and give them higher priority. IDPs from all ethnic and religious communities are surviving in precarious conditions, often under the threat of violence and further displacement and without adequate shelter, healthcare, food and water. Meanwhile, the situation of hundreds of thousands of IDPs living in areas controlled by ISIS is unclear and deeply worrying.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is support for a genuinely inclusive government. In this regard, an issue is determining how the Council and UNAMI can encourage greater cooperation on security and humanitarian issues between the dominant Shi’a Dawa party of Abadi and Kurdish and Sunni parliamentarians and thereby build confidence in the central government and fortify Iraq’s response to ISIS.

Another issue is how to address the mutually destabilising impact of the war in Syria and the Iraq crisis.

Options
UNAMI’s mandate has not significantly changed since the adoption of resolution 1770 in 2007. One option is to adopt a resolution that renews the existing mandate without adjustment.

Although UNAMI is a political mission not equipped to address the various and very serious security issues, another option is to adopt a resolution mandating UNAMI to provide better capacity to address the inter-relationship of the crises in Iraq and Syria, and support the establishment of a more inclusive political system and facilitate a humanitarian response.

The resolution renewing UNAMI could explicitly call for the government to work towards enhanced security and humanitarian coordination with the Kurdistan Regional Government and Sunni leaders. In the resolution, the Council could also condemn human rights violations by ISIS and associated armed groups (an indirect reference to former Baathists and Sunni tribal leaders) as well as by Iraqi security forces and associated armed groups (an indirect reference to Shi’a militias).

The Council could invite Special Representative on Sexual Violence Zainab Bangura to brief alongside Kubiš on her recent visit to the region, which included Iraq.

Council Dynamics
Council members uniformly support UNAMI’s mandate, which they believe is broad enough and flexible enough to allow Kubiš to fulfil the mission’s good offices role.

Despite a flurry of activity in the latter half of 2014 in response to the spread of ISIS, Council members have quickly reverted to a “wait-and-see” mode on Iraq. Except through the lens of counter-terrorism, Council members have been unable to approach the connected crises in Iraq and Syria holistically. It is likely that they will continue to treat the two situations as discrete issues. Condemning the Tehran-backed regime in Damascus is difficult to reconcile with supporting the Tehran- and US-backed government in Baghdad.

Similarly, the Council has been less directly engaged in grappling with the underlying political divisions among Iraq’s Shi’a, Sunni and Kurdish populations except for bland calls for an inclusive government. For example, Council members have yet to directly condemn violations by Iraqi security forces or militias. This trend will likely continue given the degree to which the US seeks Iraq’s agreement prior to Council outcomes on Iraq.

Council members France, Jordan, Lithuania, New Zealand, Spain, the UK and the US are part of the anti-ISIS coalition—though not all directly participate in air strikes.

The US is the penholder on Iraq issues in general, and the UK is the penholder on Iraq-Kuwait issues.

Israel/Palestine

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council will hold its quarterly open debate on the Middle East, with a focus on the situation in Israel/Palestine. New Zealand’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Murray McCully, is expected to preside.

Key Recent Developments
This July marks one year since the most recent round of conflict between Palestinian armed groups and Israeli forces, and the launch of Israel’s military operation in Gaza, from 7 July to 26 August 2014, which resulted in the worst escalation of hostilities in Gaza since 1967. Various UN reports on the conflict have recently been released.

According to the 22 June report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry established by the Human Rights Council (HRC), the scale of the devastation in Gaza was unprecedented, with substantial evidence pointing to serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law by Israel and Palestinian armed groups, which in some cases may amount to war crimes. A total of 2,251 Palestinians were killed, including 1,462 Palestinian civilians, and 11,231 Palestinians were injured. In Israel, six civilians and 67 soldiers were killed, and up to 1,600 were injured. The report states that the Israeli Defense Forces carried out more than 6,000 airstrikes in Gaza and fired approximately 50,000 tank and artillery shells, while Palestinian armed groups fired 4,881 rockets and 1,753 mortars towards Israel. Israel condemned the inquiry as biased and released its own report on the conflict on 14 June, concluding that its military acted lawfully and that 761 Palestinian civilians were killed in Gaza.

According to the Secretary-General’s summary of the Board of Inquiry report into certain incidents affecting UN Relief and Works Agency (UNWRA) schools, at least 44 Palestinians were killed and 227 injured at seven UNWRA schools that were used as emergency shelters, as a result of Israeli actions during the 2014 conflict. The report also found that Hamas militants had endangered UN facilities...
by storing weapons in three empty schools.

The Secretary-General’s annual report on children and armed conflict released on 5 June found that during the conflict at least 540 Palestinian children were killed and 2,955 were injured. At least 262 schools, 274 kindergartens and 17 hospitals in Gaza were damaged, while three schools were damaged in Israel. According to the report, the total number of children killed in 2014 in Palestine (557) was the third highest after Afghanistan and Iraq and ahead of Syria and Darfur. The total number of schools damaged or destroyed in Palestine (at least 543) was the highest recorded number in all situations in 2014. The report concludes, “The unprecedented and unacceptable scale of the impact on children in 2014 raises grave concerns about Israel’s compliance with international humanitarian law, notably the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution in attack, and respect for international human rights law, particularly in relation to excessive use of force.” Despite these findings, neither Israel nor Hamas were included in the annex to the report, which lists parties that, among other crimes, kill or maim children or attack schools or hospitals in situations of armed conflict.

The situation in Gaza remains desperate. According to a World Bank report presented to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (a forum of donors to the Palestinian Authority) on 27 May, Gaza’s economy is “on the verge of collapse”. The current unemployment rate is the highest in the world, at 44 percent (11 percentage points higher than before July 2014). The youth unemployment rate is 60 percent, and 40 percent of Gaza’s nearly 1.8 million Palestinians are living in poverty, even though around 80 percent receive some sort of aid. There has been limited progress in rebuilding Gaza since the blockade was put into effect in 2007. Last summer’s conflict exacerbated the lack of rebuilding efforts. According to UNWRA, not a single one of the 9,117 totally destroyed homes in Gaza has been rebuilt.

In the West Bank, increased confrontations between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli forces continue, as do settlement expansion and the forced displacement of Palestinians in Area C and in East Jerusalem. After a period of relative calm, the beginning of June saw an increase in sporadic rocket fire from Gaza into Israel, with no casualties reported. A group of Palestinian militants, known as the Omar Brigades, a group that identifies with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), claimed responsibility for launching at least two rockets into Israel on 3 June and said it would not abide by an informal truce agreed between Hamas and Israel after the 2014 hostilities in Gaza. In response, Israel Air Force jets struck three “terror infrastructure” targets in Gaza on 4 June. Hamas has also initiated a crackdown against ISIS sympathisers in Gaza.

At press time, a delegation from the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC was reportedly due to arrive in Israel as part of a preliminary examination of the situation in Palestine, announced by the OTP on 16 January, to establish whether criteria for opening a formal investigation had been met, following Palestine’s acceptance on 1 January of the jurisdiction of the ICC over alleged crimes committed in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including East Jerusalem, since 13 June 2014. Palestine’s Foreign Minister, Riad Malki, travelled to The Hague on 25 June to present reports to the OTP focusing on Israeli settlement construction and the hostilities in Gaza last year. The government of Palestine acceded to the Rome Statute on 2 January and became a member of the ICC on 1 April.

The Security Council last met on the issue on 24 June, when Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman briefed, remarking that the recent reaffirmations by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of his commitment to a two-state solution must be translated into action, including a halt to unilateral activities in the West Bank where homes continued to be demolished. Feltman also expressed hope that the Commission of Inquiry’s report would contribute to bringing justice to victims of the 2014 conflict.

Human Rights-Related Developments

The special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories, Makarim Wibisono, issued a statement on 5 June reiterating his call for the Israeli government to abandon and desist from implementing plans that might result in the forcible transfer of Palestinian Bedouin communities in the West Bank. The special rapporteur told the HRC in March that an estimated two-thirds of those affected by the transfer plans are children. In June, Israel blocked a visit to the Palestinian territories by Wibisono for a second time.

On 10 June, the Committee on the Rights of the Child published its concluding observations on the report submitted by Israel (CRC/C/OPSC/ISR/CO/1). The Committee voiced concern that Israel did not provide information and data on children living in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the Occupied Syrian Golan Heights. The Committee noted the absence of a comprehensive policy and strategy on children that includes all issues covered by the Optional Protocol, insufficient programmes targeting children in vulnerable and marginalised situations and the need to establish an independent mechanism to monitor and evaluate progress under the Convention and the Optional Protocols.

The HRC considered the Commission of Inquiry’s report on 29 June. In its statement, Palestine said it will work to adopt the report’s recommendations. Israel did not make a statement.

Key Issues

The overarching issue is determining how to move forward on a two-state solution in light of the April 2014 breakdown of US-brokered negociations.

Other key issues include:

- Israel’s settlement expansion in the West Bank, which undermines prospects for peace;
- reconstruction in Gaza, which needs to be facilitated and accelerated; and
- alleged war crimes committed in Gaza during last summer’s conflict, which need to be investigated, with measures to ensure accountability.

Options

One option is to revisit the idea of adopting a resolution outlining parameters for a final status agreement, an initiative that has been brewing behind the scenes among some Council members for a while.

Another option would be to explore other Council outcomes that could help advance prospects for a negotiated settlement.

Council Dynamics

Some Council members, such as France, Jordan and the UK, have been involved since late last year in efforts to negotiate a resolution that sets parameters for a final status agreement. On 30 December 2014, a draft resolution calling for an end to the Israeli occupation of the Occupied Palestinian Territories by the end of 2017, failed to pass with five members abstaining and two voting against, including the US. Since the start of this year, movement on any further outcome was stalled due to US insistence that the Council should not act until after Israel’s election. Currently, Council members seem to be in agreement to wait until the anticipated conclusion of the Iran nuclear deal and US Congressional approval of that deal before reintroducing such an initiative.
Security Challenges for Small Island Developing States

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council will hold an open debate on the peace and security challenges facing small island developing states (SIDS). New Zealand’s Foreign Minister, Murray McCully, is expected to preside. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the prime ministers of Samoa and Jamaica and the finance minister of the Seychelles are likely to brief the Council. No outcome is expected following the debate.

Background
This will be the first open debate addressing the specific challenges associated with this group of 52 countries and territories. As highlighted by the concept note circulated by New Zealand ahead of the open debate, the vulnerabilities of SIDS “are exacerbated by small size; remoteness; narrow resource, economic and export base; and exposure to global environmental challenges”.

The open debate comes after the third UN conference on SIDS in October 2014 in Samoa. The outcome document outlined a series of threats affecting peace and security and the challenges these countries face to respond to them effectively. Some of the threats expected to be raised by member states are related to transnational crime and piracy, the illicit exploitation of natural resources, climate change and uneven development.

Transnational crime and piracy
A presidential statement adopted on 21 February 2012 under the presidency of Togo on the impact of transnational organised crime in West Africa and the Sahel identified it as a serious threat to international peace and stability “including illicit weapons and drug trafficking, piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as terrorism”. Although most of the Council’s attention to this matter has focused on the linkages between organised crime and terrorism, the concept note highlights the particular impact of this phenomenon on SIDS.

Illicit exploitation of natural resources
Thus far, the Council’s most common response to conflict related to natural resources has been to authorise commodity sanctions, which has had a limited preventive role. Two open debates have taken place on the linkages between natural resources and conflict (in 2007 and 2013). The concept note outlines the challenges associated with illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing which in the past has been included in Council outcomes on Somalia and Guinea-Bissau.

Climate change
The Council tackled the issue of climate change in three open debates and an Arria-formula meeting between 2007 and 2013. On 20 July 2011 the Council adopted a presidential statement expressing concern over the possible security implications of loss of territory of some states caused by sea-level rise, in particular in small low-lying island states. The statement noted the importance of including conflict analysis and contextual information on the possible security implications of climate change in the Secretary-General’s reports when such issues are drivers of conflict, represent a challenge to the implementation of Council mandates or endanger the process of peace consolidation. At press time, Malaysia and Spain were expecting to hold an Arria-formula meeting on 30 June on the role of climate change as a threat multiplier for global security.

Key Issues
A key issue is to address the specific vulnerabilities of SIDS in relation to international peace and security.

Another issue is to overcome Council divisions when tackling issues such as climate change or the illicit exploitation of natural resources.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Although this will be the first meeting addressing the challenges for SIDS related to international peace and security, some of the issues that are expected to be discussed, such as climate change or the illicit exploitation of natural resources, have been difficult for the Council to agree upon in the past.

It seems that the scheduling of this open debate is New Zealand’s fulfilment of a commitment it made during its campaign to become an elected member of the Council. In addition to increased awareness of specific challenges that SIDS face, some of these countries might raise the difficulties in implementing Council-imposed legal obligations that rely on member states to be effective on such issues as the implementation of sanctions and other counter-terrorism or non-proliferation obligations.
Notable Dates for July

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPORT DUE</th>
<th>REPORTS FOR CONSIDERATION IN JULY</th>
<th>REQUESTING DOCUMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 June</td>
<td>SG report on UNISFA (Abyei) (S/2015/439)</td>
<td>S/RES/2205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 June</td>
<td>SG report on UNOWA (West Africa) (S/2015/472)</td>
<td>S/2013/759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 June</td>
<td>OPCW report on the implementation of resolution 2118 (Syrian chemical weapons)</td>
<td>S/RES/2118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 June</td>
<td>SG report on MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of the Congo)</td>
<td>S/RES/2211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 June</td>
<td>SG report on UNIFIL and implementation of resolution 1701 (Lebanon)</td>
<td>S/RES/2172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 July</td>
<td>MENUB report (Burundi)</td>
<td>S/RES/2137 S/PRST/2015/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 July</td>
<td>SG report on Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property</td>
<td>S/RES/1284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 July</td>
<td>SG report on UNIFCYP (Cyprus)</td>
<td>S/RES/2197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 July</td>
<td>SG report on UNAMI (Iraq)</td>
<td>S/RES/2169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 July</td>
<td>SG report on the humanitarian situation in Syria</td>
<td>S/RES/2139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MANDATES EXPIRE</th>
<th>RELEVANT DOCUMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 July</td>
<td>UNISFA (Abyei)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 July</td>
<td>UNIFCYP (Cyprus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 July</td>
<td>UNAMI (Iraq)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 August</td>
<td>UNSOM (Somalia) (mandate expires in August but will be renewed in July)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Security Council Report and What's in Blue Apps are available for free at the App Store.

Keep informed of the latest developments in the Security Council through our Apps for the iPhone and iPad.

The material in this publication is subject to copyright ownership. Material in this publication may be freely used as in the public domain. You are free to copy, distribute, or make derivative works of the work under the following conditions: you must attribute the work to Security Council Report, Inc.; you may not use this work for commercial purposes; if you alter, transform, or build upon this work, you may distribute the resulting work only under a license identical to this one.