Overview

China will have the Council’s presidency in February, who is planning an open debate on the maintenance of international peace and security. The quarterly debate on Kosovo will be held, with a likely briefing by Farid Zarif, the Special Representative and head of the UNMIK. There will also be the annual briefing in February by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Ivica Dačić, the First Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Serbia.

Briefings, followed by consultations, are expected on:
- Somalia and the latest Secretary-General’s report on the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia;
- the situation in South Sudan and the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Mission in South Sudan;
- the humanitarian situation in Syria;
- the situation in Iraq and the work of UNAMI by its head, Special Representative Nickolay Mladenov;
- developments in Guinea-Bissau by Miguel Trovoada, the head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), and Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota (Brazil), the chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission; and
- the monthly Middle East meeting on Israel/Palestine.

Briefings in consultations are likely on:
- the situation in Yemen by Special Adviser Jamal Benomar;
- the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons;
- the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA);
- the political track in Syria by Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura;
- the work of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee by its chair, Ambassador Rafael Ramirez (Venezuela);
- the work of the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee by its chair, Ambassador Román Oyarzun (Spain); and
- the work of the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanctions Committee by its chair, Ambassador Rafael Ramirez (Venezuela).

Formal sessions will be needed to adopt resolutions to renew:
- the mandate of UNIOGBIS;
- the mandate of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee’s Panel of Experts;
- the mandate of UNISFA; and
- the 2140 Yemen sanctions regime and the mandate of the associated Panel of Experts.

Throughout the month members will be following closely developments in the Central African Republic, Mali and Ukraine.
A mix of old and new complex crises required the Security Council’s attention in 2014 resulting in one of the busiest periods for the Council in several years. New situations like Ukraine competed with long-term conflicts like the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia. Reversing the trend of decreasing decisions and meetings, the Council, often at the initiative of elected members, showed renewed energy in tackling both new and stagnant issues.

Overall, for the first time in three years both Council decisions and activity registered a significant uptick. The Council adopted 91 decisions in 2014 moving out of a downward trend that had resulted in 2013 having lowest number of decisions since 1991. In 2014, the Council adopted the highest number of decisions since 2008: 63 resolutions and 28 presidential statements. In addition, there were a record-breaking 138 press statements issued. Even with half of these being prompted by specific violent incidents, press statements are clearly the Council’s most likely response to many situations.

Not surprisingly given the issues that needed the Council’s attention, there was also an increase in both formal and informal meetings. There were 263 formal meetings, the second highest number in two decades. The increase in public meetings was particularly significant. Out of its 263 formal meetings, 241 were public and 22 private. The number of meetings in consultations also increased to 167 in 2014 compared to 162 in 2013, a 3 percent increase.

With the rise of groups like ISIS, Al-Nusra Front and Boko Haram, terrorism, particularly in relation to funding foreign fighters and the root causes of terrorism, led to a number of significant decisions as well as a summit-level meeting on foreign terrorist fighters. The impact of ISIS in Iraq forced the Council to renew its interest in a long-standing issue. Boko Haram was listed in the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee but otherwise, although Chad apparently pushed for some action, no formal decision was taken in 2014 on this group.

The Ebola epidemic was determined to be a threat to international peace and security with three dedicated meetings and one resolution adopted. Liberia was also given increased attention as Council members grappled with the effects of the Ebola outbreak on the country and the mandate of the mission there.

While Council activity on the Syria political front stagnated in 2014, elected members Australia, Jordan and Luxembourg were instrumental in focusing the Council’s attention on the humanitarian situation. Three resolutions drafted by these elected members were adopted and regular briefings were held from February 2014.

The deterioration in the peace and security environment in Gaza, Mali, Iraq and South Sudan contributed to an increased focus on these situations over the year. In the Central African Republic the deteriorating situation and discussion over setting up a UN mission necessitated regular meetings. The political situations in Afghanistan, Gaza and Mali also led to Council outcomes that went beyond the regular briefings or mandate renewals. While the deterioration of the situation in Yemen did not lead to more public briefings compared to 2013, it did result in the creation of the 2140 Sanctions Committee and three listings. There was also a slight increase in meetings and decisions on Sudan and South Sudan.

The situation in Ukraine accounted for 26 formal and informal meetings, 17 of which were public. Many of these meetings were driven by Lithuania and the UK with Australia taking the lead on meetings related to the downing of flight MH17. Another elected member, Jordan, was instrumental in prompting Council activity during the violence in Gaza in July and August 2014. There were 18 meetings on Israel/Palestine over the year, with 6 meetings between July and August focused on the Gaza conflict, and one presidential statement adopted.

The election of five judges to the ICJ resulted in nine meetings in November. The year 2014 also saw a move towards public briefings by sanctions committee chairs, with 16 in public compared to ten in 2013. Wrap-up meetings held at the end of the month to assess the Council’s work became a regular feature with nine held in 2014 compared to six in 2013. Holding these sessions in public became the norm following Rwanda’s initiative to hold a public wrap-up meeting during its July presidency.

The Council showed an increased willingness in 2014 to vote on divisive issues. Compared to no vetoes in 2013, there were two last year. Russia vetoed a draft resolution ahead of the referendum in Crimea, with China abstaining. Russia and China vetoed a draft resolution on referring Syria to the ICC. At the end of 2014 a draft resolution on Israel/Palestine was not adopted because it did not receive the necessary nine affirmative votes. Non-consensual decision making decreased slightly with votes taken on three resolutions. Russia abstained on three (Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ICTY and Somalia) and Jordan on one (Somalia). The DPRK was added to the agenda through a rare procedural vote with 11 voting in favour, two abstentions and two against.

In terms of the regional breakdown, Africa continued to account for the highest number of meetings but Europe registered the largest increase due to Ukraine coming onto the agenda. The Middle East also saw a significant increase largely due to meetings on Gaza and Syria. Situations in Asia accounted for five meetings, one fewer than 2013, while meetings on the Americas increased by one. Most regular thematic issues did not significantly increase although peacekeeping meetings doubled from two to four and two resolutions were adopted compared with one in 2013.

In 2014 the Council emerged from a visible slump in both activity and decisions over the last few years. A key factor was the active involvement of elected Council members who often pushed for various regular meetings and were willing to take up the pen on country-specific issues. It remains to be seen if this positive momentum in Council activity and renewed energy among members will continue in 2015.
**Democratic Republic of the Congo**

On 5 January, Special Representative and head of MONUSCO, Martin Kobler, briefed Council members via video-teleconference under “any other business” on the situation in the DRC. On 8 January, the Council adopted a presidential statement reiterating the need for the DRC, together with MONUSCO, through its intervention brigade, to neutralise the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) by commencing military operations immediately (S/PRST/2015/1). On 22 January, the Council was briefed (S/PV.7367) by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous on the strategic review of MONUSCO (S/2014/957) and by Kobler on MONUSCO’s latest report (S/2014/956). The chair of the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee, Dina Kawar (Jordan), briefed the Council on the report of the Group of Experts assisting the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee (S/2015/19). On 29 January, the Council adopted a resolution 2198 renewing the DRC sanctions regime and the mandate of the Group of Experts.

**Mali**

On 6 January, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Hervé Ladsous presented the most recent MINUSMA report (S/2014/943) and reported that there had only been modest progress in the peace process since October 2014 (S/PV.7355). On 17 January, Council members issued a press statement condemning the coordinated attacks against MINUSMA, where one Chadian peacekeeper was killed and others were injured (SC/11739).

**Counter-Terrorism**

On 7 January, Council members condemned the terrorist attack against the headquartered of French newspaper *Charlie Hebdo* in Paris (SC/11727).

**UNOWA (West Africa)**

On 8 January, the Council was briefed by the Special Representative and head of UNOWA, Mohammed Ibn Chambas (S/PV.7357) on the latest UNOWA report (S/2014/945). He highlighted the fragile political situations in a number of West African countries in the lead up to presidential and legislative elections in 2015 and 2016. He placed particular emphasis on the risk of pre- and post-electoral violence for Nigeria’s elections in February and the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency.

**Lebanon**

On 11 January, Security Council members issued a press statement expressing outrage at a terrorist attack carried out a day earlier in Tripoli that Al-Nusra Front claimed responsibility for (SC/11731). On 28 January, Council members were briefed in consultations on UNIFIL after a Spanish peacekeeper was killed earlier in the day near the border with Israel. During the incident, UNIFIL had observed six rockets launched towards Israel from the vicinity of Wazzani north of May- sat in the UNIFIL area of operations. Israeli forces returned fire. At press time, it seemed possible that Council members would issue a press statement in response the incident.

**Côte d’Ivoire**

On 13 January, the Council was briefed by the head of UNOCI, Special Representative Aïchatou Mindaoudou, on the most recent report of the Secretary-General on Côte d’Ivoire (S/2014/892). Ambassador Cristián Barros (Chile), chair of the 1572 Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee, also briefed on his 2-7 November 2014 trip to the country (S/PV.7358).

**Ukraine**

On 13 January, Council members issued a press statement condemning the killing of 11 civilians as a result of the shelling of a passenger bus in Volnovakha (SC/11733) and another press statement on 22 January condemned the killing of 15 civilians as a result of the shelling of a public transport stop in Donetsk (SC/11749). On 21 January, the Council held a meeting on Ukraine—the first in over two months—and was briefed by Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman on the recent escalation of violence in eastern Ukraine and violations of the Minsk agreement (S/PV.7365). On 26 January, Feltman briefed the Council again on the further deterioration of the situation in the east and the growing number of civilian causalities in the Ukraine conflict (S/PV.7368).

**Peacebuilding**

On 14 January, Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliason briefed on the Secretary-General’s report on peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict (S/2014/694). Also briefing was Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota (Brazil), the chair of the Peacebuilding Commission (S/PV.7359). The Council adopted a presidential statement drawing attention to the upcoming 2015 review of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture (S/PRST/2015/2).

**Israel/Palestine**

On 15 January, the Council held its regular quarterly open debate on the situation in the Middle East (S/PV.7360). Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jens Anders Toïberg-Frandzen briefed the Council, warning that “the increasingly antagonistic and virulent nature of the discourse between the two sides should be cause for serious concern among those seeking to foster an environment conducive to a return to constructive dialogue”. He stressed that the international community must uphold its responsibility to play a role in moving the parties forward towards the two-state solution. On Gaza he noted that the ceasefire agreement between the parties remains perilously fragile, and there are no indications that a return to talks under Egyptian auspices is on the immediate horizon.

**Libya**

On 17 January, Council members issued a press statement welcoming the 14-15 January round of talks in the Libyan dialogue hosted by UNSMIL in Geneva and strongly urged all relevant Libyan stakeholders to attend the next round of talks. Council members emphasised that the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee is prepared to sanction those who threaten Libya’s peace, stability or security or that obstruct or undermine the successful completion of its political transition (SC/11738). On 27 January, Council members condemned the terrorist attack against the Corinthia Hotel in Tripoli which resulted in several deaths and injuries (SC/11754).

**Inclusive Development**

On 19 January, the Council held a ministerial-level open debate on inclusive development (S/PV.7361). President Michelle Bachelet of Chile presided. Briefers included Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota of Brazil, the chair of the PBC, and Leymah Gbowee, President of the Gbowee Peace Foundation.
A concept paper was circulated prior to the debate highlighting the Council’s previous work on inclusive development and outlining goals for the debate (S/2015/6). A presidential statement was adopted in which the Council underlined “that security and development are closely interlinked and mutually reinforcing and key to attaining sustainable peace” (S/PRST/2015/3).

**Boko Haram**

On 19 January, the Council adopted its first presidential statement on Boko Haram (S/PRST/2015/4). It condemned recent Boko Haram attacks, highlighting the group’s use of children as suicide bombers on 10 and 11 January and Boko Haram’s attack on the town of Baga, Nigeria from 3 to 7 January. The Council deplored human rights violations by the group and expressed serious concern over the scale of the growing humanitarian crisis. Expressing deep concern that Boko Haram was undermining the peace and stability of the West and Central African region, the Council urged Lake Chad Basin Commission countries and Benin to undertake further planning toward the operationalisation of the Multinational Joint Task Force to combat the group.

**Central African Republic**

On 20 January, Council members met with Fatimata M’Baye and Philip Alston (two of the three commissioners) who briefed at an Informal Interactive Dialogue on the final report of the International Commission of Inquiry on the Central African Republic (S/2014/928). The Commission was established in resolution 2127 to investigate violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and abuses of human rights in the CAR. On 22 January, the Council adopted resolution 2196 renewing the CAR sanctions regime (arms embargo, assets freeze and travel ban) until 29 January 2016 and the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee until 29 February 2016.

**LRA/UNOCA**

On 20 January, Council members issued a press statement welcoming the arrival of indictee Dominic Ongwen to the ICC. Council members recalled that ICC arrest warrants for other LRA leaders, including Joseph Kony, on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity have yet to be executed (SC/11744).

**Burundi**

On 21 January, the Council was briefed by Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman on the final report of the Secretary-General on the UN Office in Burundi (S/2015/36), the mission’s mandate ended on 31 December 2014 (S/PV.7364). The chair of the Burundian configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission Paul Seger (Switzerland) also briefed the Council. The meeting was followed by consultations.

**UNRCCA (Central Asia)**

On 21 January, Miroslav Jenča, the Special Representative and head of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, briefed Council members in consultations. In a 23 January press statement, Council members highlighted UNRCCA’s role as an early-warning and preventive-diplomacy tool. They also commended UNRCCA for its work relating to border management, counter-terrorism and drug trafficking as well as its role in facilitating the region’s continued engagement on Afghanistan (SC/11751).

**Peace Operations**

On 23 January, Lithuania hosted an Arria formula meeting with heads of human rights components of UN peace operations. The meeting focused on the impact of Council resolutions on how human rights work is carried out in peace operations. After introductory remarks by Ambassador Raimonda Murmokaitė (Lithuania), three heads of human rights components briefed Council members: Claudio Cardone (UN Support Mission in Libya), Georgette Gagnon (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) and Guillame Ngefa (UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali). Giuseppe Calandruccio (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti) and Scott Campbell (former head of the Joint UN Human Rights Office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) were also available to answer questions and Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights Ivan Šimonović provided concluding remarks.

**Cyprus**

On 26 January, Council members were briefed in consultations by Special Representative Lisa Buttenheim and Special Adviser Espen Barth Eide. Buttenheim briefed on the latest Cyprus report of the Secretary-General (S/2015/17) while Eide updated Council members on the status of unification talks. On 29 January, the Council adopted a resolution 2197 extending the mandate of UNFICYP for another six months.

**Nepal**

On 28 January, Council members were briefed in consultations under “any other business” on Nepal by Assistant Secretary-General ad interim for Political Affairs, Jens Anders Toiberg-Frandzen. Referring to the current political deadlock over the adoption of a new constitution, Toiberg-Frandzen emphasised the need for broad consultations to build consensus and also stressed the importance of flexibility by Nepalese political leaders in reaching an agreement. The briefing was held at the request of the Secretariat following Under-Secretary-General Jeffrey Feltman’s two-day visit to Nepal on 13-14 January.

**Security Council Visiting Mission to Haiti**

Security Council members visited Haiti between 23 and 25 January. The co-leads of the trip, Ambassador Cristián Barros Melet (Chile) and Ambassador Samantha Power (US), briefed the Council on the visit on 29 January (S/PV.7372).

**Protection of Civilians**

At press time, the Security Council is scheduled to hold an open debate on the protection of civilians on 30 January with a particular focus on the protection challenges of women and girls in conflict and post-conflict settings (S/PV.7374). Expected briefers include UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Director of International Law and Policy for the International Committee of the Red Cross Helen Durham, and Ilwad Elman, a Somali women’s rights activist. No Council outcome is anticipated. Chile circulated a concept paper in preparation for the debate in which it emphasises the importance of “measures...to monitor and better analyse the specific needs of women and to enhance the integration of gender perspectives in the work of UN entities and their partners” (S/2015/32).
Expected Council Action

During February, the Council is expected to adopt a resolution that renews the 2140 Yemen sanctions regime and the mandate of the Panel of Experts. Council members will also receive a briefing in consultations from the Special Adviser Jamal Benomar.

Current sanctions expire on 26 February, and the mandate of the Panel expires on 26 March.

Key Recent Developments

The political and security crisis has deepened in Yemen. On 17 January, Houthi forces ab ducted Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak, chief of staff of President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi. Bin Mubarak was abducted before a meeting scheduled that same day in Sana’a on the recently completed draft constitution, which the Constitution Drafting Committee had delivered to Hadi ten days earlier. The Houthis, a Zaidi Shi’a rebel group, rejected the draft constitution’s division of Yemen into six regions, preferring just two north-south regions.

On 18 January, Hadi ordered security forces to restore the government’s control over Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, which the Houthis have controlled de facto since September. On 19 January, fighting broke out in Sana’a between Houthi forces and members of the presidential guard. The next day, the Houthis seized both Hadi’s residence and the presidential palace, and Hadi was essentially placed under house arrest.

Hadi and the Houthis announced on 21 January a ten-point agreement, including provisions to revise the draft constitution and to allow the Houthis to appoint new members to the government. Also on 21 January, former president Ali Abdullah Saleh made a public statement, calling for early presidential and parliamentary elections and for the cancellation of Security Council sanctions imposed on him and two Houthi leaders.

The ten-point agreement was widely perceived as capitulating to Houthi demands and the next day Hadi, Prime Minister Khaled Bahah and the rest of the cabinet resigned. Despite the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) characterisation of Houthi actions as a coup, the Houthis themselves appeared reluctant to assume power after Hadi’s resignation. Under Yemen’s existing constitution, a majority vote by parliament is required to accept the president’s resignation. A 25 January session of parliament had been scheduled to consider the resignation but it was postponed. If a session is held and the vote fails, the president has ninety days to resubmit his resignation and parliament is obliged to accept it. If the resignation were to be accepted, the constitution stipulates that the speaker of the parliament will take over all presidential duties. The current speaker is a close associate of former president Saleh. At press time, Yemen remained leaderless.

As these events played out, officials in Yemen’s south announced they would ignore instructions from Sana’a, and southern independence flags were raised over government institutions in Aden and other cities.

Council members initially reacted to these developments by holding urgent consultations on 20 January. Benomar briefed via video teleconference from Doha. After the meeting, Council members issued a press statement condemning the recent violence and the attack on the presidential palace; stressed that Hadi was Yemen’s legitimate authority; and underscored the importance of implementing the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA), the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) Outcomes and the GCC Initiative and Implementation Mechanism. Benomar briefed again under “any other business” in consultations on 26 January, this time via video teleconference from Sana’a. He told Council members that he was continuing to meet daily with all 16 parties that are signatories to the PNPA and stressed that an agreement on a way forward (based on the above-mentioned agreements) was possible. The next day, the Houthis released Bin Mubarak.

In oil-rich Marib province, east of Sana’a, Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi warned in early January that the Houthis might be forced to take over the province to pursue Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). On 12 January, the government established a committee to resolve the Marib situation as well as that in Al-Jawf province, where tensions exist between the Houthis and members of the Islamist al-Islah party and Sunni tribes.

Also in recent months, AQAP has escalated its terrorist attacks in the country, targeting Houthis and government institutions. The group has allied with Sunni tribes to fight the Houthis as the Houthis have advanced from Sana’a into central Yemen. Bombings, believed to have been carried out by AQAP, on 16 December 2014 and 7 January were condemned by the Council in press statements. The Council also issued a press statement on 4 December 2014, condemning the 3 December bombing in front of the residence of Iran’s ambassador to Yemen. Renewed international focus on AQAP has been triggered by reports that one of the gunmen involved in the attack on the French newspaper Charlie Hebdo in Paris on 7 January had trained in Yemen. In addition, AQAP released a video claiming responsibility for the attack on the publication, which killed 12 people.

Sanctions-Related Developments

On 15 January, the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee received the final report of its Panel of Experts. One of the recommendations is for the Council to consider measures that would contain and restrict the flow of arms to Yemen. At press time, the Committee was expected to meet to consider the report on 30 January.

Human Rights-Related Developments

In a 9 January press release, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al Hussein warned that the deepening insecurity and violence in Yemen is taking a terrible toll on civilians, citing examples of recent bombings, including one in Radaa in central Yemen on 16 December 2014 that left more than twenty people dead, many of them schoolchildren; a suicide bombing on 31 December 2014 claimed by AQAP that killed at least 24 people; an explosion that killed six people on 4 January when Houthi tried to defuse an explosive device planted near a girls’ school in Dhamar; and a car bombing on 7 January outside a police college in Sana’a that killed at least 37 people.

Key Issues

A critical issue for the Council is supporting Benomar’s efforts to reach an agreement among the parties to avert a civil war and rising sectarian violence, salvage the transition and prevent the potential collapse of Yemen.

A closely related issue is the threat of international terrorism from AQAP and its ability...
Yemen (con’t)

to benefit from the current situation.

The prospect of southern secession continues to be a major concern.

The possible collapse of Yemen’s economy and the estimated 16 million Yemenis in need of aid is an important issue.

A key immediate issue for the Council is how these developments affect the deliberations regarding the renewal of the Yemen sanctions regime and their significance for the PNPA, NDC outcomes and GCC Initiative.

Options

Closely monitoring developments and being prepared to support new agreements or strategies that Benomar may reach with Yemeni parties and regional actors is a likely option.

A further related option would be to decide on the expansion of Benomar’s office to facilitate the disarmament provisions of the PNPA, which he has requested.

On the upcoming sanctions resolution, renewing targeted asset freezes and travel ban measures and the Panel of Experts mandate is the most likely option.

Designating new individuals to be subject to sanctions, including al-Houthi and Ahmed Saleh, the son of former president Saleh, is another option for the Council.

Council and Wider Dynamics

The Council’s leverage is limited in dealing with Yemen. Its main tool has been targeted sanctions, along with supporting Benomar’s efforts on the basis of the PNPA and other prior agreements. Russia seems to oppose further sanctions, and members currently appear to believe it is unlikely that the Council would agree on further designations or new sanctions measures.

Russia has also opposed singling out the Houthis in several recent Council statements, apparently in order not to antagonise the group, which is now the most powerful force on the ground. On the other hand, it seems GCC countries, which have had an important role in Yemen, would like a stronger approach against the Houthis. Saudi Arabia, for example, ended most aid to Yemen after the Houthi takeover of Sana’a in September. At the 26 January consultations, members were unable to agree on a press statement or “press elements” after Jordan, in support of the GCC position, wanted a reference to the Houthis’ role in current crisis.

It is not clear yet how recent developments will affect the new resolution to renew the sanctions. Prior to the current crisis, it seems the UK, as penholder had expressed its intention to propose few changes to the current sanctions regime.

South Sudan

Expected Council Action

In February, the Council will be briefed on, and then consider in consultations, the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), due by 17 February.

The mandate of UNMISS expires on 30 May.

Key Recent Developments

The security and humanitarian situations in South Sudan remain grave. Skirmishes continue between government and opposition forces, and it is now estimated that nearly 2 million people have been displaced since the civil war erupted in December 2013, including 1.5 million internally displaced persons and more than 494,000 refugees who have fled to Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. The International Crisis Group estimated more than a year ago that 10,000 people had perished in the initial weeks of the conflict; while reliable figures have yet to be calculated, many experts believe that the death toll at this point is significantly higher. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that approximately 2.5 million people in South Sudan are currently facing food insecurity at emergency levels.

Sudan’s Humanitarian Aid Commission reported on 5 January that it had extended for an additional six months its June 2014 deal with South Sudan to allow humanitarian aid to be shipped from Sudan to South Sudan in a humanitarian initiative facilitated by the World Food Programme. On 29 December 2014, approximately 450 tonnes of food reached Renk and Wadakona in Upper Nile state, South Sudan, having been transported by barge from Kosti in Sudan’s White Nile State.

In early January, clashes occurred between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the SPLA in Opposition in Unity and Upper Nile states. In Unity state, SPLA spokesman Philip Aguer alleged that the opposition was repulsed after bombing SPLA forces at an oil field outside Bentiu; SPLA in Opposition spokesman Lui Ruai Koang claimed that the SPLA had initiated the hostilities near Bentiu to regain opposition-controlled oil fields. In Upper Nile state, Aguer alleged that the opposition initiated hostilities by bombing Nasir town, while Koang said that the opposition had repelled an SPLA assault on three towns under its control.

On 25 January, unidentified assailants killed 11 people, including five journalists, in an ambush in Raja County, in South Sudan’s Western Bahr al Ghazal state. Aguer accused the Lord’s Resistance Army of the attack, while the governor of Bahr al Ghazal, Rizik Zachariah Hassan, alleged that the SPLA in Opposition was responsible.

China organised a meeting in Khartoum on 12 January with representatives of the government of South Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition. Following the meeting, Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Karti, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Seyoum Mesfin, chief mediator of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), addressed the press. Karti announced that the parties had recommitted to their agreements to cease hostilities and to work toward a transitional government. Wang said that the meeting was an effort to back the IGAD peace process, while Mesfin said that China is a “vital partner to...the Republic of South Sudan”.

On 21 January, South Sudanese President
Salva Kiir, opposition leader Riek Machar and Deng Alor Kuol, representing the political detainees arrested at the outset of the conflict but subsequently released, signed the “Agreement on the Re-Unification of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)” in Arusha, Tanzania. According to the agreement, the parties committed to “implement and comply with the…Cessation of Hostilities Agreement… and to expedite the conclusion of the Peace Agreement…to end the war”. They also recognised the “need for the establishment of a transitional government in which the SPLM Groups and other political parties shall participate proportionally in order to end the war and establish sustainable peace”. Previous agreements among key actors in the conflict—including the 23 January 2014 “Cessation of Hostilities and Status of Detainees” agreements, the 9 May 2014 “Agreement to Resolve the Crisis in South Sudan” and the 9 November 2014 “Rededication and Implementation Modalities for the Cessation of Hostilities”—have all been violated.

An advance team of 18 Chinese peacekeepers arrived in South Sudan on 9 January. They will form part of a Chinese battalion of 700 peacekeepers, whose deployment as a part of UNMISS is expected to be completed by April. South Sudanese Foreign Minister Barnaba Benjamin announced that his government would move forward with the 2015 presidential elections, planned for May or June. This position marks a departure from Kiir’s 11 May 2014 announcement that the 2015 presidential elections would be postponed until 2017 or 2018, arguing that extra time was needed to conduct a national census and ensure that political stability had been achieved. The SPLM in Opposition has criticised the government’s decision to proceed with the poll, with its spokesman James Gatdet Dak arguing that efforts to achieve peace should take precedence and that the election would be designed to “further entrench dictatorship”.

At press time, IGAD was scheduled to hold a summit on 30-31 January in Addis Ababa. The situation in South Sudan is expected to be a key focus of the summit.

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 9 January, UNMISS issued a detailed report compiled by its Human Rights Division on the mass killings in April 2014, in the towns of Bentiu and Bor. According to the report, at least 353 civilians were killed and another 250 wounded in the attacks. The report concludes that the victims in Bentiu and Bor were deliberately targeted on the basis of their ethnicity, nationality or perceived support for one or other of the parties to the conflict.

The first report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in South Sudan was issued on 11 December 2014, covering the period from 1 March 2011 to 30 September 2014 (S/2014/884). The report concludes that all parties to the conflict in South Sudan were responsible for grave violations against children during the reporting period, including killing, maiming, recruitment and use, abduction, rape and other forms of sexual violence. Military use of schools, attacks against schools and hospitals and denial of humanitarian access were also reported. Although progress was made on ending and preventing the recruitment and use of children by the SPLA between March 2011 and November 2013, much of that progress was reversed after December 2013, according to the report.

Key Issues
The key underlying issue is that the humanitarian and security disasters in South Sudan continue to unfold while the government and the opposition remain unwilling to make the compromises necessary for peace.

A related issue is how UNMISS can strengthen its ability to protect civilians, the core element of its mandate, especially given the on-going fighting and the fact that approximately 1.5 million people are now internally displaced.

Another related issue is how to overcome the impasse in the peace talks over power-sharing in the proposed transitional government of national unity. (Kiir insists that he should retain executive powers as president, and while he has proposed a prime minister’s post for the opposition, he is not willing to endow it with executive powers that the opposition believes the position should be accorded.)

Also a key issue is whether it is feasible for South Sudan to hold presidential elections without a census and given the deplorable humanitarian and security situations facing the country.

Options
The Council could consider the following:
• implementing targeted sanctions (i.e. an assets freeze and travel ban) on spoilers to the peace process who have committed gross violations of international human rights and humanitarian law;
• imposing an arms embargo on the country;
• reiterating its request for UNMISS to actively patrol along “key routes of population movement” as outlined in resolution 2187, in order to facilitate access to markets and secure areas for civilian populations; and
• calling for the use of community liaison assistants to help UNMISS enhance dialogue with local communities and get timely information about potential threats, as has been done constructively in the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC.

The Council may also consider requesting a briefing from Ivan Šimonović, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, following his early February visit to South Sudan, as well as one from OCHA on current humanitarian conditions in the country.

Inviting Olusegun Obasanjo, the chair of the AU Commission of Inquiry for South Sudan, to brief the Council on the Commission’s final report is another option.

Council Dynamics
The on-going inability of the parties to forge a political solution to the conflict is a source of consternation to Council members. There are also concerns that the fighting may escalate in the coming months, with even more devastating attendant consequences for civilians, given that it is now the dry season in South Sudan. Several Council members have emphasised that there needs to be accountability for the serious human rights violations committed in South Sudan. Targeted sanctions (i.e. an assets freeze and travel ban) have been discussed for several months now, but key members such as China and Russia have expressed reservations, especially since the sanctions do not have the backing of some of South Sudan’s neighbours. Media reports have indicated that a draft resolution on targeted measures was being discussed among the permanent members in January, but at press time, the status of these discussions was unclear. It also appears that there are divisions within the US administration about a potential arms embargo against South Sudan, and others on the Council would also likely have concerns about this approach as well. Several members would be keen to receive options for accountability that might be discussed in the AU Commission of Inquiry’s final report and in the Secretary-General’s upcoming UNMISS report.

The US is the penholder on South Sudan.
Sudan (Darfur)

Expected Council Action
In February, the chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Rafael Ramirez of Venezuela, is expected to provide the quarterly briefing on the Committee’s work to Council members in consultations. It is also expected that the Council will renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts, which expires on 13 March, during February.

The quarterly report of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) is expected to be released in late February and include “recommendations for the future mandate, composition, configuration and exit strategy of UNAMID” as per resolution 2173 of 27 August 2014. However, this report is not likely to be considered by the Council until March.

The mandate of UNAMID expires on 30 June.

Key Recent Developments
There has been no improvement in the dire security, humanitarian and political situation in Darfur in recent months. Heavy fighting was reported in January in North and Central Darfur between the government forces and rebel groups. On 4-5 January, clashes occurred in Tawila locality in North Darfur. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) referred to local reports indicating that 15 villages had been razed and an additional thirty abandoned in the midst of this fighting, with community leaders estimating that as many as 37,000 people were displaced. In Central Darfur, fighting also erupted in northern Jebel Marra in early January, with community leaders estimating 50,000 were displaced as a consequence of the violence. OCHA estimates that there are currently 2.4 million internally displaced persons in Darfur.

On 21 January, Farhan Haq, associate spokesman for the Secretary-General, referred to OCHA reports that 2,200 displaced civilians were seeking refuge from violence near a UN base in Um Baru, North Darfur, and that additional civilians were making their way toward the base.

Negotiations between Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudan Liberation Movement-Minni Minnawi, two Darfur rebel groups, were convened in Addis Ababa on 24 November 2014, with mediation from AU High-level Implementation Panel Chair Thabo Mbeki. However, Mbeki temporarily postponed the talks on 4 December 2014, as the two sides could not agree on the negotiating agenda. The Sudanese government insisted that the talks focus on ceasefire and security measures, but the rebels wanted to broaden the agenda to include political and economic issues. At press time, the parties had not reconvened for further negotiations.

In late December and January, a rift developed within the leadership of the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), the former rebel movement that has signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, the Secretary-General of the LJM, alleged that LJM Chairman Tijani el-Sissi had failed to make adequate progress in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process of former LJM combatants, thus hindering the LJM’s ability to register as a political party in the lead-up to Sudan’s national elections in April. Supporters of Abu Garda also accused el-Sissi of mismanaging the Darfur Regional Authority, which is responsible for administering the provisions of the DDPD. On 18 January, media reports indicated that the rift had caused the LJM to splinter into two separate groups, one led by Abu Garda and the other by el-Sissi.

The Council was last briefed on the work of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee on 24 November 2014 in an open session, followed by consultations. Ambassador Maria Cristina Perceval (Argentina), the Committee chair at the time, said that she was briefing in an open session to promote the transparency of the Committee’s work. She gave an overview of the 13 November Committee meeting, which was attended by Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Libya, Sudan and South Sudan, in addition to Council members. Perceval noted that the representative of Sudan referred to the establishment of border-monitoring mechanisms with Chad and Libya to stem the flow of illicit weapons into Darfur. However, she added that one Council member affirmed that the real issue is that there are weapons flowing between the other parts of Sudan and Darfur. (The 2013 final Panel of Experts report, released in February 2014, found that Sudan was responsible for violations of the arms embargo.)

The 2014 final Panel of Experts report was distributed to Council members on 16 December 2014 and made public in mid-January 2015. The report found that Sudan continues to violate the arms embargo imposed on it by the Council.

Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous briefed the Council on 4 December 2014 on the quarterly UNAMID report and the situation in Darfur. Ladsous stated that Sudan has publicly called for the departure of the UNAMID, although he indicated that Sudan “has clearly established that this is not about leaving tomorrow” and that an exit strategy needs to be developed. Ladsous noted that the government had also submitted a note verbale to the Secretariat “directing us not to deal further with any Sudanese body without first turning to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” Also on 4 December, Philip Cooper, who headed the review team that investigated allegations that UNAMID’s reporting had been manipulated to conceal evidence of crimes against civilians and peacekeepers, reported to Council members on the findings of the review under “any other business.”

On 12 December 2014, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda provided the semi-annual briefing to the Council on the Court’s work in Sudan. “In the almost 10 years that my Office has been reporting to the Council, no strategic recommendation has ever been provided to my Office, and neither have there been any discussions resulting in concrete solutions to the problems we face in the Darfur situation,” she said. Consequently, she declared, the ICC was suspending its investigations in Darfur and would apply its limited resources elsewhere.

Sudan announced its decision to expel UNDP Country Director Yvonne Helle (Netherlands) and Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator Ali al-Zaatari (Jordan) on 24 and 25 December 2014, respectively. In announcing Helle’s expulsion, Sudan claimed that she was “arrogant” and had not properly consulted with the government prior.
to halting “financial and technical support to a number of programs and strategic projects with developmental, political and economic yield to Sudan”. With regard to al-Zaatari, the government alleged that he had insulted President Omar al-Bashir and the Sudanese people in an interview in early December with a Norwegian newspaper, Bistandsaktuelt. He was quoted as saying that the country relied on humanitarian assistance and making comments on Bashir’s authoritarian leadership style. Al-Zaatari denied making these statements in the interview, alleging that his remarks were distorted. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a statement on 25 December calling on Sudan to reverse immediately its decision to expel both officials, but Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Ahmed Karti said that the decision would stand.

On 30 December 2014, at the request of the UK, Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson briefed Council members in consultations on the expulsions. Eliasson extolled the competence of Helle and Zaatari and noted that this was a difficult period for relations between the UN and Sudan.

Key Issues
The underlying issue is the on-going security and humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur, which is marked by widespread violence, impunity and displacement and shows no signs of improving, despite the fact that UNAMID has been deployed for more than seven years.

Given the political, logistical and financial challenges of the hybrid peacekeeping model in Darfur, a related issue is whether and how this model can be improved.

Another key issue is what approach the Council should take regarding the strained relations between UNAMID (as well as the UN system more broadly) and the government of Sudan, evidenced by the government’s recent expulsion of key UN officials and its request that the mission develop an exit strategy.

Also a key (and on-going) issue is what can be done by the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee to curtail violations of the arms embargo.

Options
Renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts for an additional year is the most basic option for the Council. In adopting the resolution, the Council could also consider:
- imposing targeted sanctions (i.e. travel ban and assets freeze) against additional individuals who commit atrocities or hinder the peace process;
- expanding the arms embargo to all of Sudan; and
- condemning human rights violations committed by parties to the conflict.

Council Dynamics
Strong divisions remain on the Council regarding the appropriate approach to Darfur. Some members view the recent expulsions of high-level UN officials as part of a consistent pattern of antagonistic behaviour on the part of Sudan toward the UN presence in the country. These members also tend to be highly critical of Sudan for the plight of civilians in Darfur, while being concerned about Sudan’s calls for the mission to make preparations to depart the country, given current conditions on the ground. Other members tend to be more sympathetic to Sudan’s sovereign prerogative to call for the mission to develop an exit strategy, especially in light of resolution 2173, which calls for the Secretary-General to recommend such a strategy as part of his analysis of the implementation of the mission’s strategic review. Moreover, while finding Sudan’s declaration of UN officials as persons non gratae regrettable, these members argued at the 30 December 2014 consultations that the expulsion of UN staff is not a matter of international peace and security and therefore should not have been the focus of a Council meeting.

The UK is the penholder on Darfur, while Venezuela is the chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee.

Sudan/South Sudan

Expected Council Action
Council members are expected to hold consultations in February to consider the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) due by 2 February and to renew UNISFA’s mandate, which expires on 28 February.

Key Recent Developments
Abyei, the disputed area straddling the Sudan-South Sudan border, remains a major source of tension between the two countries. They still have not agreed on the criteria for voter participation in a referendum to determine whether Abyei joins Sudan or South Sudan. Sudan continues to maintain police around the Diffra oil facility in contravention of resolutions 1990 and 2046. And temporary administrative and security units—including the Abyei Area Executive Council, the Abyei Area Administration and the Abyei Police Service—enscissaged by the 20 June 2011 agreement between the parties on “Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area” and designed to provide stability in the region

UN DOCUMENTS ON SUDAN/SOUTH SUDAN Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2179 (14 October 2014) renewed the mandate of UNISFA until 28 February 2015. S/RES/2156 (29 May 2014) renewed the mandate of UNISFA but shortened the mandate cycle from 6 to 4.5 months. S/RES/2046 (2 May 2012) was on Sudan-South Sudan relations and provided a roadmap for Sudan, South Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North to resolve outstanding issues. It also threatened Article 41 measures. S/RES/1990 (27 June 2011) established UNISFA for an initial period of six months. Secretary-General’s Report S/2014/862 (1 December 2014) was on UNISFA and the situation in Abyei.
The AJOC was designed to provide administrative oversight of Abyei. As outlined in the 29 June 2011 agreement, the parties committed to monitor a Safe Demilitarised Border Zone (SDBZ) along a temporary border with support from the UN. In resolution 2024 of 14 December 2011, the Council authorised UNISFA to assist the parties in monitoring the border within the SDBZ. However, more than three years after the adoption of this resolution, the mission’s monitoring tasks have been minimal, confined to limited aerial observation. One problem has been that Sudan and South Sudan still have not agreed on a centre line for the SDBZ, which means that the territory encompassed by this zone is not clearly defined. Another challenge is the lack of UNISFA troops available to provide protection for Sudanese and South Sudanese monitors—as well as monitors from UNISFA serving in the JBVMM along the border. The Council had this “force protection” in mind when it authorised an increase in UNISFA’s troop ceiling from 4,200 to 5,326 in resolution 2104 of 29 May 2013. However, according to the Secretary-General’s December 2014 report, only 121 force protection troops of the envisioned 1,126 have been deployed. Finally, at present, only two of the five envisioned JBVMM sector sites are operational. (These are in Kadugli and Gok Machar.)

The Council last met to discuss UNISFA and the situation in Abyei in consultations on 9 December 2014, with Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous briefing. He reported that South Sudan had appointed a co-chair of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee (AJOC), although the AJOC has not formally reconvened since a Misseriya assailant shot and killed Deng Kuol Deng, the Ngok-Dinka paramount chief, in May 2013. (Initiated in 2011, the AJOC was designed to provide administrative and political oversight of Abyei.)

A mission to assess conditions in northern Abyei was conducted from 20 to 24 December 2014 by representatives of the AJOC, Global Aid Hand (a Sudanese NGO), the International Organization for Migration, Sudan’s Humanitarian Aid Commission and some UN agencies. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “preliminary findings of the mission indicate that there is a deterioration of basic services, including the availability of water, healthcare, education and civil infrastructure such as roads.” OCHA also noted that Misseriya inhabitants told the mission that since the death of Ngok-Dinka paramount chief Deng, UNISFA had prevented them from moving “south beyond 30 kilometres north of Abyei town”—i.e. into Dinka areas.

On 21 November 2014, Major General Birhanu Jula Gelalchaa of Ethiopia was appointed Force Commander of UNISFA. Haile Tallun Gebremariam was appointed as head of mission on 28 January.

Key Issues

The fundamental issue remains whether and how the Council can compel Sudan and South Sudan to establish temporary administrative and security institutions in Abyei, and over the longer term, to agree on a mutually acceptable process for resolving the final status of the area.

Other key issues include how to:

• promote reconciliation between the Misseriya and Ngok-Dinka communities, which have been especially strained since the assassination of the Ngok-Dinka paramount chief;
• compel Sudan to withdraw its police, who are located at the Diffra oil facility, from Abyei;
• compel the parties to come to terms on a centre line for the SDBZ; and
• persuade the parties to reengage in earnest in the AJOC.

Options

In renewing the mandate of UNISFA, the Council could consider:

• calling for UNISFA to undertake a joint assessment with Sudan on the security needs of the Diffra oil facility and develop a strategy for the mission to protect the facility, thus removing Sudan’s rationale for maintaining police in Abyei;
• urging the parties to actively reengage with one another through the AJOC; and
• urging the AU to make public the findings of its investigation on the assassination of the Ngok-Dinka paramount chief, as the lack of public information on this issue has aroused resentment among members of Abyei’s Dinka community.

The Council might also request a briefing from OCHA on humanitarian conditions throughout Abyei.

Another option would be to host an Arria formula meeting via video teleconference with Ngok-Dinka and Misseriya leaders in Abyei to get a better understanding of their grievances and what role the Council could play in addressing them.

Council Dynamics

Council members remain frustrated about the lack of progress on any of the fundamental issues separating the parties in Abyei. In May 2014, with the adoption of resolution 2156, Council members reduced UNISFA’s mandate cycle from 6 months to 4.5 months, in an unsuccessful effort to put pressure on the parties to move forward with constructive negotiations. Indeed, concerns among Council members since 2011 that Abyei could become a “frozen conflict” appear to have come to fruition, with the illusion of relative calm prevailing on the surface while underlying tensions between the Misseriya and the Ngok-Dinka—as well as between their patrons in Khartoum and Juba—make the area a potential flash point for renewed conflict between Sudan and South Sudan.

With respect to the Sudan/South Sudan file, the attention of Council members continues to be pulled in multiple directions, given the civil war in South Sudan, the deteriorating situation in Darfur, the on-going conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile and the unresolved status of Abyei. Given the urgency of the catastrophes unfolding in different parts of Sudan and South Sudan, the perception of relative calm in Abyei means that it has not received the same intensive focus as other Sudan/South Sudan matters in recent times.

The US is the penholder on UNISFA.
Iraq

Expected Council Action
In mid-February, Special Representative Nickolay Mladenov will brief the Council on the Secretary-General’s reports on the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and on Iraq’s compliance with resolution 1284 regarding the repatriation or return of Kuwaiti missing persons or property. UNAMI’s mandate expires on 31 July 2015.

Key Recent Developments
The security situation in Iraq reached crisis levels with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’s (ISIS) surprise takeover of Mosul in June 2014. Since then, what was already a dire situation has deteriorated into an even more widespread humanitarian and protection crisis. As a result of armed conflict or terrorist acts, a conservative estimate of 12,282 Iraqis died and 23,126 were injured in 2014—the highest levels since the all-out sectarian warfare of 2006 and 2007. As of January, the crisis has left 5.2 million Iraqis requiring aid and 2.1 million internally displaced. Humanitarian access to millions is severely restricted in areas controlled by ISIS and associated armed groups.

Shortly after the fall of Mosul, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki—whose leadership was characterised by power consolidation and stoking of sectarian tension—resigned. Haider al-Abadi succeeded him in August 2014 with a mandate to form an inclusive government to unify Iraq’s Shia, Sunni and Kurdish citizens. The government’s formation was completed on 18 October 2014, and Abadi’s appointed priorities included fighting ISIS, tackling sectarian divisions, addressing corruption, restructuring the security forces and improving relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

When Mladenov last briefed the Security Council on 18 November 2014, he reported that while the destabilising presence of ISIS posed a very real threat to regional and global security, the formation of a unity government in Baghdad had averted the collapse of the Iraqi state.

There have been several significant developments during Abadi’s tenure to date. He removed 36 commanders from the Iraqi Security Forces, reportedly all Maliki loyalists. Abadi tackled corruption by purging the military payroll of 50,000 “ghost soldiers”—personnel who are dead, missing, absent or did not exist and whose “pay” was siphoned off by senior officers. Iraq’s finance minister has called for further reforms to address other pervasive forms of graft in the military—such as selling military materiel on the black market, which is how some US-provided arms have wound up in ISIS hands. The new unity government has tried to stem militia violence outside the command and control of Iraqi forces, and airstrikes against Sunni civilian areas in the western provinces have subsided.

Abadi also shepherded the breakthrough agreement between Baghdad and Erbil over oil exports and revenue sharing. On 2 December 2014, Baghdad and Erbil finalised their agreement to reinstate the KRG’s share of financial resources from the Iraqi budget, staving off the Kurdish push for independence. In return, the KRG will resume selling its oil via Baghdad and share revenue with the central government. (Maliki had cut off funds from Baghdad when agreement could not be reached in the 2014 budget regarding revenue sharing with Erbil. The KRG subsequently began selling its oil via Turkey, bypassing the central government.)

Shortly after this agreement was finalised, security cooperation between Baghdad and Erbil was significantly enhanced. In mid-December 2014, Kurdish peshmerga forces launched an operation to retake Sinjar, which had been overrun by ISIS. The peshmerga broke ISIS’s siege of Mount Sinjar, where thousands of the Yazidi minority community had been trapped since August 2014. Nevertheless, ISIS has largely maintained control of the territory it captured in June 2014.

At a 3 December 2014 meeting at NATO headquarters in Brussels and at a 22 January meeting in London, Abadi appealed to anti-ISIS coalition members to deliver more training and weapons to Iraq to counter ISIS. However, there are differences between Baghdad and Washington about Iraq’s readiness to execute a complex ground offensive against ISIS.

The US-led anti-ISIS airstrikes have stalled further advance by ISIS and have killed thousands of ISIS fighters as well as members of the group’s senior leadership. The containment of ISIS has also been sustained by Iraq’s reliance on Shia militias and the Kurdish peshmerga. What has been more difficult to secure in order to break the stalemate and tip the balance toward the government are a competent military and the cooperation of Sunni tribal fighters. In principle, Baghdad’s promises to support Sunni fighters against ISIS by arming them and absorbing them into a prospective national guard seem to offer a way forward. However, in practice, there is a deep distrust between Sunnis and the Shia-led government. Delivering on this promise is controversial in Baghdad and remains elusive in the near term since it is only envisioned as a step after Iraqi forces clear ISIS from the western provinces. Similarly, restructuring a notoriously corrupt military into a force trusted by all sects in Iraq and capable of retaking Mosul and Fallujah by the summer of 2015 seems equally challenging—especially when the actions of Iraqi Security Forces and associated Shia militias backed by Tehran demonstrate a bias towards protecting Baghdad.

Tehran has deepened its influence in Iraq following the fall of Mosul. Iranian military advisers helped organise Iraq’s Shia militias to stop ISIS’s advance to Baghdad. Iraq’s ministry of the interior went to a member of the Badr bloc—the political arm of a Tehran-backed Shia militia. Media reports indicate Iran has sold Iraq $10 billion’s worth of arms over the past year and on 30 December the two countries formalised their military cooperation to rebuild Iraq’s army.

Tehran has also conducted its own airstrikes against ISIS in eastern Iraq near the border with Iran, most recently in early December 2014. The US-led coalition does not coordinate its airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq with Iran—explicit military cooperation between Tehran and Washington would be impossible given the Iranian nuclear file and Iran’s support for the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. Nevertheless, both countries have long-term interests at stake in Iraq and both rely on Baghdad to ensure that their respective anti-ISIS airstrikes do not conflict. (A similar tack the US-led coalition takes with Damascus vis-à-vis its anti-ISIS strikes in Syria.)
Iraq (con’t)

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al Hussein briefed the Council on 18 November 2014 along with Mladenov. He reported severe and systematic violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws perpetrated by ISIS and associated armed groups in northern Iraq, including wanton killings and summary public executions; abductions, rape and enslavement of women and young girls, with reports of girls and women being openly sold at slave markets; brutal violence and the forced recruitment of children as young as 12; and deliberate persecution of ethnic and religious groups. He added that Iraqi Security Forces and affiliated armed groups had also violated human rights and that the conduct of particular military operations, including air strikes and shelling, may have also violated the principles of distinction and proportionality under international humanitarian law.

The Security Council had previously condemned such human rights violations in a 31 October 2014 press statement, in particular ISIS’s massacre of 322 members of the Al Bu Nimr tribe who cooperated with the government against ISIS in Anbar province. Media reports indicate that the lack of government action to stop the massacre has undermined its ability to convince other powerful Sunni tribes to take an active anti-ISIS stance.

Iraq has suffered a fiscal setback due to the 2014 budget impasse over Kurdish oil exports, ISIS’s massive looting of Mosul’s banks and plummeting global oil prices. As a result, Iraq requested that its final reparation payment to Kuwait, due in 2015, be postponed until 2016. The UN Compensation Commission agreed to the request on 18 December 2014.

Sanctions-Related Developments
The 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee met on 8 December to consider the mid-term report from its Panel of Experts. It seems this report indicated that Qassem Soleimani, an influential member of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, has been in Iraq in violation of a travel ban imposed by the Security Council.

Human Rights-Related Developments
In a press briefing on 20 January, the spokesperson for the High Commissioner for Human Rights drew attention to the establishment by ISIS of unlawful, so-called “shari’a courts” in the territory under its control. These “courts” have ordered cruel and inhuman punishments for men, women and children accused of violating the group’s extremist interpretation of Islamic law or for suspected disloyalty. Recent examples include two men who were “crucified” after they were accused of banditry and a woman who was stoned to death for alleged adultery. In addition, there were reports that educated women, particularly women who have run as candidates in elections for public office, have been targeted, with three female lawyers executed in the first two weeks of the year. Civilians suspected of violating ISIS’s rules or who are suspected of supporting the Iraqi government have also been victims. Four doctors were killed in central Mosul, allegedly after refusing to treat ISIS fighters; 15 civilians from the Jumaili Sunni Arab tribe were executed on 1 January in Fallujah for their suspected cooperation with Iraqi Security Forces, and on 9 January, at least 14 men were executed in a public square in Dour, north of Tikrit, for refusing to pledge allegiance to ISIS.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is supporting an inclusive government in order to avert the territorial and political disintegration of Iraq, which could have catastrophic implications for regional and international security.

Another issue is how to address the mutually destabilising impact of the Syrian civil war and the Iraq crisis beyond the US-led anti-ISIS operations in both countries.

Options
Aside from following the situation in Iraq through briefings, options seem limited since the security response to ISIS is happening outside the Council’s purview.

Council Dynamics
Council members uniformly support UNAMI’s mandate, which they believe is broad enough and flexible enough to allow Mladenov to fulfil the mission’s good-offices role.

Despite a flurry of activity in the latter half of 2014 in response to the spread of ISIS, Council members have quickly reverted to a “wait-and-see” mode on Iraq. Except through the lens of counter-terrorism, Council members have been unable to approach the connected crises in Iraq and Syria holistically. It is likely that they will continue to treat the two situations as discrete issues. Condemning the Tehran-backed regime in Damascus is difficult to reconcile with supporting the Tehran- and US-backed government in Baghdad.

Council members France, Jordan, Lithuania, New Zealand, Spain, the UK and the US are part of the anti-ISIS coalition—though not all directly participate in air strikes.

The US is the penholder on Iraq issues in general, and the UK is the penholder on Iraq-Kuwait issues.

Somalia

Expected Council Action
In February, the Council will receive a briefing on the Secretary-General’s most recent 120-day report on the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and other recent developments. The briefing will be followed by consultations.

Ambassador Rafael Ramirez (Venezuela), chair of the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanctions Committee, is expected to give a 120-day briefing in consultations. The Council is also expected to receive by 27 February a proposal from the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) regarding a potential exemption to the arms embargo for commercial vessels in Somali ports, which was requested in resolution 2182.


USEFUL ADDITIONAL RESOURCES
Key Recent Developments

Al-Shabaab has continued to engage in terrorist attacks in urban areas. On 25 December 2014, the group attacked the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Halane Base Camp near Mogadishu, resulting in the death of three AMISOM soldiers and a civilian contractor. The Council issued a press statement strongly condemning the attack. On 22 January, the day before the president of Turkey was due to arrive, an Al-Shabaab suicide car bomber attacked a hotel in Mogadishu where the Turkish diplomatic delegation was staying. Two policemen and a hotel employee were killed in the blast, but no members of the Turkish delegation were injured.

The on-going joint military offensive by the Somali National Army and AMISOM forces has forced Al-Shabaab from its strongholds in south-central Somalia toward Kenya in the south and the semi-autonomous region of Puntland in the north. Maman Sidikou, AU Special Representative for Somalia and head of AMISOM, commented on 7 January, “When they were hit by AMISOM, the tail went down to the Jubba valley and the head toward Puntland.” On 11 January, a remote-controlled bomb hit an AMISOM convoy in the southern port city of Kismayo, killing three soldiers; Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the blast. Conflict has also recently flared up between Al-Shabaab and Puntland security forces in the Galgala hills region 50 kilometres southwest of the northern port city of Bosaso. According to the Puntland authorities, twenty Al-Shabaab fighters and five government troops were killed in clashes during the first week of January.

The FGS and the US have continued to target Al-Shabaab through a “carrot and stick” approach: encouraging the defection of leaders and rank-and-file members through a FGS amnesty program announced 3 September 2014, and targeting Al-Shabaab leaders with US drone strikes and bounties for their capture. On 27 December 2014, Zakariya Ismail Ahmed Hersi, thought to have once been the head of the Amniyat (Al-Shabaab’s intelligence wing, responsible for assassinations, internal security and suicide bombing), surrendered to the FGS. The US had offered a $3 million bounty for Hersi in June 2012. On 29 December 2014, a US drone strike killed Tahlil Abdishakur, who the US Department of Defense stated was the current head of the Amniyat, and two other Al-Shabaab members.

In what could be interpreted as a regional show of support for the FGS, the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Council of Ministers held its 53rd session in Mogadishu on 10 January. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud noted the significance of the meeting, as the IGAD foreign ministers had not held a meeting in Mogadishu since the collapse of the Somali state more than two decades ago. The IGAD Council issued a communiqué addressing the political situation, particularly the state formation process, adoption of a constitution and elections as envisioned in the federal government’s Vision 2016 plan. The communiqué also recommended that the next IGAD summit (at the level of head of state) be held in Mogadishu during 2015.

The political crisis that resulted in the removal of Prime Minister Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed by a parliamentary vote of no confidence on 6 December 2014 and the confirmation of his successor, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, on 24 December 2014, has not yet been resolved. Despite strong support in parliament for his appointment—218 out of 224 members present were in favour—Sharmarke has had difficulty forming a cabinet. Less than a week after the cabinet was selected, the prime minister dissolved the cabinet on 17 January in the face of widespread parliamentary opposition. Sharmarke requested, and was granted, a 14-day extension by parliament to reassemble the cabinet. After meeting with President Mohamud and Prime Minister Sharmarke on 21 January, representatives of the AU, IGAD, EU, UK, UN and US issued a joint statement the next day expressing concern over political delays and calling for the rapid appointment of a new parliament-endorsed cabinet.

The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate in Somalia. The Secretary-General’s January report attributes this trend to “drought, conflict, rising food prices, access constraints and slow funding”. More than 1 million people are unable to meet their basic food requirements and another 2.1 million people are in danger of acute food insecurity, bringing the total number of people in need of humanitarian assistance to the highest level since the end of the 2011 famine. Insecurity remains a problem throughout the road network of the south-central region, hindering humanitarian and development assistance. Due to severe funding shortages, humanitarian operations are at risk of shutting down in Somalia. As of 29 December 2014, donors had contributed only 41 percent of the $933 million requested for the year.

Key Issues

The principal issue for the Council within the context of February’s briefing and consultations is likely to be consideration of UNSOM’s implementation of two components of its mandate—good offices and mediation and advising on peacebuilding and statebuilding—in order to facilitate political stability in Somalia.

A related issue for the Council is UNSOM’s role in assisting the FGS in managing the three statebuilding challenges of Vision 2016: federal state formation, revising and adopting a constitution, and holding national elections by September 2016.

Options

As UNSOM’s mandate does not expire until 28 May, the Council is unlikely to take any action specifically regarding the special political mission at this juncture.

To better address the current political situation in Somalia, Council members could request an informal interactive dialogue via video teleconference with President Mohamud and Prime Minister Sharmarke.

Council and Wider Dynamics

The 22 January joint statement by the envoys of the AU, EU, IGAD, UK, UN and US represents a unified voice by regional and international stakeholders in Somalia. The statement, which called on the president, prime minister and parliament to unite for the good of the country and move toward implementation of Vision 2016, echoed themes previously emphasised by the Security Council in its press statement of 10 December 2014. Following the parliamentary vote of no confidence that led to the removal of Prime Minister Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed on 6 December 2014, Council members stressed the importance of the “rapid establishment of an inclusive and representative government” and underlined their concern that further political instability risks undermining any progress made thus far toward peace and security. The
Somalia (con’t)

three core statebuilding tasks of Vision 2016 are formidable even under the best of circumstances: forming federal states (which also includes resolving the complex questions of semi-autonomous Puntland and secessionist Somaliland), revising and adopting a constitution, and then holding national elections by September 2016. As the Council has already noted, the necessary precursor to these ambitious endeavours remains political stability. The briefing and consultations in February provide an opportunity to attain more clarity on the immediate political situation, including with respect to how (and to what extent) UNSOM can facilitate unity.

The UK is the penholder on Somalia, and Venezuela is the chair of the 751/1907 Somalia–Eritrea Sanctions Committee.

Syria

Expected Council Action
In February, Council members expect to be briefed on the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons early in the month and on the humanitarian situation in Syria towards the end of the month.

Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura is expected to brief mid-month on the political track.

Key Recent Developments
On 6 January, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Angela Kane briefed on the remaining tasks in the implementation of resolution 2118, such as the gaps in Syria’s declared chemical weapons stockpile and the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities in Syria, which began on 24 December 2014 and is due to be completed by this summer.

On 30 December 2014, the P3, current Council members Jordan and Lithuania and then-Council members Australia, Luxembourg and the Republic of Korea transmitted to the Security Council the report by the fact-finding mission of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on Syria’s use of chlorine bombs. Discussion of this OPCW report featured prominently during the 6 January consultations. The report concluded with “a high degree of confidence that chlorine has been used as a weapon” and that there was evidence that chlorine had been consistently and repeatedly used in barrel bombs dropped from helicopters. While the fact-finding mission does not attribute blame, only the government has aerial capacity and only rebel-held areas were targeted.

The OPCW Executive Council met on 21 January to consider the 18 December 2014 report of its fact-finding mission to try to reach a decision on whether it should express concern about the report’s findings, call for accountability and for Syria’s cooperation. At press time, no decision had been taken, and the Executive Council was set to meet again on the issue on 29 January. (The Executive Council includes Russia and the US and operates by consensus.)

Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Kyung-wha Kang briefed the Council on 28 January, reporting that since the adoption of resolutions 2165 and 2191, there had been 54 cross-border aid deliveries but cross-line deliveries within Syria remain difficult. The government continues to use administrative obstacles to slow or block aid delivery. Medical neutrality is not observed, with the government withholding approvals for medical supplies in aid convoys, attacking medical facilities and killing medical personnel. Armed opposition groups and terrorist groups block access to each other’s areas of control.

The Secretary-General’s most recent report on the humanitarian situation in Syria states that there has been no improvement. The death toll is conservatively estimated at 200,000 people. Those requiring humanitarian assistance in Syria number 12.2 million. Of those needing assistance, 7.6 million are internally displaced, 4.8 million are in hard-to-reach areas and 212,000 are besieged, largely by government forces. Meanwhile, “host country fatigue” has challenged neighbouring countries, which shelter the overwhelming majority of Syria’s 3.8 million refugees. Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey have begun to restrict the refugee influx due to concerns about the destabilising impact on their own security and economic situations.

Following Kang’s briefing, Council members Jordan, New Zealand and Spain proposed press elements that thanked the neighbouring countries and expressed concern that resolutions 2165 and 2191 lacked effective implementation in Syria. The press elements called for full implementation of all of the Council’s resolutions and statements on the humanitarian situation in Syria. Council members expressed concern about the increasing number of refugees and internally displaced persons as a result of the Syrian crisis as well as violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Finally, there was emphasis that the humanitarian situation will continue to deteriorate in the absence of a political solution.

Regarding the military situation, US-led airstrikes continued in Syria, almost exclusively targeting the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) in Kobane, a town near the Turkish border. Kurdish militias regained full control of Kobane on 26 January after a three-month battle supported by hundreds of US-led airstrikes.

The Syrian military has continued its devastating aerial bombardment of rebel-held areas. However, the government lost a key military base in Dera’a in the south to Al-Nusra Front in January. Meanwhile, in the north, a previously cooperative relationship between Al-Nusra Front and other rebel groups has encountered tension as Al-Nusra Front has become more aggressive around Idlib and Aleppo.
On 18 January, Israeli airstrikes targeted two vehicles in Quneitra, a Syrian district close to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. The strike killed an Iranian general and several senior Hezbollah members. This incident was unlike the previous six Israeli airstrikes in Syria since 2013 that destroyed Hezbollah weaponry en route to Lebanon from Iran. It is unclear if the Iranian general was deliberately targeted, which could signal an escalation between Israel and Iran being played out in Syria. On 27 January, rockets from a Syrian military position were launched into the Israeli-occupied Golan and Israel returned fire the next day. At press time, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Israel were engaged in retaliatory attacks, apparently related to the incidents in the adjacent Golan Heights.

On the political track, Special Envoy de Mistura persisted in his efforts to secure a UN-mediated freeze zone for Aleppo to de-escalate violence and to allow the entry of humanitarian aid. In recent weeks, de Mistura has met with US Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and has continued discussions with Damascus, the Syrian National Coalition and key rebel groups from Aleppo. In addition, there have been other initiatives outside the UN framework, such as a conference of opposition leaders in Cairo on 25 January and talks between the Syrian government and opposition leaders tolerated by the government that got underway in Moscow on 26 January.

Before meeting de Mistura in Geneva on 14 January, Kerry praised the envoy’s plans to broker a freeze in Aleppo and welcomed the Moscow talks. Some analysts have speculated that these public comments, which did not include the standard US tagline that Assad must go, indicate a shift in US policy towards a greater degree of comfort in having Assad play a role in any transition process.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council—heading into the fifth year of a violent civil war—is to meaningfully refocus its attention on finding ways to support a cessation of violence and resuscitate efforts for a political solution.

Ongoing issues include tracking implementation of resolutions 2139 and 2191 on the humanitarian situation and 2118 on the destruction of chemical weapons—in particular aerial bombardment and the use of chlorine bombs.

Options
On the political track, in addition to de Mistura’s briefing on the opportunities and challenges of freeze zones that have emerged during his talks with key stakeholders, Council members could hold an Arria formula meeting with Syrian civil society representatives who have first-hand experience in negotiating cessations of violence on the ground.

An option for Council members who are concerned that elements of resolution 2139, such as demands regarding human rights and protection of civilians, are being flagrantly ignored is to request to be regularly informed of the work of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria as well as request regular briefings on Syria from the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

An option, albeit unlikely, for Council members who are concerned about the government’s use of chlorine bombs would be to adopt a resolution (avoiding the consensus requirement of a press or presidential statement) determining that Syria has breached resolution 2118 and demanding that it fully implement the resolution or face further measures, such as sanctions.

Council Dynamics
Despite overwhelming indications that resolutions 2118 and 2139 have been continually breached, there is no appetite among Council members to push for follow-up measures against the Syrian regime, such as targeted sanctions, due to the assumption that Russia would veto the effort in any event.

On the political track, it seems Russia is fully supportive of “freeze zones”. Other Council members are supportive of de Mistura’s incremental approach but remain concerned whether a freeze zone would be anything more than the opposition’s agreement to surrender as the result of the government’s siege and starvation tactics. Resolution 2191 reflects this tension, seeking further advice from de Mistura on his proposals and linking any Syrian political process to the 30 June 2012 Geneva Communiqué.

On the chemical weapons track, deep divisions remain within the Council, in particular over the government’s use of chlorine bombs. The US has said such allegations raise serious questions about Syria’s obligations under resolution 2118 and the Chemical Weapons Convention, whereas Russia has argued that the OPCW at The Hague, not the Security Council, is the appropriate arena to address any alleged breaches of the Chemical Weapons Convention. This was most recently demonstrated with the suggestion during the 6 January consultations that 2118 briefings be shifted to an every-other-month cycle. However, Council members who wanted to send a strong signal that there would be sustained and regular attention to the chemical weapons file insisted that the monthly cycle continue.

France is the penholder on Syria overall. Jordan leads on humanitarian issues, and it seems New Zealand and Spain will replace former Council members Australia and Luxembourg on this track. In practice, however, most texts need to be agreed between Russia and the US prior to agreement by the broader Council.

Council members France, Jordan, Lithuania, New Zealand, Spain, the UK and the US are part of the anti-ISIS coalition—though not all directly participate in air strikes.

On 28 January, Jordan agreed to prisoner swap in order to secure the release of a Jordanian pilot being held by ISIS after his F16 went down in Syria on 24 December 2014. This was a sensitive development for some Council members who, while sympathetic to Jordan, were also cognizant that resolution 2133 called upon all member states to prevent terrorists from benefiting from ransom payments or from political concessions in order to secure the safe release of hostages.
Expected Council Action
In February, the chair of the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Román Oyarzun (Spain), is due to brief Council members in consultations on the work of the Committee.

Also in February, the Sanctions Committee is expected to have a meeting to discuss the final report from its Panel of Experts, submitted on 19 January in accordance with resolution 2141.

Key Recent Developments
On 22 December 2014, the Council for the first time held a meeting on the situation in the DPRK as an agenda item separate from the non-proliferation issue. The meeting was scheduled at the request of Australia, Chile, France, Jordan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Republic of Korea, Rwanda, the UK and the US. In a 5 December letter to the Council, those countries expressed concern about the gravity of human rights violations described in the report by the Commission of Inquiry established by the Human Rights Council (S/2014/276) and the impact on the stability of the region and the maintenance of international peace and security. They therefore asked that the situation in the DPRK “be formally placed on the Council’s agenda without prejudice to the item on non-proliferation” and also requested a meeting to be briefed on the situation.

There was a procedural vote at the start of the meeting to adopt the agenda following an objection by China that the Council was not mandated to consider human rights issues and that the inclusion of the proposed item on the Council’s agenda would do more harm than good. Russia joined China in voting against, while Chad and Nigeria abstained. Argentina voted in favour, along with the ten Council members that requested the meeting. (It was the first procedural vote in the Council since 15 September 2006, when the Council decided to add the situation in Myanmar to its agenda [S/PV.5526]. Procedural decisions cannot be vetoed.) Following the vote, Tatyé-Brook Zerihoun and Ivan Simonovic, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs and for Human Rights, respectively, were invited to brief the Council. A majority of Council members said the Council should consider the Commission of Inquiry’s recommendation to refer the situation in the DPRK to the ICC, and some expressed support for the imposition of targeted sanctions against those found to be most responsible for crimes against humanity. Several members also stressed the importance of the Council’s receiving regular updates on the human rights situation.

As for the DPRK, it has reacted angrily to the increased international scrutiny of its human rights record. On 24 and 28 November 2014, it wrote to the Council to protest the adoption by the General Assembly’s Third Committee on 18 November 2014 of a resolution on the human rights situation in the DPRK, which called on the Council to consider the Commission of Inquiry’s recommendations. In a 15 December 2014 letter, the DPRK denounced the US in particular for “scheming once again to abuse the United Nations Security Council” to implement “its hostile policy” and warned that its actions would certainly bring “serious consequences”.

The DPRK continued to send mixed signals about the prospects for high-level talks with the Republic of Korea (ROK). On 1 January, DPRK leader Kim Jong-un seemed to signal openness to resuming the talks but apparently noted that this would require suspending the joint ROK-US military exercises and stopping the distribution of propaganda leaflets from the ROK into the DPRK. On 23 January, DPRK officials said that before the resumption of any dialogue, Seoul would have to remove the sanctions it imposed in response to the 24 May 2010 torpedo attack against a South Korean naval ship that killed 46 men. Meanwhile, South Korean President Park Geun-hye said on 12 January that she was willing to hold a summit meeting with Kim without any pre-conditions.

In a separate development, the DPRK announced on 10 January that it had told the US it would be willing to impose a temporary moratorium on nuclear tests if Washington cancelled the joint military exercises with the ROK. The US immediately dismissed the proposal and called on the DPRK “to take the necessary steps toward denuclearization needed to resume credible negotiations.”

The Sanctions Committee has met twice since the chair last briefed Council members on 10 November 2014. A meeting on 11 December 2014 provided an opportunity for the outgoing chair to share concluding remarks on the work of the Committee. On 28 January, the Committee was briefed on the Panel of Experts final report by the panel coordinator, Hugh Griffiths (UK). (In a first, the announcement about the meeting in the UN Journal included the agenda. At press time, the meeting was still underway.)

On 31 December 2014, the Committee issued its annual report and posted updated guidelines on its website. The guidelines include a new provision imposing a time limit of nine months on any holds placed by Committee members to consider a proposal. (Such a provision exists in many other sanctions committees.)

On 2 January, the US announced the imposition of additional targeted sanctions against three DPRK entities and ten officials in response to the 24 November 2014 cyber-attack against Sony Pictures Entertainment. The DPRK has denied any involvement in the attack.

Human Rights-Related Developments
The special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, Marzuki Darusman, visited Tokyo from 19 to 23 January, to be apprised of the latest developments in the stalled dialogue between Japan and the DPRK relating to the abduction of Japanese nationals. On 23 January, Darusman said he had been informed that the Japanese national police agency was looking into 881 possible DPRK-related abduction cases. He announced the preparation of a comprehensive strategy to resolve the problem of state-sponsored international abductions and enforced disappearances committed by the DPRK, to be presented to the Human Rights Council in March. He also commended the readiness expressed by Japanese officials to collaborate with the field-based structure soon to be established in Seoul by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to follow up on the work of the Commission of Inquiry established by the Human Rights Council (S/2014/276) and the impact on the stability of the region and the maintenance of international peace and security.

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A key issue for the Council is the DPRK’s continued flouting of all relevant resolutions and the absence of any constructive engagement with the international community.

An additional issue is what kind of follow-up action the Council should consider on the human rights situation in the DPRK.

At the Sanctions Committee-level, a key issue is whether to implement any of the Panel of Experts’ recommendations.

With regard to the Committee chair’s briefing, the Council could decide to change the format to a public meeting to increase transparency. (The briefings by the chair of the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee are public, and recently there has been a trend in other sanctions committees towards more public briefings as opposed to briefings in consultations.)

For the Committee, the main option is to continue its consideration of the Panel’s report and implementation of relevant recommendations.

**Options**

**Guinea-Bissau**

**Expected Council Action**

In February, the Council is expected to adopt a resolution renewing the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), which expires on 28 February. Prior to the renewal, Special Representative Miguel Trovoada is expected to brief on the Secretary-General’s UNIOGBIS report. Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota (Brazil), as chair of the Guinea-Bissau country configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), will also brief. Consultations will follow the briefing.

**Key Recent Developments**

Since the restoration of constitutional order following parliamentary and presidential elections in April and May 2014, the situation in Guinea-Bissau has progressed positively overall. On 11 November 2014, the National Assembly reactivated the Commission for Constitutional Review, which will be chaired by National Assembly President Cipriano Cassamá. The National Assembly has also reactivated the national dialogue and reconciliation process, with the expectation of holding a national conference on reconciliation in 2015.

On 13 November 2014, the defence minister established a committee to review the list of military personnel that the Permanent Secretariat for the Security Sector Reform Steering Committee presented on 15 September. In total, the list identifies 2,282 personnel to be retired over a five-year period, including 753 individuals in the first year. The list of names is included as part of a proposal on retirement packages for the military and police.

On 2 December 2014, Guinea-Bissau reopened its border with Guinea, which had been closed since 14 August to prevent the spread of Ebola.

Amidst renewed international engagement, the first meeting of the International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau in more than two years was held in New York on 18 November 2014, bringing together representatives of almost 60 countries and inter-governmental organisations. The Contact Group issued a communiqué afterwards welcoming the government’s planned reforms. It further supported the need to maintain the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Security Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB), which is assigned to carry out security sector reform (SSR) and maintain security, and invited the Council to coordinate the mission with UNIOGBIS’ mandate. The Contact Group also called on international partners to participate in an international donor conference to be held in Brussels (the donors’ roundtable is scheduled for 26 March). Meanwhile, ECOWAS extended the mandate of ECOMIB on 15 December 2014 for six months until 30 June.

The Council last met on Guinea-Bissau on 18 November 2014 and on 25 November, it adopted resolution 2186 renewing UNIOGBIS’ mandate.

The 19 January report of the Secretary-General on Guinea-Bissau included the findings and recommendations of a strategic assessment mission conducted by the UN from 3 to 14 November 2014 as requested in Security Council Resolution 2186 (25 November 2014) renewed UNIOGBIS for six months and requested a comprehensive review of UNIOGBIS’s mandate. Secretary-General’s Report S/2015/37 (19 January 2015) was the most recent UNIOGBIS report, including the findings of the strategic assessment mission to Guinea-Bissau. Security Council Letters S/2014/805 (11 November 2014) provided an update on the political and security situation in Guinea-Bissau. S/2014/529 (23 July 2014) took note of the Secretary-General’s request for a three-month extension to report on the comprehensive review of UNIOGBIS’s mandate and requested in turn a written update by 12 November 2014. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.7315 (18 November 2014) was the most recent meeting on Guinea-Bissau.
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resolution 2157 to ensure that UNIOGBIS’s future mandate is aligned with the new government’s priorities. The report emphasises that a continued cooperative relationship between Guinea-Bissau’s political leaders—in particular, the president, prime minister and president of the National Assembly—remains essential for continued progress. While the report indicates that the current UNIOGBIS mandate remains relevant, it recommends strengthening the mission’s role in good offices, support to a national dialogue and reconciliation process and coordination of international partners and mobilisation of international assistance. The Secretary-General additionally recommended the Council support ECOMIB’s continuation.

Key Issues
The main issue will be renewing the UNIOGBIS mandate, including possible adjustments based on the findings of the strategic assessment mission.

Supporting sustained international attention on Guinea-Bissau to help the government fulfil its reform agenda, and avoid an unravelling of recent progress, is another issue. In this regard, the upcoming donors’ roundtable will be important.

The financial strains facing ECOWAS to continue supporting ECOMIB entirely on its own is an important issue. Related to this is progress in SSR.

On-going issues are the fight against drug trafficking, natural resource management, the national reconciliation process and combatting impunity.

Options
The resolution renewing UNIOGBIS’s mandate may:

- increase the emphasis on the Special Representative’s good-offices role and the mission’s activities in supporting national dialogue and reconciliation and in coordinating international partners and mobilising assistance;
- maintain tasks for strengthening democratic governance, strategic and technical advice to rule of law institutions, support to SSR, assistance to combat drug trafficking, human rights promotion, protection and monitoring, and mainstreaming a gender perspective in peacebuilding;
- strongly appeal for the international community to support the upcoming donor’s conference; and
- encourage countries to support ECOMIB financially and with personnel.

Council and Wider Dynamics
The Council tends to follow the lead of Guinea-Bissau’s partners, ECOWAS and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP). Council member Nigeria, also a member of ECOWAS, is ECOMIB’s main contributor. New Council member Angola, which is a CPLP state, had a security sector reform mission, the Angolan Military Mission, in Guinea-Bissau until the 12 April 2012 coup. The Angolan mission was replaced by ECOMIB amidst tensions with the Guinea-Bissau military and West African countries. Now these differences, along with the divisions that existed between CPLP and ECOWAS following the coup, have greatly improved, demonstrated by the reactivation of the Contact Group.

Nigeria would like greater burden-sharing for the ECOMIB mission as it faces challenges being the force’s primary contributor. At the last Council meeting, several speakers appealed for financial support for ECOMIB, including Prime Minister Simões Pereira.

The Council additionally seems to have strong confidence in Patriota as PBC country-configuration chair for Guinea-Bissau. Nigeria is the penholder on Guinea-Bissau.

Kosovo

Expected Council Action
In February the Council is expected to hold its quarterly debate on Kosovo. Farid Zarif, Special Representative and head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), is expected to brief (via video teleconference) on the latest Secretary-General’s report and recent developments. High-level representatives of both Serbia and Kosovo are likely to participate in the debate.

Key Recent Developments
After general elections on 8 June 2014, Kosovo endured six months of political and constitutional crisis stemming from the inability of political leaders to agree on the composition of the new government. On 8 December, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) signed a coalition agreement paving the way for the creation of a new government. Of 120 seats in Kosovo’s assembly, the coalition is in control of 67, with the PDK holding 37 and the LDK 30 seats. On 8 December, the assembly elected Kadri Veseli of the PDK as the speaker of the parliament. At the assembly’s constitutive session on 9 December, the lawmakers elected the leader of the LDK, Isa Mustafa, as Kosovo’s new prime minister while Hashim Thaçi, the former prime minister and the leader of the PDK, remained in
Mogherini reiterated that continuing the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina will be related issues for the Council to follow. The resumption of the EU-facilitated dialogue and implementation of the existing agreements between Belgrade and Pristina will be related issues for the Council to follow.

Options

Given the progress made in normalising relations between Belgrade and Pristina and the overall stability in Kosovo, the Council could consider modifying the Secretary-General’s reporting cycle, currently set at three-month intervals.

Another option for the Council would be to consider reducing UNMIK’s presence in Kosovo, reflecting the current positive developments on the ground.

As has been the case for several years, the Council could choose to take no action.

Council Dynamics

Kosovo remains an issue of relatively low intensity for the Council. Other international organisations, primarily the EU, NATO and the OSCE, have tended to play a lead role.

Despite the change in the Council’s composition at the beginning of the year, Council dynamics remain largely unchanged. There is still a persistent division between permanent members France, the UK and the US, which strongly support Kosovo and Russia, which remains largely unchanged. There is still a persistent division between permanent members France, the UK and the US, which recognises Kosovo, and Russia, which remains largely unchanged. There is still a persistent division between permanent members France, the UK and the US, which recognises Kosovo, and Russia, which remains largely unchanged. There is still a persistent division between permanent members France, the UK and the US, which recognises Kosovo, and Russia, which remains largely unchanged. There is still a persistent division between permanent members France, the UK and the US, which recognises Kosovo, and Russia, which remains largely unchanged. There is still a persistent division between permanent members France, the UK and the US, which recognises Kosovo, and Russia, which remains largely unchanged.
### Notable Dates for February

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<td>Final report of the 1591 Sudan Panel of Experts (S/2015/31)</td>
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<td>19 January</td>
<td>SG's strategic assessment of UNIOGBIS (Guinea-Bissau) (S/2015/37)</td>
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<td>23 January</td>
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<td>OPCW report on the implementation of resolution 2118 (Syrian chemical weapons)</td>
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<td>SG report on Iraq/Kuwait Missing Persons and Property</td>
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<td>25 February</td>
<td>Final report of the 2140 Yemen Panel of Experts</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 March</td>
<td>Final report of the 1718 DPRK Panel of Experts</td>
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### MANDATES EXPIRE

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<td>UNISFA (Abyei)</td>
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<td>1591 Sudan Panel of Experts (will likely be renewed in February)</td>
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<td>26 February</td>
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<td>2140 Yemen sanctions and Panel of Experts (Panel of Experts’ mandate expires in March but will likely be renewed in February)</td>
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