Overview

Rwanda will hold the presidency of the Council in July. A high-level open debate on regional partnerships in UN peacekeeping is planned, to be presided by Foreign Minister Louise Mushikiwabo of Rwanda. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Chairperson of the AU Commission Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton are expected to brief.

The quarterly open debate on the Middle East is also expected with a briefing by Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Robert Serry.

A briefing is expected on the annual report of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) by Ambassadors Vladimir Drobnjak (Croatia) and Antonio de Aguiar Patriota (Brazil), the former and current chairs of the PBC.

Briefings, followed by consultations, are expected on:
- Iraq, by Nickolay Mladenov, the head of UN Assistance Mission for Iraq;
- the UN Office for West Africa by its head, Special Representative Said Djinnit; and
- the work of the 2127 Central African Republic Sanctions Committee, by its chair, Ambassador Raimonda Murmokaitė (Lithuania).

At press time, it appeared that the briefing followed by consultations on Darfur by the head of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, scheduled for July, might be postponed until August.

Briefings in consultations are likely on:
- Libya by Special Representative Tarek Mitri, the head of the UN Support Mission in Libya;
- Syria, on humanitarian access by Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos and on the chemical weapons track by Sigrid Kaag, Special Coordinator of the OPCW-UN Joint Mission;
- Sudan-South Sudan issues, by the Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan and head of the UN Office to the AU, Haile Menkerios;
- Lebanon and implementation of resolution 1701, likely by Special Coordinator Derek Plumbly and Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Edmond Mulet;
- Cyprus and the status of negotiations by Special Representative and head of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, Lisa Buttenheim;
- preparations for the deployment of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic, by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Hervé Ladsous; and
- the work of the 751/1907 Somalia and Eritrea Sanctions Committee by its chair, Ambassador Oh Joon (Republic of Korea).

Formal sessions will be needed to adopt resolutions renewing the mandates of UNFICYP in Cyprus and UNAMI in Iraq.

Also in June, Council members plan to hold an Arria-formula meeting with the Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry on Syria and an informal interactive dialogue with the chairs of the PBC country-specific configurations.

Throughout the month members will be following closely events in Ukraine, Iraq, Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and additional meetings may be scheduled.
In Hindsight: Sanctions

The Council has recently demonstrated renewed activity in using sanctions as a tool for maintaining international peace and security. With the adoption of resolution 2140 concerning Yemen on 26 February 2014, the Council reached an all-time high number of concurrent sanctions regimes: 15. Some Council members and observers, however, have recognised that there remains considerable room for improvement in UN sanctions design and implementation.

Since the imposition of the first mandatory sanctions in 1968 with resolution 253 concerning Rhodesia, the Council’s approach has evolved in several ways:

• in order to minimise unintended consequences such as humanitarian impact, sanctions regimes since the mid-1990s have been primarily targeted rather than comprehensive;
• designation criteria have expanded to address human rights violations and the protection of civilians, particularly children and women (precedents were established—both in the Democratic Republic of the Congo—with resolution 1698 and resolution 1807 respectively);
• regarding structure, sanctions committees and a panel or group of experts have become standard for most regimes (all 15 current regimes have a committee, and 12 of 15 committees have a monitoring mechanism); and
• in response to due process concerns, the Focal Point (resolution 1730) and the Office of the Ombudsperson (resolution 1904) were created to facilitate delisting processes.

One area that remains relatively underdeveloped is sanctions strategy. In the interest of improving sanctions implementation, most practitioners and scholars have focused on relatively narrow measures of efficiency, which can obscure the bigger picture of what UN sanctions are intended to achieve. At a strategic level, there is often considerable ambiguity regarding how sanctions are meant to reinforce other aspects of UN engagement, such as peacekeeping, mediation or peacebuilding. There may also be insufficient consideration of alternative policy options being effectively ruled out by imposing sanctions under certain circumstances. Prior to authorisation, the Council could take a more strategic approach to sanctions design by systematically determining objectives, identifying potential unintended consequences and mapping linkages with other aspects of UN peace operations.

Improved coordination and cooperation within the UN system and with regional organisations could also lead to enhanced effectiveness of sanctions regimes and better compliance. This might include greater synergy between the work of panels/groups of experts and UN peacekeeping operations, further communication between the Council and UN country teams, more coordination among sanctions committee chairs and information sharing among panels/groups. Regular consultations between the Council and regional organisations—potentially including efforts to harmonise certain sanctions regimes—could lead to better compliance and enforcement through complementary international and regional measures. Perhaps sanctions coordination and cooperation could be an agenda topic for the next annual joint consultative meeting with members of the AU Peace and Security Council.

Transparency is perhaps the most conspicuous area of sanctions practice where the costs of reform are low and the benefits (i.e., awareness, legitimacy and compliance) are high, yet there have been few changes. Nor is transparency in sanctions regimes a new issue: notes by the President of the Security Council were issued on the matter in 1995 (S/1995/234) and 1999 (S/1999/92), while the Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions, a subsidiary body of the Council, made further recommendations in 2006 (S/2006/997). Measures to increase transparency could include regular consultations with non-Council member states affected by specific sanctions regimes, more frequent public briefings by the chairs of sanctions committees, the inclusion of more specific information in the annual reports of sanctions committees, and publicly available transcripts or summary records of sanctions committee meetings.

Due process continues to be a subject of interest within a sanctions context. The creation of the Focal Point for Delisting in 2006 and the Office of the Ombudsperson in 2009 were largely in response to legal challenges in national and regional courts, particularly in relation to the then 1267 Al-Qaida/Taliban regime. Addressing the Council on 10 May 2013 following a briefing by the chairs of the counter-terrorism subsidiary bodies, a group of like-minded states on targeted sanctions—comprising Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland—proposed extending the procedural safeguards of the Ombudsperson from the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida regime to the other UN sanctions regimes (S/PV.6964).

Ultimately, the sanctions issues outlined above—institutional evolution, strategy, coordination, transparency and due process—are secondary to Council dynamics. Put more concretely and starkly, there may be no other greater indicator of the potential success or failure of a UN sanctions regime than consistent, sustained commitment among the Council members themselves, particularly the P5. When Council members fail to follow through with secondary sanctions against sanctions spoilers, or they themselves undermine a UN sanctions regime, the message for the wider UN membership is clear. And when Council members block or delay publication of a report by a panel/group of experts, the integrity of the process may be compromised, as may also occur when the experts appointed to such panels/groups are predominantly nationals of certain Council members. Likewise, when seeking to understand why certain sanctions regimes are actively implemented (e.g., 1267/1989 Al-Qaida) while others remain for all intents and purposes dormant (e.g., 1591 Sudan), the answer can be found within Council dynamics.

Taking up several of the challenges outlined here, the governments of Australia, Finland, Greece and Sweden in partnership with the Watson Institute at Brown University and Compliance and Capacity International launched on 28 May the High Level Review of UN Sanctions (http://www.hlr-unsanctions.org). Three working groups will consider issues related to UN integration and coordination, external institutions and instruments, and regional organisations and emerging challenges. This high-level review has a few notable state-led predecessors, including the Bonn-Berlin Process, the Interlaken Process, and the Stockholm Process, which generated reports published from 2001 to 2003. Building on these initiatives, the Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions issued its final report on 18 December 2006 (S/2006/997). Reinstating the Informal Working Group could be a useful way for the Council to consider insights and lessons from new policy-oriented research on UN sanctions.
Status Update since our June Forecast

Ukraine
On 2 June, Russia called for consultations on the humanitarian situation in Ukraine. At that meeting Council members agreed to ask humanitarian chief Valerie Amos to brief, she did so on 16 June. On 17 June, the Council issued a press statement condemning the killing of two Russian journalists that day in Ukraine, marking the first statement Council members agreed to since the crisis began (SC/11442). On 24 June, the Council was briefed by Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights Ivan Simonović and Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Tayé-Brook Zerihoun (S/PV.7205). Simonović briefed on the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission and Zerihoun briefed on the ceasefire and peace plan proposed by President Petro Poroshenko of Ukraine.

Tribunals
On 5 June, the Council held a debate on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at the Congo, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malaysia, South Sudan, the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, counter-terrorism in Africa and strengthening cooperation between the two bodies (S/2014/350).

Annual Meeting with the AU PSC Members
On 6 June, members of the Security Council and members of the AU Peace and Security Council held their eighth annual joint consultative meeting in New York. A joint communiqué was issued which discusses the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, counter-terrorism in Africa and strengthening cooperation between the two bodies (S/2014/400).

Afghanistan
On 6 June, Council members issued a press statement condemning an attack in Kabul which caused a number of deaths and injuries to civilians and security personnel (SC/11431). On 25 June, the Council held its quarterly debate on Afghanistan (S/PV.7208) considering the most recent Secretary-General’s report (S/2014/420). Briefings were provided at the debate by Special Representative and head of UNAMA Jan Kubis and Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime Yuri Fedotov. The Council also adopted two presidential statements on Afghanistan at the debate, one on counternarcotics (S/PRST/2014/12) and another on the elections (S/PRST/2014/11).

Iran
On 9 June, the Council adopted resolution 2159 which renewed for 13 months the Panel of Experts assisting the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee, without any changes to its mandate. The resolution requested the Panel to submit a mid-term report to the Committee by 9 November 2014 and a final report by 9 May 2015. On 25 June, the chair of the Committee, Ambassador Gary Quinlan (Australia), presented his 90-day report on the work of the Committee to the Council (S/PV.7211). He reported that the Committee had had one informal meeting and two “informal informal” meetings and had discussed the Panel’s final report (S/2014/394) as well as an incident report on an interception reported by a merchant state (in reference to the 5 March interception of the ship Klos-C in the Red Sea by Israel). Referring to the ongoing talks between Iran and the P5+1, Quinlan emphasised that all UN sanctions remained fully in effect and could only be altered through the adoption of a Council resolution.

Liberia
In consultations on 16 June, the chair of the 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein (Jordan), briefed Council members on the Panel of Experts’ midterm report (S/2014/363) as well as the recent sanctions review that had been conducted with a view towards scaling back or ending the regime as mandated in resolution 2128.

Peacekeeping
On 11 June, at the initiative of Russia the Council held an open debate on new trends in peacekeeping operations (S/PV7196). The Secretary-General briefed and issues such as the use of force in peacekeeping, the use of new technology in peacekeeping operations and inter-mission cooperation and multidimensional mandates were discussed.

Mali
On 11 June, Council members issued a press statement condemning an attack on MINUSMA in which four Chadian peacekeepers were killed (SC/11438). Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Hervé Ladsous briefed the Council on 18 June, presenting the most recent MINUSMA report (S/2014/403). The Foreign Minister of Mali, Abdoulaye Diop, also addressed the Council during the public session (S/PV.7202). Special Representative Albert Gerard Koenders briefed during the following consultations. On 25 June, the Council adopted resolution 2164 that established benchmarks for MINUSMA, renewed the mission for a year and granted Koenders greater political authority.

Côte d’Ivoire
On 16 June, Special Representative and head of UNOCI, Aitchatou Mindaoudou Souleymane, briefed the Council on the most recent UNOCI report (S/2014/342), followed by consultations (S/PV.7197). On 25 June, the Council adopted resolution 2162 renewing UNOCI for a year and introduced some changes to the mandate. The resolution reinforces the role of the Special Representative in supporting political processes underway in Côte d’Ivoire and envisions a reduction of UNOCI military and police components by 30 June 2015. The resolution also authorises all UNOCI and UNMIL military helicopters to be utilised in both countries. It calls for the establishment of a Quick Reaction Force within UNOCI for an initial period of one year and authorises its deployment by the Secretary-General without prior Council authorisation for up to 90 days, in case of serious deterioration of the situation there.

Counter-Terrorism
On 17 June, the Council adopted resolutions 2160 and 2161. Resolution 2160 renewed, with minor adjustments, the 1988 Taliban sanctions regime. Resolution 2161 renewed the measures targeting Al-Qaida associated individuals and entities and extended the mandates of the Office of the Ombudsperson and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team assisting the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee for 30 months.

The Sahel
On 19 June, the Special Envoy for the Sahel, Hıroate Guebre Sellassie, briefed the Council on the implementation on the UN integrated Sahel strategy (S/2014/397). Sellassie
highlighted the deteriorated situations in Libya, Mali and Nigeria and said that addressing security challenges in the Sahel requires a flexible geographic definition of the region. Sellassie also raised concerns about “competing” interventions and strategies within the UN and the need for greater coordination (S/PV.7203).

**Yemen**
On 20 June, the Council met in consultations with Special Adviser Jamal Benomar on the worsening security situation in Yemen, as well as the implementation of the national dialogue outcomes and the economic challenges facing Yemen.

**Golan Heights**
On 25 June, the Council adopted resolution 2163 renewing UNDOF for six months after considering the Secretary-General’s latest report on the observer mission during 18 June consultations (S/2014/401).

**UNRCCA (Central Asia)**
On 26 June, Miroslav Jenča, the Special Representative and head of UNRCCA, briefed Council members in consultations. In a press statement following the briefing Council members emphasised the importance of preventive diplomacy and commended UNRCCA’s efforts to assist countries in the region on issues such as trans-boundary water management, counter-terrorism and drug trafficking (SC/11457).

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**Status Update since our June Forecast (con’t)**

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**Peacekeeping**

**Expected Council Action**
In July, as proposed by Rwanda, the Council is expected to hold a high-level open debate on regional partnerships in peacekeeping. It is anticipated that Foreign Minister Louise Mushikiwabo of Rwanda will chair the meeting. AU Commission Chairperson Dlamini Zuma and EU Foreign Affairs and Security Policy chief, Catherine Ashton, are expected among the briefers. A resolution is a likely outcome.

**Background**
Rwanda seeks to discuss the growing importance of regional organisations for UN peacekeeping. Drawing on lessons learnt from operations in Africa as well as from its experience chairing the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, Rwanda would like to explore ways in which regional partnerships can best bring their comparative advantage to UN peacekeeping, help share the burden and ultimately, make peacekeeping more effective.

The role of regional and subregional organisations in UN peacekeeping has recently been discussed in the Council primarily in the context of country-specific situations such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali and South Sudan. Previously, between 2007 and 2012, there were at least five thematic debates on this issue. (Two of them took place at the initiative of South Africa and all of them at the request of elected members.) Furthermore, since 2007, AU Peace and Security Council members have held annual consultative meetings with Council members. Since 2013, Council members have also met periodically with the EU Political and Security Committee.

On 31 July 2007 the Council adopted resolution 1769, authorising the establishment of the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). In 2004 the AU had established the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), to which the UN supplied light and heavy support packages sequentially, eventually resulting in the first-ever UN-AU hybrid operation. For the first time, the UN had created an operation for which it assumed full financial responsibility but over which it did not retain exclusive operational or political control.

In resolution 1725 of 6 December 2006, the Council endorsed the proposal by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the AU to deploy a peacekeeping mission in Somalia. The AU established the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) expecting the mission to evolve into a UN operation, but a 20 April 2007 report by the Secretary-General indicated that the conditions to deploy a UN peacekeeping operation to replace AMISOM did not exist in Somalia (S/2007/204). In 2009, the Council took an unprecedented step in resolution 1872 by authorising the provision of a logistics support package funded by UN assessed contributions and channelled through the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), established for this purpose in Nairobi, Kenya.

On 16 April 2008, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa chaired a high-level open debate on the need to strengthen the relationship between the UN and regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security (S/PV.5868). The meeting resulted in the adoption of resolution 1809, which recognised the need to “enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing regional organisations” when they undertake peacekeeping under UN authorisation.

To address the limitations of AU operations due to inadequate equipment and transport and other operational weaknesses, a 24 December 2008 report by a joint AU-UN panel came up with two main recommendations:

1. Establishing a common regional fund for AU peacekeeping missions (S/PV.6196).
2. Establishing an AU-UN joint mission to the RCA (S/PV.6200).

Clearly, the UN-AMISOM mission would end in 2021, and the AU’s resulting decision to authorise a new mission has raised the question of how to involve the UN in future AU peacekeeping. This question has been further complicated by the AU’s recent decision to establish a new peacekeeping mission for the Central African Republic, and the UN’s decision to establish a new peacekeeping mission for the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Peacekeeping (con’t)

the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund to support AU peacekeeping capacity and the use of UN assessed contributions to support UN-authorised AU operations on a case-by-case basis, provided the Security Council and General Assembly approved and there was an agreement that the mission would transition to UN management within six months (S/2008/813). The report was discussed in an 18 March 2009 open debate organised by Libya (S/PV.6092) and resulted in the adoption of a presidential statement (S/PRST/2009/3). The statement did not welcome the recommendations of the report, and requested the Secretary-General to submit another report with a detailed assessment of the recommendations, in particular those on financing. The second report (S/2009/470), released on 18 September 2009, was discussed in a 26 October 2009 debate organised by Viet Nam (S/PV.6206). In a presidential statement, the Council expressed “its intention to keep all options under consideration” regarding financing (S/PRST/2009/26).

The AU efforts to support UN peacekeeping were further discussed in a 22 October 2010 open debate organised by Uganda (S/PV.6409). A presidential statement noted that “the issue of securing sustainable, predictable and flexible financing remains a key challenge” (S/PRST/2010/21).

On 12 January 2012, at the request of South Africa, the Council held its most recent debate to date on regional partnerships in peacekeeping focused on Africa (S/PV.6702). The debate resulted in the adoption of resolution 2033, which requested the Secretary-General to conduct, in consultation with the AU, a comprehensive analysis of lessons learnt from practical cooperation between the UN and the AU, in particular with regard to UNAMID and AMISOM. Although the issue has not been discussed since, the Council has continued to rely on regional and subregional organisations to support peacekeeping efforts. In addition to the examples mentioned above, two African-led missions, led by the Economic Community of West African States and the AU respectively, were authorised by the Council to fill in temporarily for UN peacekeeping missions: the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) and the African-led International Support Mission to the CAR (MISCA).

Discussions preceding and following their respective deployment focused on the need for logistical and financial support to ensure their operational capabilities.

Key Issues
A key issue is to ensure that the partnerships are effective at the strategic, operational and tactical level.

Another key issue for the Council is to devise an effective, sustainable and fair working relationship with regional organisations, compatible with the new tasks they are mandated to do.

A related issue is for African Council members to articulate any concerns African regional organisations may have over Council decisions and be proactive to draft Council outcomes on African and other issues.

Options
Council members may adopt a resolution:

- establishing a regular cycle of Council briefings on peacekeeping partnerships by the relevant actors;
- encouraging its ad hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa to meet more regularly on topics pertaining to the efforts of African-led initiatives in support of UN-mandated operations; and
- requesting the Secretary-General to elaborate lessons learnt from practical cooperation between the UN and the AU, focusing on UNAMID and AMISOM, as well as the more recent example of AFISMA and MISCA.

Council and Wider Dynamics
With Africa currently taking up about 73.7 percent of the UN peacekeeping budget and the need to react in situations where a UN peacekeeping operation is not an option at a given moment for political, operational or financial reasons, Council members agree that partnerships with regional organisations in Africa and elsewhere are fundamental in maintaining international peace and security.

However, the AU position is to seek more parity in that partnership, to replace ad hoc arrangements with sustained financial and material support for UN-authorised missions and to make sure the Council takes AU perspectives into account when a UN peacekeeping mission takes over from African-led missions.

Some Council members have promoted an ad hoc approach in order to maintain the primacy of the Council and have advocated for the establishment of trust funds or bilateral cooperation as opposed to hybrid operations or African-led operations funded through UN assessed contributions.

Iraq

Expected Council Action
In mid-July, Special Representative Nickolay Mladenov will brief the Council. Deliberations will likely focus on the prospects of forming a unity government and the security implications of the seizure of north-western Iraq by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the territorial consolidation of Kurdistan.

The Secretary-General’s report on the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) will also be presented, and the mission’s mandate, which expires on 31 July, will likely be renewed for a year.

Council members are also due to receive a report on Iraq’s compliance with resolution 1284 regarding the repatriation or return of Kuwaiti missing persons or property.

UN DOCUMENTS ON IRAQ Security Council Resolutions S/RES/1618 (4 August 2005) was on terrorism in Iraq. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2014/1 (10 January 2014) supported government efforts to address the security situation and condemned attacks perpetrated by ISIS. Security Council Press Statements SC/11437 (11 June 2014) deplored the takeover of Mosul by ISIS. SC/11430 (5 June 2014) praised the completion of the election process, called for an inclusive government and encouraged a humanitarian response to the situation in Anbar. Security-General’s Reports S/2014/191 (14 March 2014) was the most recent Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property report. S/2014/190 (14 March 2014) was the most recent UNAMI report.
Background and Key Recent Developments

An already dire security situation in Iraq reached crisis levels when ISIS spearheaded its surprise takeover of Mosul on 10 June. This crisis was preceded by almost daily coordinated and sectarian attacks in 2013 and 2014 against civilians, law enforcement personnel and government officials in the lead-up to the 30 April elections. According to UNAMI, at least 7,818 civilians were killed in 2013, compared to 3,238 in 2012. The death toll continues to climb in 2014, with UNAMI reporting a minimum of 4,000 civilians and 698 members of the Iraqi security forces already killed by the end of June. The UK-based Iraq Body Count project puts civilian deaths in 2014 at 8,266.

In Anbar province, ISIS has been in control of Fallujah and parts of Ramadi since December 2013 and had been expanding its presence in Nineveh province for several months before its takeover of Mosul. (Anbar and Nineveh provinces make up the entire western border of Iraq with Syria and Jordan.) The ongoing expansion of territorial control by ISIS in a contiguous area of eastern Syria and north-western Iraq has been possible because of a power vacuum in eastern Syria, where the regime of Bashar Al-Assad has neither the inclination nor the capacity to launch major counter-terrorism efforts, and severe sectarian political divisions in Iraq, which have been exacerbated by the lack of security following the US withdrawal in 2011 and the sectarian policies of the Shi'a-dominated government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

The recent tension is linked to a government crackdown against Sunni protests that began in April 2013, largely due to the fact that the Shi'a-led government was consolidating its hold on power. It is also linked to the anti-terrorism laws that led to mass sweeps and detention of Sunnis. This has been compounded by the heavy-handed Iraqi military assault on Fallujah to rout ISIS, including aerial bombardment of residential areas. These military operations and the government’s sectarian policies have left large parts of the Sunni population estranged and with little confidence in the government’s willingness or ability to protect their interests or their lives. Civilian displacement has been severe, with more than 427,000 people in Anbar province uprooted in the course of six months, and media reports indicate up to 500,000 have fled Mosul since the ISIS offensive began in earnest on 5 June.

In light of these developments, Mladenov briefed Council members twice in June. On 4 June, he reported that the 30 April elections gave Maliki 92 of 328 seats in parliament—the largest number of seats but not the majority needed to ensure Maliki a third term as prime minister without having to form a coalition with Kurds and Sunnis. The Council issued a press statement the next day praising the completion of the election process, calling for an inclusive government and encouraging a humanitarian response to the situation in Anbar. While Mladenov made clear that Iraq was facing grave challenges, no one anticipated he would brief the Council a week later on the possible unravelling of the state.

Council members issued a press statement on 11 June deploring the fall of Mosul. The previous day Maliki called an emergency session of parliament for 12 June to declare a state of emergency. A quorum could not be reached because a significant majority of the Kurd and Sunni blocs boycotted the session; they were extremely wary of granting Maliki even more extraordinary powers.

Mladenov briefed Council members on 12 June directly after the boycotted parliament session and two days after Mosul fell to ISIS in an offensive that began on 5 June in Samarra. Fighting continues in Samarra, which has become a front line for the Maliki government. Fighting is also ongoing for the strategic city and refinery of Baiji, the largest in Iraq. Although it mainly supplies domestic markets in the north, its loss to ISIS would be a blow to the Maliki government, potentially affecting fuel supplies further south.

In Mosul, ISIS fighters took control of government buildings, including the regional headquarters of the central bank, and military bases stocked with US-provided arms, munitions and equipment. ISIS released thousands of prisoners from city jails, some of whom may potentially join its ranks. ISIS claims to have already transported large weapons caches and armoured vehicles back to Syria.

Iraqi forces fled Mosul, offering very little resistance to an attack by only approximately 800 to 2,000 ISIS fighters. Mladenov attributed the disintegration of Iraqi forces in Mosul to several factors: two senior generals abandoned their posts, forces were overstretched due to fighting in Fallujah and Ramadi, and two longstanding issues played a part, namely corruption and the force structure, by which troops were deployed to areas where they had little or no affiliation with the local population. Meanwhile, ISIS cannot maintain control of seized territory in isolation from other Sunni groups. It needs active cooperation in the areas from which it stages its operations. Former Baathist military commanders with ties to the areas under insurgent control, including former Vice-President Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, are part of the fight against the government. While there was a disintegration of state authority in the north, Mladenov said it was not a country-wide phenomenon as forces largely withdrew from Anbar and Nineveh provinces to secure Baghdad.

After the fall of Mosul, ISIS and other groups continued to make gains, including taking control of western border crossings. By 23 June, ISIS had seized control of a Syrian border crossing. Baghdad and ISIS both claim they are in control of the single crossing into Jordan and another into Syria. Jordan, anticipating such a development, had already increased its security forces on the border with Iraq to prevent the spread of ISIS into Jordan. Analysts think ISIS is aware it would be a tactical error to spread its operations into Syria. Such a move would likely clarify the true US red line in terms of the regional balance of power.

Similarly, ISIS does not seem to be encroaching on areas administered by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and protected by its highly disciplined Peshmerga forces. The KRG has secured and expanded its borders, taking control of a border crossing with Syria and the long-disputed, oil-rich city of Kirkuk on 12 June after Iraqi troops melted away. Any potential for military cooperation between the central government and the KRG against ISIS and Sunni forces may involve Baghdad’s acquiescing to the KRG’s pursuit of unilateral oil and gas deals. On 22 May and 9 June—before the fall of Mosul—the KRG piped crude oil to Ceyhan in Turkey, bypassing the central government. This action raised fears in Baghdad that such
economic independence would lead to a broader declaration of independence, and Iraq threatened legal action against any buyer. On 20 June, Israel received a first shipment of this disputed oil.

Recent events may force Baghdad to seek cooperation with the KRG nonetheless, and it is expected that KRG oil exports will be used as political leverage during discussions to form a new national government. On the other hand, having captured Kirkuk and securing independent export capacity, the KRG has less incentive to join the central government and may be looking to unilaterally declare independence. US Secretary of State John Kerry met with KRG President Massoud Barzani on 24 June in an attempt to persuade him to participate in the political process in Baghdad.

Iraq relies on good relations with both Iran and the US, and Maliki has asked “friendly governments” for help. On 16 June, Iran and the US informally and briefly discussed Iraq on the sidelines of talks on the nuclear file. Both have reportedly deployed reconnaissance drones to gather intelligence, but not necessarily in coordination.

On 19 June, the US said it would send 300 military advisers, including elite Green Beret commando units, to Baghdad and was prepared to take targeted military action if necessary. However, US President Barack Obama said that US troops would not return to combat in Iraq and that Iraq needed a leader who could deliver an inclusive political solution. Kerry underscored those messages to Maliki during a 23 June visit to Baghdad.

Iran continues to be an ally of the Maliki government but has expressed opposition to any US military intervention. Iran is seriously concerned about the Sunni threat that ISIS poses to Iraq, has positioned troops along the joint border and authorised air strikes if ISIS forces come within 60 miles of the border. It is widely reported in the media that Islamic Revolutionary Guard units from Iran are in Iraq helping to organise the security forces and Shi’a militias—including members of Hezbollah.

It may be difficult for Maliki to stay in power given the high level of distrust Kurds and Sunnis have in his leadership. Furthermore, there are significant challenges to Iraq’s unity, including KRG threats to peel even further away from the central government as well as re-emerging splits in the Shi’a base. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the highest Shi’a religious authority in Iraq, has activated militias to support Iraq in fighting ISIS. However, Sistani also delivered a thinly veiled criticism of Maliki by calling for a government that has broad national support and avoids past mistakes. Moktada al-Sadr, a powerful Shi’a cleric heading the large and experienced Mahdi Army, vowed his forces would never be under government control. However, Iran is still clearly backing Maliki and his address to the nation on 25 June gave no indication he was willing to concede his electoral advantage in forming the government, a process expected to begin on 1 July.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

In a 13 June statement, High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay expressed extreme alarm at the dramatic deterioration in the situation in Iraq as forces allied with ISIS overran a succession of major population centres. Hundreds were killed and half a million people were displaced. Pillay warned of the acute vulnerability of civilians caught in the crossfire, targeted in direct attacks by armed groups or trapped in ISIS-controlled areas. Humanitarian access was also a major concern. She reminded the parties of their obligations under international law to treat troops who have laid down their arms humanely and to observe the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution. On 16 June, Pillay condemned the series of executions by forces affiliated with ISIS of hundreds of non-combatant men in the previous five days and of religious leaders on 12 and 14 June.

**Key Issues**

The key issue for the Council is averting the territorial and political disintegration of Iraq, which would have major negative implications for regional and international security.

Another immediate issue is how the Council can bolster counter-terrorism efforts to curtail the spread of ISIS. Related to this is whether and how to address the mutually destabilising impact of the Syrian civil war and the Iraq crisis—in particular, ISIS operations in both countries.

A more manageable issue for the Council is determining how UNAMI can contribute to a political process that yields an inclusive government and responds more effectively to the humanitarian crisis and sectarian tension.

**Options**

UNAMI’s mandate has not significantly changed since the adoption of resolution 1770 in 2007. One option is to adopt a resolution that does little more than renew this existing mandate without adjustment.

While UNAMI is a political mission not equipped to operationally address the various and very serious security issues, another option is to adopt a resolution mandating UNAMI to provide better capacity to address the cross-pollination of the crises in Iraq and Syria, support the establishment of a more inclusive political system and facilitate a humanitarian response.

As for countering ISIS, the Council could include in the UNAMI renewal a substantial reference to resolution 1618 adopted on 4 August 2005 specifically on terrorism in Iraq. Such language could include a strong reaffirmation of member states’ obligations to prevent the transit of terrorists, prevent arms and financing that would support terrorists and emphasise the importance of strengthening the cooperation of the countries in the region, particularly neighbours of Iraq.

While ISIS has been listed under the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida sanctions regime, in practice the Council has done very little to follow-up resolution 1618 on the specific threat of terrorism in Iraq. A further option would be to review, revise and revive the use of the 1518 Iraq Sanctions Committee—which for all practical purposes is defunct and was only ever used to sanction Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime—to now target high-level ISIS fighters and supporters.

**Council Dynamics**

Council members have found that publicly addressing the growing violence in Iraq in the past has been difficult, primarily because of US sensitivities related to its 2003 invasion and 2011 withdrawal. Recently, Council members issued two press statements on ISIS and the rapidly deteriorating situation in Iraq—about conditions in Anbar province on 5 June (SC/11430) and about the fall of Mosul on 11 June (SC/11437)—and were briefed in consultations on 23 June on the wider threat of terrorism in the region. This increase in Council attention contrasts with the routine and at times tangential consideration of the situation in Iraq every four months that has characterised the Council for years, despite repeated warning signs of growing authoritarian tendencies by Maliki, increasing threats from ISIS and other...
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centrifugal forces challenging or gnawing at territorial integrity.

This increased attention could signal that, given the political, humanitarian and regional implications of territorial seizures by ISIS and the KRG and pronounced sectarian violence, Council members may be looking to increase engagement on Iraq. Some members have indicated it may be necessary to take stock and deliver a more strategic response before the 31 July renewal of UNAMI.

Some Council members have noted that the same coherence with which the Council approaches the impact of the Syrian crisis on Lebanon needs to be similarly brought to bear on the Council’s approach to Iraq. Mladenov has repeatedly stated that Iraq and Syria are becoming one battleground, and some members feel that the Council should have the capacity to look at these issues holistically. These Council members have expressed concern that treating Iraq and Syria as discrete situations is not a sustainable approach.

On the political front, some members have found it difficult to formulate a Council response to the government-formation process beyond the routine call for an inclusive government. Some Council members are concerned that a display of support at this juncture might be misinterpreted as support for Maliki.

The Council continues to remain impervious to the independent oil exports from the KRG which pose mounting challenges to the authority of the central government. (Since 2007, the KRG has signed exploration and production agreements with many foreign companies, including Chevron and Exxon of the US and Total of France.)

The US is the penholder on Iraq issues in general, and the UK is the penholder on Iraq-Kuwait issues.

Syria

Expected Council Action

Early in the month Sigrid Kaag, Special Coordinator of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-UN Joint Mission, will brief Council members on the implementation of resolution 2118 regarding the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons.

Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos will brief Council members on humanitarian access later in the month. Australia, Jordan, Luxembourg and the P5 have spent a month negotiating a draft resolution to follow-up the lack of any meaningful implementation of resolution 2118 since its adoption on 22 February. At press time, it was unclear when the draft might be circulated to the wider Council for consideration and a vote.

Council members are also tentatively planning to hold an Arria-formula meeting with the Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry on Syria, which has collated testimonies that indicate a massive number of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Finally, on the political track, Council members will be anticipating the Secretary-General’s announcement of a new Special Representative to succeed Lakhdar Brahimi.

Key Recent Developments

On 3 June, President Bashar al-Assad was re-elected to a further seven years in office with 88.7 percent of the vote. Polling was only held in government controlled areas and the elections were widely viewed as a sham poll in the midst of a violent civil war.

Shortly after the elections, the Islamic State of the Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)—an extremist group that has been operating in eastern Syria and western Iraq—launched a surprise deep offensive into neighbouring Iraq, seizing Mosul on 10 June and threatening Baghdad while consolidating control of border crossings between Iraq and Syria.

Kaag last briefed Council members on 4 June, reporting that the 30 June deadline for the completion of all removal and destruction activities would be missed. On 23 June, the OPCW announced that the final 7.2 percent of declared chemical weapons material had been removed from Syria. It seems it will take a further two to four months to destroy the chemicals abroad.

During the 4 June consultations, Kaag reiterated that other important issues remained such as verification work, the destruction of production facilities and clarification of the declared chemical weapons stockpile. There was also a discussion of the OPCW’s fact-finding mission to investigate allegations that the regime had used chlorine-filled bombs against civilians. On 17 June, the fact-finding mission issued a report that its review of the evidence supported such allegations.

On 20 June the Secretary-General delivered a major public address, presenting six points for an integrated, international approach to Syria. He called for an arms embargo, unfettered humanitarian access, new efforts for a serious political process, accountability, completion of the destruction of chemical weapons and the need to address the regional dimensions of the conflict, including the threat by extremist groups. Regarding a renewed political process, the Secretary-General said he would soon announce a new special envoy with a mandate to pursue a political solution.

On 26 June, Amos briefed Council members, presenting a report that clearly demonstrates that the regime has used the distribution of humanitarian aid as a tactic of war. She reported that there continues to be no progress in implementing any of the key demands in resolution 2139, such as authorising cross-border aid operations, allowing access to besieged or hard-to-reach areas, observing medical neutrality, ceasing aerial bombardments or easing administrative hurdles. In fact, since the adoption of resolution 2139 on 22 February 2014, those in
need have increased from 9.3 million to 10.8 million and those in hard-to-reach areas have increased from 3.5 million to 4.7 million. Most alarmingly, while needs have increased, access continues to drop significantly due to even more arduous clearance and transport procedures put in place by the government over the course of the last two months.

Human Rights-Related Developments
In a 30 May statement, six special rapporteurs of the Human Rights Council and two working groups warned that the 22 May veto by China and Russia of the draft resolution referring Syria to the International Criminal Court could expose the Syrian population to further gross human rights and humanitarian law violations.

During her opening statement to the Human Rights Council on 10 June, High Commissioner Navi Pillay regretted the Security Council’s inability to ensure accountability in Syria. She deplored that war crimes and crimes against humanity are commonplace in Syria and occur with complete impunity.

On 17 June, the chair of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, Paulo Pinheiro, presented an update on the unprecedented level of violence in Syria that threatened the entire region. Pinheiro emphasised the need to find a negotiated political solution and insisted that accountability must be part of any future settlement. Regarding humanitarian access, Pinheiro stressed that the Syrian government and non-state armed groups are egregiously violating resolution 2139. He called on the Security Council to use the tools available in the UN Charter and strengthen the mechanisms for implementing its resolutions.

Human Rights Watch released a report on 23 June reporting that non-state armed groups in Syria have used children to fight in battle and in support roles. The report does not cover all armed groups that have used children, in particular allegations regarding pro-government militias.

Underlying Problems
The situation in Syria is devastating, with a death toll estimated at 162,000. There are almost 2.9 million refugees and there are 6.4 million internally displaced persons. The head of the UN Refugee Agency said on 20 June that the number of people displaced by conflict has reached levels not seen since World War II and that Syria was a significant factor behind that trend.

Adding to the dire humanitarian situation are alarming reports of intentional government policies of starving areas under siege and deliberately attacking the health infrastructure. The regime has increased its use of incendiary weapons, cluster bombs and barrel bombs, with recent allegations that it has used chlorine bombs. The proliferation of extremist armed groups and their increasing use of suicide attacks, car bombs, mortars and tunnel bombs under government military positions have contributed to the escalating violence. Although infighting between opposition groups has waned as ISIS has concentrated on Iraq, it seems ISIS has transferred part of the significant weaponry and other military assets it has seized in Iraq, back to Syria.

Meanwhile, the political and accountability tracks remain blocked.

Key Issues
In the fourth year of the conflict, the key issue is whether and when the parties, in particular the government, will meaningfully implement resolution 2139 on humanitarian access. An issue for the Council is what further steps it might take if substantive implementation continues to lag.

Another issue for the Council is to find ways to support a cessation of violence and resuscitate efforts for a political solution to the crisis.

A final issue is how to address the mutually destabilising impact of the crises in Iraq and Syria, the disappearance of the common border, and the realignment of priorities and allegiances by the parties on the ground as a result of the gains accumulated by ISIS.

Options
On humanitarian access, Council members could adopt a resolution:

• authorising cross-border aid deliveries across routes under the supervision of UN monitors; and/or
• authorising the UN to carry out cross-border aid deliveries in the absence of state consent.

Another option for the Council is to begin brainstorming how to approach the cross-pollination of the crises in Iraq and Syria—particularly the dimension of competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia for regional primacy as well as the proliferation of ISIS and Hezbollah fighters in both countries. In this regard, it will be important in the Syria prong of any such approach that the counter-terrorism aspect of the conflict does not overshadow the humanitarian, political and accountability tracks.

A less likely option is for the Council to heed the Secretary-General’s call for the international community to support an end to all violence in Syria, in particular by stopping the flow of arms into Syria and impose an arms embargo.

Council and Wider Dynamics
At press time, humanitarian leads Australia, Jordan and Luxembourg had just marked an intense month of complex negotiations with the P5, in consultation with OCHA, on a draft resolution on humanitarian access.

The initial draft was a short text that, under Chapter VII, would have permitted the UN to carry out cross-border aid operations in the absence of state consent. China and Russia, clearly uncomfortable with the prospect of casting a fifth veto on Syria, have been genuinely engaged in negotiations while firmly flagging their objection to a Chapter VII resolution challenging state sovereignty.

Early in the negotiations, Russia suggested that the draft resolution expand upon the suggestion in the 22 May report on humanitarian access that the UN ensure aid operations at border posts outside government control are conducted in a transparent way. Much of the negotiations since have been dedicated to working out what the modalities of such a monitoring mechanism would be while, in tandem, Russia sought buy-in from Syria. Some progress was made and it seems Syria has agreed in principle to the mechanism at four UN-identified priority border crossings outside government control.

A fundamental obstacle remains, Syria has insisted that all such aid would need to be redistributed under the government’s authority, undermining the original intent of enabling aid to reach those in need via the most direct route possible. The humanitarian leads and the P3 are unlikely to agree to a text which could potentially strengthen Syria’s use of aid distribution as a tactic of war. The guiding principle for these members has been to come up with a formula in New York that will have a positive impact on the ground in Syria. In addition, Syria’s letter to the Council on 18 June stating that the delivery of aid without consent constitutes an attack is a worrying development.

On chemical weapons, with the final tranche of declared chemicals having left Syria Council members are unlikely to be
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interested in doing more than monitoring the remaining activities of the OPCW-UN joint mission. Nevertheless, divisions linger on this track. Russia had put forward a draft statement welcoming the final removal. The statement was blocked by the US, with the support of several other members, given the seemingly deliberate delays by Syria in the pace of removal activity as well as other outstanding government obligations—in particular a full declaration of its chemical weapon arsenal and destruction of the 12 production facilities.

France is the penholder on Syria while Australia, Jordan and Luxembourg are the penholders on the humanitarian track. However, most texts need to be agreed between Russia and the US prior to agreement by the broader Council.

Lebanon

Expected Council Action
In July, Special Coordinator for Lebanon Derek Plumbly and Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Edmond Mulet will brief Council members in consultations on the Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of resolution 1701, which called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006.

The mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) expires on 31 August.

Key Recent Developments
Council members last discussed UNIFIL on 25 March, when deliberations focused on the relative calm in the mission’s area of operations and the added value of the tripartite mechanism in de-escalating tensions between Israel and Lebanon. Discussion also focused on the marked increase in Syrian cross-border fire. The July report is likely to highlight breaches of the Blue Line—the UN-demarcated line between Israel and Lebanon—including violations of Lebanese airspace by Israeli drones and other aircraft. Continuing hostilities and the harassment of UNIFIL personnel are also likely to be reported.

The report will likely describe ongoing tensions between Hezbollah and Israel, including the 24 February Israeli attack of a Hezbollah position inside Lebanon and the 14 March roadside bombing, claimed by Hezbollah, of an Israeli military vehicle patrolling south of the Blue Line.

The 1701 report is also expected to depict serious sectarian tension as a result of the Syrian crisis and intensified cross-border incidents from Syria into Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have continued to redeploy from the Israeli border in the south to the Syrian border in north and east of the country due to mounting instability. As a consequence, UNIFIL has increased its operational activities in the south to compensate for the loss of LAF capacity. Cooperation between UNIFIL and the LAF was the focus peacekeeping chief Hervé Ladsous’ visit to Lebanon in late June.

On 17 June, the International Support Group for Lebanon, which includes France, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the US, committed to provide training to the LAF to cope with the spillover of the Syrian crisis. On 17 May, then President Michel Sleiman announced that a contract would be signed to formalise the 29 December 2013 pledge by Saudi Arabia of a $3 billion grant to Lebanon to purchase arms from France. The military aid from the Sunni kingdom is widely perceived as an attempt to counter the influence that Shia Iran wields in Lebanon through Hezbollah.

Lebanon began to implement a new security plan in April to rein in sectarian violence. On 25 May, radical Sunni cleric Omar Bakri Muhammad was arrested due to his public support for the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). On 20 June, 17 men were arrested in Beirut on the suspicion they were plotting to assassinate a prominent Shia leader, the Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, and of possibly being members of or sympathetic to ISIS. The same day there was a suicide car bomb detonated at a checkpoint in the Bekaa Valley, killing one member of the internal security forces and wounding 32. Another car bomb detonated in a Shia area of Beirut on 23 June and a suicide attack on a Beirut hotel followed two days later. On 24 June, Lebanese authorities arrested another 11 men suspected of being part of a terrorist cell.

Regarding the political situation, Council members were briefed in consultations on the latest 1559 report by Special Envoy Terje Rød-Larsen on 6 May. Key areas of focus included the enormous impact the Syrian crisis is having on the political, security and humanitarian situation in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s military activities in Syria, subsequent sectarian tensions and pronounced cross-border incidents were also discussed. Of particular interest was the political stalemate that would ensue in the probable scenario that a new president would not be elected.

On 29 May the Security Council adopted a presidential statement following the failure of the parliament to elect a new president when Sleiman’s term expired on 25 May. The statement expressed the Council’s disappointment that the presidential election was not completed within the constitutional timeframe and urged Lebanon to hold elections quickly. It also called on all parties to respect Lebanon’s policy of disassociation and, albeit without naming Hezbollah, to refrain from any involvement in the Syrian crisis.

The existing political rivalry in Lebanon

UN DOCUMENTS ON LEBANON
Security Council Resolution S/RES/2115 (29 August 2013) renewed UNIFIL for an additional year. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2014/10 (29 May 2014) expressed disappointment that presidential elections were not completed within the constitutional timeframe. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2014/296 (24 April 2014) was the latest 1559 report. S/2014/130 (26 February 2014) was the latest 1701/UNIFIL report. OTHER RELEVANT FACTS
Special Coordinator for Lebanon Derek Plumbly (UK) Special Envoy for the Implementation of Resolution 1559 Terje Rød-Larsen (Norway) UNIFIL Force Commander Major General Paolo Serra (Italy) until 24 July 2014 and then Major General Luciano Portolano (Italy) Size and Composition of UNIFIL as of 31 March 2014 15,000 authorised troops with 10,224 troops currently deployed. Troop Contributors Armenia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Croatia, Cyprus, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tanzania and Turkey. Duration March 1978 to present; mandate expires 31 August 2014. Cost 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014: $492.62 million (A/C.5/68/21)
between the Shi’a Hezbollah-dominated March 8 coalition and the Sunni-led March 14 alliance has been exacerbated by the two blocs’ support for opposing sides in the Syrian conflict, with Hezbollah fighting openly on behalf of the Syrian regime. This rivalry has stalled the elections and, in seven rounds of voting since 23 April, no presidential candidate has received the required two-thirds majority of the 128-member parliament due to the boycott of these sessions by the March 8 bloc. The last round was 18 June, and the next vote is slated for 2 July. It seems unlikely that the necessary quorum in parliament will be reached as long as Iran and Saudi Arabia, which back the March 8 and March 14 blocs respectively, fail to agree on potential consensus candidates.

US Secretary of State John Kerry visited Beirut on 4 June and met with both the prime minister and president regarding the political stalemate and Syrian crisis. The discussions also touched on natural gas reserves. These reserves were a source of heightened tension between Israel and Lebanon in the summer of 2011 due to the disputed maritime zone of 850 square kilometres and competing claims over their respective national rights to such natural resources. (There is no established maritime boundary between Israel and Lebanon; Israel unilaterally installed a buoy line, which Lebanon does not recognise.) Given the dramatic shift in the geopolitical landscape in the region since then, the tension and public rhetoric has died down, and the US has been actively working with both Israel and Lebanon to reach a mutual understanding and avoid activity in the disputed area.

The ongoing influx of Syrian refugees is placing an unprecedented strain on Lebanon’s communities, infrastructure and services. More than 1.1 million refugees are registered in Lebanon, increasing its population by roughly 25 percent and giving it the highest per-capita refugee population in the world. Unofficial estimates put the figure closer to 1.5 million.

Key Issues
The key issue is that the conflict in Syria continues to negatively impact Lebanon.

Ongoing issues include continued violations of resolution 1701, such as the Israeli occupation of areas north of the Blue Line and overflights in Lebanese airspace.

Options
The most likely option for the Council in July is to take no action. However, most Council members will be looking to the July consultations to feed into the August renewal of the UNIFIL mandate.

Council Dynamics
There is consensus in the Council that UNIFIL contributes to stability between Israel and Lebanon, becoming even more crucial in the context of the Syrian crisis. The Council is united on the importance of preserving Lebanon’s sovereignty, national unity, territorial integrity and remains supportive of the country’s policy of disassociation from the Syrian crisis.

However, there are divisions, particularly among the P5 members, on how to characterise the impact of the Syrian conflict on Lebanon, Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian conflict, Syria’s role in cross-border attacks and Israeli airstrikes on alleged weapon transfers by Hezbollah.

Such divisions may also be reflected in a desire by Council members, particularly the P3, to manage the spillover effects from the Syrian crisis by using a mechanism outside the Council, as demonstrated by the International Support Group for Lebanon. These members highlight the importance they attach to Lebanon’s stability by providing humanitarian assistance and bilateral financial support, including for the LAF, through this Group. This support has become particularly important given the recent crisis in Iraq, Syria’s neighbour to the east.

France is the penholder on Lebanon in the Council.

Israel/Palestine

Expected Council Action
In July, Special Coordinator Robert Serry will brief the Council during its quarterly open debate on the Middle East. Issues likely to be raised include the lack of a credible path toward a political solution, Fatah-Hamas reconciliation, East Jerusalem, Israeli settlement expansion, the disproportionate Israeli military response to the disappearance of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank and Palestinian prisoners in Israeli administrative detention.

Key Recent Developments
The most recent quarterly debate on the Middle East was held on 29 April—the final day of a nine-month time frame to achieve a comprehensive settlement between Israel and Palestine. Serry briefed on the collapse of US-brokered peace talks, and there has been no real momentum to bring the parties back to the table since.

There were significant developments in the preceding weeks that had signalled the collapse. In March, Israel reneged on its commitment to release Palestinian prisoners, which, alongside accelerated expansion of illegal settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, created obstacles to the peace talks. Monitoring groups reported that Israeli settlement construction quadrupled in the nine months of the peace talks. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said he would not continue talks unless Israel agreed to a settlement freeze and honoured its previous commitment to release Palestinian prisoners.

On 2 April, Palestine then presented letters to accede to 15 international conventions and treaties, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on international humanitarian law and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.
1907 on the laws of war. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was not included. However, on 27 April the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) authorised Abbas to join some 63 additional treaties and international agencies, including the ICC. If Palestine were to accede to the Rome Statute, it would have a legal avenue to hold Israel accountable for its occupation of Palestinian territory. Such moves for recognition and the accoutrements of statehood have long been opposed by both Israel and the US. Abbas has not pursued that track any further to date.

Israel formally suspended its participation in the peace talks following the 23 April announcement that Fatah and Hamas had reached an agreement to form a unity government. While Fatah–Hamas reconciliation agreements have been reached several times—most notably in Mecca in 2007, Cairo in 2011 and Doha in 2012—each has gone unimplemented. However, both Fatah and Hamas have a significant impetus to make this agreement stick. The chances of Fatah forging a peace deal with Israel have dissipated. Hamas is extremely isolated due to the seven-year-old Israeli blockade of Gaza that was compounded by similar closures at the Rafah crossing into Egypt following the 3 July 2013 military coup against the Muslim Brotherhood-led government.

On 2 June, a national unity government was formed, ending the seven-year split between Fatah and Hamas, but key stumbling blocks remain, such as how to integrate the two security forces. Abbas pledged that the unity government would honour its international commitments, recognise Israel (the PLO recognised Israel in 1993) and renounce violence. Composed of technocrats, the unity government is temporary and will prepare for presidential and parliamentary elections in early 2015—a prospect that neither bloc seems eager to face. The EU and the US agreed to work with the new government but, given their concerns about Hamas, will watch closely how it operates.

On 5 June, in reaction to the formation of the unity government, Israel reaf-
mirmed that it would not negotiate with any Palestinian government that included Hamas and announced major new settlement plans in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. This resulted in renewed Palestinian consideration of joining the ICC, as the Rome Statute includes as war crimes the transfer of civilians into occupied territory (i.e., settlers and settlements) as well as the forcible transfer of a protected people in an occupied territory (i.e., forcing Palestinians off their lands, preventing their return and destroying their property).

Also in late April, around the time of the disintegration of the peace talks, 120 Pal-
estinians in Israeli administrative detention began a hunger strike to protest their detention without charge or trial. There are approximately 5,200 Palestinian detainees in administrative detention, by which Israel holds Palestinians suspected of being a security threat without charge or trial for six-month periods that may be renewed ad infinitum. By mid-June, the number of prisoners refusing food had increased to 300 and 75 of these had been hospitalised. The Israeli parliament approved in a first vote a measure on 10 June to enable force-feeding prisoners, other votes are necessary for the bill to become law. On 6 June the Secretary-General reiterated the UN’s long-standing position that administrative detainees should be charged or released without delay and that force-feeding prisoners would contravene international standards. The hunger strike ended on 25 June after Israel agreed to improve some conditions in detention.

On 12 June, an Israeli airstrike killed one Palestinian and wounded three in Gaza, following a rocket launch from Gaza into Israel. A similar exchange occurred on 18 June with Israel striking five targets in Gaza.

Also on 12 June, three Israeli teenage set-
ters went missing near Hebron in the West Bank. The incident occurred in Area C of the West Bank where Israel has sole security responsibility, yet Israel has attributed responsibility to Hamas. Hamas denied responsibility but has made public comments praising the perpetrators. The Palest-
inian Authority has condemned the incident without ascribing blame while criticising the Israeli military response. At press time, a massive security sweep across the West Bank has resulted in four killed, including a minor, dozens injured and more than 370 Palestin-
inians detained—mostly Hamas members, including “re-arrests” of previously released prisoners as well as several legislators. The Palestinian Authority has characterised the response as collective punishment and as an Israeli escalation tactic in retaliation for the unity government.

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 15 May, the Israeli security forces killed two Palestinian teenagers during demonstrations in the West Bank. On 23 May, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights said the two minors presented no direct threat and their killing may amount to extrajudicial executions under human rights law and willful killings under international humanitarian law.

In a 5 June press release, the UN Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories expressed grave concern at the deteriorating health of the hunger strikers and urged Israel to end the practice of administrative detention. The Special Committee also stressed that force-feeding violates principles of international human rights law and the rights of the detainees. The statement furthermore expressed concern at the alarming pace and scale of Israeli settlement expansion, the continuing exploitation of natural resources in Palestine by Israel in violation of its international obligations, the impact of the land and maritime blockade imposed by Israel on the Gaza Strip and accounts of excessive use of force by Israeli security forces against Palestinian children, especially in refugee camps.

In a statement to the Human Rights Council on 10 June, High Commissioner Navi Pillay reiterated her concern about the excessive use of force by Israeli security forces and about the continued evictions from and demolition of Palestinian homes. She also reiterated her call for Israel to respect due process when using administrative detention.

Key Issues
The key issue is determining what, if anything, the Council is prepared to do to encourage parties to reach a comprehensive final-status agreement in the face of US reluctance to address the Israel-Palestine situation substantively in the Security Council.

Options
Council members could take advantage of the political vacuum left by the rupture of US-brokered talks. They could draw attention to the fact that the situation has mostly deteriorated in the 21 years since the 1993 Oslo Accords and perhaps question whether US mediation efforts will ever be able to deliver a comprehensive agreement. Council members could also draw attention to the lack of any meaningful engagement by the
Middle East Quartet—comprising the EU, Russia, the UN and the US—and call for the Quartet to take up an effective mediation role, particularly since peace talks failed two months ago.

In response to Israeli settlement expansion, Council members could consider revising the draft resolution condemning settlements, which had 14 votes in favour but was vetoed by the US on 18 February 2011 (S/2011/24). Such a resolution could be a more palatable option for Council members leaning on Palestine to stay clear of acceding to the Rome Statute of the ICC.

Nevertheless, the most likely option for the open debate is that Council members will assert their customary reiteration of previously stated positions—such as the importance of the two-state solution and encouraging parties to refrain from undertaking actions that could threaten the renewal of negotiations, despite the accumulated evidence of such actions taking place.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

The artificially imposed moratorium on Council action on Israel/Palestine ended when the 29 April deadline passed without any agreement. Nevertheless, there remains little impetus to forge a more direct role for the Council vis-à-vis the peace process. All Council members share the view that no Council activity would be possible without the support of the US. Given the more overwhelming concerns in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, Council members have very little appetite to challenge the status quo on this particular issue—especially as the parties themselves seem ill inclined to resume negotiations at this juncture.

The US is the lead on Israel-Palestine and has given no indication it is willing to relinquish its monopoly on mediating between the parties. The US does not have favourable views of the Palestinian Authority exploring other avenues toward statehood, such as membership in the UN or a referral of Israel to the ICC. Nor is the US amenable to Council outcomes on Israel-Palestine. This was most recently displayed on 23 June when the US blocked a press statement put forward by Jordan that condemned the killing of Palestinians by Israeli forces during the security sweep.

The last resolution that specifically addressed the peace process was resolution 1850 of 16 December 2008, which expressed support for the since defunct 27 November 2007 Annapolis negotiations.

### South Sudan

**Expected Council Action**

The Council expects to receive a report from the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) by 25 July, which it will likely not discuss until early August. However, given the dire situation in South Sudan, it is possible that it may be discussed sometime during July, either in a stand-alone meeting or in the context of Sudan-South Sudan consultations.

The mandate of UNMISS expires on 30 November.

**Key Recent Developments**

National and international efforts to resolve the civil war in South Sudan have continued. Stakeholders from within South Sudan—including the government, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Opposition and civil society representatives—held a symposium in Addis Ababa on 6-7 June to focus on strategies to resolve the conflict and move forward with a political transition, as called for in the 9 May agreement between President Salva Kiir and the leader of the SPLM in Opposition, Riek Machar. According to media reports, the possibility of a federal governance system and who will lead during the transitional period were among the most contentious matters discussed. On 19 June, while addressing the National Assembly, Kiir said that he would lead the transitional government in South Sudan, arguing that his removal would be a “red line”.

On 9 June, 14 eminent African figures, including 11 former heads of state, wrote an open letter to Kiir and Machar, pleading with them to end the conflict in South Sudan and to “engage in an inclusive peace process” to avoid the continuing violence and the harsh judgment of history.

On 10 June, under pressure from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mediators, Kiir and Machar agreed to finalise negotiations on the creation of a transitional government of national unity within 60 days and recommitted to stop the fighting. (Three previous ceasefire agreements signed by South Sudan and the SPLM in Opposition on 23 January, 6 May and 9 May have been violated.) Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn of Ethiopia said that IGAD would consider sanctions, among other measures, if the parties failed to adhere to the agreement. (Ethiopia is the current chair of IGAD and has played a key role in the mediation process.)

The IGAD Heads of State and Government adopted a communiqué in Addis Ababa on 10 June on the situation in South Sudan. They commended Kiir and Machar for recommittin to their 9 May agreement and demanded that the parties respect the cessation of hostilities. They also expressed their expectation that the government and the SPLM in Opposition “immediately endorse modalities for inclusive participation…and…move immediately to inclusive negotiations on substantive issues”.

The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) met in Addis Ababa on 12 June and also adopted a communiqué on the situation in South Sudan. Among other things, the PSC welcomed the convening of the stakeholders symposium, expressed deep concern that South Sudan and the SPLM in Opposition have not moved ahead with the peace process in a meaningful way, strongly condemned continued violations of the cessation-of-hostilities agreements and reiterated...
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its readiness to implement targeted sanctions and other measures, upon IGAD’s recommendations, on any party that continues to undermine the peace process and fails to uphold its commitments.

The negotiations, which recommenced on 12 June, were suspended by 16 June, with both sides expressing their grievances about the talks. On 17 June, it was reported that Kiir wrote a letter to Desalegn, demanding an apology after IGAD Executive Secretary Mahboub Malim reportedly called Kiir and Machar “stupid” if they believed that the crisis in South Sudan could be resolved militarily.

More broadly, the government has also questioned the objectivity of IGAD. In a 12 June statement, the government called “unacceptable, wrong and unfair for both sides to all the time be uniformly and randomly blamed for any violations”, referring specifically to paragraph 8 of the 10 June IGAD communiqué, which expressed disappointment with both parties for failing “to honour their commitments to date, to engage the peace process meaningfully toward political resolution of the crisis and to bring an end to senseless killings”. The government has also stated that representatives participating in the negotiations should be “non-partisan”, and thus, should not include pro-opposition civil society figures.

Meanwhile, the SPLM in Opposition has also complained about IGAD-led selection process for participants in the negotiations. In a 15 June press release, it expressed the view that there should only be two direct parties—the government and the SPLM in Opposition—in the talks, with all other stakeholders aligning behind the party of their choice. It seems that the opposition also objected to the planned structure of the negotiations, which called for four distinct negotiating groups: the government, the SPLM in Opposition, former SPLM detainees and other political parties.

An IGAD effort to restart the negotiations on 20 June had collapsed by 23 June. The government agreed to reengage in the process, while former high-level SPLM detainees and some civil society actors also participated. However, the SPLM in Opposition continued to boycott the talks because of their concerns about the selection of participants.

In the meantime, the government has suffered some important losses. On 2 June, Francis Nazario, a high-level official in the Foreign Ministry and former deputy ambassador to the UN, resigned after stating in a press statement that the “current leadership in Juba is neither capable nor willing or ready to bring peace to the country now” and stated that the government “is insensitive to the needs and suffering of the people of South Sudan”. In particular, he complained that disrespect for human rights, corruption, and suppression of freedom of speech were characteristic of the present leadership.

On 7 June, having fled South Sudan for Nairobi, 17 members of parliament resigned and announced that they were joining the opposition. They issued a press release referring to Kiir as a “dictator” who has used the parliament as a “rubber stamp institution”. They accused Kiir of blocking the government with Dinka and argued that the government revenues had been stolen and squandered and public goods had not been fairly distributed to the population. They also called for a federal system of government in South Sudan, saying that this would help to ensure that resources and services would be fairly distributed throughout the country.

Meanwhile, the humanitarian situation in South Sudan remains catastrophic. In addition to the thousands who have perished in the conflict, more than 1.4 million are now displaced, including approximately 1,038,000 internally displaced and about 367,260 refugees who have left for neighbouring countries. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that 4 million people (more than one-third of the population) is in need of humanitarian assistance. In May, the World Food Program warned that “3.5 million people are now facing crisis or emergency levels of food insecurity and the risk of famine later in 2014 must now be taken into consideration”. On 6 June, OCHA reported an “alarming increase” in the number of children suffering from severe acute malnutrition in Unity State, where measles cases have also been confirmed. A cholera outbreak, which began in Juba in May, has begun to spread, and as of 16 June, 37 people had died from the disease according to the Ministry of Health.

At press time, Council members were planning to hold an informal interactive dialogue on 27 June with Seyoum Mesfin, IGAD’s chief mediator on South Sudan, on the status of the South Sudan peace process.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 12 June, the Human Rights Council considered a report on South Sudan by the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Chaloka Beyani (A/HRC/26/33/Add.3). Beyani visited South Sudan in November 2013, but the report also takes into account the events that have unfolded since mid-December, which have resulted in the sharp deterioration of the situation and a large-scale internal displacement in and outside the compounds of UNMISS. Beyani recommended that the overcrowding of UNMISS bases be addressed as part of a long-term comprehensive strategy on internal displacement. He said that the safety and security of the displaced population must be the absolute priority for the UN. He commended the adoption of resolution 2155, which bolstered the strength of UNMISS to protect civilians.

Key Issues

One key issue is how to ensure that the government of South Sudan and the SPLM in Opposition honour their commitments to a ceasefire and engage in meaningful negotiations.

Another key issue is the pace of deployment of the additional forces serving in UNMISS, as well as the disposition of these forces in fulfilling the mandate to protect civilians. In particular, it remains unclear what the deployment scheduled will be for the approximately 2,500 troops expected to serve in the IGAD Protection Force under the UNMISS chain of command. These troops will come from Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda. (On 19 June, the first of these troops, approximately 90 peacekeepers from Ethiopia, arrived in Juba.)

A related issue regards the anticipated participation of an infantry battalion from China in UNMISS. China has a strong economic stake in the oil industry in South Sudan, and it has been reported that it may primarily be interested in defending personnel at oil facilities. A key question is how amenable these troops will be to protecting civilians not directly linked to these facilities.

Another key issue is the Council’s role in facilitating humanitarian access, given the dire predictions of possible famine in the coming months and restrictions that have been placed on humanitarian access by government and opposition forces.
South Sudan (con’t)

Underlying Problems
While the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate and people continue to die in South Sudan, it remains unclear at this point whether Kiir and Machar and their proxies have the desire to negotiate in good faith and make the difficult decisions necessary to bring lasting peace to South Sudan. On 10 June, Kiir and Machar agreed to create a transitional government of national unity within 60 days, but who would be included in this government remains an open question as both men have shown little appetite for sublimating their personal ambitions. Given their mutual distrust, it is difficult to envision a scenario in which they could both have a meaningful role in any effective transitional arrangement. Meanwhile, the IGAD-led peace talks remain mired in process, stalled by disagreements between the parties including the form and substance of civil society participation, as well as disenchantment with the mediation.

Options
Options for the Council include:
• signalling a possibility of imposing targeted sanctions against specific individuals in South Sudan who undermine the peace process;
• conducting a visiting mission to South Sudan to put direct pressure on the parties; and
• referring the situation in South Sudan to the ICC.

Council Dynamics
There is frustration among Council members with the lack of progress being made in the IGAD-mediated negotiations, and some of them appear to question the commitment of the parties to the peace process, given the delays in the talks. Several members continue to be amenable to the notion of targeted sanctions against those obstructing conflict-resolution efforts. This idea may be given additional impetus, considering that IGAD and the AU have both indicated that sanctions should be considered an option. However, it remains unclear whether Russia, which publicly expressed wariness about potential sanctions on South Sudan, would support this approach.

The US is the penholder on South Sudan.

Sudan and South Sudan

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council is scheduled to hold its monthly meeting on Sudan-South Sudan issues, likely in consultations. The Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan and head of the UN Office to the AU, Haile Menkerios, is expected to brief. At press time, no outcome was anticipated.

Key Recent Developments
The domestic turmoil in Sudan and South Sudan, respectively, have made it difficult for the two countries to make progress in addressing the remaining issues dividing them, including border demarcation, the final status of Abyei and the establishment of a Safe Demilitarised Border Zone, among other matters.

In Sudan, fighting has continued in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. On 6 June, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) took control of the Al-Atmur area, a rebel stronghold only 30 miles from Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan. On 10 June, rebels with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A-N) launched an assault on SAF troops that had seized Al-Atmur. In repelling the attack, Sudan alleges that it killed 110 rebels, whereas the SPLM/A-N claims it suffered only three casualties. There also continued to be reports of SAF aerial bombardments of civilian targets, including, most notably, on 16 June in the town of Farandalla, where a hospital operated by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) was partially destroyed. In a 17 June press release, MSF noted that “several other medical facilities in South Kordofan have been bombed in recent weeks”. In a 10 June press release, 45 humanitarian organisations said that more than 100,000 people were displaced in April and May, primarily in South Kordofan, citing reports of looting, arson and destruction of food supplies in territories formerly held by rebel forces.

The arrests of two key opposition figures appeared to be a setback for the national dialogue process in Sudan. On 17 May, Sadiq al-Mahdi, the leader of the National Umma Party, was arrested for defamation after accusing the government-affiliated militia, Rapid Support Forces (RSF), of murdering and raping civilians in Darfur. Citing the arrest and infringements on press freedoms, the National Umma Party, one of the leading opposition parties in Sudan, and the Reform Now Party (RNP) withdrew from the national dialogue process. Although Al-Mahdi was released on 15 June, it remained unclear whether these two political parties would re-engage in the process. On 8 June, Ibrahim al-Sheikh, head of the Congress Party, was arrested for remarks critical of the government and of its management of the Darfur situation. At press time, he remained incarcerated.

In South Sudan, the dire political and humanitarian crisis continues to cause misery. In addition to the thousands that have perished in the civil war that erupted on 15 December 2013, 1.4 million people are now displaced and approximately 4 million people (more than one-third of the population) are

UN DOCUMENTS ON SUDAN-SOUTH SUDAN Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2156 (29 May 2014) renewed UNISFA until 15 October. S/RES/2046 (2 May 2012) provided a roadmap for Sudan, South Sudan and the SPLM-N to resolve outstanding issues and threatened article 41 measures (i.e., sanctions). Security Council Letter S/2013/657 (11 November 2013) was a note by the Council President indicating the change in frequency of meetings on the implementation of resolution 2046 from semi-monthly to once a month.
in need of humanitarian assistance, with aid agencies warning of a possible famine later this year. Meanwhile, negotiations between the government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition have stalemated, with the opposition boycotting the talks on 20 June, after complaining about the process by which civil society was selected for participation. At press time, it was unclear when this stalemate would be broken and the parties would reengage in negotiations.

The Council held consultations on Sudan-South Sudan issues on 10 June. Menkerios stated that Sudan and South Sudan had made no progress in addressing the political and security issues that continue to divide them. As in prior consultations, he reiterated that the national dialogue in Sudan is a positive development, while suggesting that the recent arrests of key opposition figures and restrictions on the press are counterproductive. Menkerios also spoke about recent SAF bombardments of civilian areas in South Kordofan.

On 29 May, the Council adopted resolution 2156, renewing the mandate of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) until 15 October. While the resolution leaves the fundamental mandate of the mission unchanged, it expresses concern over the lack of progress by Sudan and South Sudan in honouring security and political commitments regarding Abyei and the border areas more generally. Along these lines, it notes the stalled efforts by Sudan and South Sudan to demilitarise the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone (SDBZ) and to make operational the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM). The resolution reiterates previous demands that Sudan remove its police around the Diffra oil field and that South Sudan fully remove its security personnel from Abyei. It further urges that a peace conference be organised between leaders from the Misseriya and Ngok-Dinka groups, which have clashed in Abyei in recent years.

On 17 June, the JBVMM, which had been dormant since November 2013, was partially reactivated, with air patrols of the border recommencing out of Kadugli. At press time, ground patrols had yet to recommence.

**Key Issues**

Given the internal challenges facing both Sudan and South Sudan, a key ongoing issue is whether and how the Council can facilitate progress between the two countries in addressing the outstanding matters (e.g., the determination of the SDBZ centreline, border demarcation, the establishment of temporary administrative bodies in Abyei and the final status of Abyei).

Another key issue is how the Council decides to approach the national dialogue process in Sudan, which President Omar al-Bashir has stated is designed to “stop the war and bring peace, free political society, fight against poverty and revitalise national identity”.

Also an important issue is the impact that SAF military campaigns in South Kordofan and Blue Nile are having on civilians, particularly in South Kordofan.

A related issue is what can be done to get the peace talks between Sudan and the SPLM-N back on track, as the parties have not met since late April.

**Options**

The Council may choose to issue a statement that:

- welcomes the national dialogue but expresses concern about the curtailment of press freedom and the arrests of opposition figures in Sudan;
- encourages Sudan and the SPLM-N to reengage in negotiations on humanitarian and political issues in South Kordofan and Blue Nile; and
- deplores recent SAF ground and aerial attacks on civilian targets in South Kordofan.

Another option is for the Council to call for a commission of inquiry to investigate accusations of aerial bombardments and ground attacks on civilian targets in South Kordofan. If political differences in the Council result in a stalemate on this front, individual members could recommend this option to the Secretary-General on a bilateral basis.

Council members could also decide to hold an Arria-formula meeting on South Kordofan and Blue Nile open to all interested UN member states. Such a format would enable member states to learn about recent developments in the two areas from civil society groups and other experts and raise awareness about the political and humanitarian crisis there.

**Council Dynamics**

As has been the case for the last three years, the Council continues to be unable to formulate a strategy to alleviate the suffering of civilian populations in South Kordofan and Blue Nile because of political differences among its members. The US and others are appalled by recent reports of aerial bombardments of civilian targets, including hospitals and schools. On the other hand, China and Russia have traditionally asserted Sudan’s sovereign right to fight rebel groups on its territory, and Russia apparently questioned the veracity of the accusations that Sudan is deliberately targeting civilians in consultations on 10 June.

While Council members have viewed the national dialogue in Sudan as a step in the right direction, some have been more cautious in their support than others, preferring to see concrete steps before commending the process. The recent arrests of al-Mahdi and al-Sheikh led some Council members to call into question the government’s commitment to political inclusiveness and dialogue.

The US is the penholder on Sudan-South Sudan issues.
Sudan (Darfur)

Expected Council Action
At press time, it appeared that the Council briefing and consultations on the Secretary-General’s quarterly report on the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), which had been scheduled for July, might be postponed until August. No Council outcome was anticipated in July, although the UNAMID mandate is expected to be renewed in August.

UNAMID’s mandate expires on 31 August.

Key Recent Developments
With ongoing fighting between government forces and rebel movements and inter-communal violence, the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur remains dire. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), approximately 395,000 people have been displaced so far in Darfur in 2014, with roughly 258,000 still unable to return home. There are currently 2.4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the region. In late May and early June, there were several reports that IDPs had been assaulted and abducted by unidentified armed assailants in various parts of Darfur. On 5 and 7 June, local residents reported to UNAMID that more than 19 villages in North Darfur had allegedly been attacked by Arab militias. On 21 June, dozens were reportedly killed when members of the Seri community attacked members of the Salamat community in a cattle raiding incident in Um Dukhun county, North Darfur.

On 24 May, a UNAMID peacekeeper mediating a dispute between members of the Fur community and Arab militia was shot and killed in Kabkabiya, North Darfur. Three other peacekeepers were wounded in the incident. The Council issued a press statement later the same day condemning the attack (SC/11413).

From 5-7 June, more than 250 members of the Abbala and Beni Hussein groups met in Kabkabiya to discuss their reconciliation efforts. The two groups have a history of violent clashes, including one attack in January 2013 in Jebel Amir, North Darfur, over access to a gold mine, in which 100 people died and 100,000 were displaced. Recently, conflict between the two groups led to road closures that prevented critical supplies from reaching El Sereif, North Darfur. At the conclusion of the reconciliation meeting on 7 June, the two groups agreed to open the roads to El Sereif.

International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda delivered on 17 June her semi-annual briefing to the Council on the work of the ICC in Darfur and stated that “the time is long overdue for…Sudan’s consistent defiance of Security Council resolutions to be met by decisive action from the Council”. Bensouda also called for a “thorough, independent and public inquiry” into allegations that UNAMID reporting had been manipulated “with the intentional effect of covering up crimes committed against civilians and peacekeepers”. Bensouda further indicated that there should be greater scrutiny of the UN’s non-essential contacts policy with ICC indictees. (In her written report to the Council, she expressed concern about a long meeting that Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson held with President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan—who has been indicted by the ICC for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide—during the AU Summit in January in Addis Ababa.)

The Council adopted resolution 2148 on 3 April, which took note of the Secretary-General’s proposed adjustments to UNAMID’s benchmarks and indicators in his 25 February special report (S/2014/138) on the strategic review of the mission. The adjusted benchmarks are: (1) an inclusive peace process between Sudan and rebel groups that have not signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur; (2) protection of civilians and humanitarian access; and (3) prevention or mitigation of community-based conflict. (The first two—an inclusive peace process and protection of civilians and humanitarian access—overlapped existing benchmarks for UNAMID. The third one is new, demonstrating concern about the intensification of inter-communal violence in Darfur.)

On 24 April, the Council received a briefing, followed by consultations, on the last quarterly UNAMID report (S/2014/279). Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous briefed in the open session. Ladsous underscored the deteriorating security situation in Darfur. Chambar discussed the activities of the government-affiliated Rapid Support Forces militia.

Human Rights-Related Developments
The Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Sudan, Mashood Adenbayo Baderin, visited Sudan from 15 to 24 June. In a 25 June press statement, he urged the government to demonstrate its commitment to the national dialogue and release all political detainees. Baderin expressed concerns about the condition of three youth activists detained by the National Intelligence and Security Service; the situation of press freedom and media censorship; and the escalation of conflict leading to further displacement and other serious human rights violations. He urged the government to improve humanitarian access to civilian populations and to enable the ICRC to resume its activities. (On 1 February 2014, the ICRC was asked by the Sudanese authorities to suspend its activities.)

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council remains how to address the deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur.

A related issue is ongoing defiance of Council resolutions by Sudan. As the ICC Prosecutor noted in her 10 June written report to the Council, hardly any of the 55 resolutions adopted on Sudan since 2004 have been implemented.

Another key issue is whether the Council, or individual Council members, will exert leverage on the Secretariat to follow through on the ICC Prosecutor’s call for the Secretary-General to conduct a “thorough, independent and public inquiry” into the allegations that UNAMID’s reporting has been manipulated to conceal crimes against civilians and peacekeepers. (At press time, it remained unclear whether the Secretariat would heed the call for such an investigation.)
**Sudan (Darfur) (con’t)**

**Options**
The Council might consider adopting a statement that:
- deplores the upsurge in violence and displacement in Darfur in recent months;
- supports the ICC Prosecutor’s call for an investigation on UNAMID reporting; and
- emphasises that protection of civilians is a strategic priority of the mission.

Another option is for the Council to hold an Arria-formula meeting with Aïcha El Basri, who served as UNAMID spokesperson from August 2012 to April 2013. El Basri released documents that, according to Bensouda’s 10 June report to the Council, supported allegations of distorted reporting by UNAMID. In a 9 April piece in Foreign Policy, El Basri wrote, “UNAMID lied to the media and failed to protect, or in some cases even make an effort to protect civilians in the region.”

**Council Dynamics**
Council members continue to express concern about the heightened violence and displacement in Darfur, but there are differences in how they apportion blame for the situation in Darfur. Most Council members are highly critical of Sudan for the instability in the region, while also recognising that rebel groups share responsibility. However, China and Russia tend to be supportive of Sudan, arguing that it is working diligently to promote peace and reconciliation in the region. Some, particularly Russia, believe that reducing Sudan’s debt and removing bilateral sanctions would enable it to address the humanitarian and development needs of people in Darfur, whereas others appear to believe that such measures would reward negative behaviour on the part of Sudan.

During the 17 June briefing, several Council members—Argentina, Australia, Chile, Jordan, Luxembourg and Nigeria—explicitly supported the proposal for an independent, public investigation into the allegations that UNAMID purposely distorted its reporting to conceal information about attacks on civilians and peacekeepers. The UK also encouraged the Secretariat “to look carefully into the allegations made”.

The UK is the penholder on Darfur, while Argentina chairs the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee.

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**Somalia**

**Expected Council Action**
In July, Ambassador Oh Joon (South Korea), chair of the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanctions Committee, is scheduled to brief Council members in consultations. An outcome is not anticipated.

**Key Recent Developments**
Despite territorial gains by the joint AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army (SNA) offensive, Al-Shabaab continues to pose a serious asymmetrical security threat in Somalia and nearby countries. Al-Shabaab attacked the parliament building in Mogadishu on 24 May, resulting in the death of 10 AMISOM and SNA troops and eight attackers. The Council issued a press statement condemning the attack (SC/11412). On 15 and 16 June, gunfire killed more than 50 people in the coastal town of Mpeketoni, Kenya. Although Al-Shabaab has publicly claimed responsibility (and details in media reports seem to offer corroborations), President Uhuru Kenyatta has claimed the attacks were local political violence unrelated to the Islamist group.

The latest confidential midterm report of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG), which was leaked to the media, apparently documented governmental corruption—often in the form of diverting SNA arms to clan militias and public markets—and a lack of state regulatory capacity. Nonetheless, on 5 March the Council adopted resolution 2142 reauthorising a partial lifting of the arms embargo until 25 October. As requested by the Council, the Secretary-General offered technical advice to improve sanctions compliance by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) on 3 April (S/2014/243).

On 22 May, the Council issued a presidential statement regarding arms and ammunition management by the FGS (S/PRST/2014/9). The first of two FGS reports to the Council regarding implementation of resolution 2142, which was due 13 June, has been submitted.

The embargo on the export and import of charcoal continues to falter. According to the final report of the SEMG published 12 July 2013 (S/2013/413), Al-Shabaab derives significant revenue—perhaps more than $25 million per year—from the charcoal trade, and the overall scale of charcoal production and exports had actually increased despite the imposition of UN sanctions on 22 February 2012. The 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanctions Committee posted on its website an implementation assistance notice dated 7 May, which provides recommendations regarding the interdiction of charcoal from Somalia. Developed in conjunction with the UN Environment Programme, the document principally covers: Council requirements, particularly as stipulated in resolution 2036; measures to prevent the export and import of charcoal from Somalia (respectively by the FGS and other member states); and technical guidance on the seizure, disposal or destruction of charcoal.

Oil continues to be a potential source of instability in Somalia. In the absence of an agreed-upon regulatory framework for the industry, oil rights remain disputed among the FGS, federal states, the semi-autonomous...

UN DOCUMENTS ON SOMALIA

*Security Council Resolutions*

*OTHER RELEVANT FACTS*
- On 8 May, the Human Rights Council appointed Bahame Nyanduga of Tanzania as the new Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia.

*USEFUL ADDITIONAL RESOURCE*
region of Puntland and secessionist Somaliland (and for more on this, see Oil in Somalia: Adding Fuel to the Fire? by the Mogadishu-based Heritage Institute for Policy Studies). According to media reports, the SEMG sent the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanctions Committee a letter on 27 May expressing concern regarding a “Oil Protection Unit” planned by Somaliland. Puntland and Somaliland have a contested border covering much of the Sanaag and Sool regions and have issued competing oil concessions within this area. On 12 June, troops from Somaliland occupied Taleh in the Sool region (as they had also done briefly in mid-April), prompting a joint statement issued on 14 June by the UK, the US and EU calling for the withdrawal of all forces from Sanaag and Sool.

According to publicly available information, half of the 12 individuals currently listed under the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea sanctions regime have defected to the FGS, have been arrested or have been killed (but the consolidated list has not yet been modified accordingly):

- Aboud Rogo Mohammed, listed as an Al-Shabaab fundraiser, was killed by unknown gunmen in Mombasa, Kenya, on 27 August 2012;
- Hassan Dahir Aweys, a former Al-Shabaab commander, surrendered to the FGS in June 2013;
- Omar Hammami, an Al-Shabaab commander and spokesperson, was killed by the group’s intelligence service, Amniyat Mukhabarat, on 12 September 2013;
- Abubaker Shariff Ahmed, listed as an Al-Shabaab recruiter, was killed by unknown gunmen in Mombasa, Kenya on 1 April 2014;
- Hassan Mahat Omar, listed as an Al-Shabaab recruiter and fundraiser, was arrested in Nairobi on 2 April; and
- Mahomed Sa’id, an arms trafficker and Somali warlord in Puntland and the Sanaag region closely allied to Al-Shabaab, defected to the FGS on 7 June.

In resolution 2158 of 29 May, the Council renewed the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) for a period of one year and changed the Secretary-General’s reporting cycle from 90 days to 120 days. On 4 June, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos briefed Council members in consultations regarding the critical humanitarian situation in Somalia. Poor weather, conflict-related factors and a lack of funding for humanitarian assistance have caused early-warning indicators of an impending famine similar to three years ago. On 6 June, members of the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) issued a joint communiqué following their eighth annual consultative meeting which highlighted the need for the FGS to adhere to the terms of the partial lifting of the arms embargo, such as reporting obligations (S/2014/400).

**Key Issues**

With respect to sanctions, more effective implementation of the embargo on the export and import of charcoal continues to be a critically important issue, particularly as it is apparently still a substantial source of revenue for Al-Shabaab.

Another fundamental issue is full FGS compliance with the regulatory provisions linked to the partial lifting of the arms embargo, which has implications for the availability of arms and ammunition to clan militias and Al-Shabaab.

Improving public financial management and creating a regulatory framework for natural resource management that is mutually accepted by the FGS and federal states are central issues for peacebuilding and statebuilding in Somalia.

**Options**

As specified in paragraph 23 of resolution 2036, the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanctions Committee can list individuals and entities—such as those identified by the SEMG—that have violated sanctions on the export and import of charcoal from Somalia, particularly in cases where there has been a link to Al-Shabaab financing.

Regarding the partial lifting of the arms embargo, Council members are unlikely to take any action in July other than reviewing the report submitted in June by the FGS.

Recognising the potential for contested oil concessions to exacerbate instability in Somalia, the Council could impose a moratorium on further oil contracts until the allocation of resource rights between the FGS and federal states has been resolved and a functional regulatory framework for the oil industry has been established.

Another option could be for Council members to take a visiting mission to Somalia in order to better assess developments in the country.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

During 2014, Council members have exhibited significant cooperation with regard to policymaking on Somalia, unanimously adopting two resolutions as well as issuing a presidential statement and seven press statements. Meanwhile, Somalia faces numerous challenges that suggest the need for sustained (and perhaps increased) UN engagement, such as inadequate humanitarian financing, chronic insecurity, little progress in the federal state-formation process, rampant corruption and a conspicuous lack of state capacity. The depth of these obstacles to peacebuilding and statebuilding and the relative lack of progress by UNSOM thus far would seem to indicate that a more proactive implementation of certain existing measures (e.g., charcoal sanctions) is warranted. However, due to a number of factors—including UN budget constraints, national sovereignty concerns and counter-insurgency priorities—there also currently seems to be little latitude in the Council for pursuing alternative approaches to UN engagement in Somalia.

The UK is the penholder on Somalia, the US is the penholder on piracy, Russia is the penholder on legal aspects of counter-piracy measures and the Republic of Korea is the chair of the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanctions Committee.
Central African Republic

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council will be briefed on preparations for the deployment of the UN Multi-dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous.

The Council will also hear a briefing by Ambassador Raimonda Murmokaité (Lithuania), followed by consultations on the interim report of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 2127 Central African Republic (CAR) Sanctions Committee.

The Council may also be briefed on the work of the Commission of Inquiry (CoI) established by the Council in resolution 2127 to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and abuses of human rights in the CAR, after its report is reissued.

The mandate of MINUSCA expires on 30 April 2015.

Key Recent Developments
Thousands are estimated to have been killed in the CAR since 24 March 2013, when the predominantly Muslim Séléka rebel group ousted President François Bozizé. The Christian anti-balaka militias retaliated with attacks on Muslim civilians, who constitute roughly 15 percent of the population, and as a result, thousands of Muslims have been forced to flee towards the majority Muslim northeast, creating a sort of separation line between the two religious groups and the zones of influence of the Séléka and anti-balaka.

Despite the adoption of resolution 2149, establishing MINUSCA with an initial authorised deployment of up to 10,000 military and 1,800 police personnel, the situation remains dire. MINUSCA is to take over from the African-led International Support Mission to the CAR (MISCA) by 15 September. Continued fighting between the Séléka and the anti-balaka and attacks on civilians have resulted in many casualties and a humanitarian crisis. According to the UN Refugee Agency, the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) across the CAR as of 20 June is 542,400, including 117,400 in Bangui. Half of the population—or 2.5 million—urgently need protection and relief to meet their most basic needs.

In a recent deadly attack, the Notre Dame de Fatima church in Bangui, which was sheltering 9,000 people, was attacked on 28 May, resulting in the deaths of at least 17 people and the reported abduction of 27 civilians by the assailants, who were taken to an unknown location. Many IDPs in the CAR have taken refuge at places of worship. The attackers—who arrived in pick-up trucks in the early afternoon—threw grenades into the church ground before opening fire on people, using small arms.

On 30 May, Council members issued a press statement, condemning in the strongest terms the recent attacks and calling on member states and regional and international organisations to increase troop, financial and logistical support to MISCA to enable it to implement its mandate fully and help prepare for the transfer of authority to MINUSCA on 15 September (SC/11423).

The Council was briefed on 24 June via video-teleconference by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of MINUSCA Babacar Gaye, who stated that civilians are regularly targeted while the government lacks its own security forces or necessary finances. He added that the current number of CAR refugees in neighbouring countries is at 360,000 and expressed scepticism about holding the planned elections in February 2015 due to the deteriorating situation.

Also briefing was Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, Executive Director of UN-Women, who recently visited the country. She mentioned reports of rape, sexual slavery and early and forced marriages perpetrated by armed actors. Marguerite Marie Maliavo-Samba, CAR Minister for Public Health and Social Affairs, who addressed the Council, stated that the rule of law was “practically confined” to the capital and that there was no national army, the judiciary was “sick”, the national police needed rehabilitation and judges could not return to their posts.

In the consultations that followed, Gaye expressed concern that MINUSCA may not be able to fill its allotted troop level by 15 September, that the transitional political process is stagnant and that the country remains de-facto divided between Christians and Muslims.

The preliminary report of the CoI was circulated to Council members on 28 May (only two of the three commissioners participated in the investigation drafting). Its findings were that individuals from both sides of the conflict have perpetrated serious breaches of international humanitarian law, crimes against humanity and war crimes, from 1 January 2013 to the present. At this stage, however, the CoI said that it is premature to talk of genocide or ethnic cleansing or of significant involvement of other states in the conflict. The CoI recommended that the Council establish a body to prosecute the alleged offenders.

After the report was circulated, the CoI was heavily criticised within the Secretariat and by Council members for its lack of coordination with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and for submitting a poor quality report. On 16 June, the Secretary-General sent a letter to the Council President forwarding the request of the CoI to reissue the report to allow for updates on the situation on the ground and editing (S/2014/410).

On 15 June, the EU announced that it had reached the full operational capacity of its intervention force in the CAR. The mission includes 700 soldiers and police from Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Latvia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Spain. The EU has authorised the intervention force for a period of half a year, which is currently not expected to be extended in light of MINUSCA’s deployment.

President Catherine Samba-Panza of the CAR sent a letter of referral to the Prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, to open an official investigation into crimes allegedly committed on the CAR territory since 1 August 2012. Bensouda, who has been conducting an unofficial preliminary inquiry into the situation since 7 February, announced that
Central African Republic (con’t)

she would make a decision on opening the investigation soon.

Regarding the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee, the interim report of the PoE was circulated to Council members in June. It highlights the connection between control and illicit trade of natural resources (such as diamonds, gold and ivory) and the funding for the activities of the Séléka and the anti-balaka. It also documents violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law by various actors.

The PoE officially presented the report to the Committee on 25 June. Among the issues discussed were some of the report’s recommendations. Committee members were unable to agree on adopting the recommendation to send letters to neighbouring countries to publish their import and export statistics. One recommendation that the Committee was able to agree on is sending a letter to the CAR government to remove from its security forces anyone suspected of membership in an armed group. Some Council members inquired on the presence of Boko-Haram but the PoE’s coordinator said that they were not aware of any current Boko-Haram presence in the CAR.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 24 June, the Human Rights Council considered a report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in the CAR, Marie-Thérèse Keita Bocoum (A/HRC/26/53). Bocoum said that efforts by the international forces to protect civilians are insufficient as anti-balaka and Séléka groups continue to perpetrate serious human rights violations against civilians based on their religious affiliation. Humanitarian workers are unable to provide assistance to displaced people without endangering their own lives. Bocoum hoped that the targeted sanctions imposed by the Security Council and the work undertaken by the CoI will have a dissuasive effect on the conduct of armed groups.

Key Issues

Following the establishment of MINUSCA, an overarching issue is to sustain a hands-on approach towards the CAR, including monitoring developments on the ground closely and following up with Council action accordingly.

Until MINUSCA is fully operational, a key issue is providing effective support for MISCA and other international forces so they can restore security in the country.

A related issue is not losing track of the multifaceted needs of the CAR, in particular the establishment of state institutions from the ground up and the transitional political process.

Finally, another issue is addressing the relationship between the illicit trade in natural resources and the funding of the armed groups.

Options

Options for the Council include:

• issuing a statement in support of the transitional political process, calling for accountability for crimes and encouraging member states to contribute troops and resources to MINUSCA;
• discussing and taking up recommendations in the reissued report of the CoI and the report of the PoE;
• undertaking a Council visiting mission to the CAR, a country the Council has never visited despite its being on Council agenda since 1997;
• listing further individuals for violations of the criteria set out under resolution 2134, either through the Committee or by the Council; or
• taking no action at this time.

Council and Wider Dynamics

With the establishment of MINUSCA, Council members are now looking to monitor the situation on the ground and MINUSCA’s preparations for deployment. While Council members are concerned about the lack of improvement in security or progress in establishing state authority (it seems that the government in Bangui has very limited authority even in Bangui), resolution 2149 does not authorise a support package for MISCA until the deployment of MINUSCA. Some Council members are also concerned with the slow progress reported on recruiting more troops for the mission (beyond the MISCA contingencies) and the logistical preparations for MINUSCA’s deployment.

Council members will also be eager to address the initial findings of the CoI and of the PoE. The CoI initial report and the PoE interim report both stress that the warring parties have committed crimes and human rights violations. A difficult question for Council members (and the international community at large) is pursuing accountability while looking for interlocutors who can influence both the Séléka and the anti-balaka to lay down their arms and put an end to the de facto partition of the country that has been taking place.

France is the penholder on the CAR.

Libya

Expected Council Action

In July, Council members are likely to be briefed on developments in Libya by Tarek Mitri, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).

The mandates of UNSMIL and the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee expire on 13 March and 13 April 2015, respectively.

Key Recent Developments

The security situation in Libya remains volatile. Rogue General Khalifa Haftar attempted an unsuccessful coup on 14 February and has since targeted Islamist militias in


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Benghazi. Forces loyal to Haftar also attacked the General National Congress (GNC) in Tripoli on 18 May.

That attack came against the backdrop of the disputed 4 May GNC election of Ahmed Maiteeq as prime minister and subsequent cabinet approval, which were contested by interim Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni, who was mandated to serve after Prime Minister Ali Zeidan was sacked by the GNC on 11 March. Al-Thinni, who resigned after an attack on his family on 13 April, questioned the legality of the procedure that was used to elect Maiteeq, as have others who have argued there was no quorum for the 4 May vote by the GNC.

On 9 June, the Supreme Court ruled that the appointment was unconstitutional, thus leaving al-Thinni in office. Maiteeq and the deputy president of the GNC, Salah Makhzoum, said they would abide by the decision.

A protest march on 8 June calling for militias to disband reportedly ended with 31 killed and another 80 people wounded following clashes with the government-aligned Libya Shield militia outside its compound in Benghazi. Army chief of staff Major General Youssef al-Mangoush, who is officially in charge of the militia, resigned following the incident.

On 9 June, Mitri briefed the Council for the first time since Haftar began his operations. He said that Haftar had launched “Operation Libya Dignity”, a military offensive against groups Haftar had labelled as terrorists and blamed for the recent wave of violence and targeted assassinations in Benghazi and in eastern Libya. Avoiding any personal assessment, Mitri added that others viewed the offensive as an attempted coup.

Mitri further said that the continuing security crisis posed a threat to the political transition and that he would soon convene a meeting with major actors aimed at forging an agreement on the principles of political interaction, national priorities during the remainder of the transition and ways to address immediate security issues and other divisive matters. (Nevertheless, the dialogue that was planned for 18-19 June was postponed indefinitely in light of the objections by various parties to some of its proposed documents.)

Mitri also reported that the security situation continued to impede the functioning of the justice system, due to attacks on prosecutors and judges. Nonetheless, the trial of 37 former regime officials, including Saif al-Islam Qaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi, had begun, though not without delays. UNSMIL had visited all defendants in Tripoli, Misrata and Zintan but was denied access to detainees held in al-Hadba prison. (On 21 May, the ICC reiterated its decision that Qaddafi, held in Zintan by local militia, should be tried in The Hague, and in a 14 May briefing to the Council, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda insisted that Libya should immediately surrender him to the Court.)

The Council also received during the meeting the periodic briefing by the chair of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Eugène-Richard Gasana (Rwanda). Ambassador Ibrahim Dabbashi (Libya) stated that in the last month, freedom of expression had been greatly compromised by abductions and assassinations of political activists and the reluctance of judges to carry out their duties because they feared for their lives. Dabbashi rejected the notion that Libya was divided and ruled by tribes.

Amidst the fragile security situation and the lack of government control over large parts of the country, elections were held on 25 June for a new House of Representatives to replace the defunct GNC. Prior to the election, Haftar declared that he would suspend all military operations on 25 June.

As requested by Mitri, Council members issued a press statement on 23 June welcoming the elections as an important step towards stable democratic governance. They called on all parties to ensure that the elections are peaceful and conveyed their intention to monitor the situation closely (SC/11447).

At press time, media reports indicate that turnout for the 25 June election was relatively low, with less than half of registered voters showing up to the polls. (Above 1.5 million voters were registered for the election, down from 2.8 million registered voters for the 2012 election.) Some polling stations stayed closed for security reasons and a couple of violent incidents occurred, with at least five people killed in clashes between government forces and militants and 30 wounded in Benghazi. In another incident, human rights activist Salwa Bughaghis was shot dead at her Benghazi home shortly after she had returned from voting.

On 16 June, US special forces in Libya seized Ahmed abu Khattala, indicted by a US federal court for the 11 September 2012 attacks on the US consulate in Benghazi. (According to the media, Khattala is currently aboard the USS New York en route to the US.) On 17 June, Ambassador Samantha Power (US) sent a letter to the President of the Council stating that the US had acted in accordance with its “inherent right of self-defense” under Article 51 of the UN Charter (S/2014/417). According to the letter, Khattala was planning future attacks against US targets and will be presented before a US federal court for prosecution.

Justice Minister Saleh al-Marghani of Libya stated in response that the US had no right to abscond with Khattala, while other officials characterised the operation as an attack on Libyan sovereignty.

Key Issues
An overarching issue is the current fighting between militias and factions of the army, as well as the challenges to the government and its lack of authority. The continued operations of Haftar and his suspected political intentions to sideline the government are a particular example.

Another issue is to monitor the post-election situation and to try to build political momentum through the new House of Representatives, which, it is hoped, will be perceived as legitimate.

Options
The Council could issue a statement:

• condemning the use of violence against the legitimate authorities;

• calling on all sides to honour the election results and seize the opportunity to build up and strengthen democratic institutions;

• calling on the militias and army factions in Libya to refrain from using violence and to agree to work together for national reconciliation, justice, respect for human rights and the rule of law;

• threatening or adopting targeted sanctions against spoilers of the political process; and

• calling for improved coordination of international support under the auspices of UNSMIL.
UNOWA (West Africa)

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council will hold its semi-annual briefing and consultations on the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA). Said Djinnit, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to West Africa and the head of UNOWA, is expected to brief. UNOWA’s mandate—renewed through an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council—expires on 1 December 2016 (S/2013/759).

Key Recent Developments
Since the Council last met on UNOWA in December 2013, the region experienced increased violence, perpetrated primarily by Boko Haram in Nigeria. The conflict, which worsened compared with 2013, caused more than 1,500 deaths in the first quarter of 2014, according to an Amnesty International report.

This included a 14 March attack by Boko Haram in Maiduguri, in which an estimated 600 people died, mostly prisoners on the loose killed by security forces. UNOWA issued a press statement on 4 March condemning attacks in Borno state from 1-3 March that resulted in more than 80 deaths. A bomb blast in Abuja on 14 April, which killed at least 75 people, prompted a Council press statement condemning multiple terrorist attacks in Nigeria on 13-14 April, its first statement on a Boko Haram attack since 25 January 2012 (SC/11352).

However, it was the kidnapping of nearly 300 schoolgirls in Chibok, on 14-15 April, triggering protests both in Nigeria and internationally, that eventually brought closer attention to the group in the Security Council. Following a 5 May attack on a marketplace that killed hundreds, the Council issued a press statement on 9 May calling for the release of the girls, noting for the first time the threat that Boko Haram poses regionally and stating its intention to consider future measures against the group (SC/11387).

On 8 May, the Secretary-General announced that he was sending a high-level representative to Nigeria. Djinnit was dispatched to Nigeria from 12 to 15 May and announced that the UN would provide an integrated support package, including assistance for the abducted girls once they were released and for their families and communities, as well as increasing support to address socio-economic problems in the north. Djinnit undertook a second visit to Nigeria from 4 to 9 June.

A 17 May summit on Boko Haram, organised by France in Paris, brought together Nigeria, neighbouring Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger as well as the UK, the US and the EU. They agreed, among other things, to seek Security Council sanctions against Boko Haram, the splinter group Ansaru and their leadership. On 22 May, the 1267 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee added Boko Haram to the sanctions list (the draft narrative summary noted its links with Al-Qaida-affiliated groups in Mali), and on 26 June, the Committee approved the addition of Ansaru and Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau, subjecting them to financial and arms sanctions. A follow-up summit was held in London on 12 June, which Djinnit attended (S/2014/425). Amidst the increased attention, Boko Haram has escalated attacks, with up to 500 people reportedly killed in villages in Borno state on 2-3 June, its deadliest attack since the group emerged in 2002.

While Djinnit has become increasingly occupied by the Boko Haram crisis, UNOWA continued its work on a range of other issues. It was active in implementing the UN Sahel Strategy, which was under UNOWA’s “overall authority” after the departure of Special Envoy Romano Prodi on 31 January and the appointment of a substitute. (For further details, see “Peace and Security in Africa” in the June 2014 Forecast.)

On 22 May, Djinnit and Yury Fedotov, Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, attended a high-level donor conference in New York to raise funds for the transnational crime units under the West Africa Coast Initiative at which close to $1.4 million was raised.

As part of efforts to address drug trafficking in West Africa, the West Africa Commission on Drugs released a major report on 11 June. The report urged West African governments to reform drug laws and policies, including decriminalising low-level offences, avoiding militarisation of efforts to combat drug trafficking and providing more treatment for drug users as West Africa increasingly becomes a region for drug consumption and not just transit. It further urged law enforcement to focus more on pursuing...
UNOWA (West Africa) (con't)

high-level corruption and major traffickers and called on consuming and producing countries outside the region to provide greater assistance to West African states.

UNOWA continued to monitor developments across the region in the run-up to presidential elections to be held in at least eight West African countries from 2014 to 2016, with particular attention to political tensions in Burkina Faso and Niger.

Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman visited Senegal, Mauritania, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea from 15-18 April.

Key Issues
A critical issue is how the Council can become more engaged in dealing with Boko Haram, which is not only wreaking violence in Nigeria but was or is present in Cameroon, Central African Republic, Mali and Niger.

Transnational problems of drug trafficking, organised crime, arms trafficking and violent extremism across the region constitute further important issues. A related issue is progress with the Manu River Union security strategy to address cross-border movements of armed groups and weapons trafficking and the Gulf of Guinea anti-piracy strategy.

Options
As is common for UNOWA briefings, the Council might hear the briefing and take no action.

Conversely, the Council could issue a statement on the threat of Boko Haram, welcoming recent agreements at the Paris and London meetings and UNOWA’s role and good offices, including for addressing structural problems of poverty, human rights and governance.

A statement could also express support of the Secretary-General’s recommendation in his 11 December 2013 report on UNOWA (S/2013/732) to establish an analytical unit in UNOWA to improve its capacity to inform its good offices efforts.

Council Dynamics
The Council has largely refrained from making pronouncements on Boko Haram, due to sensitivities from Nigeria, even before it became a Council member in January. Nigeria has long considered the conflict an internal issue and has opposed suggested Council statements in the past to condemn attacks by the group. It was not until more than three weeks after the Chibok kidnappings, that, prompted by a huge public outcry and worsening attacks, the Council issued a press statement on the incident. Since the Secretary-General’s 8 May announcement that he was dispatching a high representative to Nigeria, Nigeria has gradually reconciled to increased international attention to the crisis.

France, the UK and the US have stepped up military and intelligence assistance to Nigeria and its neighbours to support efforts to confront the group as part of the agreements reached at the Paris summit. Chad also has a strong stake in the conflict, with Boko Haram operating across borders. It committed itself at Paris and London to greater cooperation with Nigeria and to developing a regional counter-terrorism strategy to combat Boko Haram.

During consultations last December, most members apparently expressed support for UNOWA’s proposed analytical unit. Whether the Council endorses the unit may depend on the larger financial contributors, such as France, the UK and the US, which have sought to cut-back UN spending and are sensitive to any proposed UN budget increases due to their own fiscal problems.

Nigeria is the penholder on West African issues.

Cyprus

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for an additional six months ahead of its 31 July expiry. The Special Representative and head of mission, Lisa Buttenheim, will likely brief the Council on the latest UNFICYP report and the status of negotiations.

Key Recent Developments
Prior to its last meeting on Cyprus on 30 January, the Council anticipated that Cypriot leaders would agree on a joint communiqué, a precondition set by the Greek Cypriot side for the resumption of unification talks. Despite the impasse in the negotiations process and a failure to agree on the communiqué, the Council extended UNFICYP’s mandate, adopting a technical rollover resolution without including any language that could be interpreted as a form of pressure to reach an agreement (S/RES/2135).

After months of political stalemate and moderate pressure by the UN Secretariat, especially the Secretary-General and his Special Adviser, agreement on a joint communiqué was reached on 11 February. The Council reacted the same day by issuing a long-awaited press statement welcoming the communiqué and the resumption of talks in Cyprus (SC/11273). The Secretary-General issued a statement commending the leaders for their commitment to resuming negotiations and reaching a statement of shared principles, deemed an invaluable basis for renewed talks. The day the communiqué was agreed, Alexander Downer announced that he was stepping down from the position of the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Cyprus, a position he held for more than five years. As there are no concrete plans at this time to find a new candidate for the position, Buttenheim will serve as acting Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Cyprus.
as well as Special Representative and head of UNFICYP.

Soon after agreeing on the joint communiqué, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot negotiators made historic visits to Ankara and Athens respectively, where they met with officials from the foreign affairs ministry of each country. Starting with the adoption of the joint communiqué, the initial screening phase of negotiations was concluded on 15 April. After completing this phase, the negotiations moved to an ongoing substantive phase. During the substantive phase, both sides are expected to submit substantial, counter and bridging proposals for a settlement. Also, both sides have agreed in principle to meet on a more frequent and structured basis, with both leaders meeting once every two weeks and chief negotiators meeting weekly.

During the substantive phase of negotiations, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman visited the island on 5 May. Feltman met with Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades and Turkish Cypriot leader Dervis Erolglu. Feltman conveyed the joint communiqué, the initial screening phase jointly with both leaders. Biden expressed support for the reunification talks and peace process. He was clear in his remarks that he came to Cyprus “on behalf of the US to help Cypriots get a solution, not to present an obstacle to the enjoyment of human rights by all. It observed that addressing the underly...
Peacebuilding

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council expects to receive a briefing by Ambassadors Vladimir Drobnjak (Croatia) and Antonio de Aguiar Patriota (Brazil), the former and current chairs of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), on the seventh annual report of the PBC (A/68/729-S/2014/67).

Later, on the day of the briefing, an informal interactive dialogue involving Council members, the six PBC country-configuration chairs and ambassadors of the PBC agenda countries is planned.

No outcome is expected.

Key Recent Developments
The PBC adopted its annual report on 29 January. The report reviews PBC activities over 2013 and assesses progress in advancing recommendations from the 2010 review. The report includes in an annex a decision in an annex a decision to formalise and clarification of the PBC's roles and activities.

Key Recent Developments

Recent Developments in Country-Specific Configurations
The chair of the Burundi configuration, Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland), visited Burundi on 26-27 May to help diffuse internal tensions and to restore trust between the government and the international community. The visit was part of a broader trip by Seger in which he also travelled to Brussels, Paris, Kigali and Arusha, meeting senior representatives of various governments and regional organisations to explore options for engagement on Burundi and to define respective roles in light of the planned departure of the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB) at the end of the year. Seger also discussed organising a round-table meeting as a follow-up to the 2012 Geneva Donor Conference and to assess the implementation of Burundi’s Strategic Framework for the Fight against Poverty II.

Ambassador Mohammed Loulichki (Morocco), the then-chair of the Central African Republic (CAR) configuration, visited the CAR from 4-7 March. It was his first visit since being appointed chair in January. Loulichki met transitional authorities and officials of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the CAR to discuss priorities for PBC engagement and how the configuration could support international and regional efforts to stabilise the CAR. In April, Ambassador Omar Hilale (Morocco) assumed the chairmanship.

At a meeting of the Sierra Leone configuration on 16 April presided by its chair, Ambassador Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg), UN security sector reform (SSR) experts briefed on a January interagency mission. SSR in Sierra Leone was starting a new phase, focusing on building civilian oversight of the defence and security forces and strengthening the police and justice sectors. The configuration has also been seeking donors for a $400,000 UNICEF program to educate rural areas about the ebola virus. As of 5 June, there had been 351 cases of ebola and 226 deaths since the outbreak began in late January.

Since April, the Sierra Leone configuration has issued three press statements on Sierra Leone’s electoral process to restore constitutional order. A statement on 1 April expressed concern over incidents of violence and intimidation before the 13 April national elections. Statements were also released prior to the 18 May presidential run-off election and on 12 June after the two successful electoral rounds. Patriota, as configuration chair, last briefed Council members on 19 May (S/PV.7177), recalling a preliminary strategy for configuration re-engagement with Guinea-Bissau following the inauguration of the new government.

In March, the third review of mutual commitments between Liberia and its PBC configuration was concluded. Commitments were extended for an additional year, with the final report noting that these may be aligned in 2015 around a “New Deal” compact. Recent configuration activities have focused, among other things, on advancing the stalled reconciliation process and improving land and natural resource management through the Peacebuilding Fund and World Bank support. In May, Ambassador Mårten Grunditz (Sweden) informed the PBC that he would replace Ambassador Staffan Tillander (Sweden) as configuration chair in July and that they would jointly visit Liberia. (Unlike the other configurations, Tillander has not been an accredited permanent representative.)

On 26 March, at the final briefing on Sierra Leone upon the withdrawal of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), Ambassador Guillermo Rishchynski (Canada), chair of the Sierra Leone configuration, addressed Council members about a new plan for lighter PBC engagement (S/PV.7148). With the conclusion of UNIPSIL, Sierra Leone became the second PBC-agenda country, with Guinea, that is not on the Council agenda.

Key Issues
Enhancing the advisory role of the PBC to the Council is a key issue. Members are likely to reflect on the PBC’s first annual
Peacebuilding (con’t)

A closely related issue is taking full advantage of the country-specific expertise of the chairs of the PBC country-configurations, in particular the question about the chairs participating in Council consultations.

Options
The Council may:
- discuss the annual report and take no action; or
- issue a presidential or press statement that welcomes recent practices for improving PBC-Council cooperation and the upcoming 2015 PBC review.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Within the Council (and broader membership), it is felt that the PBC has not lived up to its envisioned role, a view reinforced by the 12 April 2012 coup in Guinea-Bissau and the relapse into conflict in the CAR as of 10 December 2012. While the P5 continue to oppose country-configuration chairs participating in consultations, several new initiatives within the past year have been undertaken by members to enhance the PBC’s advisory role. As Presidents of the Council in September 2013 and March 2014, respectively, Australia and Luxembourg organised meetings of Council experts and Tillander prior to formal meetings on the UN Mission in Liberia. Seger had also briefed Council experts on his efforts and observations prior to Council meetings on Burundi. Additionally, the “PBC working stream”, chaired by Rwanda, is viewed as a best practice.

For some members, these practices have demonstrated opportunities to increase PBC-Council collaboration on a case-by-case basis with the different country-configurations. Informal meetings with configuration chairs ahead of Council meetings are viewed as beneficial for, among other things, providing a better idea of how PBC engagement can support the Council’s work and for planning mission mandates or drafting Council statements. Concerned over Burundi possibly relapsing into conflict in Burundi, Council members have highly valued Seger’s contribution, whose advice has been credited for specific provisions in resolution 2137 that renewed BNUB.

On the past six occasions, the presentation of the PBC annual reports provided an opportunity for Council members to hold a debate, with the 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2012 meetings held as open debates.

In addition to the 2015 PBC review, the Council expects a final report from the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict in December, when it may adopt a new presidential statement on peacebuilding.

There is no designated penholder on peacebuilding.
Notable Dates for July

**REPORT DUE** | **REPORTS FOR CONSIDERATION IN JULY** | **REQUESTING DOCUMENT**
--- | --- | ---
25 June | SG report on UNOWA (West Africa) | S/2013/759
26 June | SG report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (Lebanon/UNIFIL) | S/RES/2115
27 June | OPCW report on the implementation of resolution 2118 (Syrian chemical weapons) | S/RES/2118
4 July | Interim report of the 2127 CAR Panel of Experts (Central African Republic) | S/RES/2127
11 July | SG report on UNAMI (Iraq) | S/RES/2110
11 July | SG report on Iraq/Kuwait Missing Persons and Property | S/RES/2107
14 July | SG report on UNIFICYP (Cyprus) | S/RES/2135
24 July | SG report on the implementation of resolution 2139 (humanitarian access in Syria) | S/RES/2139

**MANDATES EXPIRE** | **RELEVANT DOCUMENT**
--- | ---
31 July | UNAMI (Iraq) | S/RES/2110
31 July | UNIFICYP (Cyprus) | S/RES/2135

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The Security Council has used its Article 41 powers under the UN Charter to impose sanctions 30 times since it first established a mandatory sanctions regime on Southern Rhodesia in resolution 232 (1966). Currently, 15 sanctions regimes are in force, with the 751 Somalia regime dating back to resolutions 733 (1992) and 751 (1992) while the 2140 Yemen regime established in resolution 2140 (2014) is the most recent. All current sanctions regimes are targeted, using one or more measures to signal, constrain or coerce states, entities or individuals to change behaviour. Different measures are frequently used in tandem to strengthen a regime: at present, arms embargoes (12), asset freezes (14) and travel bans (14) are part of almost all current regimes in force. In addition to the type(s) and scope of measures adopted, the strength of a sanctions regime is also determined by the institutional architecture that verifies compliance and non-compliance. A standalone sanctions regime is institutionally weaker than a sanctions regime with a committee, which in turn is weaker than one with a committee and a panel/group of experts or monitoring group (different shades of blue in the table reflect these institutional variants).

Security Council resolution numbers appear in bold followed by the year they were adopted in parenthesis. Only resolutions establishing, amending or ending a sanctions regime are referenced, not those renewing an existing regime without introducing any variations. Abbreviations for sanctions measures introduced, amended or continued appear below the respective resolution number.

### Active Security Council Sanctions Regimes: An Abridged History

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Type(s)</th>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Panel/Group of Experts or Monitoring Group</th>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>AE, AF, TB</td>
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<td>AE</td>
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