Jordan will preside over the Security Council in January. The presidency is planning an open debate on “War, its lessons, and the search for a permanent peace” under the agenda item “Maintenance of International Peace and Security”, with historian Margaret MacMillan (Canada) as the main briefer. An open debate on the Middle East is also planned and the Secretary-General is expected to brief.

Briefings, followed by consultations, are likely on:

- the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) by the Special Representative and head of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC, Martin Kobler, and the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, Mary Robinson;
- the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) and needed changes in the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the CAR (BINUCA) by Special Representative and BINUCA head Babacar Gaye;
- the situation in Mali by Albert Gerard Koenders, the Special Representative and head of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali;
- the Secretary-General’s report on the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous;
- developments in Burundi by the Special Representative and head of the UN Office in Burundi, Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, as well as by the chair of the Peacebuilding Commission’s Burundi configuration, Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland); and
- the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), by the Special Representative and UNOCI head, Aïchatou Mindaoudou, via videoconferencing (VTC).

Briefings in consultations are likely on:

- the work in Syria of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-UN Joint Mission by its Special Coordinator Sigrid Kaag;
- the situation in Sudan and South Sudan by Special Envoy Haile Menkerios, most likely by VTC;
- the work of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) by Special Representative and UNFICYP head Lisa Buttenheim;
- the work of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia by its head Miroslav Jenča;
- the situation in Yemen by Special Adviser Jamal Benomar; and
- developments in the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee by its chair. A successor to the departing chair, Ambassador Aghsin Mehdiyev (Azerbaijan) had not been named at press time. Formal sessions will be needed to adopt resolutions to renew:
  - the mandate of BINUCA;
  - the mandate of UNFICYP; and
  - the DRC sanctions regime and the mandate of the Group of Experts assisting the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee.

An Arria formula meeting is planned by Luxembourg and the UK on women’s participation in the Syrian transition.

In addition to Jordan, four more elected members are joining the Council on 1 January: Chad, Chile, Lithuania and Nigeria (succeeding Azerbaijan, Guatemala, Morocco, Pakistan and Togo).
Since the three vetoes by Russia and China over Syria in 2011 and 2012 and the inability of the Security Council to find a solution to the conflict, there has been a common perception that the Council is divided. Likewise, following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Council was viewed as having become badly fractured. However, looking at decisions adopted, the Council is actually divided on just a limited number of issues and otherwise largely operates by consensus (see the supplemental insert in this Forecast on Non-Consensus Decision-Making in the Security Council: An Abridged History).

Presidential statements require consensus, and press statements are issued only with the agreement of all 15 members. All sanctions committees, with a few exceptions, and working groups also operate by consensus. Resolutions, which are put to a vote, are the only Council outcome that can be adopted with or without the unanimity of the Council. Most resolutions, however, have been adopted by consensus: 93.5 percent of those adopted since 2000 to 15 December 2013. Contrary to public perceptions, this is a noticeable increase from 88.9 percent in the 1990s, a period when the Security Council was viewed as highly active and comparatively more effective and less divided due to the end of the Cold War.

Of the issues on which decisions have been adopted, only a few have generated frequent division. Iraq and Bosnia-Herzegovina account for 34.1 percent of Council resolutions adopted without consensus since 1990. Including the rest of the Middle East (Israel-Palestine and Lebanon) and the Balkans more broadly, these two regions account for 53.2 percent of the non-consensus resolutions adopted since 1990.

Moreover, Middle East resolutions have also been adopted with the lowest levels of support, further reflecting Council divisiveness over this region. Over the last 23 years, the Council has adopted only one resolution with just the minimum nine votes required and six resolutions with just 10 Council members in favor. Of these, four were related to the Middle East (two on Iraq and two on Lebanon) and two were on Libya.

On the other hand, the Council has had a much more consensual approach on African issues, with just 20.6 percent of Africa-related resolutions since 1990 not adopted by consensus. Excluding Sudan, this falls to 11.1 percent, or just 14 resolutions on Africa. This number drops even further when Libya is excluded, the next least consensual African issue, with four non-consensus resolutions.

Cyprus, for decades not viewed as a divisive issue, has been responsible for seven resolutions not adopted by consensus since 2009.

Consensus in Council decision-making seems to be the preferred mode even during years that generated bitter feelings among members. Despite recent divisions on Syria or prior to and following the 2003 Iraq war, consensus resolutions during these periods still prevailed at levels above 92 percent. Thus, it seems that either the Council looks at the merits of each situation instead of allowing divisions on specific issues to permeate into its other work or it makes a more concerted effort to at least appear united on other fronts.

The increase in consensus since 2000 can be explained in part by a change in how China votes: it abstained on 42 adopted resolutions during the 1990s whereas it has only done so 16 times since 2000. This might indicate that China is attaching more importance to being aligned with Council decisions or becoming more adept at getting what it wants during the negotiation of resolutions. Russia has been the second most frequently abstaining permanent member since 1990, having done so on 40 resolutions.

Interestingly, whereas France abstained or did not vote on seven adopted resolutions since 1990, the UK has never done so on any of the adopted resolutions during this period. The UK, though, has abstained 13 times on draft resolutions that failed to be adopted, nine of which accompanied US vetoes. It also abstained or opposed all six draft resolutions that missed obtaining nine affirmative votes since 1990, the latest being the failed draft resolution requesting an ICC deferral on the Kenyan situation. The US has abstained on eight resolutions since 2000, compared to two abstentions during the 1990s, a period seen as marking a high point in US power. The fact that the P3 have mostly accompanied the consensus or the enabling majorities adopting the resolutions may be a product of their role as the pen holders on most Council agenda items.

Elected members have cast 23 total votes against adopted resolutions since 1990, an average of once a year. However, Cuba alone did so nine times in 1990-1991, whereas Turkey did so five times in 2009-2010. Regarding abstentions, they have totaled 94 since 1990, and have become less frequent in recent years. This downward trend is also noticeable in the multiple Council terms served by Brazil, India, Nigeria and Pakistan.

Among elected members, within a single term, Cuba has logged the greatest number of non-consensual votes, opposing nine resolutions and abstaining on four during its 1990-1991 term. Pakistan and Brazil have been among the most frequent to break ranks during multiple terms by abstaining or voting against 12 and 10 resolutions respectively.

Differences can also be observed among regions. Arab states have abstained or cast dissenting votes 33 times. Latin American and Caribbean states follow with 29 and Asian states, excluding Arab states, have withheld affirmative votes 24 times.

Sub-Saharan African countries, despite being the most vociferous about the Council not taking African positions into full account, have mostly voted in favor of Council resolutions, abstaining or casting negative votes 20 times, and on only four resolutions since 2000. Until Azerbaijan abstained five times in its 2012-2013 term, Eastern European states had never broken consensus since 1990.

Perhaps Council members today place more of a premium on consensus. The argument for adopting resolutions by consensus is that when the Council has a united voice, it makes it harder for the party targeted by the decision to play Council members against each other. Of course, a potential downside in pursuing resolutions with strict consensus is that stronger language is lost.
Status Update since our December Forecast

**Horizon Scanning**

On 4 December, Council members met in consultations for a “horizon-scanning” briefing by Assistant Secretary-General Oscar Fernandez-Taranco on the Department of Political Affairs’ role in preventive diplomacy and the peaceful settlement of conflicts through special political missions, mediation/good offices and electoral assistance.

**Afghanistan**

On 4 December, Council members issued a press statement condemning the attacks in Afghanistan’s Uruzgan Province on 26 November and Faryab Province on 27 November (SC/11199). On 17 December, the Council held a debate on the quarterly UNAMA report (S/2013/721) with Special Representative and head of UNAMA Ján Kubiš briefing (S/PV.7085). Kubiš emphasised the importance of credible presidential and provincial elections, scheduled for 5 April 2014.

**International Criminal Tribunals**

On 5 December, the Council held a debate (S/PV.7073) on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) and their respective annual reports (S/2013/463 and S/2013/460). The meeting also focused on the ICTR’s completion strategy (S/2013/663), the ICTY’s assessment report (S/2013/678) and the report from the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (S/2013/679). On 18 December, the Council adopted resolution 2130 extending ICTY judges’ terms until 31 December 2014. Russia abstained on the vote.

**Security Council Elections**

On 6 December, the General Assembly elected Jordan as a Security Council member for the 2014-2015 term, to fill the seat vacated by Saudi Arabia on 18 October.

**Libya**

On 9 December, the Council was briefed (S/PV.7075) by Special Representative Tarek Mitri on UNSMIL and by the chair of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Eugène-Richard Gasana (Rwanda). Mitri defined the security situation in Libya as precarious and clarified issues related to the guard unit authorised by the Council to be deployed in Libya. On 16 December, the Council adopted a presidential statement expressing its grave concern over the worsening security situation and political divisions (S/PRST/2013/21).

**Subsidiary Bodies**

On 9 December, the Council had briefings on the 2013 work of Council subsidiary bodies from outgoing chairs: Azerbaijan on the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee; Guatemala on the 1572 Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee and the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals; Morocco on the 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee, the 2048 Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Committee and the 1566 Working Group on counter-terrorism measures; and Pakistan on the 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee and the Working Group on Peacekeeping (S/PV.7076).

**Guinea-Bissau**

On 9 December, the Council adopted a presidential statement calling for timely and credible national elections, rescheduled for 16 March 2014, and warned potential spoilers with the possibility of sanctions. It also welcomed an ECOWAS plan to reinforce the ECOWAS mission in Guinea-Bissau (S/PRST/2013/19).

**Somalia**

On 10 December, Special Representative Nicholas Kay briefed the Council (S/PV.7078) on the most recent UNSOM report (S/2013/709). In addition to discussing immediate security issues in Somalia, Kay emphasised some of the long-term challenges facing the country, including the need for national reconciliation, creating a system of federal states, revising the constitution and holding national elections.

**Liberia**

On 10 December, the Council adopted resolution 2128, modifying the Liberian sanctions regime. This included changes to the notification requirements on arms transfers and military assistance to the 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee, as well as directing the Committee to review designated individuals and entities and delist those that no longer meet the listing criteria. The resolution also reduced the Panel of Experts from three to two members, and no longer mandates the Panel to monitor Liberia’s natural resources. Earlier in the month, on 5 December, Council members held consultations on the Panel’s final report (S/2013/683).

**Iran**

On 12 December, the chair of the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Gary Quinlan (Australia), presented his 90-day report on the work of the Committee to the Council (S/PV.7082). He welcomed the 24 November interim agreement between Iran and the P5+1 and expressed hope that the agreement would encourage Iran to engage with the Committee. Quinlan emphasised that all of the sanctions imposed by the Council remained in effect and that the Committee would continue its work to monitor their implementation.

**Protection of Journalists**

On 13 December, Council members held an Arria formula meeting on the protection of journalists co-chaired by Ambassador Gérard Araud (France) and Ambassador Gert Rosenthal (Guatemala).

**Lebanon**

On 16 December, Council members issued a press statement condemning the 15 December shooting of an Israeli soldier by a Lebanese soldier near the Blue Line between Israel and Lebanon (SC/11217).

**UNOWA**

On 17 December, the Council was briefed by Special Representative Said Djinnit on the latest UNOWA report (S/2013/732), followed by consultations (S/PV.7087). At press time it was expected that the Council would renew UNOWA’s mandate, which expires on 31 December, for a further three years.

**Counter-Terrorism**

On 17 December, the Council adopted resolution 2129 renewing the mandate of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate for four years.

**Golan Heights**

On 18 December, the Council adopted resolution 2131 renewing UNDOF for six months after considering the Secretary-General’s latest report on the observer mission during 16 December consultations (S/2013/716).

**Drug Trafficking in West Africa and the Sahel**

On 18 December, the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2013/22) following a briefing on drug trafficking in West Africa and the Sahel (S/PV.7090).
Expected Council Action
Council members will be briefed on the implementation of resolution 2118, regarding the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons, by Sigrid Kaag, Special Coordinator of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-UN Joint Mission.

Council members will also closely follow preparations for the 22 January Geneva II peace talks and implementation of the presidential statement on humanitarian access.

Luxembourg and the UK were planning an Arria formula meeting focusing on women’s participation in the Syrian transition process.

Key Recent Developments
On 3 December, humanitarian chief Valerie Amos briefed Council members reporting no progress in gaining cross-line access into hard-to-reach areas, where 2.5 million people are in need, or besieged areas, where some 250,000 people are in need. She also reported no improvement in the protection of civilians or in the demilitarisation of schools and hospitals. She said there was moderate progress with the approval of visas for UN humanitarian workers and additional humanitarian hubs. There had been some movement by the government to allow aid from Iraq to clear customs at the border, but aid from Lebanon and Jordan was still routed through Damascus before distribution. She reported that a red line for Syria was the Turkish border, where no streamlined procedures for aid operations had been approved. This is an area where civilians are in significant need and it is also the largest concentration of opposition-held enclaves where the government does not control border crossings.

The Geneva-based contact group on humanitarian access met for the first time on 26 November and met again on 19 December. The group is co-chaired by OCHA, Australia and Luxembourg and includes the P5, Iran, Saudi Arabia and neighbouring countries Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. Participants have agreed on a framework to measure progress in six essential areas: protection of civilians; safe passage of medical personnel and supplies; safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance; expansion of humanitarian relief operations; non-refoulement; and funding. (On 16 December, OCHA launched its largest ever appeal, US$6.5 billion, for humanitarian aid to Syria. The UN estimates that the Syrian refugee population is likely to double over the course of 2014 and that nearly three-quarters of Syria’s population of 22.4 million will need humanitarian aid.)

On 4 December, Kaag briefed Council members on the preparations for removing critical chemical agents from Syria by 31 December. Syria would transport the material to the Latakia port in armoured vehicles provided by Russia (it seemed possible Russia would provide security at the port), where it will be loaded on vessels provided by Denmark and Norway. At press time, it seemed Italy had agreed to provide the necessary “trans-loading port” to move the materiel to a US ship for destruction activities using hydrolysis, a process never tested at sea. Kaag underlined that the volatile and unpredictable security conditions in Syria could derail the impending deadlines. Of particular importance was the security of the Damascus-Homs highway. On 9 December, the government regained control of this route after launching an offensive in mid-November. (During this same time period, OCHA reported an escalation in fighting along this highway resulting in further civilian displacement and limiting the dispatch of humanitarian assistance.)

Separately, Council members were briefed on 16 December by the Secretary-General on the final report of a UN team led by Åke Sellström that included the results of the investigation into seven allegations of chemical weapons use in Syria. The report reiterated that there was convincing evidence that chemical weapons were used on a relatively large scale in Ghouta on 21 August. The report described credible evidence of chemical weapons use in Khan al-Assad on 19 March. Results for three other incidents suggest chemical weapons use but the investigation was unable to establish a link between sites of the alleged events with the people affected. The mission was unable to establish chemical weapons use in two allegations.

At press time, UN-Arab League Joint Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi was expected to convene a trilateral meeting with Russia and the US in Geneva on 20 December, followed by meetings with representatives of the P5 and Syria’s neighbouring countries. The discussions will focus on preparations for Geneva II, in particular the parameters of the peace talks and whether Iran and Saudi Arabia will be invited to participate. Reaching agreement on these issues will be daunting given that Russia and the US continue to have divergent interpretations of the 30 June 2012 Geneva communiqué’s call for a transitional government and President Bashar al-Assad’s role in that regard.

Regarding the opposition, the 13 December statement of the “London 11” reiterated support for a transitional government with full executive powers by “mutual consent” and that Assad would have no role in Syria. However, media reports indicate that the Syrian National Coalition (SNC), which attended the “London 11” meeting, was told by some western partners that leaving Assad or close associates as part of a transitional government would be preferable to the rise of extremist groups. The Syrian Information Minister said on 4 December that Assad “will lead the period of transition, if there is one … he is the leader of Syria … and will remain the president.” Presidential elections under the current Syrian constitution are slated for May 2014.

Meanwhile, six factions of the opposition Free Syrian Army (FSA) defected to form the Islamic Front, seizing on 11 December the FSA headquarters, warehouses and a border crossing into Turkey. The UK and the US suspended assistance to the FSA. However, on 16 December, the US indicated a willingness to consider supporting the Islamic Front if it re-joins the FSA and supports the Geneva II process under the leadership of the Syrian Opposition Coalition, of which the SNC is the largest bloc. At press time, the Islamic Front had refused to meet with American officials.

The next benchmark is agreement on who will represent the government and the opposition. By 27 December, Russia is to name the government delegation and the US the opposition’s delegation. Both delegations should be credible and empowered to make decisions. For the opposition, a “credible” delegation would be broadly representative, though not necessarily relying on sectarian definitions. A “credible” government delegation would be one that does not include individuals responsible for egregious crimes. (On 2 December, High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay said that the UN Commission of...
Syria (con’t)

Inquiry (CoI) had produced massive evidence that war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed and indicated responsibility at the highest level, including Assad. The CoI’s second thematic report released on 19 December concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that enforced disappearances were perpetrated by government forces as part of a widespread campaign of terror against the civilian population amounting to a crime against humanity.)

If these difficult obstacles can be overcome and peace talks are not further delayed, it seems both delegations would be asked to find ways to lower the overall levels of violence and enhance humanitarian access as immediate steps to build confidence while the thornier issue of a transitional government is worked out.

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 13 December, Pillay expressed concern about the significant rise of abductions and enforced disappearances of human rights defenders, activists, journalists, religious figures and others by armed groups and government forces. She urged all parties to the conflict to “stop terrorizing civilians through abduction, hostage-taking, enforced disappearances and arbitrary detention, in clear violation of international human rights and humanitarian law.”

Key Issue
The key issue for the Council is how to contribute towards a solution that can significantly lower levels of violence and improve humanitarian access.

Underlying Problem
The progress on the chemical weapons track has not altered the course of the civil war in Syria. The level of violence continues unabated, with more than 100,000 killed, and some sources put the death toll at 126,000. The government conducted air strikes against opposition-held Aleppo for several days beginning on 15 December, killing scores of civilians, including children. The humanitarian situation is devastating. The refugee population now numbers 2.3 million, and 9.3 million in Syria are in need of humanitarian assistance (of these, 2.5 million can rarely be accessed by humanitarian workers, and 6.5 million are internally displaced). Adding to the dire situation are the challenges of winter, alarming reports of intentional policies of starvation in areas under siege by the government and a health infrastructure collapsing under deliberate attack.

Options
Aside from Kaag’s briefing on the chemical weapons track and possibly hearing from Amos on humanitarian access, another option includes a briefing from Brahimi on the details of the preparations for the Geneva II peace talks.

If Geneva II is convened, the Council could issue a statement supporting the peace talks and urging swift agreement that could be endorsed by a resolution.

Another option for the Council is to adopt a resolution on humanitarian issues if cooperation does not improve dramatically in the near term and if the prospect of a political solution slips further into the future.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Many Council members have acknowledged that the unprecedented cooperation on the chemical weapons track has not translated into significant improvements in humanitarian access or breakthroughs on the political track. There is a certain level of confidence that the Geneva II peace talks will be convened in early 2014 but without any corresponding optimism that they will produce any imminent political solution.

If the Geneva II talks are postponed and if cooperation on humanitarian access remains limited, then some Council members are considering a humanitarian resolution as a possible next step. Saudi Arabia has drafted a resolution and, along with Morocco—the voice of the Arab Group on the Council until Jordan takes over on 1 January—is consulting bilaterally with Council members on the text. However, no action on this draft was anticipated at press time.

Also, in the lead-up to Geneva II, Russia and the US are not likely to develop an appetite for a Syria-focused resolution, preferring instead to focus on using the Geneva-based contact group as a mechanism to improve access. Most Council members value Amos’s emphasis on Council unity and agree on the need to avoid contentious negotiations at this juncture.

Council members see that the recent thaw in diplomatic relations between the US and Iran could ease regional tensions. However, the struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia for regional influence will continue to have the potential to make progress on the Syrian situation difficult. At this early stage, Council members are wary about forecasting whether there will be any immediate, positive impacts from the Iran nuclear agreement on Syria.

On the chemical weapons track, Council members are largely satisfied by the progress but are aware that the most dangerous phase of transporting chemical agents out of Syria is still to be completed. There are several technical and legal issues regarding liability over the transport and destruction of the arsenal that are still outstanding. Council members agree the OPCW is the best forum to find solutions for these concerns.

France is the penholder on Syria. However, most texts are thoroughly negotiated between Russia and the US prior to agreement by the broader Council. Australia and Luxembourg have taken the lead on the humanitarian track.

Sudan and South Sudan

Expected Council Action
In January, Council members are expected to hold one meeting, likely in consultations, on Sudan-South Sudan issues. It is also possible that the Council may discuss the situation in South Sudan, given the fluidity of events on

the ground. At press time, it was unclear whether there would be an outcome on these issues in January.

**Key Recent Developments**

Tensions within the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the ruling party of South Sudan, boiled over in December. On 6 December, former Vice-President Riek Machar, who was sacked by President Salva Kiir on 23 July, held a press conference in Juba with other disillusioned high-level officials to criticise Kiir for what they believe are “dictatorial tendencies”. On 8 December, Kiir loyalists released a statement alleging that the participants in the press conference had attempted to “discredit and distort facts” about the SPLM leadership.

Heavy fighting broke out in Juba between members of the army, beginning on the evening of 15 December and continued intermittently in the ensuing days. On 16 December, Kiir held a press conference in which he alleged that the fighting resulted from a coup attempt sparked by forces loyal to Machar, an accusation denied by Machar in an interview with the Sudan Tribune. While Machar’s whereabouts remained unknown at press time, the government had arrested 11 leading opposition figures, including its former chief negotiator with Sudan, Pagan Amun.

Council members were briefed on South Sudan under “any other business” by Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, on 17 December. He said that the fighting within the army appeared to be along Nuer-Dinka ethnic lines. (Kiir is a Dinka; Machar is a Nuer.) While not definitively confirming casualty figures, Ladsous estimated that 400-500 people may have been killed, and 600-800 wounded. (He did not specify how many of the casualties are civilian; however, it has been reported that Nuer civilians in Juba have been targeted in the fighting.)

Ladsous also estimated that over 18,000 civilians had sought protection at two UN facilities in Juba and that the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was doing its best to attend to their humanitarian needs.

Heavy fighting has also been reported in and around Bor, in Jonglei state, along the same ethnic lines as in Juba. Peter Gadet, the Nuer army commander in Jonglei, defected alleging that the Nuer were being targeted in the turmoil. The government lost control of Bor on 18 December while the UN base in Akobo was attacked by Nuer youth on 19 December. There have also been reports of violence against civilians in Unity and War-rap states.

On 17 December, the Council issued a press statement (SC/11221) in which it inter-alia:

- expressed serious concern with the fighting in South Sudan;
- urged the parties to exercise restraint and refrain from violence;
- underscored the importance of protecting civilians, regardless of their communities of origin; and
- called on the government to dialogue with its opponents in order to resolve their differences peacefully.

On 19 December, in a news release, High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay inter-alia:

- called on the government to signal to the SPLA its “command responsibility” to prevent retaliatory violence based on communal affiliation and to hold accountable alleged perpetrators;
- expressed concern at the fate of those arrested by the government and reports of several extra-judicial killings;
- urged the government to ensure that due process is accorded to those detained and that they are promptly charged or released; and
- urged all parties to demonstrate restraint and adhere to international human rights and humanitarian law.

It appeared that a ministerial delegation of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development had been deployed to Juba on 19 December to mediate between the parties, although details about this trip were not available at press time.

Significant political developments also occurred in the ruling party in Sudan. In early December, the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) carried out a long-anticipated cabinet reshuffle. First Vice-President Ali Osman Taha was replaced by former Defence and Interior Minister Bakri Hassan Saleh. NCP Secretary for Political Affairs Hassabo Mohammed Abdel Rahman was named second vice president. Ibrahim Gandour was named presidential advisor, a post vacated by Nafie Ali Nafie. Notable among those retained were Foreign Minister Ali Karti and Defence Minister Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein, who has been indicted by the ICC for crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur.

The opposition argued that the changes were largely cosmetic. Yasir Arman, secretary-general of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) rebel group, claimed that the reshuffle strengthened President Omar Al-Bashir and enhanced the position of military elements in the NCP while weakening the Islamists. The opposition National Umma Party issued a statement on 8 December advocating a national constitutional process, calling the cabinet changes “decorative”.

Fighting has continued in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states in Sudan. Engagements between Sudan and the SPLM-N rebels and aerial bombardments by Sudan reportedly displaced about 25,000 civilians in South Kordofan in November. According to the Satellite Sentinel Project, satellite evidence showed structures burning on 24 November in Kunduk with Sudan Armed Forces personnel nearby, while aerial bombardment and shelling claimed some 20 lives and wounded 18 in and around Kunduk. OCHA reported in early December the displacement of approximately 2,800 people, mainly women and children, and food shortages in Bau, Blue Nile.

On 5 December, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet briefed Council members in consultations on Sudan-South Sudan issues and on the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). Mulet said that Sudan and the SPLM-N had still not agreed on arrangements for a polio vaccination campaign intended to inoculate 165,000 children in areas held by the SPLM-N in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, which had been scheduled for 5-12 November. Mulet also expressed concern about the security situation in the disputed Abyei region straddling Sudan and South Sudan in light of the beginning of the migration by the Misseriya through the area and the heightened tensions between the Misseriya and Ngok-Dinka communities in the aftermath of the Ngok-Dinka decision to hold a unilateral referendum on the status of Abyei in late October. (Plans for an official referendum to determine whether Abyei should become part of Sudan or South Sudan have been repeatedly delayed due to
Sudan and South Sudan (con’t)

disagreements on voter eligibility criteria. Sudan believes that the migratory Misseriya, who would likely choose for Abyei to become part of Sudan, should be allowed to vote, while South Sudan disagrees, believing that only permanent residents of the area—i.e., the Ngok-Dinka—should be eligible to participate.)

Key Issues
Regarding the situation in South Sudan, key issues include what role the Council can play in:

• mediating between the different factions of the SPLM in an effort to end the violence and ensure that peaceful political dialogue is initiated;
• protecting civilians that have been caught in or targeted during the fighting;
• ensuring that adequate humanitarian access is provided; and
• holding accountable those who have committed human rights violations.

With respect to Sudan-South Sudan relations, key issues for the Council include what role it can play in:

• ensuring that peace is maintained in Abyei between the Ngok-Dinka and Misseriya; and
• jump-starting negotiations between Sudan and the SPLM-N, as fighting continues in South Kordofan and Blue Nile and the parties have made no progress in discussing political and humanitarian issues.

An overarching issue is whether and how political dynamics in Juba and Khartoum will impact negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan, given the fighting in South Sudan and the recent cabinet reshuffle in Sudan.

Options
Options for the Council with respect to South Sudan include:

• making a special request for a troop-contributing country to supply additional troops to UNMISS to enhance the capacity of the mission to protect civilians in areas affected by violence;
• urging robust patrolling by UNMISS within its capacities to protect civilians;
• deploying a visiting mission to South Sudan to send a strong message to the parties on the need for reconciliation;
• tasking a special envoy to mediate between the factions of the SPLM; and, although unlikely at this stage,
• threatening targeted sanctions on spoilers of the state-building process.

With respect to Sudan-South Sudan relations, the Council may consider issuing a statement to reiterate:

• the importance of resolving outstanding issues (e.g., the status of disputed areas and demarcation of the border);
• grave concern at the humanitarian situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile;
• the call for Sudan and the SPLM-N to engage in direct talks and allow for humanitarian access in areas affected by conflict; and
• the importance of establishing temporary administrative institutions in Abyei (Abyei Area Council, Abyei Area Administration and Abyei Area Police Force) as long as the final status of the area is not resolved.

The Council could also request an interactive dialogue with the AU High-Level Implementation Panel Chair, Thabo Mbeki, to get his impressions of the status of negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan and the prospects for talks between Sudan and the SPLM-N.

Council Dynamics
There is very strong concern among Council members with the outbreak of violence in South Sudan, the toll the fighting is taking on civilians and the inter-ethnic dimension to the violence. At press time, Council members were still seeking greater clarity on how the fighting was precipitated.

There is a degree of optimism in the Council with regard to the recent state of relations between Sudan and South Sudan, although there is widespread concern about the heightened tensions between the Misseriya and Ngok-Dinka in Abyei, and the potential that these tensions could have a negative impact on Sudan-South Sudan relations. Some members are also curious about how the recent cabinet reshuffle in Khartoum and the fighting in South Sudan will affect Sudan-South Sudan relations.

The US is the penholder on Sudan-South Sudan issues.

Sudan (Darfur)

Expected Council Action
In January, the Council will hold a briefing and consultations on the quarterly report on the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous is expected to brief. At press time, no outcome was anticipated.

The mandate of UNAMID expires on 31 August 2014.

Key Recent Developments
The security situation in Darfur has remained volatile in recent months, with significant inter-communal violence and fighting between government forces and rebels. The instability in the region continues to cause large-scale displacement. On 14 November, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that over 460,000 people had been displaced in Darfur in 2013, more than the number displaced in 2011 and 2012 combined.

On 27 October, the Misseriya and Salamat fought near Mukjar, Central Darfur, reportedly resulting in more than 20 deaths. These communities clashed again in several towns in Central Darfur from 6–8 November, leaving a large number of dead and displaced persons. According to the American Refugee Committee, approximately 10,000 Salamat were displaced by the fighting in November.

On 3 November, rebels from the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minnawi (SLA-MM) ambushed Sudan Armed Forces
(SAF) soldiers in North Darfur, allegedly seizing two dozen SAF vehicles during the fighting and both sides apparently sustaining heavy casualties.

On 10-11 November, fighting between the Salamat and Taisha over land in South Darfur reportedly left more than 100 dead and over 300 people wounded. Addressing parliament on 12 November, Defence Minister Abdelrahim Mohammed Hussein said that inter-communal fighting had surpassed rebel-related violence as the greatest threat to security in Darfur.

After members of the Hamar community killed a member of the Ma’aliya during a dispute over grazing land, inter-ethnic violence between the two communities erupted on 5 December in Um Deibut, West Kordofan. Twenty-two Hamar and 16 Ma’aliya reportedly died in the fighting, which displaced over 6,000 people.

The visit of some members of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee had been planned for December 2013, but it was deferred as Sudan failed to provide final approval for the trip. This mission has been repeatedly postponed since it was first discussed in August 2012. The mission is now tentatively scheduled for the second half of January.

The AU-UN Joint Special Representative, Joint Mediator and head of UNAMID, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, met with representatives of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the SLA-MM in Addis Ababa between 9 and 11 December. The SLA-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW), the other major Darfur-based rebel group, did not participate in the meeting. At the conclusion of the negotiations, the JEM and the SLA-MM called for a “comprehensive…peaceful settlement of the Sudanese conflicts”.

IGC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda briefed the Council on 11 December on the work of the ICC in Darfur (S/PV.7080). During her briefing, she was highly critical of Sudan for its non-compliance with Council decisions and of the Council for its failure to ensure that the ICC indictees are tried for their alleged crimes. “Inaction and paralysis within the Council have not only prolonged the suffering of Darfur’s victims, but have also bolstered [President Omar al-] Bashir’s resolve to ignore the Council,” Bensouda said.

The Council held its most recent briefing on UNAMID on 23 October. During the briefing Chambas told Council members that he had met with key JEM and SLA-MM figures between 22-27 August in Arusha, Tanzania. He said that the groups were committed to a “negotiated political settlement…in the context of a holistic solution to Sudan’s problems.” He also noted that Sudan had said that any negotiation with the rebels should be done in the context of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD). Following Chambas, Ladsous addressed the Council referring to the limited progress in the peace process, the difficult security environment and the ongoing need for humanitarian assistance in Darfur. Finally, Ambassador Daffa-Alla Elhag Ali Osman (Sudan) expressed concern at what he called “the inability of UNAMID military personnel to defend…themselves” in reference to recent attacks on UNAMID peacekeepers.

Key Issues
One key issue is how the Council can best address the continuing deterioration of the security situation in Darfur and the toll that it is taking on civilian populations. Another key issue is the safety and security of UN peacekeepers in Darfur, as 14 peacekeepers had been killed in 2013 at press time.

Also an important issue is Sudan’s continuing effort to postpone the visiting mission of the 1591 Sanctions Committee to Darfur, which has been delayed now for 16 months.

Underlying Problem
There continues to be a lack of political progress in resolving the differences between Sudan and several key Darfur rebel groups, including the JEM, SLA-MM and SLA-AW. Khartoum is only willing to negotiate with the Darfur rebels on the basis of the DDPD, which is limited to addressing the political, economic, human rights and humanitarian grievances of people in Darfur. However, these rebel movements refuse to sign the DDPD, considering themselves part of a broader national coalition of rebel groups called the Sudan Revolutionary Front, which espouses a comprehensive national solution that includes regime change.

Options
One option is for the Council to adopt a statement:
• deploring the upsurge in violence against civilians and UN peacekeepers in the last year and demanding accountability for the perpetrators of such violence;
• demanding that Sudan commit to ensuring that members of the 1591 Sanctions Committee can visit the region; and
• reiterating the obligation of all member states to comply with the arms embargo on Darfur.

The Council could also request a briefing from UNAMID Force Commander Lieutenant General Paul Ignace Mella (Tanzania) to get his views on how the mission could strengthen its efforts to protect civilians.

Council Dynamics
Several Council members have expressed strong concern about the deterioration of the security situation in 2013, marked by inter-communal violence, fighting between the government and rebel groups and large-scale displacement. There are differences in perspective, however, in how to attribute accountability for much of the turmoil in Darfur. Some members, including but not limited to the P3, are very critical of Sudan, tending to highlight reports of aerial bombardments affecting civilians, restrictions on humanitarian access and impunity for those committing crimes in the region. Others tend to be less critical of Sudan, placing a greater share of blame on the rebel groups that have thus far refused to accede to the DDPD.

There are strong divisions on the Council regarding the work of the ICC in Darfur. Among those that support the ICC, Australia and Luxembourg have argued that those in Sudan who have been indicted by the ICC should be listed under the Sudan sanctions regime. Several Council members opposed to the ICC believe that its efforts in Darfur, as elsewhere, are driven largely by political motivations.

The UK is the penholder on Darfur, while Argentina chairs the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee.
Central African Republic

Expected Council Action
In January, the Security Council is due to adopt a resolution extending the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA). The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of BINUCA, Babacar Gaye, will brief the Council on BINUCA’s latest report. BINUCA’s mandate expires on 31 January 2014.

Key Recent Developments
Since the Séléka rebels took up arms in December 2012, culminating in the 24 March 2013 ousting of President François Bozizé, the political and security situation in the CAR has remained highly volatile and unpredictable.

During the last several months the country has continued to fall into a state of lawlessness, with a complete breakdown in state authority and a growing humanitarian crisis. Nearly 400,000 people have been displaced, with another 69,800 refugees in neighbouring countries.

The ex-Séléka rebels, now officially disbanded by the transitional government, continue to commit serious violations of human rights with total impunity. In response, militia groups known as the Anti-Balaka have emerged, creating a new dynamic of violence and retaliation. As a result, there are an increasing number of attacks by Anti-Balaka groups against ex-Séléka forces, as well as local communities, including the Muslim population. These attacks have triggered reprisals from ex-Séléka elements against the population. The cycle has the potential to spiral into uncontrollable sectarian-driven violence with serious regional implications.

Since amending BINUCA’s mandate on 10 October in resolution 2121, the Council has engaged actively with the situation in the CAR. On 5 December, the Council adopted resolution 2127, authorising the deployment of an AU International Support Mission to the CAR (MISCA) and a French intervention force. S/RES/2121 (10 October 2013) authorised MISCA and a French intervention force. S/RES/2127 (5 December 2013) authorised MISCA and a French intervention force.

The resolution also requests the Secretary-General to establish a trust fund for CAR. On 5 December, the Council adopted Council on BINUCA’s latest report.

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The resolution also requests the Secretary-General to establish an international commission of inquiry to investigate international humanitarian law and human rights law violations in the CAR since 1 January 2013, including identifying the perpetrators of such violence. In addition, it establishes an arms embargo on the supply, sale or transfer to the CAR of arms and a sanctions committee as well as a panel of experts to assist the committee. The Council warns in the resolution that targeted measures, including travel bans and assets freezes, may be considered in the future against those obstructing the transitional political process and committing human rights abuses.

The resolution further welcomes the Secretary-General’s intention to undertake the necessary preparations for the possible transformation of MISCA into a UN peacekeeping operation and asks him to initiate contingency preparations and planning to that end. It further requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within three months with recommendations on this issue, including an assessment of progress towards meeting the appropriate conditions on the ground. The resolution also stresses that the transformation of MISCA into a UN peacekeeping mission would require a future Council decision.

On 6 December the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) welcomed the adoption of resolution 2127 authorising MISCA. OHCHR deployed a human rights monitoring team to CAR on 12 December to strengthen the existing monitoring capacity of the human rights section of BINUCA.

Despite the immediate deployment of the French soldiers and the presence of 2,500 MISCA troops in the CAR, the security and humanitarian situations in the CAR continued to deteriorate. On 10 December it was reported that more than 500 people had been killed in Bangui in sectarian violence between Muslims and Christians in the span of a week, a sharp increase in religious based violence over the last period. (Various UN officials have recently forewarned of the looming threat of a future genocide in the CAR, with religious communities of Christians and Muslims being incited against one another by armed groups. For more see our CAR brief in the December Forecast). On the same day, France suffered its first casualties when gunmen killed two soldiers. The media reported instances of violence in Bangui, with lynching, looting and the burning of places of worship. At the same time, the transitional government, including transitional President Michel Djotodia, seemed to be losing the little control they had over the ex-Séléka rebels.

In a meeting hosted in Paris by French President François Hollande on 7 December, the Secretary-General discussed the situation in the CAR with African leaders as part of the Elysée Summit for Peace and Security in Africa. He said that there is an urgent need to avoid further deterioration of the situation in the CAR and called for the swift implementation of resolution 2127.

As conditions continued to deteriorate, the AU announced plans to increase MISCA to 6,000 troops. Media reports indicate that the US is assisting the deployment of a Burundian contingent to MISCA. In addition, the US, while of the position that a UN peacekeeping operation should not be deployed, has pledged to provide MISCA with US$40 million in financial support. The EU has pledged €50 million to assist MISCA.

France briefed the Council on the recent developments relating to its deployment in the CAR under “any other business” on 9 December. Ambassador Gérard Araud (France) reported that the situation is particularly alarming outside Bangui. He said Opération Sangaris is focusing on protecting civilians and has started disarming armed groups in Bangui while working to assist the transitional government. He added that France intends to pull its troops out of CAR within four months. As for MISCA, Araud relayed its intention to expand its presence in the CAR but also raised the issue of financing the additional planned troops. France also conveyed its intention to keep the Council updated on the situation.

Ambassador Samantha Power (US) updated Council members on her 8 December phone conversation with Djotodia. She expressed concern over the escalating violence in the country and urged Djotodia to ensure that perpetrators of recent atrocities are arrested. Djotodia expressed his
frustration as the international community is unable to offer solutions to the situation in CAR and on the lack of cooperation he receives from the transitional government.

**Key Issues**

A key issue for the Council is to continue the hands-on approach towards the CAR that it has recently adopted and follow developments closely. This may entail authorising a UN peacekeeping mission in the near future.

A related issue after the adoption of resolution 2127 is providing continued and effective support to MISCA in order for it to restore security in the country immediately.

Another issue for January is finding a productive role for BINUCA in light of the ongoing transitional process, the deployment of MISCA and a possible UN peacekeeping mission.

An additional issue is ensuring that the transitional process, which is to culminate with elections in early 2015, moves forward successfully.

**Options**

Options for the Council include:
- renewing BINUCA’s mandate for another year;
- renewing BINUCA’s mandate for a shorter period of time in light of the possibility that a UN peacekeeping operation will be established in the near future;
- establishing a peacekeeping operation and transforming BINUCA into its civilian component;
- expanding BINUCA’s role in assisting MISCA; and
- in line with paragraph 56 of resolution 2127, expanding the sanctions regime to include targeted sanctions against those responsible for atrocities and those disturbing the transitional process.

**Central African Republic (con’t)**

**Democratic Republic of the Congo**

**Expected Council Action**

In January, the Security Council will be briefed on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) by the Special Representative and head of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), Martin Kobler and by the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, Mary Robinson, on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region (PSC Framework).

The Council is also expected to renew the sanctions regime and the mandate of the Group of Experts (GoE) assisting the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee, as both expire on 1 February.

The Sanctions Committee will meet to discuss the final report of the GoE. The new chair of the Committee (replacing Azerbaijan) will brief the Council on the report.

MONUSCO’s mandate expires on 31 March 2014.

**Key Recent Developments**

The Council has demonstrated renewed engagement with the DRC in recent months as dramatic developments occurred on the ground.

Between 4-8 October, Council members undertook a visiting mission to the Great Lakes Region and Addis Ababa for the first time since 2010 (S/2013/579). On 21 October, the Council was briefed on the trip by the lead countries (S/PV.7045).

On the same day, Kobler briefed (S/PV.7046) the Council on the Secretary-General’s most recent MONUSCO report (S/2013/581) and Robinson briefed about the implementation of the PSC Framework (S/2013/569).

Following the suspension of the Uganda-mediated Kampala peace talks between the DRC and the March 23 (M23) rebel group, on 25 October fighting resumed between the M23 and the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). Later that day, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous briefed Council
members on developments under “any other business” in consultations and Kobler briefed in consultations on 28 October.

Also on 28 October, Council members issued a press statement condemning the M23 attacks against MONUSCO that resulted in the death of a peacekeeper and addressed shelling of Rwandan territory (SC/11163).

The FARDC offensive forced the M23 to retreat until finally, on 5 November, the M23 declared an end to its military operations, with many of its members surrendering to Ugandan authorities after fleeing across the border. Kobler and Robinson briefed Council members in consultations via video-teleconference on 6 November as events unfolded.

Following the surrender of the M23, the DRC and the M23 were to sign an agreement on 11 November but eventually failed to conclude one.

The Council adopted a presidential statement on 14 November, calling for the swift conclusion and implementation of a final outcome between the DRC and the M23 that provides for the disarmament and demobilisation of the M23 and accountability for human rights abusers (S/PRST/2013/17). The statement stressed the importance of implementing the PSC Framework, in particular the DRC’s commitment to carrying out various reforms, consolidating state authority and enhancing the judicial system and the rule of law.

Ladsous, Kobler and Robinson briefed Council members in consultations on the latest developments on 11 December. Ladsous reported on the first flight of MONUSCO’s new unarmed aerial vehicles (UAVs) on 3 December. (The Council agreed to the deployment of UAVs in a letter to the Secretary-General [S/2013/44]. In addition, resolution 2098 of 28 March stated that in monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo in cooperation with the GoE, emphasis was to be placed on documenting cross-border flows of military personnel and arms, including by using surveillance capabilities such as UAVs.) He further reported that many rebels from various groups had decided to lay down their arms after the M23 had done so. He added that the DRC planned to relocate former rebels rather than reintegrate them into the military, as had been done in the past.

Robinson updated the Council on the negotiations between the DRC and the M23 and the institutional gaps to consolidate state authority in the eastern DRC. Kobler reported that MONUSCO and the FARDC control all the main roads in the east, but many rebels, in particular the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), still remain active inland from the main roads. He spoke of MONUSCO’s plans to address the FDLR problem, the need for the DRC to restore public services in the east and the road ahead towards local elections in 2015.

An agreement between the M23 and the DRC was finally signed in Nairobi on 12 December. The DRC agreed to grant amnesty to those M23 members who are only accused of taking up arms, and the M23 is to disarm and become a political party.

In sanctions-related developments, Council members received an advanced copy of the GoE’s final report in mid-December, which documented continued Rwandan support to the M23. The GoE also documented international humanitarian law and human rights violations by the FARDC and rebel groups.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 11 December, the UN Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO), comprising the Human Rights Division of MONUSCO and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in the DRC, released a report examining human rights violations committed during the presidential and legislative election campaigns in the DRC between 1 October 2011 and 31 January 2012. The UNJHRO recorded 345 human rights violations relating to the electoral process with 769 victims, including 41 people killed and 165 injured. The report found that the defence and security forces were responsible for more than half of the documented violations, with the most violations recorded in Kinshasa and in the province of Kasai Oriental. The main victims were identified as political party members or sympathisers. The report underlined the importance of prosecuting those responsible for these violations. UNJHRO concluded that while some actions had been taken by the government to end these violations, they were largely insufficient in light of the scale of the documented violations.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is to maintain its renewed engagement with the DRC, and in particular to closely oversee the operations of MONUSCO and its intervention brigade, and to keep a close track of the M23 following its declared defeat.

Another key issue is to ensure the implementation of the PSC Framework at the national and regional levels.

An immediate issue for the Council in January is the renewal of the sanctions regime and the mandate of the GoE.

Options

Regarding sanctions, options for the Council include:

- renewing the sanctions regime and the mandate of the GoE;
- endorsing in the resolution the recommendations of the GoE in their final report;
- expanding the sanctions regime to include targeted measures against those hindering the implementation of the PSC Framework or those undermining the current sanctions;
- granting the GoE access to information gathered by UAVs; or
- adopting a resolution placing individuals on the sanctions list, if consensus is not reached in the Sanctions Committee. (This has been done, for example, in resolution 1672 on Sudan sanctions.)

Regarding the overall situation, an option for the Council would be to seek regular briefings on developments and on the implementation of the PSC Framework. The Council may also issue a presidential or press statement supporting the implementation of the PSC Framework, in particular the consolidation of state authority of the DRC and the operations of the intervention brigade.

Council Dynamics

With the agreement between the DRC and the M23 finalised, Council members appear hopeful that the military achievement will be followed by a political process. Several Council members are of the view that at this point the focus should be on national reforms, the reintegration of former rebels and the establishment of state authority.

Council members are in general agreement that the intervention brigade, though it only engaged directly with the M23 on a few occasions, played a significant role in the FARDC’s military success against the M23. Some Council members, in particular Rwanda, are supportive of the intervention brigade’s operative plans to focus attention on the FDLR next. At the same time, several Council members are interested in seeing progress in the development of a DRC rapid reaction force to eventually replace the intervention brigade.

As for sanctions and the GoE, the previous mandate and appointment of the experts were...
Expected Council Action

In January, the Council will be briefed by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB), Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, and Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland), the chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). The briefing will be followed by consultations.

BNUB’s mandate expires on 15 February 2014.

Key Recent Developments

In the context of the openly stated wishes of Burundi to see BNUB come to an end in February, a strategic assessment mission (SAM) visited Burundi from 4-10 November to assess the country’s progress. The mission was led by the Department of Political Affairs and included representatives from the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Peacebuilding Support Office, the UN Development Program, the UN Refugee Agency and the UN Children’s Fund. The findings of the SAM were discussed in the UN Policy Committee on 17 December and will be included in the Secretary-General’s report on BNUB due by 17 January. (Resolution 2090, which renewed BNUB’s mandate, requested the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on the benchmarks to assess Burundi’s progress towards the deployment of a UN country team rather than a political mission, the implementation of BNUB’s mandate and the outcome of the SAM in his next written report.)

It seems that the SAM found that the security situation in Burundi continued to remain stable, with a further drop in extra-judicial killings compared to 2012, especially with regard to politically motivated killings, and the expansion of the work of the National Commission of Human Rights.

At the same time, the mission found that Burundi is regressing in other respects. Accountability for extra-judicial killings is still absent. There were serious concerns regarding the disappearance of political space and basic freedoms that allow for the opposition and civil society to operate. This is the result of various laws that have resulted in restrictions and tight supervision of the media and NGOs and limitations on the right to assembly. Another element of this is the continuing intimidation by the youth wing of the ruling party, Imbonerakure, of those who do not share their views. The Imbonerakure act with impunity.

Many observers, including BNUB and the PBC, fear that other bills proposed by the government will further restrict the ability of the opposition to participate in the political sphere. Of greatest concern is the intention to amend the constitution, as the government has already initiated this process, asserting that the constitution is in need of serious revision.

Enacted in 2005, the constitution enshrines the principles of the 2000 Arusha Accords, including ethnic power-sharing arrangements and checks on majority rule. Some central suggested amendments include:

• allowing the president to be re-elected more than once;
• eliminating mechanisms to legally remove the president from power;
• creating the new position of prime minister with extensive authority;
• changing some elements of the ethnic balance in the composition of the government; and
• reducing requirements for a 75 percent majority for adopting ordinary laws and resolutions in the National Assembly.

Opposition parties, civil society and BNUB have all called on the government not to change the constitution without a comprehensive national dialogue and view this exercise as an attempt by the government to cement its control and further limit the political sphere.

While noting that the president of the National Assembly has expressed his willingness to hold a short dialogue with political parties and civil society about the amendments, BNUB has warned that a total revision of the constitution warrants a long consultative process.

In addition, the transitional justice mechanisms foreseen by the Arusha Accords have yet to materialise. These include the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission and an international criminal tribunal.

In light of these developments, the conclusions of the SAM seem to be that BNUB should stay in Burundi until after the June 2015 elections. At the same time, the government has openly stated that it wishes to see BNUB come to an end in February. It views BNUB as a signal to private foreign investors that the country is unstable and therefore as an impediment to progress.

Onanga-Anyanga and Seger last briefed the Council on 22 July 2013 (S/PV.7006). Ambassador Herménégilde Niyonzima (Burundi) also participated. Prior to the last mandate renewal, Burundi had initially signalled that it wanted BNUB to be converted to a UN country team. It later reconsidered and conveyed its wishes to see BNUB’s drawdown take place in 2014, possibly understanding that it requires more political assistance and reflecting its interest in receiving continued social and economic development assistance from BNUB.

Developments in the PBC

Seger paid a brief visit to Bujumbura on 28-30 October on the occasion of a conference following up on the Geneva donor meeting of 29-30 November.
October 2012.

The steering group of the Burundi PBC configuration met on 12 November, during which Seger conveyed his impressions. He reiterated his view that a UN political presence in Burundi remained crucial and that without it, the PBC would probably have to end its engagement with Burundi. The extension of a UN political presence would allow for the continued work of the PBC, which the government has said it favours, at least until after elections.

The Burundi configuration held an informal meeting on 16 December with a specific focus on the constitutional review process.

Seger is scheduled to pay another visit to Burundi in January before the Council meeting on Burundi.

Key Issues

A key issue is assessing Burundi’s progress in achieving the benchmarks and balancing the need for BNUB to remain with accommodating the wishes of the government.

A further issue is addressing the role of the PBC in Burundi, especially if BNUB is significantly scaled down.

Options

Options for the Council regarding BNUB prior to its expiry on 15 February include:

- renewing its mandate as it stands;
- renewing its mandate until after the June 2013 elections;
- scaling down its size and mandate to focus on particular issues, such as election preparations and related institutions;
- replacing it with a scaled-down political mission; or
- not renewing BNUB altogether.

Council Dynamics

It appears that the Burundi is now quite determined to see BNUB terminated or at least replaced with a substantially scaled-down mission.

Several Council members are of the opinion that a political mission is still needed and that in order to ensure future progress in Burundi, BNUB should remain until the conclusion of a successful electoral process in 2015.

Yet it is clear to all Council members that BNUB requires host government consent, as a matter of law since it is a Chapter VI political mission. In practical terms, BNUB will not be able to implement its mandate without official cooperation. At the same time, there seems to be little appetite among Council members to mandate a Chapter VII operation in Burundi, as the security situation does not justify this.

Council members will be interested in hearing from Onanga-Anyanga about the conclusions of the SAM and his assessment of Burundi’s progress in achieving the benchmarks. They will also be interested to hear about his discussions with the government on the continued presence of BNUB or a new political mission to replace it with a modified mandate until after the conclusion of the elections.

The penholder on Burundi is France.

Mali

Expected Council Action

In January, the Council expects to receive a briefing from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), Albert Gerard Koenders. The briefing will be followed by consultations.

MINUSMA’s mandate expires on 30 June 2014.

Key Recent Developments

The security situation in northern Mali has been unstable, with several violent clashes between armed groups, tensions in the Kidal region and some incidents of inter-communal violence. Four peacekeepers were killed in two suicide attacks in Tessalit (23 October) and Kidal (14 December) and on 2 November, two French journalists were kidnapped and killed near Kidal in an apparent Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) attack. On 16 December, at least two mortar shells exploded in the vicinity of a MINUSMA camp in Kidal without causing any damage.

Following a 12 December briefing on the implementation of the UN integrated Sahel strategy by the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Sahel, Romano Prodi, the Council issued a presidential statement in which it reaffirmed its commitment to “address the complex security and political challenges in this region, which are interrelated with humanitarian and developmental issues as well as the adverse effects of climate and ecological changes” (S/PRST/2013/20). The statement highlighted the continuing threat of terrorist attacks and called on states from the region to “develop inclusive and effective strategies to combat in a comprehensive and integrated manner the activities of terrorist groups, to prevent the proliferation of all arms and to fight against transnational organised crime”.

Tensions continue between former rebel groups and the government. Ineffective cantonment, lack of progress in national peace talks and the absence of clarity regarding the conditions for such a dialogue have contributed to the increased instability. On 28 November, demonstrators gathered at Kidal airport to prevent Prime Minister Oumar Tatam Ly’s plane from landing, with the army shooting at the protesters, who were reportedly carrying stones and sticks, leaving at least one woman dead and several people injured.

The framework set up by the 18 June Ouagadougou Agreement (Preliminary Agreement to the Presidential Election and Inclusive Peace Talks in Mali)—which was decisive for the holding of presidential and legislative elections, as well as the return of state authority in Kidal—was weakened when rebel and government representatives consecutively withdrew from the two key follow-up mechanisms: the Follow-up and Evaluation Committee and the Joint Technical Security Commission, chaired...
Mali (con’t)

by Koenders and the MINUSMA force commander respectively. Differences with the government over the release of Tuareg prisoners and the 28 November incident caused the rebel groups to withdraw, while the government suspended its participation because the pro-government Coordination des mouvements et des Forces Patriotiques de Résistance was not involved in the follow-up mechanisms and because the Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad had seized the Kidal radio station. In addition, even though the government has held two main dialogue conferences—the Assises du Nord and the États Généraux de la Décentralisation—international NGOs have raised questions about whether these were genuine and inclusive forums to reach national reconciliation in Mali.

On 8 November, Major-General Mahaman Tourné, a former “red beret” loyal to deposed President Amadou Toumani Touré, was appointed Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. On 27 November, General Amadou Sanogo, the 22 March 2012 coup leader, was arrested facing charges of complicity in kidnapping and murder. On 4 December a mass grave believed to include the remains of 21 “red beret” soldiers was discovered.

The first round of legislative elections took place on 24 November. Most results were inconclusive and a second round of voting took place on 15 December. Despite some protests in the north and a poor turnout, regional organisations such as the EU and ECOWAS praised the way the elections had been conducted.

MINUSMA has faced considerable challenges in achieving its full operational capability. On 10 December, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet updated Council members on the shortfalls in operational capacity, which is expected to be fully reached by the end of March, nine months after deployment. Although some air and intelligence assets are still missing, most of the force seems to have been generated, and MINUSMA will have a surge starting in January. Reaching full operational capacity is expected to significantly speed up the pace of deploying civilian staff (such as human rights and other protection staff) and facilitate implementation of the mission’s mandate in rural and remote areas of the north.

As of 27 November, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said there were 254,822 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 167,927 refugees in neighbouring countries (mainly Mauritania, Niger and Burkina Faso). Humanitarian access and funding have generally improved—50 percent of the $477 million pledged as a result of the Consolidated Appeal Process has been received. However, the spontaneous return of IDPs and refugees to northern Mali (around 90,000 people in three months) is putting people there at further risk due to insecurity, limited basic services, difficult access by humanitarian groups, unexploded ordnance and the destruction caused by military operations.

Human Rights-Related Developments

In his latest report, the Secretary-General noted that the human rights situation remained fragile in Mali, with reports of violations allegedly committed by both defence and security forces and armed groups, but the number of allegations of grave violations had markedly decreased since the signing of the 18 June Ouagadougou Agreement (S/2013/582). The Secretary-General highlighted his concern about the detention conditions for individuals held as a result of the conflict in the north.

Suliman Baldo, the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Mali for the Human Rights Council (HRC), visited the country from 21 October to 3 November. In a press statement on 5 November, Baldo called on the international community to provide financial and logistical support to Mali in its effort to combat impunity. The expert travelled to Kidal and Timbuktu and visited detention centres in Bamako. He will present a comprehensive report on his findings to the HRC in March.

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council in the next period will be to help ensure the effective implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement without further deferring the beginning of peace talks with communities in the north. Ensuring that the government’s initiative to hold dialogue conferences is inclusive and has only the preconditions established in the Ouagadougou Agreement is a related issue.

Preventing MINUSMA’s mandate from being compromised until the mission reaches its full operational capacity is also a key issue for the Council. Generating the units that are still missing to reach the troop ceiling and guaranteeing the safety and security of MINUSMA staff are related issues.

Insisting that all MINUSMA troops, new and old, meet the UN’s human rights standards is a further related issue. Speeding up the completion of the national investigations underway into cases of alleged sexual abuse by peacekeepers is a related issue.

Options

The Council could receive the briefing and take no action, or it could issue a statement:

• taking note of the results of the legislative elections in Mali;
• recalling the need for inclusive and credible peace talks open to all communities in northern Mali in the time frame set out by the Ouagadougou Agreement;
• urging the government to give the recently announced Truth and Reconciliation Commission (which will substitute the Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission sworn in on 25 April) a clear mandate and sufficient human and financial resources;
• commending the government for the steps taken on security sector reform and encouraging the authorities to deepen their commitment to that reform;
• urging the parties to the Ouagadougou Agreement to resume their participation in the follow-up mechanisms and to engage in a constructive dialogue;
• urging the government to establish an international commission of inquiry to investigate international crimes as per the Ouagadougou Agreement; and
• reaffirming the need for MINUSMA to reach its full operational capacity as quickly as possible and asking member states to contribute to the last force generation effort.

Council Dynamics

Despite the challenges that Mali still faces, Council members are satisfied overall with the return to constitutional order after the successful holding of presidential and legislative elections. However, some Council members have voiced concerns over the deadlock in the political process with the communities in the north. Some Council members have shown concerns in the past over the sluggish deployment of MINUSMA. After the 10 December consultations, it seems some of these concerns have been mitigated as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations announced the upcoming surge to ensure MINUSMA is fully operational in three months.

France is the penholder on Mali.
Côte d’Ivoire

Expected Council Action

The Council expects a briefing on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire and on the Secretary-General’s forthcoming report from Aichatou Mindaoudou Souleymane, Special Representative and head of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), followed by consultations. No outcome is expected.

UNOCI’s mandate expires on 30 June 2014, and the Côte d’Ivoire sanctions regime expires on 30 April 2014.

Key Recent Developments

Several of the developments in the past months have been related to accountability for allies of former President Laurent Gbagbo. On 24 July, Captain Kouassi Urbain, a Gbagbo supporter accused of being involved in attacks against Côte d’Ivoire, was extradited from Niger to Côte d’Ivoire following his arrest on 13 July. On 29 August, Ghana rejected Côte d’Ivoire’s request to extradite Gbagbo’s spokesperson, Justine Koné Katinan, dismissing the charges of conspiracy and theft presented against him. On 2 October, President Alassane Ouattara ordered members of the Ivorian security forces who left the country during the 2010-2011 post-election crisis to return by 30 November or they would be considered deserters. In its recent report, the Panel of Experts of the 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee indicated that Ghana had informed it that in at least two instances Côte d’Ivoire had sent agents into Ghana intending to assassinate or kidnap militant pro-Gbagbo refugees there (S/2013/683).

On 20 September, Côte d’Ivoire announced it would challenge the transfer of former first lady Simone Gbagbo to the ICC in The Hague. On 30 September, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I unsealed an arrest warrant against Charles Blé Goudé, a notorious former ally of Gbagbo, accused of being involved in attacks in the last several months, including an attack against a convoy of the national Authority for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration on 1 July near Kong and three separate attacks by armed assailants against gendarme convoys near Yamoussoukro between 11-15 September. The government set up a special force on 7 November to tackle armed banditry and remove illegal checkpoints.

On 30 July, the Council adopted resolution 2112 renewing UNOCI for 11 months yet reducing its military component and expressing the Council’s intention to consider a further reduction by 30 June 2015. The Council also asked the Secretary-General to include in his next report an analysis of the comparative advantages of UNOCI and the UN country team (UNCT) in view of transferring tasks from the former to the latter.

Sanctions-Related Developments

On 24 October, Council members were briefed in consultations by Ambassador Gert Rosenthal (Guatemala), chair of the 1572 Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee, on the mid-term report of the Group of Experts (S/2013/605). The report noted that while the government was focused on implementing a system of controls and statistics on the diamond-trading chain to meet the Kimberley Process (KP) Certification Scheme’s minimum standards, it failed to address the issue of diamond smuggling in violation of the sanctions regime. On 9 December, KP chair, Welle Nhlapo, briefed the Sanctions Committee saying that Côte d’Ivoire had fulfilled the KP Certification Scheme minimum requirements “as possibly [as it] could be achieved under the UN embargo.”

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 23 October, Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Côte d’Ivoire Doudou Diène warned that the victims of the 2010-2011 post-electoral crisis should not be forgotten. He called on Ivorians to reinforce the progress achieved so far (such as the adoption in August of laws on nationality and land tenure) through a vigorous fight against impunity, promotion of an inclusive pluralism and improvements in socio-economic conditions. He also noted that the same guarantees of independence and impartiality were required for the Ivorian justice system as for the ICC, when the former claimed its jurisdiction over the latter.

On 6 December, UNOCI and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, released a report calling for investigations into serious human rights abuses committed in Côte d’Ivoire between March 2009 and May 2013 by traditional hunters called Dozos while undertaking security activities. The report recommended that the Ivorian authorities make further progress in terms of accountability, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), and security sector reform (SSR) and deploy professional security forces throughout the whole territory in order to prevent the population from using Dozos to provide security.

Key Issues

The reconfiguration of UNOCI in the transitional phase is a key ongoing issue.

The recent rise of banditry attacks and the Secretary-General’s analysis of the comparative advantages of UNOCI and the UNCT when deciding on a further reduction of the mission will be a related issue.

Another issue for the Council is to decide whether and when to revise the diamond sanctions in light of the latest findings from the Kimberley Process.

Underlying Problems

Remaining deep political divisions are a concern, especially in view of the October 2015 elections and the gradual drawdown of the mission.

Moreover, some of the root causes of the conflict related to accountability, SSR and land ownership need to be further addressed.

UN DOCUMENTS ON CÔTE D’IVOIRE Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2112 (30 July 2013) renewed the mandate of UNOCI for 11 months. S/RES/2101 (25 April 2013) renewed for a period of 12 months the Côte d’Ivoire sanctions regime and the mandate of the Group of Experts. Secretary-General’s Report S/2013/377 (26 June 2013) was the latest UNOCI report. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.7024 (30 July 2012) was the adoption of resolution 2112. S/PV.7004 (10 July 2013) was a briefing by Ladsous on UNOCI. Sanctions Committee Documents S/2013/605 (11 October 2013) was the mid-term report of the Group of Experts.
The most likely option for the Council is to renew UNOCI’s current mandate and the sanctions regime expire. An option would be to issue a press statement that would acknowledge the progress achieved by Côte d’Ivoire with regard to the Kimberly Process.

Council Dynamics
There are no serious divisions among Council members on the issue of Côte d’Ivoire. They generally welcome the progress achieved since the post-election crisis while hoping for more efforts in SSR, DDR, accountability and reconciliation.

During the adoption of resolution 2112, Pakistan expressed its concern about the accelerated pace of the drawdown of the military component of UNOCI. While Pakistan, a major contributor of troops to UNOCI, is leaving the Council at the end of 2013, another major troop contributor, Jordan, will join the Council in January.

France is the penholder on Côte d’Ivoire.

Côte d’Ivoire (con’t)

Expected Council Action
In January, the Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for another six months ahead of its 31 January expiry. Lisa Buttenheim, the Special Representative and head of mission, will most likely brief on the forthcoming UNFICYP report, due by 10 January.

The Special Adviser on Cyprus, Alexander Downer, may also brief the Council on the status of negotiations. Downer’s briefing might be accompanied by a report on the Secretary-General’s good offices mission (the last such report was on 12 March 2012). The timing and possibility of Downer’s briefing will largely depend on whether there is progress in negotiations.

If Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders agree on a joint communiqué, the Council might issue a press statement welcoming this development.

Key Recent Developments
In resolution 2114 adopted on 30 July, the Council noted insufficient progress towards reaching a comprehensive and durable settlement and reiterated its call for both parties to “put their efforts behind further work on reaching convergences on core issues”. The resolution also welcomed the intention to resume negotiations in October. This, however, did not materialise due to the failure of Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders to agree on a joint communiqué.

The last high-level negotiations between the parties broke down in April 2012, and there has been no substantial progress since towards reaching a settlement. The beginning of 2013 was marked by the election of a new Greek Cypriot president, Nicos Anastasiades, and the continuing economic crisis on the island. The last few months were marked by increased efforts by the international community and pressure from the UN on both sides to reach agreement.

Considering that formal negotiations did not take place in October, Downer has made numerous attempts to revitalise the talks, meeting bilaterally with both leaders on several occasions. Despite these efforts, the negotiations did not resume because of Greek Cypriot insistence on a joint communiqué as a precondition for further talks. For Greek Cypriots, the joint communiqué should include the principles of single sovereignty, single citizenship and single international Cypriot state personality. Turkish Cypriot leaders insist that federated states must be considered founding states in a reunited Cyprus, thus giving them sovereignty and residual powers to decide such matters as citizenship. Turkish Cypriots, however, are willing to enter negotiations without any preconditions.

Following a 1 November meeting with Downer on the negotiations, the Secretary-General said there was a “limited window of opportunity to achieve a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus” and expressed concern that a continuing deadlock over a joint communiqué has hampered a return to talks. The Secretary-General also said he hoped that both sides would overcome the current impasse during Downer’s next visit to the island on 4-8 November and resume negotiations. Greek Cypriot leaders perceived this statement as a de facto ultimatum by the UN, which they strongly oppose in the negotiation process.

Downer arrived in Cyprus on 6 November, however, meetings with Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders once again did not result in an agreement on the joint communiqué.

The two leaders met again on 25 November in what was called an informal meeting that had been initiated by Anastasiades, with no progress on the issue of the joint communiqué. Addressing the media, Turkish Cypriot leader Dervis Eroglu said that he had proposed to Anastasiades that they skip the joint declaration and resume negotiations; Anastasiades pointed out that there was still a long way to go before reaching the desired outcome that would allow for resumption of talks.

In his latest effort to re-energise the process, Downer travelled back to Cyprus on 9 December and held meetings with both sides. Downer said the talks were at a critical and very sensitive stage, with both sides working hard to formulate a mutually acceptable statement. He shared no concrete details on progress nor did Greek or Turkish Cypriot leaders elaborate on the state of or possible progress in the talks. At press time, agreement on a joint communiqué had not been reached.

There seems to be mounting pressure from the international community, especially the UN, for leaders to resume negotiations and reach agreement on outstanding issues. The main obstacle seems to be the issue of sovereignty.

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 12 September, the first Interreligious Roundtable was held in Cyprus with the participation of the Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief. On 16 October, Bishop Christoforos of Karpasia was allowed to visit and worship at a monastery in the north-east of Cyprus. The Grand Mufti of Cyprus, Talip Atalay visited...
the areas controlled by the government of the Republic of Cyprus on 18 October. On 22 October the Rapporteur said that the crossing of the Green Line by Muslim and Greek Orthodox religious leaders constituted a huge leap for the religious communities concerned and noted that such cooperation on the whole island created a fertile ground for addressing the underlying human rights issues.

Key Issues
The main issue for the Council remains how to re-energise negotiations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. With the fiftieth anniversary of UNFICYP’s deployment next year, the looming issue is how long should the status quo be allowed to continue and whether the Council should contemplate downsizing the mission.

Options
The most likely option for the Council is to extend the mandate of UNFICYP for another six months.

Another option would be to include additional text in the resolution calling on both parties to resume negotiations.

A further option would be to ask the Secretary-General to review the mission and recommend options contingent on the different scenarios that might unfold in the negotiating process.

If agreement is reached on a joint communique, the Council could issue a press statement welcoming the progress.

Council Dynamics
Only a few Council members follow the issue of Cyprus closely, most notably the UK, France and Russia. The UK tends to be more sympathetic to the Turkish Cypriot side, while France and Russia are more sympathetic to the Greek Cypriot side. The dynamics of the Council might change slightly with incoming members Lithuania and Jordan, who will be replacing Azerbaijan and Pakistan, which were sympathetic to the Turkish Cypriot side and abstained on most UNFICYP renewals during their tenure on the Council in 2012-2013. All Council members are in favour of continued negotiations in Cyprus. However, some differences remain over the conditions and timeframe for talks. The Greek Cypriot position, which is shared by Russia, is that the Council should impose neither conditions nor a timeframe for the negotiations. Others, mainly the UK, are of the view that some pressure should be applied to both sides in order to stimulate the negotiations.

The UK is the penholder on Cyprus.

Israel/Palestine

Expected Council Action
In January the Council is expected to hold its quarterly open debate on the Middle East that will likely focus on the current direct talks between Israel and Palestine.

Key Recent Developments
On 16 December, UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Robert Serry delivered the latest monthly Middle East briefing to the Security Council. The Department of Political Affairs has welcomed the 29 July resumption of direct final-status negotiations while reiterating that momentous and sustained efforts would be necessary to conclude negotiations successfully within the nine-month deadline set for achieving a comprehensive settlement. The UN has become increasingly pessimistic about the likelihood of a substantive political breakthrough.

When Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman briefed the Council on 19 November, he reported that the talks were tackling substantive issues but were strained and had suffered a setback when Israel announced new settlement building. He said it was the UN’s view that settlement expansion cannot be reconciled with the vision of a two-state solution and that without progress soon, the two-state solution may be irreparably damaged.

Both parties have agreed not to disclose the substance of the US-brokered negotiations and that US Secretary of State John Kerry is the only actor authorised to comment. He’s refrained from doing so in any detail except on 6 November following claims in Israeli media that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas had agreed to Israeli settlement expansion in return for the release of Palestinian prisoners. In response, Kerry said, “I want to make it extremely clear that at no time did the Palestinians in any way agree … that they could somehow condone or accept the settlements.”

There have been numerous leaks, however, indicating that Palestinian officials are frustrated by what they view as problematic proposals on final-status issues favouring Israel, ongoing expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, being informed by Israeli negotiators that the “separation wall” that Israel built cutting through the West Bank would be the border of a future Palestinian state and not the 1967 Green Line and discussions by Israeli authorities that they would build a similar security fence in the Jordan Valley. These setbacks caused several Palestinian negotiators to resign on 13 November. Abbas announced the same day that negotiations would continue despite the resignations.

Kerry has undertaken intense shuttle diplomacy to keep the talks afloat but has largely acted as a facilitator. However, in December he intervened for the first time to present US proposals on security arrangements in the hope that it would break the deadlock. Kerry met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Abbas twice in December to focus largely on Israel’s security needs in the Jordan Valley, a contentious final-status issue related to the territory and borders of a future state of Palestine. Neither side has responded positively to the proposal, which would leave a limited number of Israeli troops stationed inside a future Palestinian state for five to 15 years. Netanyahu maintains the proposal does not sufficiently guarantee Israel’s safety. Abbas has argued any Israeli military presence in a future state perpetuates the occupation and undermines sovereignty. However, the Palestinians have never objected to a third-party or...
international security presence.

The US plan for security arrangements is the first of several final-status “bridging proposals” that may be made in January if direct talks continue to falter. These US proposals are expected to address other core issues, such as territory and borders, and would include a timetable for implementation and a plan for the Palestinian economy. It was unclear how these proposals might address the issue of Palestinian refugees’ right of return and the status of Jerusalem.

Meanwhile, the relationship between Egypt and Gaza’s Islamist government, Hamas, continues to be under increasing strain after the ouster of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi on 3 July. Egypt has intensified efforts to close tunnels under the border, which, along with the Israeli blockade, has made living conditions in Gaza untenable. The UN has warned of a humanitarian disaster due to power shortages that have disrupted health services and left water and sewage facilities inoperable, along with the lack of fuel and building materials and the severely limited import and export of goods.

The tense relationship between Egypt and Hamas, the humanitarian situation in Gaza and public discontent with the peace talks have led to the resumption of Fatah-Hamas reconciliation talks in Doha. A key obstacle undermining progress towards reconciliation has been the insistence by Hamas that it maintain its own security force. However, on 15 December this dialogue resulted in a grant from Qatar which allowed fuel to be imported to Gaza via Israel, bringing a power plant back on-line. (The Fatah-led Palestinian Authority can ship fuel to Gaza via Israel, but Hamas has accused Fatah of imposing high taxes on the fuel and had refused to buy it.)

Human Rights-Related Developments
Following the decision by the Human Rights Council (HRC) in March 2012 to establish an international fact-finding mission to investigate the implications of Israeli settlements on the human rights of the Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Israel suspended its cooperation with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the HRC and its mechanisms. On 29 January 2013, Israel did not appear for its Universal Periodic Review (UPR). In June, Israel expressed its intention to cooperate and resolve all outstanding issues, and appeared for its UPR on 29 October. The working group on the UPR adopted a report on Israel on 1 November. Israel will examine more than 230 recommendations formulated during the interactive dialogue and provide responses no later than March. Israel noted that seven of the recommendations contained the term “State of Palestine” and stressed that the term did not imply the existence of a sovereign State of Palestine nor its recognition as such.

Key Issues
The key issue is determining what, if anything, the Council is willing to do to encourage parties to reach a comprehensive final-status agreement in the face of US intransigence on the Israel/Palestine situation being substantive addressed by the Security Council.

Options
The Council has very few options on the Middle East peace process, and it is likely that the open debate will again feature the reiteration of previously stated positions.

Council members may also take the opportunity to voice support for the negotiation process, encourage parties to refrain from undertaking actions that could threaten the viability of negotiations, or draw attention to concerns that very little real progress is being made in the latest round of talks and, rather, the contrary, the situation has mostly deteriorated over the span of twenty years since the 1993 Oslo Accords.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Council members, while acknowledging the tremendous challenges, are generally supportive of the current direct negotiations. In the event that the talks conclude without any significant progress, there may be impetus for more direct Council action. However, for the time being members are unlikely to pursue any action that might upset the course of the talks. Most members also believe that no Council activity would be possible without the active support of the US.

The US has a vested interest in the furtherance of the talks and does not want to see the Palestinian Authority explore other avenues, such as the campaign for statehood at the UN or a referral of Israel to the ICC. The US is generally amenable to Council outcomes on Israel/Palestine. The last resolution that specifically addressed the peace process was resolution 1850 of 16 December 2008.

The Palestinians have voiced frustration over both the structure and substance of the current talks. While they have committed to the US-brokered negotiations, it remains to be seen what they will do if no progress has been made at the end of the nine-month timeline. At that time, the Palestinian Authority may choose to pursue other avenues at the UN or the ICC.

Council members are aware that the 24 November agreement between the P5+1 and Iran on its nuclear programme may negatively impact the Israel/Palestine peace process. Israel has consistently argued that its security needs are paramount because of the threat Iran poses. Israel’s displeasure over the recent thaw in diplomatic relations between the US and Iran may make it more difficult for the US to effectively exert pressure on Israel to make concessions to the Palestinians in pursuit of a two-state solution.

The US is the lead on Israel/Palestine in the Council.

Yemen

Expected Council Action
In January, the Council expects a briefing on Yemen by Jamal Benomar, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General. Depending on whether or not the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) has concluded by the time of the

UN DOCUMENTS ON YEMEN
Security Council Resolution S/RES/2051 (12 June 2012) focused on the second phase of the transition and expressed readiness to consider further measures, including under Article 41. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2013/3 (15 February 2013) welcomed the announcement of the launch of the NDC. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.7037 (27 September 2013) was a briefing by Benomar, the Secretary-General of the GCC and the Foreign Minister of Yemen. Security Council Press Statements SC/11922 (5 December 2013) condemned the attack on the Defence Ministry and hospital in Sana’a that caused numerous deaths and injuries. SC/11995 (27 November 2013) emphasised the importance of concluding the NDC to move to drafting the constitution and preparing for elections as the next steps in the transition.
briefing, the Council may either adopt a decision welcoming its conclusion and addressing the next steps, or reiterate its concerns and restate its earlier intention to impose sanctions on the spoilers of the political process.

The mandate of the Office of the Special Adviser on Yemen was renewed on 12 June 2013 without an expiration date.

Key Recent Developments
In his 27 September briefing, Benomar acknowledged that the security situation remains volatile in parts of Yemen (S/PV.7037). On 5 December, an attack by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) targeted the Defence Ministry and a hospital in Sana’a, causing at least 52 deaths. The Council issued a press statement the same day condemning the attack (SC/11202). There have also been deadly clashes recently between AQAP and the army in the city of Hadramout. On 11 December, hundreds of tribal sheikhs assembled and released a statement calling on the government to remove military camps and checkpoints from the city and declaring that Hadramout locals would enforce security in the governorate.

Tribal tensions continue in Dammaj (Sa’ada governorate), with clashes of Houthis, a Zaidi Shia former rebel group, with Salafi groups, leaving hundreds killed or injured since October. Consecutive ceasefires brokered by Benomar and the government to allow humanitarian access have reportedly been continually violated. Also, on 12 December, there were press reports of an attack by a US drone that hit a wedding convoy in Yakla, killing at least 15.

Although the deadline for the end of the NDC was 18 September, disagreements over key issues have delayed its conclusion. The working groups focusing on the future form of government—the southern issue, transitional justice and state-building—have yet to agree on their final reports. There reportedly are divisions within the working groups over the number of provinces Yemen will have, issues related to political isolation and post-NDC arrangements. The objective of the NDC was to agree on general principles to feed into the drafting of a new constitution. Delays in the work of the NDC postponed the holding of a referendum on the new constitution, which was initially planned for October 2013 but is now expected in 2014.

In a briefing in consultations on 27 November, Benomar reported that the NDC was only now beginning to uncover the nature and extent of the discrimination against southerners. He also announced the launch of a trust fund with a $350 million contribution from Qatar to compensate southerners unfairly dismissed from public service posts or whose land was confiscated following the 1994 civil war. He dispelled misperceptions and media reports regarding the alleged end of the mandate of President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi in February 2014 under the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) transition agreement. Benomar stressed that the agreement makes clear that Hadi is to remain in office until the inauguration of a new president. The presidential term limit is task-oriented and determined by the accomplishment of the tasks outlined in the agreement.

Also on 27 November, the Council issued a press statement reiterating its concern about continuing reports of interference by those intent on disrupting, delaying or derailing the transition process (SC/11195). It condemned any such attempts and reaffirmed its readiness to consider further measures on spoilers of the transition process.

According to the 2014 Humanitarian Needs Overview developed by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, an estimated 58 percent of the population—or 14.7 million people—are affected by the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. The crisis is exacerbated by the security situation, the difficulties of humanitarian access, insufficient funding of the humanitarian appeal (31 percent as of 4 December), lack of service delivery in areas of return for displaced persons, the increasing prices of basic items (90 percent of food is imported) and endemic poverty.

Key Issues
Helping ensure the stability of the Hadi government in the transition process is a key issue for the Council. Encouraging the successful conclusion of the NDC, including agreement on the form of government and promoting an inclusive preparation for the general elections, as well as constitution-drafting process, are related issues. Dispelling misunderstandings about the GCC roadmap and the next steps in the political process are further issues for the Council.

Immediate issues for the Council include the precarious security situation, the presence of AQAP and persistent violent clashes among tribal groups. Funding and supply of weapons from regional actors are related issues.

The bleak humanitarian situation, including widespread food insecurity, the challenges for internally displaced persons, returnees and refugees and limited humanitarian access, are ongoing issues.

Options
Options for the Council will depend on whether or not the NDC concludes by the time of the briefing. If the NDC concludes the Council could respond to this development by:

• taking stock of the implementation of the GCC agreement and the political process so far and setting a framework for the second phase of the transition;
• commending the work of the NDC despite the challenges faced;
• encouraging the constitution-drafting assembly to honour the compromises agreed to by the NDC; and
• encouraging the drafting of the new constitution to be based on general principles agreed by the NDC and the holding of a referendum and general elections as soon as possible.

In case the NDC has not concluded by the time of Benomar’s briefing, the Council could reiterate its concern about the significant delays in its conclusion and restate its intention to impose sanctions on spoilers of the political process.

Council Dynamics
Council members continue to follow the situation in Yemen closely. They are aware of the importance of the political transition in Yemen at a critical moment for other transition processes in the region and highlight the close cooperation with regional organisations, the constructive discussions within the Council and cost-effective UN engagement.

In a 15 February presidential statement, the Council warned former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and former Vice-President Ali Salim Al-Beidh, reiterating its readiness to consider measures under Article 41 of the UN Charter (S/PRST/2013/3). Even though Council members have reiterated their concern over continuing reports of interference by spoilers aimed at undermining the government, it is unclear whether at this stage there would be enough support among Council members to impose sanctions.

The UK is the penholder on Yemen.
### Notable Dates for January

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### MANDATES EXPIRE

| 31 January | BINUCA (Central African Republic) | S/RES/2088          |
| 31 January | UNFICYP (Cyprus) | S/RES/2114          |
| 1 February | DRC sanctions and the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee's Group of Experts | S/RES/2078          |

### OTHER IMPORTANT DATES

- **17 January**: Luxembourg and the UK are co-organising an Arria-formula meeting on participation of women in the Syrian transitional process.
- **22 January**: International Conference on Syria, or Geneva II peace talks
- **29 January**: Jordan, as president of the Security Council in January, is planning an open debate on “War, its lessons and the search for a permanent peace.”
Since the end of the Cold War, consensus decision-making by the Security Council seems to have become the rule rather than the exception. Whereas 24.3 percent (9) of the resolutions adopted by the Council in 1990 were not unanimously adopted, only 7 percent (3) were adopted without the full consensus of the Council in 2013 (through 15 December). No more than 10 percent of the total resolutions adopted within any calendar year since 2001 have been adopted without consensus, notwithstanding divisions caused by the likes of the 2003 invasion of Iraq or the situation in Syria since 2011 (see graph to the right). Taking into account that presidential statements, press statements and most subsidiary body decisions are only adopted by consensus, the Security Council has mostly pronounced itself with a single voice. Save a few agenda items, most noticeably the situations in Iraq and between Iraq-Kuwait (24) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (19)—followed in decreasing order by the situations in Sudan (10), Cyprus (9), Middle East (8) and Haiti (7)—most resolutions addressing all other items on the agenda of the Council have been adopted by consensus since 1990. Save a few exceptions, the US (10), France (7), and especially the UK (0), have joined the enabling majority voting in favor of the resolutions. Among the elected Council members, there seems to have been a greater propensity for abstention or non-participation in the early 1990s, as demonstrated by the declining numbers registered by Brazil, India and Pakistan in successive Council terms and the fact that, with the exception of Syria (7) in 2002-2003, the three highest number of dissensions, abstentions or non-participations over a two-year Council term were registered by Cuba (13) and Yemen (11) in 1990-1991 and Zimbabwe (7) in 1991-1992 (see graph to the right below).