Overview

Argentina will preside over the Security Council in August.

A high-level open debate on the cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional organisations is planned, with President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina expected to preside. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, as well as representatives of the AU, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, the League of Arab States and the Union of South American Nations are expected to brief.

An open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict is also planned. The Secretary-General, High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay (by video-conference) and the International Committee of the Red Cross Director for International Law and Cooperation, Philip Spoerri, will brief the Council.

Debates are expected on:

- developments in Haiti and the Secretary-General’s semi-annual report on the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), preceded by a briefing by the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of MINUSTAH, Sandra Honoré; and
- developments in Kosovo and the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), with a briefing by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of UNMIK, Farid Zarif (by video-conference). Briefings, followed by consultations, are likely on:
  - the situation in the Middle East, by Assistant Secretary-General in the Department of Political Affairs Oscar Fernández-Taranco; and
  - the work of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUC), by Babacar Gaye, the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General who arrived in Bangui on 9 July; the human rights situation in the country by Ivan Simonovic, the head of the New York Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; and the humanitarian aspects of the situation by Valerie Amos, the head of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (Consideration of BINUCA had originally been expected in July; see our July Forecast for details.)
  - Sudan and South Sudan issues, twice, on the first occasion most likely by Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Edmond Mulet, and on the second one by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan and South Sudan, Haile Menkerios;
  - the Secretary-General’s report on and the work of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei, by Mulet;
  - developments related to the work of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), most likely by Mulet;
  - the work of the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Sanctions Committee by its chair, Ambassador Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg); and
  - the work of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, by its chair Ambassador María Cristina Perceval (Argentina).
A formal session will be needed to adopt a resolution renewing the mandate of UNIFIL.

At the end of the month Argentina is planning a wrap-up session to be held in a private meeting under the agenda item “Implementation of the Note S/2010/507” that addresses a range of Council working methods issues.

Throughout the month, Council members will be following closely the developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali and Syria and meetings on these issues may be scheduled.
In Hindsight: The Media Stakeout

In our survey of Security Council statistics in the February 2011 Monthly Forecast, we identified a notable reduction in appearances at the Security Council media stakeout, the dedicated area for both planned and impromptu press appearances by Council members and others on their way to or from the Security Council. Though the decline in this informal but vital Council mechanism was ostensibly brought on by the relocation to temporary facilities in April 2010, we nonetheless voiced concern that such diminished information-sharing might become entrenched.

In June 2013, the Security Council returned to its permanent premises, and the stakeout was restored to its place directly along the path members must take to enter the Council. An analysis of the number of stakeouts during the entire renovation period shows that there were indeed fewer appearances at the stakeout in the temporary location, prompting us to ask once more whether such reduced use will continue to be the status quo now that the Council is back in its refurbished chamber or whether Council members will reinvigorate this mechanism.

Using the same methodology as in 2011 (that is, focusing on stakeout appearances by Council members and excluding those that did not deal with Council matters), we found that Council members appeared at the stakeout 265 fewer times in the 33 months the Council was displaced for renovations than during the 33 months prior to renovations, an overall decline of approximately 34 percent. Stakeout appearances by the president during renovations averaged eight per month, compared with ten per month prior to renovations, or a decline of 20 percent. Stakeout appearances by other Council members during renovations also averaged eight per month, compared with 14 per month prior to renovations, a decline of 43 percent.

As in 2011, the immediate cause of this ebb can be linked to spatial changes: while in the temporary space, the bank of microphones and cameras that set the stage for the media stakeout was away from the path that Council members would take to the chambers. This minor inconvenience appears to have taken an outsize toll on the mechanism. Observers note that whereas the stakeout was previously a hive of journalistic activity, by comparison far fewer correspondents have regularly hovered around the stakeout in recent months.

Council members use the stakeout in a variety of ways to deliver messages outside the formal operations of the Council. Quite often, the stakeout provides an opportunity for members to communicate a national perspective on an issue when Council action (in the form of a resolution or presidential statement) proves impossible, as when, in December 2012, multiple constituencies spoke out against Israeli settlement activity in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (see our January 2013 Forecast for a full description of this incident). In this case, beyond expressing frustration over Council inaction, the stakeout was used to make statements on the record following closed consultations. This appearance also provided an opportunity for Council members to signal to an international audience that the Council remained engaged on an issue in spite of disagreements, potentially restoring faith in the international community for an increasingly disillusioned public.

The stakeout also provides Council members the opportunity to make public Council dynamics that would otherwise remain hidden. One example of this is the divisions among the P5 on Syria that have emerged via the stakeout in recent months: in March Russia, France and the UK used the stakeout to trade accusations that each side was overstating the case that chemical weapons had been used by either the government of Syria or opposition forces in that conflict. Making disagreements like these public provides opportunities for Council members to leverage international opinion on particularly divisive issues (see our April Forecast Middle East brief for a fuller description of this incident).

Looking closely at the media stakeout, it is clear that permanent members make greater use of the mechanism than elected members. Some non-Council members observe that though certain states can be outspoken on particular issues when campaigning for a Council seat, once elected they tend to become far more timid. Many elected members worry that making controversial statements at the media stakeout will lead to negative consequences in Council negotiations. Others note that the P5 have both more capacity and more experience when it comes to using the stakeout. The lack of live translation services at the stakeout may also inhibit participation.

A related issue is that though media stakeouts have declined, the Council’s use of press statements has increased. During renovations the Council adopted, on average, six press statements per month compared with four per month for the 33 months preceding renovations. One might expect the increase in press statements to artificially inflate the number of media stakeouts, as many are read to the press by the Council president at the stakeout. However, this has not been the case, as increasingly press statements are agreed outside regular Council operating hours and issued electronically via the web. Though some Council members question the utility of publicly reading press statements aloud, the opportunities such events provide for unscripted interactions with the press should not be underestimated.

While the increase in the use of press statements might signal that the Council has become more responsive in recent years—pronouncing on issues with more speed and frequency—in fact the combination of the rise in electronic press statements and the decline in media stakeouts indicates that the Council may be less accessible than ever. These trends suggest that the Council is increasingly shying away from active interaction with the press and the international community at large. At the end of its Council presidency in June—the first month back in the permanent Council chamber—the UK noted on Twitter that it had made 14 stakeout appearances during its tenure (remarkably more than the Council average). It remains to be seen whether other members of the Council, both permanent and elected, will continue to reverse the trend of recent years.
Syria
On 5 July, Australia and Luxembourg withdrew a draft press statement on the Syrian government’s siege of Homs after three days of negotiations that were not able to address the objections raised by Russia. On 16 July, the Council was briefed on the humanitarian situation in Syria by Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valérie Amos, High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres and Assistant Secretary-General Ivan Šimonović on behalf of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (S/PV.7000). All three underscored that the solution to the Syrian crisis was political and not military. Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey also participated. Amos said that humanitarian organisations had not been able to gain consistent and unimpeded access to the 6.8 million Syrians in need. She called for a mix of approaches to address the humanitarian crisis, including cross-border operations as appropriate. Guterres said there were nearly 1.8 million Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries with two-thirds of them having fled since the beginning of 2013, a rate not seen since the Rwandan genocide. Šimonović said that serious human rights violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity were now the rule in Syria with several reports of massacres by the government and affiliated militias. He called for the supply of weapons to both sides to stop and for the Council to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC. On 26 July, Council members met with the leadership of the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) in a closed Arria Formula session organised by the UK. The delegation included the head of the SNC, Ahmad Jarba, the representative to the US, Najib Ghadbian, as well as Burhan Ghalioun and Michel Kilo. The SNC delegation communicated its willingness to participate in peace talks with the Syrian government insofar as the outcome of Geneva I—the 30 June 2012 communiqué outlining a political transition—was the basis for Geneva II. Separately, Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, the head of the Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry on Syria, addressed the General Assembly on 29 July.

South Sudan
On 8 July, the Council held a briefing and consultations on the most recent report on UNMISS (S/2013/366). Hilde Johnson, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNMISS, provided the briefing (S/PV.6993). On 11 July, the Council adopted resolution 2109, extending the mandate of UNMISS until 15 July 2014.

UNOWA (West Africa)
On 10 July, the Council received a briefing (S/PV.6995) from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and head of UNOWA, Said Djinnit, on the most recent UNOWA report (S/2013/384). In his remarks Djinnit updated the Council on UNOWA’s work in the region, especially assisting the UN mission in Mali and seeking a timetable for elections in Guinea. Additionally, Djinnit touched on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, terrorism, and progress on boundary demarcation between Cameroon and Nigeria.

DRC
On 11 July, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous briefed the Council on the latest MONUSCO report (S/2013/388). On 19 July, the Group of Experts assisting the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee officially presented their interim report to the Committee (S/2013/433). The chair of the 1533 Committee, Ambassador Aghsin Mehdiyev (Azerbaijan), briefed Council members in 22 July consultations on the Committee’s activities. On 25 July, US Secretary of State John Kerry presided over a debate on the Great Lakes and the DRC (S/PV.7011 and Resumption 1). The Secretary-General, Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region Mary Robinson and World Bank President Jim Yong Kim (via video-teleconference) briefed the Council. Robinson’s briefing focused on her recent report on the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC (S/2013/387). The US circulated a concept note prior to the debate to guide discussion (S/2013/394). In addition to the DRC, representatives of Belgium, Burundi, Congo, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, the AU and the EU also participated. During the debate, the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2013/11) calling on the DRC and the countries of the region to implement promptly, fully and in good faith, their respective commitments under the Framework agreement. The Council also called on all countries of the region not to tolerate or provide assistance or support of any kind to armed groups.

Sudan/Darfur
On 14 July, Council members issued a press statement condemning the 13 July attack on UNAMID that resulted in the death of seven Tanzanian peacekeepers (SC/11060). On 24 July, the Council held a briefing (S/PV.7010) and consultations on UNAMID. The AU-UN Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator Mohamed Ibn’ Chambas briefed Council members on the latest Secretary-General’s report on UNAMID (S/2013/420). On 30 July, the Council adopted resolution 2113 extending the mandate of the mission for an additional year.

Cyprus
On 15 July the Council received a briefing in consultations from Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) Lisa Buttenheim on the most recent report of the Secretary General on UNFICYP (S/2013/392). Speaking at the media stakeout following the meeting, Security Council President Rosemary DiCarlo related that Buttenheim had discussed UNFICYP’s efforts to maintain stability, to address humanitarian issues, and to encourage bi-communal contacts. According to DiCarlo, Buttenheim also emphasized the need for opposing sides to desist from challenging UNFICYP’s authority inside the buffer zone. On 30 July the Council adopted resolution 2114, extending the mandate of UNFICYP for six months. Azerbaijan and Pakistan abstained from voting on the resolution.

UNRCCA (Central Asia)
On 15 July, Council members received the semi-annual briefing in consultations by Special Representative and head of UNRCCA Miroslav Jencá. Council members issued a press statement reaffirming “the importance of the use of preventive diplomacy and early warning mechanisms by the United Nations to assist in the peaceful settlement of disputes” (SC/11061). They also stressed the importance of regional cooperation between the Central Asian States, UNRCCA and regional organisations.
**Iran**
On 15 July, Ambassador Gary Quinlan (Australia), the chair of the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee, presented the 90-day briefing on the Committee’s work to the Security Council (S/PV.6999). He reported that members were still divided over whether recent ballistic missile launches, the so-called “Great Prophet” exercises, were in violation of resolution 1929.

**Iraq**
The Council received its final briefing from Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq Martin Kobler on 16 July (S/PV.7002). In the briefing, Kobler detailed many of the findings of the most recent UNAMI report (S/2013/408) and emphasised four key issues for the future of Iraq: the full implementation of the constitution; the equitable distribution of the country’s resources; the protection of Iraq’s environment; and the importance of providing opportunities to Iraq’s women and youth. Kobler concluded his service as Special Representative on 22 July, and at press time no replacement had been announced. On 24 July, the Council adopted resolution 2110, extending the mandate of UNAMI until 31 July 2014.

**Sahel**
On 16 July, the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2013/10) on the Sahel, following its discussion on the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel presented to the Council in June (S/2013/354). The presidential statement reaffirmed the Council’s concern about the alarming situation in the region as well as the complex security and political challenges interlinked with humanitarian and developmental issues. It also welcomed the efforts of the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Sahel to develop the Strategy, highlighted the need for a coordinated approach by all concerned UN entities in its implementation and stressed the importance of regional and interregional cooperation to address the threat of terrorism. The Council requested the Secretary-General to keep it informed of the progress in implementing the strategy no later than 31 December 2013, and to present a written report no later than 30 June 2014 (S/PV.7001).

**Côte d’Ivoire**
On 18 July, the Council was briefed by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous (S/PV.7004) on the most recent UNOCI report (S/2013/377) followed by consultations. Ambassador Youssoufou Bamba (Côte d’Ivoire) also participated. The briefing focused on the areas of security sector reform; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; justice and reconciliation; and the security situation. On 30 July, the Council adopted resolution 2112 renewing the mandate of UNOCI until 30 June 2014. The resolution mandated the reduction of the mission’s military component by 30 June 2014 and expressed the Council’s intention to consider a further reduction by 30 June 2015. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to refine the broad benchmarks presented in his latest report to include detailed and actionable objectives to measure progress as well as a detailed report reflecting the current division of labour between UNOCI and the UN country team.

**Burundi**
On 22 July, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of BNUB, Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, and the head of the Peacebuilding Commission’s Burundi configuration, Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland), briefed the Council (S/PV.7006). Ambassador Herménégilde Niyonzima (Burundi) also participated. The briefings were followed by consultations.

**Israel/Palestine**
On 23 July, the Council was briefed by Special Coordinator Robert Serry prior to its quarterly open debate on the Middle East (S/PV.7007). Serry focused his comments on US diplomatic efforts toward the resumption of direct talks between Israel and Palestine which have been largely suspended since 2008 with the exception of brief talks in late 2010. He also underscored that the humanitarian and security situation in Gaza should not be forgotten, particularly in the wake of the current transformations in Egypt. Serry also briefly addressed developments in Syria, Lebanon, the Golan Heights and Egypt.

**Somalia**
On 24 July, the Council adopted resolution 2111 reauthorising the mandate of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group until 25 November 2014 (S/PV.7009). Resolution 2111 also renewed the humanitarian exemption in Somalia until 25 October 2014, reminded the Government of Somalia regarding its reporting obligations for arms imports, added UNSOM and the EU Training Mission in Somalia to the list of entities exempted from the arms embargo, expressed concern about continued violations of the charcoal export ban, and covered issues of mismanagement of public finances and corruption. Previously, Ambassador Kim Sook (Republic of Korea), chair of the 751/1907 Somalia and Eritrea Sanctions Committee, addressed Council members in consultations on 18 July. The Monitoring Group’s report on Somalia (S/2013/413) and the report of the Emergency Relief Coordinator (S/2013/415) were transmitted to the Council on 12 July, while the Monitoring Group’s report on Eritrea (S/2013/440) was not transmitted to the Council until 24 July (after an objection by Russia had delayed its publication). Council members also received the latest AMISOM report (S/2013/371) on 21 June, though it was not discussed in any of the Somalia-related meetings in June. The Council issued a press statement on 29 July condemning the suicide car bomb attack against the Turkish embassy in Mogadishu (SC/11080).
Cooperation with Regional and Subregional Organisations

Expected Council Action
In August, the Council will hold a high-level open debate on cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security. President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina will preside over the meeting, and several other Council members may attend at high-level.

The Secretary-General will brief the Council, as will representatives of the AU, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, the League of Arab States and the Union of South American Nations.

A presidential statement is a likely outcome.

Background
The UN Charter establishes the Security Council as the principal organ charged with the maintenance of international peace and security while forseeing a role for “regional arrangements”, especially in regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes. In Chapter VIII, the Charter encourages regional organisations to contribute towards the maintenance of peace and security as such efforts are subordinate to the UN. The Security Council is encouraged to utilise regional arrangements, but the regional arrangements may take enforcement action only under the authorisation of the Security Council.

In addition, Article 54 provides that the Security Council should “at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation” by regional organisations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The relationship with regional organisations is featured in three important reports by the Secretary-General that largely laid down the strategic vision of the organisation.

In his June 1992 report An Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General highlighted the role that regional organisations could play in preventive diplomacy, early warning systems, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding.

This led to a growing focus on the idea of a regional-global security partnership.

In Supplement to an Agenda for Peace in 1995, the Secretary-General outlined modes of cooperation between the UN and regional organisations. These are: consultation; diplomatic support; operational support; co-deployment; and joint operations.

In March 2005 the Secretary-General issued the report In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, which discussed the “establishment of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities” to allow the UN to work with regional organisations in predictable and reliable partnerships.

In initiating the upcoming open debate, Argentina seeks to consider the role of regional and subregional organisations and their experiences in conflict prevention, peaceful settlement of disputes, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding worldwide. It also wants to discuss the strengthening of cooperation with regional organisations on thematic issues, such as women, peace and security, children and armed conflict, counterterrorism and the rule of law and observance of international humanitarian law and human rights and is further interested in sharing the perspective of Latin American states and the region’s organisations.

Furthermore, Argentina’s goal is to consider cooperation in light of the proliferation of regional and subregional arrangements, all with differing structures, mandates and capacities, and how the Council can effectively interact and cooperate with more regional arrangements than it already does. Another issue Argentina wishes to highlight is that nearly 20 years have passed since the Secretary-General’s Supplement to an Agenda for Peace and whether new approaches should be explored.

Council Developments
Since 2003, the Council has held five debates on strengthening the relationship between the UN and regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security. The most recent was on 13 January 2010, on the initiative of China (S/PV.6257), at which the Council adopted a presidential statement that underscored the importance of developing effective partnerships with regional organisations and the need for cooperation with such organisations for the effective implementation of its resolutions (S/PRST/2010/1). It also conveyed the Council’s intent to consider further steps to enhance cooperation in the fields of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, while reiterating its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The Council has maintained relations with regional organisations through several means and formats. Regional organisations, such as the EU and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, regularly brief the Council.

Of these relationships, the most developed to date is the one with the AU. In April 1998 the Secretary-General issued a report on peace and security in Africa containing recommendations for peacekeeping operations and supporting regional and subregional initiatives. An ad hoc working group was established by the Council to review the report’s recommendations, the work of which led to a number of resolutions and presidential statements addressing the role of regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Since 2007, members of the Council have held an annual meeting with its AU counterpart, the Peace and Security Council (PSC), alternating between their respective headquarters. The last such meeting was held on 13 June 2012 in New York, at the end of which a communiqué was issued in which the participants agreed to elaborate further ways of strengthening relations between the two Councils, including through more effective annual consultative meetings and the holding of timely
consultations and collaborative field missions to formulate cohesive positions and strategies in dealing with conflict situations in Africa. It was further agreed that the next meeting would take place no later than July 2013 in Addis Ababa, but this has yet to happen.

The Council has also held several debates focused on collaboration with the AU, the last of which took place on 12 January 2012 (S/PV.6702). The summit-level debate was chaired by President Jacob Zuma of South Africa and resulted in the adoption of resolution 2033. The resolution reiterated the importance of establishing a more effective relationship between the Council and the PSC and called for elaboration of further ways of strengthening relations between the two Councils.

Key Issues
The key issue is to examine the full range of Security Council cooperation with regional organisations, and reflect the results in the expected presidential statement.

A further issue is addressing the Council’s relations with regional organisations of varying capacities and character, as has been increasingly the trend recently.

In what way can the Council build on and expand the language of the 2010 presidential statement is a related issue.

Options
The most likely option is the adoption of a presidential statement. In it, the Council may:
- recognise that regional and subregional organisations require a more accentuated approach from the Council in building bilateral relationships;
- stress that its cooperation with regional organisations should develop further; and
- emphasise the importance of the regional organisations promoting the upholding of the rule of law, international humanitarian law and human rights in the maintenance of peace and security.

Protection of Civilians

Expected Council Action
In August, the Security Council will hold an open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. The Secretary-General, High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay (by video-conference) and the International Committee of the Red Cross Director for International Law and Cooperation, Philip Spoerri, will brief the Council. The meeting will be chaired by Susana Ruiz Cerutti, the legal adviser to the foreign ministry of Argentina and member of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission (IHFFC). (The IHFFC is a permanent international body whose main purpose is to investigate allegations of grave breaches and serious violations of international humanitarian law, established under the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.)

No outcome is expected.

Key Recent Developments
The Council has discussed protection of civilians in open debates twice in 2013: on 12 February it held its semi-annual open debate on the issue (S/PV.6917 and Resolution 1), and on 17 July it held an open debate on the protection of journalists (S/PV.7003 and Resolution 1).

The February presidential statement was chaired by Foreign Minister Kim Sung-Hwan of the Republic of Korea and featured briefings by the Secretary-General, Pillay and Spoerri. More than 50 member states spoke in addition to Council members.

The Council adopted a presidential statement reconfirming its commitment to protection of civilians, focusing on the need to fight impunity for violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law; the humanitarian impact of conflict and implementation of peacekeeping protection mandates (S/PRST/2013/2). The statement expressed the Council’s particular concern about attacks on medical personnel and facilities; schools, teachers and other protected school personnel; and journalists and other media professionals. It also recognised the role of the ICC, ad hoc international criminal tribunals and mixed tribunals in ensuring accountability and expressed its commitment to effectively follow up on Council decisions in this regard.

The February presidential statement asked the Secretary-General to submit his next report on the protection of civilians by 15 November and include an assessment of concrete measures taken by peacekeeping missions to implement their mandate to protect civilians. According to the concept paper, one of the goals of the August open debate

Council Dynamics
Council members are generally supportive of the initiative to hold the open debate as three years have passed since the Council last discussed its relationship with regional organisations.

While Council members do not oppose adopting a presidential statement, including elements that go beyond the presidential statement of 12 January 2010 may prove more difficult. During the negotiations over the draft statement that have taken place thus far, some Council members expressed the view that the statement should be as general and concise as the January 2010 statement. Council members also differ on some points of substance. For example, including language on cooperation with regional organisations and international courts—in particular the ICC—on issues relating to accountability for violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law, may prove to be a point of contention during negotiations.
is to contribute to discussion by the Council and the broader membership in light of the upcoming report.

During the 17 July open debate, Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson briefed the Council on UN activities related to the protection of journalists. Four prominent journalists—Richard Engel (NBC), Kathleen Carroll (Associated Press/Committee to Protect Journalists), Mustafa Haji Abdinur (AFP) and Ghaith Abdul-Ahad (The Guardian)—spoke about their personal experiences as journalists in conflict situations. In addition to Council members, 29 member states participated in the debate.

Two other recent Council debates, touched upon protection issues. On 17 June, the Council held a debate on children and armed conflict (S/PV.6980), with Special Representative Leila Zerrougui briefing on the Secretary-General’s annual report on the issue (S/2013/245). Other briefers included Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous, Associate Vice-President of Save the Children Gregory Ramm and UN Children’s Fund Deputy Executive Director Yoka Brandt. (Unlike in previous years, the June debate was not open to the membership at large.) During the debate, the Council adopted a presidential statement stressing its commitment to deal with persistent perpetrators and its readiness to adopt targeted measures against them (S/PRST/2013/8). The presidential statement also highlighted the contribution of the ICC in the fight against impunity, encouraged the continuing inclusion of child protection into the policies and programmes of pertinent regional organisations and the importance of engaging armed forces and armed groups on child protection concerns during peace talks.

On 24 June, an open debate on women, peace and security was held (S/PV.6984). Briefing the Council were the Secretary-General; the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict, Zainab Hawa Bangura; Jane Awywar, on behalf of the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice; and actress Angelina Jolie, as Special Envoy of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Forty member states participated in addition to Council members. The Council adopted resolution 2106, which focused on accountability for perpetrators of sexual violence in conflict and stressed women’s political and economic empowerment as central to the long-term prevention of sexual violence. There was also a 17 April open debate (S/PV.6948) on the Secretary-General’s annual report on sexual violence in conflict (S/2013/149).

The Council’s informal expert group on protection of civilians continued to meet regularly. Most recently, it met to consider the mandates of the following missions prior to their renewal:
- UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (June);
- UN Mission in South Sudan (June);
- UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (July);
- AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (July); and
- UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (July).

Outside the Council, Norway, in cooperation with Argentina, Austria, Indonesia and Uganda hosted the Global Conference on Reclaiming the Protection of Civilians under International Humanitarian Law (the “Oslo conference”) on 23-24 May. Building on a series of four workshops held since 2010 aiming to strengthen protection of civilians under international humanitarian law, the conference had roughly 300 participants, including representatives from 94 states.

Key Issues
Reflecting several of the recommendations of the Oslo conference, the Argentinian concept note circulated for the upcoming open debate focuses on three of the five core challenges identified by the Secretary-General pertaining to protection issues:
- enhancing compliance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, highlighting states’ obligations to comply with international humanitarian law and ensure compliance by others, particularly by engaging with non-state armed groups;
- ensuring humanitarian access to affected populations, stressing that parties to an armed conflict shall take all necessary measures to ensure rapid and unimpeded access by humanitarian actors; and
- strengthening accountability for serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. In this context, the concept note highlights the role of commissions of inquiry, in particular as the February presidential statement stated that the Council would consider the possibility of making use of the IHFFC in the future and stressed the Council’s commitment to follow up on its decisions regarding cooperation with international and mixed criminal courts and tribunals, including the ICC. The concept note recalls the recommendations of the joint workshop organised by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Portugal on 1 November 2012 on the Council’s role in enhancing accountability.

A continuing issue for the Council is the importance of consolidating and ensuring implementation of the existing normative framework on protection of civilians in country-specific situations.

Another issue is fulfilling commitments made in previous Council statements—as in the February presidential statement—regarding accountability for violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including by consistently ensuring compliance with the Council’s own decisions on cooperation with international justice mechanisms.

Options
One option for the Council is to issue a press statement or for the Council President to make an extensive oral statement to the press, reiterating its commitment to protection of civilians and making advances on the five core challenges.

Another option is for member states to use this platform to further consider the role of the Council in enhancing individual accountability and its cooperation with justice mechanisms, such as the ICC.

Council Dynamics
As this thematic issue is expected to be discussed again this year, when the Secretary-General submits his next report in November, Argentina chose not to pursue an outcome for this event. Several Council members see the debate as an opportunity to raise awareness about particular protection aspects and keep up the momentum created by the debates to date in 2013 on an issue that is normally discussed only twice a year.

The difficult negotiations on the February presidential statement highlighted the usual divisions between Council members.
over how proactive the Council should be regarding protection issues (see our What's in Blue story of 11 February). However, the decision not to pursue an outcome may have eased tensions around the upcoming open debate. Only one permanent member has expressed its dissatisfaction with the fact that the Council will discuss protection of civilians in August after discussing the protection of journalists in July and the expected debate on the issue later this year.

Sudan and South Sudan

Expected Council Action
In August, the Security Council expects to hold two meetings, likely in consultations, on compliance by Sudan, South Sudan, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) with resolution 2046. The Council also expects to discuss in consultations the most recent report of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), whose mandate expires on 30 November. Ambassador María Cristina Perceval (Argentina), chair of the Sudan 1591 Sanctions Committee, will also provide the quarterly briefing on the Committee’s work to Council members in consultations.

At press time, no Council outcome on these issues was anticipated.

Key Recent Developments
Relations between Sudan and South Sudan have remained tense. From 30 June to 2 July, then Vice-President Riek Machar of South Sudan met with President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan and other high-level officials in Khartoum in an effort to ease bilateral tensions. Sudan and South Sudan issued a joint statement at the conclusion of the meetings in which they agreed to promote peace and stability between them (S/2013/391). In spite of this diplomatic activity, Sudan continued to reiterate for several weeks its threat to shut down the flow of oil from South Sudan no later than 60 days after 9 June, accusing South Sudan of supporting rebels in Sudan.

However, on 26 July, Sudan announced that it would delay its closure of pipelines an additional two weeks until 22 August. (This decision followed meetings that President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan held on 25 July with Thabo Mbeki, Chair of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel, and Foreign Minister Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus of Ethiopia, as well as with Zhong Jianhua, China’s Special Representative on African Affairs.)

On 3 July, South Sudan claimed that Sudan had conducted an aerial bombardment the day before on its territory in the town of Jau, Unity State, injuring at least six people. South Sudan also alleged that the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) conducted a second attack on Jau, but it did not provide precise casualty figures. It further claimed that the SAF crossed the border into Upper Nile State, injuring four civilians and four South Sudanese troops.

Sudan postponed its participation in the meeting of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM)—the instrument employed by Sudan and South Sudan to discuss security matters of mutual concern—that had been scheduled for 22 July in Addis Ababa, claiming that the agenda for the meeting was not clear and that some action points had yet to be finalised. (It appears that this meeting was intended to focus on issues related to border monitoring between Sudan and South Sudan and mutual accusations of support for rebel groups operating in each other’s territory.)

On 22 July, the AU issued a press release that built upon two proposals made last month by Mbeki. First, the press release stated that the AU Commission and Ethiopia, as chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, had initiated a six-week investigation to research the mutual allegations of “continued support to and harbouing of armed groups operating against the other state”. Second, according to the press release, the AU Border Programme had been assigned to determine the centre line of the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone (SDBZ) between Sudan and South Sudan, although a time frame for completing this task was not specified.

The political and security situation in both Sudan and South Sudan has been volatile. On 24 July, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebel group launched an assault on the SAF near the town of Jebel al-Dayer in North Kordofan state, marking the second time since April that the JEM has struck in this state. Sudan claimed that five SAF soldiers died in the attack and that the rebels absorbed heavy casualties. Fighting also continued in Darfur, where seven UN peacekeepers were killed and 17 were wounded on 13 July. The security situation in Jonglei State, South Sudan, remained perilous, where violence broke out in early July between the Lou-Nuer and Murle groups. The International Committee of the Red Cross reported on 17 July that the fighting had “resulted in hundreds of severe casualties”.

The Government of Sudan prevented the opposition National Consensus Forces from attending a meeting in Geneva arranged by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue from 15-17 July with the Sudan Revolutionary Front—the umbrella rebel group that includes the JEM, the SPLM-N, the Sudan Liberation Movement-Minni Minnawi and the Sudan Liberation Movement-Abdul Wahid. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, quoted in The Sudan Tribune, said that the meeting was designed to “search for a peaceful resolution to Sudan’s conflict, particularly the building of a national dialogue process”.

Meanwhile, in South Sudan, President Salva Kiir dissolved the government on 23 July, dismissing Vice-President Machar as well as all ministers and deputy ministers, apparently due to a power struggle within the ruling party.
Sudan and South Sudan (con’t)

Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous briefed Council members on Sudan/South Sudan issues on 11 July. He told Council members that UNISFA’s aerial reconnaissance as part of the Joint Border Verification Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM), which was stopped after the JBVMM headquarters was shelled on 14 June, remained suspended for security reasons. He also noted that the additional troops that the Council authorised to provide protection to monitors and support staff of the JBVMM had yet to be deployed. (JBVMM monitors and support staff will assume their responsibilities when force protection is provided to them.) Moreover, according to Ladsous, there had been no progress by the parties in establishing the temporary administrative bodies—i.e., the Abyei Area Administration, the Abyei Legislative Council and the Abyei Police Service—in the disputed Abyei region straddling Sudan and South Sudan.

The Council again held consultations on Sudan/South Sudan matters on 24 July. Haile Menkerios, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan and South Sudan, briefed. He indicated that UNISFA had recommended some aerial reconnaissance along the Sudan-South Sudan border, while also reporting that forces from Sudan and South Sudan had recently been detected in the SDBZ along the Sudan-South Sudan border.

Key Issues
A key issue is what role the Council can play in getting Sudan and South Sudan back on track in fulfilling the Cooperation Agreements (on oil sharing, cross-border trade, security arrangements, nationality issues and other matters) that they signed in September 2012.

In this respect, a related issue is whether Sudan will wait until the AU Commission-Ethiopian investigation of allegations of support to rebel groups by the parties is completed before making a final determination on whether to prevent oil from South Sudan going through Sudan. (As mentioned earlier, Sudan has threatened to shut down the flow of oil from South Sudan by 22 August, but the investigation will only be completed by early September.)

An additional key issue is how internal challenges in Sudan and South Sudan impact the ability of both governments to focus constructively on improving their relations with one another.

Another important issue is when UNISFA can fully implement the JBVMM, given the instability in border areas. The additional UNISFA troops, authorised by the Security Council in resolution 2104 of 29 May to provide protection for monitors and support staff, have yet to be deployed. This is important as the monitors and support staff will not be stationed along the border until force protection is available.

A further important issue for the Council is what efforts have been taken to quell tensions between the Misseriya and Ngok-Dinka communities in Abyei in the aftermath of the death of the Ngok-Dinka paramount chief at the hands of the Misseriya in early May.

An ongoing key issue is the failure by the parties to set up the temporary administrative institutions in Abyei.

Another ongoing issue is the continuing stalemate regarding Council efforts to improve humanitarian access to South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.

Options
Related to UNISFA, options for the Council include:
• requesting a briefing from the UNISFA Force Commander on the current situation on the ground;
• holding an Arria formula meeting with high-level Ngok-Dinka and Misseriya leaders on how to promote reconciliation between the two groups; and
• adopting a statement reiterating the importance of establishing the temporary administrative institutions in Abyei.

On Sudan-South Sudan issues more generally, the Council may consider adopting a statement that:
• encourages the two parties to implement the Cooperation Agreements and discourages Sudan from shutting down the oil pipelines from South Sudan; and
• implores the parties to continue to engage in dialogue with one another and recognises recent efforts made in this regard (e.g., Machar’s visit to Sudan).

Another option would be to employ the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa as a mechanism to discuss strategies for easing tensions between Sudan and South Sudan.

Council Dynamics
There is a growing sense among some Council members that they need to find a more strategic approach to Sudan-South Sudan issues. It appears that the twice-monthly Council meetings will continue in August, although several members question the usefulness of their frequency. It seems that they believe that often not enough happens every two weeks to justify a meeting, and the Council becomes mired in non-essential details rather than seeing the big picture. There is tangible frustration among some members that the divisions within the Council on numerous Sudan-South Sudan issues have inhibited its effectiveness, making it difficult for the Council to be proactive on these issues.

During the UK presidency in June, there had been consideration of a potential ambassador-level meeting of all Council members to explore how the Council might adjust its approach to Sudan-South Sudan issues. However, it does not seem that this meeting took place, and it is unclear if and when such a discussion will be held.

There is widespread concern that relations between the two countries are once again deteriorating. Perhaps the most prevalent preoccupation among members at the current time is Sudan’s threat to shut down oil delivery from South Sudan, given how vital oil is to the economies of both countries, but particularly South Sudan.

The US is the penholder on UNISFA and other Sudan-South Sudan issues, while Argentina is the chair of Sudan 1591 Sanctions Committee.
As a consequence, UNIFIL had increased its presence in Lebanon. The statement also expressed concern about the spillover effects of the Syrian crisis on Lebanon's political, security and humanitarian situations (S/PRST/2013/9). The statement also expressed concern about cross-border fire from Syria into Lebanon, as well as incursions, abductions and arms-trafficking across the border. It called on all parties to recommit to Lebanon's policy of disassociation from the Syrian crisis and urged the swift formation of Prime Minister-designate Tammam Salam’s government and the resumption of efforts to hold parliamentary elections, which were postponed from June 2013 to November 2014.

Lebanon continued to experience violent incidents. On 9 July, a bomb exploded in a predominantly Shi’a neighborhood of Beirut, injuring 53 people. The Council issued a press statement the same day condemning the attack and calling for all Lebanese parties to refrain from involvement in the Syrian crisis (SC/11055). There were a number of cross-border incidents throughout July impacting the Bekaa Valley. Meanwhile, Israeli air strikes in Syria have sparked concerns that Hezbollah might retaliate, potentially drawing Lebanon further into a broader regional conflict. The most recent Israeli airstrike in Syria was on 5 July, targeting anti-ship cruise missiles. Similar airstrikes on weapons depots in Syria occurred on 30 January, 3 and 5 May. Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, Israel has reitered a neutral policy vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis, with a parallel policy to take action to stop any transfer of strategic weaponry through Syria to Hezbollah.

Regarding the political situation, there is a leadership vacuum due to an unresolved political stalemate, which began when Prime Minister Najib Mikati resigned on 22 March. He now heads a Hezbollah-led government in a caretaker capacity. This stalemate has also largely paralysed parliament, which failed to meet in July to vote on the extension of the LAF commander’s term because it lacked a quorum. (The commander’s term expires in September.)

The extension of the LAF commander's term is particularly contentious. Michel Aoun, the head of the Free Patriotic Movement—the largest bloc in the Hezbollah-led 8 March political coalition—has played a significant role in blocking the extension. Aoun’s calculation may be that if the current LAF commander is extended, versus being appointed by parliament, then the presidency may be similarly extended. A further factor is that Aoun has put forward the name of his son-in-law Shamel Roukoz as one of several candidates which should be considered for the post of LAF commander. In practice, if parliament were to appoint Roukoz, this would give Hezbollah an unprecedented influence over the LAF.

Media reports indicate that Roukoz heads the LAF regiment that led the late June operation against Ahmad al-Assir, a Salafi cleric opposed to Hezbollah. This confrontation resulted in the deaths of 18 LAF soldiers and 28 gunmen loyal to Assir.

The humanitarian situation has deteriorated sharply. In July 2012 the UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that there were approximately 34,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon. By late July 2013, that number had climbed to 653,329, representing a 19-fold increase over the course of one year. The Lebanese government estimates that the actual figure is 1.2 million Syrians in Lebanon. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos, who visited Lebanon on 1-2 July, said that such overwhelming numbers are taking their toll on the economy and the provision of basic services in Lebanon.

On 16 July, the Council held a briefing on the humanitarian situation in Syria (S/PV.7000). As a participant, Lebanon emphasised that it cannot cope by itself with the massive refugee influx and appealed to the international community for $1.7 billion in direct aid to fund the humanitarian response and provision of essential services.

On 23 July, Lebanon announced new admission restrictions on Syrians entering the country. Prior to this announcement, Lebanon, which hosts the largest Syrian refugee population, was the only host country...
keeping its borders open without any restrictions. Syrian refugees had already begun to encounter significant restrictions when trying to enter Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Turkey. 

On 22 July, the EU listed the military wing of Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation following its overt acknowledgement of its involvement in the Syrian crisis. However, the political wing of Hezbollah, which dominates the caretaker Mikati government, was not listed. This decision means in practice that the UN can maintain economic and political ties with Lebanon while individuals and organisations affiliated with the military wing of Hezbollah could be subject to EU sanctions. Analysts said this compromise was reached after many EU member states expressed hesitancy to sanction Hezbollah, arguing it could fuel further instability in Lebanon and possibly endanger troops from EU countries serving in UNIFIL. (The Gulf Cooperation Council took similar measures against Hezbollah on 10 June.)

Key Issues
The key issue is that the conflict in Syria, and more recently Hezbollah’s unambiguous involvement there on behalf of the regime, has negatively impacted Lebanon.

Ongoing issues include continued violations of resolution 1701, such as the Israeli occupation of areas north of the Blue Line and overflights in Lebanese airspace.

The fact that Hezbollah maintains a significant military capacity beyond the control of the LAF remains a key issue.

Underlying Problems
Lebanon’s official policy is one of disassociation from the Syrian crisis. However, Hezbollah’s overt involvement in Syria on behalf of the regime, sectarian violence, and the burgeoning refugee situation throughout the country provide evidence of the pressures such a policy must withstand. Achieving a formal ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon is impossible so long as the Syrian conflict continues to both destabilise Lebanon and derail the Israel-Syria peace track.

Options
The most likely option for the Council is to simply renew the UNIFIL mandate as it currently stands for another year.

Council Dynamics
There is consensus on the Council that UNIFIL contributes to stability between Israel and Lebanon, which is even more crucial given the current regional political and security climate. The 10 July presidential statement also demonstrated the Council’s agreement on the importance of preserving Lebanon’s sovereignty, national unity, territorial integrity and political independence.

However, there remain strong divisions, particularly between the P5 members, on how to characterise the Syrian conflict’s impact on Lebanon. These divisions were apparent during the negotiations of the 10 July presidential statement where there were several controversial elements that were not specifically referenced in the final text, including Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian conflict, the Syrian government’s role in cross-border attacks and Israeli airstrikes on Syrian weapons depots.

France is the penholder on Lebanon in the Council.

Kosovo

Expected Council Action
In August, Farid Zarif, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), is scheduled to brief the Council during a quarterly debate. Zarif will update the Council on the Secretary-General’s report of 26 July (S/2013/444) and other recent developments. No outcome is expected by the Council.

(Recently, the reporting and briefing cycles for Kosovo have diverged, with the last two quarterly debates each occurring six weeks after the release of the Secretary-General’s report. This may have been due in part to the difficulty of arranging a mutually workable date for the high-level participation of both Serbia and Kosovo.)

Key Recent Developments
The Council last considered Kosovo at the quarterly debate on 14 June (S/PV.6979). Zarif briefed the Council on the Secretary-General’s 30 April report (S/2013/254). Prime Minister Ivica Dačić of Serbia and Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi of Kosovo also addressed the Council. Zarif emphasised the progress made in political dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, particularly the “First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations”, reached on 19 April. Both Zarif and Dačić noted the recurring challenges posed by insecurity in northern Kosovo. Thaçi suggested the UN should consider withdrawal of UNMIK:

... it is our firm conviction that it is time for the Council to consider closing the United Nations Interim Administration

Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in the near future, which will contribute to the process under way in Kosovo, create space for local ownership, preserve the credibility of the United Nations and its role in the past in Kosovo, and ultimately reduce unnecessary financial costs, which could be used by United Nations agencies in Kosovo for more important socioeconomic development projects or in other crisis situations.

On 27 June, Kosovo’s parliament approved the EU-mediated agreement with Serbia that had been initialled by Dačić and Thaçi on 19 April. The 120-seat assembly passed the measure with 84 votes in favour, despite opposition by the hard-line Vështirësin e Përvjetshëm (Self-Determination) party, which argued that the pact granted ethnic Serbs in

UN DOCUMENTS ON KOSOVO
Security Council Resolution S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) authorised NATO to secure and enforce the withdrawal of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces from Kosovo and established UNMIK. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2013/444 (26 July 2013) was the UNMIK report for the period from 23 April to 15 July. S/2013/254 (30 April 2013) was the UNMIK report for the period from 16 January to 22 April. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6979 (14 June 2013) was the most recent quarterly debate on Kosovo.

OTHER RELEVANT FACTS
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNMIK Farid Zarif (Afghanistan) UNMIK Size and Composition As of 31 May 2013: 16 uniformed, 131 international civilian, 209 local, 28 UN volunteers. Commander KFOR Major General Volker R. Halbauer (Germany) KFOR Size and Composition As of 12 June 2013: 4,985 troops from 31 countries. Head of EULEX Bernd Borchardt (Germany) EULEX Size and Composition Approximately 2,250 international and local staff.
northern Kosovo too much autonomy. Vetevendosje parliamentarians, who attempted to prevent the vote by force, were removed from the building by security. Meanwhile, hundreds of ethnic Albanians protesting ratification of the agreement outside the parliament building were forcibly dispersed by police in full riot gear using pepper spray. The police also arrested dozens of protesters.

On 28 June, the EU formally approved the initiation of membership talks with Serbia by January 2014 at the latest. The EU also approved the launching of negotiations for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo, which is the first step toward EU membership. Croatia became the second country from the former Yugoslavia (after Slovenia) to gain EU membership on 1 July. “We are at a historic moment for the Balkans and for Europe as a whole”, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy stated. “Not only are we welcoming Croatia as a new member state. We have also agreed to open accession negotiations with Serbia and taken a key step in our relations with Kosovo. These last two decisions are an immediate result of the courageous agreement Belgrade and Pristina reached last April.”

On 11 July, Kosovo’s parliament adopted a law granting amnesty for ethnic Serbs who had rebelled against Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia in 2008. The measure was approved with 90 votes in favour (a two-thirds majority of 80 votes was required for passage). The previous week, a draft amnesty law had failed to pass, with only 70 votes in favour. The principal revision that had been made to gain the needed level of support was the insertion of a clause stating that criminal offences resulting in bodily harm and murder would not be given amnesty. Passage of the amnesty law, which was backed by the EU, has been seen as an important element in implementing the 19 April agreement with Serbia.

The most recent report of the Secretary-General on UNMIK covers developments from 23 April to 15 July (S/2013/444). Highlights include: improving relations between Kosovo and Serbia, progress implementing the 19 April agreement, improved freedom of movement in northern Kosovo and a decline in incidents involving explosive devices affecting minority communities. Annex I of the Secretary-General’s report summarises the work of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). On 23 May, EULEX Police in coordination with Kosovo Police arrested seven persons, including the Kosovo Ambassador to Albania, on charges of war crimes committed at a Kosovo Liberation Army detention centre in the Drenica region during the 1999 conflict. On 24 May, a EULEX judge ordered house detention of the so-called “Drenica Group”. Three days later, war veterans associations held a protest with approximately 5,000 people. Meanwhile, a number of politicians, including the President of the Assembly, have accused EULEX of lacking impartiality and have called for an end to its mandate.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

On 19-20 June, High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay visited Kosovo. At the end of her visit, Pillay underlined the need for further cooperation between Pristina and Belgrade to find comprehensive solutions for those forcibly displaced in the 1990s. Pillay expressed concern regarding the proposed amnesty law and urged a stronger focus on human rights issues in future dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade. Pillay said that she had impressed upon the authorities the importance of remedying discriminatory practices. She expressed concern about one-sided justice and the lack of a strong protection system for victims and witnesses. She also underlined the need for authorities to investigate conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence and the importance of inclusive education for children.

**Key Issues**

The main concern of the Council continues to be the maintenance of stability in Kosovo. Recent protests by ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians suggest that this will likely be a recurring issue in the near future for Kosovo.

The Council will also likely be focused on how UNMIK can most usefully assist with implementation of the EU-mediated agreement, particularly the elections to be administered by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on 3 November.

**Options**

Given the importance of implementing the “First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations”, the Council could consider issuing either a press statement or a presidential statement expressing its support.

The Council may also wish to explore the suggestion made by Thaçi that the Council should consider the withdrawal of UNMIK from Kosovo.

If the Council determines that improving relations between Serbia and Kosovo indicate a trend of increasing stability, one option could be lengthening the reporting cycle from quarterly to semi-annually.

Alternatively, the Council could choose to take no action, as with several other previous quarterly briefings on UNMIK.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

Kosovo continues to be relatively low-profile for the Council, partly because of a long-standing stalemated between members (the US, the UK and France versus Russia), which has generally precluded action, and partly because other organisations (NATO, the EU and OSCE) have more prominent roles than the UN. The conspicuous silence of the Council in response to the “First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations” of 19 April may be a further indication of this chronic divide, as a press statement or presidential statement would have required consensus.

However, if the Council were to consider the request made by Thaçi to withdraw UNMIK, that could hypothetically alter the dynamics in a way conducive toward breaking the policymaking inertia. There have not yet been formal discussions on the subject, but extrapolating from Council members’ established positions regarding Kosovo and other related issues such as UN budgetary constraints suggests that this may be a proposal that members could coalesce around.

The lead country for Kosovo (and Bosnia and Herzegovina) rotates on a monthly basis among the Coordinating and Drafting Group, which currently includes core members France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and the US plus Luxembourg. There seems to be ambiguity regarding whether Australia (Western European and Others Group) and Azerbaijan (Eastern European Group) are members, which also has implications for which country will take the lead for Kosovo in August and then Bosnia and Herzegovina in November.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Expected Council Action

In August, the chair of the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg), is scheduled to brief Council members in consultations.

These quarterly briefings on the work of the Committee tend to be technical in nature, and no Council action is expected. The last such briefing was held on 16 May.

Key Recent Developments

After a series of aggressive steps taken by the DPRK, some positive signs were visible recently on reviving bilateral and multilateral talks. On 22 May, the DPRK sent a special envoy to China, Vice Marshal Choe Ryong-hae, in an apparent bid to mend the increasingly strained relations between the two countries. According to official media reports in China, Choe delivered a handwritten letter from DPRK leader Kim Jong-un to President Xi Jinping stating that the DPRK was willing “to make joint efforts with all interested parties to appropriately resolve related issues through multilateral dialogue and consultations like the six-party talks and maintain peace and stability on the peninsula”. These talks, stalled since 2009, involve the DPRK, the Republic of Korea (ROK), China, Japan, Russia and the US.

On 7 June, the DPRK restored an International Committee of the Red Cross hotline with the ROK. On 6 June the DPRK proposed to hold bilateral talks with the ROK—for the first time since 2008—on reopening the Kaesong industrial complex, a jointly operated industrial zone closed since April. The talks were called off, however, when the two sides were unable to agree on the diplomatic ranks of their delegations. Also in June, both countries sent envoys to China to further discuss the regional tensions and possible resumption of bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

On 16 June, the DPRK announced that it was ready to hold high-level talks with the US on relieving tensions and removing nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula. A spokesperson for the DPRK National Defence Commission said that the US could choose the time and place for such talks. The US responded by saying that it is open to negotiations but only if the DPRK is genuinely willing to comply with Council resolutions and accept eventual denuclearisation.

On 15 July, Panama detained a DPRK-flagged ship, the Chong Chon Gang, on its way through the Panama Canal from Cuba after weapons were discovered hidden in a cargo of sugar. While the DPRK demanded the ship’s immediate release, Cuba issued a statement in which it said that the ship was transporting 240 metric tons of obsolete Soviet defensive weapons, including two anti-aircraft missile complexes, nine missiles in parts and spares, two MiG-21 airplanes and 15 motors for such planes. All were to be repaired and returned to Cuba. According to Cuba, they were being repaired to “maintain our defensive capacity in order to preserve national sovereignty”. Resolution 1718 says that states “shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer” to DPRK of combat aircraft and missile systems.

Panama pressed criminal charges against the 35 crew members of the ship for endangering public security by illegally transporting war material and invited the UN to participate in further investigation. The Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 1718 Sanctions Committee is expected to travel to Panama and to report to the Committee on its findings in a few weeks. The latest PoE report was circulated to Council members in mid-May and published in June (S/2013/337). The report concludes that the DPRK is continuing to develop its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes but that the sanctions are having an impact and are causing significant slowdowns. In particular, the report notes that the financial sanctions measures appear to be effective.

The report lists a number of alleged sanctions violations committed by the DPRK, including a shipment of missile-related items bound for Syria, seized in May 2012. It also notes that the DPRK continues to violate sanctions banning the import of luxury goods. The report calls for four entities and 11 individuals to be added to the sanctions list. Other recommendations for the Committee include updating information on several existing listings and adding several items and materials to the sanctions regime, such as high-strength aluminium alloy.

The DPRK Sanctions Committee recently met twice to discuss the latest PoE report. On 31 May the PoE officially presented the report for the Committee’s preliminary discussion. On 1 July the Committee met again to discuss the recommendations contained in the report. It seems that two permanent members signalled that they will not support further listings at this time. Committee members also disagreed about possibly adding certain items and materials to the list of banned products. Consensus may yet be reachable on the recommendation pertaining to updating information on current listed individuals and entities. At press time, the Committee was scheduled to meet again on 31 July to further discuss the recommendations.

The Committee continues to work on the issuance of implementation assistance notices. A notice on guidelines for the implementation of measures regarding luxury goods was issued on 25 June by the Committee. Guidelines for national implementation reports were drafted and put under silence procedure, but a permanent member broke silence, claiming that the table of reporting is too lengthy. A notice on the supply, sale or transfer of items that contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programmes has yet to be discussed in the Committee.

The Secretary-General appointed the eighth and final member of the PoE—Neil Watts (South Africa), an expert on maritime transportation—on 21 June.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 30 May, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK expressed extreme concern about the well-being of nine North Korean defectors, mostly minors, who were reportedly arrested by Laos while crossing the Laos-China border and were subsequently sent back to China on 27 May. The rapporteur urged China not to repatriate the defectors, warning that they could face persecution or severe punishment in the DPRK. The High Commissioner for Human Rights said the following day that the group had been returned to the DPRK and urged the DPRK government to give independent actors access to them to verify their status. During a press conference in New York on 21 June, DPRK Ambassador Sin Son-ho described the group as boys and girls who had been abducted by ROK human-trafficking agents. (The defectors appeared on DPRK TV in late June and also claimed they had been abducted.)

In July, the commission of inquiry established

UN DOCUMENTS ON THE DPRK

Security Council Resolution S/RES/2094 (7 March 2013) tightened sanctions against the DPRK and extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts

Security Council Letters S/2013/369 (21 June 2013) was regarding the appointment of the eighth member of the Panel of Experts.

Sanctions Committee Documents S/2013/337 (7 June 2013) was the final Panel of Experts report to the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee.

Implementation Assistance Notice No. 3 (25 June 2013) was the Committee’s guidelines for the implementation of measures regarding luxury goods.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (con’t)

by the Human Rights Council in March (A/HRC/RES/22/13) to investigate human rights violations in the DPRK began its operations. It comprises Michael Kirby (Australia) and Sonja Biserko (Serbia), who were both appointed on 7 May.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is the DPRK’s continued flouting of all relevant resolutions. An important issue is the lack of progress in the six-party talks, despite recent seemingly positive signals from the DPRK.

At the Committee level, a key issue is the effective implementation of the sanctions regime, as well as accepting the PoE recommendations.

Options
One option is to discuss the latest alleged sanctions violation in Panama—in the Council or the Committee—pending the forthcoming report of the PoE and to follow up, possibly by issuing a statement or by requesting clarifications from Cuba and the DPRK.

Taking up some or all of the recommendations submitted by the PoE is another option for the Committee, including possibly making additional designations.

Council Dynamics
Council members view the recent political messages from Pyongyang—after a period of heightened tensions—as a positive sign. Therefore, it appears the key players are not eager to emphasise the importance of the seizure of the DPRK ship, in an attempt to continue to work towards resuming bilateral and multilateral talks with the DPRK.

After reaching consensus in March to take a more aggressive approach towards the DPRK’s defiance of Council sanctions, in particular its nuclear and missile testing, it seems that some Council members are not inclined to further tighten sanctions and apply more political pressure on the DPRK at this time.

The Sanctions Committee seems split in its response to the latest report by the PoE. While it is possible that the Committee will be able to reach a consensus on accepting some of the report’s recommendations, the current objection of some Council members to most recommendations—including new listings—may impair reaching a consensus on most of these.

The US is the penholder on the DPRK in the Council.

Haiti

Expected Council Action
In August, the Council will consider the Secretary-General’s semi-annual report on the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). A debate with a briefing by Sandra Honoré, the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of mission, is expected. At press time, no outcome was anticipated.

MINUSTAH’s mandate expires on 15 October.

Key Recent Developments
In his 8 March report, the Secretary-General defined the overall security situation in Haiti as relatively stable but marked by an increase in civil unrest and major crimes (S/2013/139). In recent months, economic and political issues have motivated demonstrations, some of which have turned violent. Some of the street protests reflected disillusionment with MINUSTAH, a sentiment also voiced in statements by political elites critical of the mission.

As of 30 June, there were still some 279,000 people displaced as a consequence of the 2010 earthquake living in 352 camps throughout the country, according to the International Organisation for Migration’s Displacement Tracking Matrix. The Matrix, covering the second quarter of 2013, showed the highest decrease in internally displaced persons in Haiti in the last year (some 33 sites were closed and over 41,000 people were relocated). The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has reported cases of extreme violence and very serious crimes against those who remain in camps, including violence associated with Haitian National Police (HNP) efforts to forcefully evict the displaced from the camps.

According to OCHA, by 21 July the number of cumulative cases of cholera stood at 667,122 and that the epidemic had killed 8,190 people. The Ministry of Public Health reported a 40 percent increase in new cases, from 3,357 in May to 4,713 in June. In his latest report, the Secretary-General explained that the increase in reported cases was due to the deterioration of cholera facilities, funding shortfalls to pay medical and sanitary staff and the closure of humanitarian facilities. The last wave of new cases also coincides with the advent of the rainy season in May. Heavy rains in June caused flooding in the Nord-Ouest and Centre regions, affecting 6,653 families.

In May, the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti gave a 60-day ultimatum to the UN to compensate individuals affected by the cholera outbreak, threatening to bring the UN before a national court. After the UN invoked in early July the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN to say that the claims of the victims regarding the cholera outbreak were not receivable, the Institute stated its intention to file lawsuits against the UN on behalf of more than 5,000 victims, asking for reparations. This threat comes as an independent panel of UN experts who authored a report on the cholera outbreak in May 2011, and who are no longer affiliated with the UN, published a second report revisiting its previous conclusions. The second report stated that “personnel associated with the Mirebalais MINUSTAH facility were the most likely source of

UN DOCUMENTS ON HAITI Security Council Resolution S/RES/2070 (12 October 2012) renewed the mandate of MINUSTAH. Security Council Press Statement SC/10901 (28 January 2013) called for the holding of elections by the end of 2013. Security Council Letters S/2013/312 (23 May 2013) and S/2013/311 (6 December 2012) was an exchange of letters regarding the appointment of Sandra Honoré as Special Representative and head of MINUSTAH. Secretary-General’s Report S/2013/139 (8 March 2013) was the latest Secretary-General’s report on Haiti. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6936 (20 March 2013) was the most recent debate on Haiti.

OTHER RELEVANT FACTS Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MINUSTAH Sandra Honoré (Trinidad and Tobago) Size and Composition of Mission Current strength as of 31 May: 8,809 total uniformed personnel, including 6,179 troops and 2,630 police (including formed units), 435 international civilian personnel, 1,323 local civilian staff and 194 UN Volunteers.
The plan includes a number of benchmarks MINUSTAH after the government agreed Council submitted a draft electoral law to President Michel Martelly. Civil society and human rights organisations have called for the draft law to be swiftly submitted to parliament and for the partial senate, municipal and local elections to be held before the end of 2013. (The elections had initially been due in November 2011.) After the sudden death on 13 July of the investigating judge probing alleged embezzlement by the presidential family, parliament decided to create a commission to investigate the death, adding to the difficult political climate between parliament and the executive.

The 8 March Secretary-General’s report included an annex with a conditions-based consolidation plan for MINUSTAH. The plan, elaborated in consultation with the UN country team and the government of Haiti, foresees focusing MINUSTAH’s work on a core set of mandated tasks between 2013 and 2016. The plan includes a number of benchmarks to serve as indicators of progress in the stabilisation process: development of HNP capacity; promotion of the rule of law and human rights protection; electoral capacity-building; and progress on key governance issues.

The plan foresees that focusing on these core objectives will allow for further reductions of uniformed and civilian strength. Furthermore, it points out that—assuming the security situation remains the same, the HNP is deployed throughout the country, its capacity is built and electoral logistical arrangements take place—the mission’s uniformed strength could be reduced by 30 percent ahead of the presidential elections in 2015. (Resolution 2070 of 12 October 2012 authorised a reduction by June of 1,070 military personnel—from 7,340 to 6,270—and of 640 police personnel—from 3,241 to 2,601—as previously recommended by the Secretary-General.)

On 15 July Honoré took office as head of MINUSTAH after the government agreed on her appointment. (A letter from the Secretary-General with the intention to appoint her was shared with Council members on 6 December 2012 but the appointment only took place in May.)

After failing to appear three times at a court hearing, former dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier appeared on 28 February in front of the Court of Appeal investigating allegations of corruption and human rights crimes committed during his rule, from 1971 to 1986. On 9 May, the Court finished hearing complainants, and it now has to determine what charges Duvalier will face.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

On 10 March during the 22nd session of the Human Rights Council, Michel Forst, the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Haiti, presented his report and an update based on his latest visit to the country from 2-9 March (A/HRC/22/65). Forst expressed concern about the nomination of magistrates for political reasons, threats against journalists thought to support the opposition, arbitrary arrests and detentions, the use of extended pre-trial detention and poor prison conditions. He said that as the security situation worsened, fear had returned and human rights violators were still enjoying impunity. Forst welcomed the appearance of Duvalier before the Court of Appeal as a victory for the rule of law. He recommended the High Commissioner for Human Rights open an office in Port-au-Prince to gradually replace the MINUSTAH human rights section in view of the mission’s future withdrawal. Forst also confirmed his resignation for personal reasons. The mandate of the independent expert on Haiti was extended for one year on 22 March (A/HRC/PRST/22/2) and on 14 June Gustavo Gallon (Colombia) was appointed as the new independent expert on Haiti.

**Key Issues**

A key issue for the Council will be the timing and priorities regarding the implementation of the MINUSTAH consolidation plan, in particular the drawdown of uniformed personnel and monitoring progress on the proposed benchmarks.

A related issue is the need to maintain progress in building the capacity (including human rights training) of the HNP and to reach the goal of increasing the number of officers to a minimum of 15,000 by 2016. Ensuring that the long overdue partial senate, municipal and local elections, now scheduled to be held before the end of 2013, actually take place and are free and fair will be an important issue for the Council in the upcoming months.

Another issue is the tension between the executive and legislative branches of the government, which is having a negative impact on MINUSTAH’s implementation of its mandate in relation to the promotion of the rule of law and the advancement of governance and human rights.

Ensuring the government’s constructive engagement with Honoré in spite of the delay in agreeing to her appointment is a related issue.

**Options**

With the renewal of MINUSTAH’s mandate coming up in October, the most likely option is for the Council to take no action at this stage.

A less likely option would be to adopt a presidential statement that could:

- welcome the conditions-based consolidation plan for MINUSTAH;
- emphasise the importance of holding elections and urge political leaders to avoid further delays;
- highlight the ongoing need to strengthen the capacity of the HNP;
- express concern about the impact of the cholera epidemic;
- emphasise the importance of ensuring accountability for serious human rights violations; and
- request more regular briefings from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on the situation in Haiti (in addition to the customary semi-annual briefings coinciding with the Secretary-General’s reports).

**Council Dynamics**

It seems Council members have high expectations of Honoré’s leadership in this critical period both for Haiti and for MINUSTAH.

With regard to MINUSTAH’s consolidation plan, Council members have differed over the timing of the drawdown. While some countries that prioritise budgetary reasons are pushing for advancing MINUSTAH’s withdrawal, troop- and police-contributing countries (some of which are currently Council members) have concerns about the pace of the process and the need to re-evaluate it based on the security and political situations on the ground instead of a pre-set time frame.

Council members have voiced concern in private about possible lawsuits against the UN in courts in Haiti, the US and Europe to seek reparations for cholera victims. However, this issue is not likely to be raised in the upcoming debate. The US is the penholder on Haiti.
Notable Dates for August

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**MANDATES EXPIRE**

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**OTHER IMPORTANT DATES**

- **6 August**
  - The Council will hold a high-level debate on cooperation between regional and subregional organisations, presided by President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina.

- **11 August**
  - The second round of presidential elections are expected to take place in Mali.

- **19 August**
  - The Council will hold an open debate on the protection of civilians.