Overview

The UK will hold the presidency of the Council in August. An open debate on the role of the Security Council in conflict prevention, with briefings by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, is planned. A high-level debate is envisaged on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to be presided by the UK Minister for Africa, Mark Simmonds, with Special Representative Martin Kobler and exiting Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region Mary Robinson as likely briefers. A debate on Kosovo is expected, with a briefing by Special Representative Farid Zarif, by video teleconference (VTC). Also in August, the Council is planning a visiting mission to Europe and Africa. Briefings are expected on:

- the protection of humanitarian workers in armed conflict, to mark World Humanitarian Day on 19 August, with Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson (or Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos) and ICRC President Peter Maurer as likely briefers; and
- the Council visiting mission, by the leaders of the trip’s different segments.

Briefings, followed by consultations, are expected on:

- the Middle East;
- progress in delivering humanitarian aid across Syria’s borders and conflict lines following the adoption of resolutions 2139 and 2165, by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs;
- developments in Burundi, by Special Representative Parfait Onanga-Anyanga and the chair of the Peacebuilding Commission’s Burundi configuration (Switzerland);
- the situation in South Sudan, by the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO);
- the situation in Sudan and the work of AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), likely by Joint Special Representative Mohamed Ibn Chambas;
- developments in Libya by Special Representative Tarek Mitri; and
- the situation in the Central African Republic by Special Representative Babacar Gaye. Briefings in consultations are likely on:

- the implementation of resolution 2118 regarding the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons, by Sigrid Kaag, Special Coordinator of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-UN Joint Mission (by VTC);
- Sudan-South Sudan issues by Special Envoy Haile Menkerios, and the work of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei, by DPKO;
- the work of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee by its chair, Ambassador Maria Cristina Perceval (Argentina);
- the work of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), by DPKO;
- developments in Guinea-Bissau, by the Special Representative Miguel Trovoada;
- the situation in Yemen, by Special Adviser Jamal Benomar;
- the work of the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee by its chair, Jordan; and
- the work of the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Sanctions Committee by its chair, Ambassador Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg).

Formal sessions will be needed to adopt resolutions renewing the mandates of UNIFIL and UNAMID.

Throughout the month members will be following closely events in Ukraine, Iraq, as well as in Gaza and Israel and additional meetings may be scheduled.
In Hindsight: The Security Council’s Action on Downed Passenger Flights

Over the past 60 years, nearly 20 civilian planes have been shot down in various places around the globe. Some downings occurred when a plane strayed off its route into the territory of a state that perceived the aircraft as a threat (such as El Al flight 402, shot down by Bulgaria on 27 July 1955, or Libyan Arab Airlines flight 114, shot by Israel after it got lost on its way to Cairo on 21 February 1973). Some were shot down accidentally during a military exercise conducted by the state in whose airspace the disaster occurred. Several were deliberately targeted by insurgents on the ground, including Air Rhodesia flight 825, which was downed on 3 September 1978 by the Zimbabwe’s People’s Revolutionary Army, who then rounded up and executed 10 of the 18 survivors on the ground, or three Transair Georgia flights shot at by Abkhazian rebels near or at Sukhumi airport on 21, 22 and 23 September 1993.

Several of these incidents resulted in international friction and heightened international tension. Prior to the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight 17 on 17 July 2014, however, only two had been discussed by the Council formally in a series of substantive meetings.

In a 1 September 1983 letter to the President of the Council, the Republic of Korea (ROK) requested an urgent meeting after Korean Air Lines flight 007, with 269 people aboard, had been shot down by a Soviet fighter plane. Between 2-12 September, the Council held six open debates (S/PV.2470 through 2474 and S/PV.2476) on the matter. During the first meeting, the ROK called on the Soviet Union (USSR) to provide a detailed account of what happened; offer an apology; guarantee unimpeded access to the crash site by international aviation investigators, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); return the remains; and give credible, specific, concrete and effective guarantees against similar actions involving “unarmed civilian airplanes anywhere in the world”. Most speakers echoed these calls. The USSR responded that its airspace had been “rudely violated,” that it tried to establish contact with the plane and that the intruder eventually left the airspace flying towards the Sea of Japan. The USSR representative called the reaction to the incident a “hullabaloo” and implied that the US Central Intelligence Agency had been involved in the incident.

During the subsequent meetings, different scenarios were presented by the USSR and US representatives, with the Cold War rhetoric becoming increasingly shrill. The USSR eventually admitted that the plane was shot down over its airspace and had crashed but continued to insist that flight 007’s straying into Soviet airspace was a deliberate “provocation”.

A draft resolution co-sponsored by both Council and non-Council member states was circulated on 8 September. It deplored the tragic loss of life, urged all states to comply with the aims and objectives of ICAO and to cooperate fully with its efforts to strengthen international civil aviation safety and to prevent the recurrence of the use of armed force against international civil aviation. It also asked the Secretary-General to conduct “a full investigation into the circumstances of the tragedy” and to report the findings within 14 days. The draft was put to a vote on 12 September and vetoed by the USSR (with Poland also voting against and China, Guyana, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe abstaining).

Over the course of the meetings regarding flight 007, several states pointed out the usefulness of conducting a thorough investigation and expressed hopes that there would be improvements in international civil aviation law that would help avoid similar tragedies in the future. Yet five years later, another passenger jet was shot down by a superpower.

On 3 July 1988, Iran Air flight 655 bound for Dubai was shot down by the US Navy missile cruiser USS Vincennes, which was in the Persian Gulf along with warships from five European countries to protect commercial shipping from the dangers posed by the Iran-Iraq war, ongoing since 1980. The US mistook the Airbus A300 for a fighter plane, killing all 290 people on board. Iran requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council in a 5 July letter and held four open debates as of 14 July to consider the matter (S/PV.2818 through 2821). Iran urged the Council to condemn the US for the downing of the airliner and to “take immediate measures to compel the United States to abandon this war-mongering and arrogant mentality in the Persian Gulf”. The US pointed out Iran’s disregard for resolution 598 (adopted in July 1987, it demanded an immediate ceasefire between Iran and Iraq), citing this as a reason for its military presence in the Persian Gulf. The US did not deny shooting down flight 655 yet offered several details, some of which were later proved to be incorrect, to justify its actions, and did not apologise. Intense diplomatic work ensued and on 17 July Iran informed the Secretary-General that it accepted resolution 598. In turn, on 20 July, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 616, in which it expressed deep distress at the US warship’s downing of flight 655, welcomed the ICAO’s decision to conduct an immediate investigation and urged “honourable and durable” settlement of the Iran-Iraq conflict. What followed were several weeks of further diplomatic activity and the establishment in August of the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group. The decade-long conflict was ultimately ended in 1990.

Given the long aftermath of these earlier incidents, it is impossible to predict now whether the tragedy of Malaysian Airlines flight 17 might serve as a catalyst for the political steps that would lead to a settlement of the conflict in Ukraine. Not only does the Council treat each tragedy differently, and at times fails to take any action, as was the case with the still unresolved shooting down over Ndola on 18 September 1961 of the Douglas DC-6B carrying then UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and 15 others, but each tragedy can play out for years.
Among other issues, the discussion focused on implementation of the ban on charcoal exports from Somalia. Council members also received a briefing via video teleconference from Nicholas Kay, Special Representative and head of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia, regarding the security situation in Mogadishu. Following the meeting, Council members issued a press statement condemning recent attacks by Al-Shabaab on Villa Somalia, the parliament building and members of parliament (SC/11471).

UNOWA (West Africa)
Special Representative Said Djinnit briefed the Council on 8 July on the latest Secretary-General’s UNOWA report (S/2014/442), followed by consultations (S/PV.7213). The next day Council members issued a press statement welcoming Djinnit’s efforts in his capacity as UN High Representative to Nigeria and wider international efforts to address the threat of Boko Haram; expressing concern over the ebola outbreak in West Africa; and endorsing the establishment of a new analytical unit in UNOWA (SC/11466).

Israel/Palestine
The Council met several times in July to address the conflict in Gaza. On 1 July, Council members issued a press statement condemning in the strongest terms the killing of three Israeli teenagers and urging parties to refrain from steps that could further destabilise the situation (SC/11460). The following day, a Palestinian teenager from East Jerusalem was abducted and killed in an apparent retaliatory attack. Council members responded with another press statement expressing sorrow and condemnation for the killing and calling for immediate calm (SC/11462). Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon briefed the Council on 10 July (S/PV.7214) and two days later Council members issued a press statement that called for de-escalation; reinstatement of the November 2012 ceasefire; respect for international humanitarian law, including the protection of civilians; and support for the resumption of direct negotiations (SC/11472). The Council met again on 18 July in a debate at which Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman briefed the Council (S/PV.7220). On 20 July, Council members met in consultations, after which agreed elements were read to the press that reiterated many of the views expressed in the 12 July press statement, as well as emphasising the need to improve the humanitarian situation, expressing serious concern at the growing number of casualties and calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities. On 22 July, the Council held its regular quarterly open debate on the situation with the Secretary-General briefing by video teleconference from Ramallah, and over 40 member states participated (S/PV.7222). The Council convened again on 28 July (S/PV.7225) to adopt the first formal Council outcome—a presidential statement—on Israel/Palestine since early 2009 (S/PRST/2014/13). The statement, among other things, called for respect of international humanitarian law; expressed support for an immediate and unconditional humanitarian ceasefire into the Eid al-Fitr period and beyond; called on parties to engage in efforts to achieve a durable ceasefire; emphasised that civilian and humanitarian facilities be respected and protected; and called for the full implementation of resolution 1860. On 22 July, Jordan, acting on behalf of the Arab League, circulated a draft resolution that also called for an immediate ceasefire but entailed a more comprehensive response to the crisis than the presidential statement. It called for renewed efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace based on the vision of two states based on pre-1967 borders; for the lifting of Israeli restrictions on the movement of persons and goods; for all parties to abide by international humanitarian law; and for the cessation of military reprisals, collective punishment and excessive use of force against Palestinians. Council members met to negotiate the text and a revised version was circulated on 25 July. While negotiations were continuing, at press time a vote on the text had not yet been scheduled. On 31 July the Council met for an urgent meeting on the humanitarian situation in Gaza, a day after Israel’s shelling of an UNRWA school shelter in which at least 16 people were killed. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos and Commissioner-General of UNRWA Pierre Krähenbühl briefed the Council via video teleconference and telephone, respectively (S/PV.7232). The briefing was followed by consultations.

Peacebuilding Commission
The Council was briefed on 15 July (S/PV.7217) by Ambassadors Vladimir Drobnjak (Croatia) and Antonio de Aguiar Patriota (Brazil), the past and current PBC chairs, who presented the 2013 PBC annual report (S/2014/67). In the afternoon, Council members held an informal interactive dialogue with the country-configuration chairs of the PBC and representatives of the PBC agenda countries. A 25 July letter from Council President Eugène-Richard Gasana (Rwanda) and Patriota was circulated to Council members summarising the discussion.

Afghanistan
Council members issued a press statement on 15 July that condemned attacks in Paktika and Kabul earlier that day that killed and wounded many civilians (SC/11476).

Ukraine
On 18 July, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman briefed the Council at an emergency session following the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight 17 (S/PV.7219). The same day Council members issued a press statement expressing condolences to the families of those killed and calling for a thorough and independent international investigation (SC/11480). On 21 July, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2166, which condemned the downing of flight 17 and called for an investigation of the crash (S/PV.7221).

Iraq
On 23 July, Special Representative Nickolay Mladenov briefed the Council on prospects of forming a government given the election of a prime minister was still outstanding following 30 April elections, the security implications of the seizure of north-western Iraq by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the fact that over a third of Iraq was outside government control, territorial consolidation of Kurdistan and the ongoing impasse between
Irbil and Baghdad (S/PV.7224). He presented the Secretary-General’s reports on UNAMI (S/2014/485) and on Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property (S/2014/480). He also discussed the humanitarian impact of the current crisis, reporting 1.2 million were displaced and that minorities were under attack as a result of the spread of ISIS. On 21 July, Council members issued a press statement expressing deep concern over reports of threats against religious and ethnic minorities in Mosul and other parts of Iraq controlled ISIS (SC/11484). Mladenov also reported that ISIS had taken control of oil fields and pipelines, increasing its access to financial resources. On 28 July, the Council adopted a presidential statement prohibiting illicit oil trade as a source of revenue for terrorists in Iraq and Syria (S/PRST/2014/14). On 30 July, the Council adopted resolution 2169 renewing UNAMI for a year and increasing the reporting period to every three months versus every four months. There were significant changes to the preambular paragraphs of the resolution to reflect the current situation, however there were no substantive changes in the operational paragraphs which form the mission’s mandate.

Cyprus
On 24 July, Council members were briefed in consultations by Lisa Buttenheim, the Special Representative and head of UNFICYP and Acting Special Adviser, on the latest Secretary-General’s report (S/2014/461). On 30 July the Council adopted resolution 2168 extending the mandate of UNFICYP for another six months.

Mali
On 28 July, the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2014/15) welcoming the commencement on 16 July of the inter-Malian negotiation process in Algiers which led to the consensual adoption of a roadmap (Feuille de route des négociations dans le cadre du processus d’Alger) by the parties (S/PV.7227). On 1 July, Council members issued a press statement condemning a 30 June improvised explosive device explosion, which killed a MINUSMA peacekeeper and injured six other peacekeepers (SC/11461).

Peacekeeping
On 28 July, the Council held an open debate on “UN peacekeeping: regional partnerships and their evolution” which included briefings by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, EU Deputy Secretary General for External Action Service Maciej Popowski and the Permanent Observer of the AU to the UN, Ambassador Téte António (S/PV.7228). Resolution 2167, covering the political, operational and financial aspects of these partnerships, was adopted.

Conflict Prevention

**Expected Council Action**
The UK, as part of its August presidency, is planning an open debate on conflict prevention with Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay as briefers. A resolution or a presidential statement is a potential outcome.

**Key Recent Developments**
The Council has recently held several events on conflict prevention. On 15 April 2013, there was a briefing on preventing conflicts in Africa (S/PV.6946), with a presidential statement drafted by Rwanda on the root causes of conflict as an outcome (S/PRST/2013/4). On 19 June 2013, the UK organised an open debate on natural resources and conflict prevention (S/PV.6982 and Resumption 1). On 29 January, at the initiative of Jordan, there was an open debate on “war, its lessons and the search for a permanent peace” (S/PV.7105). Most recently, on 16 April there was a briefing on preventing conflict and fighting against genocide (S/PV.7155), with resolution 2150 calling upon states to prevent genocide and other serious crimes under international law as an outcome.

However, during the last few years, there have been several instances when the Council has failed to prevent the onset or escalation of conflicts, including situations that had already been on the Council’s agenda:

- on Syria, the Council responded with an initial meeting one month after the government’s crackdown on protests began in March 2011, but its engagement—which has mostly been held hostage by a political stalemate within the Council—has done very little to mitigate the intensification of conflict (with the recent adoption of resolution 2165 perhaps being an exception);

- in Mali, despite ongoing Tuareg and jihadist rebellions and the 22 March 2012 military coup, the Council failed to take action toward restoring the constitutional order and stabilising the country until 20 December 2012 with authorisation in resolution 2085 for a phased deployment of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali, eventually precipitating an urgent French military intervention in January 2013;

- on the Central African Republic (CAR), the Council issued seven press statements between December 2012 and March 2013 (but otherwise took no action) in response to the Séléka rebellion and its 24 March 2013 seizure of power, and only authorised the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the CAR on 10 April with resolution 2149;

- on South Sudan, the Council established a new mission through resolution 1996 of 8 July 2011, yet it did not adequately respond to the considerable challenges facing the newly independent country and failed to take effective steps to prevent the descent into full-scale civil war as of 15 December 2013; and

- regarding Libya, other than increasing the frequency of its meetings to monthly in response to a deteriorating security situation. 

UN DOCUMENTS ON CONFLICT PREVENTION

| Security Council Resolution | S/RES/2150 (16 April 2014) calls upon states to prevent and fight against genocide. | Security Council Presidential Statement | S/PRST/2013/4 (15 April 2013) was a presidential statement on “Prevention of Conflicts in Africa: addressing the root causes”. | Security Council Meeting Records | S/PV.7155 (16 April 2014) was a briefing on preventing conflict and fighting against genocide. | S/PV.7105 (29 January 2014) was an open debate on history, national reconciliation and post-conflict peacebuilding. | S/PV.6982 and Resumption 1 (19 June 2013) was an open debate on natural resources and conflict prevention. | S/PV.6946 (15 April 2013) was a briefing on preventing conflict in Africa. |
situation, the Council has responded neither to General Khalifa Haftar's attempted coups on 14 February and 16 May nor to the Libya’s recent request for a stabilisation force in order to prevent a further escalation of conflict.

Underlying Problems
There are numerous possible explanations for the Council's disappointing track record on conflict prevention, including:

- insufficient accurate and timely information regarding emerging conflict situations;
- resistance by member states—often citing sovereignty concerns—to being discussed by the Council;
- political divisions among the P5 members, particularly when national interests are at stake;
- differences among Council members regarding what conflict prevention means in practice, including how and when it should be pursued;
- inadequate tools, such as financing and troops, for a rapid preventive deployment of peacekeepers;
- challenges related to attention span combined with a proliferation of Council agenda items to manage;
- patterns of dominance by the penholder and deference by other Council members, yielding to inertia when the former fails to act decisively; and
- standard operating procedures of the Council (e.g., press statements) that may be ill-suited for preventive diplomacy and mediation efforts.

Key Issue
The main issue is that despite the Council's oft-stated commitment to conflict prevention in principle, Council performance has been chronically poor in practice.

Options
Perhaps the most likely option would be to either issue a presidential statement or adopt a resolution reaffirming the Council's commitment to conflict prevention.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa continues to be underutilised, and could be revamped to address the early signs of conflict in a more timely and meaningful way.

Another option would be for the Council to request the Secretary-General to form an independent panel to review Council conflict prevention practice and offer policy recommendations. The panel's composition could include scholars with expertise on the Council and conflict prevention as well as former Council practitioners. The purpose would be to provide impartial analysis and fresh thinking on the subject.

Council and Wider Dynamics
In attempting to fulfil the mandate of the Council to maintain international peace and security, there is an irrefutable logic of full-scale conflict. For many developing countries, resistance to international intervention—even in the various forms of UN conflict prevention—can also be attributed to the legacy of colonialism. On the other hand, assertions of national sovereignty seem to be shifting in other cases—such as the CAR, Mali and Somalia—where governments have requested the UN to take a more proactive role. This also suggests there may be underutilised scope for Council engagement on conflict prevention.

South Sudan

Expected Council Action
In early August, the Council is expected to hold a briefing, followed by consultations, on the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) with Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet expected to brief. The 25 July Secretary-General's UNMISS report (S/2014/537) will serve as a basis for the discussion. South Sudan will also be a priority for the Council visiting mission to Africa planned for August.

The mission’s mandate expires on 30 November.

Key Recent Developments
South Sudan continues to suffer a severe humanitarian, political and security crisis. With regard to the humanitarian situation, an estimated 1.1 million people have been internally displaced, approximately 405,600 have fled to neighbouring countries and thousands have died since the conflict erupted on 15 December 2013. A cholera epidemic has also gained momentum, infecting 4,692 people and claiming 106 lives as of 21 July, according to the World Health Organization and South Sudan. In addition, food insecurity is prevalent, and the risk of famine looms large. On 23 July, the Director of the Operational Division of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, John Ging, said the humanitarian situation in South Sudan is “very desperate...and...
something that is on a trajectory to develop into a wholesale catastrophe”.

On the political track, the negotiations in Addis Ababa led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) between the government of South Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Opposition have been mired in process, stalled by disagreements between the parties, including about the form and substance of civil society participation, as well as disenchantment with the mediation. At press time, the negotiations, which were suspended on 23 June, were tentatively expected to recommence on 30 July after IGAD mediators met with various stakeholders in Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Juba, including President Salva Kiir and rebel leader Riek Machar, among others.

A debate about the merits of federalism has gained momentum in South Sudan. Several key political and civil society figures—including members of the SPLM in Opposition—have argued that this system of governance would be a constructive alternative to the current political system, which concentrates significant power in the hands of the president. Ateny Wek Ateny, a spokesman for Kiir, said on 24 June that a decision regarding the system of government should be made through a referendum after stability is re-established in the country.

The debate about federalism in South Sudan has led to restrictions on freedom of the press. On 1 July, the Juba-based Citizen Daily newspaper reported that government security forces had warned media outlets not to publish stories about federalism. The newspaper also said that government security personnel raided its offices and confiscated 3,000 copies of the paper on 7 July. On 2 July, government security forces seized copies of the Juba Monitor newspaper, warning that they would incarcerate staff and shut down the paper because of its coverage of federalism.

The security situation in South Sudan also remains tenuous. Violations of the 10 June ceasefire agreement occurred in July. (In addition to this agreement, previous agreements of 23 January and 9 May were also breached.) Mortar and gunfire was reported on 4 and 7 July between government and SPLM in Opposition forces across the Sobat River in Nasir in Upper Nile state. On 20 July, SPLM in Opposition forces and White Army youth attacked government positions in Nasir. Fighting ensued for several days for control of the town before the rebels retreated on 24 July. IGAD, UNMISS and the AU Commission Chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma issued statements deploiring the violence and accusing the SPLM in Opposition of initiating it.

Recent media reports have indicated that China North Industries Group Corporation (Norinco) shipped $38 million in arms to South Sudan in June, including ammunition, machine guns, grenade launchers and assault rifles. Norinco is China’s largest arms producer.

On 10 July, the EU imposed targeted sanctions, including travel bans and assets freezes, on Santino Deng, one of the government’s leading generals, and rebel commander Peter Gadet. In a press release, the EU announced that it had “decided to adopt as a first step restrictive measures against individuals responsible for obstructing the IGAD-led peace process, breaching the ceasefire and committing egregious human rights violations”. The US imposed an assets freeze and travel ban on Gadet and Marial Chanour, who heads the presidential guard, on 6 May.

Also on 10 July, the AU General Assembly extended the mandate of the AU Commission of Inquiry (CoI) on South Sudan for an additional three months. (Established on 12 March, the CoI was initially provided three months to finalise its activities.) While noting that the findings of its interim report (published in June) are only preliminary, the CoI stressed that healing and reconciliation in South Sudan must be inclusive and that women and others who have been on the margins of public life need to have a voice in determining South Sudan’s future. The CoI urged that deployment of the IGAD Protection Force be expedited, while recognising the sensitivities of assembling this type of multinational force. The CoI also stated that it “encountered some mass graves as well as many individuals who allege having suffered or witnessed commission of crime, including sexual and gender-based violence”.

Hilde Johnson stepped down as Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNMISS on 8 July. In her final press conference, Johnson underscored what she called three “diseases” afflicting the country: “the cancer of corruption”; “rule by the gun and not by the law”; and “rule by a self-serving elite.” She added that South Sudan would need fundamental reforms moving forward, especially pertaining to security, justice and financial management. Ellen Margrethe Løj was appointed as Johnson’s successor on 23 July.

The Council held consultations on Sudan-South and Sudan on 16 July, with briefings by Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan and South Sudan Haile Menkerios (via videoconference) and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos. While Menkerios seemed to question the commitment of Kiir and Machar to the IGAD-led mediation process, Amos discussed food shortages in South Sudan. At the stakeout after the meeting, Amos said that food security assessments in May and June had demonstrated an acute food and livelihood crisis in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states.

Following the consultations, Olivier Nduhungirehe (Rwanda), delivered elements to the press on behalf of the Council, expressing deep concern about the deteriorating situation in South Sudan and noting that roughly one million people were at risk of famine. The Council stated its alarm at information that both parties continued to violate their 10 June cessation of hostilities agreement by recruiting fighters and acquiring weapons. It further indicated its readiness to consider “appropriate measures, in consultations with countries of the region, against those who will not implement their commitment to peace”.

The Council issued two press statements on 25 July. One welcomed the appointment of the Løj, condemned the fighting in Nasir, and urged the parties to cease hostilities and resume peace talks (SC/ 11492). The other statement expressed grave concern with food insecurity in South Sudan, and urged UN member states to fulfil pledges for humanitarian support made at the Oslo Conference in May and increase their commitments to South Sudan and the region (SC/11493).

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 25 June, Flavia Pansieri, the Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, told the Human Rights Council (HRC) that the High Commissioner witnessed a critical level of violence, including ethnically motivated mass slaughter and gruesome and massive revenge killings, during her
visit to South Sudan in April. As a result of the violence, UNMISS has put on hold all operational and capacity-building support to the government as suggested in the report of the Secretary-General on UNMISS released on 6 March (S/2014/158). Nevertheless, the Council adopted a resolution on 27 June under the agenda item of technical assistance and capacity-building for South Sudan in human rights (A/HRC/RES/26/31). Italy, speaking on behalf of the EU before the adoption (without a vote), regretted that the text did not reflect the gravity of the situation on the ground and did not establish a special procedure on South Sudan. The resolution strongly condemned the violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law that have occurred since December 2013 and demanded a halt to all human rights violations by all parties. In addition, the HRC decided to convene a panel discussion on the human rights situation in South Sudan during its next session.

Key Issues
A key issue is how to get the parties to commit to cease hostilities and negotiate a political solution to the conflict in earnest.

Also a key issue is the pace of deployment of the additional forces serving in UNMISS, as well as the disposition of these forces in fulfilling their mandate to protect civilians.

Another important issue is the Council’s role in facilitating humanitarian access, given the dire predictions of famine in the coming months and the restrictions that have been placed on humanitarian access by government and opposition forces. A related issue is how the Council can best encourage donors to expeditiously honour their pledges and enhance their support for humanitarian efforts, given the shortfall in funding for the UN South Sudan Crisis Response Plan.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- using its visiting mission to South Sudan to put pressure on the parties, making it clear to key stakeholders that unless they immediately engage in good faith and serious negotiations, as well as allow unhindered humanitarian access, the international support they have enjoyed so far may be compromised or terminated;
- imposing targeted sanctions on those individuals who undermine the peace process and commit serious human rights violations; and
- welcoming the interim report of the CoI and indicating that the Council is looking forward to its findings moving forward, including its final report later this year.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Council members are gravely concerned about the humanitarian, political and security crisis facing South Sudan. Though supportive of IGAD’s mediation efforts, they are extremely frustrated with South Sudan and the SPLM in Opposition for the lack of progress in the peace talks.

The possibility of targeted sanctions against those committing human rights violations and obstructing the peace process has been discussed among Council members. While several members are supportive of this approach, challenges remain to pursuing this course of action. First, there is a desire among some Council members for regional and sub-regional actors such as IGAD or the AU to implement sanctions first, as this would give political support for the Council to follow suit. The difficulty is that, although IGAD threatened to take “punitive measures” (including sanctions) in a 10 June communiqué, it has yet to do so. As a result, some Council members are beginning to sense that the issue of targeted sanctions may be divisive within IGAD, perhaps given that some of its member states have strong economic and political ties to South Sudan. Secondly, some members, notably China and Russia, have expressed their reservations about targeted measures, and it remains unclear how they might respond in the Council, even if the region were to make the first move.

The US is the penholder on South Sudan.

Sudan and South Sudan

Expected Council Action
In August, the Council expects to hold its monthly consultations on Sudan-South Sudan issues. It will also consider in consultations the bimonthly report of the Secretary-General (S/2014/518) on the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan and South Sudan Haile Menkerios is likely to brief on Sudan-South Sudan issues, while a representative of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations will brief on UNISFA.

The mandate of UNISFA expires on 15 October.

Key Recent Developments
Although Sudan and South Sudan have maintained contact at various levels of government, both countries remain heavily focused on their own domestic political and security challenges. This has made it difficult for the two countries to make progress in addressing the remaining issues dividing them, including border demarcation, the determination of the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone (SDBZ) centrel ine, the establishment of temporary administrative institutions in Abyei and the final status of Abyei.

On 16 June, UNISFA partially reactivated the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, which had been dormant since November 2013, with air patrols of the Sudan-South Sudan border having recommenced out of Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan state in Sudan.

On 16 July, Misseriya militiamen killed five Ngok-Dinka in a cattle-raiding incident in the south of Abyei, the contested region straddling the Sudan-South Sudan border. The Misseriya militia attempted to rustle several hundred cattle, but they were largely unsuccessful due to the resistance of the local inhabitants and the intervention of UNISFA.

A memorandum of understanding regarding the delivery of humanitarian aid to South Sudan through Sudan was signed by the two countries on 8 July. The aid is expected to be...
distributed in Upper Nile, Unity and Jonglei states in South Sudan, areas that are also experiencing significant food insecurity in the midst of a civil war. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs noted in its 7-13 July Humanitarian Bulletin that “delivery of aid through Sudan is preferred, as most of the roads connecting the…targeted states with Juba are impassable during the rainy season”.

The national dialogue process in Sudan continues to proceed haltingly. President Omar al-Bashir initiated the process earlier this year, stating that it is designed to “stop the war and bring peace, free political society, fight against poverty and revitalize national identity”. The government promised to create an enabling atmosphere for the dialogue, and some opposition parties were allowed to conduct rallies unhindered by the government. However, restrictions have been placed on the press, and several opposition figures have been arrested for making comments critical of the government.

On 15 July, Sadigq Al-Mahdi, the head of the opposition National Umma Party (NUP), said that the national dialogue process should be directed toward peaceful democratic transformation. He added that the process should be chaired by a neutral figure, rather than by Bashir. Al-Mahdi was arrested on 17 May after he criticised the government-affiliated Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia for attacking civilians in Darfur. Soon after his detention, the NUP withdrew from the national dialogue process, which it has not rejoined even though Al-Mahdi was released on 15 June.

The head of the opposition Sudan Congress Party, Ibrahim al-Sheik, was incarcerated on 8 June, also for criticising the activities of the RSF. Al-Sheik has refused to apologise for his remarks, which Congress Party officials believe would have paved the way for his release. He remains in jail at press time.

On 17 July, State Minister of Information Yasser Youssef said that full freedom of the press could not be allowed because “the situation in Sudan is explosive and would be uncontrollable”. In recent months, some newspapers in Sudan have reportedly been told by security forces not to report on the actions of the RSF, as well as corruption. The Al-Salha newspaper was shut down on 17 May by the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) after covering corruption cases involving government officials. It was briefly allowed to reopen in early July but closed again by the NISS on the next day.

On 10 July, Bashir convened a meeting of pro-government and opposition political parties to assess the national dialogue. During the meeting, the participants agreed to form a committee to develop a roadmap to chart the way forward that was expected to be finalised on 22 July. Although this deadline was missed, Ibrahim Gandour, an assistant to Bashir, said on 23 July that the government and the opposition parties had conveyed on over 90 percent of the roadmap. Still it appears that fundamental differences of perspective remain. In particular, opposition parties espouse the creation of a national unity government and a postponement of the April 2015 elections to assess electoral laws, while the government seems unwilling to make these concessions.

The Council held consultations on Sudan-South Sudan issues on 16 July, with Menkerios and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos briefing. Menkerios told Council members that alongside Thabo Mbeki, head of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), he would try to urge Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) to re-engage in negotiations. He also indicated that opposition parties in Sudan had requested Mbeki to help mediate the national dialogue process in Sudan and that Mbeki would be meeting with opposition politicians to discuss what role he could play. Amos said that, according to reputable sources, 170,000 people had been displaced in SPLM-N held areas of Sudan in the first half of 2014. She also noted that Sudan and South Sudan faced significant humanitarian challenges, with both countries experiencing refugee outflows and food shortages.

Key Issues
One key issue is whether and how the Council can facilitate progress between Sudan and South Sudan in addressing outstanding issues dividing them, given that they are each focused on their own internal crises.

Another key issue is how the Council responds to the interconnected humanitarian crises facing both Sudan and South Sudan, especially given restrictions on access in both countries.

Also a key issue is whether the Council can formulate an effective response to the national dialogue process in Sudan, one that encourages progress but also signals concern about the shortcomings of the process.

Options
The Council could consider a resolution (or other outcome) that:

- demands all parties in Sudan and South Sudan (i.e., the governments and rebel movements in both countries) to allow unfettered humanitarian access;
- makes a special appeal to member states to provide funding for humanitarian operations in both countries;
- calls on those states that have pledged their support to fulfil their commitments; and
- welcomes the national dialogue in Sudan but expresses concern about the curtailment of press freedom and the arrests of opposition figures.

Another option is for the Council to request Mbeki to brief (possibly in an informal interactive dialogue) on the AUHIP’s recent work, including on efforts to convince Sudan and the SPLM-N to restart negotiations, and on any potential mediation role in Sudan’s national dialogue. This could also be an opportunity for the Council to learn about any steps that Sudan and South Sudan are taking to resolve their outstanding issues.

Council Dynamics
There is disappointment with the ongoing lack of progress by Sudan and South Sudan in implementing their agreements, although there is recognition that both countries are engrossed with their own domestic problems. While Council members view the national dialogue in Sudan as a step in the right direction, several question the government’s commitment to the process, given media restrictions and the arrest of key opposition figures.

There appears to be interest among several members in learning more about Mbeki’s efforts to play a mediating role in the dialogue and to urge Sudan and the SPLM-N to return to the negotiating table.

The US is the penholder on Sudan-South Sudan issues and UNISFA.
Expected Council Action
In August, the Council will hold a briefing, followed by consultations, on the Secretary-General’s quarterly report on the UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and adopt a resolution renewing the mission’s mandate before it expires on 31 August. Joint Special Representative and head of UNAMID Mohamed Ibn Chambas is scheduled to brief. Ambassador Maria Cristina Perceval (Argentina), chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, is also expected to provide the quarterly briefing to the Council, likely in consultations, on the committee’s work.

Key Recent Developments
The security situation in Darfur remains volatile, marked by large-scale inter-communal violence, banditry, criminality and ongoing clashes between government or government-affiliated forces and rebel groups. On 5 July, the Ma’alia and Rezeigat—two communities that traditionally fight over land ownership—clashed in East Darfur, reportedly leading to 31 deaths. More than 500 people lost their lives in clashes between these two groups in 2013.

On 6 July, members of the Abbala community abducted five women from the Beni Hussein community in North Darfur. The Beni Hussein and the Abbala have a history of violent clashes, including one confrontation in January 2013 in Jebel Amir, North Darfur, over a gold mine in which 100 people died and 100,000 were displaced.

Lawlessness has been particularly prevalent in South Darfur recently, especially in the state capital of Nyala. On 6 July, a government official was shot to death by armed men while travelling from Nyala to deliver salaries to government workers in Katita. On 14 July, General Adam Mahmoud Jar Al-Nabi, the governor of South Darfur, claimed that the Popular Defence Force, a government-affiliated paramilitary group, was responsible for the attack. A militia group abducted a worker with the International Organisation for Migration in Nyala on 6 July; he was released on 25 July.

The humanitarian situation in Darfur continues to be dire. There are currently more than 2.3 million internally displaced persons in the region. The Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs reports that more than 397,000 people have been displaced in Darfur in 2014, although nearly 131,300 of them have been able to return to their home areas. Food insecurity is also on the rise due to the lingering impact of last year’s drought, heightened food prices and the unstable security situation.

On 2 July, Stéphane Dujarric, spokesman for Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, announced that the Secretary-General had “instructed the Secretariat to review the reports of all [UNAMID] investigations and inquiries undertaken since mid-2012 to ensure that their recommendations have been implemented and that any relevant issues have been fully addressed”. He said the review was expected to be completed in one month. The announcement follows on the heels of ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda’s call, during her 17 June briefing to the Council, for an independent and thorough inquiry into allegations that UNAMID reporting had been manipulated to conceal crimes against civilians and peacekeepers. According to Bensouda’s 10 June written report to the Council, allegations of distorted reporting by the mission were supported by documents made public by Aïcha El Basri, UNAMID spokesperson from August 2012 to April 2013. In a 9 April piece in Foreign Policy, El Basri wrote, “UNAMID lied to the media and failed to protect, or in some cases even make an effort to protect, civilians in the region”.

On 9 July, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) adopted a communiqué in which it decided to extend UNAMID’s mandate for 12 months while requesting that the UN Security Council extend the mission’s authorisation (PSC/PR/COMM.[DCXLVI]). In the communiqué, the PSC also expressed concern with the humanitarian situation in Darfur and with human rights violations in the region.

Perceval last briefed the Council on the work of the 1591 Sanctions Committee in consultations on 20 May. She reported that concerns had been expressed by a number of Committee members about ongoing violations of the arms embargo.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in Darfur, which many observers believe is the worst it has been since 2003-2004. In particular, inter-communal violence since early 2013 has been a major cause of the insecurity and displacement in the region.

Another important issue is what impact implementing the findings of the strategic review of UNAMID, outlined in the Secretary-General’s 25 February special report (S/2014/138), will have on the success of the mission. Among other things, the review found that coordination within UNAMID and between UNAMID and the UN Country Team could be improved and that many troop and police contingents lacked adequate weaponry and the self-sustainability capacity needed to deploy temporarily away from team sites.

Another issue is the recent allegations that UNAMID reporting has been manipulated to hide evidence of attacks on civilians and peacekeepers.

Underlying Problems
Council resolutions continue to express support for the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), with resolution 2148 referring to it as “a solid basis for the Darfur peace process”. However, some observers question the ongoing utility of the DDPD and, more broadly, the effectiveness of the current peace process. Several of the main rebel groups—the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)—Jibril Ibrahim, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)—Abdul Wahid and the SLA-Minni Minawi—continue to refuse to sign the DPPD, preferring a national peace process that addresses the grievances of rebel groups and opposition parties throughout Sudan rather than one that exclusively focuses on Darfur. Furthermore, a lack of government resources (and perhaps commitment) has hampered implementation of several provisions of the DDPD.
Some analysts also believe that the poor economic situation in Sudan, which lost 75 percent of its oil resources with the secession of South Sudan in 2011, has also contributed to the spike in criminality and inter-communal violence in Darfur. As the Secretary-General has suggested, Sudan’s ability to finance pro-Khartoum paramilitary units—the Popular Defence Forces, the Central Reserve Police and the border guards—has been hindered, leading these units “to seek alternative sources of revenue” and precipitating “their involvement, in support of tribal affiliates, in heavy inter-communal fighting over natural resources, in particular artisanal gold mines in Northern Darfur, a prospective oil field in Eastern Darfur and land in Central and Southern Darfur” (S/2014/138).

Options
The most likely option is for the Council to renew UNAMID’s mandate for one year. In doing so, it may choose to:
- emphasise the need for greater self-sustainability of UNAMID contingents to increase the mission’s ability to operate greater distances from stationary bases, thus enhancing the scope of UNAMID’s presence and its ability to protect civilians;
- develop a joint UNAMID-UN Country Team early warning and response mechanism that prioritises the protection and humanitarian needs of civilians in specific geographic locations and provides guidance for action; and
- condemn the activities of the government-affiliated Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which have targeted civilians in Darfur (and elsewhere in Sudan) this year.

With regard to the 1591 Sanctions Committee, the Council could condemn violations of the arms embargo and express concern about the spill-over effects of the Darfur conflict in South Sudan. (There have been reports of Darfur-based militia and JEM rebels fighting in South Sudan.)

Council Dynamics
Council members remain concerned with the ongoing deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur. The P3 and others have argued that the government of Sudan is complicit in the violence in Darfur, pointing to the impact of aerial bombardments on civilians and human rights violations by the RSF. On the other hand, China and Russia have tended to be supportive of Sudan, arguing that it is doing its best to promote peace and stability in Darfur.

There is a perception among some Council members that UNAMID could be more effective, given the significant resources devoted to the mission. Along these lines, members are looking forward to discussing the initial assessment of the implementation of the strategic review of UNAMID from earlier this year, which was reflected in the Secretary-General’s 22 July report (S/2014/515). (The report argued that some progress had already been made in improving coordination and collaboration between the mission and the UN Country Team.)

The UK is the penholder on Darfur.
authorised strength by 15 September, despite contributions from states outside of MISCA. He added that except for one contingent, all of MISCA’s troops will be re-hatted into MINUSCA. Ladsous did not provide exact numbers and mentioned challenges in logistical preparations for deployment, in particular the need for adequate airlift capacity in the land-locked country. He informed Council members that the Secretariat is working on a plan to implement the executive measures that MINUSCA is mandated to carry out under resolution 2149. One such measure is the participation of international legal experts in the domestic justice system. Ladsous further informed Council members that MINUSCA’s civilian component is in the process of recruiting the remaining necessary individuals to fulfil its tasks. Finally, he said his office has completed the concept of operations for MINUSCA.

In sanctions-related developments, the Council was briefed on 11 July by Ambassador Raimonda Murmokaitė (Lithuania) on the interim report of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee and on the activities of the Committee (S/2014/452). At the request of Lithuania, the briefing was held in a public meeting, followed by consultations.

Murmokaitė told the Council that the inflow of weapons into the CAR appeared to have been staunched, but impunity for human rights abuses and illicit exploitation of minerals remain as barriers to political transition in the country. She added that the PoE reported that in the west of the country, anti-balaka are trading in diamonds while in the east, Séléka controlled the gold mines. She also said that the group had documented 103 incidents of obstruction in the delivery of humanitarian assistance between 5 December 2013 and 30 April 2014, as well as approximately 2,424 unlawful killings of civilians, including aid workers, committed by all parties to the conflict during the same period.

On 16 July, the Secretary-General appointed Babacar Gaye (Senegal), the acting Special Representative and head of MINUSCA, to that position.

From 21-23 July, 169 representatives of the transitional government, armed groups and civil society held talks in Brazzaville, with interim President Catherine Samba-Panza appealing to the Séléka and anti-balaka to agree a ceasefire. At the end of the three-day meeting, a ceasefire involving both armed groups was signed, and demands for the country to be split in two along religious lines were dropped. According to media reports, the Séléka, which recently reappointed former interim president Michel Djotodia as its leader, will now be seeking a power-sharing arrangement within the government. At press time, it was unclear what effect the signing of the ceasefire would have on the rebels on the ground.

Council members issued a press statement on 24 July welcoming the ceasefire as a first step in a wider political process that is meant to ensure durable peace, respect for human rights, protection of civilians and the rule of law (SC/11491). They also stressed the need to address the underlying causes of the conflict through political dialogue and a national reconciliation process, fighting impunity, disarmament and reintegration. Council members reiterated their call to the transitional government to accelerate, with the support of the UN and other partners, preparations in order to hold free, fair, transparent and inclusive presidential and legislative elections. They further underlined the importance of preserving the unity and territorial integrity of the CAR.

The CAR configuration of the Peace-building Commission issued a press statement on 25 July welcoming the ceasefire agreement as well, and called on all sides to build upon this initial step to preserve the unity of the country and foster a peaceful democratic transition.

Key Issues
An overarching issue is to sustain a hands-on approach towards the CAR, including closely monitoring MINUSCA’s timely deployment and developments on the ground and following up with Council action accordingly.

A related issue is the establishment of state institutions from the ground up, ensuring the success of the transitional political process, possible reconciliation and upholding accountability for human rights and international humanitarian law violations.

A further issue for the Council is the relationship between the illicit trade in natural resources and the funding of the armed groups.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- issuing a statement in support of the transitional political process and reconciliation, calling for accountability for crimes and encouraging member states to contribute troops and resources to MINUSCA;
- discussing and taking up recommendations of the CoI and the PoE;
- undertaking a Council visiting mission to the CAR, which the Council has never visited despite it being on the Council agenda since 1997;
- listing further individuals for violations of the criteria set out under resolution 2134, either through the Committee or by the Council; or
- taking no action at this time.

Council and Wider Dynamics
With the establishment of MINUSCA, Council members are now looking to monitor the situation on the ground and MINUSCA’s preparations for deployment. Some Council members are concerned about the lack of improvement in security and continuing sectarian violence. They are hopeful, however, that the signing of the ceasefire agreement in Brazzaville signifies a turning point and that the truce will be respected by all members of the relevant groups.

Some Council members are also concerned with the slow progress in recruiting more troops for the mission and the logistical preparations for MINUSCA’s deployment. In addition, during the consultations on 16 July, it was evident that some Council members were also frustrated with the lack of clear and accurate information, supported by figures, on the status of MINUSCA. They are hoping that the report due at the end of the month will provide detailed and up-to-date information on the situation and on MINUSCA’s preparations.

France is the penholder on the CAR.
**Democratic Republic of the Congo**

**Expected Council Action**

In August, Mark Simmonds, UK Minister for Africa, will preside over a high-level meeting on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), Martin Kobler, will brief, as well as possibly the exiting Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region, Mary Robinson. The newly appointed Special Envoy, Said Djinnit (Algeria), may also participate, as may representatives of regional organisations and countries of the region.

The Council may also be briefed by the Chair of the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee (Jordan) on the interim report of the Group of Experts (GoE) assisting the Committee (S/2014/428).

On 28 March, the Council adopted resolution 2147, renewing the mandate of MONUSCO—including of its intervention brigade—until 31 March 2015.

**Key Recent Developments**

Violence by armed groups has continued in eastern DRC. On 6 June, at least 30 people died and 15 were wounded in fighting in South Kivu. According to reports, DRC forces and MONUSCO personnel stationed nearby failed to intervene to stop the conflict despite being notified of the fighting as it unfolded. The local MONUSCO commander was later removed from his post.

A report released by Doctors without Borders (MSF) on 16 July stated that women are being kidnapped by armed gangs and forced to work as sex slaves in eastern DRC. MSF also warned that men are being kidnapped and put to work as labourers in the gold and diamond mining region of Okapi.

The latest Secretary-General’s report on children and armed conflict in the DRC (S/2014/453) notes that the recruitment and use of children by armed groups remained endemic in 2010-2013. Close to 4,200 cases of recruitment and use of boys and girls by armed groups and the Forces armées de la république démocratique du Congo (FARDC) were documented. The report also documented more than 900 cases of sexual violence against children committed by all parties to the conflict while acknowledging that many more children are likely to have been victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence. One positive development was that the action plan signed in 2012 by the DRC to end the recruitment and use of children and sexual violence by the FARDC has led to the release of hundreds of children.

Five FARDC soldiers were killed in a skirmish with Rwandan troops on the Rwanda-DRC border in North Kivu on 11 June. According to open sources, the Extended Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM) of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) reported that there were violations of territory from both sides but noted that there was “provocation by Rwanda Defence Forces on the Congolese national army positions”. The report then cites mistrust between the two militaries and the contested border in the area as the backdrops of the incident. One recommendation is that a detailed forensic autopsy be conducted on all corpses to determine the time, cause and circumstances of death (the DRC claims that four of the soldiers were not killed in combat). The report was not signed by the Rwandan member of the EJVM.

The ministers of defence and foreign affairs of the ICGLR and member countries of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) held a meeting on the DRC on 3 July in Luanda, Angola, taking note of the EJVM report and encouraging it to conclude its investigations on the issue for further review.

On 18 April the Hutu rebel group Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) issued a communiqué in which it announced its intention to surrender to SADC troops (of the MONUSCO intervention brigade) in exchange for negotiations, including with Rwanda, on reintegration. While some 200 FDLR members had surrendered by early June, the process has since stalled, and the FDLR remains active. The DRC recently announced that it would give the FDLR another six months to disarm voluntarily before commencing military operations to neutralise the group, as was also agreed with the ICGLR and SADC in Luanda. This delay and the continued presence in Rwanda of more than 600 former fighters of the disbanded M23 (M23) rebel group, remain contentious between Rwanda and the DRC. Meanwhile, the FARDC remains active against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain (APCLS).

MONUSCO’s latest report of 30 June (S/2014/450) highlights the partial progress achieved in the fields of neutralising armed groups, ending gross human rights violations, consolidating state authority in the east and national reforms. It notes that serious human rights violations and abuses, including rape and abductions, continue to be committed by armed groups and the DRC security forces and that armed groups continue to operate in the eastern provinces and pose a serious threat to civilians. MONUSCO continues to implement its reconfiguration to the east and by the end of August 2014, some three-quarters of all civilian staff will have redeployed to eastern DRC.

The Secretary-General takes the view in the report that the disarmament of the FDLR needs to be completed without delay and that the military option against the group should be seriously considered again if the negotiated process produces inadequate results. At the same time, the Secretary-General remains concerned by the slow progress in the implementation of national commitments, in particular those relating to army reform and the establishment of a rapid reaction force, a key element in the exit strategy for MONUSCO set out in resolution 2147. The report calls on the DRC to live up to its commitment to implement key reforms under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSC Framework).

In other developments, the Independent National Electoral Commission published a partial electoral calendar on 26 May, setting the timeframe for various local elections between June and October 2015.

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**UN DOCUMENTS ON THE DRC Security Council Resolutions**

S/RES/2147 (28 March 2014) renewed the mandate of MONUSCO, including its intervention brigade, until 31 March 2015. S/RES/2136 (30 January 2014) renewed the sanctions regime and the mandate of the GoE on the DRC. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.7137 (14 March 2014) was a briefing by Kobler and Robinson on the DRC. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2014/453 (30 June 2014) was a report on children and armed conflict in the DRC. S/2014/450 (30 June 2014) was a report on MONUSCO. Sanctions Committee Documents SC/11459 (1 July 2014) was a press release on the listing of the ADF. S/2014/428 (19 June 2014) was the interim report of the GoE on the DRC. OTHER RELEVANT FACTS Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission Martin Kobler (Germany) MONUSCO Force Commander Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz (Brazil) MONUSCO Strength as of 31 May 2014: 10,766 troops (including 488 military observers and 1,350 police), 372 International civil servants, 2,964 local civilian staff and 523 UN volunteers. Approved budget (1 July 2013-30 June 2014): $1.46 billion Mission Duration: July 2010 to present.
On 14 July, Zainab Bangura and Leila Zerrougui, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representatives on Sexual Violence in Conflict and Children and Armed Conflict, respectively, welcomed the appointment of Jeannine Mudiay as presidential adviser on conflict-related sexual violence and child recruitment in the DRC. In a joint statement, they noted the commitment of President Joseph Kabila to the fight against conflict-related sexual violence and recruitment and use of children in the DRC.

In sanctions-related developments, the Sanctions Committee added the ADF to the sanctions list on 30 June for violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law, including the recruitment of child soldiers, and attacks on MONUSCO peacekeepers.

The interim report of the GoE was submitted to the Council by the chair of the Sanctions Committee on 19 June (S/2014/428). The GoE notes that in contrast to claims that the FDLR is ready to disarm, it continues to recruit and train combatants, including children. In addition, FDLR leaders state that their main objective remains to attack Rwanda. Evidence also indicates continuing collaboration at the local level between the FARDC and FDLR.

The report also notes that resolving the issue of the ex-M23 combatants in Rwanda and Uganda continues to stagnate and that there is evidence of reorganisation among M23 members in Uganda.

On natural resources, the GoE notes delays in the implementation of the regional certification mechanism due to structural weaknesses in the ICGLR secretariat and lack of political will among its members. The lack of implementation of the DRC’s mine-validation system outside of the Kivus encourages the continuation of smuggling through neighbouring states.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 9 April, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and MONUSCO’s Joint Human Rights Office (UNHRO) released a report on the progress and obstacles in the fight against impunity for sexual violence in the DRC between January 2010 and December 2013. This period was characterised by the persistence of extremely serious incidents of sexual violence. UNHRO registered 3,600 victims of sexual violence and found that the FARDC was responsible for a third of the acts and that rape is used as a weapon of war. While the number of prosecutions and convictions has increased, the report stated that much more is needed to be done to hold perpetrators of sexual violence accountable.

During a press briefing on 6 May, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed its disappointment about the 5 May judgment of a military court against 39 members of the FARDC who were accused of committing rapes in Minova in November 2012. Fourteen of them were acquitted; two were convicted for rape, one for murder and the remaining were convicted for lesser crimes. According to OHCHR, the outcome of the trial confirmed shortcomings in the administration of justice in the country. Following the 29 April review of the DRC, the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review working group adopted its report on 2 May (A/HRC/WG.6/19/L.3). The DRC rejected 38 of the 229 recommendations.

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is to oversee MONUSCO’s operations, including the intervention brigade, in neutralising rebel groups, including the FDLR.

A related critically important issue for the Council is ensuring that the DRC lives up to its commitment to implement key reforms.

Another key issue is to ensure the implementation of the PSC Framework at the national and regional levels, in particular the disarmament and reintegration of combatants.

A continuing issue is the transition of MONUSCO’s operations from western to eastern DRC.

Options

The Council could adopt a statement that would:

• welcome the appointment of Djinnit;
• call on the DRC and other countries to implement their commitments under the PSC Framework;
• call on the DRC to ensure that the FDLR surrenders voluntarily or, if needed, by force; and
• express support for the activities of the ICGLR and the SADC, in particular in calming border tensions between the DRC and Rwanda.

Taking no action at this time is another option.

Council Dynamics

Despite the military achievements against the M23 and the ongoing engagement of the FARDC with the ADF and the APCLS, Council members are increasingly concerned with the slow or stalled progress on other fronts. Several Council members are of the view that at this point much focus should be given to national reforms, the reintegration of former rebels, neutralising remaining groups and the establishment of state authority. They hope that the appointment of Djinnit as Special Envoy will create new momentum in the implementation of the PSC Framework.

Some Council members are of the view that emphasis should be placed on the DRC’s implementation of its commitment to engage with the FDLR.

They see the initial surrender of approximately 200 FDLR members as a positive occurrence, but the FDLR remains active, and none of its estimated 1,500 members have laid down their arms since early June. These Council members believe that the situation must be monitored to ensure that the DRC follows through on this issue.

France is the penholder on the DRC.
Expected Council Action
In August, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB), Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, will brief the Council. The chair of the Peace-building (PBC) Burundi configuration (Switzerland) will also brief.

In line with Burundi’s wishes, on 13 February, the Council adopted resolution 2137 extending the mandate of BNUB for the last time, until 31 December.

Key Recent Developments
While BNUB is preparing for its withdrawal, the last few months have been a time of increasing political turmoil in Burundi. (In resolution 2137, the Council requested the Secretary-General to prepare for BNUB’s transition and transfer of responsibilities to the UN Country Team by 31 December. As requested by Burundi, the resolution calls on the Secretary-General to establish an electoral observer mission before, during and after the July 2015 elections.)

In a Council briefing on 14 May (S/PV.7174), Onanga-Anyanga focused on BNUB’s “Joint Transition Plan”, developed in coordination with Burundi, the PBC Burundi configuration and international partners. The plan tracks progress in the benchmarks established in priority areas, maps the international community’s support to Burundi and identifies possible gaps resulting from BNUB’s closing. It also seeks to enable BNUB to scale down its activities gradually while the UN Country Team increases its capacities in priority areas and the mission continues to implement its mandate as set by the Council. Onanga-Anyanga highlighted several concerns, including the outbreak of politically motivated violence in recent months (see our May 2014 Monthly Forecast), which has resulted in a tense climate, and said there was a need for political dialogue and an end of impunity for violent acts.

Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland), the chair of the PBC Burundi configuration, also briefed the Council, highlighting the political tension in the country, exacerbated by the legal limitations placed on free speech and association. He added that while Burundi had made considerable progress towards stability over the last years, momentum had to be maintained in order to avoid a relapse into sectarian violence.

On 2 June, following their visit to Burundi the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General to the Great Lakes Region, Mary Robinson; the US Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Russ Feingold; the Special Representative of the AU for Burundi and the Great Lakes Region, Boubacar Diarra; and the EU Senior Coordinator for the Great Lakes Region, Koen Vervaeke, issued a joint statement. The envoys met with President Pierre Nkurunziza and other government officials, representatives from the ruling and opposition political parties and civil society and expressed concern over constraints on political space and civil liberties that hinder the efforts of the opposition, civil society and the media in the run-up to elections in 2015. They stressed that political parties must have an equal opportunity to participate in the process and that any effort to prevent meetings, intimidate participants or undermine the opposition jeopardises the process and runs counter to the government’s expressed commitment to democracy.

The AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Smail Chergui, visited Burundi in mid-June and met with Nkurunziza. According to the AU, Chergui underlined the need for greater political inclusivity ahead of the 2015 elections. Nkurunziza assured Chergui that he will not allow any individual or group to intimidate other parts of the population.

The government of Burundi, the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) and other political parties and actors signed a code of conduct for the 2015 elections on 9 June. After that, BNUB called on all stakeholders to sensitize their constituencies, especially youth, to respect civil and political rights and to reject all forms of violence in the conduct of their political activities. Nevertheless, the opposition has continued to accuse the incumbent National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) party of distributing arms to the Imbonerakure, the youth wing of the CNDD-FDD, in order to spread terror among the electorate and force them to vote for the ruling party. According to BNUB, since the beginning of the year through early July, 49 politically motivated incidents involving the Imbonerakure have been documented.

Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights Ivan Simonović briefed Council members in consultations on 10 July on his 25-27 June visit to Burundi. Onanga-Anyanga also briefed via video-teleconference. Simonović had met with local officials, international representatives and civil society groups. At a press conference held in Bujumbura at the end of the visit, he noted his deep concern regarding recent developments, including the growing restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association. He expressed his concern about politically motivated violent attacks by the Imbonerakure on political adversaries and called on the government to hold those responsible accountable.

Addressing the Council, he raised these concerns while also emphasizing that a further cause for worry was the deep divide between political parties and that certain pieces of legislation, such as the new law on the truth and reconciliation commission and the new land law on the Commission Nationale de Terre et Autres Biens, could potentially shift political divisions back towards ethnic conflict if they are not implemented in an unbiased and fair manner. Onanga-Anyanga spoke about the need to maintain a monitoring role for the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights in Burundi following BNUB’s departure.

Developments in the PBC
Seger undertook a visit to Brussels, Paris, Bujumbura, Kigali and Arusha from 21-31 May. In Burundi, he met with Nkurunziza, opposition leaders, civil society representatives, Onanga-Anyanga and senior staff of the UN Country Team. He stressed that the international community’s attention to political developments in the country is a sign of concern over its sliding back into widespread violence and of a strong will to see Burundi prosper.

Seger briefed the steering committee of the Burundi configuration on his trip on 10 June, noting his concerns about political tensions in the country, though he took the view that they are political, not ethnic, at this point, and that opposition parties are committed to participation in the elections despite the challenges they face. He stressed the need for the international community’s continuing engagement with the government.

Seger has also been working with Burundi on
organising a roundtable with international partners before the end of 2014 to discuss political and socio-economic developments in the country since the October 2012 Geneva donor conference, including the implementation of the second poverty-reduction strategy paper. The aim of the roundtable is to achieve common conclusions and recommendations on the way forward.

On 9 June, the Burundi configuration received a briefing from Šimonović on his recent trip to the country.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

Pierre Claver Mbonimpa, the president of the Association for the Protection of Human Rights and Detained Persons, was arrested on 15 May in Bujumbura. He was charged the following day with endangering internal and external state security and inciting public disobedience for remarks he made over the radio on 6 May. The remarks related to allegations that members of the Imbonerakure were receiving military training in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Mbonimpa has since remained in pre-trial detention. His trial started on 4 July. On 30 May, Stéphane Djurjuri, the spokesman for the Secretary-General, called on the Burundi to observe the right to due process, expressing concern about the continued restrictions on civil liberties for members of opposition political parties, the media and civil-society organisations ahead of the 2015 elections. During his briefing to the Council on 10 July, Šimonović raised this issue as well after visiting Mbonimpa in prison.

**Key Issues**

The key issue is ensuring that, despite the upcoming withdrawal of BNUB, the security and political situation in Burundi does not deteriorate further given the history of ethnic violence between Hutu and Tutsi.

A particular issue is setting up the proper mechanisms for the UN electoral mission and ensuring that the 2015 elections are free and fair.

A further issue is addressing the role of the PBC in Burundi, especially in light of BNUB’s scaling down and eventual termination.

**Options**

Options for the Council regarding BNUB include:

- adopting a presidential statement or press statement condemning violence by youth groups and calling on Burundi to hold those who are responsible for the violence accountable and to ensure an open and inclusive political environment;
- issuing a statement conveying its intent to consider further measures, such as sanctions, or extending BNUB’s mandate until after the election if the situation continues to deteriorate; or
- taking no action at this time.

**Council Dynamics**

Since the adoption of resolution 2137, Council members have followed the situation closely through briefings. (There were four such briefings—on 26 March, 8 and 24 April and 10 July—of which two were at the initiative of the US, one was at the initiative of France and one was at the initiative of the UN Secretariat.) Council members issued a press statement on 10 April expressing concern over acts of intimidation, harassment and violence committed by youth groups in Burundi and calling on the government to hold the perpetrators accountable (SC/11350).

Due to recent developments on the ground, many Council members are concerned that these may be the first signs of what could be a relapse into the horrendous ethnic and political violence that plagued the country in the past. Council members agree that in order to prevent future violence and to ensure that the 2015 elections run smoothly, the Council should monitor the situation closely and apply pressure on Burundi to address the security and political concerns. However, there seems to be little appetite at this point among Council members to take strong measures to address the situation.

The penholder on Burundi is France.

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**Guinea-Bissau**

**Expected Council Action**

In August, the Council will hold consultations on Guinea-Bissau. Members will consider the 90-day report on the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau. The new Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea-Bissau Miguel Trovoada is expected to brief.

No outcome is expected.

**Key Recent Developments**

The presidential run-off election was held on 18 May between José Mário Vaz from the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) and Nuno Gomes Nabiam, an independent candidate, who had the support of the Party for Social Renewal (PRS) and the military. Voter turnout totaled 78.21 percent. The National Electoral Commission announced on 20 May that preliminary results showed that Vaz had won with 61.9 percent of the vote.

Vaz, a former mayor of Bissau and finance minister in the Carlos Gomes Júnior government that was ousted in the 12 April 2012 coup, appeared the day he was announced as the victor holding hands with General Antonio Indjai, who led the coup. Indjai said that the military would respect the outcome. Nabiam initially claimed fraud, but on 22 May, he conceded defeat.

On 17 June, the newly elected members of the National Assembly were sworn in. (In elections on 13 April, the PAIGC achieved a majority with 57 of the 102 seats. The PRS won 41 seats.) On 23 June, Vaz was sworn in as president and on 25 June appointed Domingos Simões Pereira of the PAIGC as prime minister. Simões Pereira was sworn in on 3 July while the 31 cabinet members were appointed by a presidential decree the following day.

The cabinet is made up of all political parties represented in the national assembly, namely 19 members of the PAIGC, six from the Democratic Party of Social Renewal (PRS) and one member from each of the military and youth group parties.

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UN DOCUMENTS ON GUINEA-BISSAU

| Security Council Resolutions | S/RES/2157 (29 May 2014) renewed UNOGIBIS's mandate for six months. | S/RES/2103 (22 May 2013) renewed UNOGIBIS until 31 May 2014, and requested the Secretariat to continue providing quarterly reports on the restoration of constitutional order. Security Council Press Statement S/11402 (19 May 2014) welcomed the conclusion of the second round of the presidential election. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2014/333 (12 May 2014) was on the activities of UNOGIBIS. S/2014/332 (12 May 2014) was on the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau. Security Council Letters S/2014/528 (21 July 2014) was the Secretary-General’s letter requesting a three month extension to submit a comprehensive review of UNOGIBIS’s mandate. S/2014/529 (23 July 2014) was the Council letter requesting a written update from on the comprehensive review of UNOGIBIS by 12 November 2014. | }
the PRS, members of three smaller parties and three independents. Six members are holdovers from the transitional government established following the coup, including the minister of natural resources, who retained his position, and the new minister of foreign affairs, Mário Lopes da Rosa, who had been secretary of state for fisheries.

On 11 July, the government announced the temporary suspension of timber exports in order to prioritise cashew exports. The decision came amidst public anger over illegal logging and congestion at the port of Bissau as timber operators, fearing a ban, hurried to ship their wood. The government also announced payment of public servants’ salary arrears for two of four months owed by the transitional government, extension of the school year through August and plans to improve water and electricity utilities.

José Ramos-Horta concluded his tenure as Special Representative for Guinea-Bissau in late June, as expected. The Secretary-General appointed his successor, Miguel Trovoada, a former prime minister and president of São Tomé and Principe, on 16 July.

Meanwhile, Guinea-Bissau’s suspension from the AU ended on 17 June and it resumed its participation in the Community of Lusophone-Speaking Countries (CPLP), with Simões Pereira attending its summit in Timor Leste on 23 July. During a summit of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Accra on 9-10 July, leaders committed themselves to facilitating an international donor conference on Guinea-Bissau, creating an emergency fund for its humanitarian needs and to reviewing the mandate of the ECOVAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) by the end of 2014. The EU announced its resumption of full cooperation with Guinea-Bissau during a visit by Simões Pereira to Brussels from 14-16 July.

The Council was last briefed on Guinea-Bissau on 19 May by Ramos-Horta. Members issued a press statement welcoming the conclusion of the second-round elections and reiterated its call for the military to respect the results (SC/11402). On 29 May, the Council renewed the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) for six months with resolution 2157, calling on the Secretariat to conduct a comprehensive review of the mission by the end of October to ensure that its mandate is aligned with the new government’s priorities.

On 21 July, the Secretary-General wrote the Council (S/2014/528) that it would be premature to complete and report on the review of UNIOGBIS’ mandate by 30 October since Guinea-Bissau’s new government required more time to identify its priorities for UN support. He acknowledged that the Council grant a three-month extension. In a 23 July letter in response (2014/529), the Council took note of the request, and called for a written update by 12 November 2014, in order to be able to consider it prior to the expiration of the mandate of UNIOGBIS.

**Developments in the Peacebuilding Commission**

The Guinea-Bissau configuration issued three press statements during the electoral process. A statement on 1 April expressed concern over incidents of violence and intimidation before the 13 April elections. Statements were also released prior to the 18 May presidential run-off and on 12 June after the two electoral rounds. Before the 18 May press statement, Ramos-Horta briefed the configuration by video-teleconference (VTC) on 12 May, informing members about efforts by Prime Minister-elect Simões Pereira to assemble a national unity government. On 16 July, Simões Pereira addressed the country configuration via VTC from Brussels. He outlined emergency programmes to restore basic public services and stressed that the government was counting on international support and was committed to fighting corruption.

**Key Issues**

A key issue for the Council is how to support the resumption and the consolidation of constitutional order.

Being vigilant as to whether the military or other stakeholders are respecting the new government is a related issue.

Drug trafficking, illegal fishing and, more recently, illegal logging and deforestation have been ongoing issues of concern.

In the period before the upcoming renewal of UNIOGBIS in November, the Secretariat’s expected review of the mission will be an important issue.

**Options**

The Council might:

- receive the briefing and take no action; or
- issue a press statement welcoming progress in Guinea-Bissau and new Special Representative Trovoada.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

During discussions on the renewal of UNIOGBIS’s mandate in May, all members supported extending the mission, although a division emerged over the time period of the renewal. The Secretary-General’s report recommended renewing the mission for one year and deploying an assessment mission in early 2015 to consider changes to the mission (S/2014/333). The US, however, strongly preferred a three-month renewal. During negotiations, in particular, with France advocating a longer extension in line with the Secretary-General’s recommendation, a compromise was reached to renew the mission for six months. Also at that time, language that had been inserted in the draft resolution calling for countries to assist Guinea-Bissau in combating illegal logging was dropped at the insistence of China and Russia; it was replaced by more general wording on “illegal exploitation of natural resources”.

CPLP states have called recently for ECOMIB to be transformed into a larger, UN-mandated African-led mission, noting the upcoming plans by ECOWAS to renew the mission’s mandate by the end of the year.

Nigeria (who provides most of the personnel to ECOMIB) is the penholder on Guinea-Bissau.
Expected Council Action

In August, Council members are likely to be briefed on developments in Libya by Tarek Mitri, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), and then meet in consultations.

The mandates of UNSMIL and the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee expire on 13 March and 13 April 2015, respectively.

Key Recent Developments

Briefing the Council on 17 July, Mitri referred to “a mounting sense of a probable imminent and significant escalation in the conflict” in Libya. Since 5 July, fighting among rival militias for control of the airport in Tripoli has resulted in at least 97 people killed and hundreds injured, extensive damage to airport facilities and planes and the suspension of all flights into and out of the airport. The fighting, which is also affecting oil production, has involved Zintan-based militias that supported the 16 May failed coup by rogue General Khalifa Haftar and Misrata-based Islamist militias. In the absence of a functioning, organised and well-equipped army, the government is funding these militias to provide security throughout the country.

The situation in Benghazi, where Haftar’s offensive started, is critical as well. On 27 July, at least 38 people were killed in clashes between armed groups while violence targeting security and judicial personnel and activists has persisted. On 25 June, human rights activist Salwa Bugaighis was assassinated in Benghazi, and her husband has been missing since. On 22 July, two suicide attacks targeted a military base in Benghazi, resulting in at least four dead. Benghazibased group Ansar al-Sharia—which is believed to have played a major role in the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi in September 2012—was designated a terrorist organisation in January 2014 by the US State Department. A press statement issued by the Council following the 17 July meeting condemned the recent violence in Libya and expressed concern over the “prolonged pattern of politically motivated and inter-militia violence” (SC/11479).

On 21 July, the High National Elections Commission announced the final results of the 25 June parliamentary election. The results confirmed the low turnout, and about 12 out of 200 seats are expected to remain unfilled given security challenges and boycotts. The results have brought significant losses for Islamist candidates although it seems unclear how coalitions will be formed once the Council of Representatives starts operating. (The candidates in the election stood as individuals, not on a party ticket, to mitigate the effect of political polarisation.) In a 23 July press statement, the Security Council welcomed the announcement of the final results of the elections and urged “the expeditious seating of the Council of Representatives to begin the important work of building political consensus among the Libyan people, agreeing upon a government and urgently seeking to progress Libya’s democratic transition” (SC/11489).

In July, UNSMIL withdrew part of its staff due to concerns about their safety and security, temporarily relocating them to Tunisia and Malta, where they remained at press time. (Although the Council authorised the deployment of a UN guard unit in November 2013 to protect UNSMIL personnel and facilities, the unit was never deployed following concerns expressed by Libya and the decision by Jordan, the potential troop contributor for the guard unit, to abandon the plan. The UN did not pursue other troop contributors and instead decided to strengthen UNSMIL’s security section.) Following the worsening of the security situation in late July, the embassies of the US and Turkey evacuated their staff.

Libyan Foreign Minister Mohamed Abdulaziz addressed the Security Council on 17 July calling for the establishment, under Chapter VII, of a UN stabilisation and institution-building mission for Libya. Abdulaziz suggested this mission could be mandated to build the national security forces; protect oil fields and ports and civil airports; contribute to institution-building and enhance the performance of public administration; contribute to reform of the criminal justice system; provide support to neighbouring countries with respect to border security; and support the national dialogue and reconciliation in a process led by the League of Arab States.

On 24 July, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) unanimously confirmed a previous decision by the ICC which declared the case against former intelligence chief Abdullah Al-Senussi inadmissible before the ICC and that he therefore should be tried in Libya. (A 31 May decision by the same Chamber upheld the admissibility of the case against Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, reiterating the call for Libya to surrender him for trial in The Hague.) In his Council briefing, Mitri pointed out that both Qaddafi and Al-Senussi have been unable to access the legal counsel representing them before the ICC. Following a 18 July meeting with the Minister of Justice of Libya, Salah al-Marghani, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda expressed great concern about recent reports of alleged attacks carried out against civilians in Tripoli and Benghazi and stated that she will not hesitate to investigate and prosecute crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction irrespective of their official status or affiliation.

Human Rights-Related Developments

In a press briefing on 27 June, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) condemned the 25 June murder of Bugaighis, the vice president of the National Dialogue Preparatory Commission. OHCHR expressed deep concern about the emerging pattern of directly targeting human rights defenders, humanitarian workers and media professionals in Libya. In a press briefing on 6 June, OHCHR condemned the 4 June murder of Michael Greub, head of the International Committee of the Red Cross sub-delegation in Misrata, and deplored the temporary detention of four UNSMIL staff members upon arrival at Tripoli airport.

Key Issues

An overarching set of key issues includes current fighting between militias and factions of the army, the political challenges to the...
Libya (con’t)

government and its lack of authority.

Agreeing on a ceasefire, a roadmap for an inclusive political process and ensuring the swift work of the Constitutional Drafting Assembly and the Council of Representatives is another key issue.

A pressing issue is ensuring the protection of UNSMIL staff so it can carry out its mandate.

Coordinating special envoys appointed by international actors to ensure they work coherently towards a political settlement in Libya is an ongoing issue.

Options
The Council could adopt a resolution:
• urging all parties to agree on a ceasefire;
• refocusing UNSMIL’s mandate in the light of the current situation, prioritising its work on national dialogue, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration as well as security sector reform;
• demanding that the militias and army factions in Libya to disarm, refrain from using violence and agree to work together for national reconciliation, justice, respect for human rights and the rule of law; and
• adopting targeted sanctions against spoilers of the political process.

It could also list Ansar al-Sharia under the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida Sanctions regime.

Council Dynamics
The sharp deterioration of the security and political situation in Libya is a source of concern for Council members. Yet, due to differing points of view among Council members about how to address or characterise the actions of the government and various groups and militias, in particular those of Haftar, the Council has not pronounced itself on the situation.

Resolution 2144 requests the Secretariat to brief on UNSMIL’s mandate every 90 days, but Council members seem to think that Libya deserves closer Council attention due to the current state of affairs. In August, as in July, Council members will hear an off-cycle briefing by Mitri and will meet to discuss the situation in consultations.

In a meeting in consultations on Abudaziz’s call for a UN stabilisation and institution-building mission, Council members asked the Secretariat to provide options for the support that the Council could provide to the Libyan transition.

The UK is the penholder on Libya.

Syria

Expected Council Action
Early in the month, Sigrid Kaag, Special Coordinator of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-UN Joint Mission, will brief Council members on the implementation of resolution 2118 regarding the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons. Council members are also planning to visit the OPCW in August during The Hague leg of the upcoming Council visiting mission.

Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Kyung-wha Kang will brief the Council later in the month on progress made in delivering aid across borders and conflict lines following the adoption of resolution 2165. Her public briefing will be followed by consultations.

Key Recent Developments
Kaag last briefed Council members on 7 July, reporting that the final 7.2 percent of declared chemical weapons was removed from Syria on 23 June. On 24 July, the OPCW decided on the destruction plan for the 12 production facilities in Syria that will begin within 60 days—seven will be razed and five will be sealed permanently. The facilities were to have been destroyed by 15 March.

The Council adopted resolution 2165 on 14 July, authorising cross-border and cross-line access for the UN and its partners to deliver humanitarian aid in Syria without state consent, creating the potential to help 2.9 million people in need. The resolution authorised access through four border crossings and a mechanism to monitor aid convoys and to notify Syrian authorities. The first such convoy traversed the Bab al-Salam crossing from Turkey on 24 July. Under Secretary-General Valerie Amos briefed Council members on humanitarian access for the first time under resolution 2165 on 30 July.

Meanwhile, crises in Gaza, Iraq and Libya have drawn attention away from Syria, but the civil war there continues unabated on its devastating course, with a death toll estimated at 170,000. There are 2.93 million refugees and 6.4 million internally displaced persons. Almost half of the population, 10.8 million, require humanitarian assistance, and of those 4.7 million are in hard-to-reach areas and 241,000 are in besieged areas.

On 16 July, President Bashar al-Assad was sworn in for a new seven-year term after winning a 3 June poll that was only held in government-controlled areas. The elections were widely viewed as a sham in the midst of a violent civil war. In his inaugural speech, Assad called for national reconciliation but has now ramped up the Assad regime but has now ramped up the support that the Council could provide to the opposition Syrian National Coalition (SNC).

On 9 July, Hadi al-Bahra was elected as the new SNC president, only to see his cabinet dissolved two weeks later on 22 July due to infighting. Since the failure in February of Geneva II, the second round of UN-mediated peace talks between the government and the opposition, the SNC has struggled for relevance and to establish itself as an authority on the ground in rebel-held areas of Syria. The SNC has consistently called on the US and other western backers to provide heavy weapons to fight the Assad regime but has now ramped up that plea, arguing that armed rebel groups are now confronting both government forces and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
(ISIS)—particularly around Aleppo, Damascus and in the eastern provinces.

On 26 June, two weeks after the surprise takeover of Mosul in Iraq by ISIS, US Secretary of State John Kerry said Syrian rebel forces could play a role in pushing ISIS back in Syria and Iraq, and US President Barack Obama asked congress for $500 million to train and equip such forces. It is unclear when or if such funds will be approved, and the earliest possible disbursement would be in early 2015 with implementation sometime in mid-2015. Separately, the US has accelerated its supply of arms and ammunition to a small number of vetted opposition groups in northern Syria. These efforts are perhaps too late to staunch the proliferation of ISIS.

Assad has portrayed himself as a bulwark against the rise of terrorism. However, in reality confrontations between government forces and ISIS are rare, with various opposition armed groups in Syria largely fighting ISIS for territorial control—particularly in the gas- and oil-rich eastern provinces where ISIS has its stronghold. However, clashes between the government and ISIS have increased after its surprise advance into north-western Iraq—Syrian forces recently took heavy losses in the struggle with ISIS for control of an army base near Raqqa.

On 28 July, the Council adopted a presidential statement addressing the seizure of the oilfields and pipelines in Syria and Iraq by ISIS and al-Nusra to finance terrorism. The statement stressed that all states are required to ensure that their nationals and any persons within their territory do not trade in oil with these entities.

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 27 June, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on Syria condemning indiscriminate methods of warfare and violations and abuses committed against the civilian population (A/HRC/RES/26/23). It condemned enforced disappearances by the regime and the use by the authorities of starvation of civilians as a method of combat. It demanded that the Syrian government cooperate fully with its Commission of Inquiry and emphasised accountability and the role of the ICC in this regard. Of the 47 HRC members, five voted against (Algeria, China, Cuba, Russia and Venezuela), nine abstained and one did not take part in the vote.

On 25 July, Security Council members met with the Commission of Inquiry in a closed Arria-formula format in New York. In the last three years, the Commission has collated testimonies that indicate a massive number of war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed. Such crimes include the deliberate targeting of civilians, indiscriminate attacks, attacks on protected objects—such as schools, hospitals and mosques—and the punitive imposition of sieges and blockades. The scale of government violations continues to outpace that of the opposition, with aerial bombardment, targeting highly populated areas, systematic and widespread reports of deaths and torture in government detention centres. Extra-judicial killings, sexual assaults, beatings and arbitrary arrests have become commonplace occurrences at government checkpoints. Indiscriminate attacks by armed opposition groups, including mortars, rockets and car bombs, are increasing.

Key Issues
With the accountability track blocked after the 22 May veto by China and Russia of the ICC referral and the chemical weapons track winding down, the Council will need to refocus its attention in the fourth year of the conflict back to the original and overarching issue—finding ways to support a cessation of violence and resuscitate efforts for a political solution.

Another immediate issue is how to address the mutually destabilising impact of the crises in Iraq and Syria and the realignment of priorities and allegiances by the parties on the ground as a result of the gains accumulated by ISIS.

While resolution 2165 was only adopted in mid-July, an ongoing issue for the Council will be what further steps it might take if meaningful and substantive implementation of resolutions 2139 and 2165 on humanitarian access, particularly by the Syrian government, continues to lag.

Options
On the political track, Council members could invite the newly appointed Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura to meet and discuss ways to revive the political process. While the 30 June 2012 Geneva Communiqué remains the guiding document for a political solution, Council members could discuss with De Mistura how his approach will differ from those of his predecessors, Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi. They could also discuss whether his mandate under the UN, no longer a joint post with the Arab League, will provide any latitude to move talks forward.

Another option for the Council is to begin brainstorming how to approach the cross-pollination of the crises in Iraq and Syria—particularly the dimension of competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia for regional primacy as well as ISIS and Hezbollah fighters in both countries. In this regard, it will be important in the Syria prong of any such approach that the counter-terrorism aspect of the conflict does not overshadow the humanitarian, political and accountability tracks.

Council and Wider Dynamics
With the 30 June 2012 Geneva Communiqué superseded by events on the ground—including the re-election of Assad—there has been negligible Council activity on the political track. This may change in the coming months following De Mistura’s appointment on 10 July and as the massive effort that went into agreeing on resolution 2165 on cross-border access shifts down into monitoring mode.

On chemical weapons, with the final tranche of declared chemicals having left Syria, Council members are likely to concentrate on monitoring the remaining activities of the OPCW-UN joint mission, such as remaining verification work, the destruction of production facilities and clarifying discrepancies of the declared chemical weapons stockpile.

France is the penholder on Syria while Australia, Jordan and Luxembourg are the penholders on the humanitarian track. However, most texts need to be agreed between Russia and the US prior to agreement by the broader Council.
**Expected Council Action**

In August, the Security Council will extend the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further year. This will be the eighth renewal since the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon in 2006 and will likely be done through a resolution, without any major changes to the mandate. Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet is expected to brief Council members on the work of the UNIFIL ahead of the renewal.

UNIFIL’s mandate expires on 31 August.

**Key Recent Developments**

Already weakened institutionally by its inability to elect a president and battling the effects of the conflict in neighbouring Syria, Lebanon faces the prospect that the recent outbreak of violence in Gaza could embroil Lebanese militants in renewed hostilities with Israel.

On 11 July, UNIFIL reported that three rockets originating from south Lebanon were fired towards Israel. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) then returned artillery fire towards the general area where the rockets were launched. Lebanese security forces arrested a man suspected of firing the rockets, describing him as a member of “fundamentalist groups”. Three more such incidents occurred in as many days, with rockets originating from Al-Qulayah, albeit resulting in no casualties. On 16 July Lebanese forces arrested two Palestinian men for transporting rockets to a launching site. On 17 July, Lebanon sent a letter to the Council asserting that Israel’s retaliatory fire was in violation of Lebanese sovereignty.

UNIFIL launched investigations into all the incidents and increased border patrols in coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). The outgoing UNIFIL force commander, Major General Paolo Serra, stressed that the incidents were in violation of resolution 1701 and were directed at undermining stability in the area. He said that UNIFIL was working together with the LAF to try to avoid escalation and any further launching of rockets. In a media interview on 16 July, Special Coordinator for Lebanon Derek Plumbly described the situation along the southern border as “dangerous” and stressed that all sides must exercise self-restraint. He also praised coordination between UNIFIL and the LAF on the matter.

These incidents are not believed to have involved Hezbollah, but its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, vowed that they would stand with the resistance in Gaza. According to a 21 July statement by Nasrallah, he conveyed that message of support during a telephone conversation with leaders of both Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

Meanwhile, the Syrian crisis continues to have deleterious effects on the political, security and humanitarian situation in Lebanon. Though Lebanon maintains an official position of disassociation from the Syrian conflict, as outlined in the Baabda declaration of June 2012, Lebanese militants continue to engage in the conflict. On 22 July a security source was quoted in the media as revealing that a Lebanese soldier had joined the rebel groups fighting in Syria, the first such case since the war in Syria began in 2011. The following day, the defector posted a video announcing that he had joined Al-Qaida’s al-Nusra Front due to Lebanese authorities’ alleged discrimination against Sunnis and calling the LAF a tool of Hezbollah. The total number of Lebanese rebel fighters in Syria is estimated to be somewhere between 200 and 300, according to the Lebanese Ministry of Interior. An estimated 7,000 Hezbollah members are currently fighting alongside the Syrian regime.

Fighting on Lebanon’s eastern border with Syria continues to threaten stability. Combat erupted between Hezbollah and Al-Nusra in the mountainous region of Qalamoun on 13 July. At least nine Hezbollah fighters and some 26 Nusra militants were killed in several days of fighting. On 20 July, Hassan Fadlallah, a parliamentarian representing Hezbollah, asserted that his movement is at the forefront of defending its country against the threat of takfiri groups—referring to the Sunni militants operating in Syria and Iraq—who seek to move into and occupy Lebanon.

On 6 July, Syrian warplanes bombed gunmen in Wadi al-Khayl in Arsal. Arsal and the surrounding area are largely Sunni, and residents sympathise with the Sunni-led Syrian uprising against President Bashar al-Assad. On 31 July, the LAF arrested six Syrian nationals in Arsal on suspicion that they belong to rebel groups. Arsal also hosts more than 100,000 Syrian refugees and is the main crossing point for those fleeing from Syria into Lebanon.

The influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon remains a threat to Lebanon’s stability. On 14 July, UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Lebanon Ross Mountain said that about 12,000 new Syrian refugees are entering Lebanon every week and the total number of refugees in Lebanon is expected to reach 1.5 million by the end of the year—one-third of the country’s population. Describing the situation as a “national calamity”, Moun tain warned that the majority of refugees are hosted by poor communities and that competition for scant resources is likely to cause friction between the two groups. He said he feared the problem would only get worse and result in Syrian-Lebanese hostilities and an increase in Lebanese inter-sectarian problems. He called on countries to fulfill their pledges to the $1.6 billion humanitarian response plan for Syrian refugees in Lebanon, of which only 29 percent has been funded. Last September, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon launched the International Support Group for Lebanon to help tackle Lebanon’s myriad challenges, including hosting so many Syrian refugees.

On the political front, Lebanon’s parliament remains unable to find a presidential candidate acceptable to all factions. A parliamentary session is set for 12 August to elect a president, the ninth such attempt since President Michel Sleiman’s term ended on 25 May. While the March 14 coalition, which is backing the nomination of Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, has attended the legislative sessions, March 8 lawmakers, who reportedly back MP Michel Aoun, have boycotted them, saying the parliamentary sessions were useless unless rival parties agree on a consensus candidate beforehand. UN officials and the Council have repeatedly
Yemen

**Expected Council Action**
In August, Council members expect a briefing in consultations on Yemen by Jamal Benomar, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen.

The mandate of the Special Adviser was renewed on 12 June 2013 without an expiration date. The sanctions regime established by resolution 2140 expires on 26 February 2015.

**Key Recent Developments**
The security situation in Yemen continues to deteriorate. Clashes in the northern province of Amran between the Houthis, a Zaidi Shi’a rebel group, and armed groups affiliated with the Al-Islah political party became more violent in June and July, resulting in at least 200 dead and some 45,000 internally displaced persons according to an estimate by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). On 11 July, after being briefed by Benomar under “any other business”, the Council issued a press statement demanding that the Houthis withdraw and relinquish control of Amran and hand over weapons and ammunition to the government (SC/11470). Several ceasefires had been consecutively broken in June and at press time another ceasefire had just been agreed to after a visit of President Abdo Rabbud Mansour Hadi to Amran. A campaign initiated by the government in April against Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has persisted in southern Yemen and AQAP has targeted military bases and personnel in retaliation, including the killing of five soldiers in two separate incidents on 28 June.

Yemen is currently in the first phase of the political transition outlined by resolution 2140 in line with the outcome of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC)—drafting a new constitution, adopting a new electoral law, holding a referendum and general elections and adopting a federal state structure. The Constitution Drafting Commission has been divided into working groups and its work is currently underway, although it is unclear if it will be able to respect the timeframe established by the government. A national body created by the government in April to monitor the implementation of the NDC outcome is not operational yet. In addition to the critical security situation, challenges to the transition process come from political spoilers. On 14 June, Hadi ordered the removal of heavy weaponry from the outskirts of Sana’a and had troops stationed outside a mosque controlled by former President Ali Abdullah Saleh due to fears of a coup attempt. Earlier, on June 11, Hadi partially reshuffled the cabinet and also ordered the closing down of a television station operated by his own party, the General People’s Congress, yet closely associated with Saleh.

Economic problems continue to hinder the transition process in Yemen. The government has had difficulties paying for the highly subsidised fuel for some time and suggestions that it plans to reduce fuel subsidies has sparked protests in the past. The IMF has offered a $560 million loan if there are cuts to subsidies and spending. (The government currently spends a third of state revenue on fuel subsidies annually.) Along with the risk of a raise of fuel prices in such an unstable context, the current situation, which includes increasing shortages, does not seem to be sustainable either.

The 2014 Humanitarian Response Plan developed by OCHA highlights how an estimated 58.3 percent of Yemen’s population—or 14.7 million people—are in need of humanitarian aid. The crisis is exacerbated

**Options**
The most likely option for the Council is to renew the UNIFIL mandate as it currently stands for another year.

**Council Dynamics**
There is consensus in the Council that UNIFIL contributes to stability between Israel and Lebanon, becoming even more crucial in the context of the fighting in Gaza and the ongoing Syrian crisis. The Council remains united in its support for Lebanon’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and security. The Council is also united in its concern about the continued vacancy in the presidency, particularly given the extreme challenges facing Lebanon at this time.

France is the penholder on Lebanon in the Council.

UN DOCUMENTS ON YEMEN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2140 (26 February 2014) expressed support for the political transition and established sanctions against those threatening the peace, security or stability of Yemen. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2013/3 (15 February 2013) welcomed the announcement of the launch of the NDC. Security Council Press Statement SC/11470 (11 July 2014) expressed grave concern about the serious deterioration of the security situation in Yemen in the light of the violence in Amran Security Council Letter S/2014/465 (2 July 2014) appointed Mohammad Stabli (Lebanon) to serve on the Panel of Experts of the 2140 Sanctions Committee. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV/7175 (14 May 2014) was the first briefing by the chair of the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee. S/PV/719 (26 February 2014) was the meeting where resolution 2140 was adopted.
Yemen (con’t)

by the security situation, the difficulties of humanitarian access, insufficient funding, lack of service delivery in areas of return, the increasing prices of basic items (90 percent of food is imported) and endemic poverty.

On 24 June, Ambassador Raimonda Murmokaitė (Lithuania) chaired a joint meeting of the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee, the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee and the 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee. According to a press release issued after the meeting, participants agreed that the presence of AQAP in Yemen remains a major challenge to the country’s peaceful transition and identified a range of opportunities to enhance coordination and cooperation among relevant UN and Security Council entities in supporting counter-terrorism efforts (SC/11463).

Key Issues
Helping ensure the stability of the government in the transition process and solidifying the results of the NDC is the key issue for the Council. Making full use of the sanctions regime and preventing spoilers—such as Saleh, former Vice-President Ali Salim Al-Beidh and Houthis leader Abdullah Yahya Al-Hakim (Abu Ali)—from further obstructing the political process are closely related issues.

Promoting the inclusivity of the constitution-drafting process and preparing for the general elections are key issues in the upcoming period.

Immediate issues for the Council include the precarious security situation, the presence of Al-Qaida and persistent violent clashes among tribal groups. Funding and supply of weapons from regional actors and the need for disarmament of heavy weapons are closely related issues.

The bleak humanitarian situation—including widespread food insecurity; the challenges for IDPs, returnees and refugees; limited humanitarian access; and funding difficulties—is an ongoing issue.

The government’s continuing reluctance to address past human rights violations and examine lessons learnt despite prior commitments to do so has become an issue of concern for the Council.

Options
The Council could issue a statement that would:
• urge all parties to the conflict in the north to engage in a political process aimed at halting violence, addressing root causes and ensuring the stability of the transition;
• urge all armed groups to accept a simultaneous and phased disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process, starting by heavy weapons; and
• request the Secretary-General to establish an international commission of inquiry following the failure of the government to investigate human rights violations committed during the 2011 uprising.

The Council could also move to list Saleh, Al-Beidh and Abu Ali under the 2140 sanctions regime, either as a decision of the Sanctions Committee or through a resolution.

Council and Wider Dynamics
In the discussion in consultations on the gravity of the situation in Amran, some Council members raised the possibility of using the tools under resolution 2140 to impose sanctions on political spoilers in Yemen. Some Council members also mentioned the need to investigate these events by the Panel of Experts. However, there are Council members that seem to be of the opinion that no listing is needed at this point, believing that the threat of being listed may still be enough of a deterrent. Even though an early draft of the Council’s 11 July press statement named some spoilers of the political process, these were finally dropped.

The initiative of the chair of the 2140 Sanctions Committee to convene joint meetings of counter-terrorism-related subsidiary bodies of the Council and regularly brief Gulf Cooperation Council members on the steps taken by the Committee seems to be positively changing the negative reaction some countries in the region had when the sanctions regime was established.

The UK is the penholder on Yemen.

Kosovo

Expected Council Action
In August, the Council is due to hold its quarterly debate on Kosovo. Farid Zarif, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), is expected to brief on recent developments and the latest Secretary-General’s report by video-teleconference. High-level participation from both Serbia and Kosovo is also likely at the debate.

No Council action is expected.

Key Recent Developments
Prior to the last debate on Kosovo (S/PV.7183) held on 27 May, the Assembly of Kosovo was scheduled to vote on the formation of the armed forces and resolve the issue of reserved seats for minorities in the Assembly. Unable to pass legislation on those issues, the Assembly decided to dissolve itself in an extraordinary session on 7 May. The motion was supported by the overwhelming majority of the legislators, with 90 votes in favour, four against and three abstentions. New general elections were set for 8 June.

In comparison to the 2010 general elections, which were marked by widespread irregularities, the 8 June elections were held peacefully and according to international standards. In a statement following the elections, the Secretary-General said he was encouraged “by the reports of the smooth and orderly conduct of the elections and broad public participation throughout Kosovo”. For the first time, general elections were held in all of Kosovo and with the participation of the Serb community.

Initially, Serb leaders in Kosovo threatened to withdraw from running in the elections because of a dispute over the Republic of Kosovo insignia on ballot papers and the ethnic composition of polling station
committees in the Serb-majority municipalities. Four days prior to the elections, Serb leaders agreed to take part after holding talks with Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić, who urged them to participate.

The Central Election Commission reported a general voter turnout of around 42 percent and a somewhat lower turnout in Serb-dominated municipalities. Of 120 seats in the Assembly, Hasim Thaçi’s Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) won 37 seats, while the main opposition party, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), won 30 seats. Following the elections, three major opposition parties—the LDK, the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AFK), which won 11 seats, and the Initiative for Kosovo, which won six seats—formed a coalition and expressed their intent to support Ramush Haradinaj, of the AFK, a former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) commander.

According to the constitution, the president is supposed to propose a candidate for prime minister to the Assembly in consultation with the political party or coalition that has the majority in the Assembly necessary to establish the government. After winning the most seats, the PDK claimed that it had the right to form a government. However, the opposition block also claimed the right to form a new government because it emerged as the coalition with the most seats in the Assembly. Since the election results were announced on 26 June, Kosovo has experienced a constitutional crisis.

Seeking clarification on who should be nominated for the post of prime minister, President Atifete Jahjaga referred the case to the Constitutional Court, which stated in an opinion that Thaçi should be nominated prime minister as the leader of the party or pre-election coalition that won the most votes. The Court also ruled that in case the initial candidate did not receive the necessary votes to form a government, the president should appoint another candidate who could meet those criteria.

On 17 July, the Assembly held its first session, at which Isa Mustafa, the leader of the major opposition LDK party, was elected speaker of the house. PDK members walked out of the session, but the opposition managed to form a quorum necessary for a vote. After a challenge by the PDK on 23 July, the Constitutional Court ruled to suspend the election of Mustafa as speaker of the house pending a final decision, expected by 18 September.

In April, the Assembly voted to transfer the functions of the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) Special Investigative Task Force to a special court. After visiting Kosovo on 21 July, EU Special Prosecutor Clint Williamson said that he expects the special court to be fully functional in 2015. The court is supposed to operate under Kosovo law but will be based in the Netherlands and be staffed with international judges. The court will investigate cases involving war crimes, including allegations of organ trafficking by the KLA during the conflict in Kosovo. Williamson’s report containing findings about war crime allegations was released on 29 July. Even though he did not mention specific names, Williamson stated in his findings that some senior level KLA members could be indicted for war crimes committed against non-Albanian population in Kosovo.

The general elections and the constitutional crisis have impacted recent developments. High-level dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina has not taken place since 31 March though it is expected to resume after a new government is formed. The security situation remained fairly stable with the exception of a 22 June incident in which Kosovo police clashed with Kosovo Albanians in South Mitrovica. The clashes came after local Serbs blocked a bridge on the Ibar River with concrete pots filled with flowers, calling it a “Peace Park”. This provoked demonstrations by Kosovo Albanians that eventually led to clashes with the Kosovo police. There were injuries on both sides, as well as damage to police cars and surrounding property. EULEX and the NATO led Kosovo Force (KFOR) were called on to assist the Kosovo police.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 12 June, the Human Rights Council considered a report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons (IDPs), Chaloka Beyani, on his October 2013 visit to Kosovo and Serbia (A/HRC/26/33/Add.2). He said that more is needed to be done in Kosovo and Serbia to ensure IDPs’ access to adequate housing and livelihoods in their current locations and to provide them with adequate services.

The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances visited Serbia on 19-23 and Kosovo on 24-26 June. Press conferences were held in Belgrade on 23 June and Pristina on 26 June. During the 26 June press conference, the group urged authorities in Kosovo and Serbia to show a stronger political commitment and leadership to finding the 1,711 persons still missing since the 1990s’ conflict, including 532 Kosovo Serbs. The group suggested that this question should be part of the EU-mediated talks about normalising relations between Pristina and Belgrade.

Key Issue

Maintaining stability in Kosovo remains the main concern for the Council.

Options

An option for the Council could be to issue a statement welcoming the report on war crimes and organ trafficking by the EU Special Prosecutor and call on all parties to cooperate with the newly established special court.

An option for the Council—once the constitutional crisis subsides—would be to consider lengthening the reporting cycle on Kosovo in light of the stabilisation of the situation following the 19 April “First Agreement on Normalisation of Relations between Belgrade and Pristina”.

Alternatively, the Council might choose to take no action.

Council Dynamics

Because the Council is preoccupied with several extremely pressing issues, Kosovo remains an issue of relative low intensity in the Council. This is also the case because other international organisations—mainly the EU, NATO and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe—play a more active role in Kosovo.

Council members’ established positions on Kosovo remain unchanged, with a clear division between the permanent members that recognise Kosovo (France, the UK and the US) and Russia, which strongly supports Serbia. This division will likely prevent any action by the Council that would significantly alter UNMIK’s mandate.

The contact and drafting group on Kosovo consists of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and the US and also includes Australia, Lithuania and Luxembourg.

In August, Australia will take the lead on Kosovo within the contact and drafting group.
**Expected Council Action**

In August, the chair of the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg), will brief Council members in consultations on the work of the Committee. The last 90-day briefing was on 20 May.

**Key Recent Developments**

A series of incidents have escalated tensions on the Korean Peninsula recently. The DPRK launched a total of six short-range ballistic missiles into its eastern coastal waters on 29 June, 9 July and 13 July. It additionally fired rockets on 26 June and 2 July, followed by a barrage of approximately 100 artillery shells on 14 July aimed at waters near the eastern sea border with the Republic of Korea (ROK). Previously, on 22 May, the DPRK and ROK exchanged artillery fire along their western maritime border.

The Council discussed the ballistic missile launches under “Other Matters” following consultations on Libya on 17 July. After the meeting, in agreed-upon “elements to the press”, Council President Ambassador Richard Eugène Gasana (Rwanda) said the Council condemned the launches “as violations of Security Council resolutions” and urged the DPRK to comply with relevant Council resolutions. On 26 July, however, the DPRK launched another short-range ballistic missile.

In a 21 July letter to the Council (S/2014/512), the DPRK claimed that the launches were a “self-defensive exercise” in light of the “provocative ongoing joint military exercises by the US and South Korea” and called for an urgent Council meeting on the joint exercises. (The US and the ROK commenced an annual five-day joint naval drill on 16 July, and on 21 July, Japan, the ROK and the US began a two-day trilateral naval search-and-rescue exercise.) The DPRK previously proposed on 30 June that the ROK end drills with the US as part of a series of actions it said would reduce tensions. The ROK rejected the proposal as insincere without a commitment to nuclear disarmament by the DPRK.

Further raising concerns about its ballistic missile programme, on 29 July the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University reported that satellite images showed that the DPRK was completing improvements for firing long-range missiles and had conducted recent engine tests at its Sohae Satellite Launching Station. The DPRK fired a long-range ballistic missile in December 2012 from the Sohae site that reached as far as the Philippines.

The 1718 Sanctions Committee last met on 16 June. It continued its discussion of a response to the *Chong Chon Gang* case. (The *Chong Chon Gang* was the DPRK-flagged ship detained by Panama on 15 July 2013 on its way from Cuba with weapons and military equipment hidden in a cargo of sugar in violation of Council sanctions.) The committee also considered the 26 March launches of two medium-range Rodong ballistic missiles, along with two other incident reports. On 1 July, the Committee held an open briefing for UN member states with its Panel of Experts (PoE).

As part of the response to the Chong Chon Gang case, the US proposed at the end of May an implementation assistance notice (IAN) that would inter alia remind member states that the DPRK arms embargo includes services for the maintenance of arms or related items. The no-objection procedure for the IAN was extended seven times at China’s request as it negotiated with the US over separately proposed designations related to the case. On 28 July, the Committee adopted the IAN and added Ocean Maritime Management Company Ltd. (OMM), the operator of the Chong Chon Gang, to its consolidated sanctions list. Separately, Singapore filed criminal charges on 10 June against Singapore-based Chinpoh Shipping Company Ltd., which the PoE’s final report (S/2014/147) cited for its involvement in facilitating the shipment.

In other developments, the DPRK agreed at talks with Japan in Stockholm in late May to re-investigate the cases of Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea to train its spies in the 1970s and 1980s. A DPRK committee established to re-investigate the abduction cases held its first meeting on 4 July. That same day, Tokyo eased its sanctions on travel and cash transfers to the DPRK and decided to allow port calls by DPRK ships for humanitarian purposes.

A DPRK letter to the Secretary-General on 27 June (S/2014/451), which was circulated to the Council, called on the US to ban a soon-to-be released Hollywood comedy (The Interview). The movie is about a plan to assassinate Kim Jung Un; the DPRK described it as “sponsoring of terrorism as well as an act of war”.

Chinese President Xi Jinping visited the ROK on 3–4 July. Xi’s visit broke a tradition of making the DPRK the first destination for Chinese presidents on official trips to the Korean peninsula, thus also reportedly displeasing the DPRK.

On 11 July, Australia, France and the US circulated a letter (S/2014/501) to Council members summarising the 17 April Arria-formula meeting on the report of the Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry (CoI) on human rights in the DPRK (A/HRC/25/63). In the letter, the countries said the Council should formally discuss the CoI’s findings of widespread and systematic human rights violations and consider how to hold those responsible accountable.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

On 28 March, the Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted resolution 25/25 welcoming the final report of the CoI and extending for another year the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, Marzuki Darusman. The resolution also asked the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to establish a field-based structure to strengthen monitoring of the situation of human rights in the DPRK. (On 28 May, after consultations between member states and OHCHR, the ROK announced that it would host a field-based structure to build on the CoI’s work.)

Darusman presented his next report to the HRC (A/HRC/26/43) on 18 June. He emphasised the international law implications of the CoI’s findings and highlighted in particular the conclusion that in light of the manifest failure of the DPRK to protect its population from crimes against humanity, the international community, through the UN, bears this responsibility. (The CoI had found that it had reasonable grounds to conclude that crimes against humanity continue and that they have been taking place for decades in the DPRK.) He also highlighted opportunities for engagement with the DPRK and presented key elements of a strategy to address the issue of international abductions and enforced disappearances.

Following the 1 May review of the DPRK, the HRC’s working group of the Universal Periodic Review adopted its report on 6 May. The DPRK rejected 83 recommendations, including those pertaining to the cooperation with the Special
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Rapporteur and to the implementation of the CoI’s recommendations. Another 185 recommendations will be examined by the government before September (A/HRC/WG.6/19/L.18).

Key Issues
A key issue will be how to address the DPRK’s recent series of short-range ballistic missile launches.

An expected issue for discussion is the Committee’s recently agreed-to response to the Chong Chon Gang case.

Improving member states’ implementation of the sanctions is an ongoing issue.

Options
The Committee or Council could:
• send a letter to the DPRK attaching the incident report on the 26 March mid-range ballistic range launches, updated to include addendums on the late June/early July launches, and request the DPRK’s response; or
• reconsider the PoE’s recommendations for designations in its incident report on the 26 March ballistic missile launches in light of the more recent ballistic missile launches.

On the CoI report, while it is not part of the non-proliferation agenda under which the DPRK is considered, members could use the consultations to again raise the report’s recommendations or ideas discussed at the Arria-formula meeting to:
• sanction key offenders for violating human rights in the DPRK;
• request regular briefings by the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in the DPRK; and
• refer the situation in the DPRK to the International Criminal Court.

Council Dynamics
While most Council members in the 20 May briefing called for a strong response to the Chong Chon Gang case and the 26 March ballistic missile launches, China and Russia urged caution, warning of the risk of escalating tensions with the DPRK. The US applied heavy pressure to get China to agree to the recent designation of OMM. On the 26 March mid-range missile tests, China has been more obstinate, rebuffing the initial US push for a presidential statement and rejecting as too sensitive the individuals and entity that the PoE recommended for sanctions. For now, the committee is considering sending the DPRK a letter with the PoE’s conclusions that the launches violated sanctions and requesting its response.

China, however, has exerted much effort to dissuade the DPRK from conducting a fourth nuclear test, and in the last two months concerns over a new nuclear test have subsided.

On the human rights situation, Council members urge action, but they consider it unlikely that much can be agreed to in the Council due to opposition by China and possibly Russia. (Neither country attended the Arria-formula meeting on the CoI report.)

The US is the penholder on the DPRK.

Protection of Civilians

Expected Council Action
In August, the Council expects to hold a briefing on the protection of humanitarian workers in armed conflict. UN Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) President Peter Maurer and possibly an NGO are expected to brief. In the event that Eliasson is unavailable, it seems that Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos may brief. (The meeting is likely to be held on 19 August to mark World Humanitarian Day, which honours the efforts of aid workers and takes place on the anniversary of the bombing of the UN Baghdad compound, in which 22 people were killed.)

A resolution or other outcome is a possibility.

Background
The safety and protection of humanitarian workers has been affirmed in various international instruments, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, the 1994 Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel and the 2005 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel.

Different organs within the UN system have also given the safety and security of humanitarian personnel considerable focus. The General Assembly has taken up the issue each year since its 52nd session (1997-1998). The Council has also emphasised the importance of protecting humanitarian and UN personnel in various country-specific and thematic resolutions since the adoption of resolution 1265, its first thematic resolution on the protection of civilians. The Secretary-General’s September 2013 report to the General Assembly, “Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of UN personnel”, stated that the Secretary-General’s highest priority was the safety and security of UN personnel (A/68/489).

Key Recent Developments
The world is becoming an increasingly dangerous place for humanitarian workers. According to Humanitarian Outcomes’ Aid Worker Security Database, there were 248 security incidents, defined as “deliberate acts of violence affecting aid workers”, in 2013. (Humanitarian Outcomes provides consulting services to donor governments and aid organisations on humanitarian issues.) This is, by a wide margin, the highest number of annual security incidents since Humanitarian Outcomes began compiling this data in 1997. The second-highest annual number of security incidents (170) was reported in 2012. According to the data, five of the six most dangerous places for humanitarian workers in 2013 in terms of number of security
incidents against aid workers—Afghanistan, Syria, South Sudan, Sudan and Somalia—were on the Council’s agenda. (The other country among these six is Pakistan.)

As outlined in the Secretary-General’s September 2013 report (A/68/489), several trends have been especially noticeable in recent years that have made the operating environment particularly risky for workers of the UN system. For more than a decade, attacks targeting UN personnel have become more prevalent. Furthermore, improvised explosive devices and suicide bombings are now features of the asymmetric conflict landscape. A new trend has also been the significant rise in abductions of UN personnel and non-UN humanitarian workers, as demonstrated in Afghanistan, Mali, Sudan and elsewhere. The statistics are particularly striking in Sudan, where more aid workers have been abducted so far this year (25) than in any full calendar year since 2004.

The Council held its most recent debate on the protection of civilians on 12 February (S/PV.7109), with briefings by High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous, ICRC Director General Yves Daccord and Amos. During the debate, some of the briefers spoke about the safety and security challenges facing UN staff and aid workers. Pillay said that support was needed from the Council when “mission personnel are intimidated, expelled or attacked because they are doing their jobs.”

Amos noted that humanitarian workers protect and assist people “at great personal risk,” adding that they must be “protected and respected by parties to conflict”. Ladsous underscored the risks facing UN personnel, referring to the 17 January bombing of a Kabul restaurant by the Taliban that claimed 21 lives, including four UN employees, and the threat that extremists in Mali might target UN peacekeepers there.

**Key Issues**

Key issues for the Council include:

- ensuring that humanitarian workers can maintain their impartiality, neutrality and independence in settings where the international presence is heavily militarised;
- balancing the safety and security of humanitarian workers with the effort to serve populations in need in dangerous environments;
- addressing the steady rise in abductions of humanitarian workers in recent years; and
- combating impunity with regard to those who attack humanitarian workers.

**Options**

The Council may adopt a resolution that:

- deplores the rise in attacks on humanitarian workers, especially the recent trend in abductions;
- emphasises the need to hold accountable those who commit acts of violence against humanitarian workers; and
- underscores the commitment of aid workers to the principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence.

The Council could also request from the Secretariat an update on the Department of Safety and Security’s efforts to evaluate and strengthen the physical security of UN facilities worldwide, as described in the Secretary-General’s September 2013 report.

**Council Dynamics**

Although not discussed extensively in the Council, the safety and security of humanitarian workers is an issue of concern to a number of Council members. This was reflected most notably by the statements of France and Lithuania during the February debate on the protection of civilians (S/PV.7109). France said that deliberate attacks on civilians and humanitarian workers were unacceptable and that the Council “could no longer accept such repeated and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law”.

while Lithuania argued that there must not be impunity for those “who attack and kill humanitarian and medical workers, journalists and peacekeepers”. It remains unclear whether members generally espousing strong sovereignty norms will qualify their concern for the safety and security of humanitarian workers by emphasising that these workers must adhere to the norms and restrictions placed on their movement and activities by host governments.

The UK is the lead in the Council on the protection of civilians.

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**Visiting Mission to Europe and Africa**

**Expected Council Action**

In August, the Council expects to travel to Belgium, the Netherlands, South Sudan, Somalia and Kenya. A briefing on this visiting mission is expected later in the month.

**Background**

Council visiting missions have historically served a number of purposes, including preventive diplomacy, information gathering and support for mediation and peace processes. They have been a tool that the Council has used with greater frequency since the end of the Cold War: while there were fewer than a dozen such missions during the Cold War, the August mission will be the Council’s 48th visiting mission since 1992 and its second in 2014. (For more background on Council visiting missions, please see our 25 March 2014 Special Research Report, Security Council Working Methods: A Tale of Two Councils?, pp. 40-50.)

**Agenda**

The visiting mission will likely consist of stops in Europe (Belgium and the Netherlands) and Africa (South Sudan, Somalia...
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and Kenya). While the UK has taken the lead in organising the trip, there will be co-leaders for each of the different segments of the mission. At press time, it appeared that the visiting mission might emphasise the role of women in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding, as well as the harmful impact of sexual violence in conflict. This focus would be in keeping with resolution 2122 of October 2013, in which the Council “expresses its intention to make the implementation of the Council’s women, peace and security mandate a focus on one of its periodic field visits in advance of the 2015 High-Level Review” of the implementation of resolution 1325, the Council’s first thematic resolution on women, peace and security.

Belgium
The mission’s first leg, co-led by Australia and the UK, will be in Belgium, where the Council is expected to visit World War I battlefields. The purpose of this part of the mission is to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of World War I and pay tribute to those who lost their lives in the conflict.

Netherlands
The next part of the mission, a trip to The Hague, will be co-led by Chile and Luxembourg. In The Hague, Council members will engage with officials from international courts and tribunals there, possibly including the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice. The purpose of these interactions will be to discuss lessons learned with respect to efforts to combat impunity. In addition, there will probably be a meeting with officials from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), during which Council members will discuss with the OPCW its work in Syria.

South Sudan
Rwanda and the US are co-leaders of the South Sudan part of the mission, where Council members are expected to engage with the government, humanitarian actors, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and civil society, including women’s groups. They will likely express concern about the security, political and humanitarian situation in the country and reiterate the need for all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities. Council members may also express to the parties their concerns about restrictions of movement on UNMISS, while condemning attacks on UNMISS personnel. They are also expected to visit one of the UN facilities providing protection for internally displaced persons.

Somalia and Kenya
The Somalia-Kenya leg of the trip will be co-led by Nigeria and the UK. In Somalia, Council members are expected to meet with the government, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and civil society (also including women’s groups). They expect to receive an update on how UNSOM and AMISOM are fulfilling their respective mandates. There will likely be interest among Council members in learning about the military campaign against Al-Shabaab. When interacting with the government, Council members may be interested in receiving an update on the implementation of the arms embargo. Concerns will also probably be expressed by Council members about the humanitarian situation in the country.

In Nairobi, it appears that the Council will meet with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, which is mediating the South Sudan peace talks in Addis Ababa. Other meetings in Nairobi are possible, though not confirmed, including with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition, which has been engaged in a civil war with the government of South Sudan since 15 December 2013.
Notable Dates for August

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<tr>
<th>REPORT DUE</th>
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<td>20 June</td>
<td>Group of Experts mid-term report to the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee (S/2014/428)</td>
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<td>SG report on MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of the Congo) (S/2014/450)</td>
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<td>25 July</td>
<td>SG report on UNMISS (South Sudan) (S/2014/537)</td>
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<td>OPCW report on the implementation of resolution 2118 (Syrian chemical weapons) (S/2014/533)</td>
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<td>SG final report on BNUB (Burundi)</td>
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<td>SG report on MINUSCA (Central African Republic)</td>
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<td>SG report on the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<td>20 July</td>
<td>SG report on humanitarian access in Syria</td>
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<td>UNAMID (Darfur)</td>
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