Monthly Forecast

Overview

Australia will preside over the Security Council in September.

A debate on small arms is planned during the high-level week of the General Assembly. The Prime Minister of Australia may preside with other members likely to be represented at ministerial or higher levels. The Secretary-General is expected to brief and a resolution is the expected outcome.

The quarterly debate on the situation in Afghanistan is also expected, with Ján Kubiš, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, likely to brief.

A briefing on Yemen is expected by the Secretary-General’s Special Advisor, Jamal Benomar, as well as the Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani, and a senior representative of Yemen.

Briefings, followed by consultations, are likely on:

- Liberia by Karin Landgren, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and Ambassador Staffan Tillander (Sweden), chair of the Liberia configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC);
- the Middle East, by Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Robert Serry;
- Sierra Leone, by Jens Anders Toyberg-Frandzen, the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone and by the chair of the Sierra Leone configuration of the PBC, Ambassador Guillermo Rishchynski (Canada);
- Libya by Tarek Mitri, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Support Mission in Libya;
- the work of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee, by its chair, Ambassador Eugène-Richard Gasana (Rwanda); and
- the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia, most likely by its head and Special Representative of the Secretary-General Nicholas Kay and AU Special Representative Mahamat Saleh Annadif (both likely to brief by videoconferencing).

Briefings in consultations are likely on:

- current issues of concern, under the “horizon scanning” formula, by a top official from the Department of Political Affairs;
- Sudan and South Sudan issues, twice, on at least one of these occasions most likely by Special Envoy of the Secretary-General Haile Menkerios;
- Guinea-Bissau, by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, José Ramos-Horta;
- the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights, most likely by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous; and
- the work of the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee by its chair, Ambassador Gary Quinlan (Australia).

Additionally, formal sessions will be needed to adopt resolutions:

- modifying the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (discussions of which have started in August); and
- renewing the mandate of UNMIL.

Throughout the month, Council members will be following closely the developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali and Syria, and meetings on these issues may be scheduled.

Council members will also likely be working on finalising the Council’s annual report to the General Assembly, drafted this year by the US.

Several high-level events on issues of concern to the Security Council are expected in September on the margins of the General Assembly.
Penholder is a relatively new term in the Council vocabulary that started to appear in Council-related exchanges probably some four or five years ago. But, in principle, the concept is not new. Ever since the end of the Cold War, when a previously paralysed Council saw a dramatic increase in activity, the Council has experimented with different ways to address the division of labour. It has developed a number of practices and working methods reflecting the increased cooperation to tackle the growing workload.

Drafting resolutions and chairing the subsequent negotiations has been one of the key chores (the number of resolutions went from 20 in 1988 to 93 in 1993; more recently, during the five years from 2008 through 2012, the average annual number of resolutions has been 58). In the early to mid-1990s, the drafting of resolutions would often be undertaken by whichever member took the initiative to produce the text. Specific, recurring topics did not “belong” to a particular Council member. Sometimes, members with an interest in a given situation would join forces or, on some occasions, would compete to produce a draft first in order to then chair the negotiations. Both permanent and elected members routinely undertook the drafting. With the increased number of crisis situations on the Council agenda, a more structured division of labour seemed necessary, and a system of Groups of Friends emerged within the Council. Starting around 1990, Groups of Friends had initially been used by the Secretary-General, who would enlist a set of interested states, often for a range of reasons, in a particular conflict to assist his good offices efforts. At the Council, members with stakes in an issue, or a particular commitment to, would come together to draft resolutions on that issue with both elected and permanent members playing a leadership role (for example, Canada on Haiti or Norway on the Horn of Africa). These groups furthermore often included non-Council members that had particular expertise, specific commitments or stakes in the situations (such as Spain on Western Sahara, Germany on Georgia and Iran or Australia and New Zealand on East Timor) or had kept their involvement beyond their stay on the Council (for example, Canada with respect to Haiti).

The system of Groups of Friends, while generally efficient, garnered increasing criticism within the Council from both permanent and elected members, although for different reasons. Some permanent members considered the lead role of configurations other than those involving the P5 as potentially undermining their authority. A particularly sensitive aspect was the fact that several Groups of Friends included non-Council members and thus they had been part of the early stage of drafting while some Council members were excluded from the decision-making process until much later. That is because Groups of Friends tended to keep the drafting process away from the full Council until shortly before the vote. A February 1999 Note by the President said: “It is important that all members of the Security Council be allowed to participate fully in the preparation of the resolutions of the Council and statements by the President of the Council. Contributions by members of groups of friends and other similar arrangements… are welcome…While the need is recognised for the Council, in many instances, to adopt its decisions expeditiously, sufficient time should be allowed for consultations of all members of the Council and for their own consideration of the drafts, prior to action by the Council on specific items” (S/1999/165).

Some Groups of Friends still exist (including on Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo and Western Sahara), but in mid-2000 the Council began organising its work on particular situations around a lead country. Initially, those arrangements were fairly temporary and changeable and lead nations were both elected and permanent members (for example Belgium led on Ethiopia/Eritrea in 2007 and 2008; Panama and Costa Rica co-led on Haiti in 2008 and Costa Rica led on Haiti in 2009).

Starting around 2008, however, a new system seems to have emerged. The P3 (France, the UK and the US, the more legislatively active of the P5) have divided most current situations on the agenda among themselves, assuming in each case the role nicknamed penholder. These arrangements have been informal and unwritten but, given the permanent positions of these nations, this leadership essentially remains unchanged.

Our research identified over 40 penholder arrangements as of early 2013 (please see our February 2013 Monthly Forecast) with over 30 split more or less equally between the P3, Russia leading on a couple of issues and the rest, mainly thematic issues, led by elected members.

Although this system may seem logical in terms of efficiency, a side-effect of the penholder system has been a deepening gap between the permanent and elected members. The P3 usually agree upon a given draft among themselves and then negotiate it with China and Russia. The agreed text is then circulated to the elected members, usually quite close to the adoption date. The elected members are often discouraged from making amendments because this might disturb the sometimes painstakingly achieved consensus among the P5.

The penholder is seen by all members, permanent and elected, as the leader on an issue as it takes the initiative on all matters related to that situation (even in the cases where there is a subsidiary body on that country chaired by an elected member). This in turn creates a situation of default where the other members defer to the penholder. If a crisis arises and the penholder is either unwilling or unable (for example, because it is already managing one or two other crises) to take the initiative, the Council may seem paralysed or act with what is perceived as considerable delay.

At the moment, attempts to modify this system have been unsuccessful. In 2012 Portugal, then chair of the subsidiary body dealing with Council working methods, circulated a draft presidential note outlining a system under which all members would have an opportunity to be penholders or co-penholders. After nearly six months of negotiations, no consensus was reached. The proposal was abandoned.
Cooperation with Regional and Subregional Organisations
On 6 August, the Council held a high-level open debate on cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional organisations in maintaining international peace and security (S/PV.7015 and Resumption 1). President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina presided. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also briefed, along with high-level officials representing the AU (Ambassador Tekeda Alemu of Ethiopia); the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cuba); the League of Arab States (Mr. Ahmed Fathalla, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the UN); and the Union of South American Nations (Eda Rivas Franchini, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru). Representatives of other regional and subregional organisations and non-Council member states also participated in the debate. The Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2013/12) stressing “the utility of continuing to develop effective partnerships between the UN and regional and subregional organizations in order to enable early responses to disputes and emerging crises.”

DPRK
On 7 August, the chair of the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg), briefed Council members in consultations on the work of the Committee.

Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea
On 14 August, the Council issued a presidential statement (S/PRST/2013/13) regarding piracy in the Gulf of Guinea (S/PV.7016). The principal purpose of the statement was to welcome the summit on maritime safety and security held in Yaoundé, Cameroon on 24-25 June, which was attended by twenty-five countries of West and Central Africa and three subregional organisations.

ICJ
On 15 August, Council members welcomed the conclusion of the special transitional regime established by the Greentree Agreement concerning the Bakassi Peninsula (SC/11094). Sovereignty over the peninsula was transferred from Nigeria to Cameroon in accordance with the judgment of the International Court of Justice of 10 October 2002, determining the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria.

Egypt
On 15 August, Council members met in an emergency meeting on the situation in Egypt, a day after alarming violence in the country. On 14 August, police and military forces violently dispersed two sit-ins in support of deposed President Mohammed Morsi. Egypt’s Ministry of Health indicated that at least 600 people were killed in the two dispersals and in other clashes that took place throughout the country. Widespread violence followed the crackdown, and suspected Muslim Brotherhood loyalists attacked dozens of churches and Christian homes and institutions in unprecedented sectarian attacks. The following day Council members were briefed on the situation in consultations by Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson. Although Council members were unable to agree on a press statement, they authorised Council President Ambassador María Cristina Perceval (Argentina) to make remarks to the press following the consultations. In these agreed remarks Perceval said that “the view of Council members is that it is important to end violence in Egypt and that the parties exercise maximum restraint”. Perceval said Council members agreed there was a need to “stop violence and to advance national reconciliation.”

Mali
On 16 August, Council members adopted a press statement taking note of the provisional results of the presidential runoff elections in Mali, which declared Ibrahim Boubacar Keita the elected President of Mali (SC/11096). Council members commended the Malian people for the peaceful participation in the electoral process as well as the transitional authorities for the successful preparation, organisation and management of the elections. Council members also called for the swift holding of free, fair, transparent, and inclusive legislative elections and reiterated the call for inclusive and credible peace talks open to all communities of the north of Mali in the timeframe set out by the Ouagadougou Agreement of 18 June 2013.

Protection of Civilians
On 19 August, the Council held an open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (S/PV.7019). The meeting was held on the tenth anniversary of the bombing of the Baghdad headquarters of UNAMI that claimed the lives of 22 people and wounded more than 100. The Secretary-General, Director for International Law and Cooperation at the International Committee of the Red Cross PhilippeSpoerri, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos briefed the Council. Thirty-seven states and the EU took the floor, in addition to Council members.

Middle East
On 20 August, the Council held a briefing and consultations on the situation in the Middle East (S/PV.7020). Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Oscar Fernández-Taranco provided the briefing, focusing his remarks on recent developments in the peace process between Israel and Palestine and the situations in Syria and Lebanon.

Sudan/Darfur
On 21 August, Ambassador Maria Cristina Perceval (Argentina), in her capacity as chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, provided Council members with the quarterly briefing on the committee’s work in consultations.

Syria
Council members met in consultations on 21 August to receive a briefing from Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson on attacks earlier that day on rebel-held areas east of Damascus that reportedly involved the use of chemical weapons and killed hundreds of Syrian civilians, including women and children. Speaking at the stakeout after the meeting, Ambassador Maria Cristina Perceval (Argentina), Council President for August, said that “all Council members agree that any use of chemical weapons by any side, under any circumstances, is a violation of international law.” She added that “the members of the Security Council also welcomed the determination of the Secretary-General to ensure a thorough, impartial and prompt investigation.”

DRC
On 22 August, Council members received a briefing in the morning and then in the
afternoon from Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Edmond Mulet on ongoing clashes between the M23 and the Congolese army. Both briefings were given under “any other business”. France had circulated a press statement later that day condemning the M23 for attacks against civilians and MONUSCO. At press time, Council members have yet to agree on the press statement.

**Lebanon**

On 15 August, Council members issued a press statement condemning the attack that occurred in South Beirut, which killed at least 10 people and wounded more than 100 (SC/11095). Council members held consultations on UNIFIL on 22 August, receiving a briefing from Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Edmond Mulet. The Council issued a press statement on 23 August condemning terrorist attacks earlier in the day in Tripoli, which killed more than 42 people and injured over 400 (SC/11101). At press time, the Council was scheduled to adopt a resolution on 29 August renewing the mandate of UNIFIL for an additional year.

**Haiti**

At press time, the Council was expecting to hold a debate on 28 August to consider the Secretary-General’s semi-annual report on MINUSTAH (S/2013/493). A briefing by Sandra Honoré, the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of mission, was expected. The Council held a private meeting with the countries providing police and military personnel to MINUSTAH on 26 August.

**Kosovo**

As of press time, the Council is scheduled to hold a quarterly debate on 29 August regarding UNMIK and the Secretary-General’s latest report (S/2013/444).

**Wrap-up Session**

The Council at press time was scheduled to hold a “wrap-up session” for August under the agenda item “Implementation of Note S/2010/507 (Wrap-up Session)”. Non-Council members were invited to attend the private meeting.

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**Small Arms**

**Expected Council Action**

A high-level meeting on small arms is expected to be held at the initiative of Australia as President of the Council in September. Although Australia is having federal elections on 7 September, the elected prime minister is expected to preside over the session. The Secretary-General may brief the Council.

A resolution is a possible outcome.

**Background**

The term “small arms and light weapons” covers arms intended for both civilian and military use. Small arms include revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns. Light weapons include heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems and mortars with calibres less than 100 millimetres. The category also includes ammunition and explosives. This list is available in the report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms of 27 August 1997 (A/52/298).

There are an estimated 875 million small arms and light weapons in circulation worldwide, produced by more than 1,000 companies in nearly 100 countries. The Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva estimates they are responsible for more than a half-million deaths each year, including 300,000 in armed conflict. Of the 49 major conflicts in the 1990s, small arms were the key weapons in 47 of them. Small-arms flows can also negatively affect disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes under Council mandates. In his 2005 report In Larger Freedom, the Secretary-General noted that “the accumulation and proliferation of small arms and light weapons continues to be a serious threat to peace, stability and sustainable development”.

Small arms also represent a sizeable industry: all countries—and numerous non-state armed groups—procure small arms. The Small Arms Survey estimates that their annual authorised trade exceeds $8.5 billion. Accurate assessments are difficult, complicated by the reluctance of many states to report publicly on their legal production, exports and imports of small arms. Analysis of illegal small-arms activities is even more difficult, with substantial numbers of legally acquired small arms entering illicit markets through corruption, seizure and loss. Among the top exporters of small arms are the US, Italy, Brazil, Germany and Russia.

The principal locus of UN work on small arms has been the General Assembly. Most recently, on 2 April, the General Assembly adopted the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by an overwhelming majority of 154 to three (with 23 abstentions). The treaty obligates arms-exporting countries to report arms sales and transfers. States parties also agree not to authorise any transfer of conventional weapons—or their ammunition/munitions, parts or components—if the transfer would violate their Chapter VII obligations or those under international agreements or if they have knowledge that arms would be used in the commission of gross human rights abuses and humanitarian law violations.

**Developments in the Council**

The direct impact of small arms on conflicts has made them a topic of considerable UN DOCUMENTS ON SMALL ARMS Security Council Presidential Statements S/PRST/2010/6 (19 March 2010) was on small arms and light weapons and the Central African region. S/PRST/2007/24 (29 June 2007) requested, inter alia, biennial small-arms reports from the Secretary-General starting in 2008. Reports of the Secretary-General S/2013/503 (22 August 2013) was on small arms. S/2011/255 (5 April 2011) was a report on small arms originally due in 2010. A/59/2005 (21 March 2005) was the Secretary-General’s report In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.6288 and Resumption 1 (19 March 2010) was the debate on small arms and light weapons and the Central African region. S/PV.5881 (30 April 2008) was the last open debate on small arms. General Assembly Document A/52/298 (27 August 1997) was the report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms.
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attention on the part of the Council. For several years, the Council highlighted the importance of this issue by regularly addressing small arms as one of the thematic issues, placed on its agenda in 1999. The Council held nine debates and adopted five presidential statements between 1999 and 2006.

In 2006 an Argentinian initiative for a Council resolution on small arms was blocked by the US—which felt that it was an issue best dealt with in the General Assembly—and consequently no Secretary-General’s report was requested for 2007. On 29 June 2007, after months of negotiations, the Council issued a presidential statement requesting the Secretary-General to produce biennial reports on small arms, the first of which was discussed in an open debate on 30 April 2008 (S/PV.5881).

Despite the absence of a report from the Secretary-General in 2010, Gabon initiated a Council debate, under the agenda item “Central African region: impact of illicit arms trafficking” on 19 March 2010. In a presidential statement adopted at the conclusion of the debate, the Council reiterated that small arms pose a threat to peace and fuel armed conflict, and it called on states to enforce existing arms embargoes. The Council also requested that the Secretary-General take the content of the presidential statement into account in his next report. (Gabon also attempted to initiate a debate on drug trafficking and small arms—under the agenda item “threats to international peace and security”—during its June 2011 presidency, but eventually the 24 June debate focused solely on drug trafficking.)

The Secretary-General’s report due in 2010 was delayed until 2011 and issued on 5 April (S/2011/255). On 25 April the Council received a briefing on the report in consultations. The report encouraged states to strengthen their tracing capacity and to enhance international cooperation regarding tracing, as well as asked states to voluntarily provide the UN with information on the ammunition markings used by manufacturers in their jurisdiction.

The Council received the Secretary-General’s latest biennial report on 22 August. The report takes stock of efforts to address the issue and contains 15 recommendations. Among them, it recommends that the Council take into account the capacity of a state to control its exiting arms when planning peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations and that those missions are mandated to assist their host states to manage their arms stockpiles effectively. It recommends that the Council consider utilising new technologies that can reduce the risk of diversion of arms to illicit activities in those states. The Secretary-General further recommends that in light of the impact of small arms on the protection of civilians and violence against women and children, UN officials dealing with these issues should consult regularly with UN entities dealing with small arms.

As the Council has not discussed the agenda item “small arms” in a formal meeting since 30 April 2008, the item was deleted from the list of agenda items of which the Council is seized on 30 April 2012. (According to Council practice, matters that have not been considered by the Council in the preceding three years are deleted from the list unless a request to retain a matter is received from a member state, in which case the matter is provisionally retained but only for one year. Thereafter, the matter is automatically deleted if it has not been considered by the Council during the intervening period.)

Australia is seeking to revive Council focus on the issue, as it has significant impact on the country-specific and thematic issues on the agenda of the Council, such as protection of civilians. It also has an impact on the tools available to the Council, such as arms embargoes, DDR in peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions and counterterrorism.

Australia, wishing to build upon the momentum following the adoption of the ATT in the General Assembly, sees the meeting as an opportunity to reflect on the role of the Council on small arms. In its view, a holistic discussion of small arms is timely, as small arms have not been discussed as such in the Council since 2008.

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is to use this high-level meeting as an opportunity to renew its focus on small arms as a thematic issue with considerable impact on many aspects of its work.

Another issue is to adopt an outcome document that introduces practical measures to enhance the Council’s effectiveness on issues related to small arms.

Options

The Council may adopt a resolution or presidential statement that addresses all or some of the following points relating to small arms:

- coordination of Council efforts (between peacekeeping missions in a single region and between peacekeeping missions and panels of experts);
- UN coordination with regional organisations;
- improvements in arms embargoes;
- support for security sector reform and DDR efforts;
- Council counterterrorism efforts;
- the relevance of small arms to protection of civilians issues; or
- more regular reporting by the Secretary-General.

Council Dynamics

As the 2006 Argentinian initiative for a resolution and the prolonged negotiations on the 2007 presidential statement indicate, some Council members are reluctant to see enhanced Council involvement in the small arms debate. As with some other thematic issues, some Council members are also concerned that the Council may be encroaching on the work of the General Assembly on the arms trade. In addition, arms-manufacturing states have been historically reluctant for the Council to be assertive on small arms as a thematic issue and have been especially concerned about language and action on the dangers caused by legal small arms trade. Some members may also be resistant to reinserting small arms to the Council agenda.

In order to alleviate some of these concerns, Australia (President of the Final UN conference on the ATT that took place from 18-28 March 2013) will try to focus its efforts on the illicit transfer, accumulation and use of small arms and light weapons. In addition, Council members supportive of a resolution will be mindful not to use language that appears to encroach on the mandate of the General Assembly and will want to focus on the aspects of small arms that specifically touch upon international peace and security.
Central African Republic

Expected Council Action
In September, the Security Council may adopt a resolution amending the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA). BINUCA’s mandate expires on 31 January 2014.

Key Recent Developments
Despite signing the Libreville Agreements on 11 January, the Séléka rebels seized the capital Bangui on 24 March, forcing President François Bozizé to flee the Central African Republic (CAR) and BINUCA to evacuate most of its staff. In the following months, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) led a political initiative to create a Transitional National Council (TNC) charged with drafting a new constitution and preparing for elections within 18 months. (Self-appointed interim President Michel Djotodia accepted the ECCAS framework and was then elected interim president by the TNC and sworn in on 18 August.)

The International Contact Group on the CAR (ICG-CAR) held its second meeting on 8 July in Addis Ababa, with representatives of 23 countries and seven international organisations participating. The meeting discussed the ECCAS efforts and the AU Commission’s proposed establishment of an African-led International Support Mission in the CAR (AFISM-CAR).

In a 19 July communiqué (PSC/PR/COMM.2(CCCLXXXV)), the AU’s Peace and Security Council authorised the deployment of AFISM-CAR for an initial period of six months, to take over from ECCAS’s Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the CAR (MICOPAX). AFISM-CAR will have an overall strength of 3,652 personnel (including 2,475 military personnel and 1,175 police) and will be mandated to protect civilians, restore public order, stabilise the security situation, reform the defence and security sector and facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid.

The Council received AFISM-CAR’s concept of operations in a letter from the AU on 9 August (S/2013/476). The force is to have a military, police and civilian component. While its initial authorisation is for six months, the document contains strategic planning that surpasses that timeframe. It also assumes that the Council will endorse AFISM-CAR and authorise a support package for the mission.

The transition process from MICOPAX to AFISM-CAR and preparations for the operations of the AU force commenced on 1 August and were expected to take several weeks. In a press release that day, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, looked forward to an increased and multifaceted UN involvement in the establishment and strengthening of AFISM-CAR.

The latest BINUCA report, which had been delayed more than a month to include recent developments, was circulated on 5 August (S/2013/470). It highlights the challenges in the implementation of the transitional arrangements, including the weak representation of women in the TNC and lack of geographical inclusiveness, the disagreements over key issues of the transition (i.e. timing and the ineligibility of key actors in the transition to run in future elections), divisions within the Séléka and the mistrust between the current prime minister, Nicolas Tiangaye, and President Djotodia.

The report also calls attention to the deteriorating security situation despite a partial return to duty by members of the police and the armed forces. It notes an increase in criminal activities due to the proliferation of small arms as well as an upsurge in activity reportedly linked to the Lord’s Resistance Army. It recommends that the Council consider sanctions or the establishment of a panel of experts to ensure that there is no impunity for perpetrators of gross violations of human rights.

The report also encourages the Council to “lend its full support to the mission”, but does not go into detail about the specifics of this support.

On 14 August, the Council was briefed on the Secretary-General’s last report (S/2013/470) by Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye, who was recently appointed as the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of BINUCA. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos and Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights Ivan Šimonović also briefed (S/PV.7017).

Gaye told the Council that the security situation in Bangui has improved slightly, but looting, plundering, killing, torture and kidnappings continued, compounded by a lack of law and order. He urged the Council to provide financial, logistical and technical support to AFISM-CAR, whose planned deployment was pending an AU assessment mission in Bangui.

Amos, who recently visited the CAR, stated that the humanitarian situation had deteriorated dramatically, characterised by violence, acute needs and grave protection issues. She warned that the crisis could further destabilise a region already facing significant challenges. She called on the Council to act with urgency on the AU’s request for support.

Šimonović, who returned from the CAR in early August, added that both Séléka and former government forces had committed serious international humanitarian law and humanitarian law violations, including extrajudicial killings, summary executions, torture, sexual violence and grave violations against children. He said many of those breaches were ongoing.

His recommendations for the Council and the international community to address the situation included the immediate establishment of a credible national security force. He also recommended the deployment of a large international force with a strong protection mandate and the reinforcement of the human rights component of BINUCA.

Following the briefing, the Council issued a press statement expressing grave concern about the security situation in the CAR, violations of international humanitarian law and widespread human rights violations, and it emphasised that those responsible must be held accountable (SC/11093). The Council stated that it looked forward to further discussions with the AU and also expressed its willingness to consider all potential options to stabilise CAR.

The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, voiced her deep concern on 7 August about the worsening security situation in the CAR and reports of serious crimes being committed there. She said that her office will prosecute those most
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responsible for the commission of serious crimes, if necessary.

Human Rights-Related Developments

From 20 June to 11 July, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights deployed a fact-finding mission to the CAR to gather information on human rights violations committed in the country since December 2012. The findings will be included in the report of the High Commissioner to be considered during the September session of the Human Rights Council (HRC) (A/HRC/24/59). Simonović travelled to the country from 28 July to 2 August to discuss the preliminary findings of the fact-finding mission with government representatives and civil society. Speaking at a press conference in Bangui on 1 August, Simonović stressed that accountability is key not only for victims but also to prevent future violations. He said that further discussions were needed to address the different proposals made by stakeholders, including the establishment of an international commission of inquiry, a standing invitation to HRC special procedures (independent human rights experts with mandates to report and advise on human rights from a thematic or country-specific perspective), or creating a mandate for a special rapporteur on the CAR.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is how to play a more effective and assertive role in addressing concerns about the security, human rights and humanitarian situations. In particular, formulating a new approach to the CAR in light of the AU’s initiative and its expectation of UN support will be an immediate issue.

A related issue is finding a productive role for BINUCA in light of the ongoing transitional process and the deployment of AFISM-CAR.

Options

Options for the Council on BINUCA include amending its mandate by:

• expanding its political component to play a key role in the transitional process;
• strengthening its human rights component;
• expanding and enforcing its role in security sector reform, disarmament demobilisation and reintegration processes and human rights monitoring;
• asking the Secretary-General to deploy a panel of experts to investigate and report on human rights violations; and
• providing logistical and technical support and training to AFISM-CAR.

A further option could be addressing reports of grave human rights violations via sanctions. Signalling the Council’s willingness to consider re-hatting the AU mission as a UN mission in due time would be another further option.

Council Dynamics

The Council has remained fairly passive in recent months regarding the CAR, focusing on other country situations while expressing some support for the regional and subregional efforts. There is general agreement among Council members that Council action is needed—including a possible overhaul of BINUCA’s mandate—in light of recent political developments.

At press time, Council members were waiting to receive more information from the AU on the deployment of AFISM-CAR and its needs, following the AU assessment mission. At the same time, some Council members are of the view that BINUCA should also suggest specific recommendations as to how to amend its mandate effectively and how it could assist AFISM-CAR, so the Council could make an informed decision.

Negotiations over BINUCA’s mandate and a support package may prove difficult, as recent experience has shown. During the recent consultations, at least one permanent member expressed reluctance to provide logistical support to AFISM-CAR due to financial constraints.

Some Council members are considering establishing a panel of experts that could provide more information on human rights violations in CAR. As for sanctions, it is unclear if there is appetite at this point for this measure, on the grounds that it might negatively affect the political process.

France is the penholder on CAR.

Liberia

Expected Council Action

In September, the Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) before it expires on 30 September. Prior to that, it will receive a briefing on and consider in consultations the Secretary-General’s latest report on UNMIL (S/2013/479). UNMIL head, Karin Landgren, and Ambassador Staffan Tillander (Sweden), chair of the Liberia configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), are expected to brief.

Key Recent Developments

Pursuant to resolution 2066, by 30 June UNMIL completed the first of three drawdown phases as 2,026 military personnel departed the mission, handing over some facilities and security responsibilities to national authorities.

On 22 June, Liberia deployed 45 troops to join the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), marking its first contribution to UN peacekeeping since 1961.

On 29 June, ministers of Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone met with representatives from the UN, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Secretariat of the Mano River Union (MRU) in Dakar, Senegal, to discuss a joint security strategy for the MRU. In resolution 2066, among others, the Council encouraged ECOWAS and the MRU to develop, with the support of the UN Office for West Africa, a subregional strategy to address the threat of the cross-border...
movements of armed groups and weapons as well as illicit trafficking. The high-level meeting identified the fundamental elements for the strategy and decided to establish an MRU-ECOWAS-UN Steering Committee to spearhead the development of the strategy.

In its 23 May report, the Panel of Experts (PoE) of the 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee reported an emerging security concern in the Gola Forest on the Liberia-Sierra Leone border (S/2013/316). The PoE found evidence of extensive gold mining by ex-combatants and reported on a 2 February incident during which militia members armed with assault weapons crossed into Sierra Leone and attacked forest rangers.

The security situation along the border with Côte d’Ivoire has improved but remained fragile as reports continued to indicate that planning and organisation of new cross-border attacks might be underway. The governments of Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire continued to strengthen their cooperation to address border security challenges.

As of 2 August, there were 58,276 Ivorian refugees in Liberia although some 10,000 returned to Côte d’Ivoire in the first seven months of 2013 as the closure and consolidation of refugee camps continued. However, some 1,490 new refugees registered in Liberia between January and March, and there was an influx of about 1,000 refugees into Nimba county from April to June.

According to a Transparency International survey, 96 percent of Liberians feel that the legislature is corrupt, and 94 percent believe the police are corrupt. On 8 July, four senior officials were dismissed for allegedly engaging in illegal practices. On 10 July, the House of Representatives voted to concur with the dismissal of the auditor general of the General Auditing Commission and recommended that the auditor general and the director of the General Services Agency be investigated for failure to disclose their investments in private entities. On 5 August, the deputy director of the Drug Enforcement Agency was dismissed for ethics and policy violations.

**Developments in the PBC**

From 12-16 May, Tillander, and Brian Williams of the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) visited Liberia. The mission focused on justice and security, reconciliation, land and natural resources and issues linked to the Peacebuilding Fund financing for peacebuilding.

**Key Issues**

A key issue for the Council while UNMIL is drawing down and is transitioning to a smaller presence is ensuring that there is sufficient national capacity to assume performing security tasks and address other challenges.

A related issue is the need for Liberia to address the high rates of sexual and gender-based violence, land disputes and corruption and to continue their efforts on reconciliation, security sector reform, constitutional reform, accountability and transparency.

The fragile security situation along the border with Côte d’Ivoire and the emerging security concern at the Liberia-Sierra Leone border are further issues of concern for the Council.

**Options**

When renewing the mandate of UNMIL, the Council could decide to:

- continue the pace of the drawdown of UNMIL’s military component envisaged by resolution 2066;
- or reconsider the pace of the drawdown in view of the fragility of the borders and the challenges the government is facing addressing social unrest and assuming its new security responsibilities;
- and in either case, include a strong message to the government of Liberia regarding the need for institutional reforms and for further progress.

**Council Dynamics**

The renewal of UNMIL in September will likely create little controversy among Council members as they are generally keen to continue the implementation of the drawdown plan. This would involve the reparation of another 1,129 troops to reach a level of 4,797 troops by July 2014, while increasing the number of UNMIL formed police units by two additional units to address any security vacuum. Some Council members may want to call for further progress from the government in building its national security and pursuing its reforms.

The US is the penholder on Liberia in the Council.

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**Sierra Leone**

**Expected Council Action**

In September, the Council will be briefed on the report of the Secretary-General regarding the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), most likely by Jens Anders Toyberg-Frandzen, the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNIPSIL. As with past Council practice, Guillermo Rischhynski, chair of the Sierra Leone configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), will also likely brief. The briefing will be followed by consultations. The mandate of UNIPSIL expires on 31 March 2014, by which date the mission should be fully drawn down.

**Key Recent Developments**

The Council last addressed Sierra Leone on 26 March when it adopted resolution 2097, extending UNIPSIL’s mandate for the last time (S/PV.6942). The resolution further...

**USEFUL ADDITIONAL RESOURCES**

- Koroma helps warlord escape trial, Africa Confidential, 8 August 2013.
- Who is Benefitting?: The social and economic impact of three large-scale land investments in Sierra Leone, Action for Large-Scale Land Acquisition Transparency in Sierra Leone, July 2013.
asked the Executive Representative to submit a Transition Plan by no later than 30 May and requested the Secretary-General to include an update on its implementation in his next report. Previously, on 13 March, Toyberg-Frandzen briefed the Council regarding the Secretary-General’s 27 February report on UNIPSIL (S/2013/118); Rishchynski and Samura M.W. Kamara, Sierra Leone’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, addressed the Council as well (S/PV.6933). While recognising that the mandate of UNIPSIL had nearly been fulfilled, the report identified “residual tasks” in the areas of conflict prevention, mediation and democratisation.

There have been security incidents on the Sierra Leone–Liberia border, as documented in the 23 May report of the Panel of Experts (PoE) of the 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee (S/2013/316). The PoE found evidence of widespread gold mining by Liberian ex-combatants in the Gola Forest, which covers about 2,000 square kilometres of territory. According to Sierra Leone, these ex-combatants were engaged in a range of illegal activities, such as hunting game, drug-trafficking and illicit mining. On 2 February, about 50 Liberian militia members crossed the border to attack forest rangers from Sierra Leone, who managed to flee unharmed. Sierra Leone identified the attackers as former members of the Movement for Democracy in Liberia and agreed with Liberia on 14 March to undertake joint border-security patrols.

The PoE report also noted the presence in Freetown, Sierra Leone, of Ibrahim Bah, a close ally of former President Charles Taylor of Liberia who had brokered arms transfers and diamond deals with the Revolutionary United Front rebel group during Sierra Leone’s civil war. Bah has been subject to a travel ban since 2004 under the Liberia sanctions regime. Bah failed to appear in court for a 19 July trial initiated by a domestic human rights organisation on behalf of Tamba Emmanuel, who claims he was kidnapped and assaulted by Bah in 2000. When a court in Freetown issued an arrest warrant on 5 August for non-appearance, it then became known that the government had already secretly “deported” Bah to Senegal on 27 July, in violation of the travel ban. Senegal has denied being contacted by Sierra Leone, and Bah’s current whereabouts are unknown.

On 30 July, President Ernest Bai Koroma officially launched the Constitutional Review Committee. The 80-member committee—which will be chaired by Justice Edmond Cowan, the current ombudsman and a former speaker of Parliament—has two years to propose a draft constitution, which will then be subject to a national referendum. Review of the existing 1991 constitution, was a provision of the Lomé Peace Agreement of 7 July 1999 as well as a recommendation of the final report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission released in October 2004. Speaking at the ceremony, Toyberg-Frandzen welcomed the political commitment to an inclusive and transparent constitutional review process.

In July, Action for Large-Scale Land Acquisition Transparency, a coalition of more than a dozen domestic NGOs, released a report entitled Who is Benefitting?, which assessed the social and economic impacts of three major land investments in Sierra Leone. The report analysed the leases for sugar cane and palm oil production on the three tracts totalling 92,320 hectares (227,337 acres). The report claimed that the agricultural developments have had negative social and economic consequences for local populations; benefit from corporate tax breaks depriving the government of as much as $18.8 million per year in revenue; and were approved without adequate environmental, social and health impact assessments. It suggested that rapid top-down agrarian reform could pose risks for food security, rural livelihoods, social cohesion and peace in Sierra Leone.

Key Issues

The principal focus for the Council is progress in the drawdown of UNIPSIL, including how tasks are being shifted to the PBC and the UN country team during the transition. UNIPSIL activity toward accomplishing the “residual” tasks outlined in the Secretary-General’s 27 February report—conflict prevention, mediation and supporting democratic institutions—are another set of significant issues.

The status of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), whose mandate expires on 30 September, and measures taken toward the transition to a Residual Special Court will also likely be of interest to the Council.

Options

Council members may wish to seek clarification from the government of Sierra Leone regarding the deportation to Senegal of Ibrahim Bah, who remains subject to a UN travel ban under the Liberia sanctions regime.

The Council may also request further details regarding the drawdown of UNIPSIL, coordination between the UN country team and UNIPSIL, plans for the country specific configuration in the PBC and the transition to the Residual Special Court.

Council and Wider Dynamics

With the unanimous adoption of resolution 2097, Council members signalled their unity regarding the drawdown of UNIPSIL and the transformation of UN peacebuilding activities in Sierra Leone.

The secret deportation of Bah to Senegal could damage relations between the UN and Sierra Leone. It also potentially calls into question why the SCSL, whose case against Taylor had revealed substantial evidence of Bah’s complicity in war crimes, had not issued an indictment once his whereabouts in Freetown were publicly known. The US, which through its ambassador to Sierra Leone had communicated its interest in legal action against Bah, may choose to pursue the issue (as may other Council members).

The UK is the penholder on Sierra Leone, and Canada chairs the PBC Sierra Leone configuration.
Guinea-Bissau

Expected Council Action
In September, Council members expect to hold consultations to receive a briefing from José Ramos-Horta, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and the head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), and discuss the most recent report of the Secretary-General on the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau, issued on 21 August (S/2013/499). The Council is likely to take no action.

Key Recent Developments
The Council last considered Guinea-Bissau on 22 May, when it unanimously adopted resolution 2103 extending the mandate of UNIOGBIS until 31 May 2014 (S/PV.6968). Resolution 2103 established a revised ten-point mandate for UNIOGBIS, including democratization, capacity-building, rule of law and human rights, drug trafficking and organised crime, peacebuilding and the coordination of international assistance. Previously, on 9 May, Ramos-Horta briefed the Council regarding the 6 May report of the Secretary-General on UNIOGBIS and the restoration of constitutional order (S/2013/262). Representatives of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP), the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and Guinea-Bissau also addressed the Council (S/PV.6963).

On 28 June, Transitional President Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo set a date for elections, announcing over state radio that “conditions are ripe for holding safe and secure legislative and presidential elections on November 24”. From 3-16 July, a Needs Assessment Mission led by the UN Department of Political Affairs, evaluated the pre-election environment. On 15 July, Ramos-Horta met with Nhamadjo to share the preliminary conclusions of the mission, which will make recommendations about how the UN can assist with the elections. On his private blog, Ramos-Horta disclosed that the government had proposed a $40 million election budget, but he thought that $15 million was more realistic. On 8 August, former Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior, one of the two finalists for the second round presidential election that was aborted by the 12 April 2012 military coup, announced that he would return from exile in Portugal in order to contest the presidential election.

On 17-18 July, ECOWAS held a summit meeting on Guinea-Bissau and other regional issues. The final communiqué extended the mandate of the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) until 16 May 2014 and reiterated the call for the lifting of sanctions on Guinea-Bissau and the re-engageing of bilateral donors. President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria echoed these themes when he addressed the summit stating that “the challenges facing Guinea-Bissau are complex in nature” and urging the EU and the AU “to recognise the transitional government and lift the sanctions on Guinea-Bissau, to allow the resumption of bilateral cooperation with the international community.

On 18 July, Ramos-Horta attended a meeting of the Council of Ministers of the CPLP in Maputo, Mozambique. The ministers adopted a declaration on the situation in Guinea-Bissau urging political actors: to create conditions for the safe return of Bissau-Guinean citizens in exile, to hold elections with full respect for democratic processes and human rights, and to fight impunity and drug trafficking (S/2013/510). The declaration further noted that a lack of effective civilian oversight over the security apparatus threatens the functioning of state institutions. The CPLP also reiterated its commitment to coordinating with other international partners on Guinea-Bissau.

According to a report released by the World Food Programme (WFP) office in Guinea-Bissau, the country is facing a situation of high food insecurity. This is largely due to a sharp decline in the price of cashews, an industry that accounts for 90 percent of the export revenue and provides income for 80 percent of the population. The terms of trade between cashews and rice have declined from a one-to-one ratio to a three-to-one ratio (i.e., farmers have to sell 3 kilograms of cashews in order to buy 1 kilogram of rice). Ussama Osman, the WFP country director, stated that international sanctions and the suspension of aid to Guinea-Bissau were having a negative humanitarian impact.

“There is need for immediate financial support from the donors”, he said. “They have to realize that political pressure, sanctions and boycott are punishing the most vulnerable.”

Human Rights-Related Developments
Ivan Šimonović, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, visited Guinea-Bissau from 7 to 11 July. He met with the transitional authorities and civil society representatives, while also visiting a prison in Mansoa and a detention centre and a hospital in Bissau. On 10 July, Šimonović attended a national conference on impunity, justice and human rights, stating that impunity remains the main challenge to the protection of human rights and the stability of the country. He said that the number of gross human rights violations has increased since the promulgation of the amnesty law in 2008 and following the 2012 coup. Šimonović stressed that certain human rights prerequisites must be in place for the 24 November elections to be free and fair.

Key Issues
The Council, in considering the Secretary-General’s latest report, will be principally concerned with the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau.

More specifically, the Council is likely to be focused on how the UN can most effectively facilitate the 24 November legislative and presidential elections.


OTHER RELEVANT FACTS UNIOGBIS Size and Composition Authorised: 52 international civilians, 46 local civilians, two military advisers, 12 police and six UN volunteers (as of 31 May 2013). Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNIOGBIS José Ramos-Horta (Timor-Leste) Chair of the Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Committee Ambassador Mohammad Lotulchiki (Morocco) Chair of the Guinea-Bissau Configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission Ambassador Luiz Alberto Figueiredo Machado (Brazil) ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) Size and Composition 665 soldiers and police from Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Senegal (as of 16 January 2013).

Guinea-Bissau (con’t)

The ongoing challenges posed to Guinea-Bissau by drug trafficking and transnational organised crime could also be an issue of concern for the Council.

Options
The Council may wish to consider the following options:

• requesting an update from the Secretary-General regarding progress in ensuring an adequate anti-drug component within UNIOGBIS;
• reiterating its encouragement for member states to provide financial backing for the work of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime in Guinea-Bissau;
• requesting a briefing from the Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political Affairs regarding the assessment mission and preparations for elections; and
• issuing a presidential or press statement signalling the Council’s focus on the need for timely, free and fair elections.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Council members showed a high degree of unity with the unanimous adoption of resolution 2103. There also appears to be cautious optimism among Council members that UNIOGBIS under the leadership of Ramos-Horta will manage to fulfil those aspects of its near-term mandate relating to the facilitation of elections.

Nonetheless, while setting a date for legislative and presidential elections could be seen as a positive step toward the restoration of constitutional order, the Council is unlikely to substantively change its approach to Guinea-Bissau until more concrete progress has been demonstrated. For example, the call by ECOWAS for lifting sanctions is unlikely to be considered at this juncture.

Togo is the penholder on Guinea-Bissau, and Morocco is the chair of the 2048 Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Committee.

Libya

Expected Council Action
In September, the Security Council expects to be briefed by Tarek Mitri, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), followed by consultations. The Council will also likely receive the periodic briefing by the chair of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Eugène-Richard Gasana (Rwanda), and hold consultations on the Libya sanctions. No Council action is planned at this stage.

The mandates of UNSMIL and the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 1970 Sanctions Committee expire on 16 March and 14 April 2014, respectively.

Key Recent Developments
On 9 June, the General National Congress (GNC) passed a resolution requiring the government to dissolve all former revolutionary brigades by the end of the year and integrate their members into the army or police. Yet some brigades continue to challenge state authority throughout the country, successfully blocking access to the Interior Ministry for a week in early July.

The government has been rocked by a series of high-level resignations. Mohammed Magariaf resigned as president of the GNC on 28 May following the adoption of the “political isolation law”—which precludes former officials of the Muammar Qaddafi regime from holding leadership positions in the government. Interior Minister Mohammed Khalifa Al-Sheikh resigned on 18 August, claiming lack of support from the prime minister. The deputy prime minister previously resigned on 3 August, citing over-centralised decision-making.

Nouri Abu Sahmain was sworn in as GNC president on 25 June, becoming the first Amazigh (Berber) president of Libya. Despite his appointment, tensions with minority groups have continued to affect the political transition. Following the 16 July adoption of the electoral law on the election of the 60-member constitution-drafting assembly, four Amazigh GNC members resigned, claiming there was poor representation of cultural minorities and insufficient mechanisms to ensure consensus to protect minority rights in the law.

Regional tensions prevail in the eastern Cyrenaica region, where the Cyrenaica Transitional Council, which unilaterally declared its autonomy in June, has threatened to escalate the disruption of oil production and exports if its demands for federal status are not met.

Human Rights Watch reported in early August that at least 51 people had died in a broadening wave of apparent political assassinations in the east yet “authorities have not prosecuted anyone for these crimes, and have no suspects in custody”. In response to the 26 July assassination of political activist Abdelsalam al-Mosmary, protesters attacked the offices of the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Justice and Construction Party, as well as the headquarters of the liberal National Forces Alliance.

In his last Council briefing, Mitri highlighted the deficiencies in the implementation of the rule of law in Libya, with an estimated 7,000 to 8,000 detainees who have been waiting since 2011 to be charged or released, and evidence of deaths in custody due to torture. He said efforts to improve the prison situation had met with “varying degrees of success”. On 26 July, about 1,200 inmates fled a prison in Benghazi after a riot.

On 31 May, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (ICC) rejected Libya’s challenge to the admissibility of the case against Saif al-Islam Qaddafi and reminded Libya of its obligation to surrender the suspect to the court. (Libya has challenged the admissibility of the cases against Qaddafi and former intelligence chief Abdullah al-Senussi, claiming...
that they were already under investigation in Libya.) Libya asked the Appeals Chamber to suspend the order to transfer Qaddafi, but the petition was rejected on 18 July. On 31 July, a court in Misrata sentenced to death six senior members of the Qaddafi regime, four of whom were charged in absentia.

In her 8 May briefing to the Council, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda expressed concern about the alleged crimes committed by rebel forces during the revolution, including the expulsion of residents of Tawergha and the destruction of the city. More than 35,000 homeless Tawerghans have been prevented from returning by armed groups from Misrata. On 31 July, the Ministry of Justice announced that a fact-finding commission established more than a year ago to investigate the crimes had begun work.

Gasana is likely to brief the Council on the 8 July meeting of the 1970 Sanctions Committee during which the PoE presented its interim report. Among its recommendations, the PoE asked Libya to clarify the procedures in place at all ministries other than the Ministry of Defence to deal with procurement of lethal material.

Human Rights-Related Developments

The Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, observed in a 30 May report that several provisions of a new law on peaceful assembly did not comply with international norms and standards related to freedom of peaceful assembly (A/HRC/23/39/Add.2). He also expressed concern about reported obstructions faced by peaceful protestors who called for the protection of cultural and religious sites in Libya. He urged Libya to take positive measures to ensure the free exercise of the rights to freedom of association and peaceful assembly.

Key Issues

An overarching issue is the fragile security situation due to the existence of militias that challenge the state’s monopoly of the legitimate use of force.

The deficiencies in the rule of law are a related issue. A further related issue is the impact of regional instability on Libya.

A pressing issue is the lack of inclusiveness of the political process as shown by the recent adoption of the political isolation law and the electoral law that will govern the election of the constitution-drafting assembly. A related issue is the potential impact of the upcoming municipal and assembly elections, whose date is yet to be set.

An important issue for the Council is the conflicting views of Libya and the ICC regarding the trial of the two ICC indictees, as well as other investigations currently underway. (According to article 87 of the Rome Statute, if a state fails to cooperate with the ICC and prevents it from exercising its functions and powers, the court may refer the matter to the Council.)

Options

Options for the Council include:

• receiving a briefing and taking no action;
• issuing a statement ahead of the upcoming elections emphasising the need for the GNC, the government and the constitution-drafting assembly to work inclusively for national reconciliation, justice, respect for human rights and the rule of law; and
• issuing a statement asking Libya to enforce arms-control mechanisms within the country (including the issuance of end-user certificates as requested by resolution 2095) and to take decisive steps towards security sector reform and the demobilisation of militias.

Council Dynamics

The deterioration of the security situation and the fragility of the political transition are sources of concern for Council members. Even if Libya has been a source of division in the Council—where some members have questioned the way in which resolutions 1970 and 1973 were implemented while others are more likely to showcase positive developments since the 2011 revolution—it seems many Council members are aware of the current shortfalls in the transition process. In this context, France will organise a Core Security Partners meeting on Libya—a group that includes among others France, the UK, the US, the UN and regional organisations—in New York on the margins of the General Assembly in September.

Council members are also aware of the controversy that the last two Council briefings have sparked in Libya after Mitri reported how, following the adoption of resolution 2095, some local actors “cast doubts on the intentions of the international community and attributed to the UN an interventionist design”. After local press reported on his bleak assessment of the security situation and political developments on 18 June, Mitri held a press conference on 23 June to dispel misperceptions. Mitri explained how some Council members, “due to their excessive focus on the problems, lean towards having greater concerns over what is called in the UN the democratic transition and state-building.” Some Council members have shown concern over the way actors in Libya have misrepresented the Council’s engagement.

The UK is the penholder on Libya.

South Sudan and Sudan

Expected Council Action

In September, the Security Council expects to hold two meetings, likely in consultations, on Sudan-South Sudan issues.

At press time, no Council outcome was anticipated from these matters.

Key Recent Developments

High-level international engagement to address the crisis in Sudan-South Sudan relations has continued. The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) convened at ministerial level on 29 July in Addis Ababa to discuss the situation between the two countries. The PSC issued a communiqué in which it, inter alia:
South Sudan and Sudan (con’t)

- endorsed the establishment of the Ad Hoc Investigative Mechanism (AIM) and the AU Border Program Technical Team (AUBP TT) to study allegations by Sudan and South Sudan that each supports rebels in the other’s territory and to determine the centre line of the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone (SDBZ), respectively;
- urged Sudan not to suspend the transport of oil from South Sudan until the AIM and the AUBP TT have time to finalise their work;
- recalled its earlier decision supporting the 21 September 2012 proposal of the AU High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) on the final status of Abyei, which called for a referendum that includes the participation of the Ngok Dinka and other permanent residents of Abyei to determine whether the area belongs to Sudan or South Sudan;
- expressed its intention to visit Abyei to demonstrate its support for the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) and the people in the area; and
- decided to extend the mandate of AUHIP for an additional six months.

Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet briefed Council members in consultations on 7 August on Sudan-South Sudan and UNISFA. He said that SDBZ aerial reconnaissance by UNISFA had been temporarily suspended because it was the rainy season and because of fighting around Kadugli, the headquarters of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM). Mulet also said that the advance team of troops providing protection to JBVMM monitors would likely be deployed by the end of August, thereby allowing the monitors and support staff to assume their Council-mandated monitoring and verification responsibilities.

On 12 August, Sudan again extended its deadline, this time to 6 September, to shut down oil shipments from South Sudan, apparently thanks to active mediation by AUHIP Chair Thabo Mbeki. (The original 7 August deadline had already been extended to 22 August. Sudan has threatened to close oil pipelines from South Sudan because it believes that South Sudan is supporting rebels on its territory.)

Sudan and South Sudan exchanged gunfire along the border in early August, with South Sudan claiming that it was acting in self-defence when its troops came under fire in Teskuin, a border town claimed by both countries, and alleging that Sudan crossed over the centre line of the SDBZ. (The centre line has yet to be defined to the satisfaction of both countries.) No civilian casualties were reported in this incident.

In the midst of ongoing tensions, both countries continued to face significant internal challenges. In July, Jonglei state in South Sudan was once again engulfed in inter-ethnic violence between the Lou Nuer and Murle groups. (Inter-ethnic clashes involving these groups also claimed hundreds of lives in Jonglei in late 2012 and early 2013.) According to Jongolei Boyoris, a member of the Jonglei State Assembly, more than 320 Murle, mainly women and children, died as a result of this latest outbreak of violence. The recent fighting has displaced more than 100,000 people.

On 23 July, South Sudan President Salva Kiir dismissed all ministers and deputy ministers, appointing a new cabinet within a week. However, Kiir delayed for several weeks in appointing a new vice president, a post that was vacated when Kiir dismissed political rival Riek Machar. Finally, on 23 August, Kiir named his political ally James Wani Igga as vice president, pending approval by the parliament. Among other key appointments, Kiir named Manyang Juuk, governor of the turbulent Jonglei state, as defence minister, and Barnaba Marial Benjamin, formerly the information minister, as foreign minister.

On 23 July, Kiir also dismissed Pagan Amum, the Secretary-General of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and South Sudan’s chief negotiator with Sudan. In doing so, Kiir issued a decree launching an investigation of Amum for “allegedly mismanaging the affairs of the SPLM, administratively and politically” and “for exhibiting insubordination to the SPLM leadership by using the public media to discredit the SPLM and its leadership”. (In June, Amum challenged Kiir’s decision to dismiss two ministers—Kosti Manibe, the minister of finance and economic planning, and Deng Alor, the minister of cabinet affairs—amidst allegations against them of corruption.)

In Sudan, on 31 July, Ibrahim Ghandour, the official responsible for negotiations with the SPLM-N (SPLM-North) rebel group, said that direct talks with the rebels would not take place while South Sudan continues to support them, an allegation that South Sudan denies. (The SPLM-N, the former northern branch of the ruling party in South Sudan, has been fighting the government of Sudan in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states since 2011. Sudan and the SPLM-N last held face-to-face negotiations in April, but these talks made no progress.)

In East Darfur, tensions between the Maalia and Rizeigat groups regarding land and cattle ownership deteriorated into violence. On 10 August, clashes between the two groups reportedly left 20 Maalia and 50 Rizeigat dead and dozens of people wounded. Several villages were also burned in the fighting, which continued for a number of days. On 12 August, Abdel Hamid Musa Kashaa, the Rizeigat governor of East Darfur, escaped unharmed from an attack by members of the Maalia group.

The Council held the second of its semi-monthly consultations on Sudan-South Sudan on 22 August with Haile Menkerios, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the AU and head of the UN Office to the AU, briefing in his capacity as Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan and South Sudan. He told Council members that Kiir might visit Khartoum in early September for a summit meeting with President Omar al-Bashir.

On 23 August, the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2013/14) focusing on Sudan-South Sudan relations and issued a press statement (SC/11103) condemning the violence in Jonglei state. The presidential statement called on Sudan and South Sudan to urgently implement the cooperation agreements of 27 September 2012, which focused on security, oil wealth sharing, trade and other issues. Ambassador Daffa-Alla Elhag Ali Osman of Sudan and Amanuel Yoanes Ajwain of South Sudan addressed the Council after the adoption of the statement (S/PV.7022). Ali Osman accused rebels in Sudan of “terrorizing civilians,” while Ajwain expressed his country’s commitment to better relations with Sudan. The press statement on South Sudan condemned the recent violence against civilians in Jonglei state, while deploiring the large scale displacement caused by these attacks and noting that South Sudan holds the primary responsibility to protect civilians (SC/11103).
South Sudan and Sudan (con’t)

Key Issues
A key immediate issue is how to dissuade Sudan from closing oil pipelines from South Sudan, given the enormous role oil plays in the economies of both countries.

A related issue is whether Sudan and South Sudan will fulfil their commitment to accept the findings of the AIM and AUBPTT. An additional important issue is whether the Council can use the progress reflected by the recent issuance of its two statements as a springboard for more constructive engagement on Sudan-South Sudan matters.

Options
Options for the Council include:

• requesting a briefing from Mbeki on the state of relations between Sudan and South Sudan;
• travelling to Sudan and South Sudan and meeting with key officials to signal the commitment to improved relations between the two countries; and
• adopting a statement in which the Council reiterates its decision in resolution 2046 for Sudan and the SPLM-N to negotiate a settlement on the basis of the 28 June 2011 Framework Agreement, which calls for the parties “to work towards an inclusive national process in the Republic of Sudan, aimed at constitutional reform”.

Council Dynamics
The most immediate concern of Council members is the threatened shut down of oil pipelines from South Sudan. Some Council members see this threat as unwarranted brinkmanship by Sudan that erodes the potential for progress in relations between the two countries. There is likewise a sense among several members that the threatened oil shutdown should not be used by Sudan as a bargaining chip to extract concessions from South Sudan on other issues. Nonetheless, some are more sympathetic toward Sudan than others given the significant threats to its sovereignty posed by rebel groups.

Several Council members also remain troubled by the situation in Abyei. The temporary administrative structures—the Abyei Area Council, the Abyei Area Administration and the Abyei Police Service—still have not been established, and discussions on the final status of Abyei have made no progress.

It appears that members demonstrated flexibility in the negotiations on the presidential statement and the press statement. It likewise has been noted that the initial draft of the presidential statement was more “neutral” than previous draft statements on Sudan-South Sudan relations on which the Council was unable to achieve consensus. Several members viewed these negotiations as constructive and were encouraged that the Council produced written outcomes after several months of gridlock.

The US is the penholder on Sudan-South Sudan issues.

Somalia

Expected Council Action
In September, the Council expects a briefing regarding the first report of the Secretary-General on the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) to be followed by consultations. The Council is also scheduled to receive a quarterly report from the AU on the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

Key Recent Developments
The Council last addressed Somalia on 24 July with the adoption of resolution 2111, reauthorising the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) until 25 November 2014 (S/RES/2111). Previously, Council members considered the SEMG reports during consultations on 18 July. The Somalia report (S/2013/413) was released on 12 July, but due to initial objections by Russia, release of the Eritrea report (S/2013/440) was delayed until 24 July. On 23 July, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) acknowledged the report but expressed its wish to be consulted on the findings and conclusions of future SEMG reports prior to their publication.

Since the 19 June attack on the UN Development Programme (UNDP) compound by Al Shabaab, which resulted in more than 20 deaths, terrorist bombings and targeted assassinations have continued to plague Mogadishu.

On 24 July, Al Shabaab claimed it had carried out more than 50 attacks in Mogadishu during the preceding two weeks. On 29 July, the Council issued a press statement condemning the Al Shabaab attack on the Turkish embassy, which killed three people (SC/11080).

On 1 August, the semi-autonomous state of Puntland announced that it would cut off all links with the FGS. A 5 August official statement by the Puntland administration reads: “The fragmented country has been plunged back into a vicious cycle of violence, displacement, clan animosities …and a complete disregard for the country’s genuine Provisional Federal Constitution …Puntland hereby suspends all cooperation and relations with (the) Federal Government of Somalia”.

The statement also accused the FGS of failing to equitably share power, resources and foreign aid. Despite the severing of ties, Puntland is nonetheless planning to participate in the international donor conference “A New Deal for Somalia” on 16 September in Brussels.
On 4 August, AMISOM’s troop-contributing countries, Ethiopia, Somalia and the AU met in Kampala, Uganda, and issued a communiqué outlining several decisions regarding Jubaland, the FGS, the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and AMISOM:

- control over the Kismayo seaport and airport must be given to the FGS;
- discussions between the FGS and representatives of the Juba regions should be “fast tracked and made inclusive”;
- efforts by FGS to engage stakeholders in the Juba regions in political dialogue should be supported;
- IGAD should continue to play a mediation role in line with the five principles outlined in its communiqué of 3 May; and
- the FGS will be supported in establishing authority over the Juba regions, particularly control over federally owned infrastructure.

At press time, a resumption of talks between Ahmed Madobe, president of the unrecognised state of Jubaland, and a high-level FGS delegation was expected to take place in Addis Ababa under the auspices of IGAD.

On 14 August, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) announced the immediate closure of all programmes in Somalia. MSF had provided medical assistance in Somalia since 1991, with 1,500 staff members recently working throughout the country treating approximately 50,000 people per month. In a statement published on 20 August, MSF explained its decision to withdraw from Somalia:

… the very parties with whom we had been negotiating minimum levels of security tolerated and accepted attacks against humanitarian workers. In some cases, they were actively supporting the criminal acts against our staff …. Acceptance of violence against health workers has permeated Somali society and this acceptance is now shared by many armed groups and many levels of civilian government, from clan elders to district commissioners to the Federal Somali Government.

At a Geneva press conference on 16 August, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) released statistics regarding sexual violence in Somalia. According to OCHA, there were 800 reported cases of sexual violence in Mogadishu during the first half of the year. Last year, there were at least 1,700 people affected by sexual violence in Somalia, according to the Office of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict. UNICEF stated that about one-third of the victims of sexual violence in Somalia are children. One recent alleged victim, has publicly accused the Somali National Security Forces of abducting her and then handing her over to AMISOM troops at the Masiah compound, where she was allegedly drugged and repeatedly raped. In a statement released 15 August, AMISOM announced a joint investigation with the FGS.

On 26 August, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the AU, in close consultation with FGS, began a jointly-led review of AMISOM. The mission, which is anticipated to last two weeks including trips to Addis Ababa and the four sectors of AMISOM deployment within Somalia, is also expected to establish benchmarks for a possible future UN peacekeeping operation. In terms of output, the joint mission’s goal is to produce a new UN-AU strategic framework to be presented by 10 October for consideration by the Council and the AU Peace and Security Council.

Human Rights-Related Developments

The Human Rights Council (HRC) during its 24th session (9-27 September) is due to hold a stand-alone high-level interactive dialogue to explore how all stakeholders can work more effectively on the realisation of human rights in Somalia (A/HRC/DEC/23/114). During its 24th session, the HRC will also consider the report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia (A/HRC/24/40) and a report by the HRC Working Group on the use of mercenaries on its visit to Somalia last December (A/HRC/24/45/Add.2).

On 19 July, the Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) urged Somalia to review a draft media law to ensure its conformity with international human rights standards. OHCHR expressed several concerns about the proposed law, saying the vague language and broad categories contained in the draft legislation could easily be used to curtail freedom of expression. The bill includes a provision allowing for the suspension of journalists who have merely been accused of violating the media legislation. The draft also requires journalists to reveal their sources if published information arouses public sentiment. Furthermore, OHCHR said the composition of the regulatory body that would be established by the law and the selection process for its members does not guarantee its independence.

(Following a request from the National Union of Somali Journalists, a technical expert committee on re-drafting the media bill was launched on 28 July to revise the draft legislation before its submission to the federal parliament.)

Key Issues

The Council will be principally focused upon UNSOM’s progress during its first three months of deployment, including steps it has taken toward coping with the evolving security situation in Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia.

Another issue for the Council is UN-AU relations, particularly within the context of ongoing differences over AMISOM’s support package and mandate. The human rights record of AMISOM troops could also be a point of increasing contention.

Difficulties implementing a federal system in relation to Somaliland, Puntland, and Jubaland among other areas, is likely to be a subject of recurring concern for Council members.

Options

Given the difficult operational environment, the Council could request a special briefing from the UN Department of Safety and Security regarding safety measures implemented since the 19 June attack in Mogadishu.

The Council may wish to consider issuing a press statement in support of the 16 September international donor conference in Brussels hosted by the EU.

Council and Wider Dynamics

The Council has exhibited a high degree of unity with respect to policymaking on Somalia during the last few months. Perhaps no clearer expression of unanimity has been the issuance of three press statements and a presidential statement—each requiring consensus—in June and July.

However, as difficulties become evident in implementing resolution 2093 of 6 March (which partially lifted the arms embargo, reauthorised AMISOM and established the structural parameters for UNSOM), earlier divisions among Council members may re-emerge (e.g., regarding modification of the arms embargo).

The UK is the penholder on Somalia, and the Republic of Korea is the chair of the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanctions Committee.
**Yemen**

**Expected Council Action**
Late in September, the Council expects a briefing on Yemen by Jamal Benomar, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen. Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Abdullah bin Rashid Al-Zayani and a senior representative of Yemen are expected to brief the Council as well. The outcome will largely depend on the successful completion of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) set for 18 September.

The mandate of the Office of the Special Adviser on Yemen was renewed in June without an expiration date.

**Key Recent Developments**
Following concerns about potential terrorist attacks, the US State Department closed 19 US embassies in the Middle East and Africa on 4 August. While the closure—which was followed by other Western countries—lasted about a week for the other embassies, the US Embassy in Sana’a only reopened on 18 August. Although it is unclear what kind of threat motivated this decision, the involvement of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in a terrorist plot has been reported. An August assessment of Al-Qaida by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service stated that, of the different Al-Qaida regional affiliates, “Yemen-based AQAP is frequently identified as the most potent threat”. Since 27 July, attacks by US drones in Yemen have been reported to be on the rise and have sparked protests.

The situation in the Sa’ada province, controlled by the Houthi Shia rebel group, remains tense. Nonetheless, in the 11 June briefing, Benomar highlighted how despite deep divisions, the Sa’ada NDC working group has succeeded in reaching a consensus on language about the roots of the conflict. Moreover, Houthi militants were able in June to re-bury their leader, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, who was killed in 2004, after the government handed over his remains in December 2012, in a ceremony attended by tens of thousands of followers. However, clashes between Houthi groups and security services have continued in the reporting period, escalating tensions with Sunni members of the Islah party and Salafi groups.

The second plenary session of the NDC—which will contribute to the drafting of a new constitution and pave the way for the holding of general elections in 2014—started on 8 June. The session, which lasted for a month, dealt with reports by working groups on rights and freedoms, independent government bodies, good governance, defence and security, sustainable development and transitional justice. The groups working on the southern issue, Sa’ada and state-building were not able to agree on key issues, and consultations continued at the working-group level before debating and putting them to a vote in the third and final plenary to be held in September. The NDC is scheduled to conclude by 18 September, but it is unclear that it will be able to reach all its objectives at the set date.

The consensus committee, which met in June for the first time, is expected to play an important role on issues that cannot be agreed upon at the working-group level. The final outcomes adopted by vote at the NDC will be the general principles and rules for the constitution and future legislation. Local press reported in mid-August that members of the southern movement had abandoned the NDC, protesting the lack of tangible solutions to the southern issue so far. On 21 August, state television broadcast a government apology to the people in the south, the east and the Houthis for the wars waged against them under former President Ali Abdullah Saleh despite the fact that current President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi was then vice president for 18 years.

Although the progress of the NDC has been slower than initially planned, preparations have started for the holding of general elections in February 2014. In June, the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendum (SCER), supported by the UN Development Programme and several donors, began to replace the existing voter registry with a biometric one. The SCER also announced that the referendum for the new constitution would be held on 15 October.

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) stressed in July the severe humanitarian and early-recovery needs Yemen still faces. Regarding internally displaced persons (IDPs), 306,791 people remain displaced in the north and 232,025 former IDPs have returned home, mainly in the south, where they need help to rebuild their lives. In addition, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees reported that more than 46,000 refugees (mainly from Ethiopia and Somalia) had reached Yemen during the first six months of this year. OCHA outlined the risks for vulnerable groups as humanitarian activities shift from relief to early recovery where open conflict has ended. In spite of the humanitarian challenges (e.g. food insecurity, areas with unexploded ordnance, lack of basic services), OCHA said the Yemen humanitarian consolidated appeal remains underfunded at just 43 percent, including five thematic clusters funded at less than 25 percent.

**Human Rights-Related Development**
During its 24th session (9-27 September), the Human Rights Council will consider the report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on Yemen (A/HRC/24/34). The High Commissioner notes with concern the practice of prolonged detention without trial or without proper documentation and the instances of security forces using excessive force when dispersing demonstrations. The report documents cases of threats and physical attacks on journalists by security forces and various armed groups as well as cases of threats against judges and discrimination against the Muhamasheen community. The High Commissioner regrets that since September 2012 the government has not reached a consensus regarding the appointment of commissioners for the national commission of inquiry into allegations of human rights violations that occurred in 2011.

**Key Issues**
Ensuring the timely completion of the NDC and the successful achievement of its objectives, including agreement on the form of government, is a key issue. The inclusiveness of the measures leading up to the general elections—including the constitution-drafting process—is a related issue.

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**UN Documents on Yemen**
- Security Council Resolution S/RES/2051 (12 June 2012) focused on the second phase of the transition and expressed the Council’s readiness to consider further measures, including under Article 41 of the Charter.
- Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2013/3 (15 February 2013) welcomed the announcement of the launch of the NDC, reiterated the Council’s readiness to impose sanctions against spoilers to the transition and expressed concern over reports of money and weapons being brought into Yemen from outside.
- Security Council Letters S/2012/469 (18 June 2012) and S/2012/470 (21 June 2012) was the exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Council on the establishment of an office of the Special Adviser for an initial period of 12 months.
- Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.976 (11 June 2013) was the latest briefing by Special Adviser Benomar.
- Security Council Press Statement SC/10689 (12 April 2013) welcomed Yemen’s reorganisation of the military and called on all parties to support the president’s decrees and to work to ensure their prompt implementation.

**Other Relevant Fact**
Special Adviser to the Secretary-General and UN Envoy to Yemen Jamal Benomar (Morocco)
Immediate issues for the Council include the precarious security situation, the presence of AQAP and persistent violent clashes among tribal groups. Funding and supply of weapons from regional actors are related issues.

The bleak humanitarian situation, including the challenges for IDPs, returnees and refugees from the Horn of Africa, is an ongoing issue.

### Options

Options for the Council will depend on the accomplishments of the NDC by the time of the briefing. If the 18 September deadline is not met, the Council could issue a statement:

- encouraging NDC delegates to make use of internal conflict-resolution mechanisms for the issues that remain unsolved (such as the use of the consensus committee);
- asking political actors in Yemen to finalise the NDC as soon as possible, agreeing on general principles to feed into the constitutional process in a peaceful, transparent, constructive, and reconciliatory manner;
- reiterating its warning to spoilers of the political process that Article 41 measures could be taken against them; and
- calling upon all parties to honour to the extent possible the timetable and benchmarks set out in the transition agreement and to hold general elections by February 2014.

Although unlikely, if the NDC is successfully concluded as planned before the briefing, the Council could issue a statement commending the work of the delegates of the NDC and looking forward to the adoption of the new constitution based on general principles agreed by the NDC, and the holding of a referendum and general elections in February 2014.

### Council Dynamics

Council members continue to follow the situation in Yemen closely: there was a Security Council mission to Yemen on 27 January, a presidential statement was adopted on 15 February (S/PRST/2013/3) and there are bi-monthly briefings from Benomar. Council members are aware of the importance of the political transition in Yemen at a critical moment for other transition processes in the region and highlight the close cooperation with regional organisations, the constructive discussions within the Council and the cost-effective UN engagement. The sixth meeting of the Friends of Yemen is scheduled to take place on 25 September on the margins of the General Assembly in New York, co-chaired by Saudi Arabia, the UK and Yemen.

The UK is the penholder on Yemen.

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**UNDOF (Golan Heights)**

### Expected Council Action

In September, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous is expected to brief the Council on the Secretary-General’s report, due early in the month, on the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). It is likely the briefing will focus on the security situation in the Golan, troop generation for the mission and risk-mitigation measures UNDOF is taking to increase the safety and security of its personnel. Following the briefing, Council members will meet in consultations. No outcome is anticipated.

UNDOF’s mandate expires on 31 December.

### Key Recent Developments

The Council adopted resolution 2108 on 27 June, renewing UNDOF for six months. The resolution reflected the deteriorating situation on the ground as a result of the spillover of the Syrian conflict, which has jeopardised the integrity of the ceasefire line between Israel and Syria. The resolution included stronger language on UNDOF’s risk mitigation and enhanced self-defence capabilities, reflecting the importance the Council places on the safety and security of peacekeeping personnel.

The Secretary-General’s most recent UNDOF report detailed multiple violations in recent months of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between Israel and Syria (S/2013/345). Both the report and resolution expressed particular concern over the 6 June clashes between the Syrian government and armed opposition in the area of separation near the ceasefire line between Israel and Syria. (Neither Israeli nor Syrian military forces should be in the area of separation under the terms of the 1974 agreement.)

Austria announced that it would withdraw its troops from UNDOF shortly after the 6 June clashes, fully withdrawing by the end of July. (Croatia and Japan had previously withdrawn troops in late 2012 and early 2013.) Fiji, Ireland and Nepal have since contributed troops to UNDOF to fill the gap left by these withdrawals. The Philippines—which in June had also signalled its growing discomfort with the increasingly dangerous situation for its troops—committed to remain in UNDOF for a further six months.

The Secretary-General has recommended, as a matter of priority, increasing UNDOF’s force to 1,250 troops—the allowable number under the 1974 agreement. It seems DPKO has advised it will be able to meet this recommendation by October.

In recent months, spillover from the conflict in Syria has continued to affect the security situation in the Golan. Clashes between Syrian government forces and armed opposition, particularly shellings, have been ongoing. On 16 July Syrian tanks and armoured personnel vehicles entered the area of separation during heavy clashes with the armed opposition. As a result of these clashes, several shells crashed into the Israeli occupied Golan. Media reports indicate that Syrian gunmen (unspecified whether government or opposition forces) infiltrated an unmanned Israeli position later the same day. As Israeli troops approached the position, they were fired upon from inside Syria, and they returned fire. On 17 August, after Syrian mortars...
errantly landed in the Israeli occupied Golan, Israeli forces returned fire with a missile to destroy the source of the shelling.

UNDOF has also recently found improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in its area of operations. As a result of this new development, it seems DPKO has requested troop-contributors to provide specialised counter-IED teams to the mission. UNDOF convoys have been forcibly stopped at Syrian military checkpoints, and UNDOF personnel and observation posts exposed to stray fire and warning shots.

Another potential risk to both UNDOF and regional stability is Hezbollah’s overt involvement in Syria on behalf of the government, accompanied by claims that Hezbollah would open a new front against Israel in the Syrian Golan and that Syria would provide Hezbollah with “game-changing” weapons. Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, Israel has maintained a neutral policy vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis with a parallel policy to take action to stop any transfer of strategic weaponry through Syria to Hezbollah. The most recent Israeli airstrike in Syria was on 5 July, targeting anti-ship cruise missiles. Similar airstrikes on weapons depots in Syria occurred on 30 January and 3 and 5 May.

Key Issues
The spillover from the Syrian crisis into UNDOF’s area of operations will continue to be of primary concern for the Council. Syrian rebel forces control many of the villages within the area of separation, which Syrian military forces are prohibited from entering. But they have done so nonetheless in response to the rebel presence.

A continuing key issue will be the safety and security of UN personnel given the proximity of UNDOF positions to the areas where there have been clashes between Syrian government forces and the Syrian armed opposition.

A further key issue will be the deteriorating relationship between Israel and Syria following the recent Israeli airstrikes and threats by Hezbollah that it would open a new front against Israel in the Golan.

Options
The most likely option is for the Council to receive the report and briefing and take no additional action. One other option would be for the Council to adopt a statement reiterating the need for cooperation between Israel and Syria and for all parties to exercise restraint or expressing concern for the safety and security of UNDOF personnel, or both.

Council Dynamics
Council members are concerned about the recent exchanges of fire and the escalating tension between Israel and Syria, especially over the issue of arming Hezbollah. The Council has always generally agreed that UNDOF contributes to stability in the region in the absence of a peace agreement between Israel and Syria. However, its utility is particularly high now in order to avoid any potential negative security implications for the region. In this regard, most Council members are keen to demonstrate to the troop-contributing countries their commitment to UNDOF’s ability to operate effectively and the safety of its personnel.

Though in recent years the US has been the penholder on the Golan Heights, the last three resolutions renewing UNDOF were drafted jointly by the US and Russia, demonstrating consensus on an issue that is increasingly affected by the highly divisive conflict in Syria. Most Council members strive to keep the Syrian conflict and the Golan Heights as discrete issues—a position that remains difficult in practice.

Afghanistan

Expected Council Action
In September, the Council will hold its quarterly debate on the situation in Afghanistan. Ján Kubiš, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), is expected to brief. High-level participation is possible, given that it seems the debate will likely take place the week prior to the high-level debate of the General Assembly. At press time, no outcome was anticipated.

UNAMA’s mandate expires on 19 March 2014.

Key Recent Developments
The Council last debated the situation in Afghanistan on 20 June (S/PV.6983). Kubiš briefed the Council on developments in the country emphasising how critical the 5 April 2014 presidential and provincial elections are to Afghanistan’s future. He argued that “there is no alternative to inclusive and transparent elections as a means of delivering a political transition with the necessary degree of legitimacy and acceptability.” Kubiš also expressed concern about attacks by anti-government elements that have had limited military impact but have caused significant civilian casualties.

President Hamid Karzai signed into law two critical pieces of electoral legislation. The first, the “structure law”, was promulgated on 17 July and determines the structure and activities of the Independent Electoral Commission and the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC). For several months the ECC had been a point of contention as Karzai was against its establishment while the opposition not only wanted the commission but also called for foreigners to hold at least two of the five ECC posts. The final law represents a compromise, as an ECC is in place but all five of its members are Afghans. On 20 July, Karzai signed the second, wider electoral law that governs the conduct of elections.

The security situation in Afghanistan has remained unstable, with civilians targeted in several attacks. In Ghanikhel district in Nangarhar Province, 14 children and women died when a bomb exploded at a cemetery where they had congregated on 8 August, the first day of Eid al-Fitr, to honour a deceased relative killed by the Taliban.

On 3 August, three insurgents tried to attack the Indian consulate in Jalalabad, also in Nangarhar Province, detonating a bomb-rigged car. In addition to the three insurgents, nine people died in the assault and security of UNDOF personnel, or both.
24 were injured. Most of the casualties were children, as the attack occurred close to a mosque where children were receiving religious instruction. On 5 August, the Council issued a press statement condemning the attack (SC/11086).

Two attacks on female parliamentarians were reported in August. On 7 August, Senator Roh Gul Khairzad was ambushed by armed assailants in Ghazni province. She was wounded in the attack, while her daughter and driver were killed. On 13 August, the Taliban abducted Fariba Ahmadi Kakar while she was travelling in Ghazni province. She remains in the hands of the Taliban. The Taliban have signalled that Kakar would be released in return for four insurgents in police custody.

Little progress has been made on the reconciliation process of late. On 18 June, the Taliban opened an office in Doha, Qatar to allow them to pursue reconciliation talks. However, Karzai was concerned that the US and the Taliban would side-line his government while conducting negotiations. He expressed opposition to these potential negotiations, believing that the talks must be “Afghan-led” and taking issue with the name for the office, “The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”, which was the official title of the 1996-2001 Taliban-led government that no UN member state currently recognises. (The sign on the office with this name was subsequently removed, and Qatar said that the office would be called the “Political Office of the Afghan Taliban”.) Nonetheless, as a sign of his displeasure, Karzai suspended scheduled bilateral talks with the US on the role of US troops in Afghanistan after 2014. In late August, media reports indicated that bilateral talks on a post-2014 security deal had resumed.

Pakistan and Afghanistan are making efforts to ease strained relations. Pakistan dispatched Sartaj Aziz, a key advisor to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on foreign policy and defence issues, to Kabul on 21 July, where he met with Karzai and Afghan Foreign Minister Zalmay Rassoul. At a press conference with Rassoul, Aziz said that Pakistan would try to exert its influence to facilitate talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban, but he cautioned that Pakistan does not “control” the Taliban. At press time, Karzai was also scheduled to visit Pakistan from 26-28 August, to discuss how Pakistan can help support intra-Afghan reconciliation among other issues.

Human Rights-Related Developments

According to the UNAMA Human Rights Unit mid-year report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict in Afghanistan, the first half of 2013 showed an increase of 14 percent in civilian deaths and 28 percent in civilian injuries compared to the same period in 2012. This rise contrasts with the decline observed in 2012. Anti-government elements were responsible for 74 percent of civilian casualties and injuries, with improvised explosive devices causing most casualties. Increased ground engagement between Afghan forces and anti-government elements was the second leading cause of civilian casualties, a new trend.

On 16 June, President Hamid Karzai appointed five new commissioners to the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, a permanent national body established under the constitution, and retained four other serving commissioners. On 28 June, High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay expressed concerns about whether the new commissioners met the required eligibility standards (good reputation, independence, popular trust, commitment to human rights) and complied with international standards of the “Paris Principles”. Pillay urged the government to reconsider the new appointments and re-open the selection process.

Key Issues

One key issue is how the Council and UNAMA can support the reconciliation process in Afghanistan. In his 13 June UNAMA report, the Secretary-General noted that “good offices and political outreach in support of Afghan-led reconciliation and regional processes” are among UNAMA’s “core tasks” (S/2013/350).

Also a key issue is how the Council and UNAMA can most effectively assist the government in preparing for the 2014 presidential and provincial elections.

While not directly linked to UNAMA’s mandate, there are several important interconnected security issues that are likely to be on Council members’ minds. These include how to address the heightened violence against civilians, how well Afghan security forces will perform as they assume increasing responsibility for security and what kind of post-2014 security arrangement will be struck between Afghanistan and the US (assuming the parties can come to an agreement).

Moving forward, the security environment also has implications for UNAMA’s future mandate and, more broadly, for how UNAMA cooperates with other UN entities operating in the country.

Options

The Council may choose to hold the debate but take no action.

The Council may also consider adopting a statement that:

- requests a special report from the Secretary-General on preparations for the 2014 elections;
- deplores the rise in violence against civilians; and
- reiterates support for intra-Afghan reconciliation.

Council Dynamics

While several members have been encouraged by the fact that Afghan security forces have entered the final phase of assuming the lead in providing security for their country, there are widespread concerns about the rise in civilian casualties in recent months. In this respect, several members highlight the human rights challenges facing Afghanistan.

Pakistan and Russia, two key regional actors, continue to hold strong views on Afghanistan. Pakistan argues that instability in Afghanistan impacts negatively on its own security. It has tried to facilitate intra-Afghan reconciliation, while noting the importance of promoting security along its border with Afghanistan. However, it has strongly objected to accusations that there are terrorist sanctuaries within Pakistan from which attacks on Afghanistan are launched with the complicity of some elements of the Pakistani state.

Russia is generally concerned with the regional threat posed by instability in Afghanistan, including the spill-over effects of terrorism and drug trafficking. It has expressed concern with what it views as the inadequate capacity of the Afghan security forces, given the draw-down of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). At the same time, it has argued that the role of any future NATO presence in Afghanistan must be clearly defined and must be authorised by the Security Council.

There has been widespread interest on the Council in the preparations for the 2014 presidential and provincial elections. In this sense, several members have been encouraged by the recent passage of the structure law and the more general electoral law.

Australia is the penholder in the Council on Afghanistan.
Notable Dates for September

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