Overview

Togo will preside over the Security Council in May.

Togo’s President Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé will preside over a debate on “Peace and Security in Africa: the challenges of the fight against terrorism in Africa in the context of maintaining international peace and security” with the Secretary-General providing a briefing.

The quarterly debate on Kosovo with a briefing by Farid Zarif, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Integrated Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and the semi-annual debate on Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a briefing by the High Representative Valentin Inzko, are also expected.

Briefings are expected on:
- the work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe by its Chairperson-in-Office Leonid Kozhara;
- the work of the counterterrorism subsidiary bodies—the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee; the 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee; and the 1540 Committee on weapons of mass destruction—by their respective chairs, Ambassador Gary Quinlan (Australia); Ambassador Mohammed Loulichki (Morocco); and Ambassador Kim Sook (Republic of Korea);
- the Secretary-General’s report on the Lord’s Resistance Army and on the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) by Abou Moussa, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNOCA; and
- on the situation in Libya and the proceedings of the International Criminal Court (ICC) by ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda.

Briefings, followed by consultations, are likely on:
- the Secretary-General’s report on the integrated strategy for the Sahel by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel Romano Prodi;
- the Secretary-General’s report and developments in the Central African Republic by Margaret Vogt, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA);
- the Secretary-General’s consolidated report on Guinea-Bissau by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) José Ramos-Horta; and
- the situation in the Middle East, by Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman.

Briefings in consultations are likely on:
- developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, by the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy Mary Robinson;
- Sudan and South Sudan issues, twice, most likely by, respectively, the Secretary General’s Special Envoy Haile Menkerios and Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet;
- the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) by Mulet;
- the implementation of resolution 1559, by Special Envoy Terje Rød-Larsen;
- Sudan sanctions, by the chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee Ambassador María Cristina Perceval (Argentina); and
- the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) by the chair of the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg).

Formal sessions will need to be held to adopt resolutions to:
- establish a new UN assistance mission in Somalia;
- renew the mandate of UNISFA; and
- renew the mandate of UNIOGBIS.

A wrap-up session in a private meeting is planned by Togo at the end of the month. Throughout the month, Council members will be following closely the developments in Syria, and a meeting on this issue may be scheduled.
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Afghanistan
On 4 April, the Council issued a press statement in which it condemned a terrorist attack that occurred in Farah Province in the western part of Afghanistan, which caused numerous deaths and injuries, mainly to civilians (SC/10967).

Yemen
On 4 April, Council members received a briefing in consultations by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Yemen, Jamal Benomar, mainly on the National Dialogue Conference that opened on 18 March. On 12 April, the Council issued a press statement welcoming Yemen’s reorganisation of the military and calling on “all parties to support the President’s decrees and to work to ensure their prompt implementation,” (SC/10969).

Western Sahara
On 11 April, the Council held a closed meeting with the troop and police-contributing countries to MINURSO (S/PRST/2013/7). On 22 April, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of MINURSO, Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber (Germany), and the Secretary General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross (US), briefed Council members in consultations on MINURSO’s activities and recent developments since the Secretary-General’s latest report (S/2013/220). In his briefing Ross covered his visits to North Africa from 18 March to 3 April and from 8 to 11 April. On 25 April, Council members adopted resolution 2099 and extended the mandate of MINURSO for another year. A draft resolution prepared by the US, the penholder on Western Sahara, had been discussed earlier by the Group of Friends of Western Sahara (France, Russia, Spain, the UK and the US) and between the US and Morocco in bilateral consultations. The initial draft apparently included language giving MINURSO a mandate to monitor and gather information on human rights violations and included a reference to human rights monitoring in the camps near Tindouf, Algeria, but by the time the draft was distributed to all Council members, this language had been withdrawn.

Prevention of Conflicts in Africa
On 15 April, the Council held a briefing on “Prevention of conflicts in Africa: addressing the root causes” (S/PV.6946). Louise Mushikivabo, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Rwanda, presided. A concept note for the briefing had previously been circulated as an annex to a letter to the Council on 2 April (S/2013/204). The Council was briefed by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon; Tekeda Aleme, Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the UN, representing the Chairperson of the AU; and Elliott Ohin, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Togo. The Council adopted a presidential statement at the conclusion of the meeting (S/PRST/2013/4).

Côte d’Ivoire
On 16 April, the Council was briefed (S/PRST/2013/5) by Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Edmond Mulet on the Secretary-General’s special UNOCI report (S/2013/197). In the subsequent consultations, Council members also discussed the final report of the Group of Experts assisting the 1572 Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee (S/2013/228). On 25 April, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2101, renewing for a period of 12 months the sanctions regime on Côte d’Ivoire and the mandate of the Group of Experts (S/PV.6953). The resolution rolls over most of the measures in resolution 2045, namely an arms embargo, a ban on diamond exports and targeted sanctions on a number of individuals. It also includes a change in the notification system by which member states delivering non-lethal law enforcement equipment to the Côte d’Ivoire security forces may notify the Committee of any shipment to ensure the Committee keeps track of the material delivered.

Myanmar
On 16 April, Vijay Nambiar, the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser for Myanmar, briefed Council members in consultations. It was Nambiar’s first briefing to the Council since 20 June 2012. He had visited Myanmar several times since then and updated Council members on the situation on the ground in Myanmar.

Women, Peace and Security
On 17 April, Louise Mushikivabo, the Foreign Minister of Rwanda, presided over the Security Council’s open debate on Women, Peace and Security to consider the Secretary-General’s annual report on sexual violence in conflict (S/2013/149) following a briefing by the Secretary-General and Zainab Bangura, his Special Representative on the issue (S/PV.6948). In addition, Saran Keita Diakité— the President of the Women, Peace and Security Network of the ECOWAS region, Mali—spoke on behalf of the New York-based NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security. There was no outcome following the debate, however, Bangura said that she hoped the Security Council would show resolve in June 2013 and adopt a new resolution on sexual violence in conflict focused on accountability and prevention.

Syria
On 18 April, the Council received briefings on the humanitarian situation in Syria from Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos, High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict Zainab Bangura, and Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict Leila Zerrougui (S/PV.6949). Amos described the situation in Syria as a “humanitarian catastrophe”. Guterres asserted that the refugee crisis had become an “existential threat” to some of Syria’s neighbors. Bangura detailed instances of sexual violence alleged against both the opposition and forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, adding that her message to the perpetrators of such abuses is that “justice may be delayed, but it will not be denied”. Finally, Zerrougui drew the Council’s attention to the fact that more than three million children inside Syria had been affected by the conflict, and more than 600,000 children had been counted among the refugees in the subregion. Representatives of Syria, Lebanon and Turkey also made statements. Closed consultations followed the briefings, after which the Council President read elements to the press at the media stakeout in which Council members strongly condemned incidents of sexual violence and violence against children; urged all parties to protect civilians and respect international humanitarian law; and “underscored the need to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance … including where appropriate across borders in accordance with guiding...
In Hindsight: Horizon-Scanning Briefings

From November 2010 through March 2012, with a break in December 2010 during the US presidency of the Council, “horizon-scanning” briefings by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) were a regular feature of the programme of work of the Security Council. The UK initiated these briefings to provide the Council with information that might allow for better preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention. Additionally it was hoped that this format would allow for an unscripted exchange of ideas.

After a strong start, the cycle was once again broken by the US presidency in April 2012. During the next three months Azerbaijan, China and Colombia also chose not to have these briefings. France and Germany temporarily revived the practice in August and September 2012, but there have been no horizon-scanning briefings since. It seems that Rwanda, before its presidency in April of this year, showed some interest in reviving this practice but could not find sufficient support for it.

The change in attitude was due to several factors. B. Lynn Pascoe, the former head of DPA who conducted 14 of the 16 briefings, tended to inform Council members of the topics only a couple of days before the meeting. Many Council members wanted more time to prepare. At the start these sessions were more interactive than the average Council consultations, but they became more formal over time, with Council members reading statements.

During 2012 some members began to question the usefulness of the briefings and whether they needed to be held every month. Although never spelt out, it seems that these members may have been uncomfortable with the lack of control the Council had over the issues covered. In April 2012, the US circulated a non-paper on guidelines for the briefings, which included suggestions on the purpose, topics, members’ participation and frequency. However, some members disagreed with the text, effectively killing the idea.

Analysis of Issues Covered in Horizon-Scanning Briefings

The horizon-scanning briefings ranged from covering just one issue to more than nine. A number of issues that have since needed sustained attention by the Council—such as Gulf of Guinea piracy, Tuareg activity in northern Mali and the instability in Guinea-Bissau following the death of President Malam Bacai Sanhá—were first raised at these briefings.

These sessions were also a useful forum to discuss emerging crises such as Libya, Syria and Yemen. Although these issues featured in other Council meetings, all three were regularly on the horizon-scanning briefings, allowing the Council to be updated on fast-changing situations. These briefings also allowed for issues not discussed so regularly, such as Iraq, to be covered.

More controversial for some members was having the situation in countries such as Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives or Mexico discussed during the briefings. In these

The UK initiated these briefings to provide US presidency of the Council), “horizon-scanning Jordan represents a threat to international Council members in consultations on his own action by the Council. The Syrian conflict also dominated statements made during the quarterly open debate on the Middle East, held on 24 April (S/PV.6950 and Resumption 1). At press time, it was anticipated that Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al Hussein, Ambassador of Jordan, would address the Council in a private meeting on 30 April to seek the Council’s determination that the influx of Syrian refugees into Jordan represents a threat to international peace and security (S/2013/247).

Middle East
On 24 April the Council held a quarterly open debate on the Middle East (S/PV.6950 and Resumption 1). In his briefing to the Council, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman highlighted the destabilising effects of the conflict in Syria. He identified the need for “quick, concerted action” on Syria and added that “Action must also be taken on the Israeli-Palestinian issue... There is now an opening to develop a meaningful initiative to achieve the negotiated two-State solution.” Following Feltman’s briefing, Palestine, Israel, the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States and 41 other nations made statements.

Peacebuilding
On 25 April, the Council was briefed by Ambassadors Abulkalam Abdul Momen (Bangladesh) and Ranko Vlčić (Croatia), the former and current chairs of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), on the sixth annual report of the PBC (S/2013/63), covering the period from 1 January to 31 December 2012 (S/PV.6954). There was no outcome to the meeting.

Guinea
On 25 April Council members received a briefing on Guinea under “any other business” from Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman on the 25 April demonstrations in Conakry and the 23 April joint declaration of non-violence signed between the main Guinean stakeholders. On 29 April, the Council issued a press statement expressing concern over the volatile situation in the country, welcoming the joint declaration and calling upon all parties to cooperate with Special Representative Said Djinnit with a view towards national dialogue and free, fair, transparent and inclusive legislative elections in Guinea (SC/10992)

Wrap-Up Session
On 30 April, the Council held a “wrap-up session” of Rwanda’s April presidency under the agenda item “Implementation of Note S/2010/507 (Wrap-up Session)”. Non-Council members were invited to attend the private meeting.

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cases the briefings served as a way of alerting Council members to situations that had the potential for instability. However, some members were not comfortable with this, feeling it could give the appearance that these issues were on the Council’s agenda. Focusing on elections in particular regions, such as Africa and Latin America, also generated negative reactions. And raising situations such as Israel/Palestine and Myanmar made some members unhappy. Some members may also have found it difficult to justify discussing Camp Ashraf (now Camp New Iraq) for three consecutive months in 2012.

The rationale for including issues such as the financial implications of political missions, political field missions and problems with appointing sanctions experts may also have been questioned. It is less clear how these issues fit in with the concept of conflict prevention.

Trips made by the head of DPA were also often covered. Pascoe briefed Council members on his visits to Cameroon, Egypt, Gabon and Tunisia, and following AU meetings, often in relation to ongoing situations in the Middle East or Africa.

Reactions to these briefings had clearly changed by mid-2012. With a few exceptions, Council members reacted well to the briefings at the start. But more critical views began to be expressed by mid-2012. Among the complaints was that while in theory a good idea, in practice the briefings had been disappointing. There were calls for more analysis rather than information already in the public domain. Objections were raised about some of the issues covered, with certain members attempting to influence the agenda. In 2013 the positions of those against these briefings appear to have hardened, making it difficult to get consensus on having them at all. Few members seem willing to put the matter to a procedural vote at this point.

The horizon-scanning briefings are very much in line with Article 99 of the UN Charter, which provides that the “Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.” Resolution 1625, adopted on 14 September 2005 following a summit-level meeting on conflict prevention, encouraged the Secretary-General to provide information to the Council on developments in regions at risk of armed conflict. The 2008 and 2011 Secretary-General’s reports on preventive diplomacy cite Article 99 as the basis for his preventive mandate.

Past Secretaries-General have brought issues to the attention of the Council in other ways. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in 1959 brought the matter of a letter from Laos before the Council but specifically stated that he was not acting under Article 99 and Rule 3 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure. Instead, he said he wanted to raise the issue because he felt it was personally necessary, but he was leaving the Council the option of deciding whether or not to place the issue on its agenda (S/PV.847). In the 1990s, there were daily high-level comprehensive situation briefings provided by the Secretariat to Council members during informal consultations.

Suggestions for other ways to apprise the Council of emerging issues have included the “Any Other Business” part of Council consultations, and the once-a-month Secretary-General’s lunches and Council wrap-up sessions. While these are useful forums to raise issues, none of them currently serve the Council as early-warning mechanisms. With scant conflict prevention mechanisms in place, ensuring that horizon-scanning sessions are truly informative and interactive might be worth the effort.

**Peace and Security in Africa**

**Expected Council Action**

In May, the Council is expected to be briefed in consultations by the Secretary General’s Special Envoy for the Sahel, Romano Prodi, on the Secretary-General’s report on the Sahel. The much delayed and anticipated UN integrated strategy for the Sahel requested by the Council in resolution 2056 of 5 July 2012, is annexed to the report.

The Council also expects to hold a debate on “Peace and Security in Africa: the challenges of the fight against terrorism in Africa in the context of maintaining international peace and security” with a briefing from the Secretary-General. The debate will probably highlight the situation on the Sahel, and Togolese President Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé will preside. The chair’s of African subregional organisations are also likely to attend. A presidential statement is the anticipated outcome.

**Key Recent Developments**

In resolution 2056 the Council asked the Secretary-General to develop and implement, in consultation with regional organisations, a UN integrated strategy for the Sahel region encompassing security, governance, development, human rights and humanitarian issues. On 9 October 2012, Prodi was appointed as Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel, responsible mainly for the development of this strategy.

In a 10 December presidential statement, the Council reiterated the urgent need for an integrated UN strategy for the Sahel and for enhanced cooperation and coordination between states of the Sahel and the Maghreb in collaboration with relevant UN entities and regional and international partners, in order to combat Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (S/PRST/2012/26). The statement said this coordinated effort was necessary to prevent further progress by AQIM elements and affiliated groups in the Sahel and Maghreb regions and beyond, as well as to tackle arms
proliferation and transnational organised crime, including illicit activities such as drug trafficking.

As stated in both resolution 2056 and the presidential statement, the security dimension has been key in signalling the need for a comprehensive strategy that blurs the traditional regional boundaries between West Africa and the Maghreb.

The Sahel region has recently been the focus of increased attention by the Council and its subsidiary organs, in particular the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. The four individuals listed so far in 2013 by the Committee all operate in the Sahel. The two last entities listed are Mouvement pour l’Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO) and Ansar Eddine (5 December 2012 and 19 March 2013 respectively). A special meeting of the Committee was held in March on the situation in Mali. From 13-15 March, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) held a conference in Rabat, Morocco, on border-control cooperation in the Sahel and the Maghreb. The 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) decided to hold in the fall a special meeting open to the wider UN membership on the topic “enhancing cooperation and technical assistance to states in the Sahel region to strengthen their capacity in the global fight against terrorism”.

Under the auspices of the AU, there have been initiatives to encourage synergies in counterterrorism in the region. A ministerial-level meeting held in Nouakchott, Mauritania, on 17 March was aimed at operationalising the African Peace and Security Architecture in the Sahelo-Saharan region. On 18 April a meeting of the heads of the intelligence services in the region was held in Bamako, Mali.

The Council has issued several press statements in 2013 condemning in the strongest terms terrorist attacks in the region, including In Amenas, Algeria, (SC/10887) and on the French embassy in Tripoli, Libya (SC/10984). It also expressed its grave concern regarding the seizure of the city of Konna, Mali, by terrorist and extremist groups in January (SC/10878).

Togo, as President of the Council in May, would like the discussion to be focused on the specifics of the terrorist phenomenon in the Sahel and the Maghreb. The debate may provide a space to discuss such issues as insufficient regional cooperation, lack of resources from affected states and linkages between organised criminal networks and terrorist groups.

Key Issues
A key issue is how much leeway the Council has to get involved in structural prevention and how much added value it offers as opposed to these topics being discussed at the CTC and addressed through the CTITF.

An immediate issue is the lack of regional cooperation and trust among some countries in the region, especially when it comes to sharing intelligence.

Ensuring that prevention does not undermine state sovereignty, or is used as a cover for human rights violations is another key issue.

Options
In the adoption of a presidential statement, options for the Council include:
• requesting the Secretary-General to develop an early-warning mechanism to alert the Council of possible terrorist threats (“horizon scanning” briefings by the Department of Political Affairs, which have called the attention of the Council to situations of concern, could be used for this purpose);
• asking the CTITF and its entities to enhance cooperation with regional bodies, such as the AU Commission, the African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) and the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa (CISSA), among others;
• making full use of the 1566 Working Group, which is mandated to examine practical measures that could be imposed upon individuals, groups or entities involved in or associated with terrorist activities, other than those designated by the 1267/1989 Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee.

Council Dynamics
Although terrorism is a matter of grave concern for all Council members, a debate on a broad region can show differences in their understanding of terrorism, its causes and the most appropriate ways to address it. In the wake of resolution 1973 and the downfall of the Qaddafi regime in Libya, the issue of arms proliferation in the Sahel and their use by terrorist organisations polarised Council discussions.

In a region where some terrorist groups claim political objectives and some political movements have violent outlets, Council members may become divided over the categorisation and definition of which groups are considered terrorists.

In the past, Council members have also been divided regarding references to the payment of ransoms for hostages of terrorist groups.

Council members have had high expectations regarding the integrated UN strategy for the Sahel. As it has gone through several drafts over the last ten months, most of them have expressed some degree of frustration regarding the successive deferrals of its presentation.

Mali

Expected Council Action
Following the adoption of resolution 2100 on 25 April, which established the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to take over from the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), at press time Mali was not likely to be on the May programme of work of the Council. However, the situation in

UN DOCUMENTS ON MALI Security Council Resolution S/RES/2100 (25 April 2013) established the mandate for MINUSMA. S/RES/2085 (20 December 2012) authorised the deployment of AFISMA for one year. Security Council Letters S/2013/231 (26 March 2013) included a letter from the President of ECOWAS asking for the re-hatting of AFISMA into a UN stabilisation mission and the establishment of a parallel force. S/2013/230 (29 March 2013) included a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mali endorsing the second option of the Secretary-General’s report. Secretary-General’s Report S/2013/189 (26 March 2013) contained the Secretary-General’s recommendations for a UN mission in Mali.

Mali might be addressed in the broader context of the Sahel in the upcoming briefing by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel, Romano Prodi, and discussed in the consultations that will follow, as well as during the debate on the challenges of the fight against terrorism in Africa (both covered in a separate brief in this issue of the Monthly Forecast).

AFISMA’s authorisation expires on 20 December 2013.

Key Recent Developments
The 26 March Secretary-General’s report on Mali included two options for the establishment of a stabilisation mission (S/2013/189). The first one envisaged strengthening the current multidimensional presence in BAMako and transforming it into an integrated political presence with a better-resourced AFISMA. AFISMA would transition to a UN stabilisation mission once certain critical benchmarks were met. The second option proposed an integrated stabilisation mission with a military strength of 11,200 under Chapter VII alongside a parallel force to conduct counterterrorism operations beyond the scope of the UN’s mandate.

On 29 March, the interim Foreign Minister of Mali, Tiéman Coulibaly, noted a preference for the second option in a letter to the Secretary-General (S/2013/230). Along the same lines, Kadré Désiré Ouedraogo, President of the Commission of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), had asked in a 26 March letter to the Secretary-General that AFISMA be transformed into a robust UN stabilisation mission working alongside a parallel force with the capacity to “dislodge any regrouped terrorists or insurgents” (S/2013/231).

The options were discussed by Council members in consultations on 3 April which included briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, and the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Hervé Ladsous. Council members agreed on pursuing the second option.

After three rounds of negotiations, the Council adopted resolution 2100 on 25 April, authorising the establishment of MINUSMA for an initial period of 12 months, and the transfer of authority from AFISMA to MINUSMA on 1 July 2013. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to rehat AFISMA’s military and police personnel appropriate to UN standards. Within 60 days of the adoption of the resolution, the Council will review the timeline for the deployment of MINUSMA depending on the security situation in Mali.

The resolution authorises a force structure of 11,200 military personnel and 1,440 police personnel to:
- stabilise key population centres and support the reestablishment of state authority throughout Mali;
- support the implementation of the transitional roadmap;
- protect civilians and UN personnel;
- promote and protect human rights; and
- support humanitarian assistance, cultural preservation and national and international justice.

The resolution also authorises French troops, within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment, to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat and upon request of the Secretary-General. It also includes a request for France to report to the Council on the implementation of this mandate in Mali.

Even though Opération Serval, which France launched on 11 January, successfully rolled back the gains of the terrorist and insurgent groups that seized northern Mali shortly after the 22 March 2012 coup d’état, combat operations are still ongoing, particularly in the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. Although governors have returned to Timbuktu and Gao, starting the restoration of state authority in northern Mali, it seems the authorities have not been able to establish a presence in Kidal yet.

Additionally, the transfer of control over the security situation from French forces to AFISMA in the north has been hindered by terrorist attacks and delays in the arrival of African troops. Following a suicide bombing, which resulted in at least three casualties in Kidal, President Idriss Déby of Chad announced on 14 April that Chadian troops would retreat, claiming that they are ill-equipped to engage in guerrilla warfare. Although not part of ECOWAS, Chad deployed the largest AFISMA contingent, amounting to almost 2,000 troops and having suffered more than 30 casualties.

In the context of the political roadmap approved by the National Assembly of Mali on 29 January, on 30 March the interim government appointed former Defence Minister Mohamed Salia Sokana to chair the Commission of Dialogue and Reconciliation. The interim authorities also appointed two vice chairs and 30 commissioners.

The Support and Follow-up Group on the situation in Mali held its fourth meeting in Bamako on 19 April, under the auspices of the UN, AU and ECOWAS. The conclusions of the meeting noted the steps that had been taken towards the consolidation of state authority and the security of liberated areas, as well as the implementation of the political roadmap. They also pointed out the main challenges Mali is facing, mainly regarding the reconciliation and political processes, the allegations of violations of human rights, the reform of the Malian Defence and Security Forces, the presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for 7 and 21 July 2013 and the lack of state control in the city of Kidal.

Human Rights-Related Developments
The Human Rights Council (HRC) in resolution 22/18 of 21 March established a mandate for an independent expert on the situation of human rights in Mali. The expert will be appointed during the 23rd session of the HRC (27 May-14 June).

On 4 April, the first ten of 50 human rights observers to be deployed to Mali by the AU Peace and Security Council and ECOWAS arrived in Bamako. The observers – from Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone – completed a three-day training program before their deployment to Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal to monitor the human rights situation there.

Key Issues
A key overarching issue is to stabilise the security situation in northern Mali in order to minimise the threats to the UN stabilisation operation. A related issue will be to ensure that the operations of both the French forces and MINUSMA remain independent.

Ensuring that AFISMA has adequate financial and logistical support to fulfil its mandate until 1 July is another key issue.

Ensuring that all AFISMA troops operate within the UN human rights due diligence policy is a related issue.

The provision of electoral support in a
timely manner will be an important issue, taking into account that MINUSMA will be deployed at the earliest on 1 July and that presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled as early as 7 July.

Addressing the potentially destabilising spillover effects from Mali on an already fragile region will be an ongoing issue.

**Options**

After the establishment of a UN stabilisation operation, immediate options for the Council include:

- requesting the Secretary-General to provide basic financial and logistical support to AFISMA to ensure its ability to operate until the transfer to MINUSMA starts;
- establishing a Group of Experts to investigate the identity and activities of those involved in transnational and organised crime in Mali and the Sahel, with the possibility of imposing targeted sanctions, as recommended in the latest Secretary-General’s report; and
- making full use of the 1566 Working Group, which is mandated to examine practical measures that could be imposed upon individuals, groups or entities involved in or associated with terrorist activities, other than those designated by the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee.

**Council Dynamics**

Council members have been rather unified in the process leading to the adoption of resolution 2100. From the beginning they appeared in agreement that an integrated UN stabilisation operation, working alongside a parallel force, responded better to the needs in Mali than AFISMA under its current configuration.

However, there have been issues that have divided Council members. Although France and other members wanted to accelerate the transition towards a stabilisation operation by establishing a clear timeline and deadline, Russia and others preferred to receive a clearer assessment of the situation on the ground and prioritise a benchmark-driven process before deploying MINUSMA.

During the negotiations, views also differed on the kind of actions MINUSMA was tasked to undertake, how proactive it should be and the limits of its robust mandate. Some Council members introduced language that tightened the mandate, namely regarding the circumstances of the use of force and the definition of ‘stabilisation’. They also successfully pushed for a clear mention in the preamble reaffirming the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and clearly defined circumstances for the use of force, with the intention of being more precise in distinguishing between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

At the earlier stages of the negotiations, it seems that some Council members had concerns as to how to define the relationship between the French forces and MINUSMA as well as the role of the Council with regards to their mandate. Consequently, the resolution mentions the role of French forces supporting MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat and upon request of the Secretary-General and establishes a reporting requirement for the French forces to the Council.

France is the penholder on Mali.

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**Libya**

**Expected Council Action**

In May, the Council is due to receive the semi-annual briefing by International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, who is expected to update the Council on recent developments concerning cases in Libya.

The mandates of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee expire on 16 March 2014 and 16 April 2014, respectively.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 14 March, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2095, extending UNSMIL’s mandate by 12 months and the mandate of the PoE for 13 months. The resolution called upon Libya to continue to cooperate fully with, and provide any necessary assistance to, the ICC and the Prosecutor as required by resolution 1970. The sanctions regime was modified by removing the requirement that the Sanctions Committee approve the use of non-lethal military equipment and assistance for humanitarian or protective use. It also removed the need to notify the Committee about non-lethal military equipment being supplied to the government for security or disarmament assistance. The resolution also urged the government to improve the monitoring of arms supplied to Libya, including through the issuance of end-user certificates.

While welcoming such positive developments as the 7 July 2012 elections, the resolution also expressed concern about continuing reports of reprisals, arbitrary detentions, torture and extrajudicial executions and called for the release and safe return of all foreign nationals illegally detained in Libya.

The work of the General National Congress (GNC) was seriously impeded in March by a series of violent demonstrations that besieged its building and attacked several members, including President Mohammed Magarief. The violence was apparently in support of a political isolation law...
currently under discussion in the GNC that would bar Qaddafi-era officials from holding public office.

As highlighted by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Tarek Mitri during his 14 March Council briefing, respect for the rule of law continues to be a challenge in Libya. Although some measures have been taken to tackle this issue, mistreatment and detention without due process of several thousand people in militia-controlled detention facilities continue to be a problem.

Relations between Libya and the ICC have been tense following the request by the ICC to try Saif al-Islam Qaddafi and former intelligence chief Abdullah al-Senussi in The Hague as per the ICC referral contained in resolution 1970. Libya challenged the admissibility of both cases on 1 May 2012 claiming that they were already under investigation in Libya. After the ICC ordered Libya on 6 February 2013 to surrender al-Senussi, Libya filed a second challenge to the admissibility of the case on 2 April. An ICC Pre-Trial Chamber is expected to rule in due course regarding the challenges. (Qaddafi appeared before a local court in January and was tried on charges of undermining state security and attempting to escape from prison. At press time, he had not yet been tried on charges related to crimes allegedly committed during the uprising.)

On 23 April, a terrorist attack against the French embassy in Tripoli resulted in several injuries and severe damage. The Security Council issued a press statement condemning the attack in the strongest terms (SC/10984).

At press time, armed militiamen had blockaded and attacked at least four ministries in support of the political isolation law. In response to the pressure, the GNC suspended its sessions until 5 May when the law will be debated.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

Addressing the Human Rights Council (HRC) on 20 March, the then-UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, Kyung-wha Kang, stated that Libya was still facing considerable challenges and remained at a critical juncture. She said that the Human Rights Section of UNSMIL focused its support to the transitional authorities and civil society on five priority areas: ending conflict-related detention and preventing cases of torture and ill-treatment; strengthening the rule of law; encouraging relevant treaty ratifications and commenting on draft laws; moving forward with a comprehensive strategy on transitional justice; and promoting a human rights culture.

The following day, the HRC adopted a resolution urging Libya to continue to investigate all violations of human rights, to guarantee fair trials, to continue its efforts to prevent cases of arbitrary arrest and ill-treatment of detainees, to take further steps to protect freedom of religion and belief and to expedite the return of all persons displaced by the conflict since 2011 (A/HRC/RES/22/19).

The UN working groups on enforced or involuntary disappearances and on the use of mercenaries are due to visit Libya from 8-17 May and from 20-25 May, respectively.

**Key Issues**

An overarching issue is the fragile security situation and the impact of regional instability on Libya due to the deficient control of its porous borders. According to the final report of the PoE, most former revolutionary brigades remain in control of the weapons they used during the revolution.

Halting the proliferation of weapons stockpiled in Libya into the Sahel and beyond is a closely related issue for Council members.

A pressing issue is ensuring respect for the rule of law and reforming the legal institutions (justice system, law enforcement mechanisms and correctional facilities) in order to generate trust in the political and legal system, as well as to prevent retaliatory actions aimed at naming and shaming alleged wrongdoers without due process.

A related issue for the Council is the conflicting views of Libya and the ICC regarding the trial of the two ICC indictees and the role, if any, of UNSMIL in this context.

Another issue is to ensure the coordination between the sanctions regime and the international criminal procedures currently in place in order to allow information-sharing regarding listed individuals and prevent different procedures from undermining each other.

**Options**

Options for the Council include:
- receiving a briefing and taking no action;
- issuing a statement that would aim at enhancing sanctions effectiveness by encouraging Libya to assign a focal point structure through which all security assistance procurement should be channeled, as recommended in the final PoE report; and
- asking member states to submit designation proposals to the Sanctions Committee relating to those assisting listed individuals designated under the asset freeze measures, as recommended in the final PoE report.

**Council Dynamics**

Arms proliferation in Libya and its consequences in the region have been a source of contention among Council members since the fall of the Qaddafi regime.

Regarding the venue for the trials of al-Senussi and Qaddafi, it seems unlikely that the Council will pronounce itself in favour of Libya or The Hague, despite its referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC. In April, there have been controversies in the Council about references to the ICC in the presidential statement on conflict prevention in Africa (S/PRST/2013/4) as well as in resolution 2100 on the situation in Mali. In this context, it is unlikely that the seven Council members that are parties to the Rome Statute would push for a Council decision.

The UK is the penholder on Libya.

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**Guinea-Bissau**

**Expected Council Action**

In May, the Council expects a briefing by José Ramos-Horta, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) on the Secretary-General’s consolidated report due 30 April that will cover UNIOGBIS and the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau.

The Council is likely to adopt a resolution extending the mandate of UNIOGBIS, which expires 31 May.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 22 February, the Council reauthorised UNIOGBIS in resolution 2092 for a period of three months, thus allowing for a
substantive re-evaluation of the mandate in May based in part on a forthcoming assessment by Ramos-Horta. The Council last discussed Guinea-Bissau in consultations on 6 March, following the 28 February report of the Secretary-General on the restoration of constitutional order (S/2013/123). The Council was apparently divided on whether or not to consolidate the reporting cycles for UNIOGBIS and the reports on the restoration of constitutional order (requested in resolution 2048). Proponents cited increased efficiency while opponents suggested more frequent meetings would signal greater Council interest.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the AU and the UN have each recently called for legislation for the restoration of constitutional order. ECOWAS issued a communiqué on 28 February encouraging interim President Manuel Serifo Nhamajo to propose a feasible transitional roadmap for the conduct of free and fair general elections during 2013, urging the National Assembly to promptly adopt the plan and extending the transitional period until 31 December. On 14 March, Ramos-Horta publicly called for the adoption of a roadmap for the transition by the end of the month. Similarly, on 22 March the AU Peace and Security Council urged local political actors to accelerate efforts to propose and adopt a transitional roadmap. The transitional roadmap is currently under consideration by the National Assembly.

On 23 March, the AU released the report of the Joint ECOWAS/AU/CPLP/EU/UN Assessment Mission to Guinea-Bissau, which was based on a trip to Guinea-Bissau from 16–21 December 2012 by representatives of the five organisations. The joint mission considered a wide range of issues facing Guinea-Bissau, including a stalled transition and electoral process, the need for security sector reform, impunity for human rights violations, drug trafficking and socioeconomic decline. The joint report emphasised the urgent need for a pacte de régime (a combined and revised transition pact and political agreement) ensuring the inclusivity and legitimacy of required governance reforms. The report also called for the re-engagement of the international community in Guinea-Bissau, with particular attention to modes of coordination and harmonisation.

The UN also conducted a separate technical assessment mission (TAM) in Guinea-Bissau from 16–27 March. The TAM—composed of officials from UN offices in Brindisi, Dakar, Geneva and New York—held meetings with various national stakeholders and international partners. The principal objective of the TAM was to make recommendations regarding potential changes to the mandate, structure and strength of UNIOGBIS. Based on the preliminary findings of the TAM, UNIOGBIS may be restructured, but the mandate and resources of the mission are less likely to be considerably altered.

In a move with potentially significant ramifications for the political transition process in Guinea-Bissau, on 2 April the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) arrested Admiral José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto. He was charged with conspiracy in an arms-for-cocaine deal, in which DEA informants impersonated Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) rebels. Guinea-Bissau’s top intelligence official, Serêfo Mane, was suspended in the aftermath of Na Tchuto’s arrest. In a subsequent indictment on 18 April, the US also charged Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Antonio Injai with four counts of conspiracy related to importing cocaine from Colombia and exporting arms intended for the FARC. Injai is also currently under UN sanctions for his role in the 12 April 2012 coup.

Regarding the humanitarian situation, on 26 March the World Food Programme (WFP) announced that it had been forced to temporarily suspend food aid for an estimated 278,000 people (more than one-sixth of Guinea-Bissau’s population of 1.6 million) due to a lack of funding. WFP had not yet received donations to support the $7.1 million annual country budget. Guinea-Bissau, ranked 176th out of 187 countries surveyed by UNDP’S Human Development Index, is one of the poorest countries in the world, with 69 percent of the population living on less than two dollars a day and 33 percent living on less than one dollar per day.

Key Issues

The principal issue before the Council in May will be determining the preferred mandate, structure, strength and duration of UNIOGBIS.

The restoration of constitutional order remains a key area of concern for Council members. Organised crime, especially in the form of drug trafficking, has become a conspicuously high-profile issue and may draw increased attention in the Council.

Options

One option for the Council would be to authorise an expansion of UNIOGBIS, including increased staff and resources, in light of the recommendation in the joint assessment report for the international community to substantially re-engage in Guinea-Bissau.

An additional option for the Council would be, in line with its intention signalled in resolution 2092, to strengthen the sanctions regime by increasing the number of people targeted, broadening the type of sanctions beyond a travel ban, establishing a...
Panel of Experts and explicitly adding organised crime and drug trafficking as designation criteria. Additionally, the Council could authorise the addition of enhanced institutional capacity for UNIOGBIS to tackle drug trafficking and organised crime in collaboration with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.

Council and Wider Dynamics

The successful conduct of a joint assessment by the UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS and the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) could be an encouraging sign of increasing cooperation among international and regional actors.

However, there is also a difficult legacy of rivalry between ECOWAS and CPLP in Guinea-Bissau to overcome, pre-dating the Angolan Military Mission in Guinea-Bissau and the 12 April 2012 coup.

The UN, AU, EU and CPLP have also differed with ECOWAS on the issue of recognising the transitional government. ECOWAS has requested the AU to lift its suspension of Guinea-Bissau’s membership and asked the international community to ease the sanctions imposed on the country.

The arrest of Na Tchuto and the indictment of Injai suggest the US has given new emphasis to targeting drug trafficking in West Africa, but it remains unclear what implications this may have for the political transition in Guinea-Bissau. To what extent this might affect US positions in the Council is also an open question.

Finally, there is a degree of optimism among Council members and other key stakeholders regarding the appointment of Ramos-Horta as the Special Representative. It is hoped that his experience and standing may help bridge differences among critical actors.

Togo is the penholder on Guinea-Bissau, and Morocco is the chair of the 2048 Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Committee.

Guinea-Bissau (con’t)

Expected Council Action

In May, the Security Council may be briefed in consultations by the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, Mary Robinson, following her first trip to the region. A press statement is a possible outcome.

The mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) expires on 31 March 2014.

Key Recent Developments

On 24 February, the “Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the DRC and the Region” was signed in Addis Ababa by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia in the presence of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. The agreement obligates the DRC to implement security, government and structural reforms and to take steps towards democratisation, decentralisation and enhancing economic development and the rule of law in order to establish state authority in the eastern DRC, an area controlled by different rebel groups. It also asks the DRC to enhance the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process and for countries to cooperate by agreeing not to assist rebel groups operating in the DRC. The UN, the AU, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region are to act as guarantors of its implementation. Later that day, Council members issued a press statement welcoming the signing of the Framework (SC/10924).

The Secretary-General briefed the Council on 5 March on his 27 February special report (S/2013/119) on possible options and their implications for reinforcing the capability of MONUSCO (S/PV.6928). He recommended that the Council establish an “intervention brigade” under the command of MONUSCO and operating alongside it. This brigade would be responsible for preventing the expansion of armed groups and for neutralising and disarming them. It would include three infantry battalions deployed by SADC states. The special report also reiterated the importance of efforts to begin transferring responsibility for MONUSCO’s tasks to the UN Country Team (UNCT) in areas not affected by armed conflict, underlining the intention to eventually withdraw the mission from those areas and to maximise the use of resources. The Secretary-General informed the Council on 15 March of his intention to appoint Robinson as Special Envoy and on 25 March notified the Council that the implementation of his recommendations regarding the intervention brigade would cost an additional $140 million (S/2013/200).

The Council adopted resolution 2098 on 28 March, establishing, for an initial period of one year, an intervention brigade consisting of three infantry battalions and auxiliary forces under MONUSCO command based in Goma. Its key task is to carry out offensive operations to neutralise armed groups in

Democratic Republic of the Congo
order to reduce the threat to state and civilian security. In light of differences among Council members regarding the robust peace enforcement mandate given to the brigade, it was agreed that it was “on an exceptional basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping.” In addition, the resolution authorises MONUSCO, through its regular forces as well as this new intervention brigade, to carry out the following tasks: protection of civilians, monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo and providing support to national and international judicial processes.

In monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo in cooperation with the Group of Experts (GoE) assisting the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee, the resolution places particular emphasis on cross-border flows of military personnel and arms, including by using surveillance capabilities such as unmanned aerial systems.

The resolution authorises MONUSCO to contribute, in coordination with the UNCT, to various tasks and to transfer, as soon as feasible, any other tasks to the UNCT and to shift its presence from western to eastern DRC to the fullest extent possible.

The resolution also demands that all parties fulfil their obligations under the Framework and calls on Robinson to lead its implementation and establish benchmarks to assess the implementation. The resolution states that the Council will take appropriate measures in case of noncompliance.

The resolution asks the Secretary-General to report every three months, including on the implementation of the Framework and any risks posed to UN personnel stemming from the actions of the intervention brigade. It also expresses the Council’s intention to review progress in the implementation of the Framework following Robinson’s first visit to the region.

On 18 March, Bosco Ntaganda, for whom there has been an International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant since 7 August 2006, surrendered himself to the US embassy in Kigali, Rwanda. On 22 March he was transferred to the custody of the ICC in The Hague. Ntaganda is facing charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

In March, the GoE paid a planned visit to Rwanda and Uganda. Only four (of six) of the experts were allowed into Rwanda, which had stated in the sanctions committee its refusal to cooperate with two of the experts. The GoE’s latest annual report (S/2012/843) accused both countries of providing support to the March 23 (M23) rebellion in the DRC. While in Rwanda, the GoE visited Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) detention camps. They also requested to interview Ntaganda at the US embassy but were not given access.

On 22 March, the Council issued a press statement welcoming Ntaganda’s surrender and expressing concern that Sylvestre Mudacumura, commander of the FDLR, is still at large (SC/10956).

On 23 March, Mai-Mai Kata Katanga rebels clashed with DRC military in Lubumbashi, leaving 35 dead according to media reports. Approximately 245 rebels then took refuge in a MONUSCO compound. MONUSCO assisted in negotiating their surrender to the military.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

On 8 March, the Secretary-General’s spokesman, Martin Nesirky, said that MONUSCO had information about the involvement of two battalions of the DRC military in mass rapes and other human rights violations committed in November 2012. In line with the human rights due-diligence policy, the mission addressed two letters in February to the armed forces chief of staff to initiate the formal suspension of support to these units.

In March, the UN Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO, comprising the Human Rights Division of MONUSCO and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in the DRC) published a report on deaths in detention centres in the DRC that had been confirmed as human rights violations between January 2010 and December 2012. At least 211 persons died in the detention centres as a result of the direct action or negligence of the state or of its officers, including 54 in 2010, 56 in 2011 and 101 in 2012. These findings show that the number of such deaths in detention almost doubled in 2012 compared to the previous two years and that conditions have deteriorated since previous reports in 2004 and 2005. Prison overcrowding, malnutrition, absence or lack of appropriate medical care and the insufficiency of budgets allocated to prisons, combined with the lack of transparency in how funds intended for detention centres are managed, constituted the main causes of these deaths according to the report.

UNJHRO is also preparing a report on the human rights violations committed in Minova and in Goma in November 2012.

**Key Issues**

The key issue for the Council is to ensure the implementation of resolution 2098 and the fulfilment of the commitments made by the parties in the Framework.

Another issue is to oversee the deployment of the intervention brigade and keep abreast of any collateral effects its exceptional enforcement mandate may have over the peacekeeping mandate of MONUSCO.

**Options**

The Council can issue a press statement supporting the Special Envoy and calling on the countries in the region to fulfil their obligations and reiterating its willingness to take further measures if commitments are not met.

Another option would be a visit to the region in order to support the implementation of the Framework and show its strategic approach and a resolve to hold the parties to their commitments. (The Council visited the DRC on an annual basis between 2000 and 2010, but has failed to do so since its last visiting mission on 13-16 May 2010.)

**Council Dynamics**

During the negotiations over the resolution, and in particular the concept of the intervention brigade, some of the troop-contributing countries on the Council (China, Guatemala, Morocco and Pakistan) raised concerns about the blurring of the lines between traditional peacekeeping and robust peace enforcement, both as a matter of principle and because their own peacekeepers live will be at greater risk.

With the adoption of MONUSCO’s new mandate, Council members are aware of the need to follow closely the implementation of the resolution and the Framework. At this stage they will be interested to hear Robinson’s first impressions after visiting the region and her assessment of the ability and political will of the parties to implement the Framework. In particular, Council members will be interested in hearing her views on the capacity and political will of the DRC government to undertake security sector and other reforms, including the development of a “rapid reaction force” that is to substitute for the intervention brigade in due course.

A Council visit to the region, originally planned for February and then rescheduled to May, has been postponed, possibly to take place in October.

France is the penholder on the DRC.
Central African Republic

Expected Council Action
In May, the Security Council expects a briefing by Margaret Vogt, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), followed by consultations on the latest Secretary-General’s report on BINUCA. The report, originally due 31 March, was postponed until 30 April to take into account recent developments.

A resolution amending BINUCA’s mandate, which expires on 31 January 2014, is possible.

Key Recent Developments
Agreements between the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Séléka rebels (an alliance formed by factions of the Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix, the Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement and the Convention Patriotique pour le Salut du Peuple) were reached on 11 January in Libreville. In mid-March, the Séléka renewed fighting claiming that the government had not fulfilled its promises under the agreements. Under the 11 January agreements President François Bozizé would remain in power until elections within 18 months, and electing an interim president who would be forbidden to run in the ensuing presidential elections. According to media reports, Djotodia accepted the ECCAS framework.

Vogt briefed the Council in consultations via video-teleconference on 9 April. She told the Council that the political and security situations remained highly volatile and the humanitarian situation was dire. Vogt emphasised that the Libreville agreements were key to restoring order in the country.

On 13 April, at its first session, the TNC elected Djotodia as interim president. (Djotodia was the only candidate in the vote.) Another ECCAS summit was held in N’Djamena on 18 April with its final communiqué reiterating that the transition period remains fixed, pending free elections. ECCAS expressed its support for the ongoing political transitions in the CAR and for Tiangaye, who is to form a transitional government after wide consultations in accordance with the Libreville agreements. ECCAS further emphasised that in addition to the interim president, government ministers and TNC members could not participate in the elections. ECCAS also declared it would deploy 2,000 additional troops to its Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the CAR (MICOPAX) to assist in stabilising the situation.

On 25 April, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Leila Zerrougui, issued a statement expressing alarm about the use of child soldiers by the Séléka, indicating that “boys, uniformed and armed, have been seen patrolling, manning checkpoints and participating in looting activities across the country”.

The Council was briefed in consultations on the security, political and humanitarian situation by Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman on 29 April, after his recent visit to Cameroon and CAR, where he met with Tiangaye, representatives of political parties and civil society and Vogt. In his meeting with Tiangaye on 20 April, Feltman expressed the Secretary-General’s “deep concern over the alarming situation regarding security and human rights in the country, and the lack of public order and the rule of law”. After consultations, Council members adopted a press statement calling for the quick implementation of the ECCAS framework and expressing its concern of human rights violations in CAR (SC/10993).

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 12 April, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) said more than 2,000 children have been recruited by armed forces in the CAR since December 2012. Also according to UNICEF, 1.2 million people have been cut off from essential services. According to the UN High Commission for Refugees, 37,000 refugees have fled the country since December. In addition, some 173,000 people have been internally displaced over the last four months.

In a 16 April statement, the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, expressed alarm at continuing reports of widespread human rights violations in the CAR—including targeted killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, child recruitment, rapes, disappearances and kidnappings—since the December Séléka offensive. Pillay called for the rule of law to be restored and perpetrators of abuses to be held accountable.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is to play a more effective and assertive role, especially as the security and humanitarian situations remain volatile.

Achieving synergy with subregional and regional actors in addressing the aftermath of the seizure of power by the Séléka is a related issue.

Another issue is finding a productive role for BINUCA in the new political reality and in light of the ongoing transitional process.

Options
The Council may consider the following regarding BINUCA:

- amending its mandate following receipt of the Secretary-General’s report;
- entrusting it with a more central role in mediating between the parties; and
- expanding its supporting role for the regional efforts of ECCAS.

Further options include adopting a strong
Position on security and humanitarian issues, expressing support for the deployment of additional MICOPAX troops and taking a more aggressive stance towards the Séléka leadership.

### Council Dynamics

The Council has remained fairly passive in recent months regarding the CAR, giving preference to the situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali. It has for the most part addressed the crisis in the CAR through press statements.

While no major discussions have taken place on the failure of the 11 January Libreville agreements to achieve stability, Council members are of the view that BINUCA will have to be re-evaluated for the UN presence—and the Council—to be relevant in efforts to solve the crisis in the CAR. Some members think that BINUCA’s mediation role should be fine tuned to reflect recent events and the transitional processes, but still within the framework of the Libreville agreements.

Several Council members are cautious about assigning blame for the crisis and prefer to deplore the situation in general. They feel that in light of the recent ECCAS statements and the apparent Séléka agreement to adhere to the ECCAS transitional framework, the Council should continue to take a back seat to ECCAS on the political front. They feel that the Council should focus on the security and humanitarian situation, rather than the legitimacy of the interim government, as there are signs of splits within the Séléka, which may lead to further instability. Council members will also be interested to hear more about the AU position, which, since suspending the CAR from the AU immediately after the Séléka takeover, has remained silent on the ECCAS initiative.

### UNOCA/LRA

#### Expected Council Action

In May, the Security Council expects a briefing on the Secretary-General’s report on the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and on the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) by Abou Moussa, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNOCA.

A presidential or press statement are possible outcomes.

UNOCA’s mandate expires on 28 February 2014.

#### Key Recent Developments

Moussa last briefed the Council on 18 December 2012, stressing the need to mobilise sufficient resources to implement the UN regional strategy to address the threat posed by the LRA (S/PV.6891). The next day, the Council adopted a presidential statement reiterating its support for the AU Regional Cooperation Initiative against the LRA (AU-RCI-LRA) and urged further progress towards the implementation of its strategy (S/PRST/2012/28). The statement also requested the Secretary-General to present an implementation plan to support the UN LRA strategy (S/2012/481) by 28 February. It further requested the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on the activities of UNOCA and on the LRA via a single report by 15 May 2013.

The implementation plan for the strategy was submitted to the Council on 19 April (S/2013/240). It highlights priorities in five strategic areas of focus and specifies the division of labour and coordination between the various UN entities in implementing the strategy. It also identifies the resources needed for specific projects and programmes.

Additionally, the implementation plan recalls that LRA-affected countries have been contributing troops to the AU RCI-LRA’s military component, the Regional Task Force (RTF), to fulfil its authorised strength of 5,000 troops. In February the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) contributed 500 troops to the RTF, adding to the 2,860 deployed troops from the Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan and Uganda. South Sudan has committed to provide 500 additional troops to the RTF.

According to media reports, after the Séléka rebels seized Bangui on 24 March, Uganda suspended its participation in the RTF, claiming that the rebels have been hostile towards its troops in southeast CAR. In a meeting with Moussa and AU Special Envoy for the LRA Francisco Madeira in Kampala on 3 April, Uganda clarified that its role in the RTF has not been altered by the coup. In a press statement on CAR on 29 April, Council members expressed concern over the pause of operations in CAR and urged countries to resume their efforts as soon as possible (SC/10993).

On 3 April the US announced a $5 million reward for information leading to the capture of LRA leader Joseph Kony, an International Criminal Court indictee.

LRA activities in South Sudan were taken off the list of parties to conflict that are credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence in the Secretary-General’s second report on sexual violence in conflict of 14 March (S/2013/149). LRA activities in the CAR and the DRC remain listed.

UNOCA, along with the UN Office for West Africa, has also been active in assisting the countries of Central and West Africa in addressing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, in particular by assisting in the organisation of a regional summit for the development of an anti-piracy strategy, as requested by resolution 2039 of 29 February 2012. A ministerial conference was held on 19 March in Benin, where the Economic Community of Central African States, the Economic Community of West African States and the Gulf of Guinea
UNOCA/LRA (con’t)

Commission adopted three memoranda of understanding concerning the repression of piracy. The memoranda are to be adopted in a summit meeting to be held in Yaoundé, Cameroon on 17-18 May.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is to encourage progress in the implementation of the UN regional strategy and the role it can play in supporting UN and AU efforts to address the LRA threat and ensure a sustainable solution.

Another issue is assessing how the 24 March seizure of power by the Séléka in the CAR may affect the regional strategy.

A broader future issue for the Council relates to the recent decision to create an intervention brigade charged with neutralising rebel groups as part of the UN Organization Stabilisation Mission in the DRC. The brigade will not be deployed in LRA-affected areas as of now, but it could be of future significance on this issue.

Options
Options for the Council include adopting a presidential statement or issuing a press statement that could:

- welcome progress in implementing the AU RCI-LRA strategy and the deployment of the RTF;
- welcome the efforts of affected governments and urge them to continue their contributions to the RTF despite regional instability;
- express support for the UN LRA strategy implementation plan or request its further elaboration;
- request further reporting from the Secretary-General; and
- welcome the engagement of UN field missions in the implementation of the UN LRA strategy and request their continued support.

Council Dynamics
Council members generally support the UN LRA strategy and are keen to see how it will translate into reality during its implementation and what gaps exist. Areas of particular interest are the protection of civilians including regarding children; coordinated humanitarian assistance; the expansion of disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programmes; and support in the fields of human rights, rule of law and development to establish state authority in the relevant areas.

Council members are in agreement on the importance of cooperation between countries in the region and of a coordinated approach in addressing the threat of the LRA. They will be keen to be updated by Moussa regarding the role of Uganda the RTF.

The UK is the penholder on the LRA.

Sudan and South Sudan

Expected Council Action
In May, the Security Council is expected to hold two meetings, likely in consultations, on Sudan-South Sudan issues in accordance with resolution 2046. It will also likely discuss in consultations the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA) and renew its mandate, which expires on 31 May.

Key Recent Developments
Council members held consultations on Sudan/South Sudan and UNISFA on 11 April. They were briefed by UNISFA force commander and head of mission, General Yohannes Gebremeskel Tesfamariam and Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet. Tesfamariam advocated for an additional 1,126 troops to provide force protection for the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM), reiterating the Secretary-General’s request for these troops in his recent report on Abyei (S/2013/198). Tesfamariam said that the security situation in Abyei remained challenging, in large part because of tensions between the Misseriya and the Ngok-Dinka communities. As such, he did not think that it would be possible to divert UNISFA troops currently in Abyei from their responsibilities to provide protection for the JBVMM monitors and support staff. Tesfamariam expressed concern that inadequate protection would hinder the impact of the JBVMM, cautioning that without an effective JBVMM, Sudan and South Sudan might be tempted to re-enter the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone from which they appear to have withdrawn.

Mulet said that South Sudan had resumed its production of oil and that it would be able to start exporting it through Sudan by May. He said that 23 April had been established as a date for direct talks between Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N).

Mulet also touched on the situation in South Sudan. He noted that the ambush attack in Jonglei state that claimed the lives of five peacekeepers and seven civilians on 9 April had been well-organised and included more than 200 perpetrators. He said that while the attack occurred in the area in which David Yau Yau operates, he could not confirm whether Yau Yau’s rebels were responsible. (Yau Yau has denied any role in the attack.)

On 12 April, Presidents Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan and Salva Kiir of South Sudan held a summit meeting in Juba. They reiterated their commitment to fulfilling the cooperation agreements signed on 27 September (on oil sharing, cross-border trade, security arrangements, nationality issues and other matters). In a press release following the summit, the AU said that the meeting represented the commitment of both parties “to foster the normalization of relations between the two countries and promote the well-being of their peoples.”

On 4 April, the World Food Program...
Sudan and South Sudan (con’t)

(WFP) announced that it had initiated food distribution in the Geissan and Kurmuk areas of South Kordofan state in Sudan, which has been greatly affected by the fighting between Sudan and the SPLM-N. WFP is hoping to distribute food to 39,000 people in Kurmuk and 12,000 in Geissan.

While Adnan Khan, WFP Sudan Country Director, referred to gaining this access as “a major breakthrough”, the SPLM-N downplayed the initiative in a statement released by its Secretary-General, Yasir Arman, on 5 April. Arman said that Sudan “allowed the WFP to work in a limited area controlled by Khartoum and they made big news out of that”. He also said that Sudan had heightened its aerial and ground attacks in the Blue Nile state during the last month and noted that Sudan “is denying access for humanitarian assistance to… areas controlled by the SPLM-N in Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains”.

Armed conflict continued in South Kordofan in April. On 12 April, the SPLM-N shelled Kadugli, killing three people and wounding ten others, according to local officials. A spokesperson for the SPLM-N, Arnu Lodi, said that the attack was conducted in response to aerial bombardments by Sudan on 11-12 April of areas controlled by the SPLM-N where there are displaced persons. Lodi also claimed that the SPLM-N had seized the Dandor military base near Kadugli, on 15 April. It was reported in the media that four SPLM-N rebels and 15 soldiers from Sudan died in the fighting.

Sudan and the SPLM-N met for direct negotiations on 23 April in Addis Ababa. The talks ended on 26 April without progress on the humanitarian and political issues discussed, although media reports indicate that there are plans for the parties to reconvene in May.

On 27 April, the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), an umbrella group including several rebel movements, attacked Umm Rawaba, North Kordofan state, roughly 300 miles south of Khartoum. According to Sudan, the rebels destroyed a power plant, a communications tower, and some gas stations during the attack, which also reportedly claimed the lives of nine Sudanese policemen. The SRF withdrew from Umm Rawaba on the same day as the attack.

At press time, the Council was scheduled to hold consultations on Sudan/South Sudan on 29 April.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is whether the recent progress in relations between Sudan and South Sudan can be sustained and how the Council can build on this progress.

Another issue is how the Council can foster constructive negotiations between Sudan and the SPLM-N.

An additional key issue is how effective the JBVMM will be in maintaining security along the Sudan-South Sudan border, given that the border is nearly 2,000 kilometres long and the SPLM-N controls a large portion of it.

Options
The most likely option is for the Council to renew the mandate of UNISFA for an additional six months. In doing so, the Council could consider:

• maintaining the current force level;
• authorising the additional 1,126 troops requested by the Secretariat; and
• assessing the force structure of UNISFA in three months, and assuming the Council decides to increase the size of the mission, ensuring that the additional troops are essential for UNISFA to support the JBVMM.

On Sudan-South Sudan issues generally, the Council could consider adopting a statement that:

• recognises progress made by the parties in implementing the cooperation agreements of 27 September;
• urges the parties to expedite the establishment of administrative structures in Abyei, including the Abyei Area Police and the Abyei Legislative Council; and
• reiterates its decision in resolution 2046 for Sudan and the SPLM-N to negotiate a settlement on the basis of the 28 June 2011 Framework Agreement, which calls for the parties “to work towards an inclusive national process in the Republic of Sudan, aimed at constitutional reform”.

Council Dynamics
Council members are encouraged by signs of progress in relations between Sudan and South Sudan. However, the Council remains divided on how to approach Sudan-South Sudan issues. Some members hold Sudan largely accountable for its negative relations with South Sudan and are highly critical of Sudan for the humanitarian and political crisis in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Others take what they perceive as a more balanced approach. Among this latter group, there are concerns that a Council outcome that is too critical of Sudan could undermine rather than facilitate progress in Sudan-South Sudan relations. Since February, several attempts by the Council to negotiate a statement on Sudan-South Sudan relations have failed to achieve consensus.

The US is the penholder on UNISFA and other Sudan-South Sudan issues.

Sudan/Darfur

Expected Council Action
In May, Ambassador María Cristina Perceval (Argentina), chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, will provide the quarterly briefing on the work of the Committee’s work to Council members in consultations. No Council outcome is anticipated in May on Darfur.

Key Recent Developments
On 7-8 April, the International Donor Conference for Reconstruction and Development in Darfur was held in Doha, Qatar. In

UN DOCUMENTS ON SUDAN/DARFUR Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2091 (14 February 2013) extended the mandate of the PoE assisting the 1591 Sanctions Committee until 17 February 2014. S/RES/2063 (31 July 2012) extended UNAMID’s mandate until 31 July 2013. S/RES/1769 (31 July 2007) established UNAMID. Secretary-General’s Report S/2013/225 (10 April 2013) was the most recent quarterly report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.6956 (29 April 2013) was the Council’s most recent briefing on Darfur. S/PV.6920 (14 February 2013) was the meeting at which the Council adopted resolution 2091 renewing the PoE’s mandate. Security Council Press Statement SC/10982 (19 April 2013) condemned the attack which killed one UNAMID peacekeeper and wounded two others.
keeping with article 32 of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, a Darfur Joint Assessment Mission—including various UN entities, the government of Sudan, the Darfur Regional Authority and other international development actors—had been established and produced a Darfur Development Strategy in preparation for the conference. This plan indicated that $7.2 billion would be needed for reconstruction and development of Darfur over the next six years. It also underscored three priority areas in need of support: governance, justice and reconciliation; reconstruction; and economic recovery. Approximately $3.7 billion was pledged during the conference, a figure that includes “renewed commitment and pledges” by Sudan of $2.65 billion, as described in the Doha Document. Qatar, which hosted the conference, pledged $500 million.

The Panel of Experts (PoE) of the Sudan Sanctions Committee, appointed in late March, briefed the Committee on 18 April, requesting an extension of deadline for the submission of their interim report to the Committee. (Subsequently, the Committee agreed and extended the deadline set for 14 May, until 31 July.) The experts noted that they had not received visas and thus had been unable to visit Sudan to conduct their investigation.

The experts received single-entry visas from Sudan on 19 April except for the finance expert, Ghassan Schbley (US), who had yet to receive a visa at press time. (Sudan has objected to Schbley, expressing concerns about his activities when he was a member of the PoE for the 751/1907 Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee. Schbley was prevented from entering Sudan when he arrived in Khartoum in December 2012 even though he had a visa at the time.)

The security situation has remained volatile in several parts of Darfur. On 6 April, heavy fighting between Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) broke out in and around the towns of Labado and Muhajeriya in eastern Darfur. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that approximately 40,000 people had been displaced as of 14 April. The SLA-MM seized Labado and Muhajeriya in the initial fighting, but they were forced to retreat in mid-April as Sudan reclaimed the towns. Witnesses alleged that pro-Sudan militia killed 18 civilians after the towns were retaken, while also accusing the militia of kidnapping, raping and torturing civilians. On 19 April, an AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) peacekeeper was killed and two additional peacekeepers were injured when they were shot by unidentified assailants near Muhajeriya. (Since its inception in 2007, UNAMID has lost 44 peacekeepers.) The Council issued a press statement that condemned the attack.

On 12 April, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) announced that 50,000 people, mostly women and children, had fled across the border into Chad as a result of inter-communal violence in Um Dukhun, a town in western Darfur. UNHCR said that this was the highest number of refugees from Sudan to enter Chad since 2005.

The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)-Bashar faction, which formally made peace with Sudan by acceding to the Doha Document in Qatar on 6 April, and the JEM clashed on 19 April in the Furawiya area of North Darfur. The JEM-Bashar announced that Saleh Mohamed Jarbo, its deputy general commander, had been killed during an ambush by JEM forces while en route to Furawiya.

The SLA-MM released 21 Sudanese Armed Forces soldiers—including 14 on 13 April and seven on 21 April—to Sudan. The ICRC served as an intermediary.

On 29 April, the Council held a briefing and consultations on Darfur. During the briefing, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous said that he was troubled by the situation in Darfur, referring to inter-communal violence, fighting between government forces and rebel movements, and large numbers of civilians recently displaced by the conflict.

### Human Rights-Related Developments
According to the Secretary-General’s latest report on UNAMID, covering January to March, the human rights situation in Darfur deteriorated in a manner commensurate with the intensification of conflict (S/2013/225). The overall number of documented human rights violations increased to 117 cases involving 347 victims (compared with 94 cases involving 204 victims in October–December 2012). Of the 347 victims, 176 were victims of violations of the right to physical integrity, 125 of violations of the right to life, 38 of sexual and gender-based violence and eight of arbitrary arrests and detention. The Secretary-General underlined that accountability remained a challenge. Of the 117 human rights cases documented by UNAMID during the reporting period, 42 had been reported to government authorities, but just eight of these cases are under investigation.

### Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is the deteriorating security situation in Darfur, as evidenced by numerous reports of inter-communal violence and fighting between government forces and rebels, as well as by the large numbers of recently internally displaced persons.

Another key issue is the restriction on humanitarian access in areas affected by the conflict. (On April 16, Ali Al-Za’tari, the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan, released a statement in which he expressed his concern that humanitarian organisations were not being permitted access to Labado and Muhajeriya to help thousands of civilians impacted by fighting there.)

An additional key issue is the fact that Sudan has issued only single-entry visas to four of the five PoE members, even though resolution 2091 calls on Sudan to issue “timely multi-entry visas to all members of the Panel of Experts for the duration of its mandate.”

Another important issue for the Council is what can be done to enhance the safety of UNAMID peacekeepers.

### Options
One option is for members of the Sudan Sanctions Committee to visit Darfur to gain a better understanding of the current situation on the ground. (It appears that the Committee is planning such a trip in October. It had originally planned to travel to Darfur in the second half of 2012, when Colombia was chair, but the trip did not materialise, apparently due to scheduling challenges.)

The Council may also consider requesting a briefing from the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the impact of the conflict in Darfur on civilians.

An additional option, although unlikely, is for the Sanctions Committee to update its consolidated list, which dates back to 25 April 2006, by targeting indictees of the International Criminal Court for their participation in perpetrating crimes in Darfur.
Sudan/Darfur (con’t)

as permitted by paragraph 3(c) of resolution 1591.

Council Dynamics
Several Council members remain concerned about the difficult security environment in Darfur. In particular, they continue to be alarmed by the toll of the conflict on civilians, the limited humanitarian access and the dangers faced by UNAMID peacekeepers.

While supportive of the Doha process, several members have criticised the slow pace of implementation of the Doha Document. However, some members are less critical of Sudan than others, arguing that financial difficulties have constrained its ability to implement the provisions of the Doha Document. (To date, the Liberation and Justice Movement and the JEM-Bashar faction have signed the Doha Document, while the JEM, the SLA-MM, and the SLA-Abdul Wahid have not.)

The UK is the penholder on Darfur.

Somalia

Expected Council Action
In May, the Council is expected to adopt a resolution creating a UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM).

Key Recent Developments
On 6 March the Council adopted resolution 2093 re-authorising the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and asking the Secretary-General to deploy a technical assistance mission (TAM), whose findings should be submitted to the Council by 19 April, after which the Council would formally mandate the new mission to be deployed by 3 June (S/PR.6929). Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman briefed the Council on the TAM report on 25 April.

From 17 to 29 March, the TAM travelled to Somalia, Nairobi and Addis Ababa. The mission met with the UN Country Team (UNCT) and international partners in Nairobi and consulted with the AU in Addis Ababa. In Mogadishu, it held meetings with senior government officials, civil society and some regional and international actors. The TAM also visited areas that had been recovered from Al Shabaab in south and central Somalia. Additionally, part of the team conducted meetings in Garowe, the capital of Puntland, and Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland.

According to the TAM report, UNSOM will be guided by four broad principles: national ownership, flexibility, collaboration and partnerships and risk management. UNSOM will have substantive expertise in the areas of political affairs and mediation/facilitation; rule of law and security institutions; and human rights and protection. In addition to these three core areas, multidisciplinary task teams are also envisioned. At the outset of UNSOM, the task teams would cover: stability and recovery in former Al Shabaab areas, maritime issues, capacity development and economic drivers of conflict. As for its structure, UNSOM will be headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, with a deputy Special Representative (and a second deputy as of January 2014), and will also be backed by a Director of Mission Support/Director UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA). There will be a strong emphasis placed on integration and coordination both within UNSOM and with the UNCT. On 29 April, Nicholas Kay (UK) was announced as the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia.

The TAM report also highlights security as a critical challenge for UNSOM. As the report notes, “insecurity has many implications, both operational and political”, particularly in south and central Somalia where recovered towns were described by local UN staff as “islands, beyond which movement is nearly impossible”.

Partly in recognition of the difficult security environment, UNSOM’s initial footprint will be light and then scaled up as conditions permit. The TAM report also offers a few other options: use of local UN-contracted and trained security guards, the impending deployment of an AMISOM guard force in Mogadishu and reliance on Somali National Security Forces (SNSF). If these are deemed insufficient, UN Guard Units or international private security companies could be utilised.

The security situation in south and central Somalia continues to be in a state of flux, particularly regarding the status of about 2,500 Ethiopian troops allied to AMISOM and the government. On 17 March, Ethiopia withdrew from the town of Hudur in the Bakool region, which ultimately allowed Al Shabaab to regain control. This prompted concerns about a complete withdrawal of the Ethiopian contingent from Somalia. The prime ministers of Somalia and Ethiopia held bilateral talks on 8 April, but they were apparently inconclusive. Widely reported comments by the Ethiopian prime minister on 23 April seemed to suggest the country would withdraw its troops, while the following day the foreign ministry was careful to clarify that this was not the case. In the interim, on 3 April a battalion of 850 troops began to arrive from Sierra Leone in Kismayo allowing a Kenyan battalion to withdraw from AMISOM.

Meanwhile, the US has officially signalled its intent to militarily back the government in Mogadishu. On 8 April, President Barack Obama determined that Somalia is eligible for US military assistance. The US was the strongest proponent within the Council of a partial lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia.

UN DOCUMENTS ON SOMALIA Security Council Resolution S/RES/2093 (6 March 2013) authorised AMISOM deployment until 28 February 2014 and partially lifted the arms embargo on Somalia. Secretary-General’s Report S/2013/69 (31 January 2013) was the latest regular report on Somalia. Security Council Meeting Records S/PR.6929 (6 March 2013) concerned the re-authorisation of AMISOM. Security Council Letter S/2013/239 (19 April 2013) was from the Secretary-General regarding the findings and observations of the TAM. Security Council Press Statement SC/10972 (15 April 2013) condemned the terrorist attack in Mogadishu.

OTHER RELEVANT FACTS Special Representative of the Secretary-General Augustine Mahiga (Tanzania). Size and Composition of AMISOM Authorised strength: 17,731 total uniformed personnel. The main contingents are Uganda (6,223 troops), Burundi (5,432 troops), Kenya (4,652 troops*), Djibouti (960 troops), Sierra Leone (650 troops) and 363 police from 8 countries. Special Representative of the AU and Head of AMISOM Mahamat Saleh Annadif (Chad).

*Does not reflect Kenya’s withdrawal of a battalion offsetting Sierra Leone’s deployment.

Somalia, which was approved in resolution 2093.

In the worst incident in Mogadishu since 2011, Al Shabaab attacked the courthouse on 14 April, leading to more than 50 civilian deaths, according to an estimate by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The attack was condemned by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, and the spokesperson for the High Commissioner for Human Rights. On 15 April, the Security Council issued a press statement condemning the attack, reiterating a willingness to take action against those threatening stability in Somalia and reaffirming Council resolve to support peace through the upcoming deployment of UNSOM (S/10972).

At a meeting of G8 foreign ministers in London on 10-11 April, there was agreement to offer high-level political support for Somalia’s re-engagement with the World Bank, the African Development Bank (ADB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Nearly half of Somalia’s $2.2 billion external debt is owed to the World Bank, ADB and IMF. On 12 April, the IMF recognised the Federal Government of Somalia, allowing a resumption of relations after a 22-year interval. The UK has organised an international donor conference for Somalia in London on 7 May.

**Key Issues**

The central issue facing the Council is establishing a mandate for UNSOM. Subsidiary questions concern the mission’s structure, strength and timeframe.

Somalia poses an extremely difficult security environment. Despite the very real operational constraints—which the UN will need to address—there is a risk of negative public perceptions developing against the UN for a “bunker mentality”.

Determining and managing the division of labour among the government, the UN and AU will be an evolving, complex challenge for the Council and other actors.

Managing the apparently high expectations of the government with regard to capacity-building and service delivery could also be an issue for the Council.

**Options**

The most likely option for the Council is to adopt a resolution authorising UNSOM to be deployed by 3 June as outlined by the Secretary-General in his 19 April letter transmitting the TAM report (S/2013/239).

Council members may also wish to take note of the Secretary-General’s observation that AMISOM’s military and civilian components require “enablers and force multipliers” and resources for “stabilization activities in south and central Somalia”.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

Relations between the AU and the UN have reportedly been strained since the adoption of resolution 2093 due to differing conceptions regarding the role of AMISOM (multidimensional peace support vs. counter-insurgency) and the scale and source of its financing (enhanced support package from UNSOA vs. internal AU funds). Mutually agreeing on a division of labour between the AU and UN will be critical.

The future of approximately 2,500 Ethiopian troops in Somalia remains ambiguous, with significant implications for the changing military equation in Somalia. The prime minister of Ethiopia has expressed frustration with the lack of progress by AMISOM and SNSF in assuming control over territory captured by Ethiopia from Al Shabaab. He has also objected to the mounting cost of the deployment in Somalia. Theoretically, Ethiopia could maintain the status quo, re-hat as AMISOM, obtain external financing, or withdraw from Somalia.

The UK is the penholder on Somalia, while the Republic of Korea is the chair of the 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanctions Committee.

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**Somalia (con’t)**

Zarif characterised ongoing EU-mediated talks between Serbia and Kosovo as an “historic” opportunity and urged the Council to support the negotiations. He also cautioned that obstacles remained, particularly in northern Kosovo where insecurity and ethnic tensions have been a problem.

On 2 April, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton hosted the eighth round of “Belgrade-Pristina” talks between Prime Minister Ivica Dačić of Serbia and Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi of Kosovo. In exchange for recognition of Pristina’s authority over northern Kosovo, Belgrade sought institutional autonomy for Serbs in the north, which Pristina resisted. When the parties failed to reach agreement, Ashton then established 9 April as a deadline for Serbia and Kosovo to accept the EU-mediated proposal.

On 8 April, Serbia rejected the EU plan, which was not made publicly available. Dačić stated the principles proposed by the EU “do not guarantee the full security, survival and protection of human rights to Serbs in Kosovo”. Critical points of disagreement concerned control over the police and the courts in the north. Although Ashton had previously declared that the EU would no longer

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**Kosovo**

**Expected Council Action**

In May, Farid Zarif, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), is scheduled to brief the Council during a quarterly debate. Zarif will update the Council on the Secretary-General’s report due 29 April and on other recent developments, particularly the outcome of EU-mediated talks in Brussels between Serbia and Kosovo.

**Key Recent Developments**

When he last briefed the Council on 22 March, the UK produced a press statement welcoming discussions on Kosovo’s future. Zarif characterised ongoing EU-mediated talks as historic and urged the Council to support the negotiations. He also cautioned that obstacles remained, particularly in northern Kosovo where insecurity and ethnic tensions have been a problem.

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Kosovo (con’t)

mediate, Serbia and Kosovo called for further talks, which Ashton eventually agreed to broker.

After renewed bilateral and trilateral negotiations on 17 April, the parties once again failed to reach agreement. Progress had apparently been made on the interrelated issues of autonomy for Serbs in northern Kosovo and Serbia’s recognition of Pristina’s authority in the region. However, the talks ultimately broke down over point 14 of the EU proposal, which required Serbia not to obstruct Kosovo’s accession to “international organisations”, implicitly meaning the UN.

Negotiations resumed on 19 April, when Dačić and Thaçi initialled a “First agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations”, in what may become an historic act of reconciliation. Ashton congratulated the parties for their “determination” and “courage” and suggested this represents a “step away from the past and, for both of them, a step closer to Europe”. On 21 and 22 April, the parliament of Kosovo and cabinet of Serbia respectively approved the agreement.

The key elements of the 15-point agreement include:

• the establishment of an association of Serb municipalities with representation at the central government;
• a national police and judiciary but with provisions for a regional police commander in northern Kosovo and an appellate court for Serb-majority municipalities;
• municipal elections to be held in northern Kosovo in 2013 with the assistance of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe; and
• a commitment that neither Serbia nor Kosovo will block each other’s respective “EU paths” (this represents a compromise with respect to earlier language that had referenced “international organisations”).

On 22 April, the European Commission recommended that the European Council approve negotiations on membership for Serbia and talks on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement for Kosovo (a preliminary step toward EU membership candidacy). A joint report submitted by Ashton and the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Štefan Füle, concluded that since October 2012 Kosovo had made progress in the four critical areas of public administration, rule of law, trade and protection of minorities.

Key Issues

The principal concern for the Council continues to be the maintenance of stability in Kosovo. Opposition to the agreement between Serbia and Kosovo—by either minority ethnic Serbs or majority ethnic Albanians—could result in public protest.

More generally, the Council will likely be focused on how UNMIK could most usefully assist with implementation of the EU-mediated agreement.

Options

Given the significance of the pact, the Council could consider issuing either a press statement or a presidential statement expressing support for implementation of the “First agreement on principles governing the normalisation of relations”.

If the Council determines that recent progress in negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo also signals a reduction in threats to stability, then the Council could consider lengthening UNMIK’s reporting cycle from quarterly to semi-annually.

Alternatively, the Council may choose to take no action, as with other recent quarterly briefings on UNMIK.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Kosovo has been relatively low profile for the Council, in part because of a clear division among members. Historically, the critical split has been between France, the UK and the US (the three permanent members that have recognised Kosovo) and Russia (which has consistently backed Serbia in the Council).

While Serbia stopped short in the EU-mediated text of even implicitly recognising Kosovo in a UN context, the agreement does signal its acceptance of Pristina’s authority in the north. Whether or not this development will alter dynamics within the Council, perhaps even breaking a stalemate among members, remains to be seen.

The penholder for Kosovo rotates on a monthly basis among the Contact and Drafting Group (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, UK and US).

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Expected Council Action

In May, the Council is due to hold a semi-annual meeting on Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Valentin Inzko, is expected to brief the Council. No outcome is expected.

Key Recent Developments

When last briefing the Council on 13 November 2012, Inzko expressed concern regarding public statements by senior Republika Srpska officials that called into question commitment to the unity of BiH. Inzko also noted his disappointment with the lack of progress toward meeting the five objectives and the two conditions (“5+2 agenda”) required to close the Office of the High Representative (OHR). On 14 November, the Council authorised the deployment of the EU peacekeeping operation, EUFOR ALTHEA, for another year.

On 22 March, BiH politicians attended EU-brokered talks in Brussels on the failure by BiH to implement a 2009 ruling on the Sejdic-Finci case by the European Court of Human Rights, which affirmed the right of BiH ethnic minorities who are not of the three


OTHER RELEVANT FACTS High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina Valentin Inzko (Austria). Size and composition of EUFOR ALTHEA As of 3 December 2012: 600 troops from 18 EU states and 5 non-EU states.
Bosnia and Herzegovina (con’t)

“constituent peoples” (Bosniak, Croat or Serb) to run for political office. Citing a lack of progress in bringing the constitution and electoral laws of BiH into alignment with the European Convention on Human Rights, the EU cancelled a high-level dialogue scheduled to take place in Mostar on 11 April. Štefan Füle, EU Commissioner for Enlargement, stated that compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights is one of the “pre-conditions for an application for EU membership to be taken into consideration” and that without an agreement on legal reform, “Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU path would be frozen”.

On 16 November 2012, appeals judges at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) overturned the convictions of Croatian generals Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markač for crimes related to attacks on Serb civilians in the Krajina region of Croatia in 1995. On 28 February, appeals judges overturned the conviction of General Momčilo Perišić for aiding and abetting crimes against civilians in 44 months of attacks on Sarajevo and the killing of more than 7,000 Bosniak men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995. More recently, on 27 March the ICTY convicted Bosnian Serbs Mićo Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin, a former minister and senior police official respectively of Republika Srpska, for crimes against civilians and sentenced them to 22 years each in prison.

The ICTY was a subject of discussion in the UN General Assembly on 10 April during a thematic debate on the role of international criminal justice in reconciliation, organised by Assembly President Vuk Jeremić of Serbia. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said the work of the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda had helped establish the foundation for an “age of accountability”. In contrast, Nebojša Radmanović, chairman of the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, claimed there was a widespread perception among the Bosnian Serb public and Republika Srpska officials that the ICTY discriminates against Serbs and has not been impartial. President Tomislav Nikolić of Serbia, argued the ICTY makes unjust legal decisions under political pressure and based on “untruths” resulting in what Serbs have reportedly termed “Hague justice”. The event was boycotted by many invited speakers and was characterised as “unbalanced” and “inflammatory” by the US, which joined Canada and Jordan in boycotting the debate.

Human Rights-Related Developments

From 29 October to 5 November 2012, the special rapporteur on violence against women, Rashida Manjoo, visited BiH. She will present a report with findings and recommendations to the Human Rights Council (HRC) in June.

On 12 March, Rita Izsák, the independent expert on minority issues, presented to the HRC the report of her 17-25 September 2012 mission to BiH (A/HRC/22/49/Add.1 of 31 December 2012). She underlined that the degree to which politics has been polarised by ethnic identity has blocked progress in the country. She also stressed that a high degree of ethnic segregation persisted in the education system and that religion was also a dividing line in society. She added that Roma communities, who constitute the largest recognised national minority, were facing particular challenges and stressed the importance of conducting a new census (the last one was in 1991). She stressed that accurate data is essential to provide a basis for policy and programme initiatives.

The special rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, Farida Shaheed, is due to visit the country from 13-24 May.

Key Issues

Issues that may capture the attention of the Council include:
- whether factors such as chronically high unemployment and divisive political rhetoric could undermine stability;
- the degree of progress toward completing the 5+2 agenda, which would then allow for the closure of OHR; and
- to what extent Bosnia and Herzegovina has taken steps toward enabling integration with the EU or NATO.

Options

One option the Council could consider is adopting a press statement supporting the work of OHR and the EU, re-affirming the territorial integrity of BiH, emphasising the importance of progress toward Euro-Atlantic integration and urging leaders to cooperate on 5+2 implementation.

Another option the Council could explore is discussing how and when OHR will close, including a potential re-assessment of the 5+2 criteria established in 2008. One trade-off the Council could consider would be whether the withdrawal of OHR would increase instability or facilitate domestic ownership over the future of BiH.

The most likely option is that the Council will take no action (as in May 2011 and May 2012) until it is due to consider of EUFOR ALTHEA’s re-authorisation in November.

Council and Wider Dynamics

More than seventeen years after the Dayton Peace Agreement, BiH is a low-profile issue for the Council. Nonetheless, divisions remain among members, particularly between Russia on the one hand and the UK and the US on the other. Russia has been critical of OHR for its perceived anti-Serb bias and would prefer that it be closed, while the UK and the US have maintained that OHR should remain in place until the 5+2 agenda has been fully implemented.

In practice, potential EU membership has become the principal mechanism for the international community to wield influence in BiH. Adjusting the constitution and electoral laws to comply with the Sejdić-Finci ruling remains an obstacle to EU membership. Croatia’s pending EU membership, expected on 1 July, adds additional urgency.

The penholder for BiH rotates on a monthly basis among the Contact and Drafting Group (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, UK and US).

Lebanon

Expected Council Action

In May, Council members expect to receive the semi-annual briefing in consultations from Special Envoy Terje Rod-Larsen on the Secretary-General’s latest report on the implementation of resolution 1559 (S/2013/234). Adopted in 2004, resolution 1559 urged the disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and the extension of government control over all Lebanese territory.

A press statement or similar outcome is possible.
Key Recent Developments

The Council last met on Lebanon on 14 March, when members heard a briefing in consultations on the implementation of resolution 1701 from the Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Derek Plumbly. Following the briefing, Council members issued a press statement that expressed concern about cross-border incidents between Syria and Lebanon and about the impact of the conflict in Syria on the stability of its southern neighbour (SC/10941). The press statement also encouraged relevant parties “to make swift progress to ensure that parliamentary elections take place on a consensual basis”.

The impact of the conflict in Syria on Lebanon was raised again during an open humanitarian briefing on Syria on 18 April and during the quarterly open debate on the Middle East on 24 April. During his remarks on 18 April, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres described the crisis in Syria as an “existential threat” to Lebanon, noting that Syrian refugees currently make up at least 10 percent of the population of Lebanon.

Significant incidents along the border between Lebanon and Syria continued in March and April. In a letter to Lebanon dated 14 March, Syria threatened to attack Syrian opposition forces inside Lebanon to prevent the smuggling of arms and ammunition. On 15 March, Syria appeared to be following through on its threat when several villages in northern Lebanon reportedly came under fire from Syria. On 18 March the situation continued to escalate when Syrian helicopters reportedly fired rockets at two sites near the city of Arsal that had allegedly been used for smuggling.

In response to Syrian denials that the airstrike had taken place, Lebanese President Michel Sleiman told reporters that the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) had confirmed the strikes, which he described as “an unacceptable violation of [Lebanon’s] sovereignty”. This was the first incident since the start of the conflict in which Syria entered Lebanon’s airspace. On 20 March the Secretary-General expressed grave concern at the reports and called on Syria to cease all such violations of Lebanese sovereignty. Additional cross-border incidents involving Syrian helicopters were reported on 21 March and 3 April.

Sectarian tensions in Lebanon escalated in March. On 17 March, four Sunni sheikhs were attacked and beaten in two separate incidents in predominantly Shi’a neighbourhoods of Beirut. Although Hezbollah and Amal, the major Shi’a parties in Lebanon, quickly condemned the attacks, significant protests took place around the country soon after. Following the attacks, six people were killed and at least 48 people were wounded in sectarian clashes between residents of Sunni and Alawite neighbourhoods in Tripoli.

On 4 March, President Sleiman and Prime Minister Najib Mikati signed a decree calling for parliamentary elections to be held on 9 June, despite the political deadlock over a new electoral law. Shortly after, the Ministry of Interior began accepting applications from those wishing to register as candidates in the upcoming elections, even though an election supervisory commission (which was to have been established before registration was opened) had not yet been established.

On 22 March, Mikati announced his resignation following an impasse in the cabinet regarding the extension of the mandate of Internal Security Forces Chief Major General Ashraf Rifi and the establishment of the election supervisory commission. On 23 March, President Sleiman accepted the resignation, asked Mikati to head a caretaker government, and appointed a Sunni, Tamam Salam, as Prime Minister-designate on 6 April tasked with him with the responsibility for forming a new government. Both the pro-Syria political factions (including Hezbollah) and the anti-Syria 14 March Coalition formed in the wake of the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005 endorsed Salam in the days leading up to his appointment. At press time discussions were continuing regarding the formation of a new cabinet and the adoption of a new electoral law.

At the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), after a postponement in February, no new date has been set for the start of the trial in absentia of four individuals charged with assassinating Hariri. In January, a newspaper associated with Hezbollah published a confidential list of 17 potential witnesses who might be called to testify in the trial. A spokesman for the STL has described the publication as an effort to intimidate potential witnesses. On 11 April the STL condemned the publication online of a second list of alleged witnesses by a group calling itself “Journalists for the Truth”, and added that the list was inaccurate.

Key Issues

The key issues in Lebanon addressed by resolution 1559 are the fact that Hezbollah maintains a significant arsenal not controlled by the Lebanese government and that the delineation of the border between Lebanon and Syria has not taken place.

The National Dialogue—a series of talks that started in 2006 during which political leaders have addressed the issue of Hezbollah’s arms—has not resumed in the wake of the assassination of the intelligence chief of the Internal Security Forces on 19 October 2012.

At press time it was unclear whether Prime Minister Salam’s as-yet unfurmed cabinet would be conducive to the resumption of talks. The 14 March Coalition had previously called for the resignation of the Mikati government and the installation of a neutral cabinet to oversee preparations for parliamentary elections as prerequisites for returning to the National Dialogue. Current discussions regarding the formation of a new cabinet appear to be centred on the question of whether the cabinet should be a national unity government that would be political in nature or whether it should be neutral and technocratic, charged primarily with overseeing elections, as the 14 March Coalition has called for.

Underlying Problems

The ongoing conflict in Syria will most likely indefinitely stall any effort to implement resolution 1559 properly, especially in light of the increased instability along the border between Lebanon and Syria and Hezbollah’s continuing support for the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

UN Documents on Lebanon: Security Council Resolutions

Furthermore, the flow of armaments across the border between Syria and Lebanon has contributed to the expansion of arsenals outside the control of the Lebanese government. Israeli officials have said they would intervene to prevent the transfer of chemical weapons to Hezbollah and violations of Lebanese airspace by Israel have continued in recent months. Both of these constitute violations of resolution 1559 and Lebanon’s sovereignty.

Options
The Council is unlikely to take any action on Lebanon so soon after the press statement adopted on 14 March, as many Council members are worried that a glut of press statements might dilute their efficacy. However, since the security situation in Lebanon and along the border with Syria has continued to deteriorate, the Council could adopt a statement reiterating its condemnation of cross-border incidents and expressing concern for violations of Lebanese sovereignty. In a similar vein, a press or presidential statement addressing the Syrian refugee crisis in the country might also be an appropriate demonstration of international support for Lebanon given the challenges it is facing. Finally, the Council could also issue a statement encouraging Lebanon to hold its parliamentary elections on time and on a consensual basis, in order to maintain political stability.

Council Dynamics
The lack of significant controversy in negotiations around the 14 March press statement is evidence of the consensus in the Council that the international community should support Lebanon in its efforts to contain and manage spillover from the conflict in Syria. Though Council efforts to pronounce on any aspect of the situation in Syria remain controversial, consultations in May will likely demonstrate a dynamic similar to the short, consensual consultations seen in March.

France is the penholder on Lebanon in the Council.

**DPRK (North Korea)**

Expected Council Action
In May, the chair of the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg), is scheduled to brief Council members in consultations.

These quarterly briefings on the work of the Committee tend to be technical in nature, and no Council action is expected. The last such briefing was held on 21 February.

The final report under resolution 2050 of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the Committee is due on 12 May and is expected to be discussed by the Committee in late May or early June.

Key Recent Developments
In a press statement on 12 February, Council members strongly condemned the DPRK’s nuclear test that same day and said they would begin work immediately on an appropriate response.

Subsequently, on 7 March, the Council in resolution 2094 again condemned the test and reiterated its previous demands that the DPRK retract its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and abandon all programmes aimed at developing nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles. It tightened some of the existing sanctions provisions against the DPRK and also imposed new measures. Additionally, it extended the mandate of the PoE (which would have expired on 12 July) until 7 April 2014 while increasing the number of experts from seven to eight. (For more details, please see our 6 March What’s in Blue story on adoption of the resolution.)

On 9 March the DPRK denounced the resolution in a letter to the Council, describing it as “clear proof that the Security Council was abused into implementing the hostile policy of the US” (S/2013/141). The launch on 11 March of the annual joint US-Republic of Korea (ROK) military training exercise in the region seemed to further aggravate the situation as tensions on the Korean Peninsula escalated.

Among a series of increasingly aggressive steps taken by the DPRK, the announcement on 11 March that it considered the 1953 armistice agreement with the ROK nullified. While the ROK said such a unilateral nullification was not allowed under international law, the DPRK in a 15 March letter to the Council insisted it was no longer bound by the agreement (S/2013/162). On 27 March, the DPRK cut a military hotline with the ROK, the last official direct link between the two countries.

On 2 April, the DPRK said it would restart its Yongbyon nuclear complex, including a plutonium reactor that was partially dismantled in 2007 as part of an agreement under the six-party talks. (These talks, stalled since 2009, involve China, the DPRK, Japan, the ROK, Russia and the US.) On 3 April, it blocked ROK workers from entering the Kaesong industrial zone, which had been seen as a symbol of Korean cooperation, and then on 9 April withdrew its own workers.

Tensions escalated further in April with the ROK warning on 7 April that the DPRK might launch a missile later that week and Pyongyang reportedly warning foreigners in the ROK on 9 April to prepare for nuclear war. The tensions seemed to subside, however, following the anniversary on 15 April of the birth of DPRK founder Kim Il-sung, with the DPRK responding to US and ROK offers for dialogue by scaling down its bellicose tone. It rejected, however, a 25 April formal ROK proposal for talks on the future of the Kaesong industrial complex amid concerns about the humanitarian situation of a group of ROK workers remaining at the complex to safeguard the facilities.

UN DOCUMENTS ON THE DPRK Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2094 (7 March 2013) tightened sanctions against the DPRK and extended the mandate of the PoE until 7 April 2014. S/RES/2050 (12 June 2012) extended the mandate of the PoE until 12 July 2013. Security Council Letters S/2013/199 (28 March 2013) was a letter to the Council from the Secretary-General on the re-appointment of the PoE. S/2013/186 (21 March 2013) was a letter from the Sanctions Committee chair informing the Council of the new reporting schedule of the PoE. S/2013/162 (15 March 2013) was a letter to the Council from the DPRK regarding the Korean armistice agreement. S/2013/141 (9 March 2013) was a letter to the Council from the DPRK regarding resolution 2094. Security Council Press Statements SC/10912 (12 February 2013) was a Council press statement condemning the 12 February nuclear test. Other S/2013/91 (13 February 2013) was a note verbale from the DPRK on the 12 February nuclear test.
the DPRK’s rejection of talks, the ROK announced it would withdraw its remaining workers from Kaesong.

The DPRK Sanctions Committee has met twice since the adoption of resolution 2094. The first meeting, on 15 March, focused on technical issues related to the renewal of the PoE mandate, such as its new reporting schedule and the nomination process for its eighth member. (At press time, the Secretary-General had yet to appoint the eighth expert.) The chair transmitted the new reporting schedule to the Council on 21 March (S/2013/186).

Discussions during its second meeting, on 8 April, focused on cases of possible violations brought to the attention of the Committee. Also, it seems the Committee, with the assistance of the PoE, has started drafting the implementation assistance notice requested by the Council in resolution 2094 regarding the proper implementation of the provision in paragraph 22 that calls on states to prevent the supply to the DPRK of any item that might contribute to its nuclear or ballistic programmes and to cease other activities prohibited by relevant Council resolutions.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

In a 1 February 2013 report presented to the Human Rights Council (HRC) on 11 March, Marzuki Darusman, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, provided a comprehensive review of UN documentation and resolutions on the situation of human rights in the DPRK since 2004 and identified nine patterns of human rights violations (A/HRC/22/57 of February 2013). He said many of these might amount to crimes against humanity and called for the establishment of an inquiry mechanism with adequate resources to produce a more complete picture, qualify and quantify the violations, attribute responsibility to particular perpetrators and suggest effective courses of international action.

On 21 March, the HRC adopted a resolution establishing a commission of inquiry for a period of one year comprising three members, one of whom should be the Special Rapporteur (A/HRC/RES/22/13). The commission is mandated to investigate the systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights in the DPRK. The resolution also extended the mandate of the Special Rapporteur.

**Key Issues**

A key issue for the Council is the DPRK’s continued defiance of all relevant resolutions. A related issue is the lack of progress in the six-party talks.

A broader issue is whether a continued tightening of sanctions against the DPRK is effective in changing Pyongyang’s behaviour.

At the Committee level, a key issue is the effective implementation of the sanctions regime, in particular how to respond to violations and whether to make additional designations as directed in resolution 2094.

**Options**

In the Council, one option is to change the format of the briefing by the chair of the Committee from a closed to an open meeting, as is the case for the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee.

In the Committee, one option is to issue the implementation assistance notice called for by resolution 2094. Taking up some or all of the recommendations likely to be submitted by the PoE in May is another option, including possibly making additional designations.

**Council Dynamics**

Council members were united in their support for resolution 2094. As in the past, it was first negotiated between China and the US before being presented to other Council members. Although the US did not get all of what it wanted included in the resolution, the adopted text was seen as sending a strong message, even more so with the support by China. Council members are also united in their concern about the recent escalation on the Korean Peninsula but seem hopeful that tensions have peaked.

It appears, however, that this unity does not necessarily translate into action in the DPRK Sanctions Committee. While the atmosphere in the Committee is described as constructive, recent discussions about how to respond to reports of violations were still marked by divisions between more cautious Council members who want additional information before taking any action and others who are pushing for a more proactive approach.

In the past the Committee has also been split in its response to the reports by the PoE. The 2011 report was never made public due to opposition from China. While the 2012 report was seen as more balanced, the Committee took up very few of its recommendations. It therefore remains to be seen how responsive the Committee will be to the upcoming report.

The US is the penholder on the DPRK in the Council.
Notable Dates for May

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<td>19 April</td>
<td>SG report on the implementation of resolution 1559 (Lebanon)</td>
<td>S/PRST/2004/36</td>
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<td>29 April</td>
<td>SG report on UNMIK (Kosovo)</td>
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<td>30 April</td>
<td>SG consolidated report on UNIOGBIS and the restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>S/RES/2048</td>
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<td>30 April</td>
<td>SG report on BINUCA (Central African Republic) postponed from 31 March</td>
<td>S/RES/2088</td>
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<td>Early May</td>
<td>Special Envoy’s report on an integrated Sahel strategy</td>
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<td>2 May</td>
<td>High Representative’s report on Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>S/RES/2074</td>
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<td>Mid May</td>
<td>Panel of Experts interim report to the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee</td>
<td>S/RES/2091</td>
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<td>12 May</td>
<td>Panel of Experts final report under resolution 2050 to the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee</td>
<td>S/RES/2050 S/2013/186</td>
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<td>14 May</td>
<td>SG report on UNOCA/LRA (Central Africa)</td>
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<td>17 May</td>
<td>SG report on UNISFA (Abyei)</td>
<td>S/RES/2075</td>
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MANDATES EXPIRE

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<tr>
<td>31 May</td>
<td>UNIOGBIS (Guinea-Bissau) S/RES/2092</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 May</td>
<td>UNISFA (Abyei) S/RES/2075</td>
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OTHER IMPORTANT DATES

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<th>REPORT DUE</th>
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<tr>
<td>6 May</td>
<td>Mary Robinson will brief Council members on the DRC for the first time in her new capacity as Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region in Africa.</td>
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<td>7 May</td>
<td>There will be an international donor conference on Somalia held in London.</td>
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<td>8 May</td>
<td>The ICC Prosecutor will brief the Council on Libya.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 May</td>
<td>The semi-annual joint briefing by the chairs of the 1267, 1343 and 1540 Counterterrorism Committees is expected.</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 May</td>
<td>At the initiative of Togo, the Council will hold a debate on the challenges of the fight against terrorism in Africa.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mid May</td>
<td>An Arria Formula meeting on women, peace and security, organised by Council members Australia and Guatemala in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, is expected.</td>
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