Overview

Chile will hold the presidency of the Council in January. Three open debates are planned. President Michelle Bachelet of Chile will preside over a ministerial-level open debate on inclusive development for the maintenance of international peace and security, while Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, the chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, and a high-level representative from UN Women are expected to brief. The periodic open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict will likely include briefings by representatives of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UN Women. The quarterly open debate on the Middle East will likely be presided over by Chile’s Foreign Minister Heraldo Muñoz, with Jeffrey Feltman, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, expected to brief.

A briefing is expected on post-conflict peacebuilding, most likely by Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson and Patriota;

Briefings in consultations are likely on:
- chemical weapons destruction in Syria, by High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Angela Kane;
- the developments in Cyprus by Lisa Buttenheim, Special Representative and head of UNFICYP, and possibly also by Special Adviser Espen Barth Eide; and
- the work of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia by its head, Miroslav Jenča.

Formal sessions will be needed to adopt resolutions to renew:
- the Central African Republic sanctions and the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee;
- the DRC sanctions and the mandate of the Group of Experts assisting the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee; and
- the mandate of UNFICYP in Cyprus.

Votes (in formal sessions) are also possible on:
- a resolution calling for an end to the Israeli occupation of the Occupied Palestinian Territories by 2017; and
- a resolution to authorise a regional response to the Boko Haram terrorist threat in West Africa.

Meetings may also be held on Burundi following the closure at the end of the year of the mission there and on the report of the Commission of Inquiry on CAR, mandated by the Council resolution 2127.

Throughout the month members will be following closely developments in Ukraine and further meetings may be required.

The Council is also likely to undertake a visiting mission to Haiti in January.
In Hindsight: The Military Staff Committee

When the UN Charter was adopted in 1945, member states were expected to make available to the Security Council armed forces, assistance and facilities that the Council could use at its discretion to maintain international peace and security (Article 43). The Charter established a subsidiary body of the Council, the Military Staff Committee (MSC), with a mandate to advise and assist the Council on all questions relating to military requirements and the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal (Article 47). However, the MSC, composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members, soon became a victim of the Cold War divisions and never really got off the ground.

To overcome that deadlock, the UN developed the concept of peacekeeping (which was not included in the Charter), and military planning became a responsibility of the UN Secretariat. For roughly sixty years, the MSC remained largely dormant. It met twice a month, its chairmanship rotated among the P5, but its meetings were mostly pro forma.

With the end of the Cold War, the idea of making better use of the MSC was raised within both the Secretariat and the Council. Resolution 1327, adopted in 2000, stated that the Council “undertakes to consider the possibility of using the MSC as one of the means of enhancing the UN peacekeeping capacity”. In 2001, Russia circulated a position paper with ideas to enhance the activities of the UN Secretariat. For roughly sixty years, the MSC remained largely dormant. It met twice a month, its chairmanship rotated among the P5, but its meetings were mostly pro forma.

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One of the current main shortcomings of UN peace operations is the lack of full implementation of mandates authorised by the Council. While sometimes this is due to the emergence of unpredictable external factors, it is common for the implementation of mandates to be hindered by insufficient planning or operationally unrealistic recommendations. Examples of this disconnect include the limited success of the inter-mission cooperation arrangements to provide the UN Mission in South Sudan with additional troops after the crisis in December 2013; the sluggish pace at which the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali has been deployed; and the difficulties in ensuring that the re-hatted contingents in the Central African Republic or Mali meet UN standards.

Meanwhile, the MSC started to meet ahead of Council peacekeeping-related discussions, proceeded to develop its procedures and enhanced the substance of its discussions. It now holds semi-monthly substantive meetings on operations whose mandates are to be discussed by the Council or on thematic issues involving military aspects of peacekeeping, and it engages regularly with officials from the Department of Field Support and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, including the Office of Military Affairs. Since 2009 it has adopted a yearly programme of work and in 2010, 2011 and 2012 it created informal groups to provide advice to the P5 on the planning for missions in Somalia, South Sudan and Mali, respectively. In April 2012, the MSC endorsed a handbook outlining its working methods. In September 2014, the MSC travelled to Haiti (its first field mission) and issued a report upon its return supporting the recommendations of the Secretary-General for the drawdown of the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti. In a key development aimed at increasing the inclusiveness of its discussions, the MSC started involving the military advisors of the ten elected members in its activities. Even though the MSC still meets formally after elected Council members leave the room, these formal meetings are apparently mostly ceremonial.

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While the Council is ultimately responsible for authorising these decisions, the mandates are usually adopted following specific recommendations provided by the Secretary-General. These operational weaknesses not only hinder the implementation of specific Council mandates but also, more broadly, risk delegitimising the UN’s involvement in such critical situations.

In this context, the MSC seems well-placed to provide a thorough military consideration of the Secretariat’s mission planning prior to the Council’s strategic decisions. The current pool of military advisors within Council members’ missions is a vastly underutilised resource. Council decision-making could benefit from the exchanges of ideas between Council members and the Secretariat’s military professionals. Furthermore, military advisers of troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) could systematically meet with the MSC ahead of mission renewals (which would probably also enhance the substantive quality of the Council’s periodic meetings with TCCs/PCCs). The Council might explore having the MSC regularly report to it as do the chairs of other subsidiary bodies. Currently, the institutional interaction between the Council and the MSC is non-existent. The only way in which the discussions of the MSC feed into the Council’s decision-making process is through the advice individual permanent representatives receive from their respective military advisors.

Establishing or renewing Council mandates is a process that requires huge investment of time and resources from all Council members. Ensuring that the Council is presented with sound information and realistic options and that the mandates can indeed be implemented on the ground seems fundamental for the credibility of the organisation and is vital for the people the Council strives to serve. Even if the MSC is not to play any role in the planning or conduct of peacekeeping operations, the Council could well benefit from more substantive inputs provided systematically by the MSC on military questions. Increasing the Council’s ownership of military decisions and enhancing the opportunities for careful consideration of operational challenges, may be a way toward better mandate design and enhanced implementation.
**Status Update since our December Forecast**

**Sudan (Darfur)**

On 4 December 2014, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous briefed the Council and reported that Sudan had publicly called for UNAMID’s departure (S/PV.7326). He also presented the quarterly UNAMID report (S/2014/852). On 12 December, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, during her semi-annual briefing on the Court’s work in Darfur, said that the ICC was suspending its investigations in Darfur because of the Security Council’s lack of action on the matter and the limited resources of her office which would be applied elsewhere (S/PV.7337).

**Kosovo**

On 4 December 2014, the Council held its quarterly debate on Kosovo (S/PV.7327). Special Representative Farid Zarif briefed on recent developments and the latest Secretary-General’s report (S/2014/773). Aleksandar Vučić, Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia and Hashim Thaçi of Kosovo also participated. Most of the delegations joined Zarif in calling on both sides to resume the EU facilitated dialogue that had been stalled due to the delay in forming Kosovo’s new government. Some members also called for a reduction in the frequency of Council meetings on Kosovo, citing the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina.

**Sudan/South Sudan**

On 8 December 2014, Council members held consultations on Sudan/South Sudan issues as well as on the most recent UNISFA report (S/2014/862). Special Envoy Haile Menkerios briefed on Sudan/South Sudan via video-teleconference while Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous and Force Commander Major-General Hafefom Mokes briefed on UNISFA. On 11 December, Council members issued a press statement reiterating grave concern with the humanitarian situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile and at the “relatively calm but highly volatile security situation in Abyei” (SC/11694).

**Liberia**

Council members held consultations on Liberia sanctions on 8 December 2014, where the final report of the Panel of Experts was discussed (S/2014/831). The following day, the Council adopted resolution 2188, which renews the arms embargo on non-state actors, targeted travel ban and the mandate of the Panel of Experts. Resolution 2188 also reaffirms the asset freeze on Charles Taylor, his family and associates (imposed in 2004 and not time-limited). On 15 December 2014, the Council adopted resolution 2190, extending the mandate of UNMIL until 30 September 2015. It adds a good offices role for the Special Representative and a mandate for UNMIL to provide electoral assistance. The force structure of UNMIL remains unchanged for now, but the Council did reiterate its intent to withdraw the peacekeeping operation by 30 June 2016. Resolution 2190 also requests, in addition to the regular UNMIL reports, for the Secretary-General to update the Council by 15 March 2015 regarding the impact of the Ebola outbreak on security and to provide options for resuming UNMIL’s phased drawdown.

**Subsidiary Bodies**

On 9 December 2014, the five outgoing Council members—Argentina, Australia, Luxembourg, Republic of Korea and Rwanda—briefed the Council on their work as chairs of subsidiary bodies (S/PV.7331). Argentina focused on the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee and the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions; Australia briefed on the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee and the 1988 Taliban Sanctions Committee; Luxembourg focused on the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Sanctions Committee and the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict; the Republic of Korea discussed the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanctions Committee and the 1540 Committee concerning non-proliferation; and Rwanda briefed on the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee and the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations.

**UNOCA/LRA**

On 10 December 2014, the Council was briefed by Special Representative Abdoulaye Bathily on the UNOCA report (S/2014/812) and the implementation of the regional strategy to combat the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2014/25) expressing its concern at the grave security situation in parts of Central Africa, in particular the ongoing crisis in the Central African Republic and its regional impact, the continuing threat of the LRA and the expansion of Boko Haram terrorist activities into countries in the sub-region. It also requested that the Secretary-General keep the Council informed through a single report on UNOCA and the LRA by 15 November 2014.

**International Criminal Tribunals**

On 10 December 2014, the Council held a debate (S/PV.7332) on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) in which the presidents and prosecutors of these bodies briefed. The meeting focused on the completion strategy reports submitted by both Tribunals (S/2014/827 and S/2014/829) and the report from the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (S/2014/826). On 18 December, the Council adopted resolutions 2193 extending sixteen ICTY judges’ terms until 31 December 2015, with Russia abstaining. The Council also adopted resolution 2194, extending two ICTR judges’ terms until 31 July 2015 and four judges’ terms until 31 December 2015. Resolution 2194 also reappointed the ICTR Prosecutor Hassan Bubacar Jallow until 31 December 2015.

**Sahel**

On 11 December 2014, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Sahel, Hirotu Gurebre Sellassie, briefed the Council on progress towards the implementation of the UN Sahel strategy (S/PV.7335). In addition, Sellassie noted the negative security impact that conflicts in Libya, northern Nigeria, northern Mali and the Central African Republic were having on the region. Council members also made statements.

**Yemen**

On 11 December 2014, the Council received a briefing from the chair of the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Raimonda Murmokaitė (Lithuania) (S/PV.7336). Murmokaitė described the Committee’s 7 November decision to adopt targeted sanctions against former President Abdullah Ali Saleh and two Houthi military commanders. The briefing was followed by consultations with the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Yemen, Jamal Benomar. Council members issued press statements condemning the 3 December bomb attack at the residence of the Iranian Ambassador to Yemen (SC/11683) and the 16 December bomb attacks in Radaa (SC/11710).
Afghanistan
On 11 December 2014, Council members issued a press statement condemning the attack on the French Institute of Afghanistan in Kabul by the Taliban (SC/11695). The Council met on 12 December (S/PV.7338) to adopt resolution 2189, welcoming the Afghanistan-NATO agreement to create the post-2014 Resolute Support Mission. On 18 December, the Council held its quarterly debate on the situation in Afghanistan (S/PV.7347) and considered the Secretary-General’s recent report on this issue (S/2014/876). The briefers were Nicholas Haysom, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, and Yuri Fedotow, the Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.

Terrorism
On 13 December 2014, Council members condemned the terrorist attack against the Embassy of Israel in Athens, Greece (SC/11700). On 16 December, Council members condemned the terrorist attack against children that occurred at a school in Peshawar, Pakistan, causing the death of over 140 innocent civilians, including 132 children (SC/11707).

South Sudan
On 15 December 2014, the Council adopted a presidential statement marking the one year anniversary of the outbreak of hostilities in South Sudan (S/PRST/2014/26). In the statement, the Council urgedly demanded that the parties end the fighting and maintain their commitment to create a transitional government of national unity. The Council also reiterated “its intention to commence consideration, in consultation with relevant partners, including the IGAD and African Union, on all appropriate measures, including targeted sanctions, against those impeding the peace process.”

UN-AU Partnership
On 16 December 2014, the Council held an open debate on “Peace Operations: The UN-AU Partnership and Its Evolution” (S/PV.7343) at the initiative of Chad, Council president in December, who had circulated a concept note prior to the debate (S/2014/879). The meeting was chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chad, Moussa Faki Mahamat. The Secretary-General and the head of the AU Mission in Mali and the Sahel, Pierre Buyoya, briefed. A presidential statement was adopted at the meeting acknowledging the progress in the ongoing cooperation between the UN and the AU in peace operations (S/PRST/2014/27).

Libya
On 17 December 2014, Olivier Nduhungirehe (Rwanda) briefed the Council on the steps taken by the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee to ensure compliance by member states with the sanctions regime (S/PV.7345), followed by consultations. At press time, Special Representative Bernardino Leon was expected to brief Council members in consultations on 23 December on challenges to his efforts to convene a political dialogue in Libya.

UNDOF (Golan Heights)
On 18 December 2014, the Council adopted resolution 2192 renewing UNDOF for six months after considering the Secretary-General’s latest report on the observer mission during 17 December consultations (S/2014/859).

Iran
On 18 December 2014, the chair of the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Gary Quinlan (Australia), presented his final quarterly briefing on the Committee’s work (S/PV.7350). (Ambassador Román Oyarzun Marchesi [Spain] will take over the chairmanship of the Committee on 1 January 2015.) While welcoming the continued commitment of Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US) to reach agreement on a comprehensive solution, Quinlan emphasised that the sanctions imposed by the Council remained fully in effect and that the Committee also remained fully committed to their implementation. Noting Iran’s failure to respond to letters it had received from the Committee on recent incidents reported by member states, he encouraged it to engage with the Committee. Furthermore, Quinlan informed the Council that the Committee had met on 8 December to consider the mid-term report from the Panel of Experts assisting the Committee and had continued discussions of the Panel’s latest final report (S/2014/394).

Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime
On 19 December 2014, the Council held an open debate which focused on the linkages between transnational organised crime and terrorism (S/PV.7351). Of particular consideration was Chad’s concept note for the debate that it had circulated as president of the Council (S/2014/869) and the Secretary-General’s report on the work of the UN in fighting terrorism in Africa (S/2014/9). The meeting was presided over by Chad’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Moussa Faki Mahamat, and Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman and the AU Permanent Observer to the UN, Téte António, briefed. At the debate, resolution 2195 was adopted and addressed the role of transnational organised crime in supporting terrorism.

DPRK (North Korea)
On 22 December 2014, the Council held a meeting on the situation in the DPRK with briefings by Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights Ivan Šimonović and Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Tayé-Brook Zerihoun (S/PV.7354). It was the first time that the Council considered the situation in the DPRK as a separate agenda item from the non-proliferation issue. At the initiative of Australia, ten Council members in a 5 December letter (S/2014/872), expressed concern about the situation in the DPRK and in particular the scale and gravity of human rights violations described in the 7 February 2014 report by the Commission of Inquiry established by the Human Rights Council (S/2014/276) and its impact on the stability of the region and the maintenance of international peace and security. They therefore requested that the situation in the DPRK “be formally placed on the Council’s agenda without prejudice to the item on non-proliferation in the DPRK” and also requested a meeting. (The five Council members that did not sign the letter were Argentina, Chad, China, Nigeria and Russia.) Following objections raised by China, the agenda for the 22 December meeting was put to a vote (S/PV.7353). This was the Council’s first procedural vote since 15 September 2006 when there was a vote on whether to consider the situation in Myanmar as a new agenda item. The agenda was approved by a vote of 11 in favor, two against (China and Russia) and two abstentions (Chad and Nigeria). On 15 December, the Council received a letter from the DPRK in response to the 5 December letter (S/2014/896). It denounced the US in particular for “scheming once again to abuse
the Security Council” to implement “its hostile policy” and warned that its actions would certainly bring “serious consequences.” Referring also to the public release on 9 December by the US Congress of its report on the CIA’s interrogation practices, the letter said that the Council should consider “the century-old heinous human rights violations self-revealed” by the US if it was “truly interested in the settlement of human rights issues.”

Mali

Expected Council Action
In January 2015, the Council expects a briefing from Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous on the situation in Mali and the work of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

MINUSMA’s mandate expires on 30 June 2015.

Key Recent Developments
Briefing the Council on 8 October 2014, Ladsous stated that MINUSMA is no longer operating in a peacekeeping environment and on 9 October, MINUSMA Force Commander Major General Jean Bosco Kazura told the Council that “MINUSMA is in a terrorist-fighting situation without an anti-terrorist mandate or adequate training, equipment, logistics or intelligence to deal with such a situation.” As of 30 November 2014, 27 out of the 38 peacekeepers who had been killed in 2014 in the field were deployed in Mali.

On 10 November 2014, Council members held a brainstorming session on Mali, meeting in an informal interactive dialogue format with Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support Ameerah Haq and UN Deputy Military Adviser Major General Adrian Foster. The discussion focused on the relevance of MINUSMA’s mandate in the current context of increasing asymmetrical threats. While the mandate was assessed to be sufficiently robust and Council members emphasised the importance of its full implementation, different issues were raised to improve the operational capabilities in the mission. Council members expressed appreciation for the efforts regarding the establishment of a Sector North Force headquarters in Kidial (which was inaugurated on 3 December), completing the deployment of MINUSMA’s rapid deployment capability (already provided for in the concept of operations of the mission) and improving MINUSMA’s capacities to counter improvised explosive devices. At press time, an update on the implementation of the efforts to enhance MINUSMA’s capabilities was expected to feature in the December Secretary-General’s report.

So far, three rounds of the inter-Malian negotiation process have been convened—in July, September and November 2014—by Algeria with the support of MINUSMA, as well as regional organisations and governments. Armed groups continue to negotiate as two rebel coalitions. The “Coordination” coalition comprises the Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad, the Haut Conseil pour l’Unité de l’Azawad and the Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA). The “Platform” coalition—which is perceived to be close to the government—comprises the Coordination des Mouvements et Fronts Patriotiques de Résistance, the Coalition du Peuple pour l’Azawad and another MAA faction. The two-track nature of the political process continues to be a key issue for the advancement of the negotiations. Despite the 24 July 2014 roadmap and a declaration of cessation of hostilities signed separately by the government with the two rebel coalitions, some violations of the ceasefire have continued. Discussions regarding the territorial structure of Mali, how to refer to the territory that some call “Azawad” and new security arrangements in the north remain outstanding issues. The talks are expected to resume in January 2015.

The security situation in the north continues to be negatively affected by the absence of the Malian Defence and Security Forces and the end of Opération Serval. In July 2014, French forces launched Opération Barkhane, which has a regional scope as opposed to Serval’s exclusive focus on Mali. Counter-terrorism operations in the north of Mali continue to be carried out by Barkhane, including a 10 December operation in which a leader of al-Mourabitoun terrorist group, Ahmed al-Tilemsi, was killed. The persistence of structural factors—such as the absence of state authority, the porous nature of the borders, the availability of weapons, the profitability of kidnapping for ransom, synergies with transnational organised crime and the exploitation of existing political grievances in the north—make terrorist groups an ongoing threat to stability in Mali. On 9 December, Serge Lazarevic, a French citizen who had been held hostage by Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, was freed in exchange for the release of four jihadists detained in Malian prisons.

As of 31 October 2014, MINUSMA had reached 73 percent of its planned deployment and was working on enhancing its force projection throughout the north and in rural areas. In addition to security and weather conditions, operational challenges such as the absence of some force enablers or essential contingent-owned equipment continue to hinder the implementation of its mandate. The Secretary-General has also noted the budgetary constraints to expand MINUSMA’s outreach beyond the main population centres.

On 12 December 2014, Tunisian Foreign Minister Mongi Hamdi was appointed as the new Special Representative and head of MINUSMA after the departure of Albert Koenders. Force Commander Kazura finished his tour of duty on 14 December and the appointment of his replacement by the Secretary-General is pending.

According to the World Health Organization’s 17 December situation report, Mali has had seven confirmed Ebola cases, including six deaths. On 6 December, the quarantine of 23 MINUSMA personnel who had unknowingly been treated at the same clinic as a Guinean national who had Ebola was lifted.

Mali (con’t)

Human Rights-Related Developments
The independent expert on the situation of human rights in Mali, Suliman Baldo, visited Mali from 8 to 17 October 2014. In a press conference in Bamako on 17 October, Baldo said emergency relief measures to alleviate the suffering of people in the north should be adopted to facilitate humanitarian access and ensure their right to safety, health, education and access to safe drinking water. He also called on the international community to strengthen the capacity of MINUSMA and the government of Mali to secure the north of the country and stop the proliferation of weapons, militias and other vigilante groups. Baldo is expected to present a report to the Human Rights Council in March 2015.

Key Issues
An overarching issue is the slow progress of the political process and the divisions among armed groups. The entrenchment of the parties in their positions further complicates the political process.

The marked increase in terrorist groups’ activities and the deliberate targeting of MINUSMA is an immediate issue for the Council. Given these deadly attacks, ensuring that the concerns of troop and police-contributing countries are addressed is an ongoing issue.

Ensuring accountability for the crimes committed since 2012 while pursuing a political settlement is a key issue. A closely related issue is the timely establishment of an international commission of inquiry called for in resolution 2164, which is still pending.

If a peace agreement is reached, the Council could adopt a resolution adapting MINUSMA’s mandate to ensure the implementation of the agreement in areas such as security arrangements, transitional justice and institutional capacity-building.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Council members are increasingly worried about the slow progress in the political process and the continuous attacks targeting MINUSMA in northern Mali. The challenges of transnational terrorism and the presence of jihadist groups in Algeria, Mali and Libya that have benefited from political instability in northern Mali continue to be of concern to Council members. However, some Council members and the Secretariat have warned against a rushed agreement that does not address the grievances of the parties or provide for a sustainable solution.

After the 10 November 2014 informal interactive dialogue, the idea of a more robust mandate for MINUSMA seems to have fallen off the table. Along the same lines, the conclusions of a 5 November meeting of African troop contributors to MINUSMA held in Niamey, Niger failed to endorse the Malian request for a peace enforcement mandate for the mission.

Since 1 July 2013, 33 MINUSMA peacekeepers have been killed and more than a hundred have been injured as a result of hostile acts; at least 22 of these peacekeepers have been killed since 2 September 2014. The tension between those troop contributors ready to be deployed in the most dangerous territory (which are not necessarily the best equipped) and other more risk-adverse contributors poses the threat of further increasing the gap between contributors from the developing and the developed world.

Some Council members have questioned the way the re-hatting process from the African-led International Support Mission to Mali into MINUSMA was conducted, and a lessons-learned exercise on the processes in Mali and the Central African Republic was expected to be finalised by the Secretariat at press time.

France is the penholder on Mali.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Expected Council Action
In January 2015, the Council will be briefed by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous on the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). The Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region, Said Djinnit, may also brief. The briefing will be followed by consultations.

The Council will also be briefed by the Chair of the 1533 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Sanctions Committee, Dina Kawar (Jordan), on the report of the Group of Experts assisting the Committee. Prior to that, the Group will present its report to the 1533 Sanctions Committee.

The Council is expected to renew the DRC sanctions regime and the mandate of the Group of Experts, which expire on 1 February 2015.

The mandate of MONUSCO expires on 31 March 2015.

UN DOCUMENTS ON THE DRC Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2147 (28 March 2014) renewed the mandate of MONUSCO, including its intervention brigade, until 31 March 2015. S/RES/2136 (30 January 2014) renewed the sanctions regime and the Group of Experts. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2014/22 (5 November 2014) called on the DRC, in coordination with MONUSCO, to undertake immediate military action against those in the FDLR who do not engage in the demobilization process or who continue to carry out human rights abuses. Security Council Press Statements SC/1675 (25 November 2014) condemned the attacks near the city of Beni in North Kivu and called on the DRC and MONUSCO to neutralise armed groups operating in the eastern DRC. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.7288 (27 October 2014) was the most recent DRC public briefing. Security Council Letter S/2014/753 (20 October 2014) was from the DRC, denying the allegations in the UNJHRO report and accusing the head of office of a bias against the government. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2014/698 (25 September 2014) was the latest MONUSCO report. S/2014/697 (24 September 2014) was the latest PSC Framework report.

OTHER RELEVANT FACTS Special Representative of the Secretary-General Martin Kobler (Germany). MONUSCO Force Commander Lt. General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz (Brazil). MONUSCO Size, Composition and Cost of Mission Strength as of 31 October 2014: 21,033 troops (including 481 military observers and 1,091 police), 957 international civilian personnel, 2,722 local civilian staff and 472 UN volunteers. Approved budget (1 July 2013-30 June 2014): $1.46 billion. Mission Duration: July 2010 to present.
**Key Recent Developments**

The Council’s last public briefing on the DRC took place on 27 October 2014 when Special Representative Martin Kobler noted the lack of progress in the voluntary disarmament of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR). He said that the FDLR has continued to violate human rights and that there was no excuse for further delay in its disarmament. He welcomed receiving clear instructions from Council members on the neutralisation of the FDLR.

Kobler also spoke about the expulsion of the head of the UN Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO), Scott Campbell, following the publication of a 15 October 2014 report that included information on summary and extrajudicial executions of civilians by Congolese police during Operation Likofi—a police initiative from 15 November 2013 to 15 February 2014 to combat criminal delinquency in Kinshasa. The report verified that nine men were summarily executed and 32 forcibly disappeared, with the total number of victims likely to be much higher. The report made several recommendations to the DRC, in particular to ensure that independent and impartial investigations are carried out and perpetrators are brought to justice.

On 16 October 2014, the DRC declared Campbell persona non grata and demanded that he leave the country within 48 hours. In a 20 October letter, the DRC denied the allegations in the UNJHRO report and accusing Campbell of a bias against the government. The DRC noted that the government will continue to fully cooperate with UNJHRO but could not do so with Campbell. Both the Secretary-General and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed their full support for Campbell, condemned the DRC’s decision and urged the DRC authorities to reverse it.

On 5 November 2014, the Council adopted a presidential statement noting its deep concern over the lack of progress in the voluntary disarmament of the FDLR and calling on the DRC, in coordination with MONUSCO, to undertake immediate military action against those in the FDLR who do not engage in the demobilisation process or who continue to carry out human rights abuses. The Council also strongly condemned the recent attacks by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF, an Islamist Ugandan rebel group) in Beni, North Kivu, which resulted in civilian casualties, mostly women and children. (Current media reports suggest that ADF fighters are responsible for more than 260 deaths in the area since early October). Furthermore, the statement recalls the importance of completing the permanent demobilisation of former combatants of the rebel group M23 (its members have yet to be repatriated after surrendering to Uganda). Finally, it expressed grave concern about Campbell’s expulsion and called on the DRC to investigate the allegations in the UNJHRO report while taking note of the government’s willingness to work with the UNJHRO.

In accordance with resolution 2147, the Secretary-General conducted a strategic review of MONUSCO in November, including recommendations for its future, which are to be submitted to the Council by 30 December. In general, the review concludes that MONUSCO’s presence in the DRC will likely be required for several more years and that the current mandate is comprehensive, yet its implementation has only been partially successful. The review notes criticism in the DRC about the level of engagement of some of MONUSCO’s contingents that are seen to be too passive, but the work of the intervention brigade is well appreciated. In addition, MONUSCO’s departure should be evaluated in light of the DRC’s ability to take over the mission’s functions, according to the review. While President Joseph Kabila has publicly voiced his wish to see MONUSCO start reducing its troop numbers significantly—a view that the DRC also shared with the strategic review team—the latter will likely recommend only a modest decrease in troop numbers at this time.

On 25 November 2014, Ladsous briefed Council members in consultations under “any other business” on further attacks against civilians in Beni. Later that day, members issued a press statement calling on the DRC and MONUSCO to reduce threats to civilians and neutralise armed groups operating in eastern DRC.

Additionally, despite the FDLR’s public statements about its commitment to voluntarily disarm and negotiate the return of its members and their families to Rwanda, little progress was achieved by mid-December. In accordance with a request by Rwanda to discuss the FDLR issue, Council members were briefed by Kobler in consultations on 17 December via video-teleconference, with Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet present to address any questions.

Kobler informed Council members that operational plans against the FDLR are finalised but noted that the prospective operation is dependent on the commitment of the intervention brigade contingencies and the DRC to engaging in combat with the FDLR. He also updated the Council on a new joint operation of the DRC military (FARDC) and MONUSCO against the ADF.

With respect to sanctions, Council members received advance copies of the Group of Experts’ report in December 2014. The Group notes that the momentum in 2013 toward achieving progress in the country has not carried through to 2014. Several rebel groups are still active or pose a serious threat, including the ADF, the M23 and the FDLR, which is disingenuous according to the Group in its commitment to voluntarily surrender. This latter view is shared by Council members. The report also notes the continued illegal exploitation of and trade in natural resources, which in turn finances various rebel groups.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

In October 2014, the UNJHRO released a report on human rights violations committed from mid-April 2012 to 4 November 2013 by the M23 in North Kivu province. The report documents grave violations that may constitute international crimes, such as violations of the right to life; violations of the right to physical integrity, including acts of sexual violence; violations of the right to liberty and security of the person; and violations of the right to property.

**Key Issues**

An immediate issue for the Council is renewing the DRC sanctions regime.

Another immediate issue is to oversee MONUSCO’s operations in neutralising rebel groups, including the ADF.

Another rebel group-related issue is following up on the 2 January 2015 deadline set by the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) for the voluntary surrender of the FDLR, both politically and militarily.

Another key issue is to follow closely the implementation of the PSC Framework at the national and regional levels, in particular the disarmament and reintegration of combatants.
Options

Options include adopting a resolution renewing the sanctions regime and the mandate of the Group of Experts.

In addition, the Council may issue a statement that:

• calls on the DRC and other countries to improve implementation of their commitments under the PSC Framework;
• expresses concern over continued violence in eastern DRC;
• calls on armed groups to disarm; and
• urges the DRC to take further action against these groups with the assistance of MONUSCO, including the FDLR after the 2 January 2015 deadline.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Council members are concerned about the surge of violence in Beni, particularly because earlier this year Kobler reported that the FARDC and the intervention brigade were able to substantially diminish the ADF’s capabilities. In particular there is concern that the achievements of the intervention brigade in 2013 against the M23 have eroded as other groups proliferate.

The recommendations of the strategic review regarding the performance of several MONUSCO contingents may be divisive. As was the case with the dynamics surrounding the creation of the intervention brigade, some troop-contributing countries are concerned about the safety of their troops in the DRC and elsewhere if UN peacekeeping becomes more proactive in fighting rebel groups. Kobler has been insistent that MONUSCO is a unified mission with different components and all should be more proactive in engaging armed groups for the overall success of the mission. Some Council members would like to find a way to improve MONUSCO’s contingents’ level of performance while acknowledging the separate tasks of the intervention brigade and the rest of MONUSCO.

Council dynamics on the DRC may alter with Rwanda’s term on the Council ending. Rwanda has had tense relations with the DRC for years, including around the latter’s suspected cooperation with the FDLR. For its part, Rwanda has been identified as complicit in the M23 revolt and refused to cooperate with some members of the Group of Experts. After military operations against the M23 were concluded, Rwanda was viewed by several Council members as a constructive member in addressing the situation in the DRC. Joining the Council from the region is Angola, which has good relations with the Kabila government and has been very active of late on the DRC within the ICGLR and SADC. This may allow for greater consensus in the Council and the DRC Sanctions Committee.

France is the penholder on the DRC.

Côte d’Ivoire

Expected Council Action

In January, the Council is scheduled to be briefed and hold consultations on developments in Côte d’Ivoire and the Secretary-General’s latest report on the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) (S/2014/892).

Key Recent Developments

The security situation in Côte d’Ivoire remains fragile. On 18 November 2014, thousands of Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI) soldiers protested about unpaid salaries and benefits, emptying their barracks and blocking streets in Abidjan, Bouaké and numerous other smaller cities. In Bouaké, the protesting soldiers took over state radio and television stations, broke into an FRCI armoury and looted police stations. The government negotiated with the soldiers on 19 and 20 November, agreeing to make payments to the troops initially estimated by the government at $38 million (but projected by others at $75 million) and ending the protest. The disaffected troops were largely former Forces nouvelles rebels who had helped put President Alassane Ouattara in power in April 2011 and were then incorporated into a reconfigured state military.

Elsewhere in the country, particularly in the west bordering Liberia and in the north, there have been reports of armed attacks. For example, on 15 May 2014 in the western border town of Fété, unidentified gunmen killed thirteen people, including four children and three FRCI troops, resulting in the displacement of 3,500 residents. Armed gangs have also carried out numerous violent attacks and acts of banditry on roads near Bouaké and elsewhere in the north. According to a recent Human Rights Watch report, acts of banditry have increased in frequency during 2014 (following a decrease in 2013). The attackers are widely presumed to be former combatants.

The Secretary-General’s latest report states that since 1 May 2014 former combatants, FRCI elements and police and prison forces have been responsible for six extra-judicial killings, 32 cases of torture and 49 cases of arbitrary arrest and detention. From 22 to 26 September, approximately 300 detainees went on a hunger strike to protest prison conditions and their ongoing detention without trial since the November 2010 elections disputed by former president Laurent Gbagbo. The authorities promised to accelerate the judicial process, which temporarily ended the hunger strike. However, frustrated with the lack of progress in meeting their demands, as many as 500 prisoners initiated another hunger strike on 1 December.

With respect to judicial proceedings and accountability for post‐electoral violence in 2010 and 2011, the ICC affirmed on 11 October 2014 that it has the authority to hear a case against Simone Gbagbo, the former president’s wife, on four counts of crimes against humanity. Despite an arrest warrant issued in February 2012, the Ivorian authorities have refused to hand her over to the ICC, arguing that she is being tried for similar charges in

UN DOCUMENTS ON CÔTE D’IVOIRE Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2162 (25 June 2016) renewed UNOCI’s mandate for one year, S/RES/2153 (29 April 2014) lifted the diamond embargo, partially lifted the arms embargo and renewed other sanctions measures. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.7292 (16 December 2014) and S/PV.742 (15 May 2014) were UNOCI reports. Sanctions Committee Document S/2014/729 (10 October 2014) was the mid-term report of the Group of Experts supporting the 1572 Côte d’Ivoire sanctions committee.

the national court system. The trial of Simone Gbagbo and 82 other supporters of the former president, which had originally been scheduled for 22 October, has since been postponed indefinitely. On 17 November, the ICC set a trial date for Laurent Gbagbo of 7 July 2015.

Statelessness and interrelated land-tenure issues remain an obstacle to social cohesion and are therefore also a potential source of instability in Côte d’Ivoire. According to UN Refugee Agency data, there are approximately 700,000 stateless individuals within the country, accounting for about 3 percent of the total population. The government reports that since a new law went into effect on 1 April 2014 that expanded citizenship eligibility to male foreign nationals married to Ivorian citizens and anyone resident prior to 1972 that 50,000 people have applied for Ivorian nationality.

In response to the government’s request for assistance in preparing and holding the presidential election scheduled for October 2015, the UN led an electoral needs assessment mission from 22 September to 2 October 2014. The assessment mission concluded that UNOCI should deploy specialised expertise to assist with the Special Representative’s good offices mandate, assist national authorities to develop an operational plan and provide limited logistical support. The UNDP could focus on conflict prevention, institutional capacity building, voter outreach, civic education and acquiring needed materials and equipment.

The Council last addressed Côte d’Ivoire on 29 October 2014, when Ambassador Cristián Barros (Chile), chair of the 1572 Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee, summarised the mid-term report of the Group of Experts. The Group identified several risk factors in Côte d’Ivoire, including: large numbers of former combatants excluded from the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process; persistent difficulties in security sector reform (SSR) due to divisions between former Forces nouvelle rebels and other government soldiers; possible natural resource-related instability; ongoing mercenary activity; and an inadequate border-control capacity.

Human Rights-Related Developments
The Human Rights Council adopted the outcomes of the Universal Periodic Review of Côte d’Ivoire on 18 September 2014 where Côte d’Ivoire accepted 178 of the 186 recommendations. In the discussion, Côte d’Ivoire’s efforts in the field of peace and reconciliation, as well as the establishment of a national human rights institution, were welcomed but the necessity of addressing impunity, violence against women and girls and sexual violence was underlined.

The Human Rights Council’s working group on the use of mercenaries carried out an official visit to Côte d’Ivoire from 7 to 10 October 2014. In a press conference in Abidjan on 10 October, the working group mentioned numerous reports regarding mercenaries from neighbouring countries who fought on both sides of the conflict and, along with armed counterparts, reportedly ravaged villages and carried out atrocious human rights violations, including torture and summary executions. The working group commended positive initiatives by the government, including the disarmament and reintegration of former combatants, but emphasised that justice for victims was paramount for lasting stability and reconciliation. The activities of private military and security companies were also examined, with serious concerns raised regarding the need to strengthen areas such as licensing in order to address the large number of illegal or unlicensed companies operating in the country.

Key Issues
The central issue is a possibility that the October 2015 presidential election could serve as a catalyst for renewed large-scale armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. Highly relevant risk factors include a large number of ex-combatants outside DDR processes, porous borders, lootable natural resources, the availability of small arms and ammunition, perceptions of victor’s justice, active mercenary groups within the region, incomplete SSR and inadequate command and control within the FRCI.

Options
Although UNOCI’s mandate does not expire until 30 June 2015, one option would be for the Council to adopt a resolution expanding UNOCI’s mandate explicitly for the purpose of electoral assistance, as requested in the Secretary-General’s report. (While resolution 2162 includes a good offices mandate and language regarding political support, it does not have provisions for providing electoral planning advice and logistical support.)

Short of adopting a resolution, another option for Council members would be to welcome the recommendations of the electoral needs assessment mission during the briefing and consultations.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Within the context of negotiating resolutions on sanctions and UNOCI this year, minor differences became evident among Council members. France advocated a partial lifting of the arms embargo, which was initially opposed by the US but was eventually authorised in resolution 2153. Resolution 2162 decreases UNOCI’s deployment by 1,700 troops as of 30 June 2015, which is a reduction by 600 more troops than had been recommended by Secretary-General. Some elected members had expressed reservations at the pace of drawdown, particularly in light of the security challenges posed by the October 2015 presidential election. One event that has the potential to affect both political dynamics within the Council and conflict dynamics in Côte d’Ivoire is the upcoming ICC trial of Laurent Gbagbo. Council members will likely consider the trial—which starts less than four months before the election—as a factor in their future decision-making regarding Côte d’Ivoire.

France is the penholder on Côte d’Ivoire and Chile is the chair of the 1572 Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee.

UNOWA (West Africa)

Expected Council Action
In January, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, the head of the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), will brief the Council, followed by consultations. Members will be considering the semi-annual UNOWA report.

No outcome is expected to result from the briefing. However, at press time Council members were considering a draft resolution on the Boko Haram terrorist threat affecting parts of the region.

UNOWA’s mandate expires on 31 December 2016.
Key Recent Developments
Nigeria’s conflict with the Islamist militant group Boko Haram has continued to worsen. Since July 2014, the group has seized territory across Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states, declaring a caliphate on 24 August in Gwoza. By December, Boko Haram had captured or contested many of the towns encircling Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state with a population of one million.

According to the Nigerian Social Violence Project, between July 2013 and June 2014 at least 7,000 people died due to the insurgency, almost doubling the estimated 3,120 civilians and soldiers killed during the same period in Afghanistan. Recent deadly incidents include two suicide bombers who targeted a market in Maiduguri on 25 November 2014, killing at least 45; the 28 November bombing of a mosque in Kano, killing 120 people; and a 1 December attack by two female suicide bombers in Maiduguri, killing dozens. Council members issued a press statement condemning the suicide bombing of a school in Yobe state on 10 November, which killed 48 people. Nigeria’s National Emergency Management Agency has indicated that as many as 1.5 million people have been internally displaced by the conflict. In addition, 100,000 people have fled to Niger, 2,700 refugees have been received by Chad and at least 43,000 Nigerians have fled to Cameroon. Meanwhile, Nigeria’s military has been implicated in serious human rights abuses in battling the insurgency.

Following a summit in Niamey on 7 October 2014, Lake Chad Basin Commission members (Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria) and Benin announced plans to deploy a Multinational Joint Task Force on 1 November. They also called for a “UN and AU” resolution to provide a legal framework for cross-border operations against Boko Haram. The launching of the 2,800-strong force however, has been delayed. The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) held a meeting on Boko Haram on 25 November. A communiqué issued afterwards called for the adoption of a Security Council resolution authorising the task force for an initial period of 12 months and for the Secretary-General to establish a trust fund to sustain the force’s operations. At press time, a draft resolution authorising the task force for 12 months had just been circulated to Council members.

Other developments in West Africa included the 31 October 2014 resignation of Burkina Faso’s long-standing president Blaise Compaoré following protests against his intention to amend the constitution to allow him to run for president in 2015. Amidst a power vacuum, the military took over. Negotiations between the military and opposition, mediated by a joint AU-ECOWAS-UN mission—in which Chambas was closely involved—led to a 16 November agreement for a civilian-led transition and for elections by November 2015. The next day, Michel Kafando, a former permanent representative to the UN who represented Burkina Faso on the Security Council in 2008-2009, was named interim president. On 18 November, Lieutenant Colonel Isaac Yacouba Zida, who led the military government after Compaoré’s resignation, was appointed interim prime minister. Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman briefed Council members in consultations on Burkina Faso under “any other business” on 4 November. Council members issued press statements on the situation on 5 and 17 November.

The Council held an emergency meeting on 18 September 2014 due to its concern that the Ebola epidemic in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone was undermining stability in those countries. Resolution 2177 was adopted the same day and declared the Ebola outbreak a threat to international peace and security. The next day, the General Assembly adopted resolution 69/1, establishing the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER), with headquarters in Accra, Ghana, and field offices in the three initially affected countries. Following an Ebola outbreak in Bamako in November, UNMEER established a Mali office.

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), as of 17 December 2014, there were 2,416 Ebola cases in Guinea with 1,525 deaths; 7,797 cases and 3,290 deaths in Liberia; and 8,356 cases and 2,085 deaths in Sierra Leone. Mali has had eight cases and six deaths. Senegal and Nigeria’s Ebola outbreaks were declared over by the WHO in mid-October. On 11 December, the Secretary-General appointed Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed as Special Representative and head of UNMEER, to replace Anthony Banbury in January 2015.

Key Issues
A key issue is the Boko Haram threat. A related issue is how the Council and the broader UN system can increase support of Nigeria as it deals with the conflict and find ways to support Chambas in his other role as the Secretary-General’s High-Level Representative to Nigeria.

Ongoing issues include developments in Burkina Faso and the Ebola epidemic in West Africa.

Presidential elections in five countries during 2015—Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Nigeria and Togo—are also expected to be key issues.

Options
Regarding the overall situation in the region, an option for the Council is adopting a presidential statement that:

• welcomes efforts in the region and by Chambas to resolve the Burkina Faso crisis;
• reiterates calls for international support to address Ebola; and
• requests UNOWA to closely monitor upcoming elections in the region, provide the Council with early warning regarding any potential instability so the Council could take preventive action to avert possible violence.

Regarding the Boko Haram threat, an option for the Council is adopting a resolution that would express grave concern over the regionalisation of the Boko Haram conflict and authorise the task force for 12 months.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Current Security Council member Nigeria has been perceived as opposed to the
Council’s consideration of its conflict with Boko Haram. Meanwhile, since May, France, the UK and the US have increased assistance to Nigeria to combat Boko Haram. French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said in Dakar on 16 December 2014 that France would help coordinate efforts to launch the task force.

Following the call by the AU PSC (on which Nigeria currently serves) for the Security Council to authorise the task force, Nigeria appears to have changed its approach. Since early December Nigeria has held discussions with the P5 on a resolution. Chad, which is contributing to the task force and is also a Security Council member while also serves on the AU PSC, strongly favours a resolution that would provide political and financial support for the task force. Chad and France have apparently succeeded in encouraging Nigeria to proceed with the draft. By late December 2014, Nigeria circulated to all Council members the draft resolution on behalf of Lake Chad Basin Commission countries and Benin. At press time, the Council was not expected to take-up the draft until the new year.

On Ebola, the US strongly advocated for the Council’s involvement in the issue. Regarding Burkina Faso, France maintains a base in the country for its regional counter-terrorism force Operation Barkhane and helped secure Compaoré’s exile. Nigeria is the penholder on UNOWA.

Israel/Palestine

Expected Council Action

In January 2015, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman is expected to brief the Council during its quarterly open debate on the Middle East. Also in January, Council members are expected to consider and possibly vote on a resolution calling for an end to the Israeli occupation of the Occupied Palestinian Territories by 2017.

Key Recent Developments

On 17 December 2014, Jordan, on behalf of the Arab Group, circulated a draft resolution affirming the need to attain, within 12 months of adoption, a just, lasting and comprehensive peaceful solution that “brings an end to the Israeli occupation since 1967” and fulfils the vision of two independent, democratic and prosperous states, Israel and a sovereign, contiguous state of Palestine. This Palestinian draft is based on an earlier text drafted by France with input from the UK and Germany (together, known as the E3) that outlined parameters for a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

The parameters in the draft are: borders based on 4 June 1967, with mutually agreed, limited and equivalent land swaps; the establishment of security agreements, including through a third party, that respect the sovereignty of a state of Palestine and that ensure the security of both Israel and Palestine, “including through a full and phased withdrawal of Israeli security forces which will end the occupation that began in 1967 over an agreed transition period in a reasonable timeframe, not to exceed the end of 2017”; a just and agreed solution to the refugee question on the basis of Arab Peace Initiative, international law and relevant UN resolutions, including resolution 194; Jerusalem as the shared capital of the two states; and an agreed settlement of other outstanding issues, including water. The draft recognises that the final status agreement would end the occupation and lead to immediate mutual recognition, looks forward to welcoming Palestine as a full UN member state within the timeframe defined by the resolution, and calls for a renewed negotiation framework.

An earlier Palestinian-drafted resolution was circulated to the Council in late September 2014 that called for the full withdrawal of Israel from all of the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967 by November 2016, for an independent Palestinian state, Jerusalem as the capital of two states, and a solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees. The draft was discussed among Council members once at expert-level but did not have the support of a majority of Council members. Subsequently, France led the E3 initiative on a parameters resolution that could be more palatable to Council members. The E3 entered negotiations with the US, Israel and Palestine on the draft, which formed the basis for the current draft in blue.

Speaking a day after the resolution was put in blue, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated that Israel would not accept unilateral moves and warned that such an initiative would result in a Hamas takeover of the West Bank. On 15 December 2014, US Secretary of State John Kerry had met with Netanyahu in Rome as the US and Israel developed their responses to the draft resolution. Speaking to reporters after meeting with Kerry, Netanyahu said that he had earlier spoken with French President Francois Hollande by phone and asked him to halt their initiative, warning that “such a move...will thwart all future negotiations and bring about an escalation”. He did not to divulge whether Kerry had assured him of a US veto during their meetings. Also on 15 December, Kerry met with the foreign ministers of the UK, France and Germany in Paris. The following day, he met with top Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat and Arab League head Nabil al-Abdy in London.

The initiative in the Council comes amid a wave of largely symbolic European recognitions of the state of Palestine. On 17 December, the European Parliament voted, with a large majority, to recognise “in principle” a Palestinian state. The move followed similar recent declarations by the parliaments of the UK, France, Spain, Ireland and Portugal.

The Council was last briefed on Israel/Palestine by Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Robert Serry on 15 December 2014. It was his last regular monthly Middle East briefing of 2014, a
year that he described as “dramatic”. Serious efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement stalled, there was a devastating 51-day war in Gaza and violence and tension increased throughout the West Bank, including in East Jerusalem, where he described the situation as “explosive” and expressed worry that the conflict seems increasingly inspired by religion.

Speaking about Gaza, Serry reported that while there were some initial setbacks, the delivery of construction material via the temporary reconstruction mechanism continues and had recently been scaled up. He noted, however, that the situation remains fragile, with up to 80,000 families living in houses that have sustained varying degrees of damage. He reported that 18 school buildings belonging to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees continue to house some 19,000 internally displaced persons.

Also, on 29 October 2014, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman briefed the Council at a public meeting, held following an urgent request by Jordan, on rising tensions in East Jerusalem and continuing Israeli settlement expansion.

In response to the deteriorating situation on the ground, Council members recently issued two press statements. On 19 November 2014, Council members issued a US-proposed press statement on “the despicable terrorist attack in a synagogue in Jerusalem” that occurred a day earlier, in which four civilians worshipping and a police officer were killed. In a 12 December statement proposed by Jordan, Council members expressed their sorrow at the death of Palestinian Minister Ziad Abu Ein, which occurred after a demonstration in the village of Turmus Ayya.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 28 October 2014, the special rapporteur for the Human Rights Council on human rights in the Palestinian territories, Makarim Wibisono, presented his report to the General Assembly (A/69/301). Wibisono also provided details on his first official visit to the region from 20 to 28 September. Israel refused to grant him access, but he gathered evidence in Jordan and Egypt and via video tele-conference from Gaza. In his address, he highlighted that tens of thousands of children continue to live with injuries and psychological trauma, that more than 200 schools in Gaza were damaged and that tens of thousands of people continue to live in overcrowded temporary shelters with inadequate sanitation facilities. A final report will be presented in March.

The Human Rights Committee, which monitors implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, published its concluding observations on the fourth periodic report on Israel on 30 October 2014 (CCPR/C/ISR/CO/4). The Committee noted areas of concern, including that Israel continues to maintain the non-applicability of the Covenant to the Occupied Territories, the need for accountability for alleged human rights violations committed during Israel’s military operations in Gaza, excessive use of force by Israel’s security forces and violence perpetrated by Israeli settlers against Palestinians in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.

The independent commission of inquiry appointed by the Human Rights Council in July was denied entry to the West Bank and Gaza by Israel in November 2014. The commission is charged with investigating violations of international humanitarian and human rights law arising from Israeli military operations carried out in the Occupied Palestinian Territories beginning on 13 June. As a result of being denied entry, representatives of the commission have embarked on their investigation in Jordan, collecting evidence and testimonies of victims’ families and civil society organisations.

In a 25 November 2014 press release, the special rapporteurs on the Occupied Palestinian Territory and on the right to adequate housing called on Israel to end its punitive demolition of Palestinian homes in response to alleged acts of violence by Palestinians in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

Key Issues

The overarching issue is determining how to move forward on a two-state solution in light of the breakdown of US-brokered negotiations in April 2014.

A related issue for the Council is Israel’s continuing settlement expansion in the West Bank, which undermines prospects for attaining a peace agreement.

Continuing to encourage and facilitate emergency humanitarian and reconstruction assistance for the devastated Gaza Strip remains a key issue.

Another key issue regarding Gaza is ensuring that investigations into alleged war crimes committed during the conflict are impartial and that those found accountable are prosecuted.

Options

The main option for the Council at this time is to adopt a resolution on the conflict to bolster efforts towards an expedient resolution to the conflict in the absence of any viable negotiations.

Another option, in lieu of an agreement on a resolution, could be to explore other Council outcomes that could help advance prospects for a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

Council Dynamics

Given the political sensitivities surrounding the issue, Council decisions on Israel/Palestine are generally negotiated outside New York, at capital level. Elements of the resolution tabled by Jordan in December 2014 had been negotiated by the E3, along with the US, and the parties; however, it had not been presented to the wider Council membership for consultations before being put into blue, and it is generally accepted that the draft’s fate lies with the US, which has historically used its veto to protect Israeli interests in the Council.

Kerry has publicly stated that the US would not necessarily veto a proposed resolution, but finding language that would be palatable to the US while still maintaining the spirit of the proposed resolution could be difficult. US State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said on 16 December that if the wording of the resolution included terms of reference for negotiations on the core issues, the US would accept it, as long as it contains “no unilateral measures” that would predetermine the outcome of diplomatic negotiations. A day after the draft was put in blue, Psaki told reporters that it was not something the US would support. At press time, negotiations on the text were expected to continue to ascertain whether consensus could be reached.

In January, the dynamics in the Council will change when the new elected members—Angola, Malaysia, New Zealand, Spain and Venezuela—join the Council. Australia, which is largely supportive of Israel, will be leaving the Council, while two incoming members, Malaysia and Venezuela, will join Chad as Council members that have no formal diplomatic relations with Israel. With this new composition, Palestine and its supporters may pursue a stronger strategy in the Council in 2015.
Central African Republic

Expected Council Action
In January 2015, the Council will most likely renew the sanctions regime against the Central African Republic (CAR) and the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee, both expire on 27 January 2015.

The final report of the Commission of Inquiry mandated by the Council in resolution 2127 to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and abuses of human rights in the CAR was submitted to the Council on 19 December and may be discussed in January.

The mandate of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) expires on 30 April 2015.

Key Recent Developments
Despite MINUSCA’s deployment and the signing of a ceasefire involving the predominantly Muslim Séléka and the Christian anti-balaka rebel groups on 23 July 2014 in Brazzaville, the security and humanitarian situations in CAR remain dire.

The Council was last briefed on 9 December 2014 by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous on the latest MINUSCA report. According to the report, since October 2014, there have been gross human rights violations and a resurgence of violence perpetrated by the anti-balaka, the Séléka and other groups. By mid-November, there were still more than 2 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, totalling roughly half the population and hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons.

Ladsous told the Council that in light of the situation, recommendations would be made in January 2015 regarding mission adjustments that may be required, including troop levels. He added that by the end of the month, MINUSCA will be at 80 per cent deployment (of 11,820 authorised military and police personnel). On the political front, Ladsous reported that preparations are underway for the Bangui Forum on national reconciliation, scheduled for early 2015.

During the following consultations, Ladsous addressed the criticism that MINUSCA has been slow to take action to fulfil its mandate since its 15 September 2014 deployment. Ladsous said that the transitional authorities’ lack of capacity created a huge institutional vacuum. As for an increase in troop numbers, Ladsous mentioned that the security situation entails more military and police presence in Bangui than was initially expected. (France recently announced that it would begin lowering its presence in CAR from 2,000 to roughly 500 troops. The EUFOR mandate, the EU force in the CAR, will expire in March 2015 and is not expected to be renewed.)

Also briefing the Council on 9 December 2014 was the chair of the 2127 Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Raimonda Murmokaité of Lithuania, who spoke about the work of the Committee and the final report of the Panel of Experts. Murmokaité stressed that the designations of 12 individuals and three entities suggested by the Panel for sanctioning are pending in the Committee.

In light of the stagnation on the security and political fronts, the Council adopted a presidential statement on CAR on 18 December 2014. It urged the transitional authorities to accelerate preparations for the Bangui forum and elections, which are to be held by August 2015. It called for the implementation of the Brazzaville Agreement and for armed groups to engage in political dialogue. The Council also urged the Secretariat and MINUSCA to accelerate deployment of civilian, police and military capabilities, intensify the implementation of its mandate and move forward on adopting urgent temporary measures to restore law and order.

Meanwhile, fighting and violence in CAR continues. In a recent incident, fighting broke out between Muslim and Christian combatants on 16 December in the town of Mbres in central CAR, and in the span of two days there was a tally of 28 killed, dozens wounded and dozens of houses burned down.

On a related issue, the Council adopted a presidential statement on the activities of the UN Office for Central Africa and LRA-affected areas. The statement expressed concern about the ongoing crisis in CAR and its regional impact and about continued LRA attacks against communities in eastern CAR, despite the rebel group’s moving the bulk of its presence from south east CAR to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The Council received the Commission of Inquiry’s final report on 19 December 2014. It concluded that government forces under former President Bozizé, the Séléka and the anti-balaka were involved in serious violations of international humanitarian law and gross abuses of human rights. The Commission said that it cannot establish genocidal intent on the part of any party to the conflict. The report emphasises the importance of accountability and makes several recommendations to the Council on taking measures to enhance the judicial system and accountability in CAR.

Key Issues
The immediate issue for the Council is renewing the CAR sanctions regime.

A key issue is monitoring the situation closely, in particular MINUSCA’s operations, and whether and how those operations may need to be adjusted to restore security throughout the CAR.

Another issue is ensuring the success of the transitional political process—including the observance of the ceasefire and reconciliation—leading to elections.

Also a key issue is ensuring accountability for human rights and international humanitarian law violations.

Options
On sanctions, the most likely option for the Council is to renew the sanctions regime and the Panel of Experts’ mandate.

Further options include:
• undertaking a Council visiting mission to the CAR (such a visit, which would be the first by the Council to CAR, has been raised as a possibility in early 2015);
• endorsing the Commission of Inquiry’s recommendations to the Council; and
• endorsing the recommendations of the Panel of Experts and listing further
Central African Republic (con’t)

- Individuals for that meet the designation criteria set out under resolution 2134.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Some Council members remain alarmed at the slow progress in implementing MINUSCA’s mandate, and a message to that effect is reflected in the 18 December 2014 presidential statement. During the negotiations on the text, several differences in Council members’ views of the situation emerged. One permanent member wanted to include language about certain improvements in the security situation in CAR while other Council members did not share the view that there are noticeable improvements.

- On sanctions, Council members continue to be split on whether to add individuals to the sanctions list, as some view such an action as detrimental to the reconciliation process. For that reason, the Council could only agree in the latest presidential statement on its “intent to consider” additional listings. The listing discussion is likely to continue, though there is a consensus among Council members on renewing the sanctions regime itself.

- France is the penholder on the CAR.

Syria

Expected Council Action
In early January 2015, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Angela Kane is expected to brief Security Council members on the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons. Later in the month, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Kyung-wha Kang will brief on the humanitarian situation in Syria.

Key Recent Developments

- On 3 December 2014, Special Adviser Sigrid Kaag provided her last briefing to Council members on the chemical weapons track. She focused on remaining tasks in the implementation of resolution 2118, such as the verification of the ongoing destruction of chemicals outside Syria, plans to complete the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities in Syria by the summer of 2015 and clarification of any discrepancies in Syria’s declared chemical weapons stockpile. Syria’s use of chlorine bombs was also discussed.

- The Council adopted resolution 2191 on 17 December 2014, extending until 10 January 2016 the humanitarian access provisions of resolution 2169—the authorisation to deliver aid across borders and conflict lines without Syria’s consent and the monitoring mechanism that ensures the humanitarian nature of such aid convoys. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos had briefed the Council two days earlier, reporting that brutality, violence and callous disregard for human life were the hallmark of the Syrian crisis. The death toll is conservatively estimated at 200,000 people. There are 7.6 million internally displaced persons and 12.2 million require humanitarian assistance.

- Meanwhile, since the US-led airstrikes began in late September 2014 against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the Al-Qaida-affiliated Al-Nusra Front, the Syrian military has dramatically ramped up its own air campaign against rebel-held areas. However, while coalition strikes have continued around Kobane, overall the intensity of such strikes has lessened in Syria. Separately during December, ISIS made two failed attempts to take a military air base held by the government in Deir al-Zour, an oil-rich province bordering Iraq.

- On 7 December 2014, Israeli airstriks targeted a weapons depot near the Damascus airport and the town of Dimas near the Lebanese border—home to military bases and research centres. This strike was the first in 2014, but there were at least five Israeli airstrikes in Syria in 2013. Israel has maintained a neutral policy vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis with a parallel policy to take action to stop any transfer of strategic weaponry through Syria to Hezbollah.

- Heavy fighting also continued in north-west Syria as government and rebel forces tried to restrict one another’s supply lines. On 16 December 2014, Al-Nusra captured two Syrian military bases in Idlib along a strategic highway that links Aleppo and Damascus, potentially disrupting the government’s ability to support its forces attacking Aleppo. On 14 December, the government captured an area north of Aleppo, putting in jeopardy the opposition forces’ main supply line from Turkey.

- This fighting took place as Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura was trying to secure a UN-mediated freeze zone for Aleppo to de-escalate violence and to allow the entry of humanitarian aid. In recent weeks de Mistura has visited Iran and Russia and met with EU ministers in Brussels. In Turkey, he met with Turkish officials, the Syrian National Coalition and key rebel groups from Aleppo. He has warned that if Aleppo falls there may be 400,000 more refugees to add to the current 3.3 million.

- De Mistura’s deputy visited Damascus and on 15 December 2014 presented further details of the plan, which reportedly envisions UN monitoring of crossing points between rebel and government-held areas. Several issues have emerged. Syria wants to limit the freeze zone to the city of Aleppo. The government argues that state-run services, such as the police, should return to rebel-held areas and a freeze should lead to the “cleaning of the area of armed groups”. Rebels, however, want the freeze to extend to the Turkish border and agree with the UN position that there should be self-rule in opposition areas. Opposition groups have also said that any freeze needs to be linked to a political process that is in line with the 30 June 2012 Geneva Communiqué and expressed concern that the government would use a freeze to make military gains elsewhere.

- During talks with the Syrian National Coalition based in Turkey, de Mistura was urged to also include as part of his plan “refuge zones” on the borders of Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey that would exclude regime forces, establish no-fly zones and protect civilians. Turkey has made any US access to Incirlik airbase for its anti-ISIS strikes conditional on the establishment of a no-fly zone. The US
The key issue for the Council—in the fourth year of a civil war that can no longer be contained inside Syria—is to meaningfully refocus its attention on finding ways to support a cessation of violence and resuscitate efforts for a political solution.

Ongoing issues include tracking implementation of resolutions 2139 and 2191 on the humanitarian situation and 2118 on the destruction of chemical weapons—in particular aerial bombardment and the use of chlorine bombs.

**Key Issues**

The key issue for the Council—in the fourth year of a civil war that can no longer be contained inside Syria—is to meaningfully refocus its attention on finding ways to support a cessation of violence and resuscitate efforts for a political solution.

**Options**

On the political track, Council members could follow up their own decision in resolution 2191 and invite de Mistura to brief on the opportunities and challenges of freeze zones that have emerged during his talks with key stakeholders and have preliminary discussions of what the role of the Council might be to move this process forward.

In addition to de Mistura briefing, Council members could hold an Arria-formula meeting with Syrian civil society who have first-hand experience in negotiating cessations of violence on the ground.

An option for Council members who are concerned that elements of resolution 2139, such as human rights and protection of civilians, are being flagrantly ignored is to request to be regularly informed of the work of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria as well as request regular briefings on Syria from the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

An option for Council members who are concerned that the government’s use of chlorine bombs violates elements of resolution 2118 would be to request that the reports of the OPCW fact-finding mission be disseminated as a Council document. (Resolution 2118 obligates the OPCW to report non-compliance to the Security Council.)

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

Despite overwhelming indications that resolutions 2118 and 2139 have been continually breached, there is no appetite among Council members to push for follow-up measures against the Syrian regime, such as targeted sanctions, due to the assumption that Russia would veto the effort in any event.

On the political track, it seems Russia is fully supportive of “freeze zones”. Other Council members are supportive of de Mistura’s incremental approach but remain wary about endorsing a plan that has yet to be fully formulated. Furthermore, in the absence of a concrete plan, it is unclear to these Council members whether a freeze zone would be more than the opposition’s agreement to surrender as the result of the government’s siege and starvation tactics. The recently adopted resolution 2191 reflects this tension, seeking further advice from de Mistura on his proposals and linking any Syrian political process to the 30 June 2012 Geneva Communiqué.

On the chemical weapons track, deep divisions remain within the Council, in particular over the government’s use of chlorine bombs. The US has said such allegations raise serious questions about Syria’s obligations under resolution 2118 and the Chemical Weapons Convention, whereas Russia has argued that the OPCW at The Hague, not the Security Council, is the appropriate arena to address any alleged breaches of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

While Jordan will continue as one of the humanitarian penholders in 2016, at press time it was unclear which other Council member or members would join it to replace Australia and Luxembourg, the two leading members on this issue that rotated off the Council at the end of 2014.

Of the new Council members, it seems Venezuela’s position may be closer to that of China and Russia on Syria. All three cast negative votes on the 18 November 2014 Third Committee resolution on human rights in Syria. During the same vote, incoming members Malaysia, New Zealand and Spain voted for the resolution, while Angola abstained.

France is the penholder on Syria overall. In practice, however, most texts need to be agreed between Russia and the US prior to agreement by the broader Council.

Council members France, Jordan, the UK and the US are part of the anti-ISIS coalition. In a 25 November 2014 letter, the UK said it was taking measures to support the US-led international effort against ISIS and cited Article 51 of the UN Charter—the right of individual or collective self-defence under Chapter VII.

Regarding regional dynamics, it is unclear whether the global oil price, which has dropped to its lowest point in five years since Saudi Arabia has not cut production, might influence Moscow’s and Tehran’s support for Damascus. Unlike Saudi Arabia, both Iran and Russia require higher oil prices to meet their revenue goals. Iran has said the fall of oil prices is “treachery,” in a veiled reference to Saudi Arabia.

**Somalia**

**Expected Council Action**

In January 2015, the Council is expecting a briefing on the Secretary-General’s 120-day report on the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). The briefing will be followed by consultations.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 29 October 2014, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Mogadishu, along with World Bank President Dr. Jim Kim and senior representatives of the African Development Bank, AU, EU and Islamic Development Bank. The delegation met with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Prime Minister Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed and Parliament Speaker Mohamed Osman Jawari. In his public speech, Ban emphasised linkages between security and development, particularly the importance of
Somalia (con’t)

public service delivery and strengthening government institutions.

The security situation continues to be unstable in Somalia and in adjoining border regions of Kenya as Al-Shabaab carries out further terrorist attacks. On 22 November 2014, Al-Shabaab killed 28 non-Muslims (19 men and nine women) in an attack on a bus in north eastern Kenya. On 2 December, the group killed 36 workers at a quarry in the same border region. Al-Shabaab claimed the attacks were in retaliation for raids on mosques by Kenyan authorities. The Kenyan military has responded with airstrikes on the group in Somalia. On 3 December, Al-Shabaab attacked a UN convoy in Mogadishu, which resulted in several deaths among people nearby. On 5 December, more than 15 civilians were killed in another attack by the group in Baidoa. The Council issued press statements strongly condemning the terrorist attacks in Kenya on 22 November and in Mogadishu on 3 December.

For the second consecutive year, Somalia has had a fundamental political crisis, largely due to a protracted conflict between the president and the prime minister. On 2 November 2014, Special Representative Nicholas Kay issued a statement expressing concern that some parliamentarians were being offered cash to support a potential no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Ahmed. On 6 November, 140 members of parliament submitted a motion expressing no confidence in the prime minister. Following several attempts to table the motion that were blocked by the prime minister’s supporters, the no-confidence motion passed on 6 December with 153 members in favour, eighty members against, and two members abstaining. Ahmed accepted the vote and resigned. On 10 December, Council members issued a press statement taking note of the no-confidence vote and welcoming the resolution of the crisis through proper parliamentary channels. On 17 December, President Mohamud nominated Omar Abdirashid Al Sharmarke, Somalia’s ambassador to the US (and prime minister in 2009-2010), as the new prime minister.

One consequence of the recent political crisis in Somalia, precipitated by another fall-out between the president and a prime minister, has been a further weakening of confidence among some donors. On 10 November 2014, the US State Department said in a press statement that it would not be sending a delegation to the upcoming High Level Partnership Forum on Somalia because “Somalia’s leadership is distracted with political division”. According to media reports, James P. McAnulty, US representative to Somalia, explicitly threatened aid cuts unless the president and prime minister started cooperating. The event was held on 19-20 November and co-chaired by the UN and the Federal Government of Somalia and hosted by Denmark in Copenhagen; it was a follow-up to the New Deal Conference on Somalia held in Brussels in September 2013.

There were signs of statebuilding progress in Somalia on 17 November 2014, when Hassan Sheikh Adan was elected as the president of the newly formed Interim South West Administration (ISWA) comprising Bay, Bakol and Lower Shabelle regions. The formation of the ISWA was welcomed in a joint statement on 20 November by the UN, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, the EU and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). On 17 December, the president of an overlapping, rival six-region state, Madobe Nunifu Mohamed, reportedly reached a power sharing agreement with the ISWA.

The humanitarian situation has continued to deteriorate in Somalia, risking another famine. After drought conditions earlier in the year, southern Somalia has had severe floods, further exacerbating food insecurity. More than one million people are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, which represents a 20 percent increase within the last six months, and another two million people face threats to their food security. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Somalia currently has the largest humanitarian funding gap (measured in terms of contributions as a percentage of the consolidated appeal) within the last six years. As of 21 November, contributions were 39 percent ($365 million out of $933 million) of the request for 2014.

The Council last held a meeting on Somalia on 12 November 2014, when it adopted resolution 2184 reauthorising for one year counter-piracy measures off the coast of Somalia. Previously, on 24 October, the Council had adopted resolution 2182, which authorised counter-piracy naval deployments to interdict charcoal exports and arms imports violating the 751/1997 Somalia- Eritrea sanctions regime. Interestingly, resolution 2184, which was adopted unanimously, made no references to the more contentious maritime interdiction provisions authorised in resolution 2182, which had been adopted with abstentions by Jordan and Russia.

Human Rights-Related Developments

Following a 6-13 December trip across Somalia, the UN independent expert on the human rights situation in Somalia identified critical priorities for the government: ratifying key international human rights instruments, placing a moratorium on the use of the death penalty, and adopting a bill creating a national human rights institution. He also urged the government to respect the right to freedom of expression and protect journalists. While he praised Somalia for its adoption of a national action plan to combat sexual violence, he also expressed concern at capacity and resource constraints.

Key Issues

Within the limits of a largely insecure operational environment (e.g. ongoing counter-insurgency operations by AMISOM and terrorist attacks by Al-Shabaab), the principal issue for the Council in January could be to carefully consider whether and how UNSOM might potentially better implement its highly challenging mandate: good offices and mediation, advising on peacebuilding and statebuilding, donor coordination, facilitating human rights institutions and human rights monitoring.

Options

An option for the Council, in light of the deteriorating humanitarian situation, would be to request a briefing from OCHA, including suggestions to improve humanitarian access. As UNSOM’s mandate does not expire until four months after January’s briefing and consultations, another option would be to take no action.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Although the immediate political crisis in Somalia seems to have been resolved for now, the protracted dispute between the president and the prime minister laid bare underlying tensions between the Somali government and the UN. Following Kay’s statement regarding concerns that parliamentarians were being bribed in order to support a no-confidence motion against the prime minister, Mohamud issued a reply on 3 November 2014 that in essence told the UN to stay out of Somalia’s internal politics. While the government has previously had contentious relations with the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group supporting the
Alexander Downer stepped down from his post after several months of stalemate, the unification and economic talks officially resumed on 11 February 2014 when Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders reached an agreement on a joint communiqué. The negotiations gained some momentum with both leaders and negotiating teams increasing the frequency of their meetings. However, there was still no significant breakthrough before the negotiations paused for the summer recess beginning in July.

In January 2015, the Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for another six months. Special Representative Lisa Buttenheim will likely brief Council members on the latest developments and the UNFICYP report, due by 9 January.

On 5 September, Eide made his first visit to Cyprus and met separately with Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades and Turkish Cypriot leader Dervis Eroglu. On 17 September, both Cypriot leaders resumed negotiations and agreed to move into the next phase of talks, which would include more structured negotiations, considering that both sides outlined their positions in the communiqué. At the meeting, both leaders also agreed to increase the frequency of the meetings to twice a month.

On 7 October 2014, the negotiations came to a standstill when Anastasiades unilaterally decided to suspend the talks after Turkey announced its decision to conduct offshore seismic surveys in Cyprus’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ). On 20 October, Turkey formally started its exploration activities with one exploration vessel accompanied by two navy ships.

The hydrocarbon resources off the coast of Cyprus have affected the unification talks since their discovery in 2011. The internationally recognised Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus has started issuing licenses to foreign companies to start oil exploration in Cyprus’ EEZ. In a 4 October press release addressing the issue, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed its concern over the Greek Cypriot government’s “unilateral research activities of hydrocarbon resources in its so-called EEZ without taking into account the Turkish Cypriots’ detailed and concrete proposals for a fair sharing”. Turkish Cypriots claim that they also have rights to offshore natural resources and that all exploration must benefit both communities on the island.

Though negotiations have stopped, Eide has continued to meet both leaders separately in an effort to find a solution to the current impasse. On 23 and 24 October 2014, Eide travelled to New York and held meetings with the Secretary-General, the UN ambassadors of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus and representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community in New York.

In late October 2014 and during November 2014, Eide held bilateral talks with both Greek and Turkish officials in their respective capitals, in addition to continuing bilateral meetings with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders on the island. Though Eide continues to actively engage with all relevant actors in an effort to resolve the current impasse, hydrocarbon resources are currently not part of the negotiations between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders and, therefore, formally remain outside the mandate of the Special Adviser.

Nevertheless, Eide presented his proposal for dealing with the hydrocarbons issue to both Cypriot leaders. The plan would involve setting up a group of experts to deal with the
Cyprus (con’t)

technical aspects of managing hydrocarbon resources in a reunified Cyprus. Following a recent trip to Cyprus, Eide said that his original idea was not about management of hydrocarbons at present but rather in the future when “the political process has already led to the solution”. Both sides rejected Eide’s proposal and negotiations have not resumed.

Key Issues
The main issue for the Council, besides renewing the UNFICYP mandate, is how to facilitate the resumption of the unification talks between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders. Considering that UNFICYP was established more than 50 years ago and there has yet to be sufficient progress towards unification of the island, despite all the resources spent, an issue for the Council is whether to reconfigure and downsize the mission.

Options
One option for the Council will be to renew the UNFICYP mandate in its current configuration for another six months.

Another option would be to take note of the positive momentum stemming from the adoption of the joint communiqué and call on both parties to resume negotiations within a specific timeframe.

Should there be a breakthrough in negotiations, the Council could issue a press statement welcoming the progress.

Council Dynamics
Cyprus is not a high-intensity issue on the Council agenda and is closely followed by only a few Council members, most notably France, Russia and the UK. Traditionally, the UK is more sympathetic to the Turkish Cypriot side, while France and Russia tend to be more supportive of the Greek Cypriot positions. The dynamics on the Council are not likely to change significantly when the five newly elected members assume their seats in 2015.

Even though all Council members support continued negotiations, there are some divergences as to the timeframe and conditions for the talks. The UK and other Council members share the frustration over the longevity of the process. These members are of the view that negotiations should be stimulated by imposing some form of pressure on both sides. Reflecting the Greek Cypriot position, Russia feels that the Council should not impose any conditions or timeframe on the negotiations.

Burundi

Expected Council Action
In January 2015, the Council will receive the final report on the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB), whose mandate was extended by resolution 2137 for the last time—in line with Burundi’s wishes—until 31 December 2014.

The mission ended all operations on 12 December 2014. The Council may adopt a presidential statement marking the end of BNUB in January.

In addition, the Council may be briefed by the Special Representative and head of BNUB, Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, and Paul Seger (Switzerland), the chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission.

Key Recent Developments
In resolution 2137, the Council asked the Secretary-General to prepare for BNUB’s transfer of responsibilities to the UN country team by 31 December 2014 and establish a UN Electoral Observation Mission (MENUB) as of 1 January 2015.

As BNUB ends, Burundi continues to experience political turmoil ahead of the legislative and presidential elections currently scheduled for May and August 2015, respectively. In the latest BNUB briefing on 5 November 2014, Onanga-Anyanga lamented the political tensions and called on Burundi to lift limitations on political participation. He also urged the country to ensure the protection of all stakeholders in the electoral process, guarantee the freedom and fairness of the elections and condemn, ban and end political violence in all its forms.

Onanga-Anyanga also called on the Council and UN member states to ensure that the new stand-alone office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), agreed to with Burundi, enjoys sufficient resources and support.

In terms of progress, he noted that incidents of political violence associated with the Imbonerakure, the youth group of the ruling party—the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD)—decreased in August and September. On the other hand, a sharp increase in attacks by unidentified armed groups was reported.

Seger noted that political tensions persist in the country both between the CNDD-FDD and the opposition and between the government and its international partners.

He added that BNUB’s departure leaves a serious gap in the area of political dialogue.

The briefing was followed by consultations, after which the Council’s president for November 2014, Ambassador Gary Quinlan (Australia), conveyed “elements to the press” stating that Council members were monitoring the situation in Burundi and were looking forward to the establishment of MENUB. He added that Council members encouraged the government to create conditions for an inclusive electoral process and supported the understanding reached with the government on the continued presence of OHCHR.

On 4 December 2014, the Burundi parliament elected the members of the much-overdue Truth and Reconciliation Commission, whose establishment was stipulated in the Arusha Peace Accords of 2000. The vote was boycotted by the main Tutsi opposition party, Uprona.

The Independent National Electoral Commission concluded voter registration for the 2015 elections on 12 December 2014, with more than 3.5 million registering. Yet opposition parties claim the process was marked by fraud in favour of the CNDD-FDD, saying that false identity cards were being used.
Commission spokesperson, Prospère Ntahorwamiye, has admitted that “several irregularities” were witnessed, but that these did not invalidate the process.

**Developments in the PBC**

Seger visited Burundi from 8 to 12 December 2014 and met with foreign minister Laurent Kavakure and other political leaders, representatives of civil society organisations and international organisations. He conveyed to interlocutors in Burundi that the government must ensure the protection of all civil liberties, including the right to free assembly, speech and association, and must protect human rights advocates from harm and frivolous legal action regardless of political or ethnic affiliations. He stressed to opposition figures that, for their part, they must participate in the elections and not repeat mistakes from 2010.

A roundtable of Burundi and its partners, organised with the help of the PBC configuration, was held on 11-12 December 2014 in Bujumbura to take stock of the mutual commitments made at the Geneva Conference in October 2012; assess the implications of BNUB’s drawdown on the cooperation between Burundi and its partners; and, on the assumption that the 2015 elections will be peaceful, open, inclusive and fair, discuss future cooperation between Burundi and its partners.

At the end of the roundtable, a joint communiqué of renewed and redefined mutual commitments by Burundi and its international partners was adopted. The communiqué welcomed the progress achieved, identified outstanding challenges and defined a new set of mutual engagements. Burundi committed to promoting all civil liberties and the protection of human rights defenders, to intensifying accountability and to ensuring free, transparent, credible, inclusive and peaceful elections.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

The special rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Michel Forst, conducted his first visit to Burundi from 14 to 25 November 2014. In a press conference in Bujumbura on 25 November, Forst expressed regret that activists working to promote and protect human rights and civil liberties in Burundi are deemed to be political opponents. Human rights defenders and journalists reported a high number of physical threats, assaults, arbitrary arrests and judicial harassment. Forst added that freedom of assembly is also being curtailed, with only demonstrations in favour of the government reportedly authorised while all others are systematically prohibited.

On 28 November, the Committee against Torture published its concluding observations on the second periodic report on Burundi (CAT/C/BDI/CO/2). Concerns included allegations of torture and ill-treatment by law enforcement officials and prison officers, sub-standard conditions of detention, the lack of an independent body to monitor places of detention, high numbers in custody and pre-trial detention, political violence and the composition of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as an exclusively governmental body.

The special rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, Pablo de Greiff, visited Burundi for the first time from 8 to 16 December to assess the transitional justice efforts undertaken by the Burundian authorities and the ongoing process of establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. A final report on the visit will be presented to the Human Rights Council in September 2015.

**Key Issues**

The key issue is ensuring that, despite the withdrawal of BNUB, the security and political situation in Burundi does not deteriorate further given the history of ethnic violence between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups.

A related issue is monitoring MENU and ensuring that the 2015 elections are free and fair, as well as the ability of the OHCHR representation to operate uninterrupted.

Should the political situation take a significant turn for the worse, an issue for the Council will be how to act quickly and effectively in order to preserve the progress achieved over the past decade and prevent the situation from developing into an acute crisis.

**Options**

One option for the Council, to signal its continuing engagement with and concern about Burundi, is a Council mission to Burundi during the electoral period.

Another option is adopting a presidential statement that would:

- recognise progress achieved in Burundi;
- call on Burundi to ensure an open and inclusive political environment and encourage steps taken by Burundi to that effect;
- convey readiness to take necessary measures if the situation deteriorates after BNUB’s departure; and
- express its appreciation for the work of BNUB and Council’s support for the remaining UN presence in Burundi, including the facilitation of political dialogue by MENU.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

Several Council members, UN officials and civil society groups view the departure of BNUB as premature in light of the volatile political environment and the fragility of the security situation. Despite the closure of BNUB, several Council members believe that the Council should follow the situation in Burundi closely in particular during and after the electoral cycle of 2015 and that it should signal to Burundi that it has not lost its focus and willingness to react, if needed, to developments on the ground. Additionally, some Council members wish to see MENU take a proactive mediating and reporting role in all election-related political activities from January 2015.

The penholder on Burundi is France.

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**Inclusive Development**

**Expected Council Action**

In January 2015, the Council will hold a ministerial-level open debate on inclusive development for international peace and security. President Michelle Bachelet of Chile is expected to preside. Briefers are expected to include Ambassador Antonio de Aquiar Patriota, the chair of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), and a high-level representative from UN Women.

A presidential statement is the anticipated outcome of the debate.
Inclusive Development (con’t)

Background
In recent years, the linkages between peace, security and development have been increasingly recognised by members of the Security Council and integrated into the Council’s work. World leaders explicitly recognised the nexus between these issues in the World Summit Outcome Document in 2005, and it has been often invoked by several Council members and the wider UN membership in the years since. The Council explored this nexus in a debate on the “interdependence between security and development”, under the Brazilian presidency on 11 February 2011. During that debate, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon argued that “development should be inclusive…this means including women, who can play a critical role in negotiations and peace processes, and young people, who have vast potential to contribute to the development of their societies”. Ban added, “…inclusive development…is perhaps the most effective route to diminishing the risks of conflict and enabling long-term stability.”

Ban’s words are relevant to the conflict dynamics at work in many of the world’s civil wars, including those on the Council’s agenda. Social scientists have argued that legitimacy and effectiveness are the foundations of state resilience to conflict. But that legitimacy suffers when certain groups perceive that they are excluded from processes related to political, social or economic development. This can lead to societal divisions along gender, ethnic, religious, geographic or other lines—resulting in disenfranchisement and resentment and providing fertile ground for conflict. Moreover, when women or other actors are disenfranchised, states are unable to tap into enormous resources of talent and creativity that can foster economic growth and social cohesion.

The Council’s work in recent years has recognised the connections between security and inclusive development. The Council consistently notes the important role of women in conflict prevention, peace processes and post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in its outcomes both at the thematic level, through the women, peace and security agenda as well as in country-specific cases. UN peace operations have increasingly taken on more peacebuilding tasks designed to create more legitimate, inclusive and effective states by supporting: disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; security sector reform; electoral processes; and institution-building in the justice, security and financial sectors. And through the PBC, the Council strives to help states emerging from conflict to build effective institutions that lay the foundation for sustainable peace.

The open debate will offer an opportunity for Council members to take stock of what the Council has done to foster inclusive development, explore best practices related to this issue in different geographic regions and reflect on what role the Council can play on inclusive development moving forward. The meeting may also provide the Council an opportunity to reflect on initiatives underway relevant to inclusive development, including the 2015 High-Level Review of the implementation of resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, the 2015 PBC review; and the post-2015 development agenda.

Peacebuilding

Expected Council Action
In January 2015, Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson is expected to brief the Council on post-conflict peacebuilding. Also likely to brief is Antonio de Aguiar Patriota (Brazil), chair of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). Council members will be considering the Secretary-General’s 23 September 2014 report on peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict.

The Council may adopt a presidential statement.

Key Recent Developments
On 3 November 2014, Patriota sent letters to the Council and General Assembly presidents regarding the terms of reference for the 2015 review of peacebuilding. Following the first five-year review of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture, which concluded that the PBC had yet to reach its full potential, Security Council resolution 1947 of 29 October 2010 and General Assembly resolution 65/7 of 23 November 2010 called for a further comprehensive review in 2015.

According to the terms of reference, the 2015 review will include case studies and will be conducted by an advisory expert group of seven individuals appointed by the Secretary-General. The countries selected for the case studies will represent both PBC-agenda countries and non-agenda countries and will reflect examples of progress in peace consolidation as well as conflict relapse. The expert group’s report and recommendations will be submitted to the General Assembly and Security Council. Next, an intergovernmental process, co-facilitated by two permanent representatives appointed by the Security Council and General Assembly, will review the report’s findings and submit an outcome product for the Security Council’s and General Assembly’s consideration and action. Patriota confirmed to the Council in a letter on 25 November 2014 the five countries selected as case studies: Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Timor-Leste.

Council members agreed on the terms of reference on 11 December. At press time, a joint letter from the General Assembly and the Security Council was expected to be sent to the Secretary-General. The letter would outline the process and formally begin the review.

Feeding into this preparatory work, the Secretary-General provided initial inputs for the PBC, the Council strives to help states emerging from conflict to build effective institutions that lay the foundation for sustainable peace.
Peacebuilding (con’t)

the review in a 24 October 2014 letter. The Secretary-General stressed the important political role of the PBC in facilitating peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict countries. The letter additionally suggested that the PBC adopt more flexible and lighter forms of engagement to address a broader assortment of post-conflict situations—picking up one of the recommendations of the 2010 review that has yet to be fully realized. Related to this, the Secretary-General noted that he could be more proactive in referring situations to the PBC, which he has never done. Emphasis was also placed on the PBC increasing its engagement with regional organisations and the importance of addressing regional dimensions in peacebuilding. The Secretary-General’s latest report on peacebuilding further noted the opportunity presented by the review, highlighting that the relapses of South Sudan and CAR into conflict reflect that there are still shortcomings in the international community’s peacebuilding efforts.

Effective 1 November 2014, the Secretary-General appointed Assistant Secretary-General Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, formerly of the Department of Political Affairs, as head of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office.

Recent Developments in the PBC Country-Specific Configurations

On 6 August 2014, the chairs of the Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone configurations—Ambassadors Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg), Marten Grunditz (Sweden) and Guillermo Rischchynski (Canada), respectively—issued a joint letter highlighting the need for international support to respond to the Ebola epidemic. An informal joint meeting of the three configurations on the epidemic was held on 18 August. On 8 September, David Nabarro, then senior UN coordinator for Ebola, briefed the PBC organisational committee. In a statement, the PBC noted its deep concern that the Ebola outbreak may reverse peacebuilding gains. Another informal joint meeting of the configurations was held on 3 November. As a follow-up, Patriota sent the Secretary-General a letter requesting a report to assess the epidemic’s impact on peacebuilding in the three countries.

A roundtable of Burundi and its main bilateral and multilateral partners, attended by configuration chair Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland), was held on 11-12 December 2014 in Bujumbura. In a joint declaration, participants renewed and redefined mutual commitments in light of progress achieved and remaining challenges. Prior to that, Seger participated in a workshop in Cairo on 24-25 November on regional aspects of peacebuilding (S/2014/882), followed by meetings with AU officials in Addis Ababa on 26 November as part of a visit by PBC country-configuration chairs. The UN Office in Burundi was set to close on 31 December.

Ambassador Omar Hilale (Morocco), chair of the CAR configuration, also participated in the Cairo workshop and was among the delegation that travelled to Addis Ababa. On 15 December 2014, the Peacebuilding Fund approved $2.7 million for a project to re-establish social cohesion and facilitate national reconciliation in the CAR.

Patriota, who chairs the Guinea-Bissau configuration, travelled to Guinea-Bissau from 29 to 30 October 2014. Briefing the Council on 18 November, Patriota warned that Guinea-Bissau’s recent positive developments could be reversed if the Ebola epidemic were to spread to the country. He called for the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response to increase its assistance to bolster its preparedness in case of an outbreak (S/PV.7315).

Key Issues

A key issue will be the 2015 review of peacebuilding.

Related to the review is the relationship between the PBC and the Council and practices to enhance its advisory role to the Council.

Relapses into conflict in December 2012 in CAR and December 2013 in South Sudan and the ramifications of the Ebola epidemic for peacebuilding gains in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone will be important issues.

Options

The Council may adopt a presidential statement:

• expressing its support of the 2015 peacebuilding review;
• reiterating calls for international assistance to combat Ebola in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone and to support neighbouring countries’ preparedness; and
• providing a timetable for the Secretary-General’s future reporting on peacebuilding.

Another option is organising a brainstorming with representatives of the UN peacebuilding architecture (PBC, Peacebuilding Fund and Peacebuilding Support Office), the broader UN system, post-conflict states that are not on the PBC agenda and other related processes, including the other 2015 high-level reviews on peacekeeping and on women, peace and security to discuss and promote the inclusion of all related actors in the upcoming review.

Council Dynamics

A lack of Council support for the PBC has been cited as contributing to some of the shortcomings of the body. For instance, some of the P5 oppose allowing configuration chairs to participate in consultations. Recently, there have been efforts to develop other ways to take better advantage of the PBC’s advisory role. These have included briefings by configuration chairs for Council experts organised before the mandate renewals of missions in PBC-agenda countries and quarterly stock-taking meetings of Council members, configuration chairs and PBC-agenda countries. Australia, Luxembourg and Rwanda, which have been strong advocates of these initiatives, are exiting the Council. While it remains to be seen which members might fill their place in advancing Council and PBC collaboration, it is noteworthy that the ambassador of incoming Council member Angola, Ismael Abraão Gaspar Martins, was the first chair of the PBC.

There is no designated penholder on peacebuilding. As Council president in January, Chile will likely be the lead on a statement.

Protection of Civilians

Expected Council Action

In January, the Council expects to hold an open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, with a focus on the needs of women. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos is expected to brief. Although yet to be confirmed, other potential briefers include Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous, UN Women Executive Director Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka and an NGO representative. No outcome is anticipated.

Key Recent Developments

Conflict continues to have a dramatic impact...
on civilians. More than 50 million people are internally displaced, refugees or asylum seekers worldwide—the highest level since the end of World War II. The majority of them are women and children. In Syria, approximately 7.6 million people are now internally displaced and more than 3 million people are refugees, accounting for roughly 20 percent of the world’s displaced population. In February 2014, it was estimated that 100,000 people had perished in the Syrian conflict; now that figure is closer to 200,000. Since the civil war in South Sudan started in December 2013, nearly two million people have been forcibly displaced, either internally or as refugees in bordering countries, and more than 10,000 people have died. Displacement, sexual violence, killings and other significant violations of international humanitarian and human rights law continue to be key features of conflicts in the Central African Republic, Darfur, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, among others.

On 7 March 2014, the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) published a report entitled “Evaluation of the implementation of protection of civilians mandates in United Nations peacekeeping operations”. The report found that there is “a persistent pattern of peacekeeping operations not intervening with force when civilians are under attack”. This occurs, the report argues, for a variety of reasons, including:

• dual chains of command in national contingents, with the result that they adhere to input from capitals rather than orders from the mission’s force commander;
• differing interpretations of protection mandates among Council members and troop contributors, with some troop contributors being risk adverse;
• perceptions within peacekeeping operations that the necessary resources to “respond to force with force” are not available;
• a lack of understanding that peacekeeping operations are obliged to act when host governments do not fulfil their responsibilities to protect civilians; and
• concerns among troop contributors about the potential consequences of using force if it is later considered to be a mistake.

The report made three recommendations: strengthening the command and control of peacekeeping missions over national contingents; providing improved tactical guidance to peacekeepers in the field about what is expected of them with regard to protecting civilians; and enhancing relations between peacekeeping operations and humanitarian actors on protection issues.

The High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations, which was launched by the Secretary-General in late October 2014, is expected to include protection of civilians as one of its areas of focus. The findings of the panel, which is chaired by José Ramos Horta, are expected to be released in a report in mid-2015.

The Council held a briefing on the safety and security of humanitarian workers in armed conflict on 19 August 2014, coinciding with World Humanitarian Day, which honours the efforts of aid workers and takes place on the anniversary of the 2003 bombing of the UN Baghdad compound, in which 22 people were killed. In the aftermath of the briefing, the Council adopted resolution 2175 on 22 people were killed. In the aftermath of the briefing, the Council adopted resolution 2175 ten days later, which:

• strongly condemned violence and intimidation against those involved in humanitarian operations;
• urged parties to armed conflict to allow complete, unhindered humanitarian access;
• urged states to ensure that they hold accountable those who commit crimes against humanitarian workers on their respective territories; and
• requested the Secretary-General to include in his reports on country-specific situations and other relevant reports information regarding the safety and security of humanitarian workers and to present recommendations about how to strengthen their protection.

On 28 October 2014, the Council held its annual open debate on women, peace and security. During the debate, it adopted a presidential statement which, among other things:

• recognised that displaced women and girls are at heightened risk of confronting sexual violence and discrimination; and
• expressed concern that violent extremism frequently leads to increased displacement and often targets girls and women.

Key Issues
An underlying issue is how the Council can better translate its focus on protection of civilians as a thematic issue into concrete results in country-specific situations.

A related issue is whether and how the recommendations of the OIOS report can be incorporated into the approach of UN peacekeeping to protect civilians.

Another related issue is identifying ways the Council could provide better guidance to Council-mandated peacekeeping and political missions to enhance the protection of girls and women on the ground.

Also a key issue is what impact the Secretary-General’s “Human Rights Up Front” initiative has had to date and what future steps are envisioned for its integration into the work of UN entities moving forward. (The initiative is an action plan to develop an integrated, more dynamic approach to human rights issues throughout the UN system.)

Options
The Council may choose to hold the debate but not take any specific action at the current time.

Given the devastating impact that conflict has on civilians, the Council could also consider adopting a resolution requesting that the Secretariat:

• submit a report on the protection of civilians to the Council on an annual basis, as such a report is now submitted only every 18 months;
• update the Council on the implementation of the “Human Rights Up Front!” action plan, including an assessment of efforts to date and details of next steps;
• develop a common system to record civilian casualties with the aim of strengthening efforts to monitor and report violations of international human rights and humanitarian law; and
• underscore the heightened threat that violent extremism poses to girls and women (e.g. kidnapping, human trafficking, sale and forced marriage, rape, and sexual slavery).
Protection of Civilians (con’t)

Council Dynamics
Fundamental fault lines continue to divide the Council on this agenda item, especially in some instances at the country-specific level. Some members, notably China and Russia, emphasise the need to respect national sovereignty as an element in any decision to ensure civilian protection and therefore are generally reluctant to authorise measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, such as sanctions. Others give less weight to the sovereignty argument and thus have a lower threshold for when the Council should act to protect civilians. This divide has undermined Council efforts to protect civilians in South Sudan, Sudan and Syria, among other cases. Among the incoming members, New Zealand and Spain noted their support of protection issues during their campaigns.

The UK is the penholder on protection of civilians and on women, peace and security in the Council. The US is the penholder on sexual violence.

UNRCCA (Central Asia)

Expected Council Action
In January, Miroslav Jenča, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA), is expected to brief Council members in consultations. As is customary following these semi-annual meetings, a press statement is expected.

Key Recent Developments
Jenča last briefed Council members on 26 June. In the subsequent press statement, Council members reiterated their support for UNRCCA as an early-warning and preventive-diplomacy tool. They highlighted in particular its role in assisting Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) in managing their trans-boundary water resources. They also took note of the ongoing discussions on a regional legal framework for water management and the 17 June World Bank draft assessment of the proposed Rogun hydropower project in Tajikistan, while encouraging the countries’ active and constructive engagement. In addition, Council members reiterated their support for UNRCCA’s work on counter-terrorism and prevention of religious extremism, which is aimed at facilitating implementation of the UN global counter-terrorism strategy. Finally, they commended UNRCCA’s role in helping countries in the region combat drug trafficking and in facilitating their engagement in the reconstruction and stabilisation of Afghanistan.

On 18 June the Secretary-General had welcomed the World Bank assessment, noting that it provided “important guidance for critical consultations among the region’s states on water and energy issues”, and encouraged the governments involved to engage in a constructive discussion. The assessment, “Key Issues for Consideration on the Proposed Rogun Hydropower Project”, a final version of which was issued on 1 September, concluded that the Rogun project could be built and operated within international safety norms if modifications were made to the original design and measures were taken to mitigate environmental and societal impacts, such as population resettlement and the effect on downstream irrigation. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan, which will be affected by the dam as a downstream country, remains opposed to the project.

Since Jenča’s last briefing, UNRCCA has organised several regional events. On 9-11 July it held a regional seminar in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in cooperation with the UN Counter-Terrorism Task Force on engaging the media in countering terrorism in Central Asia. On 11-12 November, UNRCCA organised a seminar in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, in cooperation with others on the impact of glacial melting on national and trans-boundary water systems. On 20-21 November, UNRCCA convened an international seminar in Almaty, Kazakhstan, entitled “Regional Cooperation as a Factor for Peace and Stability in Central Asia”, as part of a series of strategic dialogues with the expert community in the region. On 28 November, it convened the annual regional meeting of deputy ministers of foreign affairs. The meeting included consultations on UNRCCA’s next three-year programme of action, due to begin on 1 January 2015.

Key Issues
Key issues include ongoing tensions relating to trans-boundary water management and other border-related disputes, the threat of terrorism (including recent reports of recruitment from Central Asia by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham), religious extremism and drug trafficking. The regional impact of the situation in Afghanistan also remains a key issue.

With regard to UNRCCA, a key issue is the finalisation of its programme of action. At press time the programme had not yet been made public, but it was expected to focus largely on the same priorities as the previous programme, i.e. trans-boundary threats facing the region, including terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking; implications of national developments on regional stability; and management of common natural resources and environmental degradation.

Options
The most likely option for Council members is to issue a press statement, as they have done in the past, reaffirming their support for UNRCCA’s activities in the region and perhaps adding a reference to the new programme of action (which will likely be finalised by then).

Council Dynamics
Council members appear supportive of the work of UNRCCA and seem to agree that it plays a useful role in conflict prevention. Given ongoing developments in Afghanistan, including the significant changes in the international presence underway next year when the International Security Assistance Force will be replaced by the much smaller Resolute Support Mission, Council members may be particularly interested in hearing Jenča’s thoughts on how UNRCCA can help strengthen the Central Asian countries’ engagement and cooperation on Afghanistan.

Russia is the penholder on UNRCCA press statements.

### Notable Dates for January

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