### Monthly Forecast

**Overview**

Chad will hold the presidency of the Council in December and has planned two open debates. Chadian Foreign Minister Moussa Faki Mahamat will preside over a high-level open debate on terrorism’s linkages with transnational organised crime and Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman will brief. The Secretary-General and a representative of the African Union are expected to brief at the other open debate initiated by Chad this month on the evolution of the partnership between the UN and the AU in peace operations.

Debates are planned on:

- the ad hoc international criminal tribunals with the Presidents and Prosecutors of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) briefing;
- Afghanistan, with a briefing Special Representative Nicholas Haysom; and
- Kosovo (initially planned for November), with a briefing by Special Representative Farid Zarif.

Briefings are expected on:

- the implementation of the UN’s integrated Sahel strategy by Special Envoy Hирюте Геи';
- the work of the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee by its chair, Ambassador Gary Quinlan (Australia);
- the ICC work on Darfur by Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda; and
- the experience chairing Council subsidiary bodies by the permanent representatives who are rotating off the Council: Maria Cristina Perceval (Argentina), Quinlan (Australia); Oh Joon (Republic of Korea), Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg) and Eugène-Richard Gasana (Rwanda).

Briefings, followed by consultations, are expected on:

- the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Hervé Ladsous;
- the situation in Libya by Special Representative Bernardino León and the work of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee by its chair, Ambassador Gasana (Rwanda);
- the work of UNOCA and implementation of the regional strategy to combat the Lord’s Resistance Army by Special Representative Abdoulaye Bathily;
- Israel/Palestine, with a briefing by Special Coordinator Robert Serry;
- the humanitarian situation in Syria by Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos; and
- the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) by Special Representative Babacar Gaye and the work of the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee by its chair, Ambassador Raimond-Murmokaitė (Lithuania).

Briefings in consultations are likely on:

- the destruction of chemical weapons in Syria by Special Adviser Sigríður Kaag;
- developments in Yemen by Special Adviser Jamal Benomar and the work of the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee by its chair, Ambassador Murmokaitė (Lithuania);
- developments with the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) by DPKO;
- Sudan-South Sudan issues and the UN International Security Force for Abyei by Special Envoy Haile Menkerios; and
- the work of the 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee by its chair, Ambassador Dina Kawar (Jordan).

Formal sessions will be needed to adopt resolutions to renew:

- the UN Mission in Liberia and the Liberia sanctions;
- the terms of judges and prosecutors of ICTY and ICTR; and
- UNDOF.

A public wrap-up session is scheduled for the last work day of the year, 22 December.

Throughout the month Council members will be closely following developments in Mali and Ukraine, as well as events related to the Ebola epidemic in West Africa and further meetings may be required.
South Sudan
On 4 November, Special Representative Ellen Margrethe Løj briefed Council members in consultations, via video-teleconference from Juba, on the latest report of the Secretary-General on UNMISS (S/2014/821). UNMISS Force Commander Yohannes Gebremeskel Tesfamariam also participated via video-teleconference. Løj gave a grim assessment of the security situation, referring specifically to the fighting in the Bentiu area, and the security and humanitarian challenges in the UNMISS camps for internally displaced persons. Council members issued a press statement on 5 November (SC/11631) expressing “alarm and outrage” at the resumption of fighting in Unity and Upper Nile states. In the statement, Council members also “confirmed their intention to commence negotiations, in consultation with relevant partners, including the Inter-governmental Authority for Development and the African Union, on all appropriate measures, including targeted sanctions against those impeding the peace process.” On 25 November, the Council adopted resolution 2187 renewing the mandate of UNMISS for an additional six months. Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous also briefed Council members under “any other business” the same day on the mission’s efforts to address the security situation in South Sudan.

Burundi
On 5 November, the Council was briefed by Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, the head BNUB, and Paul Seger (Switzerland) who chairs the PBC Burundi configuration (S/PV.7295). Zacharie Gahutu of Burundi’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation also addressed the Council. The briefing was followed by consultations after which the president of the Council, Gary Quinlan (Australia), released elements to the press. He said that Council members are monitoring the situation in Burundi and are looking forward to the establishment of the electoral observer mission after BNUB’s drawdown on 31 December. He added that Council members encourage the government to create conditions for an inclusive electoral process and support the understanding reached with the government on the continued presence of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Burundi after BNUB’s drawdown.

DRC
On 5 November, the Council adopted a presidential statement noting deep concern over the lack of progress of the voluntary disarmament process of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and calling on the DRC, in coordination with MONUSCO, to undertake immediate military action against those in the FDLR who do not engage in the demobilization process or who continue to carry out human rights abuses (S/PRST/2014/22). On 25 November, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous briefed Council members under “any other business” on recent attacks against civilians in Beni, North Kivu that have reportedly resulted in over 200 casualties since October. Later that day, Council members issued a press statement condemning the attacks and calling on the DRC and MONUSCO to reduce threats against civilians and neutralise armed groups operating in eastern DRC (SC/11675).

International Court of Justice
On 6 November, in simultaneous and independent elections, the General Assembly and the Security Council elected four judges: Mohamed Bennouna (Morocco), James Richard Crawford (Australia), Joan E. Donoghue (US) and Kirill Gevorgian (Russia) to nine-year terms beginning on 6 February 2015 (S/PV.7297 and resumption 1). After seven rounds of voting in the General Assembly and four rounds of voting in the Security Council, the fifth vacancy remained open, as Patrick Lipton Robinson (Jamaica) consistently garnered the absolute majority required in the General Assembly, while the Council selected Susana Ruiz Cerutti (Argentina). The following day, several rounds of simultaneous voting failed to produce agreement to fill the remaining seat (S/PV.7298, 7299, 7300, 7301, 7302, 7303 and 7304). On 11 November, Cerutti withdrew (S/2014/808) and Robinson was elected on 17 November to fill the fifth remaining seat (S/PV.7313).

DPRK (North Korea)
On 10 November, the Chair of the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg), briefed Council members in consultations on the work of the Committee. Several Council members made references to the human rights situation in the DPRK and said that the Council needed to address it. Prior to the briefing, on 7 November, the Council had received a letter from the DPRK (S/2014/797) that strongly condemned “anti-DPRK propaganda leaflet-scattering operations conducted by so-called non-governmental organisations” claiming that they were “intentionally tolerated and even patronized by South Korean authorities” and urged the UN and other international organisations to take action to prevent further such operations from taking place. The letter was not discussed in the consultations on 10 November. On 18 November, in its annual resolution on the human rights situation in the DPRK, the General Assembly’s Third Committee decided to submit the report of the Human Rights Council mandated DPRK Commission of Inquiry to the Security Council and encouraged the Council to consider relevant recommendations and take appropriate action, including through “consideration of referral of the situation in the DPRK to the ICC” and “effective targeted sanctions against those who appear to be most responsible for acts that the Commission has said may constitute crimes against humanity.” It was adopted by a vote of 111 in favour, 19 against and 55 abstentions (A/C.3/69/L.28/Rev.1). A Cuban amendment that would have replaced the provisions referring to the Security Council with a call for a new cooperative approach in the consideration of the human rights situation in the DPRK was defeated by a vote of 40 in favour, 77 against and 50 abstentions. In a 24 November letter to the Council, the DPRK rejected the resolution and stated that the hostile policy of the US compels the DPRK not to exercise restraint any longer in conducting a new nuclear test (S/2014/849).

Boko Haram
On 10 November, Council members issued a press statement condemning a suicide attack earlier that day at a school in Nigeria that reportedly killed 48 people (SC/11639).

Mali
On 10 November, Council members participated in an informal interactive dialogue with Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Field Support Ameerah Haq and the Deputy Military Adviser Major General Adrian Foster on the situation in Mali. The discussion focused on the relevance of the current mandate of MINUSMA in the current context of increasing asymmetrical threats.
**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

On 11 November, the Council adopted resolution 2183 that renewed the authorisation for the EU-led multinational stabilisation force for a year. Following the adoption, the Council held its semi-annual debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina (S/PV.7308), which included a briefing by High Representative Valentin Inzko on his latest report on the situation in the country (S/2014/777).

**Somalia**

On 12 November, the Council adopted resolution 2184 renewing for one year measures to fight piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia. The counter-piracy measures have been renewed on an annual basis since they were initially authorised in resolutions 1846 and 1851. On 24 November, Council members issued a press statement condemning the 22 November attack in Kenya for which Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility and paid tribute to the role of Kenya in AMISOM as part of the fight against Al-Shabaab (SC/11668).

**Ukraine**

On 12 November, the Council held a public meeting on the situation in Ukraine following reports of renewed violence in the east and concerns about violations of the Minsk Agreement (S/PV.7311). The Council was briefed by Jens Anders Toyberg- Frandzen, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs; Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan, Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine; and Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini, representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office.

**Israel/Palestine**

On 17 November, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jens Anders Toyberg- Frandzen briefed the Council at the regular monthly meeting on the Middle East (S/PV.7312). Toyberg- Frandzen briefed on the tensions surrounding access to the holy sites in Jerusalem and recent violence in Jerusalem and the West Bank. He also reported on an increase in demolition of Palestinian buildings, continuing Israeli settlement expansion and reconstruction efforts in Gaza. On 19 November, the Council issued a press statement, proposed by the US, on “the despicable terrorist attack in a synagogue in Jerusalem” that occurred a day earlier in which four innocent civilians worshipping and a police officer were killed (SC/11660). In the statement, Council members strongly condemned all such acts of violence, expressed concern about increased tensions, which have affected both the Israeli and Palestinian people, and urged all sides to take immediate steps to restore calm. They also encouraged Israeli and Palestinian leaders and citizens to work together to lower tension, reject violence, avoid all provocations and seek a path toward peace.

**Iraq**

On 18 November, the Council held its regular quarterly briefing and consultations on Iraq (S/PV.7314). Special Representative Nickolay Mladenov presented the most recent UNAMI report (S/2014/774) and the report on Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property (S/2014/776). He focused his comments on the newly formed Shi’a-led government and Baghdad’s relationship with Iraq’s Sunni and Kurdish population. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al Hussein briefed on the human rights dimension of the conflict in Iraq. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos briefed on the deteriorating humanitarian situation.

**Guinea-Bissau**

Miguel Trowoda, the Special Representative and head of UNIOGBIS, briefed the Council on 18 November and presented the most Secretary-General’s assessment of the mission (S/2014/805). Statements were also made by the chair of the PBC, the chair of the PBC Guinea-Bissau configuration, Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota (Brazil) and Prime Minister Domingos Simões Pereira of Guinea-Bissau (S/PV.7315). On 25 November, the Council adopted resolution 2186 renewing the mandate of UNIOGBIS for three months.

**Counter-Terrorism**

On 19 November, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop presided over a high-level open debate on counter-terrorism (S/PV.7316). The Council was briefed by the Secretary-General, Ambassador Raimonda Murmokaitė (Lithuania) in her capacity as chair of the 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee and Ambassador Gary Quinlan (Australia) in his capacity as chair of the Al-Qaida 1267/1989 Sanctions Committee. Prior to the open debate, Australia had circulated a concept note to guide discussion (S/2014/787). A 3 November report of the 1267/1989 Monitoring Team on the sources of ISIS and Al-Nusrah Front’s recruits, funds and arms was also discussed at the meeting (S/2014/815) as was another report by the Counter Terrorism Committee regarding the capacity of member states to implement resolution 2178 on foreign terrorist fighters (S/2014/807). A presidential statement was adopted that focused on international cooperation in combating terrorism and addressed the interrelated threats posed by foreign terrorist fighters, violent extremism, Al-Qaida, and the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (S/PRST/2014/23).

**Peacekeeping**

On 20 November, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop presided over a meeting where Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous and three police commissioners briefed on challenges faced by police components when implementing Council mandates on the ground (S/PV.7317). The briefing was an initiative of Australia which distributed a concept note to guide the meeting (S/2014/788). Greg Hinds of the UN Mission in Liberia discussed challenges related to building the institutional capacity of the host state, Fred Yiga of the UN Mission in South Sudan tackled the importance of having the appropriate guidance, training, skills and equipment to effectively implement a mandate and Luis Miguel Carrilho of the UN Multi-dimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic addressed the

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Role of police components in the protection of civilians and aspects of the women, peace and security agenda in the policing context. At the meeting, resolution 2185 was unanimously adopted, the first standalone resolution on UN policing. Later that day, Council members held an informal interactive dialogue with the chair of the recently appointed High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, José Ramos-Horta.

Ebola
The Council held a debate on Ebola on 21 November (S/PV.7318) and was briefed by Special Representative and head of the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response Anthony Banbury, the Special Envoy for Ebola David Nabarro as well as the head of the French Red Cross in Guinea, Thomas Mauget. Statements were also made by representatives of Guinea, Liberia, Mali and Sierra Leone. The Council adopted a presidential statement that reiterated grave concern over the epidemic, recognised progress in scaling-up international assistance and called for further strengthening of response efforts (S/PRST/2014/24).

Non-Proliferation (1540 Committee)
On 24 November the Chair of the 1540 Committee, Ambassador Oh Joon (Republic of Korea) presented his semi-annual briefing to the Council (S/PV.7319). The briefing would normally have been given in a joint meeting with the chairs of the Council’s two other counter-terrorism-related committees, namely the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee and the 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee. However, since the chairs of these two Committees addressed the Council during the 19 November counter-terrorism open debate, it was decided to hold a separate briefing on the work of the 1540 Committee.

Sanctions
On 25 November, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman and Inter- Secretary-General Jürgen Stock briefed the Council regarding sanctions (S/PV.7323). Australia had circulated a concept note in advance of the meeting (S/2014/793). At press time, a draft resolution to improve the effectiveness of UN sanctions implementation was under negotiation. Due to differences among Council members—in particular, the establishment of a policy and coordination unit in the Secretariat and issues related to sanctions imposed by regional and international organisations—it was unclear when agreement might be reached and when a vote might be scheduled.

Syria

Expected Council Action
Special Adviser Sigrid Kaag and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos are expected to provide separate briefings, respectively, on the destruction of chemical weapons and the humanitarian situation.

The authorisation in resolution 2165 for cross-border and cross-line humanitarian access in Syria, including the monitoring mechanism, expires in mid-January 2015. It seems possible that the Council may adopt a resolution renewing the authorisation in December before the humanitarian leads, Australia and Luxembourg, rotate off the Council.

Key Recent Developments
The civil war continues on its devastating course, and the militarisation of the conflict has escalated with the advent of US-led airstrikes against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the Al-Qaida-affiliated Al-Nusra Front. A majority of the strikes have been focused around the Kurdish town of Kobani in northern Syria to counter the ISIS offensive to seize the town and consolidate its control along the Turkish border.

There were also three coalition strikes in November against Al-Nusra as it approached the Bab al-Hawa crossing on the Turkish border—a major conduit for humanitarian and military supplies to rebel-held northwestern Syria. One of these strikes also hit a compound of Ahrar al-Sham—one of the seven factions that form the Islamic Front. Both the Islamic Front and Al-Nusra, unlike ISIS, have been viewed by Syrian opposition fighters as allies against the Syrian regime.

Some analysts estimate there are approximately 1,500 different armed rebel groups in Syria, and the reconfiguration of alliances is constant. The strikes against Al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham have thrown these fragmented groups into further disarray, sowed mutual distrust, increased in-fighting and created the impression that the US-led raids strengthen the position of the government. This dynamic is reinforced by the demonstrable fact that since the US-led airstrikes began in late September the Syrian military has dramatically ramped up its own air campaign against rebel-held areas. Security Council members condemned one such attack in a 31 October press statement that expressed outrage at the use of barrel bombs that were dropped on a displaced persons camp and left many dead and injured, albeit without specifically assigning blame to the government due to Russian objections.

Special Envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura briefed Council members for the first time on 30 October on possible ways to revive the political process following his meetings with key regional players. He suggested that a UN-mediated “freeze zone”, to be tested first in Aleppo, could lead to increased humanitarian access; build confidence toward a more wide-ranging stabilisation of the situation; provide a basis for the opposition, government and international actors to cooperate against ISIS; and deliver incentives for negotiating a broader peace in the future. Council members issued a press statement in support of de Mistura’s efforts later that day, though the statement did not directly address the substance of his proposal.

The Special Envoy returned to Syria in early November and met with President Bashar
Turkey has begun to restrict the refugee influx—5 million are in hard-to-reach areas. The number of those trapped in besieged areas has gone down slightly to 212,000 from 241,000. Meanwhile, “host country fatigue” has challenged Syria’s neighbouring countries which shelter the overwhelming majority of its 3.2 million refugees. Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey have begun to restrict the refugee influx due to concerns about the destabilising impact on their own security and economic situations.

Kaag last briefed on 5 November, reporting on the destruction plan for chemical weapons production facilities, to be completed by the summer of 2015. Council members also discussed the 10 September fact-finding report by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapon (OPCW), which found evidence that chlorine had been consistently and repeatedly used in barrel bombs dropped from helicopters. While the report did not attribute blame, only the government has aerial capacity. The next report of the OPCW fact-finding mission on the use of chlorine bombs is expected in December.

Human Rights-Related Developments

During a 16 October press conference, High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein said his office intends to issue an updated count of reported deaths in Syria in December, which will be well over the conservative estimate of 200,000.

On 14 November, the Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry on Syria released a thematic report, Rule of Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria. The report is based on first-hand victim and witness accounts from men, women and children. It concludes that ISIS has perpetrated widespread, deliberate and systematic violations of international humanitarian law and war crimes against civilian populations, including extrajudicial killing, murder, mutilation, rape, sexual violence, forced marriage and pregnancy, torture, cruel treatment and the use and recruitment of children. The report also details ISIS’s killing of hundreds of captured beligerents during its recent military assaults. Recommendations in the report include adopting stronger remedial and preventive actions in Security Council resolutions; focusing on the suppression of war crimes and combating the current climate of impunity benefiting ISIS; and engaging international accountability mechanisms, including the ICC.

Over the next several months, the Commission is planning to release further thematic reports on deaths in custody, torture and forced disappearance, the impact of the conflict on women and attacks on journalists and human rights defenders.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council—in the fourth year of a civil war that can no longer be contained inside Syria—is to ensure that its focus on counter-terrorism efforts, while important, does not diminish its attention to reports that the Assad regime remains responsible for the majority of violations in the conflict.

An immediate issue for the Council is the renewal of the cross-border authorisation granted in resolution 2165 to ensure that the UN and its partners can continue to deliver aid in Syria.

Ongoing issues include tracking implementation of resolutions 2139 and 2165 on the humanitarian situation and 2118 on the destruction of chemical weapons—in particular aerial bombardment and the use of chlorine bombs.

Another issue is how to effectively curb ISIS’s illicit funding avenues.

Options

An option for Council members who are concerned that elements of resolution 2139, such as human rights and protection of civilians, are being ignored is to reinforce the need for full implementation of humanitarian resolutions 2139 and 2165 in any resolution that renews authorisation for cross-border aid deliveries. A related option for the Council is to renew these authorisations with periodic reviews but without a sunset clause.

Related to human rights reporting, the Council could request to be regularly informed of the work of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria. (A 25 September Human Rights Council resolution decided to transmit all of the Commission’s reports to the Secretary-General for “appropriate action”. The Secretary-General could choose to bring such reports to the attention of the Council using his article 99 powers.)

An option for Council members who are concerned that the government’s use of chlorine bombs violates elements of resolution 2118 would be to request that the reports of the OPCW fact-finding mission be disseminated as a Council document. (Resolution 2118 obligates the OPCW to report non-compliance to the Security Council.)

An option for Council members who are concerned that de Mistura’s action plan for UN-mediated “freeze zones” may unintentionally strengthen the government’s position would be to advocate for a more comprehensive engagement with the Special Envoy. The Council could issue guidelines reinforcing existing language in resolution 2165 that “freeze zones” cannot be agreed following siege-and-starvation tactics and could also encourage the UN to give local civil society leaders a prominent role in reaching localised agreements.

Regarding counter-terrorism, the Council could act on the recommendations of the 1267/1989 Al-Qaeda Monitoring Team and adopt a resolution that enhances the existing sanctions regime in three areas: seizing oil tanker-trucks coming into or out of ISIS or Al-Nusra-controlled territory, imposing a worldwide moratorium on antiquities trading from Syria and Iraq and prohibiting flights into and
out of ISIS or Al-Nusra-controlled territory.

An important, though unlikely, option in the face of the ever-increasing militarisation of the conflict is for the Council to heed the Secretary-General’s call for the international community to stop the flow of arms into Syria and impose an arms embargo.

**Council Dynamics**
The significant increase in aerial bombardment by the Syrian government has led several Council members, particularly the P3, Australia, Jordan, Lithuania and Luxembourg, to reiterate their view that, without underestimating the threat ISIS poses, the Assad regime remains responsible for the majority of violations in the conflict. These members have also continually expressed concern that there has been no progress in implementing any of the other key demands of resolution 2139 regarding human rights and protection of civilians, such as observing medical neutrality, ceasing aerial bombardments and easing administrative hurdles that slow or block humanitarian access.

Meanwhile on the chemical weapons track, there has been significant progress in the destruction of Syria’s stockpile. However, deep divisions remain within the Council, in particular over the government’s use of chlorine bombs. The US has said such allegations raise serious questions about Syria’s obligations under resolution 2118 and the Chemical Weapons Convention, whereas Russia has calculated a draft presidential statement on the possession of chemical weapons by terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria. During two rounds of negotiations, several members insisted on including the government’s use of chlorine bombs in any such text. Russia, which could not accept such references, dropped its initiative, and then attempted to incorporate language on terrorism and chemical weapons into the separate presidential statement on counter-terrorism adopted by the Council on 19 November. Similar objections were strenuously asserted, and Russia’s additions were not accepted.

Despite overwhelming indications that resolutions 2118 and 2139 have been continually breached, there is no appetite among Council members to push for follow-up measures against the Syrian regime, such as targeted sanctions, due to the assumption that Russia would veto the effort in any event.

On the political track, since de Mistura took up his post in September, he has been working around the “Assad knot” enshrined in the 30 June 2012 Geneva Communiqué—i.e. trying to find openings between Iran and Russia’s support for the regime and the position of the P3 and their Arab allies that Assad must go.

Council members are supportive of de Mistura’s quiet diplomacy and incremental approach. However, Russia seems fully supportive of the idea of a “freeze zone” while many other Council members are cautious about the implications of such a tactic. On the one hand, Council members are sympathetic to any initiative that can lower levels of violence and provide relief to civilians. On the other hand, it is unclear to many Council members whether a “freeze zone” will be little more than the opposition’s agreement to surrender, which may have the inadvertent impact of encouraging the government to scale up its attacks elsewhere in the country to consolidate its position before other “freeze zones” are negotiated.

Australia and Luxembourg have led on the humanitarian track during the last two years (joined by Jordan in 2014) but will rotate off the Council after 31 December. While Jordan will continue as one of the humanitarian penholders in 2016, at press time it was unclear which other Council member(s) would join it.

Of the incoming Council members, it seems Venezuela’s position may be closer to that of China and Russia on Syria. All three cast negative votes on the 18 November Third Committee resolution on human rights in Syria. During the same vote, incoming members Malaysia, New Zealand and Spain voted for the resolution, while Angola abstained.

France is the penholder on Syria overall. In practice, however, most texts need to be agreed between Russia and the US prior to agreement by the broader Council.

Council members Australia, France, Jordan, the UK and the US are part of the anti-ISIS coalition.

### Yemen

**Expected Council Action**
In December, Council members are expected to hold their 60-day briefing in consultations with Special Adviser Jamal Benomar. In addition, it is anticipated that Council members will also receive a briefing from the chair of the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Raimonda Murmokaitė (Lithuania).

No Council action is expected in December. The mandate of the Special Adviser on Yemen was renewed on 12 June 2013 without an expiration date. Current sanctions expire on 26 February 2015.

**Key Recent Developments**
On 7 October, President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi nominated Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak as prime minister. His nomination was rejected, however, by the Houthis, a Zaidi Shia group that seized control of Sana’a in September. As Houthi supporters in Sana’a...
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prepared to march in protest against the nomination on 9 October, they were attacked by a suicide bomber. At least 47 people were killed. Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) later claimed responsibility. The following day, Council members issued a press statement condemning the bombing as well as recent attacks against Yemeni security forces in Bayda and Hadramawt.

Council members held urgent consultations with Benomar on 13 October. He reiterated his previous warnings that the political transition was at risk of collapsing. That morning in Yemen, a positive breakthrough came when Hadi nominated Khalid Bahah, the Permanent Representative of Yemen to the UN, as prime minister, whom all Yemeni parties accepted. After the consultations, Ambassador María Cristina Perceval (Argentina), as Council president for that month, read agreed “elements to the press” urging implementation of the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA), welcomed Bahah’s nomination and agreed to urgently consider evidence in order to sanction peace spoilers.

The Houthis took over the strategic port city of Hudaydah on 15 October as they expanded their presence to the south and west of Sana’a. Egypt has warned that it might intervene militarily if the Houthis take control of the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, a major waterway between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean that ships must use to reach the Suez Canal. In central Yemen, primarily in Al Bayda governorate but also Ibb and Hudaydah governorates, since around mid-October, the Houthis have been engaged in heavy fighting with AQAP and tribes that have allied with AQAP, resulting in heavy casualties.

Reignited by the unrest in the north since the Houthis take-over of Sana’a, the Hirak Southern Movement renewed calls for independence and announced that the government had until 30 November to withdraw all employees and security forces from the south. On 14 October, tens of thousands demonstrated in Aden in support of secession and self-determination. Over the following weeks, pro-independence rallies continued.

Meanwhile, the Yemen sanctions committee on 15 October received case studies from the Panel of Experts on Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi and a top Houthis military commander, Abdullah Yahya al Hakim, about their activities that have threatened Yemen’s peace, security and stability. On 24 October, the Panel also submitted case studies on former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and his son, Ahmed Saleh, which described their support in facilitating the Houthis’ takeover of Sana’a and other military successes.

On 31 October, the US proposed that former president Saleh, al Hakim and Abd al-Khalil al-Huthi, another Houthi military commander, be designated for targeted sanctions. Committee members discussed the proposals at a 4 November meeting. On 7 November, the Committee approved sanctions on Saleh and the two Houthi commanders, which subject them to an assets freeze and travel ban. On 26 November, the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee met with representatives of Yemen and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to discuss the implementation of the sanctions.

The same day the Council announced the sanctions, an agreement was reached on the formation of a new, technocratic government in Yemen. The new government is a mix of independents and affiliates of the General People’s Congress (GPC), the opposition coalition known as the Joint Meeting Parties, the Hirak Southern Movement and the Houthis. On 8 November, the GPC and the Houthis issued statements denouncing sanctions imposed by the Council. The GPC, which was founded by Saleh, additionally voted to expel Hadi, who was its Secretary-General, from the party, and said it would withdraw from the government. However, GPC representatives later took part in the swearing-in ceremony for the government. Council members welcomed the formation of the new government in an 8 November press statement, in which it also recalled the recent sanctions designations.

The constitution-drafting committee resumed its work in mid-October and began working out of the United Arab Emirates on 23 October to finalise the first draft of the constitution.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 25 September, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on technical assistance and capacity-building for Yemen in the field of human rights (A/HRC/RES/27/19). Recalling the Security Council resolutions 2014, 2051 and 2140, the resolution notes concern over the recent escalation of armed violence and calls on the relevant parties to ensure humanitarian access to the affected population and to investigate all cases of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law. It calls on the government to release persons arbitrarily detained and demands that armed groups end the recruitment and use of children. It also stresses that the work of the Panel of Experts established by the Security Council is important in relation to the improvement in the human rights situation and plays an important role in the improvement in accountability for violations and abuses of human rights in Yemen.

Key Issues

A key issue is ensuring further implementation of the PNPA in order to salvage Yemen’s transition. Related to this is whether the Houthis, the GPC and others will cooperate with the new government.

Another issue is the fighting between the Houthis and AQAP and risk of sectarian violence.

Renewed calls from the south for independence is another important issue.

The government’s fiscal situation and the risk of an economic collapse is also an issue of concern.

For the briefing by Mursikaite as chair of the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee, a key issue is ensuring the implementation of the sanctions.

Options

One option for the Council is to closely monitor the situation but take no action.

It could also adopt a resolution or presidential statement that:

- reaffirms the need for stakeholders to abide by their commitments to the PNPA, National Dialogue Conference outcomes and the GCC Initiative and Implementation Mechanism;
- recalls that those obstructing the full implementation of these political agreements will be designated for targeted sanctions; and
- expresses full support for Hadi, Bahah, the new government and Yemen’s territorial integrity.

Council and Wider Dynamics

The Council has limited leverage in dealing with Yemen, with sanctions as its main tool, in addition to supporting Benomar’s good offices. For the recent designations, Saleh was an easier candidate for members to agree on due to his behind-the-scenes role in facilitating the Houthis’ military successes. On designating members of the Houthis, the decision was more complicated because the group is now a
Yemen (con’t)

major political player and in de facto control of much of the country, so the international community must be able to interact with them. Despite this concern, there was a strong view that there needed to be consequences for the Houthis’ actions. Therefore, the two military commanders were designated, but the political leader, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, was not listed in order to encourage the group’s cooperation. Similarly, it seems one reason for not designating Saleh’s son at this stage is to try to encourage that faction’s cooperation.

At the Sanctions Committee’s 4 November meeting, Russia was the most vocal member in expressing scepticism about the designations, in particular of the Houthis, but it ultimately agreed.

Events in the country prompted the Council to agree on sanctions. Previously, it debated whether the threat of sanctions by itself could be a sufficient deterrent of spoiler activities. In addition, the position of Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries on sanctions—having recently shifted from opposing sanctions to supporting them—was also an important factor. GCC countries are crucial for the effective implementation of the sanctions since these countries are where most of financial assets to be frozen are kept. The UK is the penholder on Yemen.

Sudan (Darfur)

Expected Council Action

In December, the Council will receive a briefing by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous, on the quarterly report on the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda is also expected to provide the semi-annual briefing on the Court’s work in Darfur. At press time, no Council outcome regarding Darfur was anticipated in December.

UNAMID’s mandate expires on 30 June 2015.

Key Recent Developments

In early April, Foreign Policy published a series of articles claiming that UNAMID had distorted its reporting to cover up crimes against civilians and peacekeepers. The fourth and final piece in the series was a 9 April article in which Aicha El Basri, a UNAMID spokesperson from August 2012 to April 2013, wrote that “UNAMID lied to the media and failed to protect...civilians in the region”.

El Basri’s claims resonated with the ICC Prosecutor. In a 10 June written report, which served as the basis for her 17 June semi-annual briefing to the Council on the ICC’s work in Darfur, Bensouda argued that allegations of distorted reporting by UNAMID were supported by documents made public by El Basri. During the briefing, Bensouda called for a thorough, independent and public inquiry into allegations that UNAMID reporting had been manipulated “with the intentional effect of covering up crimes committed against civilians and peacekeepers”.

On 2 July, UN Spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric announced that the Secretary-General had “instructed the Secretariat to review the reports of all [UNAMID] investigations and inquiries undertaken since mid-2012 to ensure that their recommendations have been implemented and that any relevant issues have been fully addressed”. The Security Council welcomed this review, which was led by a former high-level UN official, in resolution 2173 on 27 August.

The Secretary-General submitted a letter to the Council on 29 October that summarised the findings of the investigation’s review team. An executive summary of the review team’s report was attached to the letter, although Council members have yet to be given access to the entire report. According to the letter, UNAMID “did not provide United Nations Headquarters with full reports” on the circumstances of five of 16 incidents investigated. The Secretary-General stated in the letter that the mission tended “not to report anything if not absolutely certain of the facts, even when there was enough evidence to make an informed judgement about the circumstances surrounding an incident”. He added that government or pro-government forces were guilty of crimes in the five cases investigated.

On 30 October, Sudan’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Rahamtalla Mohamed Osman Elnor, claimed in a letter to the Secretary-General that UNAMID had benefited from strong cooperation with Sudan. Elnor stated that in light of Ban’s letter, Sudan would have to revisit its cooperation with the mission.

On 24 November, the Council received the quarterly briefing, followed by consultations, from the chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Maria Cristina Perceval (Argentina), on the Committee’s work in Darfur. Perceval said that she was briefing in an open session to promote the transparency of the work of the Sanctions Committee. She gave an overview of the 13 November Committee meeting, which was attended by Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Libya, Sudan and South Sudan, in addition to Council members. Perceval noted that the representative of Sudan referred to the establishment of border monitoring mechanisms with Chad and Libya to stem the flow of illicit weapons into Darfur. However, she added that one Council member affirmed that the real issue is that there are weapons flowing between the government of Sudan and Darfur. (The most recent final report of the Panel of, released in February, found that Sudan was responsible for violations of the arms embargo.)

The security situation in Darfur remains unstable. The Sudanese Central Reserve Police set fire to 26 homes and 12 businesses at the Zam Zam camp for displaced persons...
in North Darfur on 22 October, one day after camp inhabitants hanged a member of the police who allegedly had extorted traders there. On 29 October, three UNAMID peacekeepers were wounded when they were attacked by unidentified assailants near Kutum, North Darfur. On 7 November, previously unexploded ordnance blew up at a house in Twisha locality, North Darfur; five people were killed and four others were wounded.

On 4 November, media reports indicated that a mass rape of approximately 200 women and girls had occurred in the North Darfur village of Tabit, purportedly by members of the Sudan armed forces. For several days, efforts by UNAMID to investigate the allegations were rebuffed by the Sudanese military. Finally, on 9 November, a UNAMID verification team was permitted to enter the village, where they interviewed several residents.

In a 10 November press release, UNAMID said that “none of those interviewed confirmed that any incident of rape took place in Tabit on the day of that media report”. The press release further stated, “Village community leaders reiterated that they coexist peacefully with local military authorities in the area”. The release also noted that UNAMID intends to undertake “further follow-up actions on the matter, including possible further investigations and patrols; in coordination with relevant host authorities and in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement between the Government of Sudan and UNAMID”.

On 10 November, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet and Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict Zainab Bangura (who participated via video-teleconference from Geneva) briefed Council members in consultations under “any other business” on the alleged rapes in Tabit and on UNAMID’s efforts to investigate the allegations. Mulet confirmed that access had been denied to Tabit from 4 to 9 November. Bangura expressed concern that there was a heavy military presence in Tabit when the UNAMID investigators were permitted entry there. She added that it was crucial that UNAMID have unfettered access to for additional investigations into the rape allegations and to deliver humanitarian and medical assistance. A subsequent UNAMID effort to follow up the 9 November visit to the village was rebuffed by Sudanese officials. In a 16 November letter to the Council, Sudan rejected the allegations of mass rape and stated that it will “not allow UNAMID to visit the village again.”

The Secretariat and the Council both called for additional access to Tabit. On 17 November, the Spokesman of the Secretary-General released a statement confirming that the “heavy presence of military and police in Tabit made a conclusive investigation difficult,” calling for a full UNAMID investigation and urging the Sudanese authorities to provide UNAMID with unhindered access. This was followed by a Council press statement on 19 November calling on Sudan to provide proper access to Tabit and its people to enable UNAMID to “verify whether these incidents have occurred”.

On 21 November, Abdallah al-Azraq, a representative of Sudan’s foreign ministry, said in a press briefing that UNAMID should be asked to leave Sudan. On the following day, UNAMID spokesman Ashar Eissa confirmed that Sudan had transmitted a note verbal to the mission indicating that the mission needed “an exit strategy.”

Negotiations between the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudan Liberation Movement–Minni Minnawi, two Darfur rebel groups, and Sudan were convened in Addis Ababa on 24 November.

Human Rights-Related Developments
A five-day human rights workshop organised by the Sudan National Human Rights Commission, in collaboration with UNDP and UNAMID, which began on 1 November in Khartoum, brought together participants from the National Commission, civil society and women’s groups. International human rights mechanisms, functions and processes as well as the roles of national institutions were discussed. Participants identified a number of recommendations, including the formation of a joint working group from both the National Commission and civil society organisations, the appointment of a commissioner to follow up the issue of classification within the international coordination committee; and collaboration between the National Commission, civil society groups and the Human Rights Council.

Key Issues
The underlying key issue is the ongoing security and humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur, which is marked by widespread violence, impunity and displacement.

Restrictions by the government of Sudan on humanitarian access represent a recurring issue, highlighted by the recent access impediments on UNAMID personnel attempting to investigate the alleged mass rape in Tabit.

Also a key issue is the recent investigation of allegations that UNAMID reporting was manipulated, as it points to likely involvement in attacks against civilians by government and pro-government forces.

A related issue is the ongoing impunity for those who continue to attack civilians in Darfur.

Options
One option for the Council would be to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate the allegations of mass rape in Tabit and other human rights crimes purportedly committed by government and pro-government forces in UNAMID’s area of operation in recent years.

Another option is for the Council to adopt a presidential statement that:

- requests that the full report of the review team be made public;
- condemns the government of Sudan for its continued efforts to curtail the movements and access of UNAMID peacekeepers; and
- demands an end to impunity for those who attack civilians and peacekeepers in Darfur.

Council Dynamics
During the 10 November consultations, several Council members, following Mulet and Bangura’s briefings, expressed their concern about the restrictions placed on UNAMID personnel attempting to investigate the alleged rapes in Tabit and the heavy military presence there on 9 November when UNAMID’s verification team was finally allowed into Tabit. There is a sense among a number of Council members that further investigation is needed to determine precisely what happened in Tabit.

Another Darfur-related issue on the minds of Council members is the investigation into allegations that UNAMID reporting was manipulated. Some members are disappointed that they have not been given access to the review team’s full report. These members also believe that those responsible for “the tendency not to report fully on incidents involving attacks on civilians and United Nations peacekeepers” should be held accountable for their approach to reporting.

The UK is the penholder on Darfur.
**Expected Council Action**

In December, Council members will hold their quarterly meeting on implementation of resolution 2046 on Sudan-South Sudan relations, as outlined in a 21 August presidential note. Council members are also expected to discuss the report of the Secretary-General on the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), which expires on 28 February 2015. At press time, no outcome was anticipated on these matters during the month.

**Key Recent Developments**

Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP) held its party convention from 23 to 25 October. During the convention, the NCP confirmed that Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir would be the party’s presidential candidate in the upcoming national elections, scheduled for April 2015. Bashir, who has been in power since 1989, had previously said he would not run in the upcoming election.

Addressing the graduating class at Sudan’s military academy in Khartoum on 29 October, Bashir boasted of recent victories by the Sudanese Armed Forces in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile and told the audience that the army should prepare for a decisive military campaign against anti-government forces. Bashir also added that he would work to enhance the capacity of the military.

Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North rebel group commenced a new round of negotiations in Addis Ababa on 12 November, mediated by Thabo Mbeki, chair of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel. In his opening remarks, SPLM-N head negotiator Yasir Arman said that there should be “a credible national constitutional conference” in Sudan with elections taking place under the auspices of a national transitional government. He also underscored the need for humanitarian access in conflict areas of Sudan, saying that “denying it is a war crime in international humanitarian law”. Ibrahim Ghandour, who is leading the Sudanese delegation, said that the government was committed to resolving its conflicts through dialogue and negotiation, touting the country’s “national dialogue process” as a means to “reach consensus on… solutions for [Sudan’s]…major problems”. The talks adjourned on 17 November, with Mbeki declaring that each side needed “to consult and reflect” on the negotiations before reconvening.

On 2 November, according to South Sudan, an Antonov aircraft from Sudan bombed a village just across the border in Raja County, Western Bahr el Ghazal state in South Sudan. Thirty-five people were reportedly killed in the attack, and 17 were wounded.

President Salva Kiir of South Sudan arrived in Khartoum on 4 November, to meet with Bashir. The two leaders decided to create a joint committee to lobby for the removal of Sudan’s foreign debt. (According to the 27 September 2012 agreement on “certain economic matters”, South Sudan agreed to help Sudan seek external debt relief in return for Sudan’s retaining the external debt liabilities of Sudan at the time the south became independent.) Kiir and Bashir also discussed the importance of restarting oil production in areas of Unity State affected by the South Sudan civil war, as oil from South Sudan is pumped by pipeline into Sudan. The Raja bombing was also on the summit’s programme, although the substance of the two leaders’ discussions on this matter is unclear.

On 8 November, South Sudan received 700 metric tons of food through a humanitarian corridor from Sudan. This represented the first shipment to reach South Sudan as part of a deal agreed between the two countries in July allowing humanitarian aid to be shipped from Sudan. Ali Zataari, the UN Resident Coordinator in Sudan, said that this shipment would feed 45,000 people for one month. The delivery is part of a humanitarian initiative orchestrated by the World Food Programme with the goal of feeding approximately 744,000 people in South Sudan.

Abyei remains one of the most intractable issues in Sudan-South Sudan relations. Both countries still cannot agree on the criteria for voter participation in a referendum to determine whether Abyei joins Sudan or South Sudan. Sudan continues to maintain a security presence in this disputed area, and South Sudanese troops sporadically infiltrate Abyei in contravention of the 20 June 2011 agreement and resolutions 1990 and 2046, prompting concerns that Abyei could become a powder-keg for a potential Sudan-South Sudan war. Additionally, temporary administrative and security units—including the Abyei Area Executive Council, the Abyei Area Administration and the Abyei Police Service—envisioned by the 2011 agreement to provide stability to the region until its final status could be determined have never been established.

On 30 October, in recognition of the first anniversary of the Ngok-Dinka community’s unilateral referendum, approximately 6,000 members of the group held a peaceful demonstration in Abyei town. (While the Ngok-Dinka voted overwhelmingly for Abyei to become part of South Sudan in their 2013 referendum, the vote was not officially recognised by Sudan and South Sudan.) The Council last met to discuss UNISFA and the situation in Abyei in consultations on 7 October. During the meeting, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet told Council members that unilateral actions by the parties had not been helpful. Mulet was referring to the Ngok-Dinka’s decision to establish a committee to lobby for international support for their unilateral community referendum. Additionally, he mentioned the instability that could be caused by Sudan’s intention to include Abyei among the areas that will participate in the country’s 2015 national elections.

**Key Issues**

A key issue is how much progress can be made in the negotiations between Sudan and the SPLM-N given the gap in the countries’ negotiating positions, with the SPLM-N calling for “a credible national constitutional conference”, a step that Sudan does not appear ready to take.

A related key issue for the Council is Sudan’s ongoing commitment to military solutions in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur, as reflected by Bashir’s 29 October address at Sudan’s military academy in Khartoum.

Another key issue is whether the Council can exert any leverage on Sudan and South Sudan to convince them to establish temporary administrative and security institutions in Abyei, pending an agreement on the final status of the disputed region.

Also an important issue is ensuring that stability is maintained in Abyei during the upcoming Misseriya migration through the
region. (Analysts have long feared that clashes between the Ngok-Dinka, who reside in Abyei year round, and the migratory Misseriya could lead to a wider conflict between Sudan and South Sudan).

**Options**

One option for the Council is to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate allegations that war crimes have been committed in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

Council members could also decide to hold an Arria formula meeting on South Kordofan and Blue Nile, with civil society experts and/or witnesses as briefers, open to all interested UN member states. Such a format would enable member states to learn about recent developments in the two areas from civil society groups and other experts and raise awareness about the ongoing political and humanitarian crisis there.

An option on Abyei is for the Council to request a briefing from the AU commission, the UN Secretariat, UNISFA and Ethiopia on recent meetings they have reportedly held with Sudanese officials in Khartoum and South Sudanese officials in Juba on strategies to stabilise the Abyei area.

**Council Dynamics**

There is a fundamental divide in the Council with regard to the conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, which is now more than three years old and counting. Some members, led by the US in particular, have been highly critical of the brutal way Sudan has prosecuted the war in these two areas, given the reports of attacks on civilians. Opposing this perspective are China and Russia, which view the conflict through the prism of Sudan, as a sovereign state, aggressively fighting rebels on its territory.

With regard to Abyei, there is widespread frustration in the Council at the inability of the parties to make any progress in establishing temporary administrative and security institutions and in addressing the area’s final status. There are likewise ongoing concerns that what was intended to be an interim mission has now been deployed for well over three years and is becoming a frozen conflict, with Abyei remaining a tense area that could potentially fall back into open conflict and with the parties unable to address the challenges dividing them there.

The US is the penholder on UNISFA and other Sudan/South Sudan issues.

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**Expected Council Action**

The Council is expected to adopt a resolution renewing the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which is due to expire on 31 December, as well as a resolution regarding sanctions measures, which are due to expire on 10 December. Prior to the sanctions adoption, Council members will hold consultations on the final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee.

**Key Recent Developments**

The Ebola crisis has continued to be a key international concern with respect to Liberia. On 12 November, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous and Ambassador Per Thöresson (Sweden), representative of the chair of the Liberia PBC configuration, briefed the Council. Ambassador Marjon Kamara (Liberia) also participated. The briefing was held in response to the Council’s request in resolution 2176, adopted on 15 September, for an update on the situation in Liberia by 15 November. As resolution 2176 was a rollover resolution renewing UNMIL’s authorisation for an interim period of three months, the purpose of the briefing was to provide analysis to the Council prior to another resolution renewing (and potentially modifying) UNMIL’s mandate. Ladsous recommended extending UNMIL’s mandate until September 2015, adding certain political components (i.e. electoral assistance and good offices) as previously suggested by the Secretary-General in his report of 15 August, but deferring consideration of troop and police drawdowns (also originally recommended in the August report) until the Ebola crisis subsides. Kamara, too, suggested UNMIL’s mandate should be extended but differed with Ladsous regarding any reconfiguration. Thöresson discussed a 3 November meeting held by the PBC country configurations for Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, particularly regarding the economic impact of the Ebola crisis and its implications for peacebuilding. The briefing was followed by consultations.

There have been some signs of progress regarding the political and security situation. Following an investigation by the Independent National Commission on Human Rights of the 20 August shooting death of a 15-year-old boy, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf on 10 November ordered that five government soldiers be punished for having fired shots into a crowd protesting the Ebola-related quarantine of the West Point neighbourhood of Monrovia. In terms of accountability, this represents a change in course for the government, as the military had previously conducted an internal inquiry and cleared itself entirely of responsibility for the incident. On 13 November, Sirleaf announced an end to the national state of emergency imposed in August in response to the Ebola outbreak. The measures had included a curfew, the closing of schools, restrictions on freedom of movement and the quarantine of certain communities. On 18 November, the two houses of the legislature agreed on 16 December as the date for holding the Senate elections originally scheduled for 14 October. Soon after that, the National Electoral Commission announced that the campaign period would officially begin on 20 November.

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**Useful Additional Resources**

According to a 19 November report by the World Health Organization (WHO), there have been 7,069 cases of Ebola in Liberia and 2,964 deaths due to the disease, while the global total has increased to 15,145 cases and 5,420 deaths. The vast majority of those infected with Ebola have been in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, which collectively account for all but 32 cases and 14 deaths thus far (these occurred in Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Spain and the US). On 29 October, WHO announced that the rate of Ebola transmission appeared to be declining in Liberia. This conclusion was supported by decreased demand for clinic beds, lower numbers of confirmed new cases and fewer Ebola-related burials. Media reports from Monrovia and other locations have provided additional anecdotal evidence that the intensity of the outbreak may be subsiding, but health professionals have also warned of a risk of resurgence in transmission rates if containment procedures are not systematically implemented. At the initiative of the US, the Council held a debate on Ebola on 21 November, where a presidential statement was adopted.

Ebola has had a devastating economic impact on Liberia, with significant implications for the humanitarian situation in the short term, peacebuilding in the medium term and development in the long term. According to a recent assessment by the UNDP, the Ebola outbreak has reduced fiscal revenue, increased expenditure and increased the fiscal deficit, which constrains the government’s ability to provide health and social services. UNDP has also found that the prices for basic food items have greatly increased, partly due to lower domestic production and partly due to higher import costs, which both threaten to exacerbate food insecurity in Liberia. The World Bank estimated that the Ebola outbreak could cause a loss of $300 million in gross domestic product (GDP) for Liberia through the end of 2015 and a loss of as much as $32.6 billion in GDP to the West Africa region under a low containment scenario. On 15 November, the G20 issued a statement welcoming the IMF’s initiative to stem the Ebola outbreak by making a further $300 million available to Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone through debt relief, loans and grants.

Key Issues
The primary issue facing the Council in December is determining the parameters for the expected renewal of UNMIL’s mandate. Associated elements include the duration of the renewal, the force structure and schedule for a potential drawdown, any specific modifications that may be required in response to the Ebola outbreak and whether or not certain political components should be added (i.e. good offices and electoral assistance).

Another issue concerns aspects of the Liberia sanctions regime that are due to expire on 10 December: the mandate of the Group of Experts, the arms embargo on non-state actors and the travel ban. Likewise, the asset freeze, which is not time-limited, could also be subject to modification or termination by the Council.

Options
Perhaps the most likely option for the Council is for it to follow the recommendations regarding UNMIL made by Ladsous in the 12 November briefing: renew UNMIL’s mandate until September 2015, incorporate electoral assistance and a good offices role for the Special Representative as initially proposed by the Secretary-General on 15 August and defer drawdown of troops and police until the Ebola crisis is over. Alternatively, the Council could choose to defer adding new political components to UNMIL as suggested by the representative of Liberia.

Regarding sanctions, the most likely option for the Council is for it to follow the recommendations made in a 29 September letter from the Secretary-General: defer modifications of the sanctions regime for a period of six months or until the situation in the country stabilizes and the government is better able to implement relevant capacity-building measures. In practice, this would mean retaining the asset freeze and renewing the arms embargo on non-state actors, the travel ban and the Group of Experts’ mandate.

Council and Wider Dynamics
The Ebola outbreak has had a considerable impact on the Council’s approach to Liberia. The policymaking momentum seems to have shifted from a scheduled drawdown of UNMIL and a probable phasing out of sanctions toward maintaining the force levels of UNMIL and retaining sanctions measures until the health crisis has subsided. The US has dedicated substantial financial and human resources to combating the Ebola outbreak in Liberia, which would strongly suggest an equivalent degree of commitment in its ongoing capacity as penholder.

One nascent split, which is perhaps better understood as a new manifestation of old divisions between DPKO and the government, regards whether or not UNMIL incorporates political functions such as electoral assistance and a good offices role (the former supports these measures, but the latter opposes them). Hypothetically, there could also be differences between the government and UNMIL should the peacekeeping operation be compelled to intervene in order to protect civilians (although this now seems less likely than it did a few months ago as the Liberian security force’s initially heavy-handed response to the Ebola outbreak has been tempered). Lastly, troop- and police-contributing countries have maintained their deployments in Liberia with the one exception of the Philippines, but this could be a future area of tension if there are further Ebola cases in UNMIL.

The US is the penholder on Liberia, and Jordan is the chair of the 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee.

Subsidiary Bodies

Expected Council Action
In December, the subsidiary body chairpersons from countries that will be finishing their two-year term on the Council are expected to brief about their work and experience chairing the different sanctions committees and working groups.

Ambassador Maria Cristina Perceval (Argentina) will brief on the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee and the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions.
Ambassador Gary Quinlan (Australia) will brief on the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee and the 1988 Taliban Sanctions Committee.

Ambassador Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg) will brief on the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee and the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict.

Ambassador Oh Joon (Republic of Korea) will brief on the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanctions Committee and the 1540 Committee concerning non-proliferation.

Ambassador Eugène-Richard Gasana (Rwanda) will brief on the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee and the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations.

**Background**

In an annual practice dating back to 2002, the subsidiary body chairpersons from outgoing Council members have, in their personal capacity, briefed the Council. The briefing seems to serve three principal functions. First, it has provided an opportunity for subsidiary body chairpersons to convey to fellow Council members a summary of developments within their committee or working group. Second, some chairpersons have also critically analysed the work of the subsidiary body, acknowledging successes and failures while identifying areas for improvement. Third, building on this analysis, chairpersons have occasionally also provided specific recommendations for reforms, which could either concern UN institutional aspects or the subsidiary body’s sanctions regime or thematic area.

**Council Dynamics**

One issue that could come up in the briefing is the process for appointing subsidiary body chairpersons (for background, see SCR’s December 2013 “In Hindsight”). Some Council members have advocated for a more inclusive, transparent and efficient process for the annual appointment of chairpersons. On 17 December 2012, the Council addressed this issue through a note by the president. The note said that members of the Council “support an informal process with the participation of all Council members as regards appointing the Chairpersons of the subsidiary organs from among Council members in a balanced, transparent, efficient and inclusive way, which facilitates an exchange of information related to the work of the subsidiary organs involved”. It further said that Council members “should also consult informally with newly elected members soon after their election on the appointment of the Chairpersons of the subsidiary organs for the following year”. These themes were further developed in another note by the president, issued on 5 June, which also specifically encouraged the early appointment of chairs in order to improve the transition process for incoming Council members and suggested steps to be taken during the transition. Outgoing chairs may want to share their views on these processes.

The briefers may also highlight the fact that earlier in the year, the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions agreed on a note by the president on the overall issue of penholders and comment on how this may impact the roles of future chairs of sanctions committees. The 14 April note proclaimed that members of the Council agreed to support “where appropriate, the informal arrangement whereby one or more Council members (as “penholder(s)”) initiate and chair the informal drafting process” of documents, including resolutions, presidential statements and press statements of the Council. The note specified that any member of the Council can be a penholder. Perceval, as the outgoing chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions, could choose to discuss, among others, the issues covered in the two recent notes.

The relationship between penholders, which have most often been P3 members, and subsidiary body chairs, which are usually elected members, is another topic that could be discussed. There are a number of problems that can arise from this organisational arrangement, including inadequate consultation of sanctions committee chairs by penholders when drafting sanctions resolutions. As each of the outgoing Council ambassadors have chaired a sanctions committee while a P3 member was the penholder, the Council dynamics regarding this recurring institutional arrangement could be a subject for any of the five briefers.

Since Australia has been in the singular position among the outgoing members of being the penholder on Afghanistan while also chairing the 1988 Taliban Sanctions Committee, the briefing by Quinlan could be particularly instructive on this issue. Similarly, other ambassadors from countries that have simultaneously been penholders and working group chairs on thematic issues—i.e. Luxembourg on children and armed conflict and the Republic of Korea on non-proliferation—may also have unique insights to share.

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**Central African Republic**

**Expected Council Action**

In December, the Council will be briefed, most likely by the Special Representative Babacar Gaye, on the Secretary-General’s MINUSCA report due on 1 December.

Ambassador Raimonda Murmokaitė (Lithuania) will brief the Council on the final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 2127 Central African Republic (CAR) Sanctions Committee.

The final report of the Commission of Inquiry mandated by the Council in resolution 2127 to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and abuses of human rights in the CAR is due by 5 December.

The sanctions imposed on the CAR and the mandates of the CAR Panel of Experts expire...
Central African Republic (con’t)

in January 2015.

The mandate of UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) expires on 30 April 2015.

Key Recent Developments

In accordance with resolution 2149, the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) transferred its authority to MINUSCA on 15 September. The mission is composed mostly of MISCA troops, with some additional contingents from other regions.

On the same day, Council members issued a press statement (SC/11562) welcoming the transition of authority to MINUSCA. They stressed the importance for MINUSCA to accelerate the deployments of its civilian, police and military capabilities, including the necessary logistical support and command and control structure, so it can reach its full operational capacity as soon as possible.

Despite MINUSCA’s deployment and the signing of a ceasefire involving the predominantly Muslim Séléka rebel group and the Christian anti-Balaka on 23 July in Bangui, the security and humanitarian situations in CAR remain dire. Some improvement has been noticed in Bangui, but violent incidents and unrest continues throughout the country. According to the recent Panel of Experts report, some 2,000 former Séléka fighters and some 1,500 anti-Balaka continue to pose an acute security threat in a country that remains de facto partitioned. The armed groups rarely engage one another directly but consistently target civilians and their commitment to the ceasefire is highly questionable.

There was a surge of violent attacks reported in October. On 7 October, a grenade attack in Bangui killed four people, and the attacker, presumably from the Séléka, was killed by a mob. Nine civilians were killed in the unrest that followed.

On 9 October, MINUSCA suffered its first casualty when a Pakistani peacekeeper was killed and others injured in an attack on a MINUSCA convoy in Bangui. Council members issued a press statement the following day, condemning the attack and expressing concern about the recent upsurge in violence.

However, the violence continued. On 11 October, MINUSCA successfully repulsed an attack by about 100 armed anti-Balaka fighters near the residence of the transitional president, Catherine Samba-Panza. On 14 and 15 October, six people were killed, hundreds were forced to flee their homes and four peacekeepers were injured when more violence was initiated by the anti-Balaka in Bangui. The latest wave of violence has displaced some 6,500 people, according to the UN Refugee Agency.

Humanitarian assistance has been hampered by the situation as well. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) issued a statement on 11 November, that attacks and extortion of humanitarian aid workers in the CAR are threatening the provision of essential medical services. The statement relates two incidents that occurred on 7 and 8 November, when MSF trucks carrying medical supplies were stopped by an armed group on the road between Bangui and Pauoua in the north, and demands for payments were made for the vehicle and the crew’s freedom. No casualties were reported in these incidents. According to MSF, this type of event may force it to reduce its operations in the CAR.

On 21 October, the Council adopted resolution 2181, extending the mandate of the EU operation in the CAR until 15 March 2015. The next day, Council members received an update under “any other business” on recent events in the CAR from Gaye via video-teleconference.

The International Contact Group on the Central African Republic met in Bangui on 11 November. It concluded that the security situation remains precarious, as does the humanitarian situation, in particular with respect to vulnerable populations. The Contact Group called for accountability for crimes committed in the CAR, for the implementation of the Brazzaville ceasefire and for moving forward with political transition. It called on the transitional government to organise an inclusive forum in Bangui by January 2015 as a follow-up to the July meeting in Brazzaville, to discuss further issues such as governance, reforms, security, reconciliation, and accountability. The Contact Group is to convene again in February 2015.

On accountability, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced on 24 September a second investigation with respect to crimes allegedly committed in CAR since 2012. (A preliminary investigation was launched in February. On 30 May, the CAR transitional government requested that the ICC investigate alleged crimes falling within its jurisdiction committed in the country since 1 August 2012.)

In August, the government and MINUSCA agreed on the formation of a special court, composed of local judges and foreign legal experts assisting the court. According to media reports, the National Transitional Council is expected to adopt a law to give effect to the agreement by the end of the year.

In sanctions-related developments, the Panel of Experts presented its final report to the Sanctions Committee on 7 November. The report concludes that despite the signing of the ceasefire in Brazzaville, armed groups remain in control of, or still exert influence over, almost all inhabited areas. It also highlights the illicit trade, smuggling and the levying of taxes by armed groups on natural resources, such as diamonds and gold as a means of financing of violent operations by the anti-Balaka and the Séléka. The Panel also put forward a list of individuals, mainly related to these activities, to be sanctioned by the Committee.

During the meeting, the Committee discussed the recommendations in the report. One recommendation that it endorsed was to request the CAR transitional authorities to certify to the Committee that security personnel identified as being active members of armed groups had been removed from their positions. The Committee could not agree on a recommendation to request neighbouring states to supply the Committee (on a confidential basis) with complete statistics on the import and export of natural resources, including diamonds and gold, as two permanent members were against the requirement
to provide such information. In this context, the Committee was able to agree on releasing a press statement on 14 November, drawing attention to a recommendation by the Panel of Experts urging exporters, importers, processors and consumers of gold in the CAR to mitigate the risk of further exacerbating the conflict by following due diligence guidance as implemented through the Regional Certification Mechanism of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.

No decision was taken during the meeting on a recommendation for the Council to request MINUSCA to prioritize the deployment of troops and intensify patrols in the border regions with Chad, the Sudan and South Sudan because Committee members are aware that MINUSCA is currently short on manpower where it is already deployed.

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 26 September, the Security Council adopted a resolution on the CAR which condemned continued and widespread violations and abuses of human rights perpetrated by all actors and demanded an immediate halt to them (A/HRC/RES/27/28). The resolution also took note of the decision of the CAR authorities to request that the ICC prosecutor open an investigation into serious and systematic human rights violations (the investigation was officially opened on 24 September), renewed for one year the mandate of the independent expert on human rights in the CAR and requested an oral update at its 28th session.

In a press statement from Geneva on 17 October, the independent expert, Marie-Thérèse Keita Bocoum, expressed outrage at the violence in Bangui since 8 October and condemned the attacks against peacekeepers, UN personnel and the civilian population. She urged the government, in collaboration with MINUSCA, to identify those responsible and bring them to justice.

Key Issues
A key issue is monitoring the situation closely, in particular MINUSCA’s operations and whether and how they may need adjusting, in light of the dire security situation in Bangui and the lack of a significant presence outside of Bangui, in particular in the eastern regions where such presence is needed.

Other issues are the establishment of state institutions by the new government, ensuring the success of the transitional political process leading to elections, the observance of the ceasefire, possible reconciliation and ensuring accountability for human rights and international humanitarian law violations.

Options
One option for the Council would be issuing a statement:
- condemning sectarian violence;
- supporting the transitional political process and reconciliation including the upcoming Bangui Forum;
- supporting the holding of successful elections by August 2015 (postponed from February 2015 due to the situation on the ground), which would mark the end of the transitional period;
- calling for accountability for human rights and international humanitarian law violations;
- encouraging member states to contribute resources and troops to MINUSCA; and
- encouraging MINUSCA to accelerate the adoption of urgent temporary measures to maintain basic law and order and fight impunity (as authorised in resolution 2149).

Further options for the Council include:
- undertaking a Council visiting mission to the CAR (such a visit, the first ever by the Council to CAR, has been raised as a possibility in early 2015);
- endorsing any recommendations the Commission of Inquiry may have for the Council;
- endorsing the recommendations of the Panel of Experts and listing further individuals for violations of the criteria set out under resolution 2134, either through the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee or directly by the Council; or
- taking no action at this time.

Council and Wider Dynamics
With the commencement of MINUSCA’s operations, Council members are now looking to monitor its performance in stabilising the security environment and, on the civilian side, the re-establishment of state authority. On top of the security and humanitarian concerns, some Council members are alarmed at the slow progress and lack of attention given to the establishment of civilian capacities and state authority in the country, and will have questions for Gaye on MINUSCA’s advancements in this aspect, in particular on taking executive measures to reinstall law and order. Several Council members are in favour of a Council statement in support of the transitional process and calling for more measures to be taken towards reconciliation and establishing the CAR’s civilian institutions.

At this time, there does not seem to be a consensus on taking further action beyond a possible statement, such as additional sanctions listings, to try to change this dynamic. Some Council members are supportive of endorsing the Panel of Experts’ recommendations on additional sanctions listings, especially in light of the stagnated reconciliation process. However other members are still of the opinion that additional sanctions at this time might negatively affect possible reconciliation.

France is the penholder on the CAR.

International Criminal Tribunals

Expected Council Action
In December, the Security Council will hold its semi-annual debate on the ad-hoc international criminal tribunals. The Presidents and Prosecutors of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are expected to brief the Council. ICTY President Theodor Meron will also brief the Council as President of the Residual Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals as well as ICTR Prosecutor Hassan Bubacar Jallow as the Residual Mechanism’s Prosecutor. Established in 2010 by resolution 1966, the Residual Mechanism is mandated to complete the work of the Tribunals by assuming responsibility for essential functions. Operations at its Arusha branch commenced on 1 July 2012, assuming functions inherited from the ICTR and at its Hague branch on 1 July 2013, assuming functions from the ICTY. The Mechanism was tasked to operate for an initial period of four years, and subsequently for periods of two years, following reviews of its
progress, unless the Council decides otherwise. Resolutions are expected to be adopted on the extension of judges' and prosecutors' terms for both the ICTR and the ICTY.

The Council's Informal Working Group on International Tribunals may meet with the Presidents and Prosecutors prior to their appearance at the Council.

Key Recent Developments
The ICTY trial chamber on 23 October granted the prosecution's request in the case of Ratko Mladić to reopen its case to present recently discovered evidence regarding the Tomislavka mass grave in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mladić, the former commander of the Bosnian Serb Army, stands accused of genocide and a multitude of other crimes committed against Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb civilians in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995. The chamber conceded that the re-opening will prolong the trial but said the delay will not be excessive.

According to its completion strategy report, the Tribunal has concluded proceedings against 141 of the 161 persons indicted, with no outstanding indictments for violations of core statutory crimes. By the end of 2015, based on current forecasts, only one trial and one appeal, in the Mladić and Prlić et al. cases, will still be ongoing, concluding in 2017. The report also details measures taken to expedite the completion of the Tribunal's work and its downsizing.

Council members received a letter from Judge Meron on 31 October requesting extensions of the terms of six permanent judges until 31 December 2015, eight permanent judges until 31 July 2017 and three ad litem judges until 31 December 2015. The extensions beyond the target date for completion of 31 December 2014, set out in resolution 1966, are based on projections for the completion of the Tribunal's remaining four trials involving four persons and five appeals involving 16 persons. In a letter to the Council on 31 October, the Secretary-General nominated Serge Brammertz for reappointment as Prosecutor of the ICTY until 31 July 2017.

As for the ICTR, the appeals chamber delivered judgements in three cases on 29 September, affirming sentences of life imprisonment for Édouard Karembe and Matthieu Ngorumpatse (tried jointly), convicted of direct and public incitement to commit genocide, extermination, rape and murder, and for Calixte Nizabonimanana for instigating genocide and extermination. It reduced the sentence of Ildéphonse Nizeyimana from life imprisonment to 35 years imprisonment for genocide and murder, after deciding the trial chamber had erred in finding his involvement in certain attacks.

According to its completion strategy report, the Tribunal has completed cases at the trial level for all 93 accused indicted and only one case remains, concerning the appeal of six individuals, Nyiramashuhuko et al. (“Butare”), projected for completion not before August 2015. The report also details the transition of functions to the Residual Mechanism and states plans for closure are close to completion with most judicial and prosecutorial functions already handed over.

Council members received a letter from ICTR President Vagn Joensen on 31 October requesting extensions of the terms of five permanent judges until 31 December 2015, two permanent judges until 31 July 2015 and one ad litem judge until 31 December 2015. The extensions beyond the target date for completion of 31 December 2014, set out in resolution 1966, are based on projections for the completion of the Butare case and the involvement of certain ICTR judges in cases before the ICTY. In a letter to the Council on 31 October, the Secretary-General nominated Hassan Bubacar Jallow for reappointment as ICTR Prosecutor until 31 December 2015.

As for the Residual Mechanism, according to its progress report, it has assumed responsibility for many of the Tribunals’ functions, including judicial activities, enforcement of sentences, protection of victims and witnesses and the management of archives. It is also on track to deliver its first appeal judgement by the end of the year, while it also faces two pre-eminent challenges. The first is to ensure that nine individuals indicted by the ICTR but not yet arrested are apprehended (the three most senior individuals are to be tried by the Mechanism and the other six by Rwanda). The second challenge involves the relocation of individuals the ICTR has acquitted or released, but who are unable or afraid to return to their country of citizenship. Since 2011, the Council has called on member states to assist with their relocation. The number of acquitted persons still in Arusha was recently reduced to eight after Belgium agreed to accept one person. Rwanda has provided assurances that they are welcome to return, but the Tribunal is unable to assess whether the threats perceived by the individuals are real. As of 1 January 2015, the Mechanism will take over the formal responsibility for relocation.

The Council’s Informal Working Group on International Tribunals met on 13 November for preliminary discussions on the requested extensions and the issue of relocation of persons released or acquitted.

The Presidents and Prosecutors of the ICTY and ICTR last briefed the Council on 5 June.

Key Issues
The immediate issue for the Council will be the request relating to the extension of terms of the judges and prosecutors.

A key issue is the relocation of persons released or acquitted.

Another issue is the continuing review by the Working Group of the completion strategies of the ICTY and ICTR.

Options
The Council could adopt technical resolutions extending the judges’ and prosecutors’ terms as requested or extend the terms for a shorter period of time.

Council Dynamics
Difficulties arose last December when the Council adopted resolution 2130, extending ICTY judges’ terms for one year. As it did the previous year, Russia abstained, commenting that the situation regarding the Tribunal’s exit strategy had not improved and that costly trial delays continued. Similarly, during the debate in June, Russia commented on the ICTY’s and ICTR’s lack of progress in completing their activities and transferring functions to the Residual Mechanism. As in the past, Russia also demanded an independent review of the Tribunals’ work. There is
As for the LRA, the Council noted that senior LRA leaders are believed to be based in the Kafia Kingi enclave (an area also claimed by South Sudan). The statement asked that the Secretary-General keep it informed through a single report on UNOCA and the LRA by 15 November.

Council members received the latest UNOCA report, covering several situations in the region, on 13 November (S/2014/812).

One issue is the spread of Boko Haram activities into northern Cameroon, where hundreds of Cameroonians have been killed and the number of abductions has increased significantly during the reporting period. Boko Haram activities have also hindered humanitarian assistance in northern Cameroon and have caused thousands to become refugees across the region. The report welcomes the 7 October announcement by Niger, Chad, Nigeria, Benin and Cameroon about the operationalisation of a multinational task force to address the Boko Haram threat. (The task force is to coordinate military contingents from these countries. Nigeria and Cameroon further agreed during a 15 October meeting on cross-border operations by their militaries against Boko Haram.)

On piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, the report notes that 33 incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea were reported since the beginning of the year, making it the African region most severely affected by piracy. The report also notes that poaching remains a serious concern, as does its linkages to the financing of armed groups.

As for the LRA, the report notes that it continues to pose a threat to civilians across the CAR and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Kony continues to command 150 to 200 fighters, and the bulk of LRA operations has moved from the CAR to the DRC, where the group continues to abduct civilians, loot, poach elephants and ambush vehicles. The report also notes cooperation between the LRA and former Sékéka members (a predominantly Muslim rebel group alliance which staged a coup in CAR in March 2013 and now de facto controls eastern CAR) for military and finance purposes and further notes a continued LRA presence in Kafia Kingi. Sudan has denied this and has asked the AU to verify the information.

The report notes that there are still gaps in the troop levels assigned to the AU Regional Task Force (AU-RTF). Fewer than half of the soldiers pledged by the affected countries have been deployed. In addition, there is a shortage in programmes to address the needs of returnees. At the same time, military and civilian efforts made under the RCI-LRA have weakened the LRA, including the defection of 81 LRA members since May.

A report released by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) on 10 November notes that the LRA continues to be a threat to communities in the CAR and the DRC. Since January, OCHA has tracked a total of 157 LRA attacks, resulting in 22 deaths and 432 abductions. These figures constitute a decrease in attacks and deaths in comparison to 2013 but a rise in the number of abductions.

Key Issues
The primary issue for the Council will be getting an updated analysis regarding implementation of the UN regional anti-LRA strategy, both its military and civilian aspects.

A related issue is how the turmoil in the CAR and in South Sudan is affecting the LRA regional strategy.

Another issue will be ensuring cooperation between MINUSCA and the AU-RTF.

Addressing reports of LRA-Séléka cooperation as well as Boko Haram activities in Cameroon, are newly emerging issues for the Council.

Options
One option for the Council is to issue a presidential or press statement that:

• supports UNOCA and the RCI-LRA while calling on the states in the region to maintain their full commitment to the AU-RTF;
UNOCA/LRA (con’t)

- encourages member states to contribute more resources toward anti-LRA efforts and regional cooperation, especially in light of the turmoil in countries in the region; and
- calls on Sudan to cooperate with any inquiry into allegations that Kony and other LRA leaders are present in Sudanese-controlled Kafia Kingi.

Taking no action at this time is another option.

Council Dynamics
Council members are largely in agreement on LRA-related issues and strongly support the UN regional anti-LRA strategy. They are optimistic that the decline in LRA activities will continue. While it seems that the RCI-LRA and its military component, the AU-RTF, are less of a focus for Council members due to other regional conflicts, there remains support for the semi-annual consideration of the LRA to maintain prominence and focus to the issue. There is also recognition that other conflicts within the region may undermine the RCI-LRA efforts and divert the attention from the problem. Some Council members feel that a Council outcome should put an emphasis on the dangers of LRA cooperation with other regional actors. At the same time, finding consensus with respect to concerns over a Sudanese safe haven in Kafia Kingi for the LRA may prove difficult.

In May, the Council relied heavily on the wording of the Secretary-General’s report to bridge the difference of attitude towards Sudan. Some Council members would also like a statement to include language on the spread of Boko Haram activities in the region and UNOCA’s role in conflict prevention.

Sahel

Expected Council Action
In December, Special Envoy for the Sahel Hiroute Guebre Sellassie is expected to brief the Council on the implementation of the UN’s integrated Sahel strategy. No outcome is expected.

Key Recent Developments
In recent months, the security and political situation in the different Sahel countries has worsened or remained unstable.

In Mali, there has been an increase in attacks on the UN’s Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which have been attributed to extremist groups and at least 21 peacekeepers have been killed since 2 September. The situation in Libya strongly impacts the security situations of Sahel countries and fighting has intensified in Tripoli and Benghazi while the Al-Qaida linked terrorist group Ansar al-Sharia has maintained control over the town of Derna, declaring an emirate.

Nigeria’s worsening conflict with the Islamist militant group Boko Haram in the country’s northeast has led to increased military cooperation between Nigeria and its neighbours Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger through the framework of the Lake Chad Basin Commission. They agreed in Niamey, Niger on 7 October to commence a multinational joint task force on 1 November. The situation with Boko Haram in Nigeria has also led to increased international assistance, including from France, the UK and the US.

Despite the attention the Boko Haram threat received following the 17 May Paris Summit, the group captured and has held several towns since late July across Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states, declaring a caliphate on 24 August in Gwoza. It seized the cities of Bama in September and Mubi in late October, though the military and civilian militia later retook them. At least 650,000 people have been displaced by the conflict since May 2013, when Nigeria declared a state of emergency in the three states. More than 100,000 people (both Nigerian and Niger citizens living in Nigeria) have fled to Niger, and 2,700 refugees have been received by Chad. Additionally, at least 43,000 Nigerians have fled to Cameroon.

In Burkina Faso, the country’s long-standing president Blaise Compaoré resigned and fled the country on 31 October following protests against his intention to amend the constitution to run for president in 2015. Amidst a power vacuum, the military took over. Negotiations between the military and the opposition, mediated by a joint AU-ECOWAS-UN mission, led to an agreement on 5 November to establish a civilian-led transition and for elections to be held by November 2015. Stakeholders signed a charter on the framework for the transition on 16 November, and the next day Michel Kafando, who served as a permanent representative to the UN on the Security Council in 2008-2009, was named interim president. On 18 November, Lieutenant Colonel Isaac Yacouba Zida, who had been leading the military government after Compaoré’s resignation, was appointed interim prime minister. Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman briefed the Council in consultations on Burkina Faso under “any other business” on 4 November. Council members issued press statements on the situation on 5 November and 17 November (SC/11632 and SC/11651).

France meanwhile launched the Sahel-wide Operation Barkhane in July. With 3,000 troops and headquarters in N’Djamena, Chad, it supports the counter-terrorism efforts of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. One thousand troops have been kept in Mali from France’s predecessor mission, Operation Serval, while 1,200 are based in Chad and the rest are split between Niger, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire.

Sellassie previously briefed the Council on 19 June and highlighted the deteriorating situations in Libya, Mali and Nigeria. She stressed that addressing the Sahel’s security challenges requires an approach that involves North, West and Central African countries. Sellassie also raised concerns about “competing” interventions and strategies and highlighted the need...
for greater coordination and cooperation among regional and international actors.

On 27 August, the Council adopted a presidential statement that encouraged greater cooperation among stakeholders in implementing the UN’s Sahel strategy and for the Office of the Special Envoy to work closely with the countries of the region and other actors. The statement further welcomed the 16 February establishment of the G5 Sahel, and a plan to create a “follow up group” in New York of permanent representatives of the G5 Sahel and other countries in the region. (At press time, the group had not been established.) Additionally the Council expressed its continued grave concern over terrorist groups operating in the Sahel and highlighted some of the regional security initiatives to combat them.

On 18 November, the third meeting of the Ministerial Coordination Platform met in Bamako. The coordination platform, established during the Secretary-General’s high-level visit to the region in November 2013, is currently chaired by Mali and meets every six months bringing together Sahel states, neighbouring countries, regional and international organisations and financial organisations to coordinate international efforts and avoid duplication.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is ensuring that the Sahel strategy produces an impact on the security, governance and resilience of Sahel countries.

The destabilisation of the Sahel region due to crises in Libya, Mali and Nigeria is also a key issue.

The political transition in Burkina Faso and its effect on the UN’s efforts to implement its Sahel strategy may be raised.

An ongoing issue is improving coordination between the UN and the G5 Sahel, along with the AU, ECOWAS, EU, the Executive Council of the Community of Sahel-Sahara States and the World Bank, which have developed their own Sahel strategies.

A related issue is Council members’ understanding of the various regional security initiatives, including the Nouakchott Process as part of the AU Peace and Security architecture, the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis and Operation Barkhane.

The Ebola cases that occurred in some countries of the region is an additional issue for the Council to be mindful of.

Transnational crime and the fragile humanitarian situation are ongoing issues.

Options
One option is for the Council to receive the briefing and take no action.

Another option is to issue a statement that:
• highlights the Council’s concern on the impact that crises in the region and terrorist groups’ activities are having on Sahel countries’ stability and;
• reaffirms the need for the different international actors to coordinate their assistance to Sahel states in addressing the region’s multi-dimensional security, development and governance challenges.

An additional option is to organise an interactive dialogue with relevant states, regional and subregional organisations to discuss the different security initiatives being implemented and discuss how these can more fully complement one another and the UN Sahel strategy.

Council Dynamics
During negotiations on the presidential statement in August, several members wanted to merge the Secretary-General’s reporting requirements on the Sahel strategy with the Council’s consideration of the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), given that the upcoming Sahel briefing overlaps considerably with information from the briefings and reports on UNOWA. The Special Envoy apparently did not want the Sahel briefing combined with UNOWA, and keeping the Sahel briefing in December was important for Chad as the penholder on the Sahel and as Council president that month. As a member of the G5 Sahel, a contributor to MINUSMA and a country increasingly impacted by Boko Haram, it has high stakes in the strategy’s implementation and developments in the region.

France, through Operation Barkhane, plays a critical role in addressing terrorist threats across the region.

Nigeria’s conflict with Boko Haram is destabilising the Sahel region, but it opposes the conflict being more fully addressed by the Council.

UN-AU Partnership on Peace Operations

Expected Council Action
In December, at the initiative of Chad, the Council is expected to hold an open debate on the evolution of the partnership between the UN and the AU in UN-mandated peace operations. A presidential statement is a likely outcome.

Background
The role of regional and subregional organisations in UN peacekeeping, with a particular focus on Africa, has been discussed in the Council both in the context of country-specific situations and thematic debates. The last such debate took place on 28 July at the initiative of Rwanda. The scope of the open debate organised by Chad will include special political missions in addition to peacekeeping operations. Since 2007, AU Peace and Security Council members have held annual consultative meetings with Council members and peace operations have been featured prominently in all these discussions.

The involvement of regional and subregional organisations in peacekeeping is not new. On 22 September 1993, the Council adopted resolution 866 establishing the UN Observer Mission in Liberia and noting that this would be the first UN peacekeeping mission undertaken “in cooperation with a peacekeeping mission already set up by another organisation”, in this case the Ceasefire Monitoring Group deployed by the Economic Community of West African States in August 1990.

On 31 July 2007, the Council adopted resolution 1769, authorising the establishment of
the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur. In 2004 the AU had established the AU Mission in Sudan, to which the UN supplied light and heavy support packages sequentially, eventually resulting in the first-ever UN-AU hybrid operation. For the first time, the UN had created an operation for which it assumed full financial responsibility but over which it did not retain exclusive operational or political control.

In resolution 1725 of 6 December 2006, the Council endorsed the proposal by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the AU to deploy a peacekeeping mission in Somalia. The AU established the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) expecting the mission to evolve into a UN operation, but a 20 April 2007 report by the Secretary-General indicated that the conditions to deploy a UN peacekeeping operation to replace AMISOM did not exist in Somalia (S/2007/204). In 2009, the Council took an unprecedented step in resolution 1872 by authorising the provision of a logistics support package funded by UN assessed contributions and channelled through the UN Support Office for AMISOM, established for this purpose in Nairobi, Kenya.

On 16 April 2008, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa chaired a high-level open debate on the need to strengthen the relationship between the UN and regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security (S/PV.5868). The meeting resulted in the adoption of resolution 1809, which recognised the need to “enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing regional organisations” when they undertake peacekeeping under UN authorisation.

To address the limitations of AU operations due to inadequate equipment and transportation capabilities and other operational weaknesses, a 24 December 2008 report by a joint AU-UN panel (known as the Prodi Report) came up with two main recommendations: the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund to support AU peacekeeping capacity and the use of UN assessed contributions to support UN-authorised AU operations on a case-by-case basis, provided the Security Council and General Assembly approved and there was an agreement that the mission would transition to UN management within six months (S/2008/813). Despite the fact that the Council has continued to rely on regional and subregional organisations to support peacekeeping efforts, there has been no follow-up to the issue of financing AU operations mandated by the Council.

The Council in the past few years authorised two African-led missions to fill in temporarily for UN peacekeeping missions: the African-led International Support Mission in Mali in December 2012 and the African-led International Support Mission to the CAR in December 2013. Discussions preceding and following their respective deployment focused on the need for logistical and financial support to ensure their operational capabilities.

On 28 July, at the initiative of Rwanda, the Council held an open debate on “UN peacekeeping: regional partnerships and their evolution” which included briefings by the Secretary-General, EU and AU representatives. Resolution 2167, which was adopted at the meeting, requested the UN Secretariat to initiate, in cooperation with the AU, a lessons learned exercise on the transitions from AU to UN peacekeeping operations in Mali and the Central African Republic and to present specific recommendations for future transitional arrangements by the end of the year. The resolution, however, stopped short of advancing the issue of financing.

Key Issues
A key issue is to ensure that the partnerships are effective at the strategic, operational and tactical level.

Another key issue for the Council is to devise an effective, sustainable and fair working relationship with the AU, compatible with the new tasks it is mandated to do.

A related issue is for African Council members to articulate concerns African regional organisations may have regarding Council decisions.

Options
The Council may adopt a presidential statement:

- reiterating the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for regional organisations when they are implementing Security Council mandates; and
- encouraging its ad hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa to meet more regularly on topics pertaining to the efforts of African-led initiatives in support of UN-mandated operations.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Council members agree that partnerships with regional organisations in Africa and elsewhere are fundamental in maintaining international peace and security.

The AU position is to seek more parity in that partnership, to replace ad hoc arrangements with sustained financial and material support for UN-authorised missions. Some Council members, however, have advocated for the establishment of trust funds or bilateral cooperation as opposed to hybrid operations or African-led operations funded through UN assessed contributions. An earlier version of the draft text that became resolution 2167 had requested the Secretary-General to draw a roadmap for the implementation of the recommendations of the Prodi Report. That provision was dropped given the opposition of P3 members.

**Libya**

**Expected Council Action**
In December, the Council will be briefed on developments in Libya, likely by Bernardino León, the Special Representative and head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). The briefing will be followed by consultations. The Council will also likely receive the periodic briefing by the chair of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee, Ambassador

UN DOCUMENTS ON LIBYA

**Security Council Resolutions**
- S/RES/2174 (27 August 2014) imposed sanctions on those obstructing or undermining the successful completion of the political transition.
- S/RES/2146 (19 March 2014) imposed measures on vessels transporting crude oil that had been illicitly exported from Libya.
- Security Council Press Statement SC/1646 (13 November 2014) condemned the terrorist bomb attacks against the embassies of Egypt and the UAE in Tripoli.
- Sanctions Committee Document SC/1655 (18 November 2014) was a press release noting that the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee met on 14 November with Libya and other regional states.
- Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.7306 (11 November 2014) was the eighth briefing by the ICC Prosecutor on Libya.
Eugène-Richard Gasana (Rwanda), followed by consultations on the Libya sanctions regime.

The mandates of UNSMIL and the Panel of Experts assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee expire on 13 March and 13 April 2015, respectively.

**Key Recent Developments**

Briefing Council members on 4 November, León gave a bleak assessment of the situation in Libya. He echoed his previous statement from a 28 October press conference in Tripoli, where he said that Libya was “getting very close to the point of no return”. León reported on the two meetings of members of the House of Representatives (some of whom had previously boycotted the work of the House) in Ghadames on 29 September and in Tripoli on 11 October that he had facilitated and the challenges he encountered in getting them to negotiate in good faith. A 6 November ruling by the Supreme Court declared the Tobruk-based House of Representatives unconstitutional obliged UNSMIL to re-evaluate the mediation strategy.

Clashes continue in southwest of Tripoli between Misrata-based and Islamist militias (Libya Dawn) and Zintan-based militias that supported the failed 16 May coup by rogue General Khalifa Haftar. A 30 October report by Amnesty International concluded that “militias and armed groups on all sides have committed serious human rights abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, some of which amount to war crimes”. Briefing the Council on 11 November, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda highlighted how political instability and the worsening of the security situation “clearly cannot be conducive to closing the impunity gap in Libya”.

There has been continual violent fighting in Benghazi—between forces loyal to Haftar and the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries—since the 15 October operation by Haftar and elements of the Libyan National Army to retake the city. The operation, which has been publicly supported by Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni and the House of Representatives, had reached a death toll of 254 as of 3 November. In a 13 November statement, UNSMIL expressed grave concern over reports of indiscriminate ground and aerial attacks on crowded residential areas in Benghazi. On 19 November, a 12-hour unconditional humanitarian truce was brokered by León in Benghazi to allow for the evacuation of civilians and the retrieval of bodies from the affected areas. Local press reported that the truce’s full length was not respected by the parties.

On 9 November, two explosions occurred in Shahat, apparently targeting a meeting between León and Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni. On 19 November, the Derna and Benghazi branches of Ansar al-Sharia were designated for sanctions under the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida sanctions regime at the request of France, the UK and the US. (Ansar al-Sharia is in control of Derna, a town in eastern Libya where three activists where recently beheaded.) The terrorist group, which has a strong influence in the Shura Council of Benghazi Revolutionaries, is also responsible for the systematic targeting of human rights activists, members of the judiciary and security institutions in Benghazi.

Regional actors continue to be involved in the crisis in Libya. Recently both Algeria and Sudan offered to facilitate peace talks. On 21 October, the Turkish special envoy to Libya, Emrullah İşer, met with the self-declared prime minister, Omar al-Hassi, in the latter’s first public meeting with a foreign representative. On 13 November, car bombs exploded outside the embassies of Egypt and the United Arab Emirates in Tripoli. Council members condemned the attacks in a press statement (SC/11646). (United Arab Emirates and Egypt have reportedly supported Haftar’s military operation with airstrikes.)

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that two million people may have been affected by the conflict in Libya. More than 330,000 are considered to be particularly at risk, which includes almost 290,000 internally displaced persons and some 37,000 refugees and asylum-seekers.

On 14 November the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee met and discussed challenges faced by the Panel of Experts in conducting its investigations. The meeting was attended by Libya and other regional states.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

In a press briefing on 14 November, the spokesperson for the High Commissioner for Human Rights voiced alarm over the escalating violence in Libya with reports of increased human rights abuses, beheadings of activists and the recent closure of the National Council of Civil Liberties and Human Rights in Tripoli. On 9 November, armed men in military uniform arrived at the National Council, led by a man known for his support of Libya Dawn, locked the building and said that anybody attempting to re-open it would be arrested. The spokesperson for the High Commissioner stressed the importance of allowing the National Council to function smoothly and independently at a time when Libyans are facing serious human rights violations and need independent monitoring in the country. The spokesperson added that the recent dramatic increase in the use of car bombs, with civilians as the main victims, illustrates the rapidly deteriorating security and human rights situation in the country.

**Key Issues**

The main issue in Libya is how to achieve a ceasefire between warring parties in Tripoli and Benghazi. Continual violations of international humanitarian law by the warring parties is a related issue.

An overarching issue is bridging the political divisions in Libya and ending the current standoff between institutions in Tripoli and Tobruk and avoid a de facto partition of the country.

The threat that terrorist groups with regional reach could proliferate in Libya is an urgent issue.

A neglected issue is the role of regional and international actors that are contributing to the escalation of conflict in Libya. The provision of funds, weapons and other support to warring factions—in contravention of the 1970 sanctions regime—is a related issue.

**Options**

The Council could adopt a resolution:

- urging all parties to agree on a ceasefire;
- expressing concern about attacks against civilians in Libya that can amount to crimes under international human rights and humanitarian law;
- defocusing UNSMIL’s mandate in the light of the current situation, prioritising its work on national dialogue, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration as well as security sector reform;
- demanding that the militias and army factions in Libya disarm, refrain from using violence and agree to work together for national reconciliation, justice, respect for human rights and the rule of law;
- urging the parties to respect the neutrality of the National Oil Company, the sovereign wealth fund and the Central Bank of Libya; and
- calling on all member states to respect the arms embargo and threatening all those violating it with secondary sanctions.
Libya (con’t)

A further option for the Council is to impose measures under resolution 2174 (travel ban and assets freeze) against armed militias and other spoilers that threaten the peace, stability or security of Libya.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Following the worsening security situation, the limited traction of the process facilitated by León and the ruling of the Supreme Court, some Council members have raised the possibility of discussing the imposition of sanctions on those undermining the successful completion of the transition. However, Council members seem to be aware of the fact that the imposition of sanctions has to be done in a way that does not undermine current mediation efforts.

Given that proposals to list individuals obstructing the political transition are expected to come from member states, it remains to be seen how countries with vested interests in Libya are going to use this card and its impact on the perception of UNSMIL as an honest broker in the political process. The UK is the penholder on Libya.

UNDOF (Golan Heights)

Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to extend for six months the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), which expires on 31 December. A representative of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations will brief Council members in consultations on the UNDOF report, due on 3 December. The Council will also hold its regular meeting with troop-contributing countries prior to adopting the mandate renewal.

Key Recent Developments
Due to the escalating spillover of the Syrian civil war into its area of operations, UNDOF—which was established in 1974 to monitor the ceasefire between Israel and Syria and has experienced relative calm for most of its operational life—has significantly altered how it carries out its mandate.

The most recent series of events began on 27 August when the Al-Qaida affiliated Al-Nusra Front overran Syrian government forces at the Quneitra crossing on the Syrian side of the armistice line. The group detained 45 Fijian peacekeepers and encircled 72 Filipino peacekeepers. On 30 August, UNDOF’s rapid reaction force safely extracted 32 Filipino peacekeepers from a surrounded position, and the remaining 40 Filipino peacekeepers escaped to safety later that night during a UN-mediated ceasefire.

The 45 detained Fijian peacekeepers were not released until 11 September. On 2 September, Al-Nusra set out a series of demands for the release of the peacekeepers that included the group’s removal from the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida sanctions list, delivery of humanitarian aid to areas around Damascus besieged by the government and a prisoner exchange. While media reports indicate none of the group’s demands were met, a video was posted on 10 September in which Fijian peacekeepers declared that Al-Nusra had not harmed them in any way. The video statement was reportedly a condition for their release the next day.

There were similar incidents in March and May of 2013 that led Austria to withdraw its troops, Croatia and Japan had already previously withdrawn due to the worsening security situation. But the incident in August was unprecedented for the mission, both in terms of the number of affected peacekeepers and the duration of their detention. The Philippines withdrew its 331 peacekeepers from UNDOF in September.

Following the release of the peacekeepers, UNDOF began to relocate personnel and critical equipment from the Bravo (Syrian) side to the Alpha (Israeli) side of the area of operations. The pace of this relocation was accelerated when clashes intensified following the release of the Fijian peacekeepers, leaving no government forces between Al-Nusra and UNDOF positions. The relocation was safely completed on 15 September.

During this dramatic series of events, Council members were briefed by Ladsous on 3 September and were kept apprised of the situation through a series of confidential notes from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Over the course of several weeks, Council members released three press statements condemning the detention and siege of UN peacekeepers and demanding their immediate and unconditional release and safe passage.

On 17 September, Council members were briefed in consultations by Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmund Mulet on the periodic UNDOF report and on the relocation of UNDOF personnel and equipment. On 19 September, the Council adopted a presidential statement requesting the Secretary-General to update the Council within 30 days on the steps necessary to maintain UNDOF’s ability to carry out its mandate while adjusting the mission’s posture to minimise risk to personnel.

On 9 October the Council held a public briefing by UN force commanders during which Major General Iqbal Singh Singh of UNDOF was invited to brief on how traditional mandates are carried out in a changed politico-military environment. Singh reported that the focus of the mission’s activities was now on the Alpha side of the ceasefire line. He informed the Council that, in response to the 19 September presidential statement, DPKO had sent a high-level team to assess the mission. The DPKO team also consulted with Israel and Syria on feasible options for modifying UNDOF’s mandate given the challenging security environment and the relocation of the majority of personnel.
Afghanistan, during which it will consider (ISAF) and adopt a resolution regarding

The spillover of the Syrian crisis into UNDOF’s area of operations and escalating ceasefire violations will be of primary concern to the Council.

Another key issue for the Council will be how the UNDOF mandate may need to be adjusted when it is renewed in December, given that a majority of its personnel is now located on the Alpha (Israeli) side, which significantly constrains the mission’s ability to carry out its monitoring tasks. A related issue is whether new technologies should be used to carry out such tasks as so as not expose personnel to risk.

Regarding risk mitigation, an issue is how the safety of remaining peacekeepers on the Syrian side of the ceasefire line will be guaranteed. Mt. Hermon is strategically important for Israel, and if there were no UNDOF security presence there, Israel might feel compelled to man the position itself. Such a scenario would be an especially difficult challenge to the 1974 Agreement on Disengagement.

Options
It may be difficult to alter the UNDOF mandate since it derives from the 1974 Agreement on Disengagement between Israel and Syria, and any changes would require the consent of both parties and the cooperation of the remaining troop-contributing countries. Therefore, the most likely option is to simply roll over UNDOF’s mandate for an additional six months.

In addition, the Council could also call on both parties to allow the use of new technologies so UNDOF could better fulfill its mandate in the current challenging security environment.

Council Dynamics
Council members are concerned about the increasing clashes in the area of operations, both in number and intensity, as well as the tension between Israel and Syria along the armistice line. The Council has always generally agreed that UNDOF contributes to stability in the region in the absence of a peace agreement between Israel and Syria. However, its liaison function is particularly important now in order to avoid further negative security implications for the region. In this regard, most Council members are keen to maintain good relationships with troop-contributing countries to ensure UNDOF’s ability to operate.

Though the US holds the pen on the Golan Heights, since June 2012, resolutions renewing UNDOF have been jointly authored with Russia, suggesting consensus on an issue that is increasingly affected by the highly divisive conflict in Syria.

UNDOF (Golan Heights) (con’t)

Singha reported that some peacekeepers continued to be deployed on the Bravo (Syrian side) at Mt. Hermon and two other positions that are extremely close to the Alpha line. UNDOF’s former headquarters, Camp Faour, was one of the vacated positions on the Bravo side, and Singha said the command is now being split between a smaller element in Damascus and the larger Camp Zioiani on the Alpha side.

On 20 October, Mulet briefed Council members in consultations, following up the 19 September presidential statement. Discussions included the possible use of new technologies, such as unmanned, unarmed aerial vehicles or satellite imagery, to carry out monitoring tasks without exposing personnel to risk. Mulet said that both Israel and Syria were reluctant to grant authorisation for the use of such technologies. He also reported that UNDOF would review the security situation in the area of separation in cooperation with Syrian authorities on a quarterly basis, however it seemed the full return of UNDOF to the Bravo side seemed unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Key Issues
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Afghanistan

Expected Council Action
In December, the Council is expected to receive the final report of the current international military mission in Afghanistan, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and adopt a resolution regarding its successor mission. (ISAF’s Council authorisation expires on 31 December.)

The Council will also hold a debate on Afghanistan, during which it will consider the Secretary-General’s quarterly report on the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), with a briefing anticipated by Nicholas Haysom, the new Special Representative and head of UNAMA.

UNAMA’s mandate expires on 17 March 2015.

Key Recent Developments
The Council held its last debate on Afghanistan on 18 September with then-Special Representative Jan Kubis briefing from Kabul via videoteleconference. Kubis emphasised the need for the electoral impasse to be resolved and for presidential candidates Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani to finalise an agreement establishing a government of national unity. He also noted the toll that the conflict in Afghanistan continued to take on civilians, pointing out that there was a 15 percent increase in civilian casualties in the first eight months of 2014 as compared to the same period in 2013. Kubis added, “Afghanistan’s security institutions will require sustained support” moving forward. He said the new government would need to finalise requisite legal agreements “to ensure the necessary planning and preparations for continuity in international assistance”.

On 21 September, Ghani and Abdullah signed an agreement forming a government of national unity. According to the power-sharing arrangement, Ghani became the president-elect, with Abdullah (or someone he selects) serving as his chief executive officer and having responsibility for management of day-to-day government operations. Also on 21 September, the Independent Electoral Commission declared Ghani the victor in the election, although it did not release the results of the contentious audit process, which lasted for more than two months. (On 25 September, Abdullah said he would serve
as chief executive in the new government.

In a televised farewell address from the presidential palace on 23 September, outgoing President Hamid Karzai warned the incoming government to be wary of the intentions of Pakistan and the United States in Afghanistan, accusing them of not wanting peace in Afghanistan.

Ghani was sworn in as the new president on 29 September, a day that was marred by Taliban-related violence. In eastern Paktika province, four Taliban insurgents attacked the Zurmat district headquarters, which resulted in their deaths and the deaths of eight additional people. A Taliban suicide bombing close to the Kabul airport resulted in four civilian deaths, and two civilians were injured in Kunduz, a town in northern Afghanistan, when a suicide bomber discharged explosives.

The Taliban has orchestrated several other acts of violence since Ghani’s inauguration. On 27 October, four insurgents attacked a courthouse in Kunduz in northern Afghanistan, where they killed eight people and injured an additional ten. A suicide bomber tried to assassinate Shukria Barakzai, an Afghan parliamentarian and women’s rights advocate, in Kabul on 16 November. Barakzai survived the attack with minor injuries, but three nearby civilians were killed and dozens sustained injuries. On 18 November, a truck carrying explosives rammed into the exterior gate of a base for foreign contractors in Kabul, killing two security guards and injuring several bystanders. A suicide bombing on 23 November at a volleyball competition in Yakhyakhil district in Paktika province killed over fifty civilians and wounded another sixty. Council members condemned this attack in a press statement on 24 November.

On 30 September, the day after Ghani’s inauguration, Afghanistan signed security agreements with the United States and NATO. (Karzai had refused to establish post-2014 security arrangements with the US and NATO.) According to the agreements, 9,800 US troops and at least 2,000 NATO soldiers will be permitted to remain in the country to train and advise Afghan security forces and conduct counter-insurgency operations. The agreements are intended to last through 2024.

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime and Afghanistan’s Ministry of Counter Narcotics released the Afghanistan Opium Survey for 2014 on 16 November. The survey found that there has been a 7 percent increase in the “total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan” this year as compared with 2013.

On 31 October, President Ghani spoke in Beijing at the fourth ministerial conference of the Istanbul process on Afghanistan. (Launched in November 2011, the Istanbul process is designed to promote coordination between Afghanistan and neighbouring countries in dealing with common threats, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, poverty and extremism.) Telling the audience that Afghanistan’s political transition was “well underway” in light of the establishment of a government of national unity, Ghani urged the Taliban to participate in inter-Afghan dialogue and expressed his country’s intention “to provide a solid platform for collaborating among governments and organizations”. He added that Afghanistan is “committed to carry out a comprehensive reform of our legal and judicial, governance, economic and cultural institutions”. While in China, Ghani met with President Xi Jinping and other senior Chinese officials and secured a pledge of $327 million (or 2 billion yuan) in aid during the next three years.

Ghani visited Pakistan from 14 to 16 November, meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief of Staff General Raheel Sharif. The importance of security cooperation between the two countries was a major focus of the trip.

Nicholas Haysom replaced Kubiš as Special Representative on 25 September. Haysom had served as Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan since 2012.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

The special rapporteur for the Human Rights Council on violence against women, its causes and consequences visited Afghanistan from 4 to 12 November. It was the first visit to Afghanistan by a holder of this mandate since 2005. In a statement from Kabul on 12 November, the special rapporteur confirmed the continuing prevalence of violence against women and girls, including targeted killings, rape, violence perpetrated by husbands and other relatives; violence linked to early and forced marriage; and sexual harassment in the workplace and public spaces. She highlighted the issue of access to justice, the lack of effective interpretation and implementation of relevant laws by state authorities, a lack of knowledge of the law and its protective remedial provisions, deep inequality, underdevelopment, high levels of illiteracy, the lack of educational and employment opportunities and the over-incarceration of women and girls for “moral crimes”. A report will be presented to the Human Rights Council in June 2015.

**Key Issues**

A key issue is how well Afghan security forces will be able to maintain stability in the country, given the diminished role of international military forces after this year.

A related issue is the high number of civilian casualties caused by Taliban-related violence.

Also a key issue is the ability of Ghani, Abdullah and their supporters to work together in a government of national unity. Ghani promised that a new government would be formed within 45 days of his inauguration, but the deadline has passed without cabinet positions being allocated.

Another key issue is whether it is possible to promote reconciliation with the Taliban, as called for by Ghani in his 31 October speech in Beijing.

**Options**

The most likely option is for the Council to adopt a resolution that takes note of, welcomes or authorises the Resolute Support Mission (RSM), the expected name of the successor mission to ISAF. In adopting the resolution, the Council may choose to:

- outline the nature of the collaboration between the RSM and Afghan security forces with regard to training, advising, counter-terrorism and other activities;
- emphasise the importance of protecting civilians and respecting human rights in all military activities; and
- request periodic reporting from the mission to the Council.

The Council may also consider receiving a briefing from a high-level NATO official describing the goals of the new mission, its planned activities and preparations for its launch.

Another option for the Council is to issue a statement in the aftermath of the London Conference on Afghanistan, scheduled for 4 December, affirming the international community’s abiding commitment to Afghanistan’s political and economic development. Co-hosted by Afghanistan and the UK, the conference is meant to focus on effective governance and economic growth in Afghanistan in the coming years.

**Council Dynamics**

Given the challenging security environment in Afghanistan, there is widespread recognition in the Council of the critical role the
Afghan National Security Forces will play in ensuring stability in the country as ISAF’s mission comes to a close. There have also been long-standing concerns in the Council about the impact that the conflict continues to have on civilians, with several members keen to ensure that the human rights gains that have been made since 2001 continue to be built upon, including the rights of women and children. Some members, most notably France and Russia, have been particularly vocal about the threat posed by drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan, in large part because they believe that the illicit funds from narcotics fuel extremism. Regarding the security transition from ISAF to the RSM, Russia has long said that any successor mission to ISAF should have a firm legal basis, and it may be keen to see clear language authorising the RSM. Other countries, particularly those that are part of the NATO alliance, may be more inclined to endorse less formal language welcoming, rather than authorising, the RSM.

Australia is the penholder on Afghanistan and chair of the 1988 Taliban Sanctions Committee.

Countering Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime

Expected Council Action
In December, the Council is expected to hold a high-level open debate on counter-terrorism and terrorism’s linkages with transnational organised crime. The Foreign Minister of Chad, Moussa Faki Mahamat, is expected to preside. A resolution is the anticipated outcome.

Background
It seems that Chad wants to focus the meeting on the connection between terrorism and transnational organised crime. In its review of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the General Assembly adopted on 13 June a resolution expressing its deep concern “about the connections, in some cases, between some forms of transnational organised crime and terrorism, and emphasising the need to enhance cooperation at the national, subregional, regional and international levels”.

A presidential statement adopted on 21 February 2012 under the presidency of Togo on the impact of the transnational organised crime in West Africa and the Sahel identified transnational organised crime as a serious threat to international peace and stability “including illicit weapons and drug trafficking, piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as terrorism”.

In North Africa and the Sahel-Sahara region, the persistence of structural factors—such as the porous nature of the borders, the availability of weapons, the profitability of kidnapping for ransom, synergies with transnational organised crime and the exploitation of political grievances—make terrorist groups an ongoing threat to stability in the region. Al Shabaab, which continues to pose an asymmetrical threat in Somalia despite the progress made by the joint military offensive carried out by the Somali National Army and the AU Mission in Somalia, has made of the illicit export of charcoal a key funding stream.

However, the discussion is not expected to focus particularly on Africa, but on the connections between transnational organised crime and terrorist groups more broadly. A 3 November report (S/2014/815) of the Al-Quida Analytical Support and Monitoring Team of the 1267/1989 Sanctions Committee identifies three areas where additional enhanced sanctions could curb Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Al Nusra Front revenue generation that are related to transnational organised crime and which include the seizure of oil tanker-trucks coming from or trying to enter into ISIS or Al Nusra-controlled territory; imposing a world-wide moratorium on antiquities trading from Syria and Iraq; and not allowing aircraft to land in or take off from their territories if that aircraft had taken off from or is destined to land in ISIS or Al Nusra-controlled territory.

Afghanistan is another situation where the linkages between transnational organised crime and terrorism are clear. A 9 June report of the Monitoring Team on the Taliban highlights how “the past year has been a bumper year for Taliban revenues, boosted by booming narcotics income, revenue from corruption and extortion, and increasingly drawing on revenue from the illegal exploitation of natural resources”. The report argues that the economic interest of the Taliban, with clear incentives to preserve this income, implies less potential incentives to negotiate with the government.

Against this background, the Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate, along with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, have carried out some activities regarding the linkages between terrorism and transnational organised crime. These include the holding of regional workshops and the establishment of counter-terrorism and transnational crime units in some countries in the Sahel.

Key Issues
An immediate issue is the difficulty in sharing intelligence and confidential information among member states. A related issue is the porous nature of many borders and the very profitable synergies between terrorism and transnational organised crime.

An important issue is to combine any military response to terrorism with countering violent extremism through engagement with communities and civil society organisations to address legitimate political and social grievances that can be exploited by terrorist narratives.

Options
In the adoption of a resolution, options for the Council include:

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UN DOCUMENTS ON COUNTERING TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED CRIME

Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2013/5 (13 May 2013) highlighted terrorism’s connection with transnational organised crime in Africa. S/PRST/2012/2 (21 February 2012) was on the impact of the transnational organised crime on peace, security and stability in West Africa and the Sahel. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2014/9 (9 January 2014) was on the UN’s support for states and regional entities in Africa in fighting terrorism. S/2013/359 (17 June 2013) was on transnational organised crime and illicit drug trafficking in West Africa and the Sahel. Sanctions Committee Document S/2014/770 (29 September 2014) was the 16th report of the Monitoring Team of the 1267/1989 Sanctions Committee S/2014/402 (9 June 2014) was the fourth report of the Monitoring Team of the 1988 Taliban Sanctions Committee. General Assembly Document A/RES/68/276 (13 June 2014) expressed deep concern about the connections between transnational organised crime and terrorism, and emphasised the need to enhance cooperation at the national, subregional, regional and international levels. A/68/841 (14 April 2014) was on the implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
Countering Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime (con’t)

• stressing the urgent need for effective information-sharing in order to effectively counter terrorism and transnational organised crime;
• encourage the Secretary-General to incorporate new strategies to address terrorism and transnational organised crime by peace operations in the review currently under way;
• calling upon member states to develop national and multilateral strategies to counter extremism and in particular violent extremism that can be conducive to terrorism; and
• establishing an expert group to identify those involved in transnational organised crime in the Sahel, with the possibility of imposing targeted sanctions, as recommended in the Secretary-General’s report (S/2013/189).

Council Dynamics

Although terrorism is a matter of grave concern for all Council members, a broad debate on the linkages with transnational organised crime will likely reveal differences in Council members’ understanding of both the phenomena, its causes and the most appropriate ways to address them, including issues related to due process and the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. As some terrorist groups claim political objectives and some political movements have violent outlets, Council members may become divided over categorising and defining which groups are considered terrorists. Also, some Council members might argue that transnational organised crime is not always linked to terrorism fearing that situations that are not currently on the Council’s agenda might be discussed.

In the past, Council members have also been divided regarding references to paying ransoms to terrorist groups for the release of hostages.

Iran

Expected Council Action

In December, the chair of the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Gary Quinlan (Australia), is due to present to the Council his final quarterly briefing on the Committee’s work. (Australia’s term as an elected member ends on 31 December. At press time it was not decided who would be taking over the chairmanship.)

The Committee is scheduled to meet ahead of the briefing to consider the mid-term report from its Panel of Experts.

Key Recent Developments

On 24 November, Iran and the P5 +1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US) announced they were extending until 1 July 2015 the 24 November 2013 Joint Plan of Action (JPA) in order to continue negotiations aimed at reaching agreement on “a mutually agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful”. (The JPA, which came into effect on 20 January, had an initial duration of six months but allowed for the possibility of extension, by mutual consent, and stipulated that the parties would aim to conclude negotiating and commence implementing a comprehensive solution no more than one year after its adoption. The parties decided in July to extend the JPA until 24 November.) While 1 July 2015 was set as the new deadline, the aim would be to secure agreement on the substance of a final accord by March in order to allow sufficient time for technical details to be worked out at the end. Negotiations were scheduled to resume in December.

In making the announcement, officials provided few details about the state of the negotiations. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani declared that “many gaps were narrowed and our positions with the other side got closer” while US Secretary of State John Kerry said “real and substantial progress” had been made and new ideas had been discussed, but that “some significant points of disagreement” remained. While no further specifics were offered, it was widely reported that the question of how much uranium-enrichment capacity Iran should be allowed to retain was a major sticking point. Iran currently has 19,000 installed enrichment centrifuges, of which 10,000 are in operation, whereas the proposals presented by the P5+1 (which involves additional restrictions on Iran’s enrichment activities) have reportedly called for no more than 4,500 centrifuges. The parties are apparently still far apart on the question of the conditions and timetable for the lifting of sanctions, with Iran seeking permanent and almost immediate sanctions relief and not just temporary measures as proposed by the P5+1 as a first step of a gradual approach.

Other key issues in the negotiations include the duration of the final agreement (with Iran apparently initially seeking a duration of no more than three years as opposed to twenty years suggested by the other side), the modalities of the inspections and monitoring regime that will be put in place to ensure that Iran’s nuclear programme remains exclusively peaceful and what to do with the heavy water reactor in Arak, which it is apparently agreed will need to be modified to cut its annual weapon-grade plutonium output. If the main sticking points are resolved, however, the expectation seems to be that agreement on these issues will fall into place.

In parallel with the P5+1 talks, the IAEA and Iran continued to discuss the Framework for Cooperation agreed on 11 November 2013, involving a series of practical measures aimed at ensuring international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. In a 7 November report to the Council, the IAEA Director General reported that Iran had yet to implement two of the five practical measures agreed in May 2014, namely sharing information about its
research into high explosive detonators that could be used to trigger a nuclear weapon and about neutron transport studies that could be relevant to calculate the explosive yield of a nuclear weapon. The report also noted that the IAEA had repeatedly invited Iran to propose additional practical measures but had received no response.

Since Quinlan last briefed the Council on 15 September, the work of the Committee has effectively been on hold. There was a meeting on 20 October, however, mainly to consider a request from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF, an inter-governmental body with 36 members that aims to promote effective implementation of measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the international financial system). FATF had asked a member of the Panel of Experts to serve as an external reviewer of revised FATF guidelines relating to UN sanctions. It seems Committee members were divided over whether to approve such an arrangement. The chair suggested that interested Committee members should consult amongst themselves to resolve the issue.

The Panel of Experts’ mid-term report was submitted to the Committee on 7 November. The report indicated that the Panel had not received any new information from member states on alleged sanctions violations and had therefore not started any new investigations. It also noted that states might have been more cautious in their approach to exchanging information with the Panel because of the ongoing negotiations. The report is due for submission to the Council by 9 December but will not be made public. (Unlike with many other Panels of Experts, only the final report is issued as an official UN document.)

Human Rights-Related Developments
The special rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, Ahmed Shaheed, briefed the General Assembly’s Third Committee on 28 October on his latest annual report. He stated that the human rights situation remained of serious concern notwithstanding some recent advances by the Iranian government and parliament. The report details a surge in executions for crimes not recognised as capital offenses under international law, continuing reports of widespread and systematic torture, and draft laws that appear to further undermine women’s rights and the rights to freedom of expression and association. According to the report, at least 35 journalists are currently in detention in Iran, and allegations continue about harassment, interrogations and surveillance of many others.

The Third Committee also considered the report of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights in Iran, which documents increased use of the death penalty, including in relation to political Prisoners and juvenile offenders; reports of arbitrary detention and prosecution of journalists, human rights defenders and women rights activists; and discrimination against minority groups, in some cases amounting to persecution. It notes that the Iranian government did not engage substantively with the special procedures of the Human Rights Council during the reporting period and that no mandate-holder, including the special rapporteur, has been admitted into the country since 2005.

On 18 November, the Third Committee adopted its annual resolution on the human rights situation in Iran by a vote of 78 in favour to 35 against, with 69 abstentions (A/C.3/69/L.33).

In a press conference on 28 October, the spokesperson for the High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed shock at the execution on 25 October of Reyhaneh Jabbari, sentenced to death for the alleged murder of a former employee of the Iranian Intelligence Ministry, despite repeated calls by various UN human rights mechanisms not to execute her. The spokesperson also expressed concern about due process relating to the case, particularly with regard to allegations that her conviction was based on confessions made under duress.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is how it can best support the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 to ensure a positive outcome.

At the Committee level, a practical issue is how to ensure an effective transition between the outgoing and incoming chair.

Options
As long as the P5+1 talks with Iran are ongoing, options for the Council are limited. The chair’s briefing will offer an opportunity for individual Council members to express their views on the talks and the role of the Committee in supporting the process. A further option would be for the Council to issue a statement encouraging the parties to continue their efforts to reach an agreement and confirming its readiness to lift the sanctions against Iran in the event of a successful outcome.

In addition, elected members could request the P5 to brief them on the status of the negotiations. (At the moment, no mechanism exists for the P5+1 to keep the Council informed, and there seems to be some frustration among elected members that the P5 has not been more forthcoming in this regard.)

In the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee, there are two main options. The Committee can either continue the current cautious approach or it can decide to take action on the issues that are outstanding. As for the appointment of the next chair of the Committee, the Council could implement the guidelines set out in the 17 December 2012 president’s note which called for an inclusive and transparent process, rather than leaving the decision to the P5, as has been the practice in the past.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Over the past months, the Council has essentially been in a waiting mode in anticipation of the outcome of the P5+1 talks and the scope for any substantive action has been very limited. With the announcement that the talks have been extended, this situation is likely to continue. At press time, there was no indication that any formal Council response to the extension of the JPA might be considered.

There are differing views among Council members as to how the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee can best support the ongoing negotiations. While China and Russia have continued to argue in favour of a cautious approach so as not to undermine the process, other Council members seem to hold the position that the Committee can have a positive impact on the negotiations by taking action to ensure that sanctions continue to be fully implemented.

Due mainly to the opposition of Russia, several issues are on hold before the Committee. These include a US proposal to designate Jaysh Al-Shabi, a pro-government Syrian militia that has allegedly received arms from Iran (on hold by Russia), a proposal to send a letter to Iran concerning public statements by Iranian officials seemingly confirming its involvement in arms transfers to Gaza and a draft Implementation Assistance Notice on the Great Prophet exercise conducted by Iran in July 2012, during which it fired several ballistic missiles in violation of the Council’s ban on such activities. In addition, continuing divisions have also prevented the Committee from concluding its consideration of the recommendations put forward by the Panel of Experts in its June report. For its part, Iran has yet to respond to any of the letters from the Committee requesting its views on various Panel incident reports that concluded Iran had engaged in sanctions violations.

The US is the penholder on Iran.
### Notable Dates for December

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### MANDATES EXPIRE

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