Luxembourg will preside over the Security Council in March.

An open debate on children and armed conflict is planned, to be chaired by Jean Asselborn, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Luxembourg. Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict Leila Zerrougui, Executive Director of UNICEF Anthony Lake and Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Hervé Ladsous are among expected briefers. A former Sierra Leone child soldier, Alhaji Babah Sawaneh, who spoke to the Council on 20 November 2001 when he was 14, is also expected to address the Council.

Debates are expected on the situations in Afghanistan, with a briefing by Ján Kubiš, the head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and in Haiti, by Sandra Honoré, the head of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti.

Luxembourg is planning a wrap-up session to be held at the end of the month in a private meeting.

Briefings are expected on:
- the work of the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee by its chair, Ambassador Gary Quinlan (Australia);
- the situation in Sierra Leone by the head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone Jens Anders Toyberg-Frandzen and Ambassador Guillermo Rishchynski (Canada), chair of the Sierra Leone configuration of the PBC; and
- post-conflict peacebuilding by Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson and possibly also Executive Director of UN Women Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka.

Briefings in consultations are likely on:
- Syria on the chemical weapons track by the Special Coordinator of the OPCW-UN Joint Mission, Sigrid Kaag; on Geneva II peace talks by the UN-Arab League Joint Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi; and on the implementation of resolution 2139 on humanitarian access by Amos;
- the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur by Ladsous;
- Sudan/South Sudan issues by Special Envoy Haile Menkerios;
- the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei, by Ladsous;
- the implementation of resolution 1701 on Lebanon, by Special Coordinator Derek Plumbly and Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Edmond Mulet;
- the UN Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights by Mulet;
- the work of the 751/1907 Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee by its chair, Ambassador Oh Joon (Republic of Korea); and
- Yemen, by Special Advisor Jamal Benomar.
Overview (con’t)

Formal sessions will be held to adopt resolutions renewing the mandate of:
• the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee;
• UNMIL (Libya);
• UNAMA (Afghanistan); and
• MONUSCO (DRC).

A formal session will also be needed if the Council decides to continue the partial lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia.

An informal interactive dialogue regarding the AU Mission in Somalia and an Arria formula meeting with religious leaders from the CAR are also contemplated.

Status Update since our February Forecast

Mali
From 31 January to 3 February, Council members took part in a visiting mission to Mali (Bamako and Mopti) led by Chad and France (S/2014/72). The mission was undertaken to reiterate the Council’s urgent call for an inclusive and credible negotiation process open to all communities of the north, as well as emphasising the Council’s full support of the good offices of the Special Representative for Mali. On 26 February, the Council was briefed by the co-leads of the visiting mission (S/PV.7120).

Kosovo
On 10 February, the Council held its quarterly debate on Kosovo (S/PV.7108) and was briefed by Farid Zarif, the Special Representative and head of UNMIK on the latest report of the Secretary-General (S/2014/68).

UNOCA (Central Africa)
On 10 February, the Secretary-General extended the mandate of UNOCA until 31 August 2015 in an exchange of letters with the Council (S/2014/103 and S/2014/104).

Cyprus
On 11 February, the Council issued a press statement welcoming the joint communiqué agreed between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriot leaders (SC/11273).

Protection of Civilians
On 12 February, the Council held its semi-annual open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (S/PV.7109) and adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2014/3). The concept note for the debate proposed a focus on effective implementation of protection of civilians mandates in UN peacekeeping missions, which is one of the five core protection challenges identified by the Secretary-General (S/2014/74). (The other four are enhancing compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights law; enhancing compliance by non-state armed groups; ensuring humanitarian access; and promoting accountability.)

The debate also provided an opportunity to consider the Secretary-General’s most recent thematic report on the protection of civilians, issued on 22 November (S/2013/689). It featured briefings by Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous, High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay and the Director General of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Yves Daccord. In addition to Council members, more than 45 member states also spoke. The presidential statement reiterated the Council’s commitment to the protection of civilians and contained as an annex an updated aide memoire aimed at facilitating the Council’s consideration of protection issues. (First endorsed by the Council in a presidential statement on 15 March 2002 [S/PRST/2002/6] the aide memoire has been updated several times, most recently in a 22 November 2010 presidential statement [S/PRST/2010/25]). While the Council had in the past “adopted” the aide memoire, this time it instead “recognised[d] the contribution of the updated aide memoire for the consideration of issues pertaining to the protection of civilians in armed conflict.”

Burundi
On 13 February, the Council adopted resolution 2137, extending the mandate of BNUB until 31 December 2014 (S/PV.7110). The Council also requested the Secretary-General to prepare BNUB’s transition and transfer of responsibilities to the UN country team by that date.

EU-UN Cooperation
On 14 February, the Council held a meeting focusing on its cooperation with the EU (S/PV.7112). Catherine Ashton, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, briefed the Council on the activities of the EU in maintenance of international peace and security. At the meeting, the Council adopted the first-ever presidential statement on cooperation between the UN and the EU, highlighting the EU’s comprehensive approach to maintenance of international peace and security (S/PRST/2014/4).

Counter-Terrorism
On 16 February, Council members released a press statement condemning the terrorist attack targeting a bus with Korean tourists in the Sinai Peninsula (Egypt) killing at least four people and injuring dozens (SC/11284).

Rule of Law
On 19 February, the Council held an open debate on the “the promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security”, chaired by the Foreign Minister of Lithuania, Linas Antanas Linkevičius (S/PV.7113). The Secretary-General briefed the Council and representatives of 63 member states, the EU and Palestine participated. On 21 February, the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2014/5) underlining the importance of support to strengthening the rule of law institutions of the host country by a number of peacekeeping operations and special political missions within the scope of their mandates.

OSCE
On 24 February the Council was briefed by the Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs Didier Burkhalter, the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Burkhalter presented the main objectives of the OSCE in 2014 and addressed the recent crisis in Ukraine (S/PV.7117).
Status Update since our Forecast (con’t)

Israel/Palestine
On 25 February, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman briefed the Council (S/PV.7118), followed by consultations. He reported that US Secretary of State John Kerry’s efforts to forge a framework proposal as a basis for continued negotiation is reaching a defining moment and potentially will provide a credible horizon to achieve the two-state solution.

Guinea-Bissau
José Ramos-Horta, the Special Representative for Guinea-Bissau briefed the Council on 26 February (S/PV.7121) on the Secretary-General’s report on the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau (S/2014/105). Ramos-Horta reported that voter registration had been successfully completed and the electoral date had been postponed from 16 March to 13 April primarily for technical reasons. The Council also heard from Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota (Brazil) on his recent visit to Guinea-Bissau as chair of the PBC country configuration. The Council issued a press statement urging Guinea-Bissau to hold elections without further delays (SC/11299).

Children and Armed Conflict

Expected Council Action
In March the Council will hold an open debate on children and armed conflict chaired by Jean Asselborn, Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Luxembourg. Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict Leila Zerrougui will brief the Council, as will the Executive Director of UNICEF, Anthony Lake; Hervé Ladsous from the Department of Peacekeeping; and a former child soldier from Sierra Leone, Alhaji Babah Sawanéh, who last spoke at the children and armed conflict debate on 20 November 2001 when he was 14. A concept note has been circulated by Luxembourg the lead country on the issue. Among the areas that may be covered are national capacity building, the financing of action plans, military use of schools and cooperation with regional organisations. A resolution is the most likely outcome.

For a more detailed analysis of the Council’s recent work on protection of children, please refer to our 21 February Cross-Cutting Report on Children and Armed Conflict.

Key Recent Developments
The last children and armed conflict debate was held on 17 June 2013. It was a public debate, not an open one, with only Council members plus “specially affected” parties speaking. Besides the Secretary-General’s annual report on children and armed conflict, the debate focused on persistent perpetrators (i.e., parties that have been listed for five years or more in the Secretary-General’s reports) and the need to hold them accountable. A presidential statement was adopted during the debate (S/PRST/2013/8). It reiterated the Council’s concern over persistent perpetrators and its commitment to deal with them effectively. It also highlighted the importance of concrete, time-bound action plans and the Council’s readiness to adopt targeted and graduated measures against persistent perpetrators. In addition, it encouraged the exchange of information between the Special Representative and sanctions committees as well as their groups of experts.

At the debate the Special Representative introduced the joint initiative “Children, Not Soldiers” by her office and UNICEF, aimed at ending and preventing recruitment and use of children by government armed forces in conflicts by 2016. The campaign will be launched on 6 March. Eight situations are listed in the annexes of the Secretary-General’s last annual report for recruitment and use of children by government forces. Afghanistan, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Myanmar, Somalia and South Sudan have signed action plans to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children by their security forces. Sudan is in active dialogue with the UN over an action plan, while Yemen has made a commitment to end recruitment and use of children.

Since the last debate, the Working Group has adopted conclusions on the situation of children and armed conflict in Myanmar (S/AC.51/2013/2), Yemen (S/AC.51/2013/3) and the Philippines (S/AC.51/2014/1). (Conclusions on children and armed conflict affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army were adopted on 19 April 2013. Overall, the gap between reports published and conclusions adopted in 2013 was an average of 6.3 months, with actual negotiation time being an average of three months.)

The Secretary-General’s first report on the situation of children and armed conflict in Syria was published on 27 January and introduced to the Working Group on 14 February by the Special Representative (S/2014/31). The report covers the period from 1 March 2011 to 15 November 2013 and provides information on grave violations against children committed by all parties to the conflict in Syria. The Working Group will begin discussing this report after the open debate.

The Working Group visited Myanmar from 30 November to 4 December 2013. The delegation was led by Luxembourg and included Australia, Azerbaijan, France, Guatemala, Russia, the UK and the US. The main aim of the visit was to review progress in implementing the 27 June 2012 action plan to prevent the recruitment of children in the Myanmar Armed Forces and to assess the challenges and issues for monitoring and reporting as well as the reintegration of children. While acknowledging that some progress had been made, the Working Group delegation stressed that further progress was needed for full compliance with the action plan and for increased access for monitoring and reporting and for proactive identification, registration and discharge of children.

Key Issues
While the children and armed conflict agenda has been successful in developing a coherent architecture with a reliable monitoring and reporting mechanism, an overarching issue for the Council is how to move to greater
follow-up and accountability particularly in relation to persistent perpetrators.

Another significant issue is how to ensure that child protection concerns are given due weight in UN peacekeeping and political missions. While country-specific decisions in 2013 continued to include child protection language, particularly when setting up or renewing UN mission mandates, there are still gaps in implementation.

Also an issue is ensuring that the Council receives regular feedback on child protection issues in country-specific situations.

Persistent perpetrators and how to put pressure on these groups continues to be an issue. A related issue is how to make the best use of tools, such as existing sanctions committees. For example, an effort could be made to include attacks on schools and hospitals as designation criteria for the 1988 Afghanistan Sanctions Committee since the Taliban have been listed in the Secretary-General’s annexes for such attacks.

Continuing issues for the Working Group include receiving relevant, current information that can be used as the basis for its conclusions, lengthy negotiations due to lack of consensus and little response to its recommendations.

Options
The most likely option for the Council is to adopt a resolution at the open debate in which the Council might commit to focusing on practical measures that could improve the implementation of action plans, including capacity building at both the national and UN level. Another issue that could be given attention is attacks on schools and hospitals—with particular attention paid to the use of schools for military purposes—as there have been no action plans on this violation.

Options that would allow the Council to be better informed on child protection issues and could be incorporated into a resolution include:

- requesting the Secretary-General to include a separate section on the implementation of Working Group recommendations in his country-specific reports on children and armed conflict;
- requesting the Special Representative to brief the Council on situations on the agenda that have a children and armed conflict dimension;
- having the Working Group chair brief the Council when Working Group conclusions are adopted on a country-specific report on children and armed conflict or following a field visit by the Working Group;
- having the Secretary-General, Special Envoys, Special Representatives, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Political Affairs update the Security Council on issues relevant to children and armed conflict during their regular briefings;
- ensuring that commissions of inquiry include a children and armed conflict dimension;

Options for the Working Group include:
- requesting feedback from parties on requests in conclusions in order to track the impact of the tools being used (in this regard, inviting representatives from the states being considered in a Secretary-General’s report on children and armed conflict to meet with the Working Group might be useful);
- discussing alternatives to conclusions as a means of conveying the Working Group’s messages to the parties on the Secretary-General’s annexes;
- brainstorming new tools to put pressure on the parties, particularly persistent perpetrators;
- holding Arria formula meetings with relevant parties, including Child Protection Advisors (CPAs) and NGOs involved in child protection, in order to obtain current information; and
- instituting more regular contact with CPAs in UN missions for current situations being considered by the Working Group.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Over the last two years, the composition of the Council has not been particularly conducive to moving the children and armed conflict agenda forward. While several members that had strong views on limiting the scope of this agenda are no longer on the Council, there are still some who are wary of any major changes at the thematic level. China and Russia continue to stress the importance of national sovereignty and are reluctant to consider stronger measures such as sanctions, thus limiting the options for putting pressure on persistent perpetrators. However, together with France and the UK who have been supportive of the issue over the years, a significant number of elected members this year—in particular Argentina, Australia, Jordan, Lithuania and Luxembourg—have an active interest in this issue. With the current mix in the Council there may be an opportunity for new momentum on this issue.

Afghanistan

Expected Council Action
In March, the Council is scheduled to renew the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which expires on 19 March. The Council will also hold its quarterly debate on the situation in Afghanistan, during which Ján Kubíš, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNAMA, will brief the Council.

Key Recent Developments
The deadliest attack against foreign civilians in Afghanistan since 2001 occurred on 17 January when a Taliban suicide bomber and two gunmen attacked the Taverna du Liban, at a Kabul restaurant. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.7085 (17 December 2013) was a Security Council debate on Afghanistan. Other Documents A/HRC/25/41 (10 January 2014) was the annual report of the UN High Commission for Human Rights on Afghanistan. UNAMA’s 2013 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (February 2014) was 345 international civilian personnel (excluding military/police advisers), 1,170 local civilian staff and 71 UN volunteers based in Kabul headquarters, 13 regional offices, two liaison offices (Tehran and Islamabad) and one support office shared with UN Assistance Mission for Iraq in Kuwait. ISAF Size and Composition Strength as of 15 January 2014: 57,004 troops from 49 contributing countries (38,000 are US troops).
a restaurant popular with foreigners in Kabul. Twenty-one people were killed, 13 foreigners and eight Afghans. Among the victims were four UN employees. The Taliban overran an Afghan army base in Kunar region on 23 February killing 21 soldiers and leaving 6 missing, in what may have been the greatest losses suffered by government forces in a single attack since 2010.

Afghan civilian casualties, meanwhile, rose by 14 percent in 2013, a reversal from 2012’s decline. UNAMA's annual report on protection of civilians, released in February, also determined that anti-government forces were responsible for 74 percent of civilian deaths and injuries. Eight percent of casualties were attributed to Afghan security forces and three percent to international forces. (The other 15 percent were not attributed to a specific side.) A new trend was the significant increase in civilian casualties during ground engagements. This reflected the assumption of security responsibilities by the state from international forces and fighting the Taliban in more conventional military operations, increasingly in civilian communities.

The ICRC’s 11 February 2014 Operational Update highlighted that it had not observed any security improvements in 2013 and that it was operating in an “increasingly insecure environment”.

Meanwhile Afghanistan moved closer to the date of its 5 April presidential and provincial elections. The Ministry of Interior recommended on 11 January closing 414 of the 6,845 polling centres due to security concerns. On 1 February, two aides of presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah, including the campaign manager, were killed outside the campaign office in Herat. The next day, electoral campaigning officially started with 11 presidential candidates and 2,563 candidates for 34 provincial councils. Voter registration continued with over 3.5 million new voters registered since 26 May 2013. Approximately 35 percent are women. The process will continue until two weeks before election day.

As part of the drawdown of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), on 21 December 2013, NATO announced that negotiations had begun with Afghanistan on a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Meanwhile, a final agreement on the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between the US and Afghanistan, which NATO’s SOFA would resemble, had yet to be reached. The agreements envision leaving approximately 10,000 international troops in Afghanistan to train government forces and assist in counter-terrorism. Apparently frustrated by President Hamid Karzai’s unwillingness to sign the BSA, on 23 February, US President Barack Obama told Karzai that the US would start planning a complete withdrawal of US forces by the end of the year while still trying to reach an agreement with his successor after the elections.

Further fuelling tensions between the US and Afghanistan, on 13 February Afghanistan released 65 prisoners who had been transferred to its custody by the US, indicating that they had done so due to a lack of evidence. The US maintained that there was strong evidence linking the prisoners to terror-related crimes, that the decision violated a 2012 memorandum of understanding on prisoners, and threatened international forces.

In other developments, a 30 January report by the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction highlighted corruption and the difficulty of channeling aid money into developing state institutions, reporting that none of the 16 ministries could be trusted to keep funds from being stolen or wasted.

The World Bank reported a decline in Afghanistan’s economic growth from 14.4 percent in 2012 to an estimated 3.1 percent in 2013. It attributed the decline to the uncertainty about the political and security transition.

On 17 February, Karzai ordered that parliament revise a draft criminal code. The code would have effectively prohibited relatives of defendants from testifying in domestic-abuse cases. Civil society and foreign governments urged Karzai to oppose the law.

At the UN, the Fifth Committee approved UNAMA’s 2014 budget of $191.3 million on 23 December 2013, a reduction of approximately $4.9 million from its 2013 budget.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

Following the 27 January review of Afghanistan, the Human Rights Council’s (HRC) working group of the Universal Periodic Review adopted its report on 31 January. Of the 224 recommendations formulated during the interactive dialogue, Afghanistan did not support 12, of which nine concerned the establishment of a moratorium on the death penalty (A/HRC/26/4).

During its 25th session in March, the HRC will consider a report from High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay on the situation in Afghanistan (A/HRC/25/41). In her report, Pillay indicates there was a 10 percent increase in civilian deaths and injuries in the first 11 months of 2013 compared to the same period in 2012, reversing the decline that was reported in 2012. The report also voices concern about the continued use of torture by Afghan forces involving conflict-related detainees in a number of detention facilities and denial of detainees’ access to legal counsel.

Additionally, Pillay referred to the most recent report on the implementation of the 2009 Law on the Elimination of Violence against Women (EVAW) released in December: A Way to Go: An Update on Implementation of the Law on EVAW in Afghanistan. The report finds that discrimination and harmful practices against women remain systemic and entrenched. It notes that while the authorities registered 28 percent more reports of violence against women under the EVAW law over the past year, prosecutions and convictions remain low, with most cases settled by mediation.

**Key Issues**

The key issue for the Council will be renewing the mandate of UNAMA, which comes as most international forces will be withdrawn by the end 2014. The UN has proposed renewing it around the mission’s four core areas: good offices, coordinating international development assistance, human rights monitoring and advocacy and humanitarian assistance. Connected to this is the security of UNAMA and what it can do in a volatile environment.

Ensuring that the upcoming elections are conducted fairly, in particular after the widespread fraud in the 2009 elections, and are not marred by violence, is an immediate issue. Fostering public acceptance of the results, which will impact Afghanistan’s future ability to achieve stability, is a closely related issue.

Opium production and drug trafficking, undermining good governance and funding the insurgency, is an ongoing issue. Vigilance against a possible rollback in human rights gains made during the last 12 years tied to the NATO drawdown, is an emerging issue for the Council.

Ensuring that UNAMA has the resources to carry out its work, despite pressure on the UN to find budget savings, is an ongoing concern.

**Underlying Problems**

The stalling of the BSA negotiations is
Afghanistan (con’t)

creating difficulty for the international community to plan beyond 2014. It is also contributing to the lack of confidence in the country among Afghans about the security and political transitions. No agreement that would keep international troops beyond 2014 could require reassessing UNAMA’s mission.

Related to the NATO drawdown and BSA is whether government forces will perform effectively to prevent a security vacuum or Taliban resurgence.

Options
The Council could:
• renew UNAMA for one year, keeping the four core functions of its mandate;
• further streamline the mandate to produce a shorter, more concise resolution, removing parts that divert from the core functions; or
• renew UNAMA’s mandate for a shorter period.

Council Dynamics
Council members are largely in agreement on renewing UNAMA’s mandate with its core functions. With the changes Afghanistan is experiencing during 2014—the election of a new president and the withdrawal of international forces—it is considered important to provide continuity and predictability through UNAMA’s presence, without significant changes in its role. Members also widely agree that 2015 is when it will be more appropriate for intensive discussion about UNAMA’s mandate, since by then a new government will have had time to identify its priorities for where the UN can best assist.

France recently increased its emphasis on the issue of drugs, a concern often highlighted by Russia. They may seek additional language that highlights the problem or promotes regional cooperation to deal with the issue, preparing next year’s mandate discussion for a possible greater UNAMA role on narcotics. Other members are sceptical about expanding UNAMA’s mandate in this regard.

Some Council members believe that NATO’s drawdown should not have a significant impact on the mission, which has long provided for its own security, while others express concerns. Agreement is widespread about the importance of the BSA. Russia frequently cites the potential negative impact that ISAF’s withdrawal will have on regional security.

Australia is the penholder on Afghanistan.

Syria

Expected Council Action
In March, it is expected that Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos will brief Council members on the first monthly implementation report of resolution 2139 on humanitarian access.

There will also be a briefing in consultations on the implementation of resolution 2118 regarding the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons by Sigrid Kaag, Special Coordinator of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-UN Joint Mission.

Council members will also be closely watching whether a third round of Geneva II peace talks will be convened in the near future. At press time, it was expected that UN-Arab League Joint Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi would brief Council members in March.

Key Recent Developments
On 22 February, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2139, demanding that all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, allow humanitarian access across conflict lines, in besieged areas and across borders and expressing its intent to take further steps in case of non-compliance. The vote followed two weeks of intense negotiations that resulted in significant compromises on references to Syria’s unwillingness to implement the October 2013 presidential statement on humanitarian access, possible sanctions in case of non-compliance, cross-border access and access to besieged areas, aerial bombardment, accountability and counter-terrorism.

The situation in Syria is devastating and the level of violence has only escalated since the adoption of resolution 2118 on 27 September 2013. The death toll has increased by 36 percent (from 100,000 to a conservative estimate by monitoring groups of 136,000). According to UN sources, refugee numbers have also risen in the same time period by almost 14 percent (from 2.2 million to nearly 2.5 million), while the number of internally displaced persons has dramatically increased by almost 55 percent (from 4.2 million to 6.5 million). Inside Syria, there are almost 9.3 million in need of humanitarian assistance, with almost 250,000 living in besieged areas and a further 2.5 million in areas rarely accessed by humanitarian workers. Recently, OCHA estimated over 680,000 have been injured over the three years of the conflict.

Adding to the dire situation are alarming reports of intentional government policies of depopulating and razing residential areas, starving areas under siege and deliberately attacking health infrastructure. The regime has increased its use of incendiary weapons, cluster bombs and barrel bombs and the proliferation of extremist armed groups has contributed to the escalating violence.

Amos last briefed Council members on 13 February, reporting that since the adoption of the October 2013 presidential statement the conflict had intensified with the continued use of siege as a weapon of war, denial of humanitarian assistance and aerial bombardment. Amos cited the Homs evacuation as an example of what can be achieved if parties act in support of humanitarian action. However, she said Homs could not be seen as progress. It had taken 14 months to reach agreement to evacuate 1,400 people, and she said the international community could not wait another
14 months for 1,400 more with 250,000 still under siege. Nor, she added, could Homs be seen as a model when humanitarian workers had come under deliberate fire and men and boys were separated from their families and detained by the government during the evacuation. (While Amos did not attribute blame for the attack on aid workers, the US said the regime broke the humanitarian pause with shelling.) Amos said even achieving limited progress was uneven and painstakingly slow and that one-off aid deliveries were not enough. She said the Security Council had a responsibility to act.

Separately, the General Assembly held a meeting on the humanitarian situation in Syria on 25 February. The Secretary-General, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the High Commissioner for Refugees, the WHO Director-General and the Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator briefed. Pillay reiterated her call for the Security Council to refer the Syrian crisis to the ICC. Saudi Arabia requested this meeting on 7 February on behalf of Australia, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Qatar, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the UK and the US. These member states cited increasing frustration at the lack of progress in addressing the humanitarian situation as well as concern over a growing body of evidence pointing to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Regarding chemical weapons, Kaag last briefed Council members on 6 February, reporting that the 5 February deadline for the removal of the entire chemical weapons stockpile was missed, though Syria did transfer cargo on 7 and 27 January. She told Council members that the final deadline of 30 June was achievable and that Syria had sufficient material and equipment to proceed without delay. Kaag reported that Syria was at a critical juncture and that to meet the mid-year deadline it would be imperative for Syria to move sufficient volumes in a consistent and predictable manner. Finally, in remarks to the media, Kaag said it was Syria’s responsibility to meet its obligations under resolution 2118 and as a party to the chemical weapons convention.

The US drafted a press statement calling on Syria to immediately comply with its obligations under resolution 2118. However, Russia had objections and the statement, which requires consensus, was not issued. Instead, agreed “elements to the press” were read out, in which Council members noted growing concern about the slow pace of removal and called upon Syria to expedite the process. Council members underlined Syria’s responsibility in this regard and said they remained committed to the 30 June deadline and would closely monitor compliance with resolution 2118.

The day before the missed deadline, Russia announced that Syria would complete its shipments by 1 March. However, on 21 February, the UN said Syria had provided a revised timeline that requested a mid-May target for removal despite the OPCW assessment that Syria had adequate means to act immediately. The OPCW reported a third transfer on 10 February. According to media reports, the three batches represent 11 percent of the total arsenal, but only 5 percent of the most toxic, priority-one chemicals have been removed. At press time, the OPCW announced a fourth transfer on 26 February, reportedly of mustard gas.

The first round of Geneva II UN-mediated peace talks between government and opposition delegations was held 22-31 January with no progress in agreeing to confidence-building measures, such as humanitarian access, local ceasefires and prisoner releases. (The situation in Homs was discussed in Geneva without reaching agreement. The actual evacuation was agreed by parties on the ground.)

Talks resumed from 10-13 February, focusing on forming a transitional governing body, ending violence and fighting terrorism. Brahimi insisted both parties declare their political will to deal with these issues in response to the impasse that emerged in the first round of talks over President Bashar al-Assad’s future role. The government refused to discuss any political transition until there is a halt to terrorism. The opposition presented its roadmap for a political solution, but the government did not respond.

On 14 February, Brahimi convened a tripartite meeting with Russia and the US to bring fresh momentum into the process. However, the meeting was acrimonious and likely mirrored media remarks made the same day by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and US Secretary of State John Kerry. Lavrov criticised the US for using the talks to achieve “regime change”, while Kerry said agreement on a transitional government was the primary goal of the June 2012 Geneva communiqué and accused Russia of backtracking on previous commitments. The status of a third round of talks was unknown at press time.

On 26 February, the US said the Assad regime had arrested relatives of some opposition delegates. Syria also designated some delegates as terrorists and seized their assets.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

On 6 February, a group of UN independent experts and special rapporteurs urged all parties to ensure immediate humanitarian relief to those experiencing extreme deprivation. The experts warned that the withholding basic necessities and the denial of humanitarian relief used as a method of war amounted to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

On 19 February, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights released a study, “Living under Siege”, and reiterated its calls for humanitarian access to all besieged areas. High Commissioner Navi Pillay said, “The Security Council is continuing to fail Syrians by not even managing to agree on measures to ensure the provision of basic necessities to people”.

In March, the Human Rights Council will consider the updated report on the work of the Commission of Inquiry on Syria.

**Key Issues**

Three years into the conflict, the key issue is whether and when the parties to the conflict, in particular the Syrian authorities, will meaningfully implement resolutions 2118 and 2139, on chemical weapons and humanitarian access respectively. Both resolutions expressed the intent to take further steps in the case of non-compliance. In this regard, a related issue for the Council is what further steps it might take if there is not timely and substantive implementation.

**Options**

Following the adoption of resolution 2139 on humanitarian access, the Council is unlikely to press for any public outcome. However, Council members have the option to request the Secretary-General to provide benchmarks for measurable progress on the specific demands it made in resolution 2139.

An option for the Council on the political track is issuing a statement encouraging meaningful engagement by both delegations at the peace talks, stressing its endorsement...
in resolutions 2118 and 2139 of the June 2012 Geneva communiqué that called for the establishment of a transitional governing body exercising full executive powers. However, any action on this track will be informed by what Brahimì has to say when he briefs the Council.

Regarding chemical weapons, Kaag’s last two briefings indicated significant concerns regarding Syria’s cooperation. If such concerns are again amplified in March, the Council could issue a statement reminding Syria that resolution 2118 decided to impose measures under Chapter VII in the event of non-compliance.

**Council Dynamics**

Despite continuously worsening conditions following the adoption of the October 2013 presidential statement, there was a great deal of reluctance to move forward on the humanitarian track in the Council due to the importance Russia and the US placed on avoiding contentious negotiations in the lead-up to Geneva II. However, with no political solution in sight following the January and February rounds of peace talks and with no clear indication if they will resume, Australia, Jordan and Luxembourg, along with the P3, decided to table the draft resolution on humanitarian access for a vote after two weeks of intense negotiations.

Russia warned that the initiative would jeopardise the political, humanitarian and chemical weapons tracks. However, the broader Council membership was not swayed by the argument, given their increasing frustration at the overwhelming lack of cooperation Syria had exhibited on all three tracks.

When the draft resolution was put in blue, it was unclear whether sufficient compromises had been made to avoid a veto by Moscow and Beijing. Resolution 2139 on humanitarian access was adopted unanimously.

On the chemical weapons track, many Council members are concerned by the slow pace of removal and few are confident that the 30 June deadline will be met. These members are coming to the conclusion that Syria’s delayed implementation is a tactic to buy time. At this juncture, Council members have not actively discussed taking any concrete action for non-compliance.

France is the penholder on Syria but most texts are thoroughly, if not exclusively, negotiated between Russia and the US prior to agreement by the broader Council. However, the negotiation of resolution 2139 provides an interesting counter to Russia-US predominance on the Syria file in the Council. Australia and Luxembourg are the penholders on the humanitarian track and, along with Jordan, led these negotiations. It is an example of elected members’ ability to take the lead and actively participate in P5 negotiations, refusing to be excluded.

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**South Sudan**

**Expected Council Action**

In March, the Council is scheduled to be briefed on the report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous. Executive Director of UN Women Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka may also brief on her 18-19 February trip to South Sudan. Council members are likely to hold consultations following the briefing.

At press time, an outcome was not anticipated. However, after considering the findings of the upcoming Secretary-General’s report, the Council could choose to modify the mandate of UNMISS well ahead of its 15 July expiration.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 21 February, Council members received an interim report on the human rights situation in South Sudan issued by the Human Rights Division of UNMISS. The report covers events during the first six weeks since the outbreak of hostilities, from 15 December 2013 through 31 January 2014. The report summarises human rights violations in the Central Equatoria, Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile states, including the deliberate targeting of civilians in extrajudicial killings and mass killings, enforced disappearances, gender-based violence and torture committed by forces from both sides of the conflict. The report also notes that many civilians were deliberately targeted and killed along ethnic lines, while many more civilians have been forcibly displaced.

A second round of talks mediated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) between the government of South Sudan and the opposition was due to start on 10 February. The rebel delegation then made two demands as a pre-requisite: the withdrawal of Ugandan military forces deployed in support of the government and the participation in the talks of the 11 Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) members initially detained by the government in mid-December (four remain in detention in South Sudan facing treason charges and seven were released into the custody of Kenya on 29 January). After the rebels were assured their concerns would be addressed, an opening ceremony was held on 11 February, and the seven former political detainees arrived in Addis Ababa from Nairobi the following day. Potentially complicating the mediation process, the group of seven has since asked to participate independently rather than joining the rebel delegation. IGAD chief negotiator Seyoum Mesfin said, “They rather would like us to prepare a sort of a triangular table for their negotiations.” Despite the holding of an opening ceremony, as of press time the second round of talks failed to progress. This may be largely due to rebel objections regarding the continued detention of four opposition figures and the ongoing deployment of Ugandan forces in South Sudan.

Meanwhile, although the parties had signed the IGAD-mediated 23 January cessation of hostilities agreement and IGAD had deployed an advance team of ceasefire monitors from 2-7
February, armed conflict has reigned in South Sudan. According to a rebel spokesperson, Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) forces and Justice and Equality Movement rebels were responsible for an attack on former Vice President Riek Machar’s hometown, Leer, in Unity state on 1 February. Analysis of imagery by the US-based NGO Satellite Sentinel Project indicates more than 1,000 huts were burned down in the attack. More recently, as of 18 February, a major battle has erupted for control of Malakal, the capital of Upper Nile state, which has strategic significance as the sole remaining source of oil production; earlier combat damaged the oil fields in Unity state. Both sides have traded accusations regarding responsibility for widespread human rights violations in Malakal. There have also been reports of fighting in Jonglei and Lakes states, with the SPLA being reinforced by Ugandan air and ground forces.

The outbreak of armed conflict in South Sudan on 15 December has presented numerous difficult challenges for UNMISS, particularly with regard to protecting civilians and managing contentious relations with the government. Approximately 75,000 civilians have sought refuge inside 10 UNMISS bases throughout the country. Maintaining security—both internal and external—has been an operational priority for UNMISS. Nonetheless, inter-communal clashes erupted on 18 February inside the UNMISS base near Malakal, with at least 10 civilian deaths reported due to injuries sustained both inside and outside the compound. SPLA violations of the UNMISS Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) have also become increasingly common, including attempts to force entry into UNMISS bases. Other SOFA violations include: restrictions on the freedom of movement; arbitrary arrests and detention; and screening of UN flights and other forms of transport.

Armed conflict in South Sudan has had a high humanitarian cost. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, more than 710,600 people are displaced within the country, more than 171,000 people have fled to neighbouring countries, and aid agencies have reached more than 300,000 people thus far with assistance. In order to assist the 3.2 million most affected by the conflict, the UN launched an urgent appeal on 4 February for $1.27 billion to fund aid through June. As of 24 February, donors had contributed $260 million.

The Council last discussed South Sudan on 11 February, when members were briefed in consultations by Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos and Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNMISS Hilde Johnson (via videoconference from Juba). Among other subjects, Amos and Ladsous also shared insights from their recent trips to South Sudan, on 27-29 January and 2-3 February respectively.

Two days after the briefing in consultations, a press statement on the situation in South Sudan was issued on 13 February (SC/11278), in which the Council:

- expressed support for mediation by IGAD;
- welcomed the release of seven detained political leaders and called for the release of the remaining four detainees;
- condemned violations of the 23 January ceasefire agreement and called for the progressive withdrawal of foreign forces from South Sudan;
- condemned widespread violations of human rights and humanitarian law and noted with concern the deteriorating humanitarian situation;
- condemned interference with humanitarian activities, including the looting of humanitarian property and supplies;
- condemned violations of the SOFA, demanded cooperation with UNMISS and called on the government to accept new troop contributions to UNMISS regardless of country of origin; and
- welcomed the next steps toward the formation of the AU commission of inquiry into human rights violations and the anticipated receipt of an UNMISS report on human rights.

**Key Issues**

How to improve the effectiveness of UNMISS, potentially including through modification of its mandate in the near term, is currently perhaps the central issue.

Another critically important issue concerns the IGAD-mediated peace negotiations in Addis Ababa and the Council’s possible role in facilitation of a successful outcome.

**Options**

One option would be to modify the mandate of UNMISS well ahead of its expiration on 15 July. Particular aspects that the Council may wish to consider include:

- how the mandate could be modified to reflect a de facto shift away from state capacity building and toward other priorities, including protection of civilians;
- to what extent peacekeepers will be able to extend operations beyond bases, conduct patrols and assist IGAD ceasefire monitors;
- what level of capacity in terms of troop numbers, hardware and financing would likely be required;
- how UNMISS can be equipped and staffed adequately—considering UN budget and personnel constraints—to prevent further conflict;
- how to manage deteriorating relations with the government characterised by numerous SOFA violations; and
- how best to facilitate and conduct UN human rights investigations, assist the AU commission of inquiry and contribute to national reconciliation.

Another option, although it is perhaps unlikely under the current circumstances facing South Sudan, would be to take no action in the near term regarding modification of UNMISS’s mandate.

**Council Dynamics**

Council members are united in their concern regarding the magnitude of conflict in South Sudan, particularly reports of the deliberate targeting of civilian populations. There also seems to be an increasing recognition among Council members of the need to adjust the approach of UNMISS, with greater emphasis placed on protection of civilians, maintaining humanitarian access and enabling human rights reporting. Although Council members appear to be receptive toward modification of UMISS’s mandate, the specific measures and exact timeframe remain unclear at this juncture.

The US is the penholder on South Sudan.
Expected Council Action
In March, Council members are scheduled to be briefed in consultations on Sudan-South Sudan issues and the quarterly report of the Secretary-General on the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), released 25 February (S/2014/126). As of press time, an outcome was not anticipated.

Key Recent Developments
Tensions have eased recently between Sudan and South Sudan, starting with the meeting in Juba between Presidents Omar al-Bashir of Sudan and Salva Kiir of South Sudan on 6 January. Sudan has participated in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) efforts to resolve the conflict in South Sudan, including making a commitment to support the cessation of hostilities agreement signed by the warring parties on 23 January and offering to participate in the monitoring and verification team to be deployed by IGAD in South Sudan. One issue that could complicate the improving relations between Sudan and South Sudan is the deployment of Ugandan troops in support of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Sudan, which is a member of the IGAD mediation team along with Ethiopia and Kenya, has stated its opposition to any foreign military intervention, while South Sudan has maintained its right as a sovereign state to accept military assistance from Uganda.

In their first talks since April 2013, the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) held negotiations mediated by the AU High-level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki, from 13-18 February in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The opening statements by Yasir Arman, head of the SPLM-N delegation, and Ibrahim Ahmed Ghandour, head of the government of Sudan delegation, indicated significant divergence between the two parties. Arman called for a single forum for negotiations with the Sudan Revolutionary Front, a cease-fire including not only South Kordofan and Blue Nile states but also Darfur and a national constitutional process enabling a transitional government and a democratic transformation. Ghandour emphasised that negotiations would be confined to the three issues (i.e., security, political and humanitarian) of South Kordofan and Blue Nile and that these talks should be held “concurrently and as one package”. Following several days of negotiations, Mbeki announced on 18 February that there would be a 10-day break in the talks so the parties could consult with their “principals” and further evaluate proposals offered by the AUHIP team.

Meanwhile, conflict has continued in the border states of both countries, particularly South Kordofan and Blue Nile in Sudan and Unity and Upper Nile in South Sudan. On 18 February, the defence minister of Sudan, Abdel-Rahim Mohamed Hussein, said: “We are keenest to resolve issues through dialogue and only dialogue, but if war is imposed upon us we will fight. We are ready to finish the summer campaign to end the rebellion.” Media reports also suggest that Sudanese Armed Forces have increased the intensity of aerial bombardment in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states in recent months. Across the border in South Sudan, despite the 23 January ceasefire agreement, SPLA forces on 2 February reportedly attacked the hometown of former Vice President Riek Machar in Unity state. According to analysis of imagery by the US-based NGO Satellite Sentinel Project, more than 1,000 huts were burned down. More recently, there have been numerous clashes in Upper Nile state, including a major rebel offensive launched on the state capital, Malakal, on 18 February.

Continued fighting in Sudan and South Sudan has had a substantial adverse impact on the cross-border humanitarian situation. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, as of 10 February there were nearly 25,000 refugees from South Sudan in Sudan, with the majority in White Nile state. Further complicating a complex demographic situation within the contested territory, another 2,500 to 3,000 refugees have arrived in Abyei from South Sudan. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, there are also more than 210,000 refugees from Sudan in South Sudan. Many of these refugees reside in camps that are becoming increasingly inaccessible to humanitarian actors due to worsening insecurity in South Sudan.

Council members were last briefed on Sudan-South Sudan issues in consultations on 11 February, by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous. Among other issues, Ladsous discussed the lack of recent progress implementing the 27 September 2012 agreements between Sudan and South Sudan.

On 14 February, the Council issued a press statement on Sudan and South Sudan (SC/11282). Addressing a number of significant points, the statement:

- welcomed the resumption of negotiations between the SPLM-N and the government of Sudan on 13 February;
- welcomed improved relations between Sudan and South Sudan, including within the context of participation within the IGAD;
- reiterated concern regarding the humanitarian situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states and called on all parties to refrain from attacks on civilians and to expedite the delivery of humanitarian assistance;
- demanded the withdrawal from Abyei of forces of the SPLA and personnel of the South Sudan National Police Service and reiterated a demand for the withdrawal of Sudan’s oil police; and
- urged resumption of the work of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee, establishment of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ) and implementation of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM).

Key Issues
The outcome of the AUHIP-mediated talks between Sudan and the SPLM-N is perhaps the most urgent Sudan-South Sudan issue.

There are also a number of other longer term and unresolved issues that require the sustained focus of the Council, such as the status of Abyei.

Options
One option would be for the Council to issue
Sudan and South Sudan (con’t)

a presidential statement in support of the ongoing negotiations in Addis Ababa mediated by AUHIP (Sudan) and IGAD (South Sudan). Certain Council members with political and economic leverage may also wish to consider intensifying their bi-lateral diplomatic engagement.

An alternative option would be to take a more cautious approach in deference to the lead mediation roles assumed by regional and subregional organisations.

Council Dynamics
On the one hand, as press statements require consensus, the issuance of the 14 February statement would seem to indicate a certain degree of unity among Council members on Sudan-South Sudan issues. On the other hand, as the press statement was first put under silence on 12 February and then only agreed upon after a two-day delay—at which point the AUHIP-mediated talks had already started—there also seems to be a limit to the extent to which Council members may be able to effectively work toward assisting the resolution of Sudan-South Sudan issues.

The US is the penholder on Sudan-South Sudan issues.

Sudan (Darfur)

Expected Council Action
In March, Council members are scheduled to be briefed in consultations on the report of the Secretary-General offering recommendations on improving the effectiveness of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), which is due by 28 February. It is unclear if the Council will take action in response to the report.

Key Recent Developments
The Council last addressed Darfur on 13 February with the adoption of resolution 2138, which extended for 13 months the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee (S/PV.7111). Resolution 2138 reduced the reporting requirements of the PoE from three to two reports annually: a midterm briefing due by 31 July and a final report due by 17 January 2015. Resolution 2138 also included new language on the need for Sudan to address the illicit transfer, accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons in Darfur. During consultations on 11 February, Ambassador María Cristina Perceval (Argentina), chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, briefly discussed her trip to Sudan from 20-23 January.

The final report of the PoE was transmitted to the Council on 7 February (S/2014/81). It highlights violations of the arms embargo and international humanitarian law, including the presence of recently manufactured ammunition in Darfur, aerial attacks on civilian populations and attacks on UNAMID peacekeepers. The report also discusses increasing conflict among ethnic groups in Darfur and the lack of progress in implementing the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD).

Council Dynamics
On the one hand, as press statements require consensus, the issuance of the 14 February statement would seem to indicate a certain degree of unity among Council members on Sudan-South Sudan issues. On the other hand, as the press statement was first put under silence on 12 February and then only agreed upon after a two-day delay—at which point the AUHIP-mediated talks had already started—there also seems to be a limit to the extent to which Council members may be able to effectively work toward assisting the resolution of Sudan-South Sudan issues.

The US is the penholder on Sudan-South Sudan issues.

between the conflicts in Darfur and in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states, another option would be for the Council in consultation with the AU Peace and Security Council to modify the mandate of the Joint Chief Mediator (as most recently outlined in resolution 2113) to provide more flexibility regarding the basis for future negotiations regarding Darfur (i.e., only the DDPD or perhaps a national dialogue), the parties to be included in talks (i.e., only Darfur-based groups or the Sudan Revolutionary Front) and modes for more effective coordination with other mediation processes (e.g., the AU High-level Implementation Panel).

**Council Dynamics**
Most Council members are concerned about the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in Darfur and agree that there has been a general lack of progress in implementing DDPD. Some members have also expressed concerns regarding the level of UNAMID’s achievements in relation to its cost. As of press time, it is unclear how Council members will react to specific, technical recommendations in the forthcoming report for improving UNAMID’s effectiveness.

With respect to mediation, differences seem to have emerged among Council members during negotiations over resolution 2138.

**China and Russia apparently objected to language regarding a “national political process” and favoured continued recognition of the DDPD as the basis for mediation. Other members, particularly the US, supported language regarding the need for a national dialogue and implying that the DDPD should not necessarily be the only recognised basis for future mediation.**

The UK is the penholder on UNAMID, the US is the penholder on Sudan sanctions and Argentina is chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee.

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**Sudan (Darfur) (con’t)**

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**Somalia**

**Expected Council Action**
In March, the Council will be briefed on the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) by Special Representative of the Secretary-General Nicholas Kay. The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Somalia, Mahamet Saleh Annadif, is also expected to brief the Council. The briefing is likely to be followed by consultations. Council members are also scheduled to be briefed in consultations by Ambassador Oh Joon (South Korea), chair of the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanctions Committee. Council members may also hold an informal interactive dialogue regarding the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

The modification of the arms embargo on Somalia authorised in resolution 2093 on 6 March 2013, which removed most restrictions on the importation of small arms for the intended use of the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF), is due to expire on 6 March. The Council may take action to renew these provisions in some form.

**Key Recent Developments**
Chronic insecurity continues to be prevalent throughout Somalia, including in the capital, Mogadishu. On 1 January, Al-Shabaab exploded two car bombs outside the Jazeera Hotel in Mogadishu, killing at least 10 people. On 13 February, an Al-Shabaab car bomb apparently targeting a UN convoy exploded near the airport in Mogadishu, killing at least seven people (none of the casualties were UN staff). More recently, on 21 February Al-Shabaab launched a terrorist attack on Villa Somalia, the presidential palace, in which two senior government officials, one SNSF soldier and nine attackers were killed. The Council issued press statements condemning each of these terrorist attacks (SC/11240, SC/11277 and SC/11291).

Meanwhile, Kenya and the US have launched air strikes targeting Al-Shabaab. In the first major aerial bombing undertaken by Kenya since October, fighter jets attacked a camp in the Gede region on 9 January killing more than 30 insurgents and commanders, according to the Kenyan Defence Forces. On 26 January, a US missile strike hit a moving vehicle outside the coastal town of Barawe, apparently killing a senior Al-Shabaab intelligence official, Ahmed Mohamed Ameen. Media reports suggest he had close ties to Al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane, advising on kidnapping and suicide bombings.

On 22 January, AMISOM’s troop deployment increased with the formal incorporation of 4,395 troops from the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF). The ENDF contingents are anticipated to operate in the Bakool, Bay and Gede regions. Their addition brings AMISOM’s total force strength close to the 22,126 troop ceiling authorised by the Council in resolution 2124 on 12 November 2013. However, as the ENDF were already conducting counter-insurgency operations within Somalia, their incorporation into AMISOM is effectively a re-hatting and does not seem to be a net increase in the troops available to fight Al-Shabaab.

According to the confidential mid-term report of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG), which was leaked to Reuters, there has been “high-level and systematic abuses in weapons and ammunition..."
manage the coordination for humanitarian affairs and ensure that the humanitarian consequences of protracted fighting in Somalia are quite severe. Speaking at a press briefing on 19 February after a three-day trip to Somalia, John Ging, operations director for the UN Office of the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), said two million people are coping with food insecurity in the country. Ging also noted that merely 4 percent of the $933 million in the 2014 appeal had been met thus far by donors.

Politically, Somalia has been unstable over the last several months. Donors have expressed concern regarding the resignation of the central bank governor, Yusur Abrar, in November. After only seven weeks on the job, she cited widespread corruption in the FGS as her rationale for quitting and fled the country. Forced migration also continues to be an acute problem. According to OCHA data, more than one million people are internally displaced, and there are more than one million Somali refugees in nearby countries. Geng also noted that merely 4 percent of the $933 million in the 2014 appeal had been met thus far by donors.

Key Issues
In March, the most immediate issue for the Council’s consideration is the modified arms embargo, whose partial suspension is due to expire on 6 March.

More broadly, the Council will likely be focused on assessing UNSOM and AMISOM, particularly regarding what impact changes to the mandate of the latter (i.e., an increase in the troop ceiling and further mechanisms for financial support) that were authorised on 12 November might have on the effectiveness of the former.

Options
One option is for the Council to renew the provisions that modified the arms embargo prior to their expiration on 6 March, thus enabling the uninterrupted importation of small arms by the FGS as delineated in resolution 2093.

Another option is for the Council to renew modification of the arms embargo while also including substantial additional language imposing tighter monitoring, reporting and regulatory requirements on the FGS for importing small arms.

A third option is to take no action prior to 6 March, in which case the provisions of resolution 2093 related to modification of the arms embargo would expire and the prior (i.e., more comprehensive) arms embargo would be reinstated.

Council and Wider Dynamics
There is likely to be backing for renewal of modification of the arms embargo among key allies of the FGS within the Council, particularly the US and the UK, although the mid-term report of the SEMG does raise difficult and important issues regarding corruption and the ability of the FGS to regulate small arms transfers. Certain Council members who had privately expressed reservations regarding resolution 2093 (although it passed unanimously) may raise these points once again. The most likely outcome would seem to be renewing modification of the arms embargo among key allies of the FGS within the Council, particularly the US and the UK, although the mid-term report of the SEMG does raise difficult and important issues regarding corruption and the ability of the FGS to regulate small arms transfers. Certain Council members who had privately expressed reservations regarding resolution 2093 (although it passed unanimously) may raise these points once again. The most likely outcome would seem to be renewing modification of the arms embargo among key allies of the FGS within the Council, particularly the US and the UK, although the mid-term report of the SEMG does raise difficult and important issues regarding corruption and the ability of the FGS to regulate small arms transfers. Certain Council members who had privately expressed reservations regarding resolution 2093 (although it passed unanimously) may raise these points once again.

In terms of the evolving relations among
Somalia (con’t)

the FGS, AU and the UN, developments over the last few months have been mixed at best. Resolution 2124, with an increase in the AMISOM troop ceiling and related provisions for military hardware and better financing, undoubtedly improved relations between the Council and the AU Peace and Security Council with respect to policymaking on Somalia. However, interaction between the FGS and the AU has been characterised by complicated dynamics, particularly with key troop contributors to AMISOM such as Ethiopia and Kenya, whose own national interests can also conflict with Somalia’s (e.g. power struggles over the port city of Kismayo and past disputes between SNSF and ENDF).

Likewise, relations between the FGS and the international community have deteriorated, with longstanding concerns regarding corruption and the governance capacity of the FGS resurfacing. The optimism characterising backers of the FGS as recently as the EU donor conference last September seems to have dissipated.

The UK is the penholder on Somalia, the US is the penholder on piracy and the Republic of Korea is the chair of the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanctions Committee.

Central African Republic

Expected Council Action
In March, the Council will be briefed on the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Secretary-General’s report on the possible transformation of the African-led International Support Mission in the CAR (MISCA) into a UN peacekeeping operation. The Council may also be briefed by Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos on her recent visit to the CAR. The Council may adopt a resolution establishing a peacekeeping mission in the CAR and providing further support for the existing forces.

Also in March, at the initiative of France, Council members may hold an “Arria formula” meeting with religious leaders from the CAR, co-chaired by Chad and France.

The mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the CAR (BINUCA) expires on 31 January 2015.

Key Recent Developments
Since the Séléka uprising, culminating in the 24 March 2013 ousting of President François Bozizé, the CAR has fallen into a state of lawlessness, with a complete breakdown in state authority and a growing humanitarian crisis. The situation worsened despite the deployment of MISCA and Opération Sangaris by French forces, as authorised in resolution 2127. On 28 January, the Council renewed BINUCA for 12 months and authorised an EU mission to the CAR for six months for the protection of civilians in cooperation with the international forces on the ground (S/RES/2134).

According to media reports, the first soldiers of the EU force to the CAR, authorised by resolution 2134, will arrive in March. The force will aim to secure an area in Bangui for humanitarian work and is expected to consist of up to 1,000 troops. On 14 February, France announced that it would strengthen its 1,600-troop operation by an additional 400 troops.

Thousands are estimated to have been killed since last March, and some 833,000 people have been internally displaced across the country. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) reported on 12 February an additional 268,779 people seeking refuge in Cameroon, Chad, Congo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Half of the 4.6 million population is reportedly in need of humanitarian assistance. Since the resignation of interim President Michel Djotodia on 10 January, there has been an increase in violence against Muslims, who comprise roughly 15 percent of the population. The Christian anti-balaka militias have increased their attacks on Muslims, as have mobs of civilians who have carried out gruesome killings of Muslims in recent weeks. As a result, thousands of Muslims have been fleeing to the north, where most of the Muslim population resides. Guterres said the situation was a “humanitarian catastrophe of unspeakable proportions. Massive ethno-religious cleansing is continuing”.

In a letter to the Secretary-General of 27 January, the CAR foreign minister, Léonie Banga-Bothy, wrote that her country faces several challenges, including the need to establish state authority, prepare for elections and build state institutions, including police, gendarmerie, customs, the justice system and social services.

In his briefing to the Council on UN-EU cooperation on 14 February, the Secretary-General stated that there is a crucial opportunity to fortify the collective efforts of the UN, AU and EU in the CAR (S/PV.7112). He added that he would return to the Council with recommendations for containing and then ending this crisis.

The Council was briefed on 20 February on the situation in the CAR by the Secretary-General and Smail Chergui, the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security (S/PV.7116). This was followed by an interactive dialogue session between Council members and Chergui and the head of MISCA, Major General Jean-Marie Mokoko. The Secretary-General stated during the briefing that religious violence is causing a de-facto partition of the country between Christians and Muslims. He noted that in his upcoming report on the possible transformation of MISCA into a UN peacekeeping mission, in accordance with resolution 2127 (due by 5 March) he will present an outline for the deployment
of a UN peacekeeping mission for the protection of civilians and promotion of stability. But as a UN mission will take months to deploy, he presented an urgent six point plan:

- rapid reinforcement of troops on the ground (noting that the AU is willing to consider further deployment on top of the additional French and EU troops due to arrive);
- a coordinated command for these forces;
- a logistical support package to MISCA;
- support for the government to establish basic state authority;
- expediting reconciliation and the political process; and
- more funding for humanitarian aid.

Chergui asked the Council to approve a support package that will allow MISCA to successfully stabilise the CAR and lay the groundwork for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission.

On 21 February, while briefing Council members in consultations, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman reiterated the urgency of the situation. Most Council members were in agreement that the Council should take action soon in accordance with the six point.

ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced on 7 February that the Court will open a preliminary investigation into crimes that have allegedly been committed in the CAR by various groups.

In sanctions-related developments, on 6 February, the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee, established on 5 December 2013, held an exchange of views on the implementation of the arms embargo with countries from the region. On 13 February, the Secretary-General, after consulting with the members of the Committee, appointed the Panel of Experts. The chair, Ambassador Raimonda Murmokaitė (Lithuania) briefed the Council on the work of the Committee on 21 February.

The new chair of the CAR Peacebuilding configuration, Ambassador Mohamed Loulichki (Morocco), intends to visit the country in early March. In the meeting of the configuration on 19 February, the World Bank pledged 100 million dollars for projects in the CAR and an additional 150 million for infrastructure. Amos visited the CAR from 18-20 February. She expressed shock at the atrocities taking place and stressed the need to send more troops to provide security.

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 11 February, the spokesperson for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rupert Colville, said that the security situation in Bangui continued to deteriorate, with targeted assassinations, increased violence and criminality on the streets. Colville recounted the 9 February events: the assassination of a member of the National Transitional Council, Jean-Emmanuel Ndjaroua; the looting of houses of Seleka ministers; and the attack against two magistrates. Colville also said that UN human rights staff in the CAR conducted a mission to Boda following the killing of 92 people on religious grounds between 30 January and 5 February. He expressed concern at the climate of complete impunity in the country.

During its 25th session in March, the Human Rights Council will consider a report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation in the CAR (A/HRC/25/43) and the report of the working group on the Universal Periodic Review on the country (A/HRC/25/11).

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is to develop and sustain a hands-on approach towards the CAR. This may entail authorising a UN peacekeeping mission in the near future.

A related issue is providing effective support to MISCA and the other international forces so they can restore security in the country immediately.

Another issue is ensuring that BINUCA can fulfil its mandate in light of the dire security situation, including as a possible civilian component of a future UN peacekeeping mission.

An additional issue is ensuring that the transitional political process, now under new leadership, moves forward successfully.

Options
Options for the Council include:

- establishing a peacekeeping operation and transforming BINUCA into its civilian component with an emphasis on establishing law and order;
- authorising further support for the above forces in the meantime, in accordance with the Secretary-General’s plan;
- issuing a presidential or press statement in lieu of a resolution and in light of further developments and challenges, to express the Council’s commitment to help solve the continuing crisis;
- undertaking a Council visiting mission; and
- listing individuals for violations of the criteria set out under resolution 2134, either by the Council or in the Committee.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Since the Council adopted resolution 2127, the possibility of establishing a UN peacekeeping operation continues to be the main topic of discussion among Council members. In previous discussions, Russia, the US and the African Council members took the position that MISCA and the other international forces should be given time to fulfil their mandates and restore security in the CAR, while close attention should be paid to ensuring the success of the transitional political process. The AU, on which a UN peacekeeping mission would likely be dependent for troops, also maintained that the establishment of a UN mission should wait.

Among the points raised by some Council members against creating a UN peacekeeping mission are budgetary concerns and questions about whether such a mission is the appropriate response to stabilise the CAR at this juncture, as the situation still requires a more robust peace enforcement response. Other members view the situation as necessitating a robust law-and-order mandate in lieu of state authority, rather than peace enforcement.

In view of the Secretary-General’s upcoming report, and in light of the rapidly deteriorating situation on the ground, it seems that there is growing openness to a UN peacekeeping mission and a growing consensus that Council action on the CAR is needed in the immediate future, as any UN mission would take several months to become operational.

France is the penholder on the CAR.
Democratic Republic of the Congo

Expected Council Action
In March, the Security Council will be briefed on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), Martin Kobler. The Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region, Mary Robinson, will also brief on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region (PSC Framework).

The Council is also expected to renew MONUSCO’s mandate, which expires on 31 March, for another year.

Key Recent Developments
The Council has demonstrated renewed engagement with the DRC in recent months as dramatic developments occurred on the ground.

In a 13 January briefing (S/PV.7094), Kobler reported to the Council on the situation in the DRC and the latest MONUSCO report (S/2013/757). Robinson also briefed on her activities and the latest report on the implementation of the PSC Framework (S/2013/773).

The chair of the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein (Jordan), briefed the Council on 23 January on the Group of Experts (GoE) final report (S/2014/42). The Committee met with the GoE to discuss the report and their recommendations on 17 January.

The Council unanimously renewed the DRC sanctions regime and the mandate of the GoE on 30 January (S/RES/2136). However, after the adoption, Ambassador Eugène-Richard Gasana (Rwanda) stated in relation to the GoE “that the use of a United Nations sanctioned and funded mechanism to launch deliberate attacks against States...by making grave, unsubstantiated and damaging accusations without any credible evidence is totally unacceptable”.

Ambassador Ignace Lufuta (DRC) accused both Rwanda and Uganda of violating their commitments by assisting the 23 March (M23) rebel group. Gasana replied that the DRC should “stop whining every time it comes before the Council and...stop bash[ing] Rwanda”.

After the military success of the Forces armées de la république démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and the MONUSCO intervention brigade against the M23, an agreement between the M23 and the DRC was signed in Nairobi on 12 December 2013. The DRC agreed to grant amnesty to those M23 members who are only accused of taking up arms, and the M23 is to disarm and become a political party. At press time, close to 1,300 M23 members were still awaiting their fate in a camp in Uganda. On 12 February, DRC President Joseph Kabila declared amnesty for acts of insurgency and political offences committed up to 20 December 2013.

While there have been some encouraging developments with respect to stabilising specific areas in North Kivu and the surrender of 8,000 rebels who are awaiting reintegration, other rebel groups (estimated at about 40 in total) continue to operate and wreak havoc on civilians.

In a recent attack in Masisi territory, North Kivu, in late January and early February, Mai-Mai rebels are believed to have used machetes to execute 70 civilians in three villages that were subsequently burnt to the ground.

On 18 February, MONUSCO announced it would reinforce its presence in Katanga. More than 400,000 people have been displaced, and Mai-Mai rebels have burnt down more than 60 villages in the region since September 2013.

The FARDC has been engaged in fighting the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)—a Ugandan Islamist rebel group—in North Kivu since January. According to the DRC, 22 FARDC soldiers and 230 ADF rebels have been killed in the fighting thus far. Kobler has identified the ADF as a priority for MONUSCO, along with the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), a Hutu rebel group.

Human Rights-Related Developments
During its 25th session in March, the Human Rights Council will hold a high-level dialogue on the lessons learned from and the continuing challenges in combating sexual violence in the DRC to allow countries in conflict and post-conflict situations share their experiences.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is to renew MONUSCO’s mandate, including the intervention brigade with modified tasks to focus more specifically on the ADF, FDLR and Mai-Mai groups.

A continuing issue is maintaining engagement with the DRC to closely oversee MONUSCO, in particular the transition of its operations from western to eastern DRC and the operations of the intervention brigade.

Another key issue is to ensure the implementation of the PSC Framework at the national and regional levels.

Options
Options for the Council include:
• renewing MONUSCO’s mandate, including the mandate of the intervention brigade;
• specifying the tasks of the intervention brigade to address threats posed by specific armed groups, such as the ADF and the FDLR; and
• calling on MONUSCO to further expand the transition of its activities to the east.

Council Dynamics
Council members are hopeful that the recent military achievements against the M23 will be followed by a political process. Several Council members are of the view that at this point much focus should be given to national reforms, the reintegration of former rebels and the establishment of state authority.

Council members are in general agreement that the intervention brigade, though it only engaged directly with the M23 on a few occasions, played a significant role in the FARDC’s military success against the M23. This success, along with the lack of progress...
Democratic Republic of the Congo (con’t)

Liberia

Expected Council Action

In March, the Council expects a briefing by Karin Landgren, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) on the Secretary-General’s report that will include an update on UNMIL’s ongoing reconfiguration. Ambassador Staffan Tillander (Sweden), chair of the Liberia configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), will also brief the Council following his recent visit to the country. The briefing will likely be followed by consultations.

The mandate of UNMIL expires on 30 September. No outcome is expected.

Key Recent Developments

In resolution 2128, adopted on 10 December 2013, the Council took steps to scale back the Liberia sanctions while renewing the sanctions regime for another year. Changes were made to notification requirements on arms transfers and military assistance, and the resolution directed the 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee to review designated individuals and entities over the next three months and delist those that do not pose a threat to the country anymore. The mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) was changed to no longer include monitoring of natural resources. It additionally specified that a review of the sanctions would occur in six months “with a view to further modifying or lifting all” the sanctions.

The Committee delisted Benoni Urey from the asset freeze and travel ban sanctions on 23 December. Urey had been commissioner of maritime affairs under former President Charles Taylor. On 26 December, Urey announced that he would run for president in 2017.

A survey measuring public perceptions of corruption, conducted by the National Integrity Forum was released on December 19. It found that people believe corruption in Liberia remains widespread, particularly in government services, such as civil protection, health and education. The judiciary ranked as having the highest perceived levels of bribery.

Forty prisoners escaped from the Voinjama Prison in Lofa County on 18 December. Also in Lofa County, approximately 300 residents forcibly entered on 4 January a police station, beating a murder suspect and reportedly stealing four weapons.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations conducted a strategic review of UNMIL and the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire from 7-19 February to assess their military and police components. The review intends to make recommendations for enhanced coordination and cooperation between the two peacekeeping operations, including the development of a UNOCI quick-reaction force that could support UNMIL if security issues arise during its ongoing drawdown. (Resolution 2116, adopted on 18 September 2013, authorised UNMIL to reduce its military component by 1,129 personnel between October 2013 and September 2014 during the second phase of its three-year drawdown plan, which will leave the operation with approximately 5,550 soldiers and police by July 2015.)

The latest Liberia PoE report revealed that the Bureau of Operational Intelligence of the Ministry of the Interior of Côte d’Ivoire has been paying Liberian mercenaries to not launch attacks against Côte d’Ivoire (no new cross-border attacks have been reported since March 2013) (S/2013/683). It also described a lack of coordination between both countries as highlighted by the detention of a Côte d’Ivoire delegation and a UNOCI staff member in Liberia on 23 May 2013. The delegation and UNOCI individual had crossed into Liberia, without informing authorities, to raise awareness among Ivorian militia commanders about a resettlement program to return to Côte d’Ivoire.

A trial in Monrovia of 18 Liberians accused of participating in cross-border attacks in western Côte d’Ivoire, including an attack that killed seven UN peacekeepers on 8 June 2012, was suspended by the judge in early January for security reasons.

The UN High Commission for Refugees accused Liberia of violating international law when it deported to Côte d’Ivoire 14 Ivorian registered refugees in the early morning of 17 February. The men, who had been arrested in southeast Liberia, were suspected of involvement in cross-border attacks.

Developments in the Peacebuilding Commission

From 2-7 February, Tillander visited Liberia and met with President Ellen Sirleaf Johnson and other government officials and stakeholders to discuss ways to accelerate progress in national reconciliation, justice and security. Among other things, more dedicated financial resources from the government are required. Progress has also been slowed by its limited implementation capacity. Tillander also attended a workshop of the Gbargna justice and security hub (created to increase access to justice and security services in the historically neglected interior). Achievements and difficulties with the hub were reviewed to provide lessons for the next two hubs, which are due to become operational over the next year.

Tillander also held discussions with the government, local community groups and business representatives following his communication with the Sanctions Committee on several of the PoE’s recommendations in its final report on natural resource management and land-related issues.

Key Issues

A key issue will be progress in the drawdown of UNMIL and efforts by Liberia to fill the gaps where peacekeepers have left, the latter
of which is viewed as moving too slowly.

Another issue is the slow deployment of the regional justice hubs outside Monrovia.

Members will look forward to learning more about the strategic review conducted by DPKO.

Improving border security management is another issue, in particular with Côte d’Ivoire but also with Sierra Leone and Guinea, where mercenaries and ex-combatants reportedly cross and which are vulnerable to arms and drug trafficking.

Regarding sanctions, their upcoming review will be an important issue for the Council. Related to it are the plans Liberia has to strengthen safeguards for controlling arms if the sanctions are reduced further. The expectation that the US will soon provide the Sanctions Committee with recommendations for additional delistings is a further related issue.

Concerns about land rights, natural resource management, corruption and youth unemployment are ongoing issues.

Preparations for the October senatorial elections in which 15 of 30 Senate seats are up for election, will be a further issue of interest for the Council.

**Options**

The Council could receive the briefing and take no action or issue a press statement calling on the government to accelerate the assumption of security responsibilities, national reconciliation and completion of the justice hubs (this is a less likely option).

**Council Dynamics**

Council members are largely in agreement on Liberia and implementing UNMIL's drawdown.

Differences exist among members over the winding down of the sanctions regime. For the forthcoming sanctions review, France, the UK and the US are keen to see the regime scaled back further or lifted entirely. Other members oppose this, a position they say is supported by findings and recommendations in the PoE reports.

The US is the penholder on Liberia.

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**Sierra Leone**

**Expected Council Action**

The Security Council expects a briefing in March on Sierra Leone. Jens Anders Toiberg-Frandzen, Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPISIL), is expected to brief the Council for the last time before the mission’s mandate ends on 31 March. Ambassador Guillermo Rishchynski (Canada), chair of the Sierra Leone configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), is also expected to address the Council.

The Council may adopt a presidential or press statement.

**Key Recent Developments**

When the Council considered Sierra Leone on 18 September 2013, Council members focused on progress in the drawdown of UNIPISIL and the transition of its tasks to the UN country team. Toiberg-Frandzen reported that the drawdown was progressing according to schedule. He described general stability in Sierra Leone, while noting ongoing challenges (S/PV.7034).

On 26 September 2013, the Special Court for Sierra Leone rejected former Liberian President Charles Taylor’s appeal, which the Council welcomed in a press statement (SC/11133). Taylor was transferred to a prison in the UK, where he will serve a 50-year sentence. The Special Court closed on 31 December, and the Residual Court for Sierra Leone took over on 1 January after its 16 judges were sworn in on 2 December in Freetown.

The public works minister and director of the roads authority were dismissed on 19 October, and on 18 February the energy minister was fired due to criticism of the state of the public infrastructure and recent power outages, sectors which President Ernest Bai Koroma had prioritised in the 2008 peacebuilding strategy, *Agenda for Change*.

Parliament adopted the Right to Access Information Act on 29 October, which Koroma signed into law several days later, requiring the government to establish a plan for making records publicly available. Conversely, the criminal libel law was used to arrest, charge with sedition and jail on 18 October two journalists of the *Independent Observer* who criticised Koroma. They were released on 4 November after posting bail of 500 million Leones ($115,000) each. According to Reporters Without Borders, which has expressed concern over the libel law, in total seven journalists have been arrested since October.

The opposition Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) and civil society groups condemned constitutional amendments from 19 November that lifted the requirement that the Speaker of Parliament be a high court judge. They claimed that the changes pre-empted the work of the Constitutional Review Committee. Despite the protestations, Parliament elected Sheku Dumbuya of the incumbent All People’s Congress (APC) as the new speaker on 21 January. A member of the Constitutional Review Committee, Dr. Omoide Jones, resigned the next day.

A court ruling on 27 November awarded parliamentary seats to APC candidates in two constituencies in the southeast of the country. The candidates received only 10 percent of the vote in those districts during the 17 November 2012 elections. The decision was made on a legal technicality that disqualified the SLPP candidates. With the ruling, the APC is one seat shy of a two-thirds majority in the Parliament, the vote needed, followed by a referendum, to amend the constitution.

Economically motivated unrest continued. On 10 December police fired on protestors upset about the expansion of palm oil plantations in southern Pujehun province. A government committee was established to investigate landowners’ grievances in the district.


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UN DOCUMENTS ON SIERRA LEONE Security Council Resolution S/RES/2097 (26 March 2013) renewed the mandate of UNIPISIL until 31 March 2014. Security Council Press Statement SC/1133 (27 September 2013) welcomed the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s rejection of Charles Taylor’s appeal. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.7034 (18 September 2013) was the Council’s last meeting on Sierra Leone.
Rights Abuses in Sierra Leone’s Mining Boom,” documents violations of workers’ and local communities’ rights by African Minerals Limited, the largest employer in Sierra Leone, and the government’s failure to address complaints and enforce its labour laws.

Developments in the Peacebuilding Commission
A PBC assessment mission visited Sierra Leone between 18-22 November, in line with a request in resolution 2097 that the PBC “review its engagement with a view to scaling down its role”. In its report, the assessment mission recommended that the PBC reduce its engagement and be “more reactive” through monitoring developments while maintaining the ability to advocate for resources in specific cases. In March 2015, the PBC should review this new, lighter approach.

Rishchynskii visited Sierra Leone from 25 February to 2 March to discuss the proposal with the government and gain its agreement.

Human Rights-Related Developments
During its 25th session in March, the Human Rights Council will consider the report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, on his mission to Sierra Leone from 30 June to 5 July 2013 (A/HRC/25/58/ Add.1). Bielefeldt identified serious challenges including harassment and persecution of persons suspected of “witchcraft” and harmful practices such as female genital mutilation. He called upon religious leaders to speak out publicly against these practices.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council will be to confirm that the transition of remaining tasks (supporting political dialogue and the constitutional review, security sector reform and human rights) to the UN Country Team or government is on track to be completed by 31 March, under the terms of resolution 2097. In this context, members will be interested to receive an update on the constitutional review, which started on 30 July and is planned to take two years.

An ongoing issue, to be carried over by the UK and UNDP, will be the security sector reform where work is still required in the training and professionalising of the police.

Underlying Problems
Despite UNIPSIL’s end, Sierra Leone will continue to face challenges. Corruption is widespread and there is low public confidence in the government. Tensions between and within political parties is a potential source of instability.

Concerns remain over natural-resource management and the environment, land rights, youth unemployment and, increasingly, drug trafficking and organised crime. Some of these are problems common to peacebuilding. Others are viewed as underlying causes of the civil war.

The interconnectedness of the Manu River Union states (Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire) means that fragility in one country can impact others. Building up border security capability to deal with illicit trafficking and the movement of mercenaries and ex-combatants remains a need.

Options
The Council could take no action or issue a presidential statement congratulating Sierra Leone and UNIPSIL on the completion of the mission’s work.

Council Dynamics
All members consider that the time is right for the end of UNIPSIL.

During the negotiations on resolution 2097, the UK, the penholder on Sierra Leone, initially proposed that PBC engagement with Sierra Leone end at the same time as UNIPSIL. Some members were more cautious and the recent PBC assessment mission, in which the UK participated, should quell most discussion on this issue.

Libya

Expected Council Action
In March, the Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). Tarek Mitri, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNSMIL, is expected to brief the Council on the Secretary-General’s latest report.

The Council will also likely renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee and the Council expects a briefing by its chair, Ambassador Eugène-Richard Gasana (Rwanda).

The mandates of UNSMIL and the PoE expire on 16 March and 14 April, respectively.

Key Recent Developments
In a 16 December 2013 presidential statement, the Council expressed its “grave concern at the worsening security situation and political divisions” in Libya. Armed clashes between Tabu and Tuareg groups and militias associated with the former Qaddafi regime in the southern city of Sabha have resulted in more than 120 casualties since mid-January. On 18 January, the General National Congress (GNC) declared a state of emergency in the south.

Political leaders and security force members continue to be targeted. The Deputy Industry Minister was killed in Sirte on 11 January and Deputy Prime Minister al-Sidiq Abdelkarim survived an assassination attempt on 29 January. The disruption of oil production by federalist regional leaders seeking to profit from the oil trade in the east and clashes between rival militias that resulted in the closure of oil facilities and power stations seriously impacted the economy and produced water and electricity shortages in the Cyrenaica region and its capital, Benghazi.

The lack of stability in the country has sparked anti-government protests. On 14 January, armed protestors attacked the GNC, demanding Prime Minister Ali Zeidan’s resignation. On 21 January, the Islamist Justice
and Construction Party pulled its five ministers from the cabinet. There have been several attempts to pass a motion of no-confidence at the GNC, but they have fallen short of support among members. On 14 February, Major General Khalifa Haftar, a leading figure in the 2011 revolution, announced a coup against the government, which was denied by the government the same day. On 18 February, militias from Zintan gave the GNC a five-hour ultimatum to dissolve that was not finally upheld.

Deadlock in the GNC over the roadmap for the transition process and popular protests as a result of its inaction have fueled political divisions. In the last two months, UNSMIL held five consultative meetings with political factions to alleviate divisions. Consensus was not reached, and on 16 February, members of the GNC, whose mandate some believed was set to expire by 7 February, extended it until the end of the year and agreed on early elections. (On 3 February, the GNC had revised the roadmap for the transition providing for the approval of amendments to the Constitutional Declaration and a new election law in case the 60-member Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA) is unable to complete its work within four months. CDA elections had to be held in two rounds on 20 and 26 February because violent incidents prevented electoral material from reaching some polling stations.)

Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi, whose case was referred to the ICC in resolution 1970, remains in jail in Zintan, held by a militia despite repeated calls by the court for his surrender. In an 11 October 2013 decision, Pre-Trial Chamber I concluded that the case against former intelligence chief Abdullah Al-Senussi, also referred by resolution 1970, was being investigated by Libya, thus making it inadmissible before the ICC. (Al-Senussi’s counsel appealed the decision.) A decision from the Pre-Trial Chamber on a request for a “finding of non-compliance” for the non-surrender of Qaddafi is now expected. Such a finding might result in the re-referral of the case to the Security Council to ensure compliance by Libya.

The final report of the PoE was circulated to Council members on 15 February. The report identifies the proliferation of weapons to and from Libya as a major challenge for the stability of the country and the region given that “most weapons are still under the control of non-state armed actors and border control systems remain ineffective”.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

On 18 February, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) called on the GNC to reconsider two recent legislative amendments: a revision to the Penal Code imposing prison sentences on any person “undermining the February 17 revolution” or “publicly insulting one of the legislative, executive or judicial authorities” and a regulation authorising relevant ministries to take necessary measures to discontinue and prevent the broadcasting of satellite channels that are deemed hostile to the revolution. The OHCHR pointed out that the February 17 revolution, whose third anniversary was celebrated the day before, had included a guarantee of freedom of expression and opinion among its key goals. Furthermore, the OHCHR condemned recent cases of reported violence and intimidation against members of the media and called for investigations into these attacks.

**Key Issues**

An overarching issue is the deteriorating security situation due to the existence of militias that challenge the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. The fragility of the government and the continual threats against the GNC are related issues.

Breaking the stalemate in the political process and ensuring the swift work of the CDA is a key issue. Ensuring the inclusivity of the entire political process is a related issue. (Tabu, Amazigh and Tuareg groups boycotted the elections for the CDA in late February.)

A pressing issue is ensuring the protection of UNSMIL staff so it can carry out its mandate. (A 21 November 2013 letter from the Secretary-General recommended the establishment of a guard unit consisting of up to 235 military personnel to protect UN facilities and personnel in Tripoli. The Council took note of this arrangement in a 27 November 2013 letter [S/2013/705].)

Addressing the highly diversified range of arms trafficking to and from Libya—which include state-sponsored traffic by air and traffic by terrorist and criminal entities by land and sea to neighbouring countries—as stated in the PoE report is a key issue. Ensuring proper transfer of military materiel to the government through centralised oversight, more clarity regarding focal points for military procurement and enhanced capacity to secure stockpiles, is a related issue.

**Options**

Options for the Council include adapting UNSMIL’s mandate to the current security situation and prioritising key tasks within its broad mandate, such as:

- stressing the good offices role of the Secretary-General and the facilitation and provision of technical support to the upcoming constitution-drafting and electoral processes;
- highlighting the importance of sufficient funding for UNSMIL’s work on counter-illicit proliferation of arms and disposing of ammunition through the UN Mine Action Services.

Regarding the mandate of the PoE, the Council could incorporate some of the recommendations in the report such as:

- clarifying the mechanisms by which frozen assets are disposed of; and
- calling on the government to ensure clearer procurement procedures for military materiel and more precise end-user certificates.

Although unlikely, the Council could impose sanctions against armed militias and other spoilers that significantly undermine state authority and its monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

**Council Dynamics**

Although the deterioration of the security situation and the fragility of the political transition are sources of common concern for Council members, considerable differences arise when identifying causes for the current sources of instability in Libya and their regional impact. Council members also differ on the tone to use in Libya-related outcomes. (The particular order of sentences within a paragraph—with the idea that the first sentence of every paragraph sets its tone—and the order of the paragraphs within the statement were thoroughly discussed in the negotiation of the 16 December 2013 presidential statement.)

The UK is the penholder on Libya.
Yemen

Expected Council Action
In March, the Council expects a briefing on Yemen by Jamal Benomar, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General. This will be his first briefing after the adoption of resolution 2140 on 26 February, which expressed the Council’s strong support for the next steps of the political transition and established sanctions against individuals or entities that the 2140 Sanctions Committee determines to be engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen.

The mandate of the Special Adviser on Yemen was renewed on 12 June 2013 without an expiration date. Current sanctions expire one year after the adoption of the resolution.

Key Recent Developments
On 21 January, the members of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) finally agreed on a Document of the National Comprehensive Dialogue. This outcome document endorses the federal structure of the state, and provides for the creation of a constitution-drafting commission to build on the generally agreed principles by the nine working groups of the NDC. On the southern issue, following a 23 December 2013 agreement on the creation of a federal state, a 22-member commission appointed by President Abdo Rabbud Mansour Hadi decided on the federal structure of the state, comprising six regions, with two regions in the south and four in the north.

The security situation in the country continues to be precarious. A truce was reached in early February between Salafist groups and the Zaidi Shi'a Houthis in Dammaj and other parts of the Sa'da's Arhab and Amran governorates. Since October 2013, these clashes left hundreds dead or injured and resulted in thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs), mainly non-local Salafists. Ongoing unrest persists in the eastern Hadramout governorate, where armed tribesmen have been fighting with the government since December 2013. This unrest has had a negative impact on oil production, with crude oil exports declining by 23.8 percent in 2013 according to the Central Bank.

Since December 2013, there have been reports of fighting between government forces and a local secessionist movement in the southern governorate of al-Dhale’e. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has described unconfirmed reports of indiscriminate shelling in al-Dhale’e, including of civilian infrastructure, resulting in civilian deaths. The Humanitarian Country Team members, who estimate 3,150 people have been displaced by the conflict, have not been granted access to al-Dhale’e due to security concerns. An armed assault, on 13 February on a prison in Sana’a resulted in the freeing of at least 14 inmates believed to be members of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

In consultations on 28 January, Benomar briefed Council members on the remarkable achievement of the NDC in agreeing on the only negotiated transition in the context of the Arab Spring. Benomar also reported on the systematic pattern of obstruction to the transition process, which could plunge the country into chaos if the threat is not removed soon. On 26 February the Council adopted a resolution expressing its strong support for completing the next steps of the transition, in line with the Implementation Mechanism, including the drafting of a new constitution, the adoption of a new electoral law, the holding of a referendum and general elections and the transition of the structure of the state from unitary to federal. The resolution established a sanctions regime, a sanctions committee and a four-member panel of experts and included among the designation criteria undermining the successful completion of the political transition, impeding the implementation of the final report of the NDC or being responsible for human rights abuses in Yemen. The resolution stops short of listing anyone (even though former President Ali Abdullah Saleh or former Vice-President Ali Salim Al-Beidh were named in a 15 February 2013 presidential statement in the context of the Council’s expressing its readiness to impose sanctions). The Council also expressed its concern over reported serious human rights abuses and violence against civilians in both the northern and southern governorates, including al-Dhale’e.

The 2014 Humanitarian Response Plan developed by OCHA highlights how an estimated 58.3 percent of Yemen’s population—or 14.7 million people—are in need of humanitarian aid. The vulnerable population includes some 306,600 IDPs, 147,500 migrants from the Horn of Africa and 228,900 returnees. The crisis is exacerbated by the security situation, the difficulties of humanitarian access, insufficient funding, lack of service delivery in areas of return, the increasing prices of basic items (90 percent of food is imported) and endemic poverty.

OCHA issued a Consolidated Appeal for 2014 of $592 million.

Human Rights-Related Developments
Following the 29 January review of Yemen, the Human Rights Council’s working group of the Universal Periodic Review adopted a report on 31 January (A/HRC/26/8). Some 166 recommendations formulated during the interactive dialogue received Yemen’s support while another 25 recommendations will be examined by Yemen before June.

Key Issues
Helping ensure the stability of the Hadi government in the transition process and ensuring the solidifying of the results of the National Dialogue is the key issue for the Council.

Preventing spoilers from further obstructing the political process is a closely related issue.

Promoting the inclusivity of the constitution-drafting process and preparing for the general elections are key issues in the upcoming period.

Immediate issues for the Council include the precarious security situation, the presence of AQAP and persistent violent clashes among tribal groups. Funding and supply of weapons from regional actors are closely related issues.

The bleak humanitarian situation—including widespread food insecurity, the challenges for IDPs, returnees and refugees and limited humanitarian access—are ongoing issues.

Options
Options for the Council include:

UN DOCUMENTS ON YEMEN Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2140 (25 February 2014) expressed the Council’s strong support for the next steps of the political transition and established sanctions against those threatening the peace, security or stability of Yemen. S/RES/2051 (12 June 2012) focused on the second phase of the transition and expressed readiness to consider further measures, including under Article 41. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2013/3 (15 February 2013) welcomed the announcement of the launch of the NDC. Security Council Press Statements SC/11922 (5 December 2013) condemned a terrorist attack in Sana’a. SC/11955 (27 November 2013) reiterated Council members’ concern over continuing reports of interference by those intent on disrupting, delaying or derailing the transition process and undermining the government. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.7037 (27 September 2013) was a public briefing by Benomar, the Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Foreign Minister of Yemen.
Yemen (con’t)

- receiving a briefing and taking no action; or
- issuing a statement urging the government to form the commission formally established in 2012 to address human rights violations related to the events of 2011 and, as per the NDC final document, a Transitional Justice Commission to address past abuses, lessons learnt, ensure the reparation to the victims and helping to establish an all-inclusive historical narrative.

In the Sanctions Committee, a key option is to move towards targeting former President Saleh and former Vice-President Al-Beidh with sanctions.

Council Dynamics
Council members have shown a high degree of convergence regarding the situation in Yemen. They are aware of the importance of the political transition in Yemen at a critical moment for other transition processes in the region and highlight the close cooperation with regional organisations, the constructive discussions within the Council and cost-effective UN engagement.

However, during the negotiation on the resolution, Council members could not agree on the imposition of sanctions specifically on Saleh and Al-Beidh. Leaving this matter to the Sanctions Committee was the accepted compromise. Although Hadi had made known his preference for the imposition of sanctions, it seems other factions within the government were wary of the consequences such a move could have on the stability of the transition.

The UK is the penholder on Yemen.

Lebanon

Expected Council Action
In November, Special Coordinator for Lebanon Derek Plumbly and Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet will brief Council members in consultations on the Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of resolution 1701, which called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006.

The mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) expires on 31 August.

Key Recent Developments
The report is likely to highlight continuing cross-border incidents in which violations of the Blue Line—the UN demarcated line between Israel and Lebanon—were made by both sides, including violations of Lebanese airspace by Israeli drones and aircraft. Continuing hostilities and the harassment of UNIFIL personnel is also likely to be reported.

One grave violation occurred in the vicinity of the Blue Line at Naqoura on 15 December 2013 when a Lebanese soldier fired on and killed an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldier who was on the Israeli side. The IDF retaliated by shooting, non-fatally, two Lebanese soldiers whom they believed were involved in the attack. The following day, UNIFIL convened an extraordinary tripartite meeting with senior officers from the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the IDF.

In his inaugural message, Salam noted that he had attempted to form a balanced government in which all parties participated, but without any religious or sectarian quotas. The cabinet is not expected to remain in office long, however, as President Michel Sleiman’s six-year term will end in May, at which time a new head of state will be elected and a new government will be formed.

Spillover from Syria continues to have a destabilising effect on Lebanon. Approximately 900,000 refugees are registered in Lebanon, increasing the country’s population by roughly 25 percent. Unofficial estimates put the figure closer to 1.5 million. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees says that 50,000 refugees arrived in Lebanon in January alone.

The Syrian crisis also continues to exacerbate deeply sectarianism in Lebanon. Since late December 2013, the Council has issued six press statements relating to terrorist attacks in Lebanon. The most deadly of these attacks came on 19 February, when twin attacks killed at least eight people in the vicinity of the Iranian cultural centre in Beirut. The Lebanese Al-Qaida-linked group Abdullah Azzam Brigades claimed responsibility. Other statements were issued in response to two deadly attacks in the Shi’a majority town of Hermel and three others in Beirut, including a 27 December car bombing that targeted former Minister
Mohammad Chatah—a fierce critic of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad—killing him and at least four others (SC/11232). Each statement stressed the importance for all parties to respect Lebanon’s policy of disassociation and appealed to the Lebanese people to refrain from any involvement in the Syrian crisis, consistent with their commitment in the Baabda Declaration.

On 24 February, Israeli warplanes launched two raids targeting a convoy carrying surface-to-surface missiles into Lebanon in the eastern Bekaa valley, on the Lebanon-Syria border. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said the target was a Hezbollah “missile base”, but it was not immediately apparent whether the strike hit inside Lebanese or Syrian territory. In early January, media reports indicated that Hezbollah has been moving long-range missiles from storage bases in Syria to positions in Lebanon, from which they could strike deep into Israel. The reports claimed that as many as 12 Russian-made anti-ship cruise missile systems may be in Hezbollah’s possession inside Syria. According to US officials, Israel has struck Syria at least three times in the past year to prevent weapons from reaching Hezbollah inside Lebanon.

On 16 January, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon opened the trial for the 2005 assassination of former Sunni Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in a terrorist attack that also killed 21 others. In a press statement issued that day, the Council welcomed the opening of the trial and stressed the vital importance of combating impunity for the long-term stability and security of Lebanon (SC/11250). All five of the defendants, said to be members of Hezbollah, are being tried in absentia.

President Suleiman on 29 December announced that Saudi Arabia had made a landmark $3 billion military grant to Lebanon to purchase arms from France. Special Coordinator Plumbly visited Riyadh on 6 January and welcomed the pledge of assistance. However, the military aid from the Sunni kingdom, seen as an attempt to counter the influence that Iran wields in Lebanon through Hezbollah, could further ignite tensions.

Key Issues
The key issue is that the conflict in Syria continues to negatively impact Lebanon.

Ongoing issues include continued violations of resolution 1701, such as the Israeli occupation of areas north of the Blue Line and overflights in Lebanese airspace.

UNDOF (Golan Heights)

Expected Council Action
In March, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is expected to brief Council members in consultations on the Secretary-General’s upcoming report on the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). No outcome is anticipated.

UNDOF was established in 1974 to monitor the ceasefire between Israel and Syria. Its mandate expires on 30 June.

Key Recent Developments
The spillover from the conflict in Syria has continued to affect the security situation in the Golan. Clashes between Syrian government forces and armed opposition groups and shelling have been ongoing inside the area of separation and in the area of limitation, forcing UNDOF personnel to take shelter. Mortar rounds have landed near UNDOF positions on several occasions since December.

UNDOF’s freedom of movement has been regularly restricted by the presence of roadblocks, and its convoys have been repeatedly shot at by the armed opposition and Syrian forces (10 December, 22 January and 2 and 7 February).

On 2 December, Israel informed the Security Council that Syria fired at an Israeli military outpost (S/2013/711). Israel returned fire. Also that day, a Syrian mortar landed in Majdal Shams, in the Israeli-occupied Golan, causing no casualties or damages. Two rockets landed in the Israeli-occupied Golan on 18 February. Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, Israel has maintained a neutral policy vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis except to block any transfer of strategic weapons via Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

In the last few months, UNDOF observed armed members of the Syrian opposition transferring wounded across the Israeli technical fence with media reports indicating that wounded have been treated in a hospital near the ceasefire line. The mission also reported that an Israeli military vehicle briefly crossed the ceasefire line twice on 10 December and two Israeli military aircraft flew over the area of separation on 2 January.

On 19 December and 1 January, UNDOF observed armed members of the opposition handling mines. The mission continued to find improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in its area of operations. Specialised counter-IED teams

Options
The most likely option for the Council in March is to take no action. However, Council members could issue a statement stressing their support for the LAF as a pillar of stability and reiterating the importance for all parties to respect Lebanon’s policy of disassociation from the Syrian conflict.

Council Dynamics
There is consensus in the Council that UNIFIL contributes to stability between Israel and Lebanon, becoming even more crucial in the context of the Syrian crisis. The Council is united on the importance of preserving Lebanon’s sovereignty, national unity, territorial integrity and political independence and remains supportive of the country’s policy of disassociation from the Syrian crisis.

Some Council members have also highlighted the importance they attach to Lebanon’s stability by providing humanitarian assistance and bilateral financial support, including for the LAF, through the International Support Group for Lebanon.

France is the penholder on Lebanon in the Council.
from Ireland are expected to arrive in March.

After decades of dealing with UNDOF twice a year in an essentially routine fashion, by the second year of the Syrian crisis, the spillover effects were prominently felt in UNDOF’s area of operations. In response, the Council has modified its handling of UNDOF by deploying additional peacekeepers and equipment as allowed by the 1974 Separation of Forces Agreement between Israel and Syria. It also requested quarterly reporting whereas, until resolution 2084 was adopted on 19 December 2012, reports were semi-annual. Resolution 2108 of 27 June 2013 stressed the need to enhance the safety and security of UNDOF personnel. The budget for the period of 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014 was increased by $12.6 million in December 2013 (A/RES/68/260). As of 31 December 2013, UNDOF’s strength was 1,239 troops.

On 18 December 2013, the Council adopted resolution 2131, renewing UNDOF for six months after considering the Secretary-General’s latest report on the observer mission during 16 December consultations (S/2013/716). The resolution drew attention to the deteriorating situation on the ground as a result of the spillover of the Syrian conflict and strongly condemned several incidents threatening the safety and security of UNDOF personnel. It also noted the increased use of IEDs by elements of the Syrian opposition in the UNDOF area of operation and underscored that the theft or destruction of UN weapons, ammunition, vehicles or other assets were unacceptable.

DPKO’s September 2013 request for authorization to use enhanced defensive equipment has largely been approved by Israel and Syria. However, its requests regarding advanced defensive arms, such as man-portable air-defence systems, and communication systems, including jammers have not been approved by the parties. Both Israel and Syria fear such equipment might fall into the hands of armed rebel groups.

Key Issues

The spillover of the Syrian crisis into UNDOF’s area of operations will continue to be of primary concern to the Council. Syrian military forces are prohibited from entering the area of separation, but they have nonetheless done so in response to the rebel presence.

A continuing key issue will be the safety and security of UN personnel given the proximity of UNDOF positions to the areas where there have been clashes between Syrian forces and the armed rebels.

Options

The most likely option is for the Council to receive the report and briefing and take no additional action. One other option would be for the Council to adopt a statement reiterating the need for all parties to exercise restraint or expressing concern for the safety and security of UNDOF personnel, or both.

Council Dynamics

The Council agrees that UNDOF contributes to stability in the region in the absence of a peace agreement between Israel and Syria. From the beginning of 2013 the Council has received quarterly reporting on UNDOF, whereas previously it had only been semi-annual. The mission’s importance is particularly high now in order to avoid further potential negative security implications for the region. In this regard, most Council members are keen to demonstrate to troop-contributing countries their commitment to UNDOF’s ability to operate effectively and to the safety of its personnel.

Though in recent years the US has been the penholder on the Golan Heights, the last four resolutions renewing UNDOF were drafted jointly by the US and Russia, demonstrating consensus on an issue that is affected by the highly divisive conflict in Syria. Council members prefer to keep the Syrian conflict and the Golan Heights as discrete issues.

Expected Council Action

In March, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Nickolay Mladenov will brief the Council on the report on the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). Council members are also due to receive a report from UNAMI on Iraq’s compliance with resolution 1284 regarding the repatriation or return of Kuwaiti nationals or their remains and the return of Kuwaiti property.

The UNAMI mandate expires on 31 July 2014.

Key Recent Developments

During the reporting period, an already dire security situation in Iraq was exacerbated by a surge in fighting between pro- and anti-government forces that erupted late in December 2013 when security forces dismantled a Sunni protest camp near Ramadi in the western province of Anbar, which borders Syria. Following the incident, Al-Qaida-affiliated armed groups, which have proliferated throughout the area and in neighbouring Syria, seized parts of Ramadi and all of Fallujah. The government has since launched military operations in the region and co-opted local Sunni tribal leaders, providing them with weapons and funding, to assist forces in expelling the militants. The humanitarian consequences of the fighting have been grave, with the UN High Commissioner on Refugees estimating that 300,000 Iraqis have been displaced so far by fighting in Anbar.

In response, the Council on 10 January adopted a presidential statement, drafted by the US in consultation with Iraq, which deplored in the strongest terms recent events in Ramadi and Fallujah and condemned the attacks by Al-Qaida affiliate the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) which have attempted to destabilise the country and the region (S/PRST/2014/1). The Council also urged the people of Iraq to continue to expand their cooperation against violence and terror.

Elsewhere in Iraq, near-daily fatal attacks, many of them coordinated and sectarian in nature, against civilians, law enforcement and
government officials continue. On 2 February, UNAMI issued casualty figures for January, according to which a total of 733 people, including 618 civilians, were killed in acts of terrorism and violence. These numbers did not include victims of the ongoing conflict in Anbar.

Preparations for the 30 April parliamentary elections are largely on track. On 26 August 2013, the courts struck down a law limiting the prime minister to two terms in office, allowing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to run for a third consecutive term. The Speaker of Parliament, Usama al-Nujaifi, warned during a 22 January visit to Washington, D.C., that elections may be used to further marginalise Sunnis and that attempts to discourage voting or cause provocation in Sunni areas would weaken their representation in parliament. Many fear that the elections may further inflame sectarian tensions.

Influential Shi’a cleric Moktada al-Sadr announced his withdrawal from politics on 15 February. In a speech delivered later that week, al-Sadr urged his followers in parliament to continue to serve and encouraged all Iraqis to participate in elections so that they would be represented fairly. He criticised the government, saying it was behaving like a dictatorship and was using the army against the people.

Reports surfaced on 24 February that Iraq had signed a deal to acquire $195 million worth of arms from Iran. The deal, which would be in contravention of a UN embargo on weapons sales by Tehran, was reportedly signed in late November—just weeks after Maliki returned from lobbying Washington for extra weapons to strengthen the efficacy of the security apparatus in its fight against Al-Qaida-linked extremists. The Iraqi government made contradictory statements concerning the deal. The defense ministry—facing pressure from the US—denied that a contract had been signed, however, a senior government lawmaker said Baghdad had bought “some light weapons and ammunition” from Tehran. On 27 January the Pentagon had notified US Congress that it intends to sell 24 Apache helicopters and 500 Hellfire missiles to Iraq in a deal worth upwards of $6 billion. Several Iraqi lawmakers had reportedly claimed that Maliki made the deal with Tehran out of frustration with delays in US arms deliveries.

With both the US and Iran encouraging a reconciliation between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government ahead of the April elections, the two sides held a round of negotiations on oil exports and revenue sharing on 16 February. The talks have delayed the adoption of the 2014 budget. Kurdistan has threatened to sell oil and natural gas to Turkey without the approval of the central government, raising fears that attaining economic independence would lead to a broader declaration of independence.

With regard to the Iraq-Kuwait file, the Geneva-based UN Compensation Commission, which settles the damage claims of those who suffered losses due to the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, paid $1.03 billion to Kuwait on 23 January, bringing the total amount disbursed to $44.5 billion.

On 26 December 2013, three residents of Camp Hurriyah were killed and 70 were wounded in the fourth rocket attack to hit the camp in 2013. The camp houses members of the Iranian dissident group Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK). The group has accused the government of being behind the attack. However, the attack was claimed by the militant group Jaysh al-Mukhtar, whose stated mission is to protect Iraq’s Shi’a population and aid the government in fighting Sunni extremist groups. Its leader, Wathiq al-Battat, was arrested at a Baghdad checkpoint on 2 January.

On 5 January, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced the appointment of Jane Holl Lute as his Special Advisor for Relocation of Camp Hurriyah Residents Outside of Iraq.

Human Rights-Related Developments
Iraq has continued wide use of the death penalty, reportedly hanging 26 people accused of terrorism on 22 January. UN human rights chief Navi Pillay has deplored what she called the “conveyor belt of executions by the government of Iraq.”

Human Rights Watch (HRW) said in its 2013 annual report that Iraq hanged at least 151 people last year. HRW also published a report on 6 February that claimed that Iraq is illegally detaining thousands of women—the vast majority of whom are Sunnis—and subjecting many to torture and ill-treatment, including sexual abuse.

The UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances on 9 December 2013 called on Iraq to clarify the whereabouts of seven residents of Camp Ashraf (which previously held the MEK dissidents) who were allegedly kidnapped after an attack on the camp on 1 September 2013 that left 52 dead.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is how UNAMI can continue to contribute to the stability of Iraq and play a role in facilitating an end to the political stalemate, the humanitarian crisis and sectarian tension.

A related issue is how the Council can support an inclusive political process through the holding of free and fair elections in April. A further issue will be whether and how to address the destabilising impact of the Syrian conflict on Iraq—in particular the proliferation of extremist armed groups operating in both countries.

The issue of Camp Hurriyah and the future disposition of the Iranian exiles housed there is also of ongoing concern to Council members.

Options
One option is for the Council to receive the briefing and take no action. However, given the situation on the ground, it is possible that the Council will issue a statement addressing the security and humanitarian concerns.

As the March briefing will be the last regular briefing before the April elections, another option is for the Council to issue a statement urging all stakeholders to work to ensure that elections are conducted peacefully and in a free and fair manner.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Council members have in the past found that publicly addressing the growing violence in Iraq has been difficult, primarily because of US sensitivities related to its 2003 invasion. As such, beyond the routine annual renewals of UNAMI, the Council had remained largely silent on Iraq. However, in recent months the Council has responded to the situation by adopting both a presidential and press statement. This could signal that, given the political, humanitarian and regional implications of the proliferation of extremist groups and increased violence, Council members may be looking to increase engagement on Iraq.

The US is the penholder on Iraq issues in general, and the UK is the penholder on Iraq-Kuwait issues.
Iran

Expected Council Action

In March, the chair of the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Gary Quinlan (Australia), is due to present his quarterly briefing on the Committee’s work to the Council.

Key Recent Developments

Quinlan last briefed the Council on 12 December 2013 (S/PV.7082). He welcomed the 24 November interim agreement (Joint Plan of Action, [JPA]), which is the first step towards a comprehensive, long-term agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (Germany is the additional member of the negotiating group). But he stressed that all Council sanctions remained in effect and that member states should continue to implement them. He encouraged Iran to engage with the Committee and respond to the letters requesting clarification of incidents investigated by the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the Committee.

The Sanctions Committee held an informal meeting on 20 January and also had informal discussions (“informal informals”) on 29 January focusing on the six recommendations directed at the Council in the PoE’s 3 June 2013 report (S/2013/331).

Recent discussions focused in particular on recommendations two and four as listed in the PoE’s report. Recommendation two called for the Committee to encourage states “to be alert to the attempted procurement of items for prohibited purposes, including items that fall below control thresholds, and to issues relating to end use and end users” possibly through the issuance of an Implementation Assistance Notice. However, no conclusion was reached on this.

Recommendation four said the Committee should provide guidance to states about ambiguities in the language of the resolutions concerning the phrases “entities acting on their behalf or at their direction” and “entities owned or controlled by them”. The chair proposed that instead of the Committee trying to develop such guidance only for its own purposes, it should reach out to other committees dealing with similar issues to try to agree on a common approach. It was decided that the chair should initiate such consultations and report back to the Committee but with the understanding that members reserved their positions with regard to the final outcome.

On 18 February, Iran and the P5+1 began their first round of talks aimed at reaching a long-term agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme involving the lifting of all nuclear-related sanctions. The two sides had announced on 12 January that the six-month JPA would take effect on 20 January, meaning that 20 July will be the first deadline for concluding the agreement. The JPA can be extended by mutual consent for six months if agreement has not been reached by then. (Although the JPA was announced on 24 November, technical details had to be finalised before implementation could start. Please refer to our December 2013 Monthly Forecast for further details.)

On 20 February the two sides announced that they had agreed on a road map for the negotiations. The agreed schedule included an experts’ level meeting in early March and for the full delegations to meet again on 17 March followed by monthly sessions. It was also envisaged that Catherine Ashton, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and chief negotiator for the P5+1 would travel to Iran ahead of the 17 March meeting. Few details emerged as for any more substantive points discussed.

There seemed to be good progress under the 11 November 2013 cooperation framework agreed between Iran and the IAEA to resolve outstanding issues. In a 20 February report to the Council (S/2014/116), the IAEA Director General said that Iran had implemented the initial six practical steps agreed in November and that it had now agreed to implement seven additional measures agreed by 15 May, including managed access to the Saghaf mine in Yazd and the Ardakan concentration plant as well as Iran’s providing information on various other aspects of its nuclear programme. (There was still no mention of Parchin, a military site that Iran is believed to have used for nuclear activities and to which the IAEA has unsuccessfully sought access in the past.) Previously, in a 17 January report, the Director General had informed the Council of the IAEA’s role with regard to monitoring and verification of the JPA.

On 13 February, the International Energy Agency reported that sales of Iranian crude oil rose by 100,000 barrels a day in January, to 1.32 million. It was seen as an early indication of the initial impact of the measures agreed to by the US as part of the JPA to suspend some oil-related restrictions on importers of Iranian oil. China accounted for most of the additional sales.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 18 December, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on human rights in Iran expressing deep concern at serious recurring human rights violations and urging Iran to cooperate with special procedures’ mandate holders (A/RES/68/184).

On 22 January, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, Ahmed Shaheed and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, issued a statement urging Iran to heed the calls for a moratorium on executions, especially in cases relating to political activists and alleged drug offences. The statement—which was endorsed by the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Juan Mendez—expressed alarm at sharp increases in hangings in Iran. At least 40 persons were reportedly hanged in the first two weeks of January and some 625 executions were carried out in 2013, without due process rights and for crimes that do not meet the threshold of the “most serious crimes” as required by international law.

During the 25th session in March, the Human Rights Council will consider the report of the Secretary-General on the human rights situation in Iran and Shaheed’s report.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is whether developments in the ongoing talks with Iran should have any impact on the work of the Sanctions Committee and lead to a more cautious approach so as not to interfere with negotiations or whether, as some argue, it is essential to keep up the pressure on Iran—and even impose additional measures—for negotiations to succeed.

Options

One option for the Council is to continue its work on sanctions enforcement through the Sanctions Committee independently of what is happening on the political track until a
Iran (con’t)

long-term agreement has been reached.

Another option is to significantly slow down the work in the Committee as long as there is continued positive momentum in the negotiations with Iran.

A further option would be to adopt a statement or a resolution welcoming the JPA and the launch of negotiations on a long-term agreement with Iran, reiterating the Council’s demands and expressing its willingness to suspend and eventually terminate all measures against Iran if it complies with all relevant Council resolutions.

**Council Dynamics**

Council members continue to have differing perspectives on the implications for the Sanctions Committee of the ongoing talks between Iran and the P5+1. The P3 and like-minded countries seem to think that until further notice the Committee should carry on its work on sanctions implementation. China and Russia on the other hand argue that the Committee needs to take a more cautious approach to avoid any potential negative impact on the negotiations.

Because of these differences, Council members do not expect much action in the Committee in the foreseeable future. Still, it seems the chair has been trying to advance the discussions on the recommendations in the PoE’s 5 June 2013 report to be able to show some results before the next report comes out in May although they are likely to be minimal.

The US is the penholder in the Council on Iran.

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**DPRK**

**Expected Council Action**

In March, the Council is expected to adopt a resolution renewing for 13 months the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee.

Also in March, the Committee is due to update the lists of banned items as required by resolution 2094, which directs it to review and update the lists of sanctioned items by 7 March 2014 and on an annual basis thereafter. (If the Committee fails to update the lists by then, the Council will have to take action within an additional 30 days.)

**Key Recent Developments**

The PoE’s final report under resolution 2094 was circulated to Council members on 10 February. The report confirms that the DPRK is continuing to develop its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and describes in detail the types of techniques used to evade sanctions and recent violations, including the Chong Chon Gang case. (Chong Chon Gang was the DPRK-flagged ship detained by Panama on 15 July 2013 on its way from Cuba with weapons and military equipment hidden in a cargo of sugar. The PoE submitted an incident report on 23 December concluding that the case constituted a sanctions violation.) Recommendations focus on measures to improve sanctions implementation, such as the issuance of Implementation Assistance Notices (IANs) by the Sanctions Committee.

On 20 February, the chair of the Committee, Ambassador Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg), briefed Council members in consultations on its work. The Committee then met on 24 February for an initial exchange of views on the PoE’s report and also discussed possible measures in response to the Chong Chon Gang case.

On 7 February, the Committee adopted the IAN requested by paragraph 22 of resolution 2094, the so-called “catch-all” provision. (The provision calls on states to prevent the supply, sale or transfer of any item that might contribute to activities prohibited under relevant Council resolutions and directed the Committee to issue an IAN regarding its proper implementation.) It was posted on the Committee’s website on 13 February.

Relations between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the DPRK seemed to improve. On 5 February the two countries agreed to hold family reunions at the Diamond Mountain resort inside the DPRK from 20 to 25 February. On 12 February, the countries held their first high-level meeting in seven years, apparently at the suggestion of Pyongyang. The meeting took place in the Panmunjom truce village on the border between the two countries and covered a range of issues, including the family reunion programme.

There was speculation that the DPRK was trying to demonstrate progress in its relations with the ROK in order to please China and secure an invitation to Beijing for its leader Kim Jong-un to strengthen his authority.

Meanwhile, the DPRK continued to protest the annual joint ROK-US military exercises underway in February. It sent a letter to the Council on 7 February condemning the exercises and threatening to call off the family reunions unless the exercises were cancelled (S/2014/84). It complained in particular that the ROK had allowed US nuclear-capable B-52 bombers to fly off the west coast of the Korean peninsula. Despite these threats, however, the DPRK agreed to allow the family reunions to go ahead as planned.

In a further sign of the easing of tensions between the two countries, the ROK on 21 February was reported to have approved a shipment of medicine and powdered milk for the DPRK and promised more humanitarian aid. It also offered to assist the DPRK with an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in pigs.

On 14 February, US Secretary of State John Kerry held meetings in Beijing with top Chinese officials and discussed, among other things, the situation on the Korean peninsula. Following the meetings, Kerry said that China “could not have more forcefully reiterated its commitment” to the goal of denuclearising the DPRK. He also stated that China had indicated its willingness to take additional steps to push the DPRK to halt its nuclear programme.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

On 17 February, Michael Kirby, the chair of the international commission of inquiry on human rights in the DPRK, and Marzuki Darusman, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, presented the report of the commission to the United Nations Security Council. The report highlighted ongoing human rights violations in the DPRK, including forced labor, arbitrary detentions, and the use of torture and酷刑.

The report also called for the UNSC to take action to bring those responsible for these violations to justice. However, the resolution that the commission presented was blocked by China, which stated that it could not support the resolution due to its concerns about the report’s methodology.

A further option would be to adopt a resolution establishing a UN-mandated commission of inquiry to investigate human rights violations in the DPRK. However, this option has been met with resistance from China and other countries that have close ties with the DPRK.

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UN DOCUMENTS ON THE DPRK Security Council Resolution S/RES/2094 (7 March 2013) tightened sanctions against the DPRK and extended the mandate of the PoE until 7 April 2014. Sanctions Committee Document S/2013/337 (7 June 2013) was the PoE report to the Sanctions Committee under resolution 2094. Other A/HRC/25/63 (7 February 2014) was the report from the international commission of inquiry. S/2014/84 (7 February 2014) was a letter to the Council from the DPRK Implementation Assistance Notice No. 4 (7 February 2014) was on the proper implementation of paragraph 22 of resolution 2094.
rights in the DPRK and also a member of the commission, held a press conference in Geneva for the launch of the commission’s report released that same day (A/HRC/25/63 and A/HRC/25/CRP). The commission found that crimes against humanity had been committed and continue to take place. These crimes, which arise from policies established at the highest level, entail extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions, persecution, the forcible transfer of populations, enforced disappearances and the inhumane act of knowingly causing prolonged starvation.

In a letter sent on 20 January to Kim Jong-un, the commission drew attention to the principle of command and superior responsibility under international criminal law. The commission informed Kim that officials of several governmental agencies had been committing crimes against humanity and added that it was “open to inference that the officials [were] in some instances acting under [his] personal control.”

The commission urged the UN Secretariat and agencies to adopt a system-wide strategy under the recently launched “Rights up Front” approach, including the possibility of the Secretary-General bringing the situation to the attention of the Security Council. The commission recommended that the Security Council refer the situation in the DPRK to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and impose targeted individual sanctions against those most responsible but stressed that it did not support sanctions that would target the population or the economy as a whole.

The commission will present its findings to the Human Rights Council on 17 March, during its 25th session.

On 18 February, High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay called on the international community “to use all the mechanisms at its disposal to ensure accountability, including referral to the ICC.”

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is the renewal of the PoE’s mandate.

A further issue is the report from the international commission of inquiry and whether it will be formally brought to the Council’s attention.

An ongoing key issue is the DPRK’s continued flouting of all relevant Council resolutions.

At the Sanctions Committee level, a key issue in March is whether to take up any of the PoE’s latest recommendations.

Options
The main option for the Council is to adopt a resolution extending the PoE’s mandate for another 13 months. It could also stress the importance of taking into consideration the need for broad geographic representation when selecting the experts.

Another option would be to organise an Arria formula meeting with members of the international commission of inquiry.

A further option would be to refer the situation in the DPRK to the ICC.

Options for the Committee include:
- implementing the PoE’s recommendations;
- making additional designations;
- updating the lists of banned items as required by resolution 2094;
- releasing publicly the Chong Chon Gang incident report; and
- expediting the issuance of additional IANs, including those that have been proposed in response to recent sanctions violations.

Council Dynamics
The PoE mandate renewal is expected to be a technical rollover and should therefore not be controversial. (The US circulated a draft resolution to Council members on 26 February.) It appears that some discussions have already taken place with regard to the selection of experts and there are expectations that the more transparent and merit-based procedures that the Secretariat has used in other sanctions regimes will also apply in the case of the DPRK.

With regard to the work of the international commission of inquiry, although not directly related to the work of the Sanctions Committee, most Council members referred to the commission’s findings at the 20 February informal consultations. They emphasised that the DPRK’s human rights violations represent yet another example of Pyongyang’s complete disregard for international law and indicated that the situation should be dealt with by the Council. China on the other hand, who has publicly criticised the commission’s report, stressed the need for dialogue. No further discussions are expected in New York, however, until the Human Rights Council has considered the commission’s findings.

Discussions on how to respond to the Chong Chon Gang case have continued to focus on the three measures proposed earlier by the US and supported by most Council members: issuing an IAN, designating those found to be involved in the sanctions violations and publicly releasing the PoE’s incident report. During the 24 February committee meeting, the US presented in more detail the main elements of the proposed IAN. Council members also discussed possible designations. It appears that the PoE’s report, in a confidential annex, contains proposals for two designations related to the Chong Chon Gang case and many members expressed initial support for these proposals. As for publicly releasing the incident report, it seems that China and Russia remain opposed and it is therefore unlikely to happen.

The US is the penholder on the DPRK in the Council and Luxembourg chairs the Sanctions Committee.
Haiti

Expected Council Action
In March, the Council will consider the Secretary-General’s semi-annual report on the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The report is expected to include options for the future UN presence following the end of MINUSTAH’s current consolidation plan in 2016. A debate with a briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of mission, Sandra Honoré, is expected.

Ahead of the debate, the Council is expected to convene a meeting with MINUSTAH’s troop contributors to hear a briefing by the outgoing force commander, Lieutenant General Edson Leal Pujol (Brazil).

MINUSTAH’s mandate expires on 15 October.

Key Recent Developments
On 10 October 2013, the Council, in resolution 2119, renewed MINUSTAH’s mandate until 15 October 2014. It also authorised a reduction in troop strength from 6,270 to 5,021 while maintaining the size of the police component at 2,601 as recommended by the Secretary-General in his 19 August report (S/2013/493). With regard to the long-overdue elections in Haiti, the resolution urged political actors in Haiti to work together to hold the elections in accordance with the constitution “to ensure the continued functioning of the national assembly and other elected bodies”. (This referred to the controversy surrounding the mandate of senators elected in 2009, which according to the constitution does not expire until 2015, whereas the 2008 electoral law could be interpreted to mean their term ended in January.)

In an explanation of vote following the adoption, the UK said that MINUSTAH was “the clearest example of a mismatch between the needs on the ground and the tools the Security Council uses to address them” and that it made little sense to have more than 5,000 peacekeepers in a situation with no recent military conflict. It argued that some of the tasks performed by MINUSTAH were better suited to other parts of the UN system, criticising in particular the continued use of quick-impact projects and asserted that there was scope for a more accelerated drawdown of the mission, especially of engineering personnel.

Preparations for elections in Haiti took an important step forward on 27 November 2013 when the Chamber of Deputies approved a new electoral law in a special session convened by President Michel Martelly. The new law replaced the controversial 2008 electoral law, thus resolving the dispute over the term of senators elected in 2009.

The political climate seemed to improve with the launch on 24 January of a new national dialogue involving key political stakeholders under the auspices of the Conférence Episcopale d’Haiti. During the first round of talks, it seems a consensus was reached to organise combined elections in 2014 (as opposed to two separate elections) for the Chamber of Deputies and a second third of the Senate, in addition to the local, municipal and partial senatorial elections already foreseen. Participants also discussed possible changes to the transitional Electoral Council (Collège transition du Conseil Electoral Permanent), reshuffling the cabinet to include opposition leaders and the need for constitutional amendments. A second round of talks was launched on 11 February.

During a visit to Washington, D.C., from 4 to 7 February, Martelly for the first time met with US President Barack Obama. He also met with US Secretary of State John Kerry and members of the US Congress. The organisation of elections was among key issues discussed, which also included security, reconstruction and the economic situation. From 19 to 26 February Martelly travelled to France, Italy and Belgium for high-level meetings and also visited the Vatican.

Capacity building of the Haitian National Police seemed to be progressing well. Its most recent class, whose graduation ceremony was held on 27 December 2013, was the largest in its history with 1,058 graduates, including 111 women.

On 17 December, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs launched its 2014 action plan for Haiti, requesting $169 million in funding. Estimating that 817,000 people will still require assistance this year, the plan focuses in particular on aiding displaced families, alleviating food insecurity, fighting cholera and strengthening emergency preparation. It also notes a number of positive developments since the 2010 earthquake: 89 percent of the displaced population has left the camps; the incidence of cholera has been reduced by over 50 percent and severe food insecurity has been brought down from 1.5 million affected people in early 2013 to 600,000 in October 2013.

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 20 February the court of appeals in Haiti voted in favour of opening new investigations into former President Jean-Claude Duvalier for crimes against humanity. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights welcomed the decision as “a landmark step for Haitian justice in combating impunity for past human rights violations”.

During its 25th session in March, the Human Rights Council will consider the report of the independent expert on human rights in Haiti, Gustavo Gallón (A/HRC/25/71). When Gallón last visited the country from 23 September to 1 October 2013, he put an emphasis on five aspects: the right to education; the situation of persons deprived of liberty; the strengthening of justice institutions; addressing human rights violations committed under Duvalier and former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide; and the situation in IDP camps.

Key Issues
The organisation of elections remains a key issue. A related issue is whether the national dialogue will succeed in building consensus on the way forward.

Another key issue is the continued consolidation of MINUSTAH and the future UN presence. Resolution 2119 took note of paragraph 64 of the Secretary-General’s 19 August report, which stated that the option of replacing the mission with a smaller, more focused assistance mission in 2016 would be explored and that proposals on the way forward would be included in the upcoming March report. It seems the report is expected to present four options, ranging from continuing the consolidation of the current operation to replacing MINUSTAH with a small UN office headed by a special envoy.

Options
One option is for Council members to listen to the Special Representative’s briefing and express their national positions but take no further action at this stage.

Another option would be to adopt a...
presidential statement or press statement to welcome recent political progress, express support for the Special Representative, encourage broad participation in the national dialogue and urge political leaders to keep up the momentum to resolve outstanding issues and expedite the organisation of elections.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Council members welcome recent progress in the preparations for elections and the launch of a national dialogue, but there are still concerns about the potential for further delays. At press time, it seemed that a press statement focusing on the political situation was being considered as a possible outcome.

Views differ on the way forward for the mission. While the UK believes the mandate should focus strictly on security and favours an accelerated drawdown (it would have preferred, for example, that the mission stop doing quick-impact projects altogether), other members, such as Argentina and Chile, argue that the balance between security and development tasks must be maintained and that Haiti still needs a multidimensional peacekeeping mission.

With regard to the Secretary-General’s expected options for the future reconfiguration of MINUSTAH it seems unlikely that Council members will engage in a very substantive discussion of these at this stage. It is possible, however, that the options will provide further arguments to those in favour of an accelerated drawdown. Furthermore, recent demands for additional peacekeeping resources in other situations such as South Sudan and potentially in the Central African Republic may create additional pressure for MINUSTAH to downsize.

While the US is the penholder on Haiti, the Group of Friends of Haiti plays an influential role. (Current members are Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, France, Guatemala, Peru, the US and Uruguay, which is the chair.)

Peacebuilding

Expected Council Action

In March, the Council will be briefed on peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict. In a 20 December 2012 presidential statement, the Council requested the Secretariat to provide this oral briefing as an update on progress in the UN’s peacebuilding efforts, including women’s participation in peacebuilding, as well as a final report by December 2014 (S/PRST/2012/29).

Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson will brief the Council. Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota (Brazil), the recently elected chair of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), and possibly the head of UNDP, Helen Clark, will also address members.

No outcome is expected.

Key Recent Developments

The Council debated the PBC’s sixth annual report on 25 April 2013 (S/2013/63). The following day it held an interactive dialogue with the chairs of the PBC’s six country configurations. Earlier, at the behest of Pakistan, the Council adopted resolution 2086 on peacekeeping on 21 January 2013 highlighting peacebuilding activities in peacekeeping operations.

The PBC adopted a declaration on women’s economic empowerment for post-conflict recovery on 26 September (PBC/7/OC/3) during a high-level meeting convened with UN Women. UN Women, the Peacebuilding Support Office and the UN Development Program (UNDP) concluded an indicative baseline study in November 2013, measuring the amount of UN-managed peacebuilding funds allocated for empowering women and gender equality. The study looked at 334 UNDP projects in six countries during 2012. It found that funding totalled only six percent, well below the 15 percent target that the Secretary-General set in his Seven-Point Action Plan (S/2010/466).

The Secretary-General’s latest report on civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict was published 6 January (S/2014/5). The initiative was introduced in 2011 to improve UN capacity for institution-building in post-conflict countries and to more rapidly deploy civilian experts for peacebuilding. The report noted that the UN was abandoning its automated matching system to identify international civilian expertise. It was also decided that this would be the final report on the civilian capacity initiative.

Recent Developments in Country-Specific Configurations

A first-of-its-kind assessment mission by the PBC to review its engagement with Sierra Leone was conducted from 18-22 November 2013 as requested in resolution 2097. The mission’s final report recommended a lighter PBC role in Sierra Leone.

Patriota visited Guinea-Bissau from 20-24 January to begin planning a strategy for PBC reengagement with Guinea-Bissau after its activities there were suspended following the 12 April 2012 coup. Briefing the Council on 26 February, Patriota stated that the configuration envisions supporting Guinea-Bissau to complete a full democratic cycle, coordinating security sector reform and promoting food security and rural development.

Ambassador Mohammed Loulichki (Morocco) was officially appointed chair of the Central African Republic (CAR) configuration by the PBC Organizational Committee on 29 January 2014. The previous chair, Ambassador Jan Grauls (Belgium), resigned in June 2012.

Ambassador Staffan Tillander (Sweden), the Liberia configuration chair, visited Liberia from 2-7 February and met with President Ellen Sirleaf Johnson and other government officials and stakeholders, during which they discussed progress on three priorities of engagement (reconciliation, security and justice), as well as land and natural-resource issues.

Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland) visited Burundi from 13-17 January. The visit was one of Seger’s regularly scheduled trips but occurred in the context of the government's request to...
Peacebuilding (con’t)

close the UN Office in Burundi. In Seger’s view, as expressed in his report on the trip (S/2014/57) and Council briefing on 28 January, the international community should continue to closely follow developments in Burundi.

Key Issues
The briefing will update the Council on UN peacebuilding efforts, likely by reporting on examples from the field in inclusivity, institution-building and sustained international support, areas which the Secretary-General highlighted in his 8 October 2012 report on peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict.

Progress on the Secretary-General’s Seven Point Action Plan to increase women’s participation in peacebuilding is another issue. The outbreak of civil war in South Sudan and the recurrence of conflict in the CAR will be on members’ minds. Renewal of conflict in these countries comes despite the UN Mission in South Sudan’s strong peacebuilding mandate and the CAR’s inclusion on the PBC’s agenda since 2007.

Options
The Council could:
• receive the briefing and take no action (a final report on peacebuilding is due from the Secretary-General in December, when it may adopt a new presidential statement); or
• issue a press statement welcoming the briefing and reiterating support for UN peacebuilding efforts, including strengthening women’s involvement.

Council Dynamics
According to the 20 December 2012 presidential statement, this briefing should have been held last December. France, however, asked if Luxembourg could preside over the meeting during its presidency, as Luxembourg, which chairs the PBC Guinea configuration, is very active in peacebuilding. Ambassador Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein (Jordan), who joined the Council in January, was formerly chair of the Liberia configuration and brings additional peacebuilding experience.

The Secretary-General’s Seven-Point Action plan to enhance women’s participation in peacebuilding was never endorsed by the Council. Russia has prevented it from being referenced in Council documents.
### Notable Dates for March

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