Overview

The United States will preside over the Security Council in July.

A high-level debate on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Great Lakes region is expected, to be presided over by US Secretary of State John Kerry, with Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region Mary Robinson as briefers. Open debates are likely on:

- protection of journalists; and
- the Middle East, with a briefing by the Department of Political Affairs.

Briefings, followed by consultations, are likely on:

- the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) by its head and Special Representative of the Secretary-General Hilde Johnson;
- the UN Office for West Africa by its head and Special Representative of the Secretary-General Said Djinnit;
- the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations;
- the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), by the Joint Special Representative Mohamed ibn Chambas;
- developments in the Central African Republic (CAR) and the work of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the CAR, by the Secretariat;
- the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) by its outgoing head and Special Representative of the Secretary-General Martin Kobler; and
- developments in Burundi and the work the UN Office in Burundi by its head and Special Representative of the Secretary-General Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, and by Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland), the chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission. Briefings in consultations are likely on:

- the Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (which called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006), by Derek Plumbly, the Special Coordinator for Lebanon;
- the implementation of the Somalia and Eritrea sanctions by the chair of the 751/1907 Sanctions Committee Ambassador Kim Sook (Korea);
- the mid-term report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee by Ambassador Agshin Mehdiyev (Azerbaijan), the chair of the Committee;
- Sudan and South Sudan issues, twice, most likely by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan and South Sudan Haile Menkerios;
- the work of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, by its head and Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Miroslav Jenča; and
- developments in Cyprus and the work of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus by its head and Special Representative of the Secretary-General Lisa Buttenheim.

Formal sessions will need to be held to adopt resolutions to renew the mandates of:

- UNMISS;
- UNFICYP;
- UNOCI;
- UNAMID;
- UNAMI; and
- the Monitoring Group of the 751/1907 Sanctions Committee concerning Somalia and Eritrea.

Throughout the month, Council members will be following closely the developments in Mali and Syria and meetings on these issues may be scheduled.
The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the only international body with which members of the Security Council have regular interactions. They have been meeting annually since 2007, alternating between their respective headquarters. The practice—originally a joint UK-South African initiative—resulted from the realisation that since conflicts in Africa occupy the bulk of the Security Council’s time and resources, the need for various forms of conflict-prevention and -management had surpassed the capacity of the UN and that new approaches and burden-sharing were needed. The Security Council’s AU counterpart, the PSC, was an obvious candidate for a partnership that could work out ways in which to use the comparative advantages of the two organisations in addressing peace and security issues in Africa.

This relationship, however, has not always been entirely smooth and has experienced its share of tensions and frustrations. The first several meetings were largely focused on the process for the meetings themselves, and the key provisions of the resulting short communiqués in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 were that the relationship would continue and that within a year there would be another meeting in one of the headquarters. This changed with the consultative meeting held in Addis Ababa on 21 May 2011. The consultations were mostly focused on substantive issues, including Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Somalia and Sudan. The communiqué adopted at the end of the meeting contained detailed sections on each of those situations.

On 12 January 2012, South Africa organised an open debate on strengthening the relationship during its presidency of the Security Council. The summit-level debate was presided over by South African President Jacob Zuma and resulted in the adoption of resolution 2033. The resolution reiterated the importance of establishing a more effective relationship between the Security Council and the AU PSC and called for elaboration of “further ways of strengthening relations between the two Councils, including through achieving more effective annual consultative meetings, the holding of timely consultations and collaborative field missions of the two Councils”. It furthermore reflected the decision “to follow up on the Communiqués of the annual consultative meetings of the two Councils, including through its Ad-hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa”.

On 13 June 2012 at UN headquarters, Security Council members held their sixth annual consultative meeting with the PSC. Issues discussed included: Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan, developments in the Sahel region of Africa and the further strengthening of methods of work and cooperation between the two bodies. The closed informal meeting lasted three hours and, according to participants, was less contentious and more substantive than some of the previous consultations. A detailed communiqué (S/2012/444) from the meeting seemed to signal the consolidation of a shift toward a more substantive and less process-oriented phase in this relationship. The communiqué also expressed satisfaction with the progress made in the cooperation between the two Councils and the determination to improve the effectiveness of consultative meetings in the future. Participants, the communiqué said, “agreed to elaborate further ways of strengthening relations between the two Councils, including through more effective annual consultative meetings and the holding of timely consultations and collaborative field missions of the two Councils, as appropriate, to formulate cohesive positions and strategies on a case-by-case basis in dealing with conflict situations in Africa”.

In the period since the June 2012 meeting, the two Councils as well as some African subregional organisations, in particular the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), saw themselves engaged in a number of overlapping issues, including the Central African Republic, DRC, Somalia, Sudan, and, most notably, Mali. Not all of the above situations are examples of growing synergies. The process that led to the adoption on 25 April of resolution 2100 on Mali increased tensions between the Council and the AU and ECOWAS over some issues. Following the adoption of resolution 2100, a PSC communiqué noted “with concern that Africa was not appropriately consulted in the drafting and consultation process”. Several requests made by African stakeholders to address issues of concern to them were disregarded. These issues included authorising a peace enforcement mandate for the peacekeeping force established by the resolution, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA); providing a logistical and financial support package to the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) authorised by Council resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012; and ensuring the continuity of AFISMA’s leadership in MINUSMA.

The 2012 communiqué said in its final paragraph 35: “The next consultative meeting will be held at the headquarters of the African Union no later than July 2013”. At press time, however, no such meeting had been scheduled. The Security Council has not visited Africa in more than a year, the longest such gap since 2000. Earlier this year, plans to visit Addis Ababa and the Great Lakes region in February and then in May were aborted, largely due to scheduling problems. (Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, on the other hand, has undertaken three trips to Africa in 2013, including to Ethiopia on 26-28 January and 23-24 February as well as the DRC, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda and Uganda on 20-24 May.)

Over the years, one ongoing feature of the PSC-Security Council relationship has been that the annual meetings have been discrete events with last-minute preparations and little follow-up, rather than becoming part of a process leading to greater effectiveness in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa.

An option for the Security Council could have been to establish a timetable for the follow-up to, and implementation of, the understandings included in the 2012 communiqué and use its Ad-hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa as a tool for this work (as per the decision of resolution 2033). While this has not been done in the course of the last year, a more focused approach could take this issue forward in the second half of 2013.
Status Update since our June Forecast

Sahel
On 4 June, in the “horizon scanning” briefing to Council members in consultations, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Oscar Fernández-Taranco presented the three strategic goals of the UN integrated strategy for the Sahel prepared by Special Envoy Romano Prodi: inclusive governance, capacity building to address cross-border threats and resilience. On 26 June, Prodi briefed (S/PV.6988) the Council on the strategy which had been previously circulated as an annex to the Secretary-General’s report on the Sahel (S/2013/354).

Syria
On 4 June, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Oscar Fernández-Taranco briefed Council members at “horizon-scanning” consultations on the UN’s preparations for a possible peace conference between the Syrian government and opposition in Geneva. The Council issued a press statement on 7 June expressing grave concern about heavy fighting in Al-Qusayr, calling for unhindered humanitarian access and emphasising accountability (SC/11028). On 20 June, OCHA head Valerie Amos briefed Council members in consultations under “any other business” on the humanitarian situation in Syria. She reported that access had been denied or delayed for months and there had been an increasing use of siege tactics by the parties. She said that unless there is a genuine political solution to the crisis then the humanitarian situation would continue to deteriorate with increasing regional instability. She called on the Council to consider alternative forms of aid delivery, including cross-border operations. On 21 June, Council members met with Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro and Karen Abu Zayd of the Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry on Syria in a closed “Arria formula” format session organised by Australia. Pinheiro reported on the militarization of the conflict, warning that further arms shipments to Syria are likely to be used to commit serious violations of international law. He added that violations are being committed by all parties but that the scale and intensity were greater on the part of Syrian government forces and affiliated militias. Regarding the use of chemical weapons, he said the Commission could not establish the perpetrator, the chemical agent or the mode of delivery. Finally, he called for the Council to lead a diplomatic surge to find a political solution to the Syrian crisis.

Iran
On 5 June, the Council adopted resolution 2105 renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee until 9 July 2014. The Panel’s latest report was circulated on 5 June (S/2013/331). On 24 June, the Committee chair, Ambassador Gary Quinlan (Australia), held an open briefing to interested member states about the mandate and activities of the Committee. The 90-day briefing by the chair, initially scheduled for 13 June was postponed in the absence of agreement in the Committee on the text of the briefing. It seems Council members disagreed over whether to characterise the Great Prophet 7 exercises conducted from 2-4 July 2012, during which Iran launched ballistic missiles, as a violation of Council resolutions. At press time, the issue had not yet been resolved and a new date for the briefing had not been set. During consultations at ambassadorial level on 25 June, it was agreed that the Committee should make a last effort to come to an agreement, but that if no compromise had been found within ten days, the chair would present a report reflecting the divided views of Council members. It was also agreed that in the meantime, the Council president, the UK in June, would contact the Iranian permanent representative in New York to ask for a response to the letter which was sent by the Committee chair in April inviting Iran to express its views on the Panel of Experts’ conclusion that the Great Prophet exercise constituted a violation of the sanctions regime.

International Criminal Tribunals
On 10 June, the informal working group on international tribunals met with the presidents and prosecutors of the ICTY and ICTR who also briefed the Council on 12 June (S/PV.6977). On 12 June, the Council sent a letter to the Secretary-General (S/2013/349) asking him to invite states to submit nominations to the Council for the position of judge for the ICTY Appeals Chamber.

Afghanistan
The Council issued a press statement on 11 June condemning the terrorist attack on the same day near the Supreme Court in Kabul (SC/11030). On 20 June, the Council held its quarterly debate (S/PV.6983) on Afghanistan with Ján Kubis, the Special Representative and head of UNAMA briefing on the Secretary-General’s latest report (S/2013/350). He noted his concern that important legislation regarding the 2014 presidential and provincial council elections had not been adopted. He also informed the Council that there has been a 25 percent increase in civilian casualties in the conflict during the first half of this year as compared to the first half of 2012.

Yemen
On 11 June, the Council was briefed by Jamal Benomar, the Special Adviser on Yemen, mainly on the closure of the first plenary session of the National Dialogue Conference, as well as on the work of its working groups and consensus committee (S/PV.6976). The briefing was followed by consultations.

Liberia
On 13 June, Council members received a briefing in consultations from the chair of the 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Masood Khan (Pakistan), on the 23 May midterm report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia (S/2013/316).

Kosovo
On 14 June, the Council held a quarterly debate on Kosovo (S/PV.6979). Farid Zarif, Special Representative and head of UNMIK, briefed the Council on the Secretary-General’s latest report (S/2013/254). Prime Minister Ivica Dačić of Serbia and Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi of Kosovo also addressed the Council. Zarif emphasised the progress made in political dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, particularly the “First Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations” agreed on 19 April. Both Zarif and Dačić noted the recurring challenges posed by insecurity in northern Kosovo, while Thaçi suggested the UN should consider withdrawal of UNMIK in the near future in order to facilitate local ownership, preserve credibility and reduce expenses.

Children and Armed Conflict
On 17 June the Council held a debate on children and armed conflict (S/PV.6980) with Special Representative Leila Zerrougui briefing on the Secretary-General’s annual report on the issue (S/2013/245). Other briefers included
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous, Associate Vice-President of Save the Children Gregory Ramm and Deputy Executive Director of UNICEF Yoka Brandt. Canada spoke on behalf of the Friends of Children and Armed Conflict. During the debate the Council adopted a presidential statement expressing strong concern over the high number of repeat offenders that openly disregard Council resolutions and stressed its commitment to effectively deal with persistent perpetrators as well as its readiness to adopt targeted measures against them (S/PRST/2013/8). The presidential statement also underlined the importance of concrete time-bound action plans to prevent violations against children and called on parties to armed conflict listed in the annexes of the Secretary-General’s report to implement such action plans. It also highlighted the contribution of the ICC in the fight against impunity, encouraged the continuing mainstreaming of child protection into the policies and programmes of pertinent regional organisations and the importance of engaging armed forces and armed groups on child protection concerns during peace talks.

**Libya**

On 18 June, the Council received a briefing (S/PV.6981) in consultations by Tarek Mitri, the Special Representative and head of UNSMIL, and by the chair of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Eugène-Richard Gasana (Rwanda). In light of recent developments, Mitri touched upon the security situation in Libya, the impact of the recently approved political isolation law and the regional challenges the country is currently facing. Gasana informed the Council that Libya had decided to designate a focal point structure for military procurement as recommended in the latest report of the Panel of Experts assisting the Committee (S/2013/99). On 20 June, the Council issued a press statement expressing its concern about the recent acts of violence in Benghazi, as well as the continued arbitrary detentions without access to due process of thousands of persons held in illegal detention centres (SC/11042).

**Conflict Prevention and Natural Resources**

On 19 June, the Council held an open debate on conflict prevention and natural resources (S/PV.6982). A concept note by the UK was circulated on 6 June (S/2013/334). The Council was briefed by Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson, Chair of the Africa Progress Panel, Kofi Annan, World Bank Managing Director Caroline Anstey and UNDP Associate Administrator Rebeca Grynspan. In addition to Council members, 27 member states and the EU also participated. A presidential statement, which had been under negotiation for several days, could not be agreed by the Council, largely due to an objection by Russia that the subject matter was not within the purview of the Council.

**Women, Peace and Security**

On 24 June the Council adopted resolution 2106 focusing on accountability for perpetrators of sexual violence in conflict and stressing women’s political and economic empowerment as central to the long-term prevention of sexual violence. The resolution was adopted at a ministerial-level open debate presided by UK Foreign Secretary William Hague and following briefings by the Secretary-General and the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict. Jane Awywar, on behalf of the Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, and Angelina Jolie, as Special Envoy of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, also participated (S/PV.6984).

**Peacekeeping**

On 26 June, Council members received a briefing by peacekeeping head, Hervé Ladsous, and force commanders Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz (Brazil) of MONUSCO, Major General Leonard Muriuki Ngondi (Kenya) of UNMIL and Major General Muhammad Iqbal Asi (Pakistan) of UNOCI. The briefing focused on the use of advanced military technology in peacekeeping, the need for in-mission assessments of pre-deployment training and inter-mission cooperation (S/PV.6987).

**Golan Heights**

On 27 June the Council adopted resolution 2108 renewing UNDOF for six months after meeting with troop-contributing countries on 13 June and considering the Secretary-General’s latest report on the observer mission during 18 June consultations (S/2013/345). Earlier in the month, the Council issued a press statement on 6 June condemning clashes between the Syrian government and armed opposition in the area of separation between Israel and Syria (SC/11027). The next day, 7 June, Council members were briefed in consultations by DPKO following these clashes and Austria’s subsequent announcement that it would withdraw its troops from UNDOF.

**Wrap-Up Session**

On 27 June, the Council held a “wrap-up session” for June under the agenda item “Implementation of Note S/2010/507 (Wrap-up Session)”. Non-Council members were invited to attend the private meeting.

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**Democratic Republic of the Congo**

**Expected Council Action**

In July, the Security Council will hold a high-level debate on the DRC and the Great Lakes. US Secretary of State John Kerry is likely to preside and other ministers may attend.

A presidential statement is a possible outcome.

During the event, the Secretary-General will brief on his latest report on the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, Mary Robinson, will brief on her report on the establishment of benchmarks for the implementation of national and regional commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region (PSC Framework).

The 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee will receive a briefing from the Group of Experts (GoE) assisting the Committee on their interim report. The chair of the Committee, Ambassador Agshin Mehdiyev (Azerbaijan), will then brief Council members on the interim report in consultations.
MONUSCO’s mandate expires on 31 March 2014.

Key Recent Developments

The establishment of the intervention brigade in resolution 2098 and its implications for UN peacekeeping have created much discussion. On 22-23 April, the Secretary-General met with Council members during a retreat where the traditional boundaries of peacekeeping and alternatives were discussed with particular emphasis on the mandate of the intervention brigade. Council members received an overview from the UN Office of Legal Affairs of the possible ramifications of the intervention brigade to the protected status under international humanitarian law of UN peacekeepers. Some Council members expressed surprise that resolution 2098 might have such legal implications.

New developments in peacekeeping, including the intervention brigade, were also recently discussed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ (DPKO) senior management. It was noted that the brigade must have capabilities to operate in a volatile setting and the political will to use force when necessary to achieve its goals. It was also noted that the intervention brigade’s operations might cause retaliation against civilians and UN personnel. These may cause tension between the tasks of the brigade and MONUSCO’s protection of civilians mandate and could eventually make the Council reluctant to give its full support to the brigade. While noting the need for political will to engage, some in DPKO have outlined concerns over children at risk of being recruited by the M23 in North Kivu. Of particular concern was a group of 53 children in the Nyiragonso territory that were previously recruited by the M23 and escaped from the rebels, but are again being sought by the M23.

On 26 May, the first meeting of the regional oversight mechanism of the PSC Framework was held in Addis Ababa. The Chairperson of the AU Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Representatives of ten states and of the Southern African Development Community and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region also attended the meeting. A communiqué released at the end of the meeting welcomed the establishment of a technical support committee to define regional benchmarks, as requested by resolution 2098.

On 29 May, Council members were briefed in consultations by the Secretary-General on the Addis Ababa meeting and on his visit to the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda with Robinson and World Bank President Jim Yong Kim. The Secretary-General called for both states and private investors to help the region establish peace and long-term development.

Following the briefing, France initiated a press statement to express Council members’ support for the PSC Framework, the deployment of the intervention brigade, its condemnation of recent M23 attacks and its readiness to impose additional sanctions on M23 leadership and those that target UN peacekeepers.

Rwanda opposed the language of the statement because in its view it was overly focused on the M23, while ignoring recent attacks by the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the need to hold accountable human rights violators among the FDLR and the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). Bilateral negotiations between France and Rwanda failed to produce an agreement, and the press statement was not issued.

On 7 June, Robinson issued a statement welcoming the scheduled resumption of peace talks in Kampala between the DRC and the M23, mediated by Uganda. On 13 June, however, the M23 sent a letter to Robinson stating that the M23 government delegation told the mediator in Kampala that it refused to negotiate after talks ended in April, when the M23 broke off negotiations. At press time, negotiations have not resumed.

The GoE of the 1533 Sanctions Committee experienced difficulties in its work. Only four of the six experts were allowed into Rwanda during their visit in March. (Rwanda has stated in the Committee that it refuses to cooperate with two of the experts after their latest annual report [S/2012/843] accused Rwanda of providing support to the M23.)

The Secretary-General appointed Martin Kobler (Germany) on 10 June as his Special Representative for the DRC and head of MONUSCO. Kobler, currently the Special Representative for Iraq, will assume the position in August.


OTHER RELEVANT FACTS


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Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission Roger Meece (US) through July, Martin Kobler (Germany) as of August. MONUSCO Force Commander Lieutenant General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz (Brazil). MONUSCO Size, Composition and Cost of Mission Strength as of 31 May 2013: 19,192 troops, 516 military observers, 1,416 police, 1,001 international civilian personnel, 2,959 local civilian staff and 582 UN volunteers. Approved budget (1 July 2012-30 June 2013): $1.3 billion. Mission Duration 30 November 1999 to present; mandate expires on 31 March 2014.
Democratic Republic of the Congo (con’t)

Human Rights-Related Developments
In May, the UN Joint Human Rights Office (comprising the Human Rights Division of MONUSCO and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in the DRC) published a report on human rights violations perpetrated by FARDC soldiers and combatants of the M23 from 15 November to 2 December 2012 in Goma and Sake, North Kivu province, and in Minova, South Kivu province. Among the most serious human rights violations, the report documented 135 cases of sexual violence perpetrated by FARDC troops and 59 cases of sexual violence perpetrated by the M23. (Twelve senior army officers have since been suspended in relation to investigations into these incidents.)

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is to ensure the implementation of resolution 2098 and the fulfilment of the commitments made by the parties in the PSC Framework.

Another issue is to oversee the deployment of the intervention brigade and to stay abreast of any collateral effects its exceptional enforcement mandate may have on the peacekeeping mandate of MONUSCO.

Regarding the DRC sanctions, a key issue is ensuring states’ cooperation with the sanctions regime and the GoE.

Protection of Journalists

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council is scheduled to hold an open debate on the protection of journalists featuring briefings by representatives of the media. At press time, a concept note was expected to be circulated shortly, but it was unclear whether there would be an outcome. This will be the first time the Council considers this issue in a separate meeting since the adoption of resolution 1738 on the protection of journalists on 23 December 2006.

Background
Resolution 1738 was adopted at the initiative of France and Greece (an elected Council member at the time) to remind parties to include as a sub-item in his next reports on the protection of civilians the issue of the safety and security of journalists.

To protect the Secretary-General’s subsequent report on the protection of civilians (S/2007/643) of 28 October 2007, contained a separate section on the protection of journalists, expressing concern about the increasing number of journalists killed or injured while reporting from conflict situations. Also, when the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 2008 updated the Aide-Mémoire on the protection of civilians that had been endorsed by the Council in 2001 to facilitate consideration of protection-of-civilians concerns in country-specific situations, it added the protection of journalists and the use of speech to incite violence among the concerns the Council should consider.

The Council could issue a presidential or press statement supporting the PSC Framework, Robinson’s efforts and the new benchmarks, the operations of the intervention brigade, calling on the countries in the region to fulfil their obligations and reiterating its willingness to take further measures, including under Article 41 of the Charter, if commitments are not met.

Another option would be a visit to the DRC, as was done every year between 2000 and 2010, in order to show support for the implementation of the PSC Framework and the resolve to hold the parties to their commitments.

Council Dynamics
It seems that previous concerns raised by the troop-contributing countries on the Council (China, Guatemala, Morocco and Pakistan) about the blurring of the lines between traditional peacekeeping and robust peace enforcement and the risk to their troops will continue to be an issue to monitor closely. Recent discussions have suggested that Council members and DPKO are still unclear about the potential legal and political implications of robust peacekeeping and how MONUSCO’s mandate is to be implemented in light of these circumstances.

Having received a first briefing by Robinson in May, Council members will now be interested to hear about more concrete steps to be taken by the DRC government and the countries in the region to implement the PSC Framework and of any reports of non-compliance by any party.

As for the 1533 Sanctions Committee, where decisions are adopted by consensus, Rwanda will not allow for any condemnation of its actions. While some Council members may make statements calling for cooperation with the sanctions regime, it is unlikely that any Council member will initiate any action to respond to Rwanda’s non-cooperation in the Council. This dynamic, coupled with the recent inability to issue a press statement, raises concerns over the political will of Council members to take necessary action to ensure the implementation of resolution 2098 and the PSC Framework.

A Council visit to the region, originally planned for February and then rescheduled to May, has been postponed, possibly to take place in October. (The Council last visited the DRC on 13-16 May 2010.) The initiative of the U.S. to hold a high-level event may mark a renewed focus of the Council on the situation in the region.

France is the penholder on the DRC.
Protection of Journalists (con’t)

The Secretary-General later thematic reports on the protection of civilians also addressed issues relating to the protection of journalists, albeit not in a separate section. In his most recent report (S/2012/376 of 22 May 2012), the Secretary-General reminded the Council of the need, as expressed in resolution 1738, for parties to conflict to prevent attacks against journalists and to prosecute those responsible for such attacks, and he expressed disappointment about the Council’s lack of engagement in this regard. According to the report, since the adoption of resolution 1738 the Council had expressed concern about attacks against journalists in only one situation-specific resolution, concerning Afghanistan, and then it did not call for any action in response. (Renewals of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan note with concern the continued restrictions on freedom of media and attacks against journalists.) Citing recent initiatives in the Human Rights Council (HRC) to ensure better protection of journalists, the Secretary-General suggested that the Council should develop a more “proactive approach” to the issue.

In the period since the report was published, attacks against journalists seem to have increased, in particular in two situations on the Council’s agenda: Somalia and Syria. According to a recent report by the Committee to Protect Journalists, 70 journalists were killed in the line of duty in 2012, an increase of 49 percent from 2011 and one of the highest numbers on record. While not all of these deaths occurred in situations of armed conflict, 28 journalists were killed in Syria and 12 in Somalia, the two deadliest countries by far in 2012.

In response to these developments, there was some Council action. On Somalia, the Council in resolution 2067, of 18 September 2012, for the first time specifically condemned violence against journalists and then in resolution 2093, of 6 March 2012, emphasised the obligations of the government of Somalia with respect to the protection of journalists.

With regard to Syria, the Council, in a presidential statement adopted on 21 March 2012 (S/PRST/2012/6) and in resolution 2042 adopted on 14 April 2012, expressed its support for the six-point plan proposed by the joint UN/Arab League Envoy, which among other things called on the government to ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists.

Also, in its presidential statement on the protection of civilians of 12 February (S/PRST/2013/2), the Council for the first time since the adoption of resolution 1738 specifically addressed the protection of journalists in a thematic decision. It expressed deep concern about violence against journalists, media professionals and associated personnel and called for an end to such practice. It also recalled the main provisions of resolution 1738.

While the Council has overall not been very proactive on protection of journalists, other significant initiatives have recently taken place elsewhere. On 13 April 2012, the UN Chief Executives Board adopted a UN action plan on the safety of journalists and the issue of impunity. A UN inter-agency meeting in Vienna from 22-23 November 2012 agreed on an implementation strategy for the action plan, to be coordinated by UNESCO.

On 27 September 2012, the HRC adopted a resolution on the safety of journalists, stressing the need to ensure greater protection for all media professionals. Among other things, it asked the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to prepare a compilation of good practices regarding the protection of journalists, the prevention of attacks and the fight against impunity.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is whether further steps can be taken to enhance implementation of resolution 1738 and improve protection of journalists on the ground. A related question is whether UN missions can play a greater role. Another issue is whether the Council has any role to play in relation to the 2012 UN action plan.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- inviting UNESCO’s Director General to brief on the UN action plan on the protection of journalists and its implementation strategy, along with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; and
- adopting a presidential statement aimed at strengthening the protection of journalists.

Among other things, a presidential statement could:
- reiterate key provisions of resolution 1738;
- welcome the UN action plan;
- express the Council’s intention to ensure that the protection of journalists is integrated into the mandates of relevant UN missions; and
- request that briefings and reports to the Council on relevant country-specific situations include information about attacks against journalists and that the Secretary-General’s next report on the protection of civilians contains recommendations on how to strengthen the protection of journalists.

Council Dynamics
It appears that the idea of having a meeting on the protection of journalists initially came from the UK. For practical reasons it preferred not to schedule such a meeting during its own presidency in June and therefore proposed it for July instead. While there is generally strong support among Council members for the protection of journalists (several Council members were co-sponsors of the HRC resolution), some seem less enthusiastic than others and do not necessarily believe that it is a central protection issue.
The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was held on 3 May in Brazzaville. The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) held summits on 3 and 18 April in which it called for the creation of a Transitional National Council (TNC) charged with drafting a new constitution, preparing for elections within 18 months and electing an interim president and government, who would be forbidden to run in the ensuing elections. Self-appointed interim President Michel Djotodia accepted the ECCAS framework and was then elected interim president by the TNC. (Djotodia was the only candidate in the vote.) On 13 June, the new transitional government was formed. The 34-minister government includes nine from among the Séléka rebels. Two supporters of Bozizé, seven members of former opposition parties and 16 civil society and other party representatives were named ministers. Djotodia was appointed defence minister.

The first meeting of the International Contact Group (ICG-CAR) established by ECCAS was held on 3 May in Brazzaville. Among those attending were Presidents Jacob Zuma of South Africa and Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Congo and AU officials. The ICG-CAR—comprised of ECCAS, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the UN, the EU, the International Organisation of la Francophonie and other bilateral and multilateral partners of the CAR, including the representatives of economic and financial institutions—released a press statement and a document titled “Appeal of Brazzaville”, in which it expressed concern over the situation in the CAR and its support for the implementation of the transitional process within the framework of the Libreville Agreements and the ECCAS transitional process.

The Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of BINUCA at the time, Margaret Vogt, briefed the Council on the latest report on 15 May (S/2013/261). The report, which had been postponed for more than a month to take into account recent developments, did not contain recommendations for BINUCA’s mandate. (In resolution 2088, the Council asked the Secretary-General to provide a report on the situation on the ground and to assess how BINUCA could further implement its priorities in light of recent events.) The report stated that due to the security situation, only critical BINUCA staff remained in the country and most BINUCA activities had been suspended. The adoption of an amended mandate for BINUCA, which had been scheduled for later in May, was cancelled as a result of what Council members felt were the lack of options for BINUCA at that point.

Vogt stated that indiscriminate and often targeted killings, rampant rape, recruitment of children as soldiers and looting were prevalent, and Séléka leaders were unable or unwilling to control the ranks of the fragmented rebel groups. She called for the Council to consider sanctions against perpetrators of gross human rights violations and informed the Council of preliminary discussions with authorities in the CAR about establishing a UN peacekeeping mission, while suggesting that much planning is needed before that could happen. She welcomed the ECCAS decision to expand its Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the CAR (MICOPAX) to 2,000 troops. She also called for the deployment of a “neutral security force” that would contain the current state of anarchy and force the rebel elements to conform to the security framework laid down in the Libreville Agreements.

Prime Minister Nicolas Tiangaye of the CAR transitional government also addressed the Council. He called on France to intervene by force to disarm the Séléka and restore peace in the CAR. After the meeting, some Council members expressed interest in issuing a press statement. The lead country, France, did not take the initiative, and no other country pushed the issue further.

The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, an international organisation meant to stop trade in conflict diamonds, suspended the CAR on 27 May. Diamonds are a major source of revenue for the CAR government.

On 31 May, the CAR interim government issued an arrest warrant for former President Bozizé for crimes against humanity and incitement of genocide.

Violence has continued. On 27 May, it was reported that 25 people were killed in attacks on various villages near Bossangoa by Séléka rebels and on 4 June, 12 people were reportedly killed by rebels in Bouca.

In a 29 May presidential statement, the Council expressed concern at the recent pause in operations to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the CAR due to the 24 March Séléka seizure of power (S/PRST/2013/6). The Council called on the transitional CAR authorities to uphold existing commitments and allow regional counter-LRA operations to resume without hindrance.

On 16 June, LRA fighters attacked two villages in the central mining region of Bria, killing 12 people and wounding others. Recent studies of attacks between January and March indicate that the LRA has increased its activities in the Central African region compared to the end of 2012. Reports also indicate that the LRA is resorting to elephant poaching to support its operations.

The AU Peace and Security Council issued a communiqué on 17 June supporting, “in principle” the establishment of an African-led “international support mission” for CAR, whose core elements will be constituted by the contingents serving under MICOPAX, within a maximum strength of 3,500 uniformed personnel. It then requested the AU Commission to develop a concept of operations for the force.

The Secretary-General appointed Babacar Gaye as his new Special Representative and head of BINUCA on 12 June.

Human Rights-Related Developments

In her opening statement to the 23rd session of the Human Rights Council (HRC) on 27 May, High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay announced that she will be sending a fact-finding team to the CAR. The mission is expected to arrive in late June-mid July to gather information on human rights violations committed in Bangui and other localities since December 2012 and will submit a report on its findings.

On 7 June the HRC heard an address from Minister of Justice Arsène Sende. He said the
CAR was making progress in the field of human rights in a very difficult context and was ready to work with the High Commissioner in a constructive spirit and the CAR would participate in the Universal Periodic Review in September 2013. He also issued a standing invitation to HRC special procedures to visit the CAR to examine the situation and provide recommendations. (The last such visit was a July 2010 trip by the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons.)

On 13 June, the HRC adopted a resolution on the CAR condemning the serious human rights violations and acts of violence perpetrated against the civilian population and requesting the High Commissioner to submit to the HRC at its 25th session a report evaluating the needs for technical assistance and capacity-building in the CAR (A/HRC/23/L.3).

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is how to play a more effective and assertive role in addressing concerns about the security, human rights and humanitarian situations.

Achieving synergy with subregional and regional actors in addressing the aftermath of the seizure of power by the Séléka remains an issue.

Another issue is finding a productive role for BINUCA in light of the ongoing transitional process and the need to stabilise the situation in the CAR.

Options
Options for the Council on BINUCA include amending its mandate:

- allowing it to assist rule of law efforts;
- entrusting it with a more central role in mediating between the different groups and parties in the CAR; and
- expanding its supporting role for the regional efforts of ECCAS, for instance by allowing it to assist with the training and reinforcement of MICOPAX.

Further options include taking a strong position on security, human rights and humanitarian issues, expressing the Council’s support for the deployment of additional MICOPAX troops and taking a more aggressive stance towards the Séléka leadership, including by imposing targeted sanctions.

Council Dynamics
The Council has remained fairly passive in recent months regarding the CAR, giving preference to the situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali.

Several Council members are of the view that BINUCA’s mandate must be re-evaluated for the UN presence for the Council to be relevant in efforts to solve the crisis in the CAR. However, the lack of views by BINUCA itself about how it can regain relevance created a general feeling among Council members that a small peacebuilding office like BINUCA is not equipped to deal with the current situation. Council members are hoping that the new Special Representative will take a more proactive approach in reasserting BINUCA as a relevant actor in the CAR transitional process.

It seems that at this juncture there is no appetite among Council members to consider a peacekeeping force, despite the unstable security situation. Therefore, Council members are still of the position that the Council should take a back seat on the political front and focus on supporting the regional and subregional efforts.

One option that some Council members have raised is for BINUCA to assist in training and providing resources to MICOPAX, which has not demonstrated that it is a viable force capable of stabilising the security situation. Council members will also be interested to hear more about the AU position regarding the establishment of a regional force or strengthening the capabilities of MICOPAX.

Burundi

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council will be briefed by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB), Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, and Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland), the chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). The briefing will be followed by consultations.

BNUB’s mandate expires on 15 February 2014.

Key Recent Developments
Onanga-Anyanga briefed the Council on 24 January on developments in Burundi and the Secretary-General’s latest report on BNUB, which analysed progress regarding the benchmarks for the future evolution of BNUB into a country team (S/2013/36). (The benchmarks and indicators concerned the areas of security and stability, democratic process, transitional justice, governance and institution-building, rule of law, human rights, regional integration and social and economic development.) The report noted that overall the security situation remains stable. It expressed concern, however, over the violent activities of some in the youth league of the ruling party, aimed at intimidation and repression of certain populations and stressed the need for greater emphasis on justice and ending impunity. Albert Shingiro, permanent secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, told the Council that BNUB should be converted into a UN country team in 12 months. The briefing was followed by consultations.

On 13 February, the Council adopted resolution 2090, extending the mandate of BNUB until 15 February 2014 (S/PV.6918). The Council requested the Secretary-General to provide a briefing by the end of July and a report by 17 January 2014 on the implementation of BNUB’s mandate. The resolution called on Burundi to take further steps necessary to prevent human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, mistreatment of detainees and torture, restrictions on civil liberties and limitations on the freedom of press.

Violent incidents have persisted. The
Burundi (con't)

youth league has continued to interfere with the political activities of opposition parties with impunity. On 12 March, police killed seven worshippers in clashes with more than 100 followers of an offshoot sect of Roman-Catholicism, banned by Burundi. On 18 May, members of the National Liberation Forces, a former rebel group, killed two people and injured ten.

On 5 June, the Secretary-General expressed regret that a new media law was promulgated the day before with provisions that may negatively affect freedom of the press in Burundi. Of particular concern are articles that force journalists to reveal their sources and grant the government broad powers and discretion to censor publications on a wide range of issues, including public safety, the head of state and stories that may undermine the “honour of Burundi”.

Developments in the Peacebuilding Commission

The PBC Burundi configuration met on 6 June, with Burundi's Second Vice-President Gervais Rufyikiri participating. Several members of the configuration expressed concern over the new media law and called particular attention to other bills being considered such as on justice and reconciliation and on freedom of association. They feared the media law might jeopardise progress achieved in Burundi thus far. Rufyikiri responded that Burundi would continue to protect freedom of expression and of the press.

At press time, Seger was to visit Burundi on 24-28 June. The issues he will focus on include the new media law and other draft laws, the 2015 elections, and support for the continued engagement of BNUB and the PBC with Burundi until after the elections.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 6 June, the Human Rights Council adopted the outcome of the Universal Periodic Review of Burundi. Burundi rejected 39 of the 176 recommendations it had received, including recommendations regarding freedom of assembly and the role of the press, arguing in the latter case that the press needed to be regulated.

On 7 June, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed regret over the promulgation of the new media law.

Key Issues

A key issue is assessing Burundi's progress in achieving the benchmarks and the possible ramifications for BNUB's mandate when it comes up for renewal next February.

A related issue is hearing Onanga-Anyanga's assessment of the political and economic situation and on electoral preparations.

A further issue is addressing the role of the PBC in relation to the benchmarks.

Options

Options for the Council include:
- adopting a press statement acknowledging progress made towards an inclusive election process, emphasising support for the continuing roles of BNUB and the PBC and expressing concern over continuing human rights violations and violence; or
- taking no action at this time.

Council Dynamics

Prior to the last mandate renewal, Burundi initially signalled that it wanted BNUB to be converted to a UN country team in February. It later reconsidered and conveyed its wishes to see BNUB's drawdown take place in 2014, possibly understanding that it requires more political assistance and reflecting its interest in receiving continued social and economic development assistance from BNUB.

Several Council members are of the opinion that in order to ensure future progress in Burundi, BNUB should remain on the ground until the conclusion of a successful electoral process in 2015. Some Council members, however, emphasise the government's position on BNUB's future as the most important factor. A recent request from Burundi that BNUB deploy an electoral assessment mission may be an indication that Burundi is interested to prolong BNUB's presence until after the elections.

As the Council will only be briefed orally, Council members will be interested in hearing about progress in achieving the benchmarks, and possible shifts in Burundi's position regarding the future of BNUB. Other areas of interest are political developments, including the preparations for elections, which were boycotted by the opposition in 2010, and the implications of the media law and other prospective legislative bills. Some Council members will also be interested in the human rights situation because of reports of persistent violence.

The penholder on Burundi is France.

Mali

Expected Council Action

Following the decision of the Council to go ahead with the transfer of authority from the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) on 1 July, at press time there was no Mali-related activity scheduled for the Security Council in July. However, it is highly probable that the Council will continue to follow the situation in Mali closely, as presidential elections are scheduled to be held on 28 July. Mali will also likely be discussed during the briefing on the work of the UN Office for West Africa. (Please see a separate brief on West Africa in this Forecast for more details.) A presidential statement welcoming the integrated Sahel strategy is likely to be adopted in July.

MINUSMA's mandate expires on 30 June 2014.

Key Recent Developments

The security situation in the north of Mali is described by the Secretary-General in his latest report as “complex and volatile” (S/2013/359). Although major combat operations have ceased, there have been clashes between the Mouvement pour l'Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) and the Malian Defense and Security Forces (MDSF), AFISMA troops

UN DOCUMENTS ON MALI Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2199 (25 April 2013) established the mandate for MINUSMA. S/RES/2056 (5 July 2012) expressed full support for the joint efforts of ECOWAS, the AU and the interim government in Mali in trying to re-establish the constitutional order and territorial integrity. Security Council Press Statement SC/1040 (19 June) welcomed the signing of the Preliminary Agreement to the Presidential Election and Inclusive Peace Talks in Mali. Secretary-General's Reports S/2013/359 (18 June 2013) was on transnational organised crime and illicit drug trafficking in West Africa and the Sahel. S/2013/354 (14 June 2013) was on the situation in the Sahel region and contained the UN integrated strategy for the Sahel as an annex. S/2013/338 (10 June 2013) contained an assessment of the security situation in Mali. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6985 (25 June 2013) was the first briefing by Koenders as head of MINUSMA.

OTHER RELEVANT FACTS Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MINUSMA Albert Gerard Koenders (Netherlands)
and the Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA). According to the report, the ability of MUJAO and other extremist groups to launch large-scale operations has been degraded, but the Secretary-General also acknowledged that “the armed elements in Mali maintain the capacity to recover with auxiliary support networks and recruitment structures reportedly still in place”.

Since 3 June, indirect talks were held between the interim Malian government and Tuareg groups in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. The negotiations were brokered under the aegis of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) by Foreign Minister Djibril Bassolé of Burkina Faso and involved Malian special envoy Tiébélé Dramé, as well as representatives from both the MNLA and the High Council for the Unity of Azawad. The main objective was to pave the way for direct talks and to solve some imminent issues, such as the status of the city of Kidal in the presidential elections. On 7 June, the parties were presented with a draft framework agreement. After further negotiations on ongoing judicial proceedings against members of armed groups and their disarmament, as well as on the conditions for the deployment of MDSF troops in Kidal, an agreement was signed on 18 June. The Preliminary Agreement to the Presidential Election and Inclusive Peace Talks in Mali includes the presidential elections set for July, commitments to a ceasefire, the deployment of the MDSF in Kidal along with French and MINUSMA troops and the establishment of a joint security commission, chaired by MINUSMA’s force commander, with all parties equally represented to elaborate on arrangements for the ceasefire and other security matters. A follow-up committee chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Albert Gerard Koenders will supervise the implementation of the security arrangements. The Council welcomed this agreement in a 19 June press statement (SC/11040).

The political climate was tense during the negotiations. The local press reported in early June that there had been cases of inter-ethnic violence against dark-skinned citizens in Kidal. The MDSF responded by seizing the MNLA-controlled town of Anefis on 5 June and threatened to attack Kidal. As negotiations were taking place, different groups attempted to organise demonstrations against what they understood was a very weak position by the interim Malian authorities regarding Kidal. Most of these attempts were aborted by police forces and resulted in various detentions.

In June, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) worked on a status-of-forces agreement with the interim government, as well as two supplemental arrangements about providing support to AFISMA and MINUSMA’s handover of detainees to the transitional authorities. In addition to this, DPKO has been consulting with AFISMA’s troop-contributing countries (TCCs) on the conditions for the re-hatting and has focused its force generation efforts in countries that have not been TCCs to UN operations lately. Discussions were also under way with France on the practical arrangements for French troops to intervene in support of MINUSMA at the Secretary-General’s request if the mission is under imminent and serious threat. Koenders assumed his responsibilities as head of MINUSMA in Bamako on 4 June, and Major General Jean Bosco Kazura (Rwanda) was appointed MINUSMA’s force commander on 17 June.

On 14 June, the report on the situation in the Sahel region was released (S/2013/354). The report acknowledges how “the problems in Mali should not be seen in isolation. While the deployment of peacekeepers is a critical component of the international response to the current crisis, the countries of the region recognise that sustainable peace and security will require collective action in addressing the root causes of instability that extend well beyond Mali’s borders.” The Council was briefed by Romano Prodi, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel, on 26 June, followed by consultations.

The Council was briefed on 25 June by Koenders as well as Hervé Ladsous and Ameerah Haq, respectively the heads of peackeeping and field support. The briefing focused on ongoing major combat operations by international military forces in MINUSMA’s area of responsibility and vicinity, as well as the capacity of terrorist forces to pose a major threat to the civilian population and international personnel in Mali. After considering their assessments, Council members decided that the transfer of authority from AFISMA to MINUSMA will proceed on 1 July.

Key Issues

A key overarching issue is to stabilise the security situation in northern Mali.

The upcoming 28 July presidential elections and the fulfilment of MINUSMA’s electoral-assistance mandate is a key intermediate issue. Ensuring that internally displaced people and refugees and citizens living in Kidal can vote is a closely related issue.

As the Secretary-General pointed out in his recent report, “current timelines for the deployment of military force enablers indicate that most will arrive and be operational in Mali towards the end of 2013”.

As the Secretary-General pointed out in his recent report, “current timelines for the deployment of military force enablers indicate that most will arrive and be operational in Mali towards the end of 2013”. In this context, ensuring that MINUSMA’s initial operational capability does not compromise its mandate is a key issue.

Another key issue will be to clearly set out the interaction modalities between French forces and MINUSMA, particularly with a view to prepare for a further drawdown of French forces after the summer.

An important issue will be to ensure the coordination of those with a role in facilitating political processes (i.e., MINUSMA, ECOWAS and the Commission of Dialogue and Reconciliation) to avoid the possibility of undermining each other’s work. A related issue will be the role of MINUSMA in the cantonment and disarmament of armed groups as agreed in the preliminary agreement.
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Ensuring that all AFISMA troops, which will be re-hatted, operate within the UN human rights due-diligence policy is a further related issue.

Addressing the destabilising spillover effects from Mali on an already fragile region is an ongoing issue.

Options

After authorising the transfer of authority from AFISMA to MINUSMA by 1 July, as envisaged in resolution 2100, immediate options for the Council include:

- issuing a presidential statement praising the parties for the signature of the preliminary peace deal, asking them to resolve their differences peacefully during the critical run-up to the elections and encouraging them to resume direct talks once elections have taken place and there is a legitimate government in Mali;

- following the release of the report of the Secretary-General on transnational organised crime and illicit drug trafficking in West Africa and the Sahel (S/2013/359), establishing an expert group to identify those involved in transnational organised crime in the region, with the possibility of imposing targeted sanctions, as recommended in the Secretary-General’s report (S/2013/189); and

- making full use of the 1566 Working Group, which is mandated to examine practical measures that could be imposed upon individuals, groups or entities involved in or associated with terrorist activities, other than those designated by the 1267/1989 Al-Qaïda Sanctions Committee.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Although all Council members agreed on the transfer of authority as of 1 July, some members highlight how the security situation is still fragile in Mali, as the recent asymmetrical attacks show. These were the countries that advocated for a tighter definition of MINUSMA’s stabilisation mandate during the negotiations of resolution 2100. By contrast, other Council members prefer to showcase the positive developments that have taken place in the country, both in terms of security and political transition.

The UN Secretariat is aware that MINUSMA will not be able to provide the level of electoral support they could have provided during the later stages of deployment. For some UN and civil society stakeholders, the 28 July elections seem too rushed. The pressure of some Council members, international donors, and now the interim government has prevented any discussion about the feasibility of holding the presidential elections at a later date.

The process that led to the adoption of resolution 2100 increased tensions between the Council, the AU and ECOWAS over demands made by African stakeholders—such as authorising a peace enforcement mandate for MINUSMA, providing a logistical and financial support package to AFISMA or ensuring the continuity of AFISMA’s leadership in MINUSMA—that were not addressed by the UN Secretariat and Council members. At a time when indirect peace talks brokered by ECOWAS mediation seem to have yielded results, the political mandate of MINUSMA might not be fully in sync with existing mediation processes.

France is the penholder on Mali.

Côte d’Ivoire

Expected Council Action

In July the Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) before it expires on 31 July. A briefing, followed by consultations, by the head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, on recent developments and the Secretary-General’s report, due on 30 June, is also expected.

The current mandate of the French forces in the country also expires on 31 July.

Key Recent Developments

On 16 April, Edmond Mulet, the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, briefed the Council on the special report of the Secretary-General on UNOCI (S/2013/197). Mulet noted that Côte d’Ivoire had made good progress with regard to the security situation in general but that the situation remained fragile (S/PV.6947). In the subsequent consultations, Council members also discussed the final report of the Group of Experts assisting the 1572 Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee (S/2013/228).

Armed elements conducted deadly cross-border attacks from Liberia into Côte d’Ivoire on 13 March in Zikely and 23 March in Petit Guiglo, leading to the death of 13 people and to further displacement. On 5 April, the governments of Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire and the heads of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and UNOCI held a quadrupartite meeting in Monrovia during which they condemned repeated sporadic attacks in the border region and agreed to reinforce coordinated border patrolling.

Police stations were also reportedly attacked in at least two separate incidents on 9 April in Abidjan and 22 May in Abengourou.

On 21 April, municipal and regional elections, originally scheduled for February, took place across Côte d’Ivoire without major incidents. Former President Laurent Gbagbo’s Ivorian Popular Front (FPI)
boycotted the elections. Clashes between police and protesters occurred in different parts of the country on 22 April, including in Abidjan and Yamoussoukro, as the first results were declared.

Since the beginning of 2013, the government has engaged in direct discussions with the FPI and reportedly reached an agreement on a number of issues. Despite the FPT’s boycott of the 21 April elections, the government called for reopening political dialogue in July.

Between October 2012 and April 2013, more than 4,000 former combatants were disarmed and demobilised, some of whom are in the process of being employed in public service positions. The number of former combatants to be disarmed is estimated at 65,000.

However, the national strategy for security sector reform (SSR) has remained in the planning stage.

Progress on reconciliation has remained slow. The Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission is struggling to produce concrete results before its mandate expires on 30 September, possibly in part due to questions being raised about the neutrality of its chairman, former Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny, who is the leading figure in the party that is in coalition with President Alassane Ouattara.

On 11 April, trials began against 33 soldiers allegedly implicated in crimes against the population but not related to the 2010-2011 post-election violence. On 18 May, Amadé Ouérémi was arrested. His forces fought alongside Ouattara’s forces, and he is suspected of playing a command role in the March 2011 Duékoué massacre, in which several hundred people were executed. He could be the first person from Ouattara’s side to be held accountable for post-election violence.

On 3 June, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC decided to adjourn the hearing on the confirmation of charges against Gbagbo, requesting the prosecution to consider providing further evidence or conducting further investigations with respect to the charges presented against him. On 11 June, the prosecution decided to appeal this decision. Also on 11 June, the ICC rejected the admissibility challenge raised by the defence that Gbagbo could not be prosecuted in The Hague because he was being investigated for the same crimes in Côte d’Ivoire.

In May, a UNOCI battalion made up of some 830 troops from Malawi repatriated from Côte d’Ivoire. (The reduction of UNOCI’s military strength was authorised in July 2012 in resolution 2062 but was deferred in light of the deterioration in the security situation in the country.)

In his March report, the Secretary-General recommended considering the introduction of unmanned aerial systems in UNOCI. During the 16 April Council briefing, Ambassador Youssoufou Bamba (Côte d’Ivoire) requested the deployment of surveillance drones in the border area between Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia to compensate for the withdrawal of peacekeepers. The 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee’s Panel of Experts, however, during a 23 May meeting with the Committee argued that the effectiveness of drones in the Liberia-Côte d’Ivoire border area would be limited due to specific climatic and geographic conditions. (In the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], in a January letter to the Secretary-General, Council members took note of the Secretariat’s intention of deploying drones on a trial basis in line with the case-by-case approach regarding modern technologies and “without prejudice to the ongoing consideration by relevant United Nations bodies of legal, financial and technical implications” [S/2013/44].)

On 17 May, the Secretary-General appointed Aïchatou Mindaoudou Souleymane (Niger) as Special Representative for Côte d’Ivoire and head of UNOCI to replace Albert Gerard Koenders (Netherlands) who was appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali. Koenders left for Mali on 4 June, and Souleymane is expected to arrive in Côte d’Ivoire in early July.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 12 June, during the 23rd session of the Human Rights Council (HRC), the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Côte d’Ivoire, DouDou Diène, presented his latest report (A/ HRC/23/38). The report, among other things, recommended that the Security Council lift the arms embargo on Côte d’Ivoire in order for the country to reinforce internal security and address the risk of destabilisation inherent in the crisis in the Sahel and Sahara region. Diène, who last visited the country from 28 April to 4 May, reiterated his call for addressing impunity for all those who had committed crimes during the conflict regardless of political affiliations. He also suggested that the mandate of the National Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission be extended beyond its term, which expires in September. In a resolution adopted on 14 June, the HRC renewed the independent expert’s mandate for another year.

Key Issues

An overarching issue is the security situation along the border with Liberia and the uncontrollable circulation of weapons. Sub-regional security threats, including transnational crime and terrorism, are a growing concern.

Addressing the root causes of the conflict is a closely related issue. Efforts related to reconciliation, SSR, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), and promotion of human rights are critical in this context.

Another related issue is the need to bring to justice those accused of having committed serious crimes regardless of their status or political affiliation.

Remaining deep political divisions, especially in view of the 2015 elections and the gradual drawdown of the mission, are a key issue.

An emerging issue for the Council is to assess the need, feasibility and appropriate-ness of drones to monitor the situation on the Liberia-Côte d’Ivoire border.

Options

The Council could either adopt a resolution extending the mandate of UNOCI for another year without major changes or modify UNOCI’s mandate taking into consideration the Secretary-General’s recommendations, including:

- authorising the gradual withdrawal of additional battalions while highlighting the importance of considering the fragile security situation when planning for the scaling down of UNOCI;
- considering using surveillance drones on the border of Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire; and/or
- creating a quick reaction capability within UNOCI that could provide support to UNMIL and to respond to other crises in the subregion.

Council Dynamics

The main controversy among Council members is the possible deployment of drones to monitor the Liberia-Côte d’Ivoire border. While some Council members favour this option, others argue that drones should only be deployed in a case-by-case approach and
Côte d’Ivoire (con’t)

consider that it would be better to first assess their effectiveness in the DRC.

Most Council members are likely to agree on a further downsizing of the mission, on the condition that the situation on the ground is favourable.

Council members seem to agree that more needs to be done by the government on SSR, DDR, reconciliation and addressing impunity.

France is the penholder on Côte d’Ivoire.

UNOWA (West Africa)

Expected Council Action
In July the Council expects to receive a briefing on the work of the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) from Said Djinnit, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of UNOWA. At press time, the semi-annual report of the Secretary-General on UNOWA was due on 28 June. The Council is not likely to take any action following the briefing.

UNOWA’s mandate expires on 31 December.

Key Recent Developments
Djinnit last briefed the Council on 25 January, presenting the December UNOWA report (S/2012/977). In his remarks, Djinnit focused on the situation in Mali and the risk that the conflict there might spread to neighbouring states. Beyond the Sahel, he noted peaceful elections in Ghana and Sierra Leone but cautioned that the international community would need to remain vigilant across West Africa to avoid post-election violence. Djinnit also highlighted the threat posed by piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and the overall threat posed by transnational organised crime and terrorism.

On Mali, the 26 March report of the Secretary-General noted that Djinnit had been instrumental in supporting the mediation efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and in assisting with negotiations between the government of Mali and rebel groups in northern Mali (S/2013/189). On 17 May, the Secretary-General announced his intention to appoint Albert Gerard Koenders as his new Special-Representative for Mali. Koenders took up the post on 4 June. Although the arrival of Koenders may signal that Djinnit can be less focused on Mali in the coming months, the 14 June UN integrated strategy for the Sahel region makes clear that implementation of the strategy “should rest on the strong engagement of UNOWA” in the region (S/2013/354).

Beyond Mali, Djinnit has been especially focused on elections in Guinea, which have been postponed four times and are currently expected to be held in July. On 27 February opposition activists initiated protests against the government of President Alpha Conde, whom they accused of trying to rig the polls. According to news reports, more than 50 people have been killed in violent clashes related to the protests since February. (Most recently, on 19 June several opposition activists were injured when police moved to disperse an anti-government protest.) In April, Djinnit was appointed to a team of international facilitators working to bring about an inclusive national dialogue in Guinea. He travelled to Conakry twice to meet with several Guinean stakeholders. On 25 April Council members received a briefing in consultations about Guinea under “any other business” from Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman on demonstrations that day in Conakry. On 29 April, the Council issued a press statement expressing concern over the situation in the country, welcoming a 23 April joint declaration of non-violence signed by key stakeholders and calling upon all parties to cooperate with Djinnit to promote national dialogue and free, fair, transparent and inclusive legislative elections in Guinea (SC/10992).

On 22 May, Djinnit convened a consultative meeting between the prime minister of Guinea and opposition leaders in Conakry, an event he characterised as an “initial promising step” towards the holding of free, transparent and peaceful elections. On 5 June, the first session of an inter-Guinean dialogue was held, drawing together supporters of President Condé and members of the opposition, with Djinnit’s assistance and facilitation. On 9 June, he reported to the press that significant progress had been made and that opposition parties had agreed to join the electoral process following concessions on both sides. However, on 17 June the electoral commission announced that elections would be delayed for a fourth time to allow opposition party members to register as candidates. On 20 June the main opposition leader withdrew from talks following the 19 June violence. At press time, Djinnit had returned to Conakry on 22 June in an effort to encourage the opposition and the government to return to the dialogue.

Regarding piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, on 19 March Djinnit (along with the head of the UN Office for Central Africa) attended the Ministerial Conference on Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea in Cotonou, Benin, organised by the Economic Community of Central African States, ECOWAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission. Three memoranda of understanding were adopted at the meeting. On 18 June, the Oceans Beyond Piracy project released a report indicating that in 2012 piracy in the Gulf of Guinea had overtaken piracy off the coast of Somalia, finding that 966 seafarers were attacked in West Africa, compared with

UN DOCUMENTS ON UNOWA

OTHER RELEVANT FACTS
Special Representative and Head of UNOWA Said Djinnit (Algeria) UNOWA: Size of Mission Staff strength (as of 31 March 2013): 21 international civilians, 18 local civilians and three military advisers.

ADDITIONAL USEFUL RESOURCE
UNOWA (West Africa) (con’t)

851 in the horn of Africa.

On 18 June the Secretary-General released a report (S/2013/359) on transnational organised crime and illicit drug trafficking in West Africa and the Sahel that had been requested by a 21 February 2012 presidential statement (S/PRST/2012/2). The report provides updates on developments in the region since 2008 and offers 28 recommendations for member states, international partners and the UN, including strengthening cooperation and coordination among all the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General in West Africa and the Sahel.

The commission on the demarcation of the border between Nigeria and Cameroon (the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission), chaired by Djinnit, held its 31st session from 23–26 April where the parties agreed to resume placement of boundary demarcation pillars.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is ensuring that UNOWA can continue to provide support to the range of UN efforts in the region, not only in countries of concern such as Mali and Guinea, but also in encouraging regional cooperation on thematic issues such as piracy, terrorism, drugs and crime. The role UNOWA will play in the newly published Sahel strategy will also be of particular interest to Council members.

Options
In July, the Council could:
• receive the briefing and take no further action; or
• adopt a statement addressing one or more of the issues on which UNOWA has played a leading role, most likely regarding events in Guinea or the growing threats of piracy, organised crime and terrorism in West Africa.

Council Dynamics
Council members generally consider the receipt of the UNOWA report to be routine. Even so, with the renewal of UNOWA’s mandate approaching in December, some Council members are beginning to consider ways in which UNOWA could play an even more productive role in the region. Most are quite pleased with the work Djinnit has accomplished during his tenure, though some are interested in strengthening the support his office is able to provide him.

Togo is the penholder on UNOWA.

Sudan/Darfur

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council is likely to renew the mandate of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)—which expires on 31 July—for an additional year. Prior to the renewal, it will hold a briefing and consultations on the Secretary-General’s quarterly report on UNAMID.

Key Recent Developments
Fatou Bensouda, the ICC Prosecutor, briefed the Council on 5 June with “a deep sense of frustration, even despair”, as each of the 17 previous briefings on the work of the ICC on Darfur “had been followed by inaction and paralysis within the Council while the plight of victims of crimes committed in Darfur has gone from bad to worse” (S/PV.6974). Bensouda described several problems in the region, including indiscriminate aerial bombardment, sexual violence as a weapon of war, lack of humanitarian access and impunity for crimes.

High levels of inter-communal violence and displacement have plagued Darfur in recent months. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has reported that members of the Ta’isha and Missiriya communities have carried out attacks on the Salamat community since April in the Um Dukhun area of Central Darfur. As a result of this violence, over 100 civilians have been killed, and more than 30,000 have fled into neighbouring Chad. (According to HRW, while the source of these clashes is a land dispute between the Ta’isha and the Salamat, observers believe that Sudan has been supporting the Ta’isha and Missiriya because of their participation in pro-Khartoum militia in past years.)

In one incident on 8 April, Janjaweed leader Ali Kushayb, who has been indicted by the ICC for war crimes and crimes against humanity, was spotted with government security forces and affiliated militia, who razed the town of Abu Jeradil, Central Darfur.

Fighting between the Salamat and Missiriya communities has also expanded to South Darfur, with clashes reported in Shataya on 19 June and some 40 people allegedly killed and 45 wounded in the fighting.

According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Sudan Liberation Army–Minni Minawi rebel group has led to the displacement of 61,000 people from East Darfur since early April. Most of these people continue to be displaced, with many in dire need of humanitarian aid. (Between January and May this year, roughly 300,000 people have been displaced in Darfur, more than the total number of displaced in the previous two years combined.)

A group of civil society leaders from all five Darfur states held a conference organised by UNAMID on 10–11 June in El Fasher to discuss how to implement the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur. Addressing the participants, El Tijani Seïsi, the chairperson of the Darfur Regional Authority, urged civil society “to come together under one umbrella” to have a greater impact on the peace process in Darfur.

Two high-level appointments to UNAMID were recently announced. On 4 June, Lieutenant General Paul Ignace Mella (Tanzania) became the new force commander. Prior to assuming this post, he had served as the chief of the Tanzanian Defence Intelligence Organisation. On 20 June, Joseph Mutaboba (Rwanda) was named Deputy Joint Special Representative in Darfur and deputy head of UNAMID. Mutaboba had served as the Special Representative for Guinea-Bissau and

UN DOCUMENTS ON SUDAN/DARFUR
Security Council Resolutions
S/RES/2063 (31 July 2012) extended UNAMID’s mandate until 31 July 2013. S/RES/1769 (31 July 2007) established UNAMID. S/RES/1983 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC. Secretary-General’s Report S/2013/325 (10 April 2013) was a quarterly report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.6974 (5 June 2013) was the latest briefing to the Council on the ICC’s work in Sudan. S/PV.6956 (23 April 2013) was the latest briefing to the Council on UNAMID.

USEFUL ADDITIONAL SOURCE
A key issue for the Council is how to address the considerably heightened level of violence in Darfur in recent months.

A related issue for the Council is determining the extent to which the government of Sudan has played a role in supporting this violence.

Another related issue is what the Council can do to improve humanitarian access in the region, notably to civilians displaced by the growing violence in Darfur.

An additional key issue is what can be done to revive the peace process and engage the rebel groups that have not signed the Doha Document in constructive dialogue with the government.

In renewing the mandate of UNAMID, the Council could:

- request from the Secretariat an evaluation of the impact of UNAMID’s recent reconfiguration on the mission’s effectiveness, as well as a determination of whether UNAMID troops can be more strategically deployed;
- demand that Sudan improves its cooperation with UNAMID, given ongoing restrictions on humanitarian access;
- reiterate its demand that rebel movements that have not signed the Doha Document engage in the peace process; and
- emphasise the importance of combating impunity in Darfur.

Although unlikely, the Council might also consider imposing sanctions on rebel groups that have not acceded to the Doha Document, as well as on the six individuals—President Omar Al-Bashir, Defence Minister Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, Governor of South Kordofan Ahmad Harun, Kushayb, Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammad Jerbo Jamus—who have been indicted by the ICC for crimes in Darfur. (Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, a former high-ranking member of the JEM, was charged with war crimes by the ICC, but on 8 February 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber I decided against confirming the charges.)

Another option would be for the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations to develop strategies to enhance UNAMID’s protection of civilians work and report these strategies to the Council.

An additional option for the Council would be to ask the Secretary-General to launch a commission of inquiry to investigate the sources of the recent inter-communal violence in Darfur, including allegations of government involvement in this violence.

Several Council members have been troubled by the toll that the deteriorating security environment in Darfur has taken on civilians, and by the assessment by some observers that 2013 has been the worst year for displaced civilians in camps. At least one member believes that the reduction of UNAMID’s force level, mandated in resolution 2063 last July, may have negatively impacted the mission’s effectiveness in protecting civilians. (Resolution 2063 in July 2012 authorised a reduction in the mission’s force level by over 5,900 troops and police to be carried out over 12 to 18 months.)

There are differences of opinion among Council members regarding Sudan’s commitment to the peace process. Some have been critical of the slow pace of implementation of the Doha Document and believe that the government is responsible for much of the conflict in Darfur. France, Luxembourg, the Republic of Korea, the US and others have pointed to reports that security forces are attacking civilians, with some of these members underscoring allegations of indiscriminate aerial bombardments and the climate of impunity in the region.

Other Council members tend to be less critical of Sudan, believing that it is making an honest effort to implement the Doha Document under difficult circumstances. These members tend to emphasise the role of rebel groups in Darfur for the instability in the region. Among this group, Pakistan and Russia have argued that the Council should consider imposing sanctions on rebel groups that have not signed the Doha Document.

The UK is the penholder on Darfur.

Sudan and South Sudan

The UK is the penholder on Sudan-South Sudan relations.

Security Council Resolution S/RES/2046 (2 May 2012) was on Sudan-South Sudan relations. Security Council Press Statement SC/11034 (14 June 2013) condemned the attack on the JBVMM in Kadugli, South Kordofan. Security Council Letters S/2013/352 (13 June 2013) was from Sudan containing alleged evidence of South Sudanese support for rebels in Sudan. S/2013/342 (10 June 2013) was from Sudan outlining the types of support that it believes South Sudan is providing to rebels in Sudan.

Useful Additional Sources

Sudan and South Sudan (con’t)

Oil from South Sudan through Sudan if the support to the rebels does not end.

Regarding the situation in Abyei, Menkarios said that Sudan and South Sudan had made no progress in establishing the temporary administrative institutions in the disputed Abyei area, including the Abyei Area Administration, the Abyei Area Council and the Abyei Police Service. According to the latest Secretary-General’s report on Abyei (S/2013/294), the lack of these institutions “continue(s) to undermine efforts to stabilise the security and humanitarian situation”.

Tensions escalated between Sudan and South Sudan in June. On 8 June, President Omar al-Bashir stated that Sudan would block the transit of oil from South Sudan through Sudan due to evidence that South Sudan was supporting rebels in Sudan. On 9 June, Information Minister Ahmed Bilal Osman provided more detail, saying that oil transit through Sudan would be halted in 60 days if South Sudan did not cease its support of the SRF. Sudan then sent letters to relevant oil companies, indicating that it would suspend the shipment of oil from South Sudan within 60 days of 9 June.

South Sudan has continued to challenge the allegations that it is supporting rebels in Sudan. President Salva Kiir has said the allegations are tantamount to an indirect declaration of war.

On 10 June, Sudan submitted a letter to the Council alleging that South Sudan had not honoured its commitment to cease its support of the SRF and reiterated that as a result Sudan had decided to close its oil pipelines within 60 days of 9 June (S/2013/342). In the letter, Sudan accused South Sudan of providing the rebels with financial, logistical and material support and medical treatment in South Sudan for rebels wounded in combat. The letter also alleges that South Sudan continues to maintain troops across the border and in the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone (SDBZ). In a follow-up letter to the Council on 13 June, Sudan submitted documentation detailing the alleged support lent to the SRF (S/2013/352).

Thabo Mbeki, the chair of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), sent a letter to Bashir and Kiir on 9 June urging Sudan and South Sudan not to undermine efforts to implement the agreements they have made, while offering proposals to the parties in an effort to alleviate the tensions. One proposal calls for the establishment of a technical team by the AU Border Programme, set up in 2007 to promote conflict prevention and regional and subregional integration, to make a determination on the centre line of the SDBZ within six weeks of 18 June, or in a time frame proposed by the AU Border Programme’s technical team. (A recent research report by the Satellite Sentinel Project has indicated that both Sudan and South Sudan have troops in the SDBZ in spite of their agreement to remove them.) A second proposal was for the AU Commission and the chair of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development to make a determination on the facts regarding allegations by both sides that each is supporting rebels in the other country, discuss their findings with the parties and propose next steps by 25 July. (South Sudan sent a letter to the AUHIP specifying its understanding of these proposals and accepting them. At press time, Sudan had yet to inform the AUHIP of its intentions, although initial media reports indicated that it is amenable to the proposals as well.)

An oil pipeline running from Diffra in the disputed Abyei region to Heglig, a town along the Sudan-South Sudan border that has also been contested by the parties, was damaged by an explosion on 12 June. Sudan blamed the JEM rebel group for the incident, an accusation that the JEM has challenged.

The headquarters of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) in Kadugli was shelled on 14 June. While details are unclear, it appears that the headquarters may have been hit by the SPLM-N, which has claimed that it was firing on “military” sites in the area and did not intend to hit the JBVMM facility. One UN Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA) peacekeeper died in the bombing and two were wounded. On the same day, the Council issued a press statement condemning the attack (SC/11034).

Consultations on Sudan/South Sudan were again held on 20 June with briefings by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos. Ladsous told Council members that an initial group of 120 peacekeepers, who will provide protection for JBVMM monitors, is currently being trained in Ethiopia, but he was unable to give a definitive timeline for their deployment. Amos briefed members on her recent trip to Sudan from 20-23 May, noting at the press stakeout after the meeting that 4.4 million people in Sudan are in need of humanitarian assistance.

Human Rights-Related Developments

The Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, Mashood Adebayo Baderin, conducted his third visit to the Sudan from 15-20 June and will present his findings and recommendations to the Human Rights Council in September 2013.

Key Issues

One key issue for the Council is how it can play a constructive role in easing the ongoing friction between Sudan and South Sudan and help the parties to regain the positive momentum they experienced in March with the resumption of oil production by South Sudan and the progress in making the JBVMM operational.

Another key and ongoing issue is what role there is for the Council in promoting constructive dialogue between Sudan and the SPLM-N and improving humanitarian access to South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.

Options

One option is for the Council to invite Mbeki for an informal interactive dialogue to get his perspective on the status of, and potential next steps in, the negotiations between the parties and to obtain his input on how the Council and the AUHIP can collaborate most constructively moving forward.

Another option for the Council is to use the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa as a forum to discuss conflict prevention strategies related to Sudan-South Sudan relations.

An additional option is for the Council to conduct a visiting mission to Sudan and South Sudan to get a better sense of the situation on the ground to inform its decision-making and to signal to key officials in both countries its engagement on and commitment to this issue.

Council Dynamics

Council members are concerned by the recent tensions between Sudan and South Sudan, culminating in the threat by Sudan to shut down oil pipelines from South Sudan within 60 days of 9 June. There are also ongoing
Assembly adopted a law on 26 February

The Council was last briefed on UNMISS June 2013) was the most recent report on UNMISS.

Key Recent Developments

The Council was last briefed on UNMISS and the situation in South Sudan on 21 March (S/PV.6938). Johnson told the Council that “South Sudan’s transition to a stable, viable state continued at an uneven pace”. She emphasised that inter-communal violence in Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity states continued to pose a serious threat to civilians. She noted that UNMISS had enhanced its troop presence and stepped up its integrated civilian-military patrols in Jonglei, given the complexity of the security challenges there. She also said that the mission continued to train the South Sudan National Police Service.

With respect to political developments, Johnson noted the National Legislative Assembly adopted a law on 26 February extending the mandate of the National Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) through the end of 2014. (The NCRC was appointed by South Sudan President Salva Kiir in January 2012 and assigned to consult on the(pr) 

There will likely be two meetings on Sudan/South Sudan in July, most members are now questioning the need for this frequency of meetings, believing that quantity has not translated into quality in terms of Council engagement on Sudan/South Sudan issues.

In this sense, there has also been some reflection among Council members on how to be more proactive on this agenda item, given the fact that Council members have been unable to reach consensus on numerous draft statements in recent months. In early June, there was some discussion of a potential ambassador-level meeting among Council members to discuss how the Council can improve its management of Sudan-South Sudan issues. At press time, such a meeting had yet to take place, although it might be held in July.

The US is the penholder on Sudan/South Sudan issues.
assertion, alleging that the SPLA had only taken control of Iti, a small village outside Boma, while conceding that five rebels had died in the fighting with the SPLA.

On 14 May, UNMISS issued a press release in which it expressed its deep concern at the security situation in and around Pibor town. The release referred to public statements made by Yau Yau’s group on three separate occasions, warning of forthcoming assaults on Pibor town and Kapeota town in Eastern Equatoria state and demanding that NGOs and civilians leave these places. (Large-scale displacement of civilians occurred in response to these public statements.) The press release also noted looting of facilities belonging to the UN and humanitarian organisations by undisciplined SPLA troops, members of the wildlife service and rebels.

Large-scale displacement has resulted from the fighting in Jonglei. In its 27 May–2 June Humanitarian Bulletin on South Sudan, OCHA noted that “Boma, Pibor and other population centres were deserted” and that nearly “all civilians had fled into the bush amid increasing tensions between state and non-state armed actors”. OCHA has also estimated that high numbers of refugees have fled Jonglei for Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda since the beginning of 2013. For example, roughly 2,700 South Sudanese refugees from Jonglei made their way into Uganda between January and May 2013, while over 5,390 former inhabitants of Jonglei have been registered in the Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya in the same time period.

**Key Issues**

A key issue is how South Sudan’s difficult relationship with Sudan weakens the new country’s ability to focus on its own political, security and economic challenges.

Another key issue is how to strengthen efforts to prevent inter-communal violence and promote inter-communal reconciliation in Jonglei state and elsewhere in South Sudan. Human rights violations committed by Yau Yau’s group and other rebels—as well as by government security forces—constitutes another issue that needs to be addressed more effectively. (One challenge has been the government’s ambivalent relationship with UNMISS’s human rights staff, reflected by its decision in November 2012 to expel a high-ranking UNMISS human rights officer and by its detention and questioning of two UNMISS human rights staff in late January.)

An additional important issue is the need to enhance the aerial assets (e.g., helicopters) available to the mission and to ensure that they are used as effectively as possible.

Also an issue is how to facilitate progress in the constitutional review process to ensure that it is conducted in a fair, inclusive and timely manner.

**Options**

The most likely option for the Council is to renew UNMISS’s mandate for an additional year. In doing so, the Council may consider:

- highlighting the importance of UNMISS’s protection of civilians efforts while condemning the perpetrators of violence against civilians;
- calling on the Secretariat to enhance training for women’s protection advisors in the mission;
- reminding the South Sudanese government of the importance of upholding its human rights responsibilities;
- recognising efforts by the government to promote reconciliation;
- making a special request to member states to provide the mission with more aerial assets;
- highlighting the importance of advancing the constitutional review process in a timely and inclusive manner; and
- changing the UNMISS reporting cycle to a quarterly basis (rather than the current three times per year) given the fragility of the security situation in South Sudan.

In keeping with the results of the review of the mission conducted in April, and outlined in the Secretary-General’s recent report, the Council could also:

- request UNMISS “to develop options for the geographical reconfiguration” of the mission to ensure that it focuses on the most volatile areas; and
- call for UNMISS and the UN country team to conduct a “joint review of the… respective comparative advantages [of the UN system] in support of the extension of civilian state authority.”

The Council may also request a briefing from the Secretariat on the potential use of unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) for early-warning surveillance in areas of South Sudan where rebel activity and inter-communal violence have been prevalent.

**Council Dynamics**

While there is widespread support among Council members for UNMISS’s efforts to help South Sudan develop rule of law and governance institutions, most Council members also share the view that protection of civilians is a priority for the mission. Given the numerous reports of violence in South Sudan in recent months—particularly in Jonglei state, where Yau Yau’s rebel group has been active—several Council members are interested in exploring how the mission can play a more proactive role in protecting civilians. There is an understanding that the mission needs enhanced air assets to improve its monitoring of the situation on the ground, especially given the lack of roads in remote areas of the country.

The safety and security of peacekeepers in Jonglei has also been on Council members’ minds, especially in light of the five UNMISS peacekeepers killed on 9 April and the downing of the UNMISS helicopter on 21 December 2012.

While there are strong concerns about the security threat posed by Yau Yau’s group, some members also appear to be alarmed by reports of human rights violations committed by South Sudan’s security forces.

The US is the penholder on South Sudan.
Somalia

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council will likely renew the mandate of the Monitoring Group of the 751/1907 Sanctions Committee concerning Eritrea and Somalia (it expires on 25 August). The Council will also receive the final reports on Eritrea and Somalia from the Monitoring Group and a 120-day briefing from the chair of the 751/1907 Sanctions Committee. The report from the Emergency Relief Coordinator on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia is due on 22 July.

Key Recent Developments
The security situation in Somalia took a dramatic turn for the worse in June. On 19 June, Al Shabaab attacked a UN compound in Mogadishu, resulting in at least 20 deaths including five civilians, four Somali security guards, three foreign contractors, one UN international staff member and seven Al Shabaab militants. Government and AMISOM troops secured the compound within an hour of the attack. Al Shabaab claimed responsibility, posting on Twitter during the attack: “The UN, a merchant of death & a satanic force of evil, has a long inglorious record of spreading nothing but poverty, dependency & disbelief”. The Council issued a press statement condemning the attack and reiterating its resolve to support Somalia’s transition to peace and stability (SC/11039).

The Council last received a 120-day briefing from Ambassador Kim Sook (Korea), chair of the 751/1907 Sanctions Committee, in consultations on 12 March. The briefing covered the work of the Committee as well as the semi-annual reports of the Monitoring Group, which highlighted regional and international networks of the Al Shabaab insurgency, chronic governmental corruption and weaknesses in the enforcement of sanctions on charcoal exports.

On 3 June, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) officially deployed for an initial period of one year, as specified in resolution 2102 of 2 May. Unlike its predecessor—the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), which was principally based in Nairobi—UNSOM staff will be located in Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Garowe. A further expansion of UNSOM’s field presence to Baidoa, Beletweyne and Kismayo among other cities is anticipated as political and security conditions permit. The deployment of UNSOM has a particular significance both in terms of the Council’s intent and Somali public perception, considering the relative lack of UN staff based in the country since the departure of UN peacekeepers in March 1995.

On 6 June, Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson briefed the Council on the report of the Secretary-General released 31 May (S/2013/326) and other recent developments in Somalia (S/PV.6975). Somali Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs Fowsiyi Yusuf Haji Adan and Ambassador Tekeda Alemau (Ethiopia) also addressed the Council, the latter speaking on behalf of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). After the briefing, the Council adopted a presidential statement welcoming the international conference on Somalia held in London on 7 May and the deployment of UNSOM (S/PRST/2013/7).

Following conflicting claims on 15 May to the presidency of the self-declared state of Jubaland, whose formation remains unrecognised by the federal government, fighting erupted on 7 June among rival clans in the economically significant port city of Kismayo, leaving at least 18 dead after two days of clashes. On 13 June, Assistant Secretary-General Tayé-Brook Zerihoun briefed Council members in consultations under “any other business” regarding the situation in the Juba regions of Somalia. After the briefing by Zerihoun, the Council issued a press statement (SC/11032) welcoming the commitment of the federal government to take the lead in reconciliation and supporting the offer of assistance made by IGAD in its communiqué of 24 May.

On 13 June, the Chairperson of the AU Commission released a report addressing several issues raised by resolution 2093 of 6 March. The report is highly critical of the current support package provided by the UN for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): low budgetary allocations; slow logistics; poor equipment servicing; and insufficient armed personnel carriers and helicopters for the geography of operations. The report also suggests AMISOM is inadequately staffed and resourced to assume guard force tasks on the scale required by UNSOM. The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) then issued a communiqué on 13 June calling for: additional force multipliers and enablers; logistical support for the Somali National Security Forces; dedicated funds for training and capacity-building; and a re-evaluation of the guard force.

At press time, Hassan Dahir Aweys, one of Al Shabaab’s senior leaders, is reported to have surrendered to the government of Somalia. Aweys is currently subject to an asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo under the Somalia sanctions regime.

The previous report from the Emergency Relief Coordinator was transmitted to the Council on 19 November 2012 (S/2012/856). The report noted problems with insecurity and “gatekeepers” but suggested that the diversion and misuse of humanitarian aid has decreased.

Key Issues
In July, while watching the overall situation, the Council will be principally concerned with issues directly related to the sanctions regime, including:

- the influence the partial lifting of the arms embargo has had on the dynamics of the conflict;
- the effect the charcoal export ban has had on Al Shabaab finances;
- the effect the travel ban and asset freeze have had on the insurgency; and
- whether the sanctions have been effective, and options to improve implementation.
Options
One option for the Council is to renew the mandate of the Monitoring Group for one year without any substantive revisions to the Somalia sanctions regime.

Another option would be to strengthen the Monitoring Group by increasing the number of arms experts. (Resolution 2093 gives the Monitoring Group responsibility for assessing the government’s infrastructure and procedures for storage, registration, maintenance and distribution of weapons, as well as monitoring the misappropriation or sale of weapons to other groups.)

In order to improve analysis and implementation of the charcoal export ban, a further option for the Council could be to consider the addition of an expert on conflict commodities to the Monitoring Group.

Another option could be increasing AMISOM’s authorisation by at least 1,000 troops, as suggested in the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission, in order to provide an adequate guard force in all four sectors.

Council and Wider Dynamics
At present, the Council appears to be united on Somalia policymaking, particularly in comparison to when contentious issues such as structural integration and a partial lifting of the arms embargo had not yet been decided. This was evident in the Council quickly reaching consensus during negotiation of the presidential statement adopted 6 June and press statements issued on 13 and 19 June.

The difficult security situation in Somalia has significant implications for the UN’s relations and interaction with the government, Somali civil society and its own staff. Practical assistance with peacebuilding and statebuilding will require frequent interaction between government officials and UN staff, but even in Mogadishu the security conditions do not yet exist for the free movement of civilian personnel. After the 19 June attack on the UN compound, the UN Staff Union urged the Secretary-General to take additional security measures prior to increasing the size of UNSOM. However, the more substantial and restrictive these changes are, the more difficult it will be to interact with the government and civil society and the UN could ultimately run the risk of renewed accusations regarding a “bunker mentality”.

As evidenced by the content of the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and the communiqué of the AU PSC issued on 13 June, relations between the AU and the UN are increasingly tenuous concerning Somalia. At a basic level, the core issue seems to be institutional contestation over who will bear the cost—both financial and human—for the war against Al Shabaab. At a deeper level, current disagreements reflect long-standing tensions and ambiguity regarding decision-making authority, the division of labour and financing obligations.

Conflicting positions regarding the implementation of a federal system also pose significant difficulties. Resolution of the worsening situation in the Juba regions will be critical for the central government, particularly because it has clear implications for relations between the core and periphery in other contexts. If Mogadishu concedes too much autonomy to local actors in the self-declared state of Jubaland, then it may never attain control over the regional state-formation process. On the other hand, if the central government either fails to facilitate reconciliation or attempts to impose what is perceived as an inequitable solution, then a negative precedent will have been set for future negotiations with Punland and Somaliland.

There are also important regional inter-state dynamics. IGAD has offered to assist the government with mediation of the conflict in the Juba regions. However, the situation is potentially complicated by rival claimants to the “presidency” of the unrecognised state each having external backers: Ahmed Madobe, leader of the Ras Kamboni militia, has been aligned with Kenya, while Barre Hirale, a former defence minister, is widely perceived to be tacitly supported by the central government of Somalia. Kenya may see an allied administration in the Juba regions as a buffer against Al Shabaab and part of its exit strategy from AMISOM. The government of Somalia cannot afford to lose AMISOM’s Kenyan contingent, but it is also unwilling to cede control over Kismayo.

The UK is the penholder on Somalia, and the Republic of Korea is the chair of the Sanctions Committee on Somalia and Eritrea.

Israel/Palestine

Expected Council Action
In July the Council is expected to hold its quarterly open debate on the Middle East following a briefing by the Department of Political Affairs. Discussions will likely focus on the stalled Middle East peace process. The briefing will also likely cover recent events in Syria and Lebanon.

Key Recent Developments
The Security Council’s last quarterly open debate on the Middle East was held on 24 April. In the briefing before the debate, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman stated that there was now an opening to achieve the two-state solution in reference to the initiative of newly appointed US Secretary of State John Kerry.

Since then, the Council has received two additional briefings on Israel/Palestine. In his briefing on 22 May, Special Coordinator Robert Serry reported on US efforts to reengage Israel and Palestine in direct talks and on the 29 April visit of Arab leaders to Washington, D.C. to reaffirm the importance of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. On 15 May, representatives of Palestine, Jordan and the Arab League
met with Togo, the President of the Council that month, requesting that the Council pronounce itself as actively engaged in efforts to revive the peace process. The request was brought to Council members’ attention under “any other business” during 16 May consultations. However, there was no outcome following the 22 May briefing.

On 25 June, Assistant Secretary-General Oscar Fernández-Taranco briefed the Council. He reported that safeguarding the two-state solution was imperative to regional stability, but that a rush to negotiations without buy-in from both Israel and Palestine would be counter-productive. He also said that the Palestinian economic crisis cannot be resolved without progress on the political track.

Since US President Barack Obama’s March trip to the region, Kerry has undertaken four visits attempting to reengage Israelis and Palestinians in negotiations. At press time, it seems a fifth trip was being planned for late June. However, analysts see resumption of negotiations as unlikely, especially with the region (particularly Syria) in flux, the peace process no longer tops Israeli foreign policy concerns. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas requested clear terms of reference for negotiations from Kerry by 20 June to break the impasse, including talks on the basis of the 1967 borders, a freeze on settlement construction and the release of Palestinian prisoners. In the absence of any clear plan from Kerry, Abbas has indicated he might resume diplomatic activities afforded by the non-member state observer status granted by the General Assembly in November 2012—a reference to possibly becoming a party to the Rome Statute of the ICC.

Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad resigned on 11 April and his successor, Rami Hamdallah, was sworn in on 6 June. On 20 June, Hamdallah offered his resignation to Abbas, reportedly due to a conflict over authority. Hamdallah was a political independent in a Fatah-dominated cabinet.

On 15 May, Fatah and Hamas set a three-month deadline to form a unity government following a meeting of the two factions in Cairo. (Reconciliation was originally agreed in April 2011 and again in February 2012, to date with no results and no elections.)

On 14 May, the ICC announced it would examine the referral by the Union of the Comoros of the 2010 Gaza flotilla incident to establish whether criteria for opening an investigation are met. An Istanbul-based law firm prepared the referral on behalf of the Comoros, a party to the Rome Statute. (On 31 May 2010, Israeli naval forces boarded a flotilla in international waters. The flotilla’s intent was to break the Israeli naval blockade and deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza. A confrontation on the vessel Mavi Marmara resulted in nine civilian deaths, all Turkish nationals.)

Human Rights-Related Developments
In January, Israel failed to appear before the working group of the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) for its second review. (This was the first time that a state was absent from its own review, reportedly in protest over a report of the international fact-finding mission on the implications of Israeli settlements on the human rights of Palestinians.) On 5 June, the Human Rights Council received a report related to Israel’s non-cooperation with the UPR that noted on several occasions Israel had been urged to resume its cooperation (A/HRC/23/CRP.1). On 3 June, Israel expressed its intention to cooperate and resolve all outstanding issues. The President of the Human Rights Council strongly encouraged Israel to participate in its own UPR, now scheduled for 29 October 2013.

Key Issue
The key issue remains the lack of progress in the Israel/Palestine peace process and whether the Security Council can have any impact on that process.

Underlying Problems
The major obstacles facing the peace process remain unchanged: the Palestinian Authority requires an end to settlement activity, and more recently the release of prisoners, as prerequisites for negotiations, while Israel will only accept talks without preconditions.

A further complication is the possibility that the Palestinian Authority could use its upgraded status at the UN to press claims against Israel through the ICC, an action that Israel would find counter-productive to returning to negotiations.

The lack of progress on reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas further impedes the possibility of reaching a solution even if negotiations were to resume. Israel considers Hamas a terrorist organisation and so will not negotiate with any Palestinian government that includes it.

Options
The Council has very few options in July. It is likely that the open debate will again feature the reiteration of Council members’ previously stated positions before quickly moving on to Syria.

Should the Council want to take a more active role in the peace process, an option, albeit highly unlikely, may be to adopt a resolution that would do one or more of the following:

- reaffirm past Council decisions that Israeli settlements in the occupied territory are illegal and constitute a major obstacle to peace;
- outline parameters for renewed negotiations between the parties; or
- call on the Quartet—comprising the EU, Russia, the UN and the US—to resume its diplomatic push and report back to the Council (the Quartet has not met in over a year).

Council and Wider Dynamics
Most Council members believe that no activity will be possible in the Council on the peace process without the active support of the US and are waiting to see what, if anything, develops from Kerry’s efforts.

China has recently strengthened its bilateral approach to the peace process saying that the challenges are too complicated for the U.S. to address alone. Beijing also hosted a UN conference on this issue on 19 June and hosted Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in back-to-back visits on 6 and 8 May. However, most Council members do not expect this engagement to fundamentally affect the dynamics in the Council.

Few, if any, Council members would disagree that any agreement must be reached through direct talks. However, most consider that this does not rule out a Council role in the peace process. Nevertheless, the Council is unlikely to take any action despite ongoing reports from the Secretariat that the situation on the ground undermines the possibility of a two-state solution.

The Council is at a standoff on Israel/Palestine because an overwhelming amount of political energy is being consumed by the Syrian crisis and its regional spillover, with little left to confront the particularly rigid US position on this issue.

In the past, the Council had outsourced its role to the Quartet, which seems to be similarly frozen, the principals not having met since September 2011.

The US is the lead on Israel/Palestine.
Expected Council Action
In July, Special Coordinator Derek Plumbly will brief Council members in consultations on the Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of resolution 1701, which called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006. The report is due by the end of June. The Council’s consideration of Lebanon in July will feed into the renewal of the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which expires on 31 August.

Key Recent Developments
Council members last heard from Plumbly on 14 March when he briefed on the 27 February 400,000–made up at least 10 percent of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon, more than in any other of Syria’s neighbours. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees said the impact of the conflict in Syria on Lebanon was raised again during an open humanitarian briefing on Syria on 18 April, when the UN High Commissioner for Refugees said Syrian refugees—at that time approximately 400,000–made up at least 10 percent of the Lebanese population. As of 25 June there were 564,039 Syrian refugees in Lebanon, more than in any other of Syria’s neighbours. The upcoming 1701 report will likely pay increased attention to the Syrian refugee situation, especially in the south of Lebanon, and its impact on UNIFIL.

On 30 April, Jordan addressed the Council regarding the influx of Syrian refugees and invited the Council to visit Jordan. During deliberations on the proposal it was suggested that any such visiting mission should also include Lebanon and Turkey. Council members could not reach agreement and the visit never took place.

On 8 May, Council members were briefed in consultations by Special Envoy Terje Rød-Larsen on the Secretary-General’s latest report on the implementation of resolution 1559 (S/2013/234). Sectarian tensions in Tripoli, the influx of Syrian refugees and Israeli aerial attacks on Syria to disrupt arms shipments to Hezbollah were al key areas of discussion.

Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Hervé Ladsous visited Lebanon on 14 May to meet with senior officials and discuss UNIFIL’s cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Ladsous stressed the importance of safeguarding Lebanon’s stability from the negative impact of regional developments—a reference to the Syrian crisis.

Assistant Secretary-General Oscar Fernández-Taranco also addressed the spill-over effects during a horizon-scanning briefing by the Department of Political Affairs to Council members on 4 June and at the monthly Middle East briefing on 23 June. He reported that Hezbollah’s announcement on 25 May of its military involvement in Syria on behalf of the Syrian government marked a turning point in the heightening sectarian tension in Lebanon.

Hezbollah’s decisive role in aiding the Syrian forces has aggravated sectarian violence across Lebanon—in Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, Tripoli and most recently Sidon in southern Lebanon. At press time, clashes in Sidon were particularly fierce between the LAF and armed supporters of Ahmad al-Assir, a Sunni cleric opposed to Hezbollah. Clashes erupted on 23 June precipitated by the arrest of an Assir supporter at an LAF checkpoint followed by Assir supporters opening fire on the checkpoint. On 24 June, Special Coordinator Plumbly met with P5 ambassadors to Lebanon in Beirut. They were unanimous in deploiring the attacks against the LAF and urged support for the Lebanese state institutions, particularly the army. The Secretary-General made a similar statement on the same day.

On 31 May the Lebanese parliament postponed June 2013 elections until November 2014. This is the first time since Lebanon’s civil war ended in 1990 that parliament has extended its term. The decision was taken in the context of increased sectarian tension and the political stalemate following the 22 March resignation of Prime Minister Najib Mikati. (Mikati is currently in a caretaker role until the prime minister-designate Tamam Salam can form his cabinet.)

On 18 June, the 14 March political coalition asked President Michel Sleiman to call on Hezbollah to withdraw from Syria and for the LAF to deploy along the Syrian border with the support of international forces (a reference to UNIFIL, which does not have a mandate to deploy outside its area of operations in southern Lebanon). The forthcoming 1701 report is expected to highlight that LAF has redeployed just north of UNIFIL’s area of operations in response to the security situation though it is ready to redeploy south if necessary.

Regarding the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, October 2013 is the earliest possible start for the trial in absentia of four individuals charged in the February 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. On 29 April, the Tribunal decided to investigate whether three incidents in which Hezbollah-associated media outlets published alleged witness identities could be considered interference with the administration of justice.

Key Issues
The key issue is that the conflict in Syria, and more recently Hezbollah’s unambiguous involvement there on behalf of the regime, has continued to negatively impact the political and security situation in Lebanon.

Ongoing issues are the Israeli occupation of areas north of the Blue Line (the border demarcation between Israel and Lebanon), including the village of Ghajar, in violation of resolution 1701.

The fact that Hezbollah maintains a significant military capacity beyond the control of the LAF remains a key issue.

Regular Israeli overflights in Lebanese airspace continue to be a source of concern—theses were particularly intensified during Israel’s 3 and 5 May airstrikes on Syria.

Underlying Problems
Lebanon’s official policy is one of disassociation from the Syrian crisis. However, sectarian
Lebanon (con’t)

violence and the burgeoning refugee situation throughout the country provide evidence of the pressures such a policy must withstand. Achieving a formal ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon is impossible so long as the Syrian conflict continues to both destabilise Lebanon and derail the Israel-Syria peace track.

Options

The most likely option for the Council in July is to take no action. However, Council members could issue a statement stressing their support for the LAF. Political support in Lebanon for LAF activities is particularly challenging given the current political stalemate.

An unlikely option is for the Council to reconsider the possibility of a visiting mission to the region in light of the increasing influx of Syrian refugees, primarily into Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey.

Council Dynamics

There is consensus on the Council that UNIFIL contributes to stability between Israel and Lebanon and that the Council must remain vigilant regarding the effects of spillover from the Syrian conflict into UNIFIL’s area of operations.

Regarding the political situation, many Council members view the postponement of elections and the discernible uptick in sectarian violence following Hezbollah’s decision to fight on behalf of the Syrian regime as worrisome developments.

France is the lead on Lebanon in the Council.

Iraq

Expected Council Action

In July, Council members are due to receive the Secretary-General’s most recent report on the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), and the outgoing Special Representative Martin Kobler is expected to brief them on its contents. The Council will likely adopt a resolution extending UNAMI, whose mandate expires on 24 July. The resolution is also expected to acknowledge the addition of the mandate formerly assigned to the High-Level Coordinator for Iraq/Kuwait Missing Persons and Property to the mandate of UNAMI, transferring Iraq’s obligations in this regard from Chapter VII to Chapter VI of the UN Charter.

Key Recent Developments

Council members held consultations on Iraq on 27 June, following a briefing by the Department of Political Affairs, on the 35th report of the Secretary-General on Iraq’s non-compliance set out in resolution 1284 (1999) regarding the repatriation or return of Kuwaiti and third country nationals or their remains and the return of Kuwaiti property, including archives that had been seized by Iraq. In that report, the Secretary-General recommended that the mandate previously assigned to the High-Level Coordinator on Iraq-Kuwait issues be folded into the mandate of UNAMI. This recommendation followed the 4 June horizon-scanning briefing from the DPA, at which Assistant Secretary-General Oscar Fernández-Taranco highlighted the progress that had been made in the normalisation of relations between Iraq and Kuwait. In particular, Fernández-Taranco pointed to two letters from Kuwait to the Council and the Secretary-General (dated 30 May) that acknowledged advances in the maintenance of the border between the two countries and on the issue of missing Kuwaiti and third-country persons and property. Additionally, the letter on missing persons and property asked the Council to adopt a resolution that would add the High-Level Coordinator’s mandate to UNAMI’s responsibilities (transferring it from Chapter VII to Chapter VI) and ensure the following elements:

- follow-up on Iraq/Kuwait issues would not end with the termination of the mandate of UNAMI;
- the Secretary-General’s reporting on Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property would be separate from the regular reporting on UNAMI; and
- UNAMI would have a dedicated official whose sole responsibility would be Iraq/Kuwait issues.

The Council adopted resolution 2107 on 27 June, formally transferring the mandate to UNAMI and taking into account the additional elements proposed by Kuwait.

Iraq held provincial elections on 20 April in 12 of its 18 provinces. The party of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki won the most seats of any party (102 out of 378 possible provincial council seats) but fewer seats than it had won in 2009. Elections in Kirkuk and the three semi-autonomous Kurdish provinces were separately scheduled for 21 September, while elections in Anbar and Nineveh provinces were delayed due to security concerns stemming from antigovernment protests that have been ongoing since December 2012. On 14 June, a candidate from the Iraqi Republican Gathering party was assassinated in Mosul (in Nineveh province), the sixth such assassination in recent weeks. Elections in Anbar and Nineveh were ultimately held on 20 June, despite the fact that protests continued. (Results in those elections were not known at press time.)

Iraqi leaders made some efforts towards advancing dialogue in the hopes of ending the political stalemate that has predominated in Iraq for more than a year. On 1 June, Ammar al-Hakim—the leader of the Shi’a political party, the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council—organised a meeting that included al-Maliki and Parliament Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi (they had long opposed one another), as well as several other political and religious leaders. Participants did not reach any decisions at the meeting, but did agree to meet again. On 9 June, al-Maliki visited Erbil, where he met with the President of the Kurdistan Regional...
Iraq (con’t)

Government, Massoud Barzani. It was their first meeting in more than two years.

Violence in Iraq continued in April, May and June at levels not seen in Iraq since 2008. According to UNAMI, 712 civilians were killed and more than 1,600 were wounded in attacks in April, whereas 1,045 were killed and more than 2,300 were wounded in May. As of 24 June, the independent public database Iraq Body Count had estimated that 466 civilians had been killed in June. In remarks to the press on 6 June, Kobler condemned an attack that killed 14 border-guard policemen and civilians, and on 16 June he condemned a wave of bombings targeting predominantly Shi’a areas that killed at least 33 people. On 11 June, the Secretary-General also voiced concern regarding the upsurge in violence in Iraq and called on all parties to redouble their efforts towards reconciliation.

In June, violence also struck Camp Hurriya (also known as Camp Liberty), the temporary home of more than 3,000 exiles belonging to the Mujahedin-e Khalq Iran (an organisation opposed to the government in Tehran) who previously resided at Camp Ashraf. A mortar attack on the camp on 15 June killed two and wounded dozens. In a statement condemning the attack the next day, Kobler reiterated requests made to the government of Iraq for more protective measures to be installed at Camp Hurriya and to the international community for countries to come forward with serious offers to resettle Camp Hurriya residents outside Iraq. A 15 June statement from António Guterres, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, also condemned the attack and reiterated the same requests. On 20 June the residents of Camp Hurriya and Camp Ashraf submitted a petition of relief to the Council, the Secretary General and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights requesting the UN return the residents of Camp Hurriya to Camp Ashraf and place the latter under the control of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The petition also called for an investigation of alleged misconduct by Kobler.

On 10 June, the Secretary-General announced that he had appointed Kobler as his Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and head of the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC, effective 1 August. At press time, the Secretary-General had not announced who would replace Kobler as Special Representative for Iraq and head of UNAMI.

Key Issues
Key issues for the Council include determining how UNAMI can best:
• encourage efforts towards political reconciliation;
• support efforts to stem sectarian violence; and
• incorporate the mandate formerly assigned to the High-Level Coordinator on Iraq/Kuwait issues into that of UNAMI.

The Council will also be concerned with continuing efforts to protect and relocate the Iranian refugees housed in Camp Hurriya.

Underlying Problem
Sectarian divisions have deepened and anti-government protests have expanded in recent months. It remains to be seen whether tentative efforts towards political reconciliation will continue to develop in the coming weeks.

Options
In renewing the mandate of UNAMI, the Council has several options to address the variety of issues currently facing Iraq. The Council could renew UNAMI, acknowledging the mission’s added responsibilities on Iraq/Kuwait issues but not otherwise substantially changing the mandate.

Additionally, the Council could:
• express concern over the dramatic increase in sectarian violence in Iraq in recent months; or
• encourage the nascent political dialogue established between Sunni, Shia and Kurdish politicians.

Council Dynamics
Following the receipt of the 30 May letters from Kuwait, consensus appears to have developed on the Council that the mandate of the High-Level Coordinator should be added to that of UNAMI; at press time, negotiations on the expected 27 June resolution had so far proven non-contentious.

The renewal of UNAMI in July is considered a routine issue and will likely also create little controversy among Council members, though some may be interested in discussing the ways in which its mandate to provide good offices and facilitate political dialogue might be sharpened or better focused.

The US is the penholder on Iraq. (In the past, the UK has been the penholder on Iraq/Kuwait issues, and the expected 27 June resolution was authored by the US and UK.)

Cyprus

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for an additional six months before the mandate expires on 31 July. Lisa Buttenheim, the Special Representative and head of UNFICYP, will likely brief Council members in consultations on the upcoming report of the Secretary-General on Cyprus. (Resolution 2089 requested the report by 10 July.)

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative and Head of UNFICYP Lisa M. Buttenheim (USA) UNFICYP Force Commander Major General Chao Liu (China) UNFICYP Size, Composition and Cost Strength (as of 30 April 2013): 855 military personnel, 66 police, 38 international civilian personnel and 106 local civilian staff. Troop and Police Contributors: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Montenegro, Paraguay, Serbia, Slovakia, Singapore, Ukraine and the UK. Budget Appropriation (1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013): $56.97 million (one-third of which is funded by the government of Cyprus, with $6.5 million from Greece).
Key Recent Developments

The Council last met on Cyprus on 30 May, when Special Adviser Alexander Downer briefed Council members by videoconference on the prospects for the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides to return to negotiations. It appears the briefing emphasised the lack of progress in negotiations and the need for negotiations towards a peaceful solution to continue and not be neglected in the face of the economic crisis on the island. The briefing was held in advance of a social dinner hosted by Downer that brought together Buttenheim, President of the Republic of Cyprus Nicos Anastasiades and Turkish Cypriot leader Dervis Eroğlu. The dinner was the first encounter between Anastasiades and Eroğlu since Anastasiades was elected president on 17 February.

Though the dinner itself went smoothly, there was some controversy in the period leading up to it. On 17 May, the Republic of Cyprus sent a letter to the Secretary-General that apparently requested assurances that the dinner would be a social event and would not touch on any substantive issues. On 23 May, Ambassador Nicholas Emiliou (Republic of Cyprus) met with the Chef de Cabinet of the Secretary-General, Susana Malcorra, to confirm that the event would be purely social. Indeed, those attending the dinner did not touch on substantive issues in their conversations.

Further complicating the return to negotiations in May was the leak of a 77-page document prepared by the UN Good Offices Mission for the use of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot negotiators detailing the convergences reached by the two sides in the course of negotiations that occurred between 2008 and 2012. Some on the Greek Cypriot side have expressed worry that the document would bind Greek Cypriot negotiators to the positions it contained.

The question of reunification has been overshadowed in recent months by economic concerns. During the elections in February, the economy reigned as the primary campaign issue for candidates and voters, and on 30 April the parliament of the Republic of Cyprus approved a $13 billion bailout from the EU and IMF asking for the bailout to be overhauled, as its effects have been more deleterious than expected. On 19 June, the government issued a statement denying that the letter was intended to renegotiate the terms of the bailout.

There have been signs that a return to negotiations may be near. On 5 May, following a meeting with Anastasiades, Buttenheim announced that she was “quite persuaded” that the president was committed to a solution. On 10 June, press reports quoted Eroğlu as saying that renewed negotiations could begin in October. On 19 June, a spokesperson for the government of the Republic of Cyprus announced that the selection of a chief negotiator for the Greek Cypriots would take place in mid-July.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 20 March, during the 22nd session of the Human Rights Council (HRC), then Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Kyung-wha Kang presented the High Commissioner’s report on Cyprus covering the period from 1 December 2011 to 30 November 2012 (A/HRC/22/18). The main concerns included the right to life and the question of missing persons, non-discrimination, freedom of movement, property rights, freedom of religion and the right to education. Kang said that addressing the underlying human rights issues should be an increasingly important part of peacekeeping efforts. The report also welcomed the first-ever visit to Cyprus by a special procedure mandate-holder, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, in March-April 2012. Bielefeldt briefed the HRC on 5 March on the findings of his mission.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council remains the question of how to support and re-energise negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots towards reunification, which have not taken place since April 2012.

In the context of the renewal of UNFICYP, some questions remain for the Council:
• to what degree and to what ends can the resolution renewing UNFICYP be used to exert political pressure on the parties; and
• if and how a potential review of UNFICYP should figure into the resolution.

Options

The most likely option for the Council is to simply adopt a resolution renewing the mandate of UNFICYP for a further six months.

Less likely options include adding language to the resolution noting the lack of progress since 2012 and encouraging the parties to return to negotiations as soon as possible.

An additional option would be to add language addressing the underlying human rights issues detailed in the latest High Commissioner’s report on human rights in Cyprus.

Council Dynamics

The dynamics on the Council with regard to Cyprus have not changed since the last mandate renewal. France and Russia tend to support the Greek Cypriot position while Azerbaijan (which abstained from resolution 2089 during the January renewal), in particular, hews closely to the Turkish Cypriot position. Other Council members, such as the UK, are most interested in cutting costs by beginning to drawdown UNFICYP. Such a move, some argue, could put pressure on the sides to return to negotiations and achieve a solution more speedily. This notion has some opposition on the Council, as was especially evident during the adoption of resolution 2058 in July 2012, since the Greek Cypriots and like-minded Council members find the proposal of a review (and the implication of a potential drawdown of UNFICYP) particularly objectionable. Similar divisions exist among Council members on the question of whether or not to include any elements in the renewal resolution making reference to the political situation on the island. Some Council members have expressed scepticism about whether such references would be productive at present.

Additionally, dynamics on the Council have emerged in the past year regarding the degree of openness in the process by which the UNFICYP resolutions are drafted. In July 2012, Pakistan abstained from resolution 2058, saying that “not enough time was given to all Council members to engage in open and transparent negotiations”. The January renewal, by comparison, was far less contentious. Many Council members feel that the UK (the penholder on Cyprus) has made the drafting process significantly more inclusive, though some still doubt the degree to which suggestions from beyond the P5 are seriously considered by the drafters.
UNRCCA (Central Asia)

Expected Council Action
In July, Miroslav Jenča, the Special Representative and head of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA), is expected to brief Council members in consultations. As has been established practice since these semi-annual briefings began in 2008, a press statement welcoming UNRCCA’s role as a preventive-diplomacy tool is expected.

Key Recent Developments
Jenča last briefed Council members on 29 January. In a press statement following the briefing (SC/10903), Council members stressed the need for further coordination and cooperation between UNRCCA, the governments of the region and regional organisations. They also expressed their appreciation for the centre’s role in preventive diplomacy, in particular with regard to trans-boundary threats, regional stability, management of water and energy resources and environmental degradation. Furthermore, they noted the centre’s success in helping implement the UN’s global counter-terrorism strategy and its role in facilitating Central Asian states’ engagement with regard to Afghanistan.

In the period since the January briefing, Jenča travelled first to Kazakhstan from 14-15 February and then to Germany from 20-21 February for high-level bilateral talks. The meeting with Kazakh officials focused on water and energy issues, terrorism and extremism and the impact of developments in Afghanistan. In Germany, discussions focused primarily on developments and potential trends in the region, taking into account the planned withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF). Other, more general issues, such as water and energy resource management and terrorism were also addressed.

On 22-24 April, UNRCCA organised an international seminar in Tajikistan in cooperation with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime entitled “Challenges in addressing the illicit drugs problem in Central Asia in the context of the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan in 2014”.

On 26 April, Jenča attended a “Heart of Asia” ministerial conference in Almaty, Kazakhstan. The conference was part of the Istanbul process on Afghanistan launched in November 2011 to promote coordination between Afghanistan and neighbouring countries in dealing with common threats, such as terrorism, drug trafficking, poverty and extremism.

On 5 June, also in Almaty, Jenča participated in a ministerial conference on protection of refugees and international migration organised by the government of Kazakhstan, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organisation for Migration.

On 13-14 June, Jenča travelled to Beijing for high-level talks focusing on political and security dynamics in Central Asia and prospects for increased regional cooperation.

Background on UNRCCA
Based in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, UNRCCA was inaugurated on 10 December 2007 as a special political mission by the Department of Political Affairs with the aim of assisting the countries of the region (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) in building conflict-prevention capacities. UNRCCA’s latest programme of action for 2012-2014 focuses on three areas:

- impact of trans-boundary threats facing the region (terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking);
- implications of national developments on regional stability; and
- management of common natural resources and environmental degradation.

UNRCCA’s mandate includes working with the governments of the region and other parties on issues relevant to preventive diplomacy; monitoring the situation on the ground; maintaining relationships with regional organisations and encouraging their peace-making efforts; providing a political framework for the preventive activities of the UN country teams and resident coordinators across the region; and maintaining close contact with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.

Key Issues
A key issue for Council members is the general security situation in the region, including underlying risks of ethnic conflicts, terrorism and resource-management concerns.

Another issue is the potential impact on the region of the expected withdrawal of international troops from Afghanistan and UNRCCA’s role in this context.

A further issue is whether there may be opportunities to further enhance UNRCCA’s role as a preventive-diplomacy tool.

Options
The most likely option for Council members is to issue a press statement, as it has done in the past, reaffirming its support for UNRCCA’s activities in the region.

Council Dynamics
Council members are generally supportive of the work of UNRCCA and believe it plays a useful role in preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention. They seem to welcome the semi-annual briefings as an opportunity to focus on the situation in Central Asia as a whole, including the impact of developments in Afghanistan.

Russia is the penholder on UNRCCA press statements.
# Notable Dates for July

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<tr>
<td>28 June</td>
<td>SG report on MONUSCO (DRC)</td>
<td>S/RES/2098</td>
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<td>28 June</td>
<td>Special Envoy’s report on the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region</td>
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<td>Group of Experts interim report to the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee</td>
<td>S/RES/2078</td>
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<td>30 June</td>
<td>SG report on BINUCA (CAR)</td>
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<td>SG report on UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire)</td>
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<td>8 July</td>
<td>SG report on UNFICYP (Cyprus)</td>
<td>S/RES/2089</td>
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<td>11 July</td>
<td>SG report on UNAMI (Iraq)</td>
<td>S/RES/2061</td>
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<td>12 July</td>
<td>Monitoring Group annual reports to the 751/1907 Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee (separate reports on Eritrea and Somalia)</td>
<td>S/RES/2060</td>
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<td>15 July</td>
<td>SG report on UNAMID (Darfur)</td>
<td>S/RES/2063</td>
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<td>22 July</td>
<td>Somalia Emergency Relief Coordinator report</td>
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<th>MANDATES EXPIRE</th>
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<tr>
<td>19 July</td>
<td>UNMISS (South Sudan)</td>
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<td>25 July</td>
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<td>25 August</td>
<td>Monitoring Group to the 751/1907 Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee (but expected to be renewed in late July)</td>
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