In Hindsight: Changes to UN Peacekeeping in 2013

Status Update since our January Forecast

Protection of Civilians

Rule of Law

Central African Republic

Burundi

South Sudan

Sudan and South Sudan

Sudan (Darfur)

Visiting Mission to Mali

Guinea-Bissau

Syria

DPRK

Kosovo

UN-EU Cooperation

Chairs of Subsidiary Bodies and Pen-Holders for 2014

Security Council Statistics in 2013

Notable Dates

Supplement

UN Peacekeeping: Deployments and Budgets, 1946-2013

Overview

February 2014

Lithuania will preside over the Security Council in February.

A meeting on the cooperation between the UN and the EU, presided over by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, Linas Linkevičius, with EU High Representative Catherine Ashton and Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon as speakers, is expected. Open debates are scheduled on the protection of civilians in armed conflict and on the rule of law. Briefers for the debate on protection of civilians are likely to include High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay (by video-conference), Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Edmond Mulet; Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos and a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Secretary-General is expected to brief during the open debate on the rule of law.

Lithuania is planning a “horizon scanning” briefing by Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffery Feltman, and a wrap-up session to be held at the end of the month in a private meeting.

A quarterly debate on Kosovo is also scheduled, with a briefing by Special Representative Farid Zarif.

Briefings are expected on:

• the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe by its Chairperson-in-Office Didier Burkhalter (Switzerland); and
• the Council visiting mission to Mali in early February by its co-leaders, Ambassadors Gérard Araud (France) and Mahamat Zene Cherif (Chad).

Briefings, followed by consultations, are expected on:

• the developments in the Middle East, by Feltman; and
• the situation in Guinea-Bissau, by Special Representative José Ramos-Horta (via video-conference) and the chair of the Peacebuilding Commission’s Guinea-Bissau configuration, Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota (Brazil).

Briefings in consultations are likely on:

• the destruction of chemical weapons in Syria, by the Special Coordinator of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-UN Joint Mission, Sigrid Kaag;
• the situation in South Sudan, most likely by Mulet;
• Sudan-South Sudan issues, by Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan Haile Menkerios (by video-conference);
• Sudan sanctions, by the chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Maria Cristina Perceval (Argentina);
• the humanitarian situation in Syria, by Amos;
• Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) sanctions by the chair of the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg); and
• Central African Republic (CAR) sanctions by the chair of the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Raimonda Murmokaitė (Lithuania).

Formal sessions will be needed to adopt resolutions to renew:

• the Sudan sanctions and the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee; and possibly
• the mandate of the UN Office in Burundi.

Though no meetings are currently scheduled, members will also be following closely the events in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in the CAR.
In Hindsight: Changes to UN Peacekeeping in 2013

The 2013 composition of the Security Council—whose members jointly contributed 22.4 percent of UN peacekeeping personnel as of 31 December 2012—was instrumental in two significant developments regarding the use of force in peacekeeping operations.

On 28 March 2013, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2098, establishing, for an initial period of one year, an intervention brigade based in Goma in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) consisting of three infantry battalions and auxiliary forces under the command of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). Its key task is to carry out offensive operations to neutralise armed groups that threaten state authority and civilian security. Although not new—the UN Operation in the Congo of 1960-1964 has been characterised by some as the first UN peace-enforcement mission—the establishment of a UN mission with an enforcement component constitutes a shift in the continuum of the use of force from the previous circumstances in which MONUSCO, already a robust mission, had been authorised to use it.

Less than a month later, on 25 April, the Council adopted resolution 2100 establishing the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. The mission is authorised to use all necessary measures to stabilise “the key population centres, especially in the north of Mali and, in this context, to deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas”.

Aware of the wider implications these developments had for peacekeeping, Council members inserted caveats in both resolutions. Resolution 2098 underscored that the brigade was established “on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping”. Resolution 2100 reaffirmed these principles, “including consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate” and recognised the specific mandate of each peacekeeping mission.

There were two additional factors that helped override the misgivings some actors had about both decisions. First, African countries had called for peace-enforcement mandates in both cases, which gave this approach political legitimacy. The DRC, the International Conference on the Great Lakes region and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) had first called for the establishment of an intervention brigade in the eastern DRC, and SADC countries were ready to be part of the brigade. Regarding Mali, the AU Peace and Security Council asked on 7 March 2013 that the new mission be given a peace-enforcement mandate to “actively sustain efforts aimed at dismantling the terrorist and criminal networks operating in the north of the country” (S/2013/163).

The second factor was the urgency and perceived inevitability of such moves. On the intervention brigade, Council members saw its establishment as part of a wider process along with the signing of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region in Addis Ababa on 24 February, with the Secretary-General and regional bodies as guarantors. The difficulties in reaching this agreement and the lack of alternatives seem to have prevented some Council members, especially troop-contributing countries (TCCs), from opposing the brigade more vigorously. On Mali, Council members had been presented with two alternatives: establishing a UN political mission alongside the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) or a multidimensional integrated UN stabilisation mission under Chapter VII alongside French forces. Given the budgetary, operational and logistical difficulties AFISMA was then facing and the likelihood that it would have required a logistics support package funded through UN assessed contributions, something the US accepted for the AU Mission in Somalia as an exception, the more logical option seemed a UN peacekeeping mission operating under robust rules of engagement.

There were, however, serious reservations expressed at various points, including with the short time allowed for the negotiations (one week) on resolution 2098. Two key issues were raised by China, Russia and some elected troop-contributing Council members after the adoption of resolution 2098: involvement in peace enforcement could compromise the impartiality of UN peacekeeping operations and the safety and security of peacekeepers. A March internal memo from Assistant Secretary-General for peacekeeping operations Edmond Mulet on the UN peace enforcement option for Mali cautioned that UN peacekeepers “are neither trained nor equipped to implement such a mandate.” Russia, the only Council member that explained its vote on resolution 2100, expressed its concern about the growing shift towards the military aspects of peacekeeping and highlighted that “what was once the exception now threatens to become unacknowledged standard practice”.

When the March 23 rebel group in the DRC surrendered on 7 November 2013, Council members welcomed this development, which was seen as a result, among other factors, of the increased military pressure added by the intervention brigade on the group. Although it is unclear whether these more aggressive mandates will lead to a significant rise in peacekeeping casualties, this risk may mean that TCCs could have to increase their tolerance for casualties in the future. Consent of the local parties, impartiality and the use of force only in self-defence were considered the bedrock principles of peacekeeping. UN peacekeepers may no longer be perceived as impartial but as a party to an armed conflict, with implications under international humanitarian law: being considered as combatants and legitimate targets. In light of the varying tolerance levels among member states, the increased risk might further exacerbate the peackeeping divide between those states that mainly contribute troops and those that mainly contribute funds (see the supplemental guide in this Monthly Forecast on UN Peacekeeping Deployments and Budgets).

If UN blue helmets are to be deployed in increasingly volatile settings with more robust mandates, a shared understanding about the new boundaries of peacekeeping will probably need to be developed not only taking into account specific situations, but also reflecting on the broader legal, political and operational implications. All TCCs, and more so the ones directly affected, will likely be keen on undertaking these discussions before more aggressive mandates are again put to the test.
Status Update since our January Forecast

Lebanon
The Council issued three press statements in January in response to escalating sectarian terrorist attacks linked to the spillover effects of the Syrian crisis in Lebanon (SC/11239, SC/11249 and SC/11256). All of the statements stressed national unity and the importance for all parties to respect Lebanon’s policy of disassociation and to refrain from any involvement in the Syrian crisis. Separately, on 16 January, the Council welcomed the opening of the trial at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon on the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in a terrorist attack that also killed 21 others (SC/11250).

Somalia
On 2 January, the Council issued a press statement condemning the terrorist attack on 1 January in Mogadishu by Al-Shabaab (SC/11240). The Council also reiterated its resolve to continue supporting efforts by the AU Mission in Somalia and the Somali National Security Forces to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab.

Iraq
On 9 January, Special Representative and head of UNAMI, Nickolay Mladenov, briefed Council members in consultations on the deteriorating security situation in Fallujah and Ramadi. The Council adopted a presidential statement the next day supporting government efforts to address the security situation and condemning attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaida affiliate ISIL (S/PRST/2014/1). The Council also stressed the critical importance of an inclusive political process, the holding of free and fair elections in April 2014 and the right to peaceful protest as guaranteed under the constitution.

DRC
On 13 January, the Council was briefed on the situation in the DRC and the latest MONUSCO report (S/2013/757) by Special Representative Martin Kobler (S/PV.7094). Special Envoy Mary Robinson also briefed on the latest report on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region (S/2013/773). Council members were briefed on 23 January by the chair of the DRC Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein (Jordan), on the Group of Experts (GoE) final report (S/2014/42). The Committee met with the GoE to discuss the report and their recommendations on 17 January. The committee itself met with the GoE to discuss the report and their recommendations on 17 January. The Council renewed the sanctions regime and the mandate of the GoE on 30 January (S/RES/2136).

Afghanistan
The Security Council issued a press statement condemning in the strongest terms the terrorist attack by the Taliban at a Kabul restaurant on 17 January that caused numerous deaths and injuries to Afghan civilians and international personnel, including UN employees (SC/11251).

Israel/Palestine
On 20 January Jordan’s foreign minister presided over the Council’s quarterly open debate on the Middle East (S/PV.7096). The Secretary-General briefed and said, in reference to the US framework for the peace process, that the year 2014 would be decisive in helping Israelis and Palestinians draw back from a perilous and unsustainable status quo.

UNRCCA (Central Asia)
On 21 January, Council members held consultations with Miroslav Jenča, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNRCCA. The Council released a press statement supporting the ongoing work of UNRCCA (SC/11255).

Cyprus
On 22 January, Council members were briefed in consultations by Lisa Buttenheim, the Special Representative and head of UNFICYP, on the latest Secretary-General’s report (S/2013/781). In addition, Alexander Downer, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus, also briefed Council members on the status of negotiations. On 30 January, the Council adopted resolution 2135 extending the mandate of UNFICYP for another six months.

Counter-terrorism
On 27 January, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2133 proposed by the UK calling on states not to pay ransom to terrorist kidnappers (S/PV.7101). The resolution, which does not impose new obligations on member states, reaffirms resolution 1373, in particular its provisions that all states shall prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts and refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts. It also calls on all member states to prevent terrorists from benefiting directly or indirectly from ransom payments or from political concessions and to secure the safe release of hostages. Argentina offered an explanation of vote after the adoption.

Côte d’Ivoire
On 27 January, the Security Council was briefed by Aïchatou MindaoudouSouleymane, the Special Representative and head of UNOCI, on the latest report of the Secretary-General (S/2013/761) via video-conference (S/PV.7102). Ambassador Yousseffou Bamba (Côte d’Ivoire) also made a statement. As requested by resolution 2112, the Secretary-General’s report included refined strategic benchmarks to measure progress in the achievement of long-term stability in the country, as well as information on the ongoing analysis of the comparative advantages of UNOCI and the UN country team. The briefing was followed by consultations.

Yemen
On 28 January, Council members were briefed by Special Adviser Jamal Benomar on the conclusion of the National Dialogue Conference and the next steps ahead of Yemen’s political transition.

Maintenance of International Peace and Security
At the initiative of Jordan, President of the Council in January, the Council held an open debate on 29 January on “War, its lessons, and the search for a permanent peace”. Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman briefed the Council (S/PV.7105). Earlier in the month, Jordan circulated a concept note for the open debate to member states (S/2014/30).
Protection of Civilians

Expected Council Action
In February, the Security Council will hold an open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. It appears that the debate will focus on implementing the protection aspects of UN peacekeeping mandates, one of the five core challenges first outlined in the 2009 Secretary-General’s report on protection of civilians in armed conflict (S/2009/277). (The other four are enhancing compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law, enhancing compliance by non-state armed groups, ensuring humanitarian access and promoting accountability.) Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos, High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, Assistant-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet and a high-level ICRC official are the expected briefers.

A presidential statement is the likely outcome.

Key Recent Developments
The Council’s most recent debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict was held on 19 August 2013 (S/PV.7019). The Council was briefed by Secretary-General Ban Kimoon, Pillay, Amos and ICRC Director for International Law and Cooperation Philip Spoerri. In addition to Council members, 38 member states and the EU participated in the debate. There was no outcome.

The Secretary-General issued his tenth report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict on 22 November 2013 asserting that “the current state of the protection of civilians leaves little room for optimism” (S/2013/689).

It expressed particular concern about attacks against, and other interference with, healthcare facilities, personnel and transport, as well as continuing attacks against journalists. Moreover, it expressed concern about reports of civilian casualties resulting from drone attacks and the lack of transparency surrounding such attacks. The use of autonomous weapons systems, or so-called “killer robots”, was also for the first time raised as an issue that required further consideration.

On 13 December 2013, Council members held an Arria formula meeting on the protection of journalists co-chaired by Ambassadors Gérard Araud (France) and Gert Rosenthal (Guatemala). The meeting featured presentations by Irina Bokova, Director-General of UNESCO; Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor of the ICC; David Rohde, an investigative journalist; Christophe Deloire, Director General of Reporters Without Borders; Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression; and Anne-Marie Capomaccio, of Radio France Internationale. The purpose of the meeting was to take stock of the implementation of resolution 1738, which focused on the protection of journalists and other related personnel in armed conflict. The meeting also addressed such questions as how to ensure a safe environment for journalists, how to strengthen the implementation of norms and mechanisms to protect journalists and how to protect journalists in non-conflict situations.

On 17 December, Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson presented the “Rights Up Front” initiative to member states during an informal session of the General Assembly. The initiative is an action plan to implement the recommendations of the November 2012 report of the Internal Review Panel on UN Action in Sri Lanka, which found significant failings by the UN system in addressing human rights violations against civilians in the final stages of the civil war in Sri Lanka in 2008-2009.

The action plan, which was developed by an inter-departmental and inter-agency UN working group, consists of six elements:

- integrating human rights into the lifeblood of staff so that they understand what the UN’s mandates and commitments to human rights mean for their department, agency, fund or programme and for them personally;
- providing member states with candid information with respect to peoples at risk of, or subject to, serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law;
- ensuring coherent strategies of action on the ground and leveraging UN capacities in a concerted manner;
- adopting at Headquarters a “One-UN approach” to facilitate early coordinated action;
- achieving, through better analysis, greater impact in the UN’s human rights protection work; and
- supporting all these activities through an improved system of information management on serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law.

During his briefing, Eliasson noted that in order for the “Rights Up Front” agenda to be successful, support from the member states would be required, adding that “any requirements for new resources, or proposals to shift resources would...be discussed and approved by member states through regular budget processes”.

Key Issues
A continuing key issue for the Council is the importance of consolidating and ensuring implementation of the existing normative framework on protection of civilians in country-specific situations.

A related issue is whether and how this debate will result in concrete improvements in how the Council formulates and manages elements related to protection of civilians in peacekeeping mandates.

Also an important issue is whether and how the “Rights Up Front” initiative will impact the work of the Council and the broader UN system on protection issues moving forward. It is clear, for example, that this new agenda has positively informed the Secretariat’s response to the recent crisis in South Sudan.

Options
The most likely option for the Council is to adopt a presidential statement at the open debate. In the statement, the Council might endorse the “Rights Up Front” action plan and adopt a revised version of the aide-mémoire (S/PRST/2010/25). (Initially created on 15 March 2002, and last updated on 22 November 2010, the aide-mémoire provides guidance on the Council’s work on protection issues).

The Council might also consider supporting some of the recommendations from the Secretary-General’s recent protection of civilians report by including language in the statement that:

- condemns the use of explosive weapons in...
Protection of Civilians (con’t)

populated locations;
• requests parties to conflict to develop mechanisms to track civilian casualties;
• requests that UN actors develop a common system to record civilian casualties to strengthen efforts to monitor and report violations of international human rights and humanitarian law;
• urges troop- and police-contributing countries to ensure that their personnel have requisite pre-deployment training in protection issues;
• urges the promotion of accountability for attacks on humanitarian workers, including by encouraging country-level investigations and prosecutions; and
• insists upon member state cooperation with the ICC.

Other options available to the Council include:
• making sure all relevant Council-mandated missions have a strong human rights monitoring mandate and adequate resources to implement that mandate;
• consistently requesting horizon-scanning briefings by the Secretariat and making sure that these include relevant updates on key protection issues;
• mainstreaming protection of civilians concerns through the use of “any other business” in consultations; and
• increasing Council members’ interactions with civil society actors well-attuned to the protection needs of civilians in specific conflict situations.

Council Dynamics
It appears that the UK, the lead in the Council on protection of civilians, and Lithuania, Council president in February, believe that discussing a particular aspect of the protection of civilians agenda will help to ensure that the debate is focused and constructive. Several members seem to share this perspective, although it has been noted that focusing the debate on the implementation of protection elements of UN peacekeeping mandates could inhibit in-depth discussion of challenging cases such as the situations in the Central African Republic and Syria.

Fundamental fault lines continue to divide the Council on this agenda item, especially in some instances at the country-specific level. Some members, notably China and Russia, emphasise the need to respect national sovereignty as an element in any decision to ensure civilian protection and therefore are generally reluctant to authorise measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, such as sanctions. Others give less weight to the sovereignty argument and thus have a lower threshold for when the Council should act to protect civilians. This divide has undermined Council efforts to protect civilians in Syria and in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states in Sudan.

The new composition of the Council in 2014 may have some impact on the Council’s approach to protection issues. Pakistan and to some extent Azerbaijan, which left the Council at the end of 2013, were perceived by some as reluctant on many protection issues. Of the new members, Chile and Lithuania appear most likely to support the wider protection of civilians agenda, whereas Jordan and Nigeria, both leading troop contributors to UN peacekeeping missions, are likely to pay attention to the need for adequate resources for missions to fulfil their protection mandates. Chad is on the Secretary-General’s list of countries that recruit and use child soldiers, although it has signed an action plan that it is striving to implement in an effort to be delisted.

Rule of Law

Expected Council Action
An open debate on strengthening the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security is planned in February. In addition to member states at large, the Secretary-General will likely address the Council. A presidential statement is expected as an outcome.

Background
In recent years, rule of law and justice issues have gained prominence in Council thinking and discussions about long-term solutions. They have also influenced the design of its operations in the field and are now part of mainstream Council discussion and action.

Rule of law and international justice issues also have become a focus in a number of other thematic issues in the Council—such as protection of civilians; children and armed conflict; and women, peace and security—and are referred to when evaluating resort to sanctions.

The Council held its first thematic debate on the rule of law in 2003, followed by debates in 2004, 2006 and 2010. The last open debate on the rule of law as a general thematic issue was held on 19 January 2012 (S/PV.6705 and Resumption 1). In a presidential statement following the debate, the Council recognised that sustainable peacebuilding requires an integrated approach that strengthens the coherence between political security, development, human rights and rule of law activities (S/PRST/2012/1). It also reaffirmed the Council’s opposition to impunity for serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law. The Council requested the Secretary-General to report within 12 months regarding the effectiveness of UN system-wide support for promoting the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict situations. (For more on the issue, please see Security Council Report’s 18 January 2013 Cross-Cutting Report on the Rule of Law: The Security Council and Accountability.)

UN DOCUMENTS ON RULE OF LAW Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2012/1 (19 January 2012) was on the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security and requested the Secretary-General to provide a follow-up report within 12 months. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2013/341 (11 June 2013) was on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict situations. S/2004/616 (23 August 2004) was the report. The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, which assessed existing UN practices, experience and expertise and put forward a series of recommendations for both the Council and the UN system. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.7060 (15 November 2013) was the vote on the draft resolution on the ICC referral of President Kenyatta and his deputy. S/PV.6913 (30 January 2013) was the briefing on the rule of law. S/PV.6849 and Resumption 1 (17 October 2012) was the open debate on the relationship of the Council with the ICC. S/PV.6705 and Resumption 1 (19 January 2012) was the latest open debate on the rule of law. Other S/2013/660 (15 November 2013) was the draft resolution on the Kenya referral. S/2012/860 (20 November 2012) was the letter from Liechtenstein proposing the establishment of a body to address questions arising from the relationship between the Council and the ICC.
Key Developments since the 2012 Debate

Several developments relating to various aspects of the rule of law have taken place at the Council since the 19 January 2012 debate.

On 24 September 2012, the General Assembly adopted a “Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels” (A/RES/67/1). The declaration stated that impunity would not be tolerated for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, violations of international humanitarian law and gross violations of human rights law. Such violations must be investigated and appropriately sanctioned, including by bringing the perpetrators of any crimes to justice through domestic mechanisms or, where appropriate, regional or international mechanisms, in accordance with international law. The declaration also recognised the contribution of the Security Council to the rule of law while discharging its primary responsibility in the maintenance of international peace and security.

On the initiative of Guatemala, on 17 October 2012 the Council held an open debate on “the promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security,” which focused particularly on the relationship of the Council with the International Criminal Court (ICC) (S/PV.6849 and Resumption 1). This was the first debate focusing on Council overall interaction with the ICC rather than specifically on the two referrals agreed to by the Council, under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute of the ICC, in resolutions 1593 (2005) on Darfur and 1970 (2011) on Libya.

Speaking in the Council were the Secretary-General; the President of the ICC, Judge Sang-Hyun Song; and Phakiso Mochokoko, from the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC. Fifty states and the EU participated in the debate. The debate produced several calls for the Council to improve its interaction and cooperation with the ICC, including effective follow-up on its Article 13(b) referrals to ensure its own credibility and the legitimacy of international criminal justice, especially regarding cooperation with the ICC. Another suggestion was to establish a subsidiary body of the Council on the ICC or to amend the existing mandate of the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals to include the ICC. On 20 November 2012, Liechtenstein sent the Council a letter, also signed by Costa Rica and Jordan, proposing the establishment of such a body to systematically address questions arising from the relationship between the Council and the ICC or to expand the mandate of the Informal Working Group to this effect (S/2012/860). Some Council members suggested that the ICC Prosecutor should brief the working group, but that divided the Council.

On 30 January 2013, Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson briefed the Council on the rule of law, followed by consultations among members (S/PV.6913). The briefing was to coincide with the Secretary-General’s report requested in the 2012 presidential statement, but the report was delayed and was eventually submitted to the Council only on 11 June 2013 (S/2013/341). The report concluded that a strategy for evaluating the rule of law did not exist and developing such a strategy should be a goal of the UN system, a task the Secretary-General intends to undertake.

A recurring issue confronting Council members has been the request that the ICC proceedings against President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Samoei Ruto of Kenya be deferred for a year. Council members held an interactive dialogue with Kenya on 23 May 2013 and with an AU high-level contact group regarding an AU request for a deferral on 31 October. The issue was discussed again by Council members under “any other business” during consultations on 11 November, and consultations on the matter were held on 12 November. Notably, when the issue was brought before the Council by Kenya in 2011, Council members were generally in agreement that a deferral was unwarranted. Yet during the more recent meetings there seemed to be a split in the Council regarding the AU request. A draft resolution (S/2013/660) on a deferral was finally put to a vote on 15 November by Morocco, Rwanda and Togo but was not adopted as only seven Council members voted in favour and the remaining eight abstained (S/PV.7060).

Key Issues

An issue for the Council is to be able to develop a more enduring and sustained focus on issues of justice and rule of law, as it has done with other thematic issues regularly on its agenda.

An important emerging issue is cooperation between the Council and its subsidiary bodies and international justice mechanisms, such as the ICC.

An increasingly important issue is what the Council can do to support and strengthen national rule of law and transitional justice within its mandates.

Options

One option is adopting a presidential statement simply focusing on areas covered in the debate without asking for any follow-up action.

Another option is a presidential statement that makes specific recommendations for greater Council involvement, with an in-depth focus on institution-building and national capacities.

Requesting a follow-up report on the rule of law from the Secretary-General is a likely option.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Lithuania intends to circulate a concept paper for the open debate. In order for the discussion to be more practically oriented, Lithuania wishes to steer the meeting to focus on the vital role of Council-mandated missions in addressing the root causes of conflict and supporting host countries in ensuring stability by strengthening rule of law institutions in conflict and post-conflict settings.

Council members in general are supportive of the debate and see the relevance of the rule of law to the Council’s work. As with some other recent thematic debates, there is general awareness that the Council must be cautious not to appear to encroach on the jurisdiction of other UN organs. Some Council members may try to limit the scope and language of the expected presidential statement in accordance with their view of the Council’s mandate under the UN Charter. References to the ICC may prove difficult to agree on following the political fallout from failed draft resolution on the Kenya deferral.
Central African Republic

Expected Council Action
In February, the chair of the 2127 Central African Republic (CAR) Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Raimonda Murmokaitė (Lithuania), will brief the Council on the work of its most recent Committee, established by resolution 2127 of 5 December 2013.

The Council may also be briefed on the activities of the African-led International Support Mission in the CAR (MISCA) as resolution 2127 requests the AU to report to the Council every 60 days on the deployment and activities of the mission.

The mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the CAR (BINUCA) expires on 31 January 2015.

Key Recent Developments
Since the Séléka uprising, culminating in the 24 March 2013 ousting of President François Bozizé, the CAR has fallen into a state of lawlessness, with a complete breakdown in state authority and a growing humanitarian crisis. The situation worsened despite the deployment in December of MISCA and Opération Sangaris by France as authorised in resolution 2127. Nearly a million people are internally displaced and more than 1,000 have been killed in Bangui since 5 December, figures in the countryside are unknown due to lack of information. It is estimated that half of the 4.5 million inhabitants of the CAR are in need of humanitarian assistance.

As for BINUCA itself, the report indicates that some operations have taken place but that the mission has been unable to implement its new mandate under resolution 2121 due to the security situation. Additionally, the report, to the dismay of some Council members, contains no recommendations regarding BINUCA itself. As for a UN peacekeeping operation, the report contains no specific recommendations, unlike the Secretary-General’s previous report (S/2013/677).

Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman briefed the Council on the BINUCA report on 6 January. In his public comments, Feltman elaborated on the dire situation in the CAR and called for action without specifying what action should be taken. During consultations, he addressed allegations that Opération Sangaris and components of MISCA are favouring one religious group over the other and suggested that international forces on the ground take a more integrated and coordinated approach to address this issue. He also told Council members about the tensions between ex-Séléka leader and interim President Michel Djotodia and Prime Minister Nicolas Tiangaye, which are disrupting the transitional political process. France suggested during consultations that the elections scheduled for February 2015 be held earlier, though other members are uncertain about the plausibility of this suggestion. Some delegations also raised the issue of authorising targeted sanctions, yet other Council members were hesitant on this issue, in particular some of the P5.

In comments to the press after consultations, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein (Jordan), the president of the Council in January, said that Council members still disagreed about the transformation of MISCA into a UN peacekeeping mission.

Following an extraordinary summit of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in N’djamena on 8-9 January and facing international pressure, Djotodia resigned as interim president and went to Benin. (Tiangaye resigned as well.) The situation in the CAR has calmed somewhat, yet reports of violent inter-communal attacks persist.

On 20 January, the mayor of Bangui, Catherine Samba-Panza, was elected by the interim National Council as interim president. On 25 January, the interim government chose Andre Nzapayeke as prime minister. In the meantime, Séléka leaders are reported as fleeing the CAR and on 24 January, Joseph Kalite, a former health minister who had supported the Séléka was found dead in Bangui.

EU foreign ministers approved on 20 January a military mission to the CAR of up to 1,000 troops. The force is to deploy around Bangui airport, where many civilians have taken refuge, allowing Operation Sangaris, currently stationed there, to perform other tasks. The EU indicated that it would seek Council authorisation for the force, which would be deployed for six months and expected to begin operations towards the end of February. (At press time, it was unclear which EU countries would contribute troops.)

EU and other foreign donors met in Brussels and pledged nearly $500 million in humanitarian assistance for the CAR, with major contributions from the EU, France and the US.

At the initiative of Luxembourg, the Council was briefed on 22 January on the humanitarian situation in the CAR by Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict Leila Zerrougui, Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict Zainab Hawa Bangura, Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide Adama Dieng and Kyung-wha Kang, Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator at the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Zerrougui, Dieng and Bangura’s chief of staff, Nancee Oku Bright, made a joint visit to the CAR from 17-21 December 2013. The briefing was followed by consultations.

Zerrougui said that as many as 6,000 child soldiers are currently associated with various armed forces and groups and children have been directly attacked, maimed, killed and beheaded.

Bangura informed the Council that between January and November 2013, the UN recorded at least 4,530 cases of sexual violence perpetrated by armed men, with more assaults reported during last month’s attacks in Bangui.

On 28 January, the Council adopted resolution 2134 renewing BINUCA’s mandate for a year. The resolution enhances the
role of the mission in assisting the transitional process, reforms and human rights monitoring. It also authorises the deployment of the EU force for six months and expands the sanctions regime to include targeted sanctions (travel ban and assets freeze) on individuals that hinder the political process, violate international humanitarian law and human rights law or violate the arms embargo. Also affected by these targeted sanctions will be individuals and entities that have recruited and used children in armed conflict, provided support for armed groups through illicit exploitation of natural resources, obstructed the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the CAR and have been involved in attacks against UN missions or international security presences.

It seems that during the negotiations there were some disagreements on including all of the above elements in a single resolution, which was a mixture of a Chapter VI mandate (BINUCA) and some Chapter VII elements (the EU force and sanctions). But eventually agreement was reached.

The 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee held its first formal meeting on 16 January to discuss preliminary procedural issues after an informal meeting the day before. Committee members agreed on the Committee guidelines and the text of the letter to be sent to UN member states, inviting them to report to the Committee on the implementation of sanctions. The Secretariat has indicated to Council members that the nominees for the Panel of Experts assisting the Committee will be appointed in the near future. The mission noted that while Opération Sangaris and additional MISCA troops had defused further large-scale attacks by ex-Séléka, the disarming of the group left Muslim communities vulnerable to anti-balaka retaliatory attacks. The mission also received allegations of the involvement of some MISCA soldiers in the killing of Christian civilians. She reported that on 14 January an advance team deployed to the CAR and neighbouring countries to prepare for the establishment of the international commission of inquiry mandated by the Security Council. She added that additional human rights officers would be deployed to the CAR in the following weeks to strengthen BINUCA.

At the end of the session, the HRC adopted a resolution emphasising the urgency of appointing an independent expert on the situation of human rights in the CAR. (The HRC established this mandate on 27 September in resolution 24/34 but the expert had not yet been appointed.) The HRC subsequently decided to appoint Marie-Thérèse Keita Bocoum as independent expert.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is to sustain the current hands-on approach towards the CAR. This may entail authorising a UN peacekeeping mission in the near future.

A related issue after the adoption of resolution 2127 is providing continued and effective support to MISCA and the other international forces so they can restore security in the country immediately.

Another issue is ensuring that BINUCA can fulfil its mandate in light of the dire security situation, including as a possible civilian component of a future UN peacekeeping mission.

An additional issue is ensuring that the transitional process, now under new leadership, moves forward successfully.

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 20 January, the Human Rights Council (HRC) held its first special session on the human rights situations in the CAR. Michael Moller, the acting head of the UN Office in Geneva, delivered a message from the Secretary-General. Navi Pillay, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and Chako Beyani, the chairperson of the Coordination Committee of Special Procedures, also spoke.

Pillay briefed on the findings of the human rights monitoring mission deployed to the CAR on 12-14 December 2013. The mission documented large-scale human rights violations perpetrated by the ex-Séléka, the anti-Balaka, as well as by Muslim and Christian civilians. It concurred that at least 1,000 people were killed in Bangui during the 5–6 December violence. Pillay said that the 5 December attacks prompted a rapidly escalating cycle of sectarian violations and reprisals. The mission noted that while Opération Sangaris and additional MISCA troops had defused further large-scale attacks by ex-Séléka, the disarming of the group left Muslim communities vulnerable to anti-balaka retaliatory attacks. The mission also received allegations of the involvement of some MISCA soldiers in the killing of Christian civilians. She reported that on 14 January an advance team deployed to the CAR and neighbouring countries to prepare for the establishment of the international commission of inquiry mandated by the Security Council. She added that additional human rights officers would be deployed to the CAR in the following weeks to strengthen BINUCA.

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Options
Options for the Council include:
• issuing a presidential or press statement in light of further developments and challenges to express the Council’s commitment to help solve the continuing crisis;
• establishing a peacekeeping operation and transforming BINUCA into its civilian component in the next few months;
• albeit unlikely for security concerns, undertaking a Council visiting mission; and
• listing individuals for violations of the criteria set out under resolution 2134, either by the Council or in the Committee.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Since the Council adopted resolution 2127, the possibility of establishing a UN peacekeeping operation continues to be the main topic of discussion among Council members. While there may be general agreement that such a mission may be inevitable, there are disagreements on when and how this can take place. Russia, the US and the African Council members believe MISCA and the other international forces should be given time to fulfil their mandates and restore security in the CAR, while close attention should be paid to ensuring the success of the transitional political process. The AU, on which a UN peacekeeping mission would likely be dependent for troops, is currently of the firm position that the establishment of a UN mission should wait for a future point in time.

Another consideration raised against creating a UN peacekeeping mission at this point is the cost of such a mission. The reluctance to increase the peacekeeping budget was evident when the Council authorised an increase in peacekeepers in South Sudan by transferring troops from other UN missions. The focus on addressing the current crisis in South Sudan may affect consideration of the CAR and further delay the possible deployment of UN peacekeepers.

Other Council members, first and foremost France, are highly supportive of a UN peacekeeping force to take over operations in the CAR, viewing it as the only effective solution to the crisis. They believe that BINUCA should become its civilian component and that this is necessary for the force to be able to address both the security threats and...
reforms and assistance needed in the political, institutional and humanitarian spheres.

The Secretary-General’s report on a possible transformation of MISCA into a UN peacekeeping operation is due by early March but it may be delayed further. The recent Secretary-General’s report and Secretariat briefings are more ambivalent about the desirability of turning MISCA into a UN peacekeeping mission than his 15 November 2013 report on the issue. It is unlikely that the Council will take decisive steps in this direction before the Secretary-General’s next report.

France is the penholder on the CAR.

Burundi

Expected Council Action
The mandate of the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB) expires on 15 February and at press time it seems unlikely—though not out of the question—that it would be renewed. If BNUB is not renewed, the Council may adopt a presidential statement on the situation in Burundi and the termination of BNUB.

Key Recent Developments
In accordance with resolution 2090, which last renewed BNUB, a strategic assessment mission (SAM) visited Burundi from 4-10 November to assess the country’s progress. The conclusions of the SAM were included in the Secretary-General’s report on BNUB (S/2014/36). The SAM concluded that the security situation in Burundi remained stable, but in light of the political and institutional challenges in the country, and human rights concerns, BNUB should remain until after the June 2015 general elections.

However, Burundi had openly stated that it wished to see BNUB terminated because it viewed BNUB as a signal to private foreign investors that the country was unstable. In light of this position, the SAM offered two less preferred options, the first being a scaled down political mission and the second, as a last resort, the appointment of a special envoy to promote and facilitate dialogue between national actors and coordinate international efforts to ensure a conducive, free and fair environment for the 2015 elections.

Against this background, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of BNUB, Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, held talks with the government to try to reach an agreement regarding a continued UN political presence in the country.

While several scenarios were discussed, one compromise that seemed to be agreeable was a smaller political mission with a focus on specific issues, such as electoral assistance, that would remain in the country until after the June 2015 elections. In a 26 December letter to President Pierre Nkurunziza, the Secretary-General suggested a UN political mission on those terms. However, on 31 December, Nkurunziza informed the Secretary-General that Burundi rejected this proposal.

On 17 January, Burundi forwarded a 15 January letter from Foreign Minister Laurent Kabakure which unequivocally stated that Burundi wished BNUB to expire and, furthermore, that Onanga-Anyanga should ensure that BNUB concluded all operations within six months of its termination date.

Onanga-Anyanga and Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland), the chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) briefed the Council on BNUB on 28 January (S/PV.7104). Onanga-Anyanga told the Council that the recommendation to extend the political presence in Burundi is based on the evaluation of peacebuilding benchmarks, and took into account the fact that a country team would not be able to absorb the mission’s tasks at the present time. The Burundi foreign minister also addressed the Council, stating that the UN country team can provide support for the June 2015 elections and so there is no justification to extend BNUB’s mandate.

Controversy continued over the government’s intention to amend the constitution, possibly before the elections. Enacted in 2005, the constitution enshrines the principles of the 2000 Arusha Accords, including ethnic power-sharing arrangements between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority and checks on majority rule.

A related issue is the recent indication that Nkurunziza, who is currently serving a second term, intends to run for re-election in 2015 although the constitution only allows two five-year terms. However, supporters claim that since he was elected by the National Assembly in 2005 and not by universal suffrage, he may run for another term in 2015. Others do not accept this interpretation of the constitution. There is no suggestion that the constitution be amended regarding allowable presidential terms, but some fear that the strengthened powers of the prime minister the constitutional amendments favoured by the government are aimed at ensuring that if Nkurunziza cannot be re-elected as president, he can retain influence as a future prime minister.

Developments in the PBC
Seger visited Burundi from 13-17 January to assess peacebuilding efforts in the country. Prior to the visit, he was informed that, as opposed to past practice, interaction with the government would be limited to two meetings with the foreign minister and the second vice president, reflecting the politically limited role the government wishes the PBC to play, although it is still of the position that the Configuration should operate till after the elections.

During the visit, Seger additionally met with other political and civil society actors to discuss such issues as the need for a continued BNUB presence, the follow-up to the Geneva donor conference held on 29-30 October 2012, economic development, and the revision of the constitution and other concerning acts of legislation, such as the press law and the new land law. After meeting with the second vice president, Seger stated that if Burundi wishes BNUB to expire, it should not seek to do so immediately but rather as a process.

Key Issues
As Burundi has clearly stated its desire for BNUB to depart imminently, a key issue is evaluating thoroughly Burundi’s progress in...
achieved the benchmarks for the future evolution of BNUB into a UN country team.

A further issue is addressing the role of the PBC in Burundi, especially if BNUB is significantly scaled down or terminated.

Options
Options for the Council regarding BNUB include:

• scaling down its size and mandate to focus on particular issues, such as election preparations and related institutions;
• replacing it with a scaled-down political mission;
• appointing a special envoy to Burundi or calling on the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region, Mary Robinson, to play a greater role in political dialogue in the country; or
• terminating BNUB altogether.

If BNUB is not renewed, the Council may adopt a presidential statement addressing the timeframe for its closure, the progress achieved in Burundi over the years, the challenges remaining and the concerns of Council members about possible developments that might lead to a deterioration of the situation in the country.

Council Dynamics
At press time, it appeared that Burundi was quite determined to see BNUB terminated, and attempts to broker a meaningful UN political presence in the country had not been fruitful.

Several Council members, such as France, Luxembourg and the UK, are of the opinion that a political mission is still needed and that in order to ensure future progress in Burundi, BNUB should remain until the conclusion of a successful electoral process in 2015. In line with this view, they have sought to persuade Burundi to change its position, with no success thus far. However, some Council members, such as China and Russia, stress that the wishes of Burundi regarding BNUB are to be respected.

All Council members are nevertheless cognizant that BNUB requires the consent of the host government as a matter of law since it is a Chapter VI political mission. In addition, BNUB would not be able to implement its mandate without official cooperation.

If the mandate is not renewed, several Council members will be inclined to issue a presidential statement commending the progress achieved in Burundi in the past 20 years while highlighting the remaining political challenges and concerns, and possible regression in the security situation if those are not addressed. In addition, they will seek to apply pressure on Burundi to accept that BNUB’s drawdown period be extended beyond six months.

The penholder on Burundi is France.

South Sudan

Expected Council Action
In February, the Council is scheduled to hold a meeting, likely in consultations, to discuss the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), as well as the broader situation in South Sudan, in accordance with resolution 2132 of 24 December 2013. (The Council requested the Secretariat to report on the implementation of this resolution, which increased the troop and police ceiling of UNMISS, in 15 days and at least every 30 days thereafter.) Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet is expected to brief. It is possible that Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNMISS Hilde Johnson will participate via video teleconference.

Given the severity and fluidity of the situation in South Sudan, it is possible that other meetings on the issue may be held in February. At press time, no outcome was anticipated, but this could change depending on how the Council decides to address developments in South Sudan during the month.

Key Recent Developments
The outbreak of violence in South Sudan on 16 December was the culmination of a political crisis within the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Tensions within the party had reached a boiling point in the days before the conflict erupted. On 6 December, former Vice President Riek Machar, who was sacked by President Salva Kiir during a July 2013 cabinet reshuffle, and other SPLM officials held a press conference to criticise Kiir for “dictatorial tendencies”.

On 16 December, after clashes within the presidential guard in Juba, Kiir alleged that a coup had been attempted by Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) forces loyal to Machar. Machar denied the allegation but subsequently took charge of the ensuing rebellion. Eleven high-ranking SPLM officials were detained by Kiir at the outset of the crisis.

The clashes quickly expanded in Juba and then beyond the capital. The human toll was significant with the International Crisis Group estimating on 9 January that close to 10,000 people had been killed. From the outset, while the fighting was sparked by a political dispute, it took on an ethnic component, with members of the Dinka and Nuer communities committing atrocities against one another in a spiralling cycle of retaliatory violence. (Kiir is a Dinka, and Machar is a Nuer.) The capitals of Jonglei (Bor), Unity (Bentiu) and Upper Nile (Malakal) states, key strategic towns that witnessed heavy fighting, were the sites of large-scale destruction of property, killings and displacement. Control of these towns changed hands several times, although they all appeared to be under the control of government forces by the time a ceasefire deal was brokered by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on 23 January.
Tensions rose between the government of South Sudan and UNMISS during the conflict. Government forces in Juba temporarily confiscated UNMISS weapons and ammunition on 15 January. On 19 January, high-level government officials accompanied by troops threatened to break into the UNMISS base in Bor, believing that the UN was harbouring armed rebels there. UNMISS repelled the attempted intrusion and denied the allegations. Following the incident, Kiir accused UNMISS of acting like a “parallel government”.

In an apparent attempt to quell these tensions, South Sudan sent a letter to the Security Council on 23 January in which it affirmed “its willingness to work closely with the leadership of UNMISS, as they provide critical support to the people and Government of South Sudan during this time” (S/2014/46).

On 16 January, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated that the violence had displaced roughly 468,000 people, while about 83,900 had sought refuge in neighbouring countries, including Uganda (45,239), Ethiopia (20,264), Sudan (10,000) and Kenya (8,430). As of 27 January, almost 76,000 internally displaced persons were protected in eight UN bases across the country, including roughly 36,000 in two facilities in Juba and 27,000 at a base in Malakal. Many of them are fearful of being targeted by inter-ethnic violence if they try to return home.

In addition to the refugee crisis, there were other regional implications to the conflict. Uganda, which initially sent in troops to evacuate its nationals and protect infrastructure, including the airport and presidential palace in Juba, admitted on 16 January that its troops were fighting alongside the government against the rebels, particularly in and around Bor. When President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan met with Kiir in Juba on 6 January, media reports initially suggested that Bashir and Kiir were negotiating the creation of a joint force to defend oil fields in South Sudan near the border with Sudan. The parties subsequently dismissed these reports, but it was also reported, accurately it appears, that the parties had agreed to consider the potential deployment of approximately 900 oil technicians from Sudan to work on South Sudan oil facilities vacated by foreign workers at the start of the conflict. At press time, it did not appear that this plan had come to fruition.

After weeks of negotiations in Addis Ababa with IGAD mediation, a breakthrough was reached on 23 January, when the parties committed to a cessation of hostilities. They also signed an agreement on the status of the detainees, recognising a commitment to “undertake every effort to expedite the release of the detainees” and agreeing to the establishment of “an all-inclusive National Reconciliation Process in which the detainees and other political actors, civil society organisations, traditional and religious leaders have a significant role to play”.

Council members have been focused on the crisis from the beginning. They were briefed on South Sudan under “any other business” on 17 December. They held further consultations on the matter on 20, 23 and 30 December 2013 and on 9 and 23 January. They also issued several press statements (SC/11221, SC/11227, SC/11236 and SC/11244) condemning the fighting and calling for dialogue and a cessation of hostilities. On 23 January, Council members issued another press statement (SC/11261) following consultations on South Sudan welcoming the cessation of hostilities, condemning violations of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) by South Sudan and welcoming the decision by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) to establish a commission to investigate human rights violations during the conflict.

Most significantly, the Council adopted resolution 2132 on 24 December 2013. The resolution increased the troop ceiling of the mission from 7,000 to 12,500 troops and the police level from 900 to 1,323, specifically in order to help enhance the protection of civilians and provide humanitarian assistance. The additional troops and police, as well as force enablers, were to come temporarily to UNMISS through inter-mission cooperation. On 9 January, Ladsous said that transfer of assets and personnel to UNMISS would take four to six weeks. At press time, efforts to meet troop and police ceilings authorised in resolution 2132 were ongoing. As of 23 January, three formed police units (approximately 140 police per unit), 350 troops, two military utility helicopters and one C130 transport plane had been transferred to UNMISS.

On 17 December, just two days after the fighting broke out in Juba, Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson presented the “Rights up Front” initiative to member states during an informal session of the General Assembly. It has been argued that this initiative—which focuses on how to enhance the UN system’s efforts to protect civilians from human rights violations—has positively informed the Secretariat’s response to the crisis in South Sudan.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 24 December, High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay called on both sides to protect civilians and refrain from instigating violence based on ethnic grounds. She said that mass extrajudicial killings, the targeting of individuals on the basis of their ethnicity and arbitrary detentions have been documented. Pillay noted the discovery of a mass grave in Bentiu in Unity State and said that there were reportedly two mass graves in Juba.

Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights Ivan Šimonović travelled to South Sudan from 14-17 January to assess the human rights situation in the country, visiting Juba, Bor and Bentiu. In a press statement on 17 January, Šimonović said that the conflict had reached the threshold of an internal armed conflict with mass atrocities committed by both sides. He told the media he had received reports of mass killings, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, sexual violence, widespread destruction of property and the use of children in the conflict. He asserted that the worst affected communities were in Juba and in areas that have changed hands several times, as Bentiu and Bor.

He stressed the need for an independent fact-finding mission and accountability while welcoming the key role played by UNMISS in protecting civilians in the past few weeks and the reinforcement of its human rights monitoring capacity. (The UN currently has 90 human rights investigators in South Sudan.) Speaking at a press conference in New York on 20 January, Šimonović highlighted the approach adopted by UNMISS of providing protection to civilians seeking shelter in its compounds. He stressed that the number of victims would have been much higher had the UN not opened its compounds to some 70,000 people seeking protection. But, he admitted, such an unprecedented protection effort was bringing a number of humanitarian and security challenges.

Key Issues

A key issue is the need for UNMISS to continue to protect civilians and ensure that humanitarian access is provided. In spite of the 23 January cessation of hostilities, Johnson mentioned to Council members in consultations on the same day the risk that some armed groups might continue to fight against the government, thus signalling the ongoing
South Sudan (con’t)

instability of the security situation and the potential risk to civilians.

Another key issue is the ongoing violations of the SOFA between UNMISS and South Sudan—as well as misconduct towards humanitarian actors by both government and opposition forces—given that such acts place UNMISS personnel and humanitarian partners at risk and inhibit their ability to fulfill their responsibilities.

Also an important issue is whether UNMISS’s mandate should be adapted moving forward to emphasize the protection of civilians as the main priority of the mission.

A potential related issue, if the security environment remains unstable, is whether the strength of the mission should be expanded on a more permanent basis, as the current inter-mission cooperation is a temporary measure. This would require increasing the budget and recruiting additional troops and police for the mission.

Another key issue is how the Council can support justice and reconciliation efforts in South Sudan to help the country heal from the recent violence and avoid a relapse into conflict.

Underlying Problems
The state-building process has made little progress since South Sudan became independent in 2011. The impact of efforts to conduct an inclusive constitutional review process, to reform the security sector and to combat corruption has been limited.

Existing political and ethnic tensions have been exacerbated by the conflict. Since the fighting erupted in mid-December, several analysts have emphasized its fundamentally political nature. This view is supported by the evidence. Kiir’s political opponents were embittered by his authoritarian governing style, and the conflict never fit the simplistic characterisations as a Dinka-versus-Nuer dispute. The government forces represent several ethnic groups, as do the rebels opposing them. Additionally, five of the 11 SPLM officials detained by Kiir are Dinka, while Foreign Minister Barnaba Marial Benjamin is a Nuer. On the other hand, the fighting did take on an ethnic dimension, suggesting that significant efforts will be needed to promote healing, reconciliation and the creation of a stronger sense of national identity among the various ethnic communities.

Options
Options for the Council include:
• requesting a report from UNMISS specifically on violations of international human rights and humanitarian law committed during the crisis;
• imposing targeted sanctions against those responsible for such crimes;
• signalling the imperative for progress in the constitutional review process and urging enhanced political dialogue in South Sudan; and
• conducting a visiting mission to South Sudan, where the Council has not been since 2011, to meet with key stakeholders to get their input about how the Council can best support efforts toward national reconciliation and to emphasize the Council’s resolve to stay engaged with the situation.

Council members may also consider altering the mandate of UNMISS to prioritize the protection of civilians; the provision of humanitarian access; and human rights monitoring and reporting. Along these lines, it could also expand the force structure of UNMISS to enable it to fulfill protection tasks more robustly.

Council Dynamics
The Council has been unified in its concern about the magnitude of the fighting, the inter-communal aspects of the conflict and the reports of gross human rights violations. There is also a widespread belief on the Council in the importance of protecting civilians and holding accountable those who have committed atrocities. Members have been alarmed as well by a recurring pattern of misconduct by government forces, which began well before the recent conflict erupted, and they are unified in their condemnation of SOFA violations.

The US is the penholder on South Sudan.

Sudan and South Sudan

Expected Council Action
In February, the Council is scheduled to hold one meeting, likely in consultations, on Sudan-South Sudan issues. Haile Menkerios, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan and South Sudan and head of the UN Office to the AU, is expected to brief during the meeting by videoconferencing. At press time, no outcome was anticipated.

Key Recent Developments
Heavy fighting continued in South Sudan throughout much of January between government and opposition forces, including in areas near the border with Sudan in oil-producing Unity and Upper Nile states. In addition to the large number of civilian casualties caused by the fighting, oil facilities were reportedly damaged, and the flow of oil to Sudan was disrupted, although reports vary regarding the level of disruption. A cessation of hostilities, brokered by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), was signed by the parties on 23 January, although there were reports of sporadic fighting in both Unity and Upper Nile in the ensuing days.

President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan met with President Salva Kiir of South Sudan in Juba on 6 January. Media reports initially suggested that Bashir and Kiir were negotiating the creation of a joint force to defend oil fields in South Sudan near the border with Sudan from the rebels, but these reports were subsequently dismissed by the parties. Sudan and South Sudan have stated that the
meeting focused on efforts by both countries to implement the cooperation agreements signed on 27 September 2012. (These agreements dealt with oil-sharing, cross-border trade, border security, nationality issues and other matters.) During a press conference at the summit, Kiir and Bashir reiterated their pledge not to support rebels operating on either side of the border.

Following the summit, Bashir indicated that Sudan would allow refugees fleeing the fighting in South Sudan to enter Sudan in accordance with the “four freedoms” agreement of 27 September 2012 which gives nationals of either country the right to live, work, travel and own property in the other. However, he said that Sudan would not build refugee camps for the new arrivals.

Sudan said on 11 January that it had expelled forces opposed to Kiir that had crossed the border into Sudan near Heglig. It reportedly disarmed 54 fighters. The remainder refused to be disarmed and retreated back into South Sudan.

On 14 January, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) announced that approximately 78,000 refugees had left South Sudan since the crisis broke out on 15 December. According to UNHCR, over half of these have gone to Uganda (42,654), with the remainder fleeing to Ethiopia (18,616), Kenya (6,778) and Sudan (10,000). Regarding the refugees fleeing into Sudan, UNHCR has said that most are nomadic and that lack of access makes it hard to provide precise figures. Sudan challenged UNHCR, claiming that only 1,371 refugees had entered its territory. Some humanitarian assistance is being provided to these refugees through local actors working with UNHCR, the World Food Program and other entities.

Bashir announced on 25 December 2013, that in 2014 Sudan would defeat the Sudan Revolutionary Front, a coalition of major rebel groups in Sudan. (On 11 November 2013, Defence Minister Abdul Rahim Mohamed Hussein made a similar claim, alleging that the rebels would be defeated by the end of 2013.) Bashir also boasted that after the current military operation in Darfur is completed, another one will follow.

Meanwhile, fighting between government forces and rebels in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states in Sudan continues to be reported, with both sides issuing contradictory statements about their successes that are difficult to verify. On 6 January, fighting was reported between the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a Darfur-based rebel group, and Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in the Trogi area of South Kordofan. The JEM claimed it won the battle, inflicting dozens of casualties on the SAF, while Sudan alleged that it had defeated and repelled the rebels. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North (SPLM-N) alleged that it killed more than 70 SAF troops and took military equipment, including two tanks, during an attack on a military convoy on 17 January in the Malkan area of Blue Nile. Sudan claimed that it won the battle in Malkan and took control of the area several days prior to the alleged rebel attack.

On 9 January, Council members held consultations on Sudan-South Sudan issues during which they were briefed by Menkerios. (Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous and Hildegard Johnson, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Mission in South Sudan, briefed members on the situation in South Sudan during the same session.) Menkerios said that it would be difficult for Sudan and South Sudan to make progress on pending issues between them, including determining the centre line of the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone (SDBZ), while South Sudan is in conflict. Menkerios added that there had been no progress regarding efforts to gain humanitarian access to Blue Nile and South Kordofan. He noted that negotiations between Sudan and the SPLM-N on the polio vaccination campaign for children in areas held by the SPLM-N never materialised. The campaign, which has not occurred, was originally planned to commence on 5 November 2013 and last for two weeks.

**Key Issues**

One key issue is what impact the fighting in South Sudan will have on its relations with Sudan moving forward, especially given the vital importance of oil to the economies of both countries and the influx of refugees from South Sudan into Sudan.

Another important issue is whether any progress can be made on unresolved issues between Sudan and South Sudan while the latter is mired in conflict. These unresolved issues include the creation of the SDBZ, the implementation of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, the establishment of temporary administrative institutions in Abyei, the final status of Abyei and border demarcation.

Also a key issue is the ongoing lack of humanitarian access in Blue Nile and South Kordofan, where civilians continue to be displaced by the ongoing fighting.

**Options**

One option is for the Council to organise an informal interactive dialogue with Thabo Mbeki, the chair of the AU High-level Implementation Panel, to get an assessment of the status of relations between Sudan and South Sudan and the negotiations between them, in light of the recent turmoil in South Sudan.

Another option is to adopt a statement that:

- commends recent cooperation between Sudan and South Sudan;
- reiterates the view, expressed in its 10 January press statement, that external intervention in South Sudan could worsen the political and military situation (SC/11244); and
- urges the government of Sudan and the SPLM-N to reengage in negotiations on humanitarian access in Blue Nile and South Kordofan.

**Council Dynamics**

Since 15 December 2013 the conflict in South Sudan has limited Council attention to Sudan-South Sudan relations. The 9 January Council consultations on Sudan-South Sudan issues were viewed largely in the context of what impact events in South Sudan are having on Sudan. Nonetheless, some members are keen to ensure that while the Council remains focused on South Sudan, it does not lose sight of the intractable issues related to Sudan-South Sudan relations and the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Blue Nile and South Kordofan.

The US is the penholder on Sudan-South Sudan issues.
### Expected Council Action

In February, the Council will likely renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, which expires on 17 February. The chair of the Committee, Ambassador Maria Cristina Perceval (Argentina), will brief Council members in consultations on the Committee’s work. She will also brief on her January trip to Sudan either in these consultations or possibly in another session during the month. Furthermore, the Council expects to receive the Secretary-General’s options and recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) by the end of the month (as mandated by resolution 2113 of 30 July 2013), although this will likely not be discussed in the Council until March.

### Key Recent Developments

The security situation remains volatile in Darfur, with reports of inter-communal violence, fighting between government forces and rebels, banditry and criminality. The insecurity has contributed to large-scale displacement, with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reporting as of 14 November 2013 that more than 460,000 people had been displaced, more than the number displaced in 2011 and 2012 combined.

A land dispute led to fighting between the Ma’alia and the Hamar groups near Zarga Mahajin in Eastern Darfur on 5-6 December, which resulted in 48 deaths. Local reports have indicated there may be oil in the contested area.

Members of the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) rebel group raided a Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) camp near Abata, Central Darfur, on 13 December, killing 10 SAF troops and wounding 18.

On 29 December, two peacekeepers were killed when unidentified assailants fired on a UNAMID patrol near Gereida, South Darfur, bringing to 16 the total number of peacekeepers killed in action in Darfur in 2013. (Fifty-seven have been killed since UNAMID deployed in 2008.)

AU-UN Joint Special Representative, Joint Mediator and head of UNAMID Mohamed Ibn Chambas continued his efforts to engage with rebel movements that have yet to join the peace process. Between 9-11 December, he met with representatives of the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)-Jibril Ibrahim in Addis Ababa. (SLA-AW decided not to take part in the meeting.) During the meeting, SLA-MM and JEM-Jibril Ibrahim representatives reportedly indicated their willingness to negotiate a cessation of hostilities for humanitarian purposes and reiterated their view that the Darfur conflict needs to be resolved through political means.

However, they again noted that they are part of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), a country-wide coalition of rebel groups that envisions comprehensive political transformation in Sudan that includes regime change. This makes achieving a sound basis for negotiating with Sudan challenging, as Sudan has indicated in the past that it will only negotiate on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), which is limited to addressing the political, economic, human rights and humanitarian grievances of people in Darfur.

The Implementation Follow-Up Commission on the DDPD held its seventh meeting on 16 December in El Fasher. Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed bin Abdallah El Mahmood of Qatar, who chaired the session, said that the prevailing insecurity in Darfur had stalled implementation of the DDPD. Although Chambas noted that 315 reconstruction and development projects had recently been initiated in Darfur, it is unclear how much progress has been made on the implementation of these projects. Participants also expressed concern that some of the approximately $1 billion committed by donors to support Darfur’s reconstruction and development at the Doha Conference on 7-8 April 2013 had yet been delivered.

The Council received a briefing on UNAMID from Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous on 23 January followed by consultations (S/PV.7100). During the briefing, Ladsous highlighted the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in Darfur during the past year, as well as the limited progress that has been made in implementing the DDPD and in bringing tangible benefits to the people of Darfur. Speaking after Ladsous, Ambassador Daffa-Allah Elnag Ali Osman (Sudan) countered by saying that progress had been made in carrying out the DDPD, attributing delays in its implementation to limited funds resulting from lower oil revenue after the secession of South Sudan, unfulfilled pledges made at the 7-8 April Doha Conference, and targeting of signatory parties by rebels.

The Sanctions Committee chair visited Sudan from 20-23 January, traveling to Khartoum and Darfur and meeting with Sudan government officials and UN representatives. The main objective was for the Committee to enhance its understanding of the state of implementation of the Council’s resolutions related to the Sudan sanctions regime. Some other Council members with diplomatic representation in the region also took part in several meetings held in the context of the trip.

### Key Issues

A key sanctions-related issue is how the Council can make the sanctions regime more effective, as numerous violations of the arms embargo have been reported by the PoE in recent years. A related issue for the Council is ensuring that the experts on the PoE have access to Sudan in order to do their work. (In 2013, the finance expert, Ghassan Schibley, continued not to be allowed into the country.)

A key ongoing, overarching issue is what role the Council can play in addressing the widespread violence in Darfur and jump-starting the peace process, which continues to make limited progress.

### Options

One option is to renew the PoE without changes to the sanctions regime.

Another option would be to include in the resolution such additional elements as:

- strengthening language obliging states supplying arms and related equipment to Sudan to obtain credible end-user documentation ensuring that these materials do not enter Darfur;
- adding more rebel leaders on the sanctions list; and
- demanding that Sudan cooperate fully with the work of the PoE.

Other options, although unlikely, would...
Visiting Mission to Mali

In February, the Council expects to receive a briefing on its visiting mission to Mali, with a written report to follow. At press time, the mission was scheduled for early February. (For further information, please follow our “Dispatches from the Field” in What’s in Blue.)

**Background**

From 1993 to 1999, only non-permanent members led Council visiting missions. The US was the first P5 member to lead a visiting mission when Council members visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2000. It is now rare for the P5 not to lead Council visiting missions to destinations for which they are the penholder of the relevant agenda-item. France and Chad will co-lead the Council’s first visiting mission to Mali.

**Mali**

In visiting Mali, Council members aim to impress on the government the need to move forward in the political process following the end of the electoral cycle and the full return of constitutional order. After recent discrepancies between the government and the leadership of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) over the preconditions to hold national peace talks, Council members are expected to highlight the need for an inclusive and credible negotiation process open to all communities of northern Mali.

A presidential statement adopted on 23 January highlighted the Council’s call to swiftly and fully implement the provisions of the 18 June 2013 Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement, including “the cantonment of armed groups, the re-establishment of state administration throughout the country and the urgent launching of inclusive and credible peace talks”. Council members are expected to reiterate in Bamako their full support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali, Albert Gerard Koenders, to use his good offices to reach a comprehensive agreement. In the 23 January statement the Council also commended Mali on the successful holding of peaceful and transparent legislative elections on 24 November and 15 December 2013.

Council members, who have often reiterated the importance of achieving MINUSMA’s complete deployment without further delays in order to implement its stabilisation and protection mandate, are expected to meet with MINUSMA’s leadership as the surge phase begins for the mission to reach its full operational capacity.

The visit to Mali is expected to convey the importance the Council places on maintaining civilian control and oversight of the army as a key element of security sector reform. Another important aim of the visit is to reiterate the Council’s demand that armed groups in Mali put aside their arms and reject violence as an essential step leading to an effective disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process in the context of a comprehensive peace settlement.

Although it was unclear at press time if the mission would go to the north, it seems France and Chad were eager to pay a brief visit to a northern town as a way to assess the improvements in the security situation one year after France deployed Opération Serval in the north and to be briefly by its leadership on recent incidents revealing how terrorists and other armed groups have regained some ability to operate.

Council members are also expected to meet with members of the recently elected parliament, local authorities, civil society organisations and religious leaders. They are also expected to raise issues of accountability for violations and abuses of human rights, such as incidents of sexual violence in armed conflict, including against children. In their discussions with civil society organisations, Council members might also be interested in the extent of the food crisis in Mali and the conditions that internally displaced persons and refugees face upon their return.
Guinea-Bissau

Expected Council Action
In February, the Council is expected to have a briefing and hold consultations on Guinea-Bissau. José Ramos-Horta, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Mission in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), will brief the Council as it considers the Secretary-General’s 90-day report on the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau. Other expected speakers are Ambassador Antonio Patriota (Brazil), as chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), and representatives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries.

It is likely that the Council will issue a presidential or a press statement.

Key Recent Developments
Transitional President Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo issued a decree on 15 November rescheduling national elections from 24 November 2013 to 16 March 2014, marking the second time that a deadline to restore constitutional order would be missed. When Ramos-Horta briefed the Council on 26 November 2013, he reported a deterioration in the human rights and security situation that threatened the holding of credible elections. During consultations, he asked the Council to consider visiting Guinea-Bissau to send a strong signal about keeping to the new electoral date.

In a presidential statement adopted on 9 December, the Council called for timely and credible national elections and warned potential spoilers of possible sanctions (S/PRST/2013/19). The statement also welcomed an ECOWAS plan to reinforce the ECOWAS mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB).

The long-delayed voter registration began on 1 December and was to run until 31 December. The elections commission president, Augustine Mendes, issued a statement on 17 December noting that the process was behind schedule due to, inter alia, insufficient electoral kits and inadequate training of Guinea-Bissau nationals in their use. He recommended a minimum of 400 electoral kits. As of late January, there were approximately 200 functioning kits, comprising laptops, webcams, generators and fingerprint and barcode readers, of which 150 had been provided by Timor-Leste and 50 by Nigeria (Nigeria sent 300 total kits, but most have not worked). During multi-stakeholder consultations over the weekend of 4-5 January, it was decided that voter registration would be extended to 31 January.

Addressing the media on 27 January, Nhamadjo said that 72 percent of the estimated 810,000 potential voters, including in the diaspora, had been registered. He suggested that authorities could extend the registration by several days, but would not change the 16 March election date.

Earlier, Koumba Yalá of the Social Renewal Party (PRS) announced on 1 January that he was retiring from political life and would not run for president. Yalá would have faced ousted former Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior in the 2012 run-off presidential election had it not been interrupted by the 12 April 2012 coup.

In other developments, an amnesty law for the coup leaders was reintroduced in the National Assembly on 6 December, which the assembly has yet to act on.

The crew of a TAP Portugal passenger plane was forced to board 74 Syrian refugees by authorities at the Bissau airport on 10 December flight bound for Lisbon. The Syrians, who carried fake Turkish service passports, had travelled from Turkey then Morocco to Guinea-Bissau. After they landed in Portugal, where they sought asylum, Portugal suspended direct flights to Guinea-Bissau. In a press release, Ramos-Horta described the incident as likely part of a human-trafficking ring. Guinea-Bissau Foreign Minister Fernando Delfim da Silva resigned; several days later, Interior Minister Antonio Suka Tchama, who personally telephoned airline staff and demanded that the refugees be allowed to board, also resigned. Nhamadjo has yet to accept their resignations. Attorney-General Abdu Mane ordered that Tchama be arrested, but police have not done so citing security concerns.

On 4 January, Senegal detained a Russian fishing trawler with reportedly 62 Russians and 20 Guinea-Bissauans on board. Senegal said that the ship was illegally fishing without a permit in its waters near the Guinea-Bissau border. It had a Guinea-Bissau license. In the Secretary-General’s November report, it was noted that the Guinea-Bissau military has been negotiating fishing licenses with foreign fishing boats (S/2013/680).

Guinea-Bissau police and the National Guard tried to enter UNIOGBIS facilities in Buba on 16 January to search for Gomes Júnior, who is rumoured to have returned to the country. After about an hour, they left having been denied entry by UNIOGBIS.

Developments in the Peacebuilding Commission
From 20-23 January, Patriota, as chair of the PBC Guinea-Bissau configuration, visited the country. The mission was intended to show support for the elections and the efforts of UNIOGBIS, as well as to begin planning a post-electoral strategy for PBC reengagement.

Key Issues
The key issue of concern for the Council is the holding of elections and whether the 16 March date will be met.

In addition to completing voter registration, a key immediate issue is the need for the National Assembly to shorten several electoral deadlines, in particular the requirement that voter registration be completed at least 60 days before elections.

The pre-electoral climate, including the human rights situation and keeping the candidates and press free of intimidation, is also critical for credible elections.

Post-election plans to support a newly elected government and promoting a government of national unity are considered important in order to avoid a new coup.

Moving forward with structural reforms to break the cycle of military interference in politics and corruption is a related longer-term issue.

An emerging issue seems to be that as substitutes for a reported decline in drug-trafficking revenues since some high-profile arrests by the US Drug Enforcement Agency, other illicit activities have expanded. (In this context members may seek more information about human trafficking networks or illegal fishing.)
Guinea-Bissau (con’t)

Options
The Council may consider the following options:
• issuing a presidential or a press statement reiterating the importance of free and fair elections and reminding potential spoilers of possible sanctions;
• directing the 2048 Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Committee to identify individuals for further sanctions if Ramos-Horta reports intentional delays in holding the elections; and
• undertaking a visiting mission to Guinea-Bissau.

Council and Wider Dynamics
The Council tends to be united on Guinea-Bissau and follows the lead of ECOWAS. With Nigeria having joined the Council on 1 January 2014, members may defer to its preferences. Council members’ concerns about the situation were demonstrated by the warning of targeted sanctions in their recent presidential statement. However, with the voter registration moving forward, the Council may continue to show flexibility if another delay of elections appears likely. Much will depend on whether UNIOGBIS assesses the delays as technical or intentional.

To date, the 2048 Sanctions Committee has not been very active. With Nigeria now chairing the Committee and also being the penholder on Guinea-Bissau, as well as manning most of ECOMIB, this may result in a new dynamic and an increase in overall focus on Guinea-Bissau in the Council.

ECOWAS has sought financial and logistical support to reinforce ECOMIB but the P3 have made it clear that ECOWAS must support ECOMIB using its own resources.

As for a possible Council visiting mission to Guinea-Bissau, several members think that a visit will be more appropriate after the elections.

Syria

Expected Council Action
In February, Council members will be briefed by OCHA head Valerie Amos on humanitarian access in Syria. Council members will also be closely following the Geneva II peace talks, which began on 22 January. Developments there will likely inform any Council activity on Syria.

There will also be a briefing in consultations on the implementation of resolution 2118, regarding the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons, by Sigrid Kaag, Special Coordinator of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-UN Joint Mission.

Key Recent Developments
Amos last briefed Council members on 3 December 2013, reporting that there had been no progress in gaining cross-line access or access to besieged areas and no improvement in the protection of civilians or in the demilitarisation of schools and hospitals. In a 17 January note to Council members, Amos reported nominal progress in some areas but reiterated that intense needs continued to go unmet, particularly in besieged areas. While in Damascus on 12 January, Amos said that she raised access to besieged areas with the government and that she was “particularly worried about reports of starvation”. The 17 January note recommended intense engagement by Council members to respond to these increasing reports of malnutrition and starvation.

On 31 December 2013, the Secretary-General and Amos condemned attacks against civilians in Aleppo and voiced concern over the government’s indiscriminate use of heavy weapons. Earlier in the month, Russia had blocked the release of a Council press statement condemning the Aleppo attacks, which began on 15 December. Russia said singling out the government was unwarranted, given the overall levels of violence by all parties. The US argued that the regime should be singled out due to the magnitude and barbarity of the Aleppo airstrikes. Russia blocked a similar press statement again on 8 January using the same arguments.

On 8 January, Kaag briefed Council members, reporting that the 31 December 2013 deadline for removing priority-one chemicals was missed, though Syria did transfer an initial tranche on 7 January. She told Council members that the first movement of chemicals must not be a symbolic action and that the government should continue its cooperation in a safe and timely manner. Kaag also reported that Syria continued to request security equipment despite consistent advice that such “dual use” equipment would not be procured by the mission. Finally, Kaag encouraged key member states to continue to exert pressure on Syria to fulfil its obligations.

In remarks to the media following her briefing, Kaag said she expected that the 30 June deadline for the complete removal and destruction of the chemical weapons programme would be met. On 16 January, the OPCW said that the original 31 March deadline for the removal and destruction of most critical chemicals may not be met until June due to security concerns and bureaucratic delays.

The OPCW reported a second cargo transfer on 27 January. According to media reports, the two batches represent only 5 percent of the total arsenal.

On 12 January, the “London 11” met with the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) in Paris. The resulting statement reiterated support for a transitional government with full executive powers by “mutual consent”, with no role for President Bashar al-Assad, and urged the SNC to send a delegation to Geneva II talks. It condemned recent statements by the regime that it would not agree to establish a transitional government and that Assad would run for re-election. It also condemned the presence of foreign fighters in Syria, including Hezbollah, Iranian-backed forces and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), and noted that, despite its claims to the contrary, the regime had taken no significant measures to fight extremism.
Syria (con’t)

The next day, UN-Arab League Joint Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi convened a trilateral meeting with Russia and the US in Paris, where issues of humanitarian access, local ceasefires and prisoner releases were discussed as possible confidence-building measures in the lead up to Geneva II talks. The issue of Iran’s participation was also raised with the US maintaining its position that such participation would be predicated on Iran’s public acceptance of the 30 June 2012 Geneva communiqué as the basis for Geneva II.

On 18 January, under significant pressure from international backers such as the “London 11”, the SNC voted to attend Geneva II, despite misgivings that the international community had any significant leverage to compel the regime to make concessions. A third of the SNC membership boycotted the vote due to concerns that agreeing to negotiate with a regime responsible for war crimes and with a stated intention of staying in power would further alienate the SNC from opposition groups operating on the ground.

On 19 January, the Secretary-General invited Iran to participate after intensive consultations with the US and other P5 members. Shortly after it was issued, Iran said it did not support the Geneva I communiqué as a basis for a transitional government despite verbal assurances given to the Secretary-General otherwise. Under pressure from the US and with a SNC ultimatum that it would not attend if Iran participated, the Secretary-General withdrew the invitation on 20 January. On 22 January, Iran said Geneva II was unlikely to succeed “because of the lack of influential players at the meeting”. The next day Iran echoed Syria’s call for elections (versus a negotiated transition) as the “best solution” and that “we should all accept” the outcome.

Geneva II opened on 22 January. Predictable, yet fundamental, divisions quickly emerged, with the US saying it was unthinkable Assad would have any role in a transitional government while Russia argued against predetermining the outcome of the process. Meanwhile, the SNC cast doubt on whether the government was there to negotiate in good faith, and the government framed the purpose of the talks strictly as a forum to discuss counter-terrorism. UN-mediated talks began on 24 January with Brahimi shuttling between the SNC and government delegations. At press time, agreement had been reached that direct talks would take place on 25 January with Brahimi expressing hope that they would at least continue through the end of January.

On 17 January, Security Council members held a closed Arria formula meeting focused on women’s participation in resolving the Syrian conflict. A key message was that neither the government nor the opposition sufficiently represent the Syrian people and the integrity of the talks would be undermined if women and civil society were excluded.

Key Issue
The key issue for the Council is how, three years into the conflict, it can contribute towards a solution in Syria that can significantly lower levels of violence and improve humanitarian access.

Underlying Problems
The progress on the chemical weapons track has not altered the course of the civil war, with some sources reporting a death toll that exceeds 130,000. The level of violence has only escalated since the agreement on chemical weapons was inked as the regime has increased its use of incendiary weapons, cluster bombs and barrel bombs. Escalating violence is also attributable to the proliferation of extremist armed groups, such as ISIS, whose agenda is to control territory for a future Islamic state. These groups are strategically targeting opposition-held areas and are not fighting the regime. Likewise, the regime is making no significant efforts to confront ISIS.

The humanitarian situation is devastating. The refugee population numbers 2.4 million, and 9.3 million in Syria are in need of humanitarian assistance (of these, 2.5 million can rarely be accessed by humanitarian workers, and 6.5 million are internally displaced). Adding to the dire situation are the challenges of winter, alarming reports of intentional policies of depopulating and razing residential areas, intentional policies of starvation in areas under siege by the government and a health infrastructure collapsing under deliberate attack.

Options
An option for the Council is issuing a statement supporting the peace talks, recalling its endorsement in resolution 2118 of the establishment of a transitional governing body exercising full executive powers and urging swift agreement that could be endorsed by a resolution.

Another option is a briefing from Brahimi on the Geneva II peace talks.

Regarding chemical weapons, Kaag’s last briefing seemed to indicate a certain wariness regarding Syria’s cooperation. If such concerns are amplified in February, the Council could issue a statement reminding Syria that resolution 2118 decided to impose measures under Chapter VII in the event of non-compliance.

A more remote option for the Council is to adopt a resolution on humanitarian issues if access does not dramatically improve in the near term.

Council Dynamics
Many Council members are firmly of the view that, five months after the 2 October 2013 presidential statement on humanitarian access was adopted (S/PRST/2013/15), the lack of substantial cooperation demonstrates a deliberate political decision by Syria to deny aid as a war tactic and that the small, incremental allowances it does agree to are mere tools to buy time. Council members are also aware of Russia’s efforts to compel the regime to improve access. However, given the astonishingly low level of cooperation relative to the cooperation on the chemical weapons track, some Council members are beginning to question whether Russia has the desire or leverage to get major concessions from the regime on this particular issue,

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 16 January, High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay said mass executions by ISIS of civilians and fighters no longer participating in hostilities may constitute war crimes. On 17 January, Pillay condemned the repeated obstruction of food and medical aid deliveries to 18,000 people living in the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp, stressing that starvation of civilians as a method of combat was prohibited under international law and may amount to a war crime.

Separately, on 20 January former prosecutors of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the Special Court for Sierra Leone released a report citing credible evidence that the Syrian government systematically tortured and executed some 11,000 detainees.

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especially without any corresponding pressure from Iran.

While Council members are relieved to see that the Geneva II peace talks are underway, there is little optimism that it will produce any imminent political solution. There is also concern by some Council members that the talks may get bogged down in negotiations over humanitarian access, prisoner exchanges and local ceasefires. While all Council members see value in any agreement which can alleviate suffering, there is concern that engagement on these issues will likely come at the expense of immediate negotiations on a transitional government. Furthermore, the SNC has extremely limited political and military influence on the ground and will be largely unable to deliver on any agreements on these issues. (Its most effective fighters defected in December to form the Islamic Front, which did not agree to participate in Geneva II.)

If the Geneva II talks produce no tangible progress and if cooperation on humanitarian access remains stunted, then some Council members are considering a humanitarian resolution as a necessary next step. In this regard, most Council members will place a great deal of emphasis on Amos’s view of what the Council could do to best help OCHA improve its access to populations in need.

On the chemical weapons track, Council members are largely satisfied but have noted that “bureaucratic delays” on the part of the government have begun to impede progress, much as they do on the humanitarian track.

Despite many Council members becoming frustrated with the Council’s inability to alter the course of events in Syria, it will be difficult to move forward on any initiative without buy-in from Russia and the US. Neither will likely develop an appetite for a Syria-focused resolution in the coming month.

France is the penholder on Syria. However, most texts are thoroughly, if not exclusively, negotiated between Russia and the US prior to agreement by the broader Council. Australia and Luxembourg have taken the lead on the humanitarian track.

Expected Council Action

In February, the chair of the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg), is scheduled to brief Council members on consultations. The Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the Committee is due to submit its final report under resolution 2094 by 7 February. The Committee is likely to meet at least once in February to discuss the report.

The PoE’s mandate expires on 7 April, but it is expected to be renewed in early March, with negotiations possibly starting towards the end of February.

Key Recent Developments

The Committee has held two formal meetings since the chair’s last 90-day briefing on 11 November.

On 20 December the Committee met to discuss several incident reports from the PoE:

A report on the June 2012 attempted procurement by DPRK officials of missile technology from Ukraine concluded that the case demonstrated the need for increased vigilance regarding DPRK diplomatic personnel as called for by resolution 2094.

A report on two separate incidents from 2009 involving interception of shipments from the DPRK to Syria of suits intended for protection against chemical weapons had no clear conclusion. The PoE was split, with two experts (China and Russia) maintaining that the suits were for defensive purposes and that the shipments therefore did not constitute a sanctions violation. (Given recent developments relating to the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the case was considered particularly sensitive.)

A report on the interception by the Republic of Korea (ROK) in July 2012 of a shipment of graphite cylinders from the DPRK on board a Chinese-operated vessel in transit in the port of Busan concluded that the shipment was a clear sanctions violation. (Such cylinders can be used in the construction of missiles.)

In a meeting on 24 January, the Committee discussed the PoE’s incident report on the Chong Chon Gang case, circulated to Council members on 23 December. (Chong Chon Gang was the DPRK-flagged ship detained by Panama on 15 July 2013 on its way from Cuba with weapons and military equipment hidden in a cargo of sugar.) The report concluded that the incident constituted a clear sanctions violation.

On 31 December, the Committee updated the consolidated sanctions list to include translation into Korean of the names of designated individuals and entities as recommended by the PoE in its 7 June 2013 report (S/2013/337).

At the time of writing it seemed the Committee was close to reaching agreement on the Implementation Assistance Notice (IAN) requested by operative paragraph 22 of resolution 2094, the so-called “catch-all” provision. (The provision calls on states to prevent the supply, sale or transfer of any item that might contribute to activities prohibited under relevant Council resolutions and directed the Committee to issue an IAN regarding its proper implementation.) A draft that had apparently already been agreed by China, Russia and the US, was circulated to Committee members for comments on 27 January and was expected to be put under silence for adoption in early February.

The situation on the Korean peninsula remained calm, although the 12 December execution of Jang Song-thaek, the uncle of DPRK leader Kim Jong-un, led to speculation about the stability of the Pyongyang regime. According to DPRK state media, Song-thaek, who was considered the second most powerful man in the DPRK, had been plotting a military coup and was convicted of treason...
by a military tribunal. His execution was seen as a sign that Kim Jong-un is continuing to consolidate power amid reports of internal divisions and competing factions in the top DPRK leadership. On 26 January it was widely reported in the media that Song-thaek’s immediate family had also been executed.

In a separate development, on 6 January ROK President Park Geun-hye proposed that the two countries resume the family reunion programme suspended since 2010. (An attempt to resume the programme in September last year failed after the DPRK accused the ROK of “reckless and vicious confrontational racket”.) The DPRK first responded negatively, but then on 16 January proposed that on the occasion of the Lunar New Year Holiday starting on 30 January the two sides take “practical measures” to halt all hostile military actions against each other, “create a climate for improved north-south relations” and “prevent a nuclear holocaust.” While the proposal also included a warning to the ROK and the US not to hold the annual joint military exercises due in February and March, the DPRK on 24 January agreed to the resumption of family reunions.

The ROK welcomed the move on family reunions, but said the military exercises would go ahead as planned and questioned the sincerity of DPRK’s invitation to improve relations. Meanwhile, the DPRK reiterated its proposal to the ROK in an open letter which was transmitted to the Council on 27 January (S/2014/53). That same day, the ROK proposed that family reunions take place between 17-22 February.

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 18 December, the General Assembly adopted a resolution expressing its serious concern about the persistence of continuing reports of systematic, widespread and grave violations of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights in the DPRK. It urged the government to cooperate with the Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur, Marzuki Darusman, and its Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK, including by granting them access (A/RES/68/183).

Also on 18 December, Darusman and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, issued a statement urging the DPRK to immediately halt all executions. The statement—which was also endorsed by the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Juan E. Méndez—came in the wake of the execution of Jang Song-thaek. The experts warned that the high-profile execution of a senior official, with total disregard for due process and other international human rights standards, was just one among multiple executions reported in the country. (The arrest, trial by a special military tribunal and execution of Jang Song-thaek all reportedly took place within only five days.)

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is the DPRK’s continued flouting of all relevant resolutions.

A further issue is the lack of any progress towards restarting the six-party talks.

At the Sanctions Committee level, a key issue is the overall effective implementation of the sanctions regime. This includes the question of how to respond to the PoE’s reports of sanctions violations and whether to take up its recommendations. A related issue is the provision in paragraph 21 of resolution 2094 that directed the Committee to review and update the lists of banned items referred to in resolution 2087 no later than 7 March 2014 and on an annual basis thereafter. The provision says that if the Committee has not acted to update the lists by then, “the Security Council will complete action to update within an additional 30 days”.

Options
The Council could invite the Committee chair to present the 90-day report in a public meeting as opposed to the current informal consultations format.

Options for the Committee include:
• making additional designations as recommended by the PoE’s 7 June 2013 report (which proposed listing four additional entities and 11 individuals);
• updating the lists of banned items and adding the items and materials proposed by the PoE;
• releasing publicly the Chong Chon Gang incident report;
• expediting the issuance of additional IANs, including those that have been proposed in response to recent sanctions violations; and
• considering the recommendations of the upcoming PoE report.

Council Dynamics
There are several proposals under consideration in the Sanctions Committee in response to the sanctions violations reported by the PoE. In relation to the Chong Chon Gang case, the US has proposed that the Committee issue an IAN and designate those found to be responsible for the violation. It has also suggested releasing publicly the incident report. While Australia, the ROK and EU Council members supported the proposals, others said they needed more time to consider the report. China and Russia already made clear that they are opposed to the release of the report, citing confidentiality concerns.

In response to the cases discussed at the 20 December meeting, the issuance of IANs was also among the possible options put forward. It seems it was agreed that the ROK would go ahead and draft an IAN on the incident involving the attempted procurement of missile technology from Ukraine. As for the case involving a Chinese-operated vessel, China is conducting its own investigation and apparently wants the Committee to hold off on any action until this has been concluded.

With regard to additional sanctions designations, it appears that some Council members have been working on putting together a package. The PoE’s upcoming report may contain additional proposals in this area, including in relation to the Chong Chon Gang case. It is therefore possible that a formal proposal for additional designations will be submitted to the Committee later this year.

The US is the penholder on the DPRK in the Council and Luxembourg chairs the Sanctions Committee.
Kosovo

Expected Council Action
In February the Council will hold its quarterly debate on Kosovo. Farid Zarif, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), is expected to brief the Council on recent developments and the latest Secretary-General’s report. High-level participation from both Serbia and Kosovo is also likely at the debate.

No Council action is expected.

Key Recent Developments
The municipal elections held under the framework of the 19 April “First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations between Belgrade and Pristina” were a major development in Kosovo. The elections were held on 3 November 2013 with close to 20 percent of the local Serb population participating, which is significant considering that Serbs boycotted the last elections in 2009. Isolated incidents of violence at polling stations occurred in three municipalities in North Mitrovica forcing the Central Election Commission (CEC) to hold repeat elections in those municipalities on 17 November. With the increased presence of the Kosovo police and the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), repeat elections were held without any incidents.

Second round mayoral elections were held in 25 municipalities on 1 December 2013. On the same day, a re-vote was held in Zvecan municipality due to procedural irregularities that were reported in the 3 November first round. The second round elections were held without major disruptions, with a Serb turnout of around 20 percent, according to data by the CEC. The only incident occurred in Parteš municipality, a Serb-majority municipality in eastern Kosovo, where 20 people attacked the election staff and destroyed three ballot boxes. Successful repeat elections in this municipality were held on 15 December.

During the implementation of the results of the mayoral elections in four Serb-dominated municipalities in northern Kosovo one incident occurred on 13 January. Krstimir Pantić, the newly elected mayor of North Mitrovica, failed to fulfil the legal obligation to be sworn in. According to Pantić, he refused to sign the oath of office as it had the Kosovo coat of arms and the inscription of the Republic of Kosovo. As a result, repeat mayoral elections have been called for North Mitrovica on 23 February.

The high-level Belgrade-Pristina dialogue continued after the completion of second-round elections. On 5 December, Prime Minister Ivica Dačić of Serbia and Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi of Kosovo met with Catherine Ashton, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in Brussels. Implementation of the remaining elements of the 19 April agreement dominated the discussion, especially the integration of judiciary and police structures in northern Kosovo. Furthermore, on 10 December, Belgrade and Pristina reached agreement on electricity transmission. The 10 December meeting, held in Vienna, was organised with the backing of the European Commission and the Energy Community Secretariat.

The 19 April agreement stipulates the integration of judicial authorities within the legal framework of Kosovo, an issue Dačić and Thaçi discussed again in Brussels on 13 December alongside Ashton. However, they failed to reach agreement on the functioning of the judiciary in northern Kosovo as Belgrade insisted on having a separate court in North Mitrovica or assigning cases involving Serbs only to Serbian judges, a proposal Pristina did not accept. The next round of the EU-facilitated dialogue took place on 27 January with the agenda focusing on outstanding issues related to the Brussels agreement, mainly the judiciary and formation of the community of Serb municipalities.

The progress of Serbia in the EU accession process and its efforts to normalise relations with Kosovo was recognised by the European Council which adopted a negotiating framework and set a formal date (21 January) for the start of Serbia’s accession talks with the EU. At the first Intergovernmental Conference, the EU presented Serbia with the negotiating framework containing chapters which take account of Serbia’s continued engagement towards improvement of relations with Kosovo.

Even though the overall security situation in Kosovo remained stable, one isolated incident of violence occurred. In the early morning hours of 16 January, Dimitrije Janičijević, a North Mitrovica municipal assembly member and former mayor, was shot. The killing was condemned by members of the international community as well as by Belgrade and Pristina. Appearing in front of the media a day after the incident, Dačić said that “given that Janičijević was a member of a political organisation, which has participated in the local government elections, there will certainly be political implications and consequences”. Kosovo police and EULEX are investigating the incident. At press time, the motives and perpetrators were unknown.

Key Issues
The role of UNMIK in supporting the process of normalisation between Serbia and Kosovo is the key issue for the Council.

After successful completion of the municipal elections in Kosovo, implementation of the remaining elements of the 19 April agreement will be an important related issue for the Council.

An ongoing issue for the Council is maintaining stability in Kosovo.

Options
One option for the Council is to consider lengthening the reporting cycle set in resolution 1244 from quarterly to semi-annual. Because it would require a decision, this option is probably not viable in February, but could become more likely as Serbia and Kosovo continue to make progress. (The last Council resolution on Kosovo was adopted in 1999, and the most recent presidential statement was issued in 2008.)

On the other hand, the Council may choose to take no action, as has been the case for several years.

Council Dynamics
Council dynamics remain practically unchanged, with clear divisions between permanent members. France, the UK and the US recognise Kosovo, while Russia is strongly supportive of Serbia on the Council. Among
Kosovo (con’t)

non-permanent members, Kosovo has also been recognised by Australia, Chad, Jordan, Lithuania, Luxembourg and the Republic of Korea.

Other international organisations, mostly the EU, NATO and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, are playing more of an active role on the issue of Kosovo, while at the Council this issue is one of relative low intensity.

The contact and drafting group on Kosovo consists of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and the US, and also includes Australia, Lithuania and Luxembourg.

In February, Germany will take the lead on Kosovo within the contact and drafting group.

UN-EU Cooperation

Expected Council Action
In February, the Council will hold a meeting on cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional organisations, with a focus on strengthening the partnership with the EU. The Council will be briefed by Catherine Ashton, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. It is possible that Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon will also brief the Council.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, Linas Antanas Antanas Antanas Antanas Antanas Linkevičius, will preside over the meeting.

A presidential statement is expected as an outcome following the meeting.

Background
The UN Charter establishes the Security Council as the principal organ charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. However, Chapter VIII of the Charter also envisions a role for “regional arrangements” in an effort to achieve peaceful settlement of local disputes. Chapter VIII is clear in its encouragement of contributions by regional organisations to the maintenance of peace and security as long as such efforts are subordinate to the Security Council. In addition, Article 54 states that the Council should “at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation” by regional organisations “for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

In her last briefing to the Council, on 13 February 2013 (S/PV.6919), Ashton highlighted different ways in which the EU makes contributions to international peace and security, including:

- its ability to marshal a wide range of instruments for a comprehensive approach;
- its direct involvement in international negotiations, including mediation, on behalf of the international community; and
- its close work with international and regional partners.

Cooperation between the EU and the UN has evolved over the years. Just a decade ago, these two organisations had very limited experience working together. When a Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management was signed in 2003, the relationship between the EU and the UN started to develop further. Both organisations share a similar or, in many cases, the same agenda with regard to crisis management, conflict prevention, mediation, peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery. Although troop contributions by EU member states to UN peacekeeping operations are relatively low (around 5 percent), the financial contributions of EU member states to UN peacekeeping operations are significantly larger, at approximately 37 percent.

This will be the fourth Council meeting on cooperation between the UN and the EU with Ashton as the main brief. In addition to 2013, the previous meetings on this issue took place in 2011 and 2010. As President of the Council in February, Lithuania places very high emphasis on this meeting, in addition to being an EU member it was also its president during the second semester of 2013. By organising this meeting, Lithuania strives to highlight the EU’s role in supporting the efforts of the UN in addressing the issues on the Council’s agenda and to explore ways to make this cooperation more effective.

Key Recent Developments
Ashton’s previous briefings on cooperation between the EU and the UN were structured as updates on the activities of the EU in the maintenance of peace and security. The upcoming briefing in February will most likely follow a similar format. The Council’s agenda is still heavily dominated by African issues, where the EU has been increasingly engaged on its own and in cooperation with the UN. In regard to African issues, Ashton will likely focus on providing updates on the EU’s involvement and cooperation with the UN in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel region and the Central African Republic (CAR).

In Somalia the EU’s involvement in collaboration with the UN is set out through the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa. The EU has been making significant contributions, especially in supporting the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by paying the salaries of AMISOM troops. In addition to the EU’s successful efforts in fighting piracy off the coast of the Horn of Africa, one of the major developments that marked 2013 was the organisation of a donor conference for Somalia held in Brussels in September. A variety of donors pledged $2.4 billion to address four key priority areas: security, legal reform, public finances and the economic recovery of Somalia.

The EU has also cooperated with the UN as part of the Sahel strategy framework, especially in the case of Mali. Last February, the EU launched the EU Training Mission in Mali with the goal of restoring the national armed forces in order to sustain peace and stability in the country. Aside from Mali, the EU, together with the UN and other regional organisations, has reinforced its commitment to support the foundations of stability and
Following growing instability and a deteriorating humanitarian situation in the CAR, on 20 January the EU decided to approve deployment of up to 1,000 EU troops in an effort to stabilise the country. Deployment of EU troops is expected to relieve the pressure on the existing international troops on the ground, stabilise the country and prevent a further humanitarian crisis. Upon receiving a Council mandate on 28 January (S/RES/2134), this will be one of the most significant EU ground operations. Additionally, the EU and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs organised a donor conference in Brussels on 20 January, during which $500 million was pledged by various donors for humanitarian assistance in the CAR.

The EU’s role in dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue will also most likely be emphasised during Ashton’s briefing. Working together with the P5+1, the EU has taken a lead role in negotiating a potential solution to the issue, resulting in a 24 November 2013 joint plan of action, setting out the measures to be undertaken during an initial six-month interim period and the elements for a longstanding, comprehensive solution. After the International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that Iran had disabled facilities for uranium enrichment, the EU and the US responded by starting to ease economic sanctions on Iran. Though the deal is in its interim phase, Ashton will likely highlight the progress achieved to date.

In the Balkan region, the UN has been gradually scaling down its presence while the EU has been increasing its own. The year 2013 was a year of landmark achievements for the EU in mediation efforts in the Balkans. Ashton will likely update Council members on the historic agreement on normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, signed on 19 April 2013 in Brussels. Mediation efforts by the EU, and Ashton in particular, have been of crucial importance for the 19 April agreement as well as its implementation. As a result of the progress achieved, Serbia was granted a start date (21 January) for EU accession negotiations.

Key Issues
A key issue is to have a productive discussion about the cooperation between the UN and EU and different ways in which this relationship could be strengthened.

Considering that the UN and EU have become more interlinked in recent years, another issue will be how to make this cooperation more efficient, especially since both organisations in many cases operate parallel to each other.

Another issue is how to achieve effective cooperation between the two organisations on common objectives and how this cooperation could be formalised to provide the best results without becoming bureaucratic.

Council Dynamics
Council members are generally supportive of the briefing on cooperation between the UN and the EU. This will be the first time the Council will be working on adopting a presidential statement following the briefing. The statement will likely contain generally agreed language acknowledging the role of the EU in: the maintenance of international peace and security, cooperation with the UN, and implementing mandates and tasks set by the Council. Taking into account previous presidential statements on cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, it is likely that the Council will be more supportive of the statement if it is general in nature and does not contain language reflecting more specific regional and country specific issues, especially if there is no consensus opinion on those issues by the Council members.

This year the Council has in its ranks four members of the EU (France, Lithuania, Luxembourg and the UK).
Every year, the Security Council revisits its allocation of chairmanships of its subsidiary bodies, a task entrusted to elected Council members. Following deliberations between the P5, and the designation of a P5 coordinator, the coordinator holds separate consultations with the elected members. Decisions regarding the 2014 distribution, coordinated by Russia, were reportedly finalised during the last week of December 2013, although Chad has since recused itself of the allotted chairmanships alleging it was not appropriately consulted.

As this chart illustrates, there is scant correlation between the “penholders” for situation-specific agenda items and the chairs of the relevant subsidiary bodies. In most, though not all, cases penholders are permanent members. As the penholders take the lead in drafting Council decisions, they normally “trump” chairs notwithstanding the chairs’ formal title and mandate. The table below lists those agenda items of which the Council is or was seized since 1 January 2010 and which have a designated penholder. For the full name of the agenda items please refer to the latest summary statement by the Secretary-General of 2 January 2014 (S/2014/10).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION-SPECIFIC OR THEMATIC MATTER</th>
<th>“PENHOLDER” IN THE COUNCIL</th>
<th>CHAIR OF THE RELEVANT COUNCIL SUBSIDIARY BODY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Australia, 1988 Taliban Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Chair of the rotating Contact and Drafting Group</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa Region</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Chile, 1572 Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism (1267 and 1989)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Australia, 1267/1989 Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Jordan, 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK (Non-proliferation)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Luxembourg, 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Group of Friends</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Lakes Region</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Nigeria, 2048 Guinea-Bissau Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTR</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Chile, International Tribunals Informal Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Chile, International Tribunals Informal Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran (Non-Proliferation)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Australia, 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Chad, 1518 Iraq Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Chair of the rotating Contact and Drafting Group</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Jordan, 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Rwanda, 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Syria, France, Australia and Luxembourg on humanitarian issues; UNDOF: US and Russia; UNIFIL: France; Yemen: UK</td>
<td>Chad, 1636 Lebanon Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East, including the Palestine Question</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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Security Council Statistics in 2013

Decreased Activity

With 47 resolutions adopted in 2013, the year saw a new decline (-11.3 percent) in resolutions relative to 2012 (53) and an even larger decrease in presidential statements from 29 to 22 (-24.1 percent). Overall, the Security Council adopted 69 decisions in 2013 compared to 82 in 2012 (-15.9 percent), hitting a new all-time low in terms of decision-making since 1991, when 63 decisions were adopted. The Council did however adopt a record number of press statements (86), which do not carry the same weight as decisions and are mainly issued to signal the opinion of Council members regarding a recent development.

Meetings also registered a slight decline (-3.0 percent) with the Council holding 193 in 2013, including 13 with troop-contributing countries, against 199 in 2012. As for consultations, the decrease was more pronounced, down from 175 to 162 (-7.4 percent). One possible constraint on the Council’s scheduling more meetings and consultations is the need to make sufficient time available for Council members to tend to the work of the subsidiary bodies: the 14 sanctions committees held 90 meetings throughout the year, with the working groups adding another 59.

The decision-to-meeting ratio, moreover, fell slightly in 2013 (0.36) relative to 2012 (0.41) as the overall decline in decisions outpaced the decrease in the number of meetings. The decision-to-meeting and consultation ratio likewise decreased from 0.22 in 2012 to 0.19 in 2013. In terms of the powers invoked, 24 resolutions (51.1 percent) in 2013 made reference to “acting under Chapter VII”, compared to 32 (60.4 percent) in 2012.

Following three visiting missions in 2012, Council members undertook two in 2013: on 27 January to Yemen and on 4-8 October to the Great Lakes Region in Africa. In terms of informal briefing formats, Council members participated in six “Arria formula” meetings and “interactive dialogues” each in 2013, compared to 12 and 10 in 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>UK; US on piracy; Russia on legal issues on piracy</td>
<td>Republic of Korea, 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan and South Sudan</td>
<td>UK on Darfur; US on South Sudan; US on Sudan/ South Sudan</td>
<td>Argentina, 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children and Armed Conflict</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Luxembourg, Children and Armed Conflict Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism (1373)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Lithuania, 1373 Counterterrorism Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism (1566)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Lithuania, 1566 Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-proliferation of WMD</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>Republic of Korea, 1540 WMD Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and Security in MAB</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Nigeria, Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa Ad Hoc Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Rwanda, Peacekeeping Operations Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UK, Protection of Civilians Informal Expert Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women and Peace and Security</td>
<td>UK on 1325 women’s participation; US on 1820 sexual violence in conflict</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Methods</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Argentina, Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As in previous years, the attention of the CAR and South Sudan and the precarious Consensual resolutions were slightly on the vote in 2013. Contrary to 2012, when two draft International Criminal Court proceedings, Russia, in 2013 no vetoes were cast. However, was a significant increase from 2012, and is 26 total annual Decisions of the Security Council: 1990–2013 total Non-Consensual Resolutions: 1990–2013

Security Council Statistics in 2013 (con’t)

Increased Consensus
Consensual resolutions were slightly on the rise relative to 2012, as only four resolutions (2089, 2114, 2117, 2130) were adopted by a vote in 2013. Contrary to 2012, when two draft resolutions on Syria were vetoed by China and Russia, in 2013 no vetoes were cast. However, one draft resolution (S/2013/660), on an Article 16 deferral of the situation in Kenya from International Criminal Court proceedings, failed to get the minimum nine votes required for adoption by Article 27(3), the first such case since S/2000/1171 in 2000. Interestingly, as in 2012, it was Azerbaijan, alongside Russia, that most frequently broke ranks with the majorities, with three abstentions each.

Breakdown by Region
As in previous years, the attention of the Council varied from region to region, with agenda items pertaining to Africa totaling 98 meetings (50.8 percent), of which 88 (45.6 percent) dealt with sub-Saharan Africa. This was a significant increase from 2012, and is not surprising considering the outbreak of sectarian wars in the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan and the precarious security situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Libya, Mali and Somalia. The Council held 44 meetings (22.8 percent) on situations in North Africa and the Middle East and 46 (23.8 percent) on situations in Asia (some of which are also included in the Middle East). The Council only had 12 meetings (6.2 percent) on agenda items pertaining to Europe and only four (2.1 percent) on the sole situation (Haiti) in the Americas.

Relative to 2012, 2013 registered increased attention to situations in Africa (+3.1 percent) and sub-Saharan Africa (+5.7 percent), with decreased attention to all other regions: Europe (-33.3 percent), the Americas (-20.0 percent) and Asia (-4.2 percent), as well as North Africa and the Middle East (-17.0 percent). The increasing activity on Africa is significant as it seems to readjust the stark decline in meetings on Africa (-24.6 percent) and sub-Saharan Africa (-14.4 percent) registered in 2012.

Breakdown by Agenda Item
In 2013, the Council continued to address three of the situations arising out of the Arab Spring. It held eight meetings on Libya and

Adopted two decisions (resolution 2095 and S/PRST/2013/21), nine meetings on Syria, including meetings pertaining to the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), leading to four decisions (resolutions 2108, 2118 and 2131 and S/PRST/2013/15), and four meetings and one decision on Yemen (S/PRST/2013/3). Consideration of Libya and Syria were on decline relative to 2012 despite the worsening situations in both. In fact, in the case of Syria, resolutions 2108 and 2131 dealt with UNDOF only, whereas resolution 2118 was circumscribed to the chemical weapons programme, despite the more than 100,000 civilians killed by the conflict by the end of the year. Only the presidential statement addressed the dire humanitarian impact of the wider civil war. Whereas on Yemen the Council adopted one less decision in as many meetings relative to 2012, on Lebanon it adopted the annual UN Interim Force in Lebanon renewal (resolution 2115) and an additional decision (S/PRST/2013/9) in two meetings. As for the Middle East, including the Palestinian Question, the Council continued to hold a significant number of meetings (12) without adopting a single decision.
Regarding the situations in and between Sudan and South Sudan, consideration by the Council remained on par with 2012 (17 meetings), yet dramatically lower than the 35 meetings held in 2011. However, unlike 2011 or 2012, when it adopted 13 and nine decisions respectively, in 2013, the Council adopted seven decisions (resolutions 2091, 2104, 2109, 2113, 2126, 2132 and S/PRST/2013/14), with resolution 2132 standing out for promptly addressing the ongoing political crisis that engulfed South Sudan as of 15 December and including unprecedented arrangements in terms of UN intermission cooperation to reinforce the UN Mission in South Sudan. Consideration of the situation in Somalia also remained unchanged, with 11 meetings and six decisions (resolutions 2093, 2102, 2111, 2124, 2125 and S/PRST/2013/7) as the situation on the ground continued to improve following the routing of Al-Shabaab by the AU Mission in Somalia and the swearing in of a new national government.

Not surprisingly, in light of the continuing fallout from the 22 March and 12 April 2012 coups that affected Mali and Guinea-Bissau, the Council dedicated five and six meetings, respectively, to address the two situations while adopting one (resolution 2100) and three (resolutions 2092 and 2103 and S/PRST/2013/19) decisions. However, due to the instability threatening the wider Sahel and West Africa region, the Council also considered the Sahel in five meetings, adopting four decisions (S/PRST/2013/5, S/PRST/2013/10, S/PRST/2013/20 and S/PRST/2013/22), and West Africa in four meetings and one decision (S/PRST/2013/13). In addition, Council activity regarding Côte d’Ivoire increased just slightly in 2013 with six meetings and two resolutions (2101 and 2112) compared to five and two respectively in 2012. With progress seemingly continuing to build in Liberia and, more evidently, in Sierra Leone, the Council held five and three meetings respectively. It also adopted two resolutions on Liberia (2116 and 2128) and one on Sierra Leone (2097).

On the DRC, the Council continued to hold as many meetings in 2013 as was the case in 2011 and 2012 (8), albeit adopting less decisions (resolution 2098 and S/PRST/2013/17). However, resolution 2098 was an important breakthrough setting the stage for the routing of the March 23 rebel movement with the exceptionally robust mandate given to a novel “intervention brigade” embedded within the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC. In addition, the Council held a meeting on the situation in the Great Lakes Region, leading to an outcome (S/PRST/2013/11) urging full and prompt implementation of the 24 February 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and Region. As for the CAR and the wider Central African region, Council attention increased dramatically from four meetings in 2012 to 10 in 2013, and from two to five decisions (resolutions 2088, 2121, 2127 and S/PRST/2013/16 and S/PRST/2013/18), following the 24 March seizure of power by the Séléka rebels. Resolution 2127 was a significant development, with the Council mandating a sanctions regime, an inquiry commission and authorising France to deploy what became Opération Sangaris to support the fledgling ECCAS-led peacekeeping mission on the ground.

As regards Burundi, the Council returned to its 2011 level of activity, holding three meetings and adopting one outcome (2090) after a single meeting with no outcome in 2012. As for Western Sahara, Council attention remained unchanged relative to 2012 with two meetings and one resolution (2099). On Haiti, 2013 ended with four meetings and one resolution (2119).

Regarding the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Council met six times and adopted two resolutions (2096 and 2120) on the former, compared to seven meetings and three resolutions in 2012, and five times leading to two resolutions (2107 and 2110) on the latter, up from four meetings and one decision in 2012, in light of the worsening political situation there and the increasing humanitarian toll of the sectarian violence.

In contrast, the Council met twice as much on Cyprus in 2013, scheduling four meetings and adopting two resolutions (2089 and 2114), both of which were adopted with abstentions. It also held three meetings on Bosnia and Herzegovina, leading to a single resolution (2123). Another agenda item without an outcome in 2013 was Kosovo, despite being considered at four meetings.

On the ad hoc international tribunals, which are gradually winding down with the establishment of the International Residual Mechanism, the Council only held three meetings and adopted one decision (resolution 2130). Finally, regarding non-proliferation in a country-specific context, there were no changes in Council activity in 2013 compared to 2012 with five meetings on Iran and one resolution (2105), and two meetings on the DPRK with an equal number of decisions (resolutions 2087 and 2094).

The thematic agenda items suffered less variation altogether. The agenda items “Children and Armed Conflict” and “Rule of Law” suffered no variations being considered at one meeting each and one decision (S/PRST/2013/8) for the former. “Threats due to Terrorist Acts” were discussed in two meetings, with one less decision adopted than in 2012 (resolution 2129 and S/PRST/2013/1). Whereas the Council dealt with “Peacekeeping” and “Peacebuilding” in three and two meetings in 2012 adopting a single decision on the latter, in 2013 it met twice and once respectively, adopting resolution 2086 on peacekeeping. On “Women and Peace and Security”, it met three times and adopted two resolutions (2106 and 2122), compared to two presidential statements in 2012 and four meetings. As for “Protection of Civilians”, the Council met three times and adopted a decision (S/PRST/2013/2) while it only met once in 2012 without any outcome. While no new agenda items were added to the work of the Council in 2013, Australia led the reintroduction of the item “Small Arms”, its consideration at one meeting and the adoption of the first ever Council resolution (2117) on the matter. Finally, unlike 2012, when a single meeting was scheduled under note S/2010/507 to address the working methods of the Council, in 2013 it was employed once for a working methods debate and six times to allow for monthly “wrap-up sessions”.

In sum, in addition to its continuing failure to address the wider conflict in Syria, most indicators point to a continuing overall downward trend in Council activity in 2013. Beyond this general trend, the year was punctuated by significant decisions that expanded the terms of UN intermission cooperation (resolution 2132) or use of force authorisation (resolution 2098) to new heights, instituted a groundbreaking chemical weapons inspection regime (resolution 2118) and covered new ground in addressing small arms (2117).
### Notable Dates for February

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPORT DUE</th>
<th>REPORTS FOR CONSIDERATION IN FEBRUARY</th>
<th>REQUESTING DOCUMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 June</td>
<td>SG report on the Rule of Law (S/2013/341)</td>
<td>S/PRST/2012/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 November</td>
<td>SG report on the Protection of Civilians (S/2013/689)</td>
<td>S/PRST/2013/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 January</td>
<td>Panel of Experts final report to the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee</td>
<td>S/RES/2091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 January</td>
<td>OPCW report on the implementation of resolution 2118 (Syrian chemical weapons)</td>
<td>S/RES/2118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 January</td>
<td>SG report on UNMIK (Kosovo)</td>
<td>S/RES/1244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 February</td>
<td>AU report on MISCA (Central African Republic)</td>
<td>S/RES/2127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 February</td>
<td>Panel of Experts final report to the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee</td>
<td>S/RES/2094 S/2013/186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 February</td>
<td>SG report on the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau as per resolution 2048</td>
<td>S/RES/2103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 February</td>
<td>SG report on UNISFA (Abyei)</td>
<td>S/RES/2126</td>
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### MANDATES EXPIRE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELEVANT DOCUMENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 February BNUB (Burundi)</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 February 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee’s Panel of Experts</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 February UNOCA (Central Africa)</td>
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### OTHER IMPORTANT DATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 February</td>
<td>The Council will hold a debate on the protection of civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 February</td>
<td>The Council will have a briefing on its visiting mission to Mali, currently slated for early February.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 February</td>
<td>The Council will hold a debate on the rule of law.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UN Peacekeeping: Deployments and Budgets, 1946-2013

Top 10 Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries (as of 31 December 2013 deployments)

1. Pakistan....................8,266
2. Bangladesh................7,918
3. India.........................7,848
4. Ethiopia....................6,619
5. Nigeria.....................4,836
6. Rwanda.....................4,751
7. Nepal.......................4,580
8. Jordan.......................3,254
9. Ghana.......................3,005
10. Senegal....................2,998

Top 10 Peacekeeping Financing Countries (as per 2013-2015 assessments, A/67/224/Add.1)

1. United States............28.36%
2. Japan......................10.83%
3. France.....................7.21%
4. Germany...................7.14%
5. United Kingdom........6.68%
6. China....................6.64%
7. Italy.....................4.45%
8. Russia....................3.14%
9. Canada.................2.98%
10. Spain.................2.97%

Annual Peacekeeping Budget
Total Peacekeeping Deployment
as of 31 December