Rwanda will preside over the Security Council in April.

Two open debates are planned: on sexual violence in conflict and the quarterly debate on the Middle East. The former will be held under the agenda item Women, Peace and Security and will include a briefing from Zainab Hawa Bangura, the Special Representative on sexual violence in conflict. Rwanda’s Foreign Affairs Minister Louise Mushikiwabo will preside. The Middle East open debate will be preceded by a briefing from the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman.

A ministerial level briefing on conflict prevention in Africa and its root causes, by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and possibly also the Chairperson of the AU, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn of Ethiopia, is planned with Rwanda’s Foreign Minister Mushikiwabo presiding.

Other briefings expected in April will focus on:

- the annual report of the Peacebuilding Commission by its current chair, Ambassador Ranko Vlčić (Croatia) and the chair during the previous PBC session, Ambassador Abulkalam Abdul Momen (Bangladesh); and
- cooperation between the UN and the OSCE, by its Chairperson-in-Office Leondid Kozhara (Ukraine).

Also possible is a briefing by the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, Mary Robinson, following her first visit to the region.

Briefings, followed by consultations, are likely on:

- developments in Mali and the Secretary-General’s report on recommendations regarding size, mandate and composition of a new peacekeeping operation, by DPKO;
- developments in Somalia and the findings of the Secretary-General’s technical assessment mission for a new UN special political mission that will replace the current UN presence in Somalia, most likely by Feltman;
- developments in Côte d’Ivoire and the Secretary-General’s special report requested by resolution 2062 on possible adjustments in the structure and strength of UNOCI, most likely by DPKO’s Assistant Secretary-General, Edmond Mulet; and
- the Secretary-General’s quarterly report on the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), most likely by DPKO.

Briefings in consultations are expected on:

- Sudan-South Sudan issues—in line with resolution 2046 two briefings are expected, respectively by DPKO head Hervé Ladsous and Special Envoy Haile Menkerios;
- the first stage of the National Dialogue Conference in Yemen by Jamal Benomar, the Special Adviser on Yemen;
- developments in the Central African Republic and the latest Secretary-General’s report on BINUC by Margaret Vogt, the Special Representative and head of mission;
- the Secretary-General’s most recent report on the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), by Ladsous;
- Western Sahara by Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber, the Special Representative and head of MINUSO and possibly also by the Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross; and
- the work of the 1572 Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee and the final report of its Group of Experts, by Committee chair, Ambassador Gert Rosenthal (Guatemala).

Formal sessions will be held to adopt resolutions renewing:

- the Côte d’Ivoire sanctions regime and the mandate of the Group of Experts that assists the 1572 Sanctions Committee; and
- the mandate of MINUSO.

In the third week of April, the Council will hold its annual retreat with the Secretary-General. Throughout the month, Council members will be following closely developments in Syria and a meeting on this issue may be scheduled.
On 5 March, the Council received a briefing by the Secretary-General and held consultations on his 27 February special report (S/2013/119) on possible options and their implications for reinforcing the capability of MONUSCO (S/PV.6928). On 22 March, the Council released a press statement (SC/10956) welcoming the surrender of Bosco Ntaganda to the ICC. It also expressed concern that Sylvestre Mudacumura, commander of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, is still at large. At press time, it was expected that the Council would adopt a resolution on 28 March to renew MONUSCO’s mandate—including an intervention brigade to neutralise rebel groups in eastern DRC—until 31 March 2014.

Golan Heights (UNDOF)
Following the detention of 21 UNDOF peacekeepers by armed Syrian opposition fighters, Council members held consultations on 6 March at which they agreed to a press statement condemning the event and demanding the unconditional and immediate release of the peacekeepers (SC/10933). Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous updated Council members in consultations on the status of negotiations with those holding the peacekeepers on 8 March, and all 21 were released unharmed into Jordan on 9 March. In letters dated 11 March, Austria and the Philippines (the two largest UNDOF troop contributors) separately requested the Security Council to develop a mechanism to “guarantee” active dialogue between troop-contributing countries (TCCs) and the Council (S/2013/142 and S/2013/152). On 22 March, Council members held consultations with the UNDOF TCCs to address their concerns. On 26 March, Council members met again in regularly scheduled consultations on UNDOF to consider the Secretary-General’s 19 March report on the mission (S/2013/174). On 27 March, the Council adopted an additional press statement on UNDOF expressing grave concern over continued violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement and calling on all parties to respect the safety and security of UNDOF personnel (SC/10962).

Iran
On 6 March, the chair of the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Gary Quinlan (Australia) presented his first 90-day report on the work of the Committee to the Council (S/PV.6930). He said the Committee had held one meeting on 13 February during which it had discussed the interception reported by a member state (widely reported to be Yemen) of a vessel suspected of carrying illicit weapons from Iran to that state, and had encouraged the Panel of Experts to investigate the incident. The Committee had also considered an 11 January incident report from the Panel on the missile launches conducted by Iran in July 2012 which concluded that they represented a violation of resolution 1929. Quinlan said Council members were still discussing how to respond to this as well as to a Panel compilation of statements made by Iranian officials indicating potential violations of resolution 1747. Quinlan also mentioned that the Committee on 20 December had designated two additional entities as subject to targeted sanctions and had issued two implementation assistance notices, one on conventional arms and related material on 26 December and one on financial and business measures on 27 February.

Guinea-Bissau
On 6 March, the Council was briefed in consultations by Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, on the quarterly report (S/2013/123) on efforts to restore constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau following the 12 April 2012 coup, following which there was no outcome. Council members agreed on the consolidation of reporting cycles for resolutions 2048 (on the restoration of constitutional order) and 2092 (on the mandate of UNIOGBIS), with the next report due by the end of April. This report will include an assessment of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation on the ground, guide the discussions, and will be taken up by the Council in May when it will feed into the negotiations on a new resolution for the renewal of UNIOGBIS’s mandate.

A Meeting with Members of the EU Political and Security Committee
On 13 March, seventeen ambassadors and the permanent chair of the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC) met with the fifteen members of the Security Council (ten EU ambassadors could not attend due to weather-related flight cancellations). The meeting was hosted by Russia, as Council president, at its permanent mission. The topics of discussion included Mali, Somalia, Syria and the Middle East peace process, particularly with respect to enhancing UN-EU coordination in these areas. As it was an informal meeting, there was no official outcome, but the permanent chair of the PSC, Olof Skoog, did extend an invitation for Council members to visit Brussels.

Sierra Leone
On 13 March, the Council was briefed by Jens Anders Tøyberg-Frandzen, Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNIPSIL, on the Secretary-General’s report (S/2013/118). Ambassador Guillermo Rishchynski (Canada), chair of the Sierra Leone configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), also briefed the Council following the recent PBC visit to the...
country (S/PV.6933). On 26 March, resolution 2097 was adopted renewing UNIPSIL's mandate for twelve months, articulating a specific timeframe for the mission's drawdown process, which should be completed by 31 March 2014. The resolution notes three key tasks for UNIPSIL to perform for the remainder of its mandate, in coordination with the UN country team and other partners: conflict prevention and mediation support for the upcoming constitutional support process (in which UNIPSIL is expected to play a role, with the UN country team taking over following UNIPSIL's drawdown); security sector reform support; and support to the strengthening of human rights institutions. While Council members did not agree on a timeframe for the conclusion of the work of the Sierra Leone PBC configuration beyond the drawdown of UNIPSIL, it seems likely that it will continue through late 2014.

**Libya**

On 14 March, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2095, extending UNSMIL's mandate by 12 months and the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee for 13 months (S/PV.6934). The resolution lifts the requirement that the Sanctions Committee approve the use of non-lethal military equipment and assistance for humanitarian or protective use. It also removes the need for notification to the Committee of non-lethal military equipment being supplied to the government for security or disarmament assistance. The resolution also urges the government to improve the monitoring of arms supplied to Libya including through the issuance of end-user certificates. The meeting included briefings by the Special Representative and head of UNSMIL, Tarek Mitri, Ambassador Eugène Richard Gasana (Rwanda), the chair of the Libya Sanctions Committee and Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan.

**Afghanistan**

On 19 March, the Council held a debate on the situation in Afghanistan during which it discussed the Secretary-General's most recent report on UNAMA (S/2013/133) and adopted resolution 2096 extending the mandate of UNAMA until 19 March 2014 (S/PV.6935 and Resumption 1). Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon briefed the Council.

**Haiti**

On 20 March, the Council held its semi-annual debate on Haiti during which the Secretary-General's Acting Special Representative, Nigel Fisher, presented the Secretary-General's 8 March report (S/2013/139) on MINUSTAH and provided an update on recent developments (S/PV.6936). Fisher described the situation in Haiti as challenging both at the political and socioeconomic levels. He emphasised in particular that it was crucial for elections to take place in 2013 and said the president of Haiti had committed to establishing a temporary electoral council (a prerequisite for elections to move forward) before Easter. Fisher also presented the conditions-based consolidation plan for MINUSTAH, which was annexed to the Secretary-General's report.

**Iraq**

On 21 March, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNAMI, Martin Kobler, briefed the Council on the most recent report (S/2013/154) of the Secretary-General on UNAMI (S/PV.6937). Kobler highlighted progress towards the normalisation of Iraq's relations with Kuwait, spillover from the Syrian conflict in Iraqi territory, significant political demonstrations that have gripped Iraq since late December, acts of terrorism that killed approximately 1,300 people between November 2012 and February 2013, and ongoing efforts to relocate the more than 3,000 Iranian exiles currently living in Camp Hurriya. Ambassador T. Hamid Al Bayati (Iraq) also spoke.

**South Sudan**

On 21 March, Hilde Johnson, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNMISS, briefed the Council on the recent report (S/2013/140) of the Secretary-General on UNMISS (S/PV.6938). During her briefing, which was followed by consultations, Johnson said that "South Sudan's transition towards a stable, viable state continued at an uneven pace".

**Kosovo**

Farid Zarif, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNMIK, briefed the Council on 22 March regarding the Secretary-General's report of 4 February (S/2013/72) and recent developments (S/PV.6939). Prime Minister Ivica Dačić of Serbia and Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi of Kosovo also addressed the Council in the debate. Zarif reported that since he last briefed the Council on 27 November 2012 (S/PV.6872), there had been positive developments related to the high-level political dialogue facilitated by the EU in Brussels, with the most recent meeting having taken place on 20 March. Nonetheless, significant challenges remain, particularly within the mixed communities of the north where security incidents have inflamed ethnic tensions. Dačić suggested that “the situation on the ground has not been substantially improved”, particularly with regard to the human rights of ethnic Serbs in Kosovo. Thaçi stated the principal obstacle to further progress in political talks has been Serbia’s proposal for territorial Integrity and separate institutions for Serbs in Kosovo, which he claimed would be detrimental to an efficient, stable and centralised state. Council members expressed strong support for EU mediation, but also noted with concern the potential for a fragile security situation to undermine political progress.

**Liberia**

On 25 March, the Council was briefed by Karin Landgren, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNMIL, on the situation in Liberia (S/PV.6941). Ambassador Staffan Tillander (Sweden), chair of the Liberia configuration of the PBC, also briefed the Council following the recent PBC visit to the country. No outcome followed the briefing and consultations. Landgren’s briefing was largely guided by the Secretary-General’s latest report (S/2013/124), with discussions around UNMIL’s continuing reconfiguration, progress towards achieving the transition benchmarks, and the development of a transition plan with the Government of Liberia during and beyond UNMIL’s drawdown. Tillander focused on key findings of the PBC mission related to progress on security sector reform, rule of law and national reconciliation.

**Cyprus**

An expected briefing by Alexander Downer, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus, failed to materialize in March. No new briefing by Downer has been scheduled.
**Prevention of Conflicts in Africa**

**Expected Council Action**

In April, the Council is expected to receive a briefing on “Prevention of Conflicts in Africa: Addressing the Root Causes” from Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and possibly the Chairperson of the AU, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn of Ethiopia.

The briefing will be held at the ministerial level, with Rwandan Foreign Affairs Minister Louise Mushikiwabo presiding. The chairs of African subregional organisations will also likely attend. A presidential statement is the anticipated outcome.

**Key Recent Developments**

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa continues to meet a few times a year and reports to the Council annually, most recently on 31 December 2012 (S/2012/965). Meanwhile, annual consultations between Council members and the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) are perhaps the most prominent steps toward developing an effective partnership between the UN and the AU (S/2012/444). (For more information on UN-AU relations in this context, see SCR’s Special Research Report of 10 May 2011, Working Together for Peace and Security in Africa.)

In 2012, 61.2 percent of the country or region-specific meetings held by the Council concerned Africa. A similar trend seems to have prevailed thus far during 2013, with the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Somalia and Sudan/South Sudan as prominent examples of conflicts requiring the sustained attention of the Council. Recent developments in the Central African Republic, where events on the ground appear to have outpaced international responses, further illustrate the practical difficulties of conflict prevention. Fortunately, one country that some observers thought might be another case of failed conflict prevention efforts—Kenya—remains stable thus far after the 4 March general elections.

The Council has held a number of meetings regarding conflict prevention in recent years mostly spearheaded by elected members during their monthly presidency of the Council. Brazil scheduled an open debate on 11 February 2011 on the interdependence between conflict and development, which has significant implications for structural prevention. Previously, Nigeria organised an open debate on 16 July 2010 on preventive diplomacy in Africa. Lebanon scheduled a briefing on 22 September 2011 regarding the Secretary-General’s report on the use of preventive diplomacy (S/2011/552).

Rwanda, as Council president for April, would like the emphasis to be on structural prevention addressing the underlying political, social and economic causes of conflict. This entails focusing on the intersection between development and security. Preventive diplomacy, the subject of a PSC open session on 22 March, may also come up. The briefing will apparently discuss partnerships among the UN, AU and subregional organisations. AU initiatives and institutions such as the PSC, Continental Early Warning System, the African Peer Review Mechanism and the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy, may also be covered.

**Key Issues**

In practical terms, a central concern of the briefing will be how to improve existing mechanisms for conflict prevention partnerships between the UN and the AU and African subregional organisations.

There are also two other fundamental issues:

- whether structural prevention, which is ultimately about the development of nation states, goes beyond the mandate of the Security Council; and
- how to overcome concerns that preventive diplomacy, which requires Council engagement with states that are not yet in armed conflict, infringes state sovereignty.

**Options**

One option would be to resolve to change the practice of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa. The Working Group could meet on a more regular basis and provide a venue for Council members to discuss emerging and current conflict situations and how the Council might respond as well as receive informal briefings from the Secretariat on issues of concern in Africa.

Another option would be for the Council to deepen its substantive engagement with the AU and subregional organisations. Annual meetings of Council members and the PSC (which alternate between New York and Addis Ababa) and the meeting between Council members and the Economic Community of West African States in Côte d’Ivoire on 21 May 2012 have established a precedent that could be built upon.

A final option, which Rwanda unsuccessfully floated for the April programme of work, would be to resurrect and perfect the “horizon scanning” briefings by the Department of Political Affairs, which at times in the past called the attention of the Council to situations of concern.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

Past Council meetings on conflict prevention, whether a briefing or an open debate, have rarely translated into policymaking innovation by the Council or improved implementation in the field. Agreeing on an outcome that pushes the boundaries of existing debate and goes beyond reiterating previous content has so far proven to be a recurring challenge.

With respect to preventive diplomacy, translating support for the concept in the abstract among Council members into timely action in practice remains a challenge. Countries that are not yet in a situation of armed conflict, but may be at risk, commonly assert state sovereignty, which reinforces caution in how the Council sets its agenda.

In terms of structural prevention, some
members consider this to be outside the mandate of the Council. However, the World Bank has become increasingly active in this area, suggesting that rigid institutional boundaries between “security” and “development” may be shifting elsewhere.

One potential obstacle to an improved conflict-prevention partnership between the Council and the PSC is that the former carefully protects its status as the principal actor mandated to maintain international peace and security. This can have the unintended consequence of framing Council interaction with their regional counterparts in a way that is not conducive to more effective collaboration.

Central African Republic

Expected Council Action
In April, the Council is scheduled hear a briefing in consultations by Margaret Vogt, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), on developments and the latest Secretary-General’s report on BINUCA. (The report is due by 31 March but may be delayed to reflect the most recent developments.)

BINUCA’s mandate expires on 31 January 2014.

Key Recent Developments
In December 2012, the Seleka rebel alliance—formed by factions of the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace, the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity and the Wa Kodro Salute Patriotic Convention—took control of several major towns in the Central African Republic (CAR) and advanced on the capital, Bangui, demanding that President Francois Bozize step down after failing to implement the 9 May 2008 Libreville Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Media reports indicated that, at the request of the government, 2,000 troops from Chad went into the CAR on 18 December to help the army fight the rebels. These troops were sent in addition to the roughly 500 troops who were already there as part of the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in CAR, a mission of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) that has been in place since 2008. At the request of Bozize, South Africa sent 200 troops as well. France, which had 250 soldiers already stationed in CAR, increased its deployment to 600 troops to protect its “nationals and interests”. (According to the French foreign ministry, there are roughly 1,200 French citizens in CAR; most of them working for the French nuclear energy group Areva which mines the Bakouma uranium deposit in south CAR.)

On 3 January, Council members were briefed in consultations by Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, on recent developments. The following day, the Council issued a press statement demanding that the Seleka rebels halt all hostilities (SC/10877).

A ceasefire and a political agreement were signed between the government and the rebels on 11 January in Libreville, Gabon under the auspices of ECCAS after three days of negotiations. The parties agreed that Bozize would remain in power until the end of his term in 2016, and a government of national unity—in which opposition leaders were to be given key posts—was formed to implement reforms and hold parliamentary elections. On the same day, the Council was briefed by Vogt via videoconference from Libreville and in person by Zainab Hawa Bangura, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict. The Council then issued a press statement welcoming the signing of the political agreement (SC/10880).

On 24 January, the Security Council adopted resolution 2088, extending BINUCA’s mandate until 31 January 2014. BINUCA is to support the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and security sector reform processes—the delays in which were recognised as partially responsible for the current crisis—and to use its good offices to assist the parties in implementing the 11 January Libreville agreements. The Secretary-General was requested to report on the situation on the ground and provide an assessment of the implementation of the mission’s priorities by 31 March, possibly allowing for an adjustment to the mandate.

Renewed fighting between the rebels and the government broke out in mid-March as the Seleka rebels claimed that the government had not fulfilled its promises under the 11 January Libreville agreements. As tensions mounted, France, the penholder on CAR, organised a briefing with Vogt in consultations on 20 March. Vogt informed the Council about reports of widespread rape, looting, recruitment of children and starvation, with villagers hiding in the bush because they feared the rebels. She pointed out that the most violent actions against civilians have come from foreign elements within the rebel alliance. She added that the international community has been absent when it comes to the CAR. The Council then adopted a press statement condemning the recent attacks (SC/10948).

Urgent consultations were convened again on 22 March and the Council was briefed by Taye-Brook Zerihoun, Assistant-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, after which a Council press statement was issued calling for the cessation of hostilities (SC/10955).

The rebels took over Bangui on 24 March, causing Bozize to flee to Cameroon. Thirty South African troops were killed during the...
Central African Republic (con’t)

advances. Michel Djotodia, a Seleka leader, announced the annulment of the constitution and said he would rule by decree until the 2016 scheduled elections. Meanwhile, BINUCA has temporarily relocated uncritically to Cameroon.

On 25 March, the AU Peace and Security Council suspended the CAR from participation in AU activities and imposed sanctions on seven Seleka leaders.

The Council heard a briefing by Zerihoun on the situation in the CAR and from Ambassador Michel Tommo Monthe (Cameroon) in a private meeting on the same day. During the following consultations, Council members shared the view that the 11 January Libreville agreements are still the basis for political stability and that the regional organisations are to play the lead role at present. The Council released a press statement condemning the Seleka advancements and noting the AU actions (SC/10960). The statement called for the implementation of the Libreville agreements as the “framework for political transition and the basis for a peaceful solution”. It emphasised the role of ECCAS in facilitating the implementation of the Libreville agreements with the support of the AU. At the insistence of Rwanda, the statement added that the Council will consider further steps if required.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is playing a more effective and assertive role.

Achieving synergy with the subregional and regional actors in addressing the aftermath of the coup is a related issue.

Another issue is finding a productive role for BINUCA in the new political reality.

Options
One option is imposing sanctions on the Seleka leadership in light of the AU position.

The Council may consider to amend BINUCA’s mandate in light of the apparent collapse of the 11 January Libreville agreements, in particular the security situation and the wishes of the parties in CAR so that it can be a more relevant actor in achieving political stability. It may give BINUCA a more central and direct role in mediating between warring parties.

Another option is for BINUCA to play a supportive role to regional efforts to bring political stability to the CAR while not moving beyond the Libreville agreements.

Council Dynamics
It appears that in the last several months, the Council has been more focused on other pressing issues, paying relatively little attention to developments on the ground in the CAR, giving preference to other country situations such as Mali and the DRC. As the Seleka forces advanced on Bangui, the Council met several times yet refrained from taking a strong stance in a resolution or presidential statement, reflecting a continued lack of resolve on this issue.

While at present no major discussions have taken place on how to address the situation after the failure of the 11 January Libreville agreements to achieve stability, some Council members are realising that BINUCA’s mandate will have to be revaluated for the UN presence—and the Council—to be relevant in efforts at solving the renewed crisis in the CAR. A key factor in this respect is the position of the opposing sides in the CAR and that of ECCAS.

Several Council members, including some permanent ones, are cautious of singling out a specific side to the conflict and prefer deploring the situation in general. Others, including the African members of the Council, seem to be advocating a more aggressive approach towards the rebels in line with the recent AU sanctions.

Mali

Expected Council Action
In April, the Council is expected to be briefed in consultations by the Secretariat and consider the options included in the 26 March report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2085 (S/2013/189). A new resolution establishing a UN mission in Mali is a likely outcome.

AFISMA’s authorisation expires on 20 December 2013.

Key Recent Developments
Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman briefed Council members on 27 February on developments on the ground in consultations at which Council members also discussed the content of a letter to the Secretary-General from the interim President of Mali, Dioncounda Traoré (S/2013/113). The letter requested the rapid deployment of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to restore state authority and sovereignty prior to its possible transformation into a UN stabilisation and peacekeeping operation. Although it seems that a clearer request from the interim government will be needed, Council members have started their preliminary thinking about the establishment of a peacekeeping operation. In a letter to the Secretary-General (S/2013/129), the Council concentrated on the reference to the transformation of AFISMA into a UN peacekeeping operation made by Traoré and requested the inclusion of recommendations on options in terms of size, mandate and composition of such an operation in the upcoming Secretary-General’s report.

A 28 February communiqué of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) supported the formal request by Mali to the UN to take steps towards the transformation of AFISMA into a UN peacekeeping operation as soon as conditions allowed.

On 7 March, the AU’s Peace and Security
Council approved the revised joint strategic concept of operations of AFISMA and the Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF). AFISMA revised its total strength to 9,620 personnel, including 171 civilians, 590 police officers and 8,859 military personnel. The revised concept of operations described as the main constraint for the full deployment of AFISMA the insufficient access to financial and logistical support within the envisaged timeline. In a 7 March letter to the Secretary-General, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ramtane Lamamra, echoed the desire of the AU Peace and Security Council for the new UN operation to have a peace enforcement mandate (S/2013/163). He also requested a logistics support package for AFISMA, to be funded through UN-assessed contributions, in order to help complete the deployment of contingents and sustain operations on the ground.

On 10 March, the UN Secretariat sent a week-long exploratory mission to Mali, headed by Edmond Mulet, the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, to explore options for a UN mission, assess the situation on the ground and identify the potential risks that might arise.

Opération Serval, which France launched on 11 January, has successfully rolled back the gains of the terrorist and insurgent groups who seized northern Mali shortly after the 22 March 2012 coup d’état, but combat operations are still ongoing, particularly in Gao and Kidal. Although jihadist leaders Abou Zeid of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Mokhtar Belmokhtar of the al-Nusra Biddam Brigade were reportedly killed in the operations, at press time, only the former had been confirmed by France.

Following the political roadmap approved by the Malian National Assembly on 29 January, the interim government established, on 6 March, a Commission of Dialogue and Reconciliation whose members have yet to be appointed.

On 18 March, Council members were briefed in consultations by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, who stressed that impartiality of humanitarian work and protection of civilians must be a top priority in the UN involvement in Mali.

The Secretary-General’s report was circulated on 26 March among Council members. The two options that appear in the report include beefing-up the current multidimensional presence in Bamako and transforming it into an integrated political presence with a better resourced AFISMA. AFISMA would then have “an offensive combat and stabilisation mandate, focusing on extremist armed groups”, together with bilateral military efforts. AFISMA would then transition to a UN stabilisation mission once certain critical benchmarks are met. The second option advocates for an integrated stabilisation mission with a military strength of 11,200 under Chapter VII alongside a parallel force to conduct counterterrorism operations beyond the scope of the UN’s mandate. The report rules out the possibility of a UN operation under a peace enforcement mandate as was requested by the AU, ECOWAS and many Malian interlocutors.

At press time, the Council was expecting a briefing by Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, on 27 March in consultations.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 12 March, the Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, Kyung-wha Kang, presented to the Human Rights Council (HRC) the Mali report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights covering the period from January to November 2012 as well as an update on the current situation (A/ HRC/22/33 and Corr.1 of 7 January 2013). Kang said that the High Commissioner deployed a monitoring mission of human rights officers to Mali on 18 February. According to the preliminary findings of the mission, the military intervention was followed by a serious escalation in retaliatory violence by government forces that appeared to be targeting members of the Peuhl, Tuarag and Arab ethnic groups—perceived to be supportive of the armed groups—and led to the displacement of these populations. The mission also reported cases of gender-based violence and lacked of progress in investigating human rights violations. She concluded that plans were underway to reinforce the UN human rights team in Mali. Speaking after Kang, Justice Minister Malick Coulibaly underlined Mali’s commitment to justice, as demonstrated by its referral of the situation to the International Criminal Court. On 21 March, the HRC adopted a resolution condemning the human rights violations in Mali, especially in the north, established a mandate of an independent expert on the situation of human rights in Mali, and asked the High Commissioner to present an updated report at the next session of the HRC.

Key Issues

A key overarching issue is to stabilise the security situation in the north in order to minimise the threats to a future peacekeeping operation. A related issue will be to define who will be in charge of counterinsurgency operations.

Ensuring that AFISMA has adequate financial and logistical support to fulfil its mandate in the transition towards a UN stabilisation operation is another key issue. As the Council discusses the mandate of the UN mission, other key issues include:

- considering a role for the mission to address both the divisions within the government and the MDSF in parallel with the need to facilitate a wider negotiation process with minority groups;
- addressing the difficulty of providing sufficient electoral support in a timely manner for the 7 and 21 July presidential and parliamentary elections, respectively; and
- ensuring that, if there are AFISMA troops who will be re-hatted, that these have not committed human rights violations. Addressing the potentially destabilising spillover effects from Mali to an already fragile region will be an ongoing issue.

Options

Regarding the establishment of a stabilisation operation, immediate options for the Council include:

- establishing a full-fledged peacekeeping operation aimed at ensuring stability and security in Mali; assigning a parallel force to operate in Mali (and potentially in the subregion) alongside the UN mission in order to conduct major combat and counterterrorism operations;
- ensuring that AFISMA has the basic financial and logistical support to attain its objectives before the transition starts;
- including in the mandate of the mission a role in facilitating the return to constitutional order, including dialogue with minorities;
- assigning the work of building electoral management capacities to the current UN office in Bamako or a regional organisation, taking into account that the UN mission might not be fully deployed for the July elections; and
- establishing a vetting mechanism to ensure that all re-hatted AFISMA troops respect international human rights standards beyond the force commander and
his deputy, as per the current internal screening policy.

Further options include:

• stressing the importance for donors to quickly honour the pledges they made in support of Mali, AFISMA and its troop-contributing countries at the 29 January Addis Ababa donor conference; and

• reiterating the call for the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy for the Sahel, Romano Prodi, to finalise as soon as possible the much delayed UN integrated strategy for the Sahel region encompassing security, governance, development, human rights and humanitarian issues as requested by resolution 2056 of 5 July 2012.

Council Dynamics
Council members seem to agree that a new UN stabilisation operation in Mali will be more predictably and sustainably resourced than AFISMA under its current configuration. The idea of having a mission that is structurally integrated seems to enjoy wide acceptance among Council members.

Although France wanted to speed up the transition towards a stabilisation operation, some countries, especially other permanent members, preferred to receive a clearer assessment of the situation on the ground from the Secretariat before starting to discuss the new mandate.

Views differ when it comes to the emphasis on the political mandate of the mission and the dimension of the UN presence in Bamako. Some members are sympathetic to the reservations the interim government seems to have about a heavy UN footprint in Bamako, while others are more aware of the centrality of governance issues that led to the current situation in Mali.

France is the penholder on Mali.

Sudan/Darfur

Expected Council Action
In late April, the Council expects to hold a briefing and consultations on the Secretary-General’s quarterly report on the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The Council began negotiating a draft presidential statement on 20 March that appeared to express concern at the recent violence in North Darfur. However, at press time, it seemed that this statement had reached an impasse, and it is unclear whether the Council will attempt to revive its discussions on the statement.

The mandate of UNAMID expires on 31 July.

Key Recent Developments
Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, briefed the Council on Darfur and the latest UNAMID report prior to its consultations on the issue on 24 January. Mulet expressed concern at the recent deterioration of the security situation in certain parts of Darfur, particularly western Jebel Marra and North Darfur. He said that the government needed to provide “a holistic settlement of the issues of political and economic marginalisation affecting not only Darfur but Sudan as a whole” to achieve a durable and comprehensive peace in Darfur.

Speaking after Mulet, Ambassador Daffa-Alla Elhag Ali Osman (Sudan) urged the Council to take stronger measures against rebel groups that have not joined the Doha peace process. He also alleged that rebel movements in Darfur received logistical and political support from South Sudan and claimed that they initiated attacks from South Sudan on Darfur.

On 14 February, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2091 renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee for an additional year. The resolution did not make any fundamental changes to the mandate of the Panel. However, it expressed concern that materiel or other resources supplied to Sudan could be used to operate military aircraft in violation of the arms embargo. In a statement in the Council after the adoption of the resolution, Ali Osman said, “This concern is based on false premises, since…Sudan uses its aircraft for purely peaceful, civilian purposes”.

Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement-Bashar (JEM-Bashar) continued their negotiations in an effort to reach a peace agreement. On 24 January in Doha they signed a framework agenda outlining the topics to be discussed, which are based on five elements of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD), including power sharing, wealth sharing, justice and reconciliation, ceasefire and security arrangements and compensation of refugees and internally displaced persons. Sudan and JEM-Bashar signed a ceasefire agreement in Doha on 10 February, and on 24 March they struck a partial deal, also in Doha, as they are still negotiating power-sharing and security arrangements. (JEM-Bashar, headed by Mohamed Bashir Ahmed, is a splinter group of the JEM, one of the main rebel groups in Darfur.)

Violent conflict has continued in Darfur in recent months. Fighting between the Beni Hussein and Abbala communities in Jebel Amir, North Darfur, over access to a gold mine caused 100 deaths and displaced 100,000 people in early January. Despite a ceasefire agreement signed on 17 January, the two communities clashed again in late February, this time near El Sereif, North Darfur, with Al-Jazeera reporting that the fighting claimed 51 lives. UNAMID sent medical supplies to the area and flew 37 of the injured to El-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, to receive medical care. On 8 and 9 March, bombings were reported in Al Malaha, North Darfur, apparently destroying several homes and killing a large number of cattle. Additionally, on 15 March, members of the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni

UN DOCUMENTS ON SUDAN/DARFUR Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2091 (14 February 2013) extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sanctions Committee until 17 February 2014. S/RES/2063 (31 July 2012) extended UNAMID’s mandate until 31 July 2013. S/RES/1769 (31 July 2007) established UNAMID. S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court. Secretary-General’s Report S/2013/22 (10 January 2012) was the most recent UNAMID report. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.6920 (14 February 2013) was the meeting at which the Council adopted resolution 2091 renewing the Panel of Experts’ mandate. S/PV.6910 (24 January 2013) was the latest briefing to the Council on UNAMID.
Minawi (SLA-MM) reportedly killed four civilians who were part of the Rizeigat community during a raid on their camp near Beleil, South Darfur.

Human Rights-Related Developments
The independent expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, Mashood Baderin, visited Sudan from 3-10 February. He met with a variety of interlocutors in Khartoum and El-Fasher. At the end of the visit, Baderin made preliminary observations regarding the flaws in the prosecution of crimes committed in Darfur, the challenges faced by civil society organisations, the arrest and detention of political opposition figures by the National Intelligence and Security Services, the lack of security and denial of humanitarian access in North Darfur and his concerns regarding women and children’s rights. Baderin will present his report to the Human Rights Council in September 2013.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is whether and how UNAMID can strengthen its role in protecting civilians, given the toll that recent outbreaks of inter-communal violence have taken on civilian populations.

Another key issue is how the Council can exert leverage on Sudan to end aerial bombardments in civilian areas in Darfur.

An additional important issue is how the Council can facilitate progress in the implementation of the DDPD, given the significant delays in its implementation, so that noticeable, concrete progress can be made in improving the lives of people on the ground.

An ongoing, key issue is how to convince rebel groups in Darfur that have not put down their arms and the Sudanese government to engage in constructive peace talks.

Options
The Council could decide to invite the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and the High Commissioner for Human Rights to brief the Council on the impact of the recent conflict in Darfur on civilians.

It could also adopt a statement that:
• expresses concern with recent inter-communal violence in Darfur and its impact on civilians;
• condemns violence against civilians by parties to the conflict;
• condemns destabilising activities by rebel groups and demands that they join the peace process;
• encourages progress in negotiations between Sudan and the JEM-Bashar faction; and
• urges progress in implementing the provisions of the DDPD, while expressing support for the upcoming donor conference on Darfur, scheduled for 7-8 April in Doha.

Council Dynamics
Over the past year, the Council’s focus on Darfur has been somewhat overshadowed by its dealings with Sudan-South Sudan issues. However, several Council members have been troubled by reports of deteriorating security in Darfur and its humanitarian impact. In particular, there is growing concern among several Council members about the heightened inter-communal violence this year in North Darfur, notably between the Beni Hussein and Abbala communities. Nonetheless, some members appear to believe that inter-communal tensions in North Darfur have diminished in recent weeks.

Over the past several months, some Council members have also been disappointed by the lack of progress in implementing the DDPD, pointing to the difficult security situation, weak rule of law and the lack of sufficient funds for implementation. While Council members are hopeful that the upcoming donor conference on Darfur could provide funds to help support implementation of the DDPD, some are more optimistic than others that the funds generated will be used effectively to improve services in Darfur.

The UK is the penholder on Darfur.

Sudan and South Sudan

Expected Council Action
In April, the Council is likely to hold its twice-monthly consultations on the situation between Sudan and South Sudan in accordance with resolution 2046. The Council is also expected to discuss in consultations the Secretary-General’s most recent report on the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), which expires on 31 May.

It is unclear whether there will be any outcome to the deliberations on Sudan-South Sudan this month, especially given the divisive nature of the Council’s discussions on this issue in the recent past.

Key Recent Developments
On 8 March, the defence ministers of Sudan (Abdul Raheem Mohammad Hussein) and South Sudan (John Kuong Nyuon) met in Addis Ababa and signed an implementation agreement focusing on security arrangements agreed to by the parties on 27 September 2012. The implementation agreement outlines tasks and deadlines related to making operational the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone (SDBZ) and the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) between Sudan and South Sudan. On 12 March, Sudan and South Sudan additionally adopted an implementation matrix that provides a timeline for tasks to be completed by the parties related to security arrangements (including those outlined on 8 March), the administration of Abyei, nationality issues, oil production, trade and other matters.

The Council met in consultations on 12 March to discuss Sudan/South Sudan issues and was briefed by Hervé Ladsous, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and Haile Menkerios, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan and South Sudan. In light of the 8 and 12 March agreements, Ladsous discussed the technical aspects of establishing the JBVMM, stating that UNISFA would need more troops.

Sudan/Darfur (con’t)

UN DOCUMENTS ON SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2046 (2 May 2012) was on Sudan-South Sudan relations. Security Council Press Statement S/10779 (23 September 2012) welcomed the 27 September agreements. Security Council Letter S/2013/148 (11 March 2013) was a letter from the Secretary-General to the Council that contained the 8 March agreement.
to fulfil its mandate to support the JBVMM. Menkerios said that the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) had agreed to negotiate directly with Sudan on the situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states but that, to date, Sudan had not been willing to engage in such negotiations with the SPLM-N. The AU High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and South Sudan (AUHIP) scheduled talks between Sudan and the SPLM-N on at least two occasions in the first half of March to no avail.

During the meeting, Russia tabled a draft press statement welcoming the signing of the 8 and 12 March agreements. However, the US, which had been leading negotiations on a draft presidential statement on Sudan and South Sudan since mid-February, was unwilling to endorse the statement. (It appears that the draft presidential statement was in part intended to express concern with delays in the implementation of the 27 September agreements, in addition to addressing the humanitarian crisis in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states and the situation in Abyei.)

Speaking to media at the stakeout after the meeting, Ambassador Susan Rice (US) argued that the proposed press statement was “divorced from the larger set of issues”, as it did not mention the situations in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei, nor did it address recent cross-border incidents. She added that the US objected to the draft press statement because Russia was “unwilling to commit to a swift issuance” of the presidential statement. In response, Ambassador Vitaly Churkin (Russia), also addressing the media at the stakeout, said that Russia was “working for the Security Council to try to make a positive contribution to the talks between Sudan and South Sudan” and that the US reaction “was not reasonable”.

On 14 March, South Sudan instructed pipeline operators and oil firms to restart oil production for international transport via Sudan. (South Sudan shut down its oil production in January 2012, after accusing Sudan of stealing $815 million worth of its oil.)

South Sudan withdrew its troops to its side of the SDBZ on 17 March in concurrence with the 8 and 12 March agreements. The Sudan Tribune reported on the same day that Sudan submitted a letter to the UNISFA Force Commander, indicating that it had withdrawn its armed forces from the border areas. Also on 17 March, however, South Sudan accused the Sudanese Armed Forces and affiliated militias and ethnic groups of a cross-border incursion into Northern Bahr el Ghazal state.

From 16-19 March, the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM), a body that the parties use to address border-related security concerns, convened in Addis Ababa. During the meeting, Major General Yoshannes Gabremenkesel Tesfamariam (Ethiopia), the Force Commander and head of UNISFA, reported that Sudan and South Sudan had withdrawn their troops from the border and that national monitors from both countries were in transit to the headquarters of the JBVMM in Kaduguhi, South Kordofan state.

Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, chairperson of the AU Commission, welcomed in a 20 March press release the JPSM meeting and the efforts undertaken by the parties to make the SDBZ operational. In the press release, she also urged the Security Council “to authorise the additional 1,126 personnel… requested by UNISFA, to facilitate force protection for the monitors of the JBVMM.”

Also on 20 March, Hussein, the Sudanese defence minister, indicated that Sudan would be willing to negotiate directly with the SPLM-N so long as the negotiations were “based on the [2005] Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the protocol for the two areas [South Kordofan and Blue Nile] as a reference”.

The Council held an informal interactive dialogue on 27 March with Thabo Mbeki, the chair of the AUHIP, on Sudan and South Sudan. Abdulsalami Alhaji Abubakar, also a member of the AUHIP, participated, although Mbeki was the primary briefer. Mbeki told Council members that he was optimistic about the prospect for improved relations between Sudan and South Sudan since the signing of the 8 and 12 March agreements. He was also hopeful that Sudan and the SPLM-N would hold direct negotiations in the near future, although Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir had yet to concur with his defence minister’s comments on 20 March and give his approval to such negotiations. Mbeki added that there was a possibility that al-Bashir and South Sudanese President Salva Kiir would meet in early April to resolve their differences related to the establishment of the Abyei Area Council and the Abyei Area Police. It seems that he claimed as well that economic sanctions against Sudan were unhelpful.

**Key Issues**

A key issue is whether Council members can overcome their differences and speak with a unified voice on Sudan-South Sudan issues in a manner that enhances their influence on the calculations of the parties.

On the ground, given their failure to honour several previous agreements, a key issue is whether Sudan and South Sudan can continue to make progress in implementing the arrangements agreed to on 8 and 12 March.

Another important and ongoing issue is how to address the fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile between Sudan and the SPLM-N and the resulting and ongoing humanitarian crisis.

A related issue is whether Sudan and the SPLM-N will engage in direct talks and make progress in negotiations on a cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access to the two states.

**Options**

Options for the Council on Sudan-South Sudan issues include:

- requesting a report from the Secretary-General on the implementation of the 8 and 12 March agreements by 8 June, the deadline set for the full operational capacity of the JBVMM in these agreements;
- travelling to Sudan and South Sudan to meet with officials from both governments and to impress upon the parties the importance of fulfilling prior commitments; and
- mandating the Secretary-General to launch a commission of inquiry to investigate reports of human rights violations in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.

**Council Dynamics**

Sudan-South Sudan issues have remained divisive within the Council, as reflected by the consultations on 12 March. Some
members, notably the US, hold Sudan largely responsible for its poor relations with South Sudan. Russia and others advocate for what they consider a more balanced approach.

In February, the US circulated a first draft of a presidential statement to Council members, followed by a revised second version, in an effort to achieve the consensus needed to adopt the statement. However, the contentious consultations on 12 March appear to have generated new difficulties in negotiations on the statement. At press time, it seems that the Council’s discussions on this statement have reached an impasse.

While Council members are encouraged by the signing of the 8 and 12 March agreements, they underscore the importance of implementing these agreements, recalling the history of non-implementation of previously signed agreements. In this sense, members will view as a positive development recent efforts by the parties to disengage their troops from the border and move their national monitors to the JBVMM headquarters in Kadugli.

The ongoing conflict and related humanitarian crisis in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states remain a continuing source of distress in the Council. Council members are eager for Sudan and the SPLM-N to engage in direct talks without preconditions.

With respect to UNISFA, at least one member appears wary of the suggestion that more troops may be needed by the mission to carry out its mandate to support the JBVMM. (This may result in part from concerns about the budgetary implications of expanding the size of the mission.)

The US is the penholder on Sudan-South Sudan issues, although Russia took the lead in circulating a draft press statement acknowledging the 8 and 12 March agreements.

UN DOCUMENTS ON SOMALIA Security Council Resolution S/RES/2093 (6 March 2013) authorised AMISOM deployment until 28 February 2014 and partially lifted the arms embargo on Somalia. Security Council’s Report S/2013/69 (31 January 2013) was the latest regular report on Somalia. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6929 (6 March 2013) concerned the re-authorisation of AMISOM. Security Council Letters S/2013/134 (5 March 2013) was from the Secretary-General and included the AU strategic review and the UN Political Office for Somalia should be replaced by an AU Mission; the AU Peace and Security Council based on the Secretary-General’s recommendations in his report, the Council is likely to adopt a resolution in late April or early May authorising a new UN mission to be deployed by 3 June. The Council will also be briefed, most likely by the Department of Political Affairs, in late April. The government of Somalia is also due to report on the implementation of safeguards related to a partial lifting of the arms embargo.

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**Sudan and South Sudan (con’t)**

**Expected Council Action**

In April, the Council expects the Secretary-General’s report with the findings of the Technical Assessment Mission (TAM), which had been tasked with developing further details for the new a UN special political mission that will replace the current UN presence in Somalia. Based on the recommendations of the report, the Council is likely to adopt a resolution in late April or early May authorising a new UN mission to be deployed by 3 June. The Council will also be briefed, most likely by the Department of Political Affairs, in late April. The government of Somalia is also due to report on the implementation of safeguards related to a partial lifting of the arms embargo.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 6 March, the Council adopted resolution 2093 extending the authorisation of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) until 28 February 2014 while specifying that its mandate includes the provision of assistance to the government in extending state authority in areas recovered from the Islamist rebel group Al-Shabaab. The Council also reiterated its request for AMISOM to establish a guard force for the protection of international staff and requested the AU to consider providing funding for AMISOM through its own assessed costs as it has done for the African-led International Support Mission to Mali.

Resolution 2093 did not reflect the requests submitted to the Council by the AU Peace and Security Council based on the strategic review that had been conducted by the AU Commission. In a 27 February communiqué, the AU decided to broaden AMISOM’s mandate to a “multidimensional Peace Support Operation” and called on the Council to authorise an “enhancement of the support package to AMISOM”. (The strategic review and the communiqué were submitted to the Council on 5 March [S/2013/134].)

In addition, in resolution 2093, the Council authorised a partial lifting of the arms embargo for a period of 12 months for weapons and training solely intended for the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF). (Some types of heavy weaponry are excluded as specified in an annex to the resolution.) The partial lifting of the arms embargo also applies to AMISOM’s “strategic partners”. The resolution asked the government to report to the Council within one month and semi-annually thereafter on the structure of the SNSF and the infrastructure and procedures it has established for registration, storing, maintaining and distributing weapons. Resolution 2093 also expanded the mandate of the Monitoring Group to oversee the new provisions. It furthermore endorsed the Secretary-General’s recommendations in his report of 31 January that the UN Political Office for Somalia should be replaced by a new expanded UN special political mission that would incorporate the UN Support Office for AMISOM (S/2013/69). It requested that by January 2014 the UN country team be integrated as well.

In the interim, resolution 2093 asked the Secretary-General to conduct a TAM and report back to the Council by 19 April, after which it will likely mandate a new Special political mission in Somalia to be deployed by 3 June. Guiding principles for the TAM suggested an expanding role for the UN in providing advice, support and capacity-building to the government of Somalia in areas such as peacebuilding, statebuilding, elections, governance, human rights and security sector reform. Under the leadership of the Department of Political Affairs, a TAM was conducted from 18 to 29 March, with visits to Nairobi, Addis Ababa and Somalia.

On 12 March, Ambassador Kim Sook (Republic of Korea), chair of the 751/1907
Western Sahara

Expected Council Action
In April, the Council expects a briefing in consultations on the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) by Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of MINURSO. The Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross, is also likely to brief the Council.

A likely outcome is the adoption of a resolution renewing MINURSO’s mandate—which expires on 30 April 2013—for another 12 months.

Key Recent Developments
Ross last briefed the Council on the status of negotiations on Western Sahara in consultations on 28 November 2012, following which there was no outcome. Weisbrod-Weber also made a statement. Ross focused primarily on his trip to North Africa from 25 October to 11 November—which included meetings with King Mohammed of Morocco and Mohamed Abdelaziz, the...
Secretary-General of the Polisario Front (in Algeria)—in addition to meetings in Madrid and Paris on 12-15 November. The trip resulted in an agreement on a “shuttle diplomacy” approach to the negotiating process, reminiscent of that undertaken by then Personal Envoy James A. Baker III in 1997, comprising regular visits to Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco and Western Sahara.

From 28 January to 15 February, Ross continued his tour of members of the Group of Friends of Western Sahara (France, Russia, Spain, the UK and the US) aimed at building international support for the negotiations, visiting Washington DC and Moscow, in addition to Germany and Switzerland.

The next step in the shuttle diplomacy began on 20 March and was scheduled to end on 3 April, with the aim of preparing for the subsequent phase in the negotiating process and a possible resumption of direct talks by mid-2013. Ross has held discussions with Morocco and the Polisario Front and visited Western Sahara, Algeria and Mauritania. Ross may also consider visiting Libya and Tunisia at a later stage, to explore further options for regional engagement and support for the negotiating process, as well as to discuss concerns about the heightened risks of instability and insecurity in the Sahel.

On 15 March, the Group of Friends issued a joint statement, welcoming the upcoming trip and expressing their support for the mediation efforts undertaken by Ross. The statement also encouraged the parties to show flexibility in their engagement with the Personal Envoy and each other, in the hopes of ending the current impasse and achieving progress towards a political solution.

There have been some improvements in the situation since the adoption of resolution 2044 renewing MINURSO’s mandate on 24 April 2012. UN officials noted an increase in access to a broader range of interlocutors, including Ross’s visits to Western Sahara in October-November 2012 and early 2013 and regular meetings with Morocco’s National Human Rights Council.

However, media reports suggest that access to Western Sahara for international delegations remains an issue of concern. On 6 March, four members of the European Parliament arrived in Casablanca on their way to Laâyoune for meetings with human rights organisations and MINURSO representatives; they were denied access by Morocco and later returned to Europe.

The programme run by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), offering separated families in Western Sahara and refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria a range of services to help them reconnect, has continued. UNHCR’s family visit programme has significantly expanded, with larger aircraft permitting a greater number of Sahrawi refugees in Tindouf to reunite with their families in Western Sahara and vice versa. Furthermore, free telephone services allow separated Sahrawi families to contact and stay in touch with their relatives. However, as noted by Ross in his 28 November briefing, there is a need for increased funding for UNHCR’s confidence-building measures programme, which has seen a significant decrease in financial support due to the global economic crisis.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

On 19 February, a spokesperson for the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) expressed concern at the use of a military court to try and convict 25 Saharan civilians charged in relation to violence surrounding the dismantling of the Gdim Izik protest camp near Laâyoune on 8 November 2010, and at the alleged ill-treatment they received during their pre-trial detention. According to a report of Morocco’s National Human Rights Council, the trial took place “under normal conditions and was marked by due process”.

The UN Human Rights Council (HRC) considered several reports relevant to the situation in Western Sahara during its March session.

On 4 March, Juan Méndez, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, introduced his report to the HRC on his September 2012 visit to Morocco that included Laâyoune (A/HRC/22/53/Add.2 of 28 February 2013).

On 5 March, the HRC considered the report of the working group on enforced or involuntary disappearances on the follow-up to its country mission to Morocco (A/HRC/22/45/Add.3 of 1 March 2013).

On 4 March, the HRC considered the report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Margaret Sekagya. In its addendum, Sekagya expressed concern regarding the restrictions on the freedom of peaceful assembly encountered in Western Sahara, the excessive use of force during demonstrations, and the alleged difficulties to register for organisations in Western Sahara (A/HRC/22/47/Add.4 of 27 February 2013).

In the lead up to the ongoing negotiations on the draft resolution renewing MINURSO’s mandate, a number of international human rights groups reiterated their call for the introduction of a human rights component in MINURSO’s mandate, obtaining widespread media exposure.

**Key Issues**

A key issue for the Council is the renewal of MINURSO’s mandate that complements the negotiating process and takes into consideration the regional context and the instability of the situation in Mali and the Sahel.

A related issue is for the Special Representative and Personal Envoy, UN and associated personnel and international delegations to have free access to interlocutors in Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco and Western Sahara.

Human rights monitoring and agreement on a mechanism that is independent, impartial, sustained and comprehensive is an ongoing issue.

**Options**

One option is for Council members to adopt a resolution renewing MINURSO’s mandate for a period of 12 months, maintaining similar language to that of the current mandate and encouraging progress in the negotiating process and the resumption of direct talks.

This option could include taking note of the Secretary-General’s recommendation for an increase in MINURSO personnel that appeared in his report of 5 April 2012 (S/2012/197). The request was for 15 UN military observers to bolster MINURSO’s monitoring capacities, in addition to six MINURSO police officers to support the expansion of the humanitarian family visit programme.

Further options that could be discussed in April for possible consideration at a later stage relate to the monitoring of human rights, such as:

- welcoming the work of Morocco’s National Human Rights Council and

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**UN DOCUMENTS ON WESTERN SAHARA Security Council Resolution S/RES/2044 (24 April 2012) renewed the MINURSO mandate for twelve months. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2012/197 (5 April 2012) was the Secretary-General’s report on the situation in Western Sahara. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.6758 (24 April 2012) was the adoption of resolution 2044 renewing MINURSO’s mandate.**

**OTHER RELEVANT FACTS** Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MINURSO: Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber (Germany). Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara: Christopher Ross (USA). MINURSO Size: Composition and Budget Strength as of 31 January 2013: 25 troops; 175 military observers; 6 police; 95 international civilians; 165 local civilians; 16 UN volunteers. Budget (July 2012-June 2013): $61.3 million. MINURSO Duration April 1991-to present.
Western Sahara (con’t)

Morocco’s ongoing cooperation with Special Procedures of the UN Human Rights Council;
- requesting the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to brief on the human rights situation in Western Sahara, encouraging consideration of alternative human rights monitoring arrangements such as regular OHCHR staff visits; and (although unlikely options at this juncture)
- asking the Secretary-General to establish an independent commission of inquiry to investigate the overall human rights situation in Western Sahara; or
- introducing a human rights component to MINURSO’s mandate.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Council members engaged on the issue, including Morocco, remain supportive of the shuttle diplomacy undertaken by Ross and remain hopeful that such an approach could pave the way for moving into direct talks shortly.

Positions on Western Sahara—including those of the Group of Friends, four of whom are permanent Council members—remain unchanged, with most Council members remaining reluctant to speak out strongly on the issue and instead preferring to use their political capital on other issues on the Council’s agenda.

While the EU stance has generally been aligned with that of Morocco, some EU members may be shifting, as reflected by the 5 December 2012 vote by the Swedish parliament to recognise the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. Media reports suggest that advocacy efforts are underway to promote similar initiatives in other European parliaments.

The US is the penholder on Western Sahara.

Côte d’Ivoire

Expected Council Action
In April, the Council expects a briefing by Edmond Mulet, the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire and on the Secretary-General’s special report requested by resolution 2062 with, inter alia, recommendations on possible adjustments in the structure and strength of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI).

The Council also expects a briefing in consultations by the chair of the 1572 Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Gert Rosenthal (Guatemala) on the final report of its Group of Experts (GoE). A new resolution renewing the sanctions measures and the mandate of the GoE is the likely outcome.

The current mandate of UNOCI expires on 31 July 2013 and the sanctions regime and the mandate of the GoE expire on 30 April 2013.

Key Recent Developments
Koenders briefed the Council on recent developments in Côte d’Ivoire on 17 January. He noted how—despite the existence of a comprehensive security sector reform (SSR) strategy and a national disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) policy—security continues to be a challenge.

Paramilitary groups have continued to operate in the country and along the borders with Ghana and Liberia, potentially further destabilising the country, as exemplified by the mid-March deadly attacks in the town of Zilebly, close to the Liberian border.

Charles Blé Goudé, an ally of former President Laurent Gbagbo and former leader of the Young Patriots militia, was arrested on 17 January in Ghana. Blé Goudé was listed in the travel ban and asset freeze list of the Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee. He was extradited to Côte d’Ivoire and has been charged with war crimes, murder and theft of public funds.

The prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, confirmed on 19 February the charges pending against Gbagbo, who may bear criminal responsibility for four counts of crimes against humanity for the post-electoral violence that hit the country in late 2010 and early 2011. The news resulted in violent clashes among pro- and anti-Gbagbo demonstrators.

Despite the release of political detainees in late December 2012 and the work of the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the divisions within the country continue to be blatant. Regional and local elections, originally scheduled for February, were postponed to 21 April to allow all major political parties to participate. However, Gbagbo’s Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) leaders have announced that the party will not participate in the April elections.

A technical assessment mission from UN headquarters was deployed from 2 to 16 February. The mission evaluated the situation on the ground and assisted UNOCI in developing benchmarks with the government to measure progress. Its findings will feed into the special report to the Council to be submitted by 31 March. As requested in resolution 2062, the report is supposed to include benchmarks to measure and track progress towards the achievement of long-term stability in the country, recommendations on possible adjustments in UNOCI’s structure and strength, options to reinforce inter-mission cooperation arrangements between UNOCI and the UN Mission in Liberia and an assessment of the implementation of UNOCI’s protection of civilian strategy.
Rosenthal last briefed the Council as chair of the 1572 Sanctions Committee on 25 October 2012 during consultations on the Committee’s activities and the midterm report of the GoE (S/2012/766). The report recorded numerous violations of all the measures, including the arms embargo, the travel ban and the restrictions on diamonds, during the previous six months. The report provided details of the regional geopolitical reach of the Ivorian anti-government forces and the illicit movement of arms into the country to support these forces. Furthermore, the GoE stated its concern regarding the lack of implementation of the sanctions measures imposed on Côte d’Ivoire by member states, which constituted a serious issue in the monitoring of both the arms and diamond embargoes.

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 19 March, the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Côte d’Ivoire, Doudou Diène, presented to the Human Rights Council his report for the period 15 July-15 December 2012 (A/HRC/22/66 of 7 January 2013). The expert undertook his third visit to the country from 24 September to 12 October 2012. Diène reported that large-scale attacks that took place in August-September 2012 against the Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI) in an attempt to destabilise the country resulted in the killing of 60 people including FRCI troops and civilians, wounded others and displaced populations in the west of the country. The FRCI reacted vigorously to these attacks, at times disproportionally, leading to human rights violations, including killings, arbitrary arrest and detention and torture. Diène also highlighted the persistence of intercommunity tensions, the resurgence of acts of sexual violence and serious violations against children and the urgent need to fight impunity.

Key Issues
The key overarching issue for the Council is the security situation, in particular the recent series of attacks against civilian populations, the government and UN personnel.

A related issue is the impact of such attacks on already existing divisions throughout the country, hampering the possibility of a credible political dialogue and national reconciliation.

Concerns about the upcoming 21 April elections are another related issue, given that the FPI has decided to boycott them and that UNOCI’s electoral assistance division was shut down.

In spite of the recent establishment of the National Security Council, SSR—including the DDR process—remains a key issue due to the ongoing circulation of large numbers of weapons in Côte d’Ivoire.

A closely related issue is how to control the flow and movement of arms in the country and the region and how to enhance the implementation of Council-imposed sanctions or whether to revise the existing sanctions to make them better suited to the current situation.

A further related issue, if contemplating easing notification requirements when renewing sanctions, will be to consider how non-lethal equipment (such as satellite phones or uniforms) can act as force multipliers.

A broader issue is the cross-border linkages of anti-government groups, which continue heightening the regional dimensions of the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire.

Options
Options for the Council include:

• to maintain the sanctions regime without modifications and to renew the mandate of the GoE, strongly emphasising the need for compliance with the sanctions measures; or

• to sharpen further the sanctions regime in light of the anticipated downsizing of UNOCI by emphasising private companies’ responsibility for ensuring compliance with the sanctions and requiring the issuance of end-user certificates; and

• to emphasise the need for Côte d’Ivoire and all countries in the region to facilitate the work of the GoE by replying in a timely manner to its queries, granting access to all necessary documents, and ensuring that companies based in their countries do likewise.

Council Dynamics
At least one Council member, echoing Côte d’Ivoire’s worries, has expressed its reservations regarding the downsizing of the mission by one battalion before July. However, as the decision was already agreed upon in resolution 2062 (and deferred in October 2012 following a letter from the Secretary-General), no further questioning of this decision is expected. Regarding further downsizing, Council members might express different views, mainly if the conclusions of the GoE report on the compliance with the sanctions regime are rather pessimistic.

Also, while President Alassane Ouattara’s leadership has been hailed in recent Secretary-General’s reports, some Council members have shown frustration at the worsening of the security situation since last summer. In addition, accounts of retaliation and violent clashes initiated by pro-government militias might prevent the Council from easing the arms embargo when it comes to the provision of lethal equipment for the government, as Côte d’Ivoire has requested.

France is the penholder on Côte d’Ivoire, while Guatemala is the chair of the 1572 Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee.

Middle East

Expected Council Action
In April the Council is expected to hold its quarterly open debate on the Middle East, following a briefing by Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman. Discussions will likely focus on the stalled peace process and the humanitarian and security situations in Gaza and the West Bank. Feltman’s briefing will also likely cover recent events in Syria.

Key Recent Developments
Israel/Palestine
The Security Council’s last quarterly open debate on the Middle East was held on 23 January. Following a briefing by Special Coordinator Robert Serry, who reiterated the need for “concerted action...to salvage the two-state solution”, Palestinian Foreign Minister Riad Malki and officials from more than 40 states made statements in either their
national capacity or on behalf of regional organisations or groupings.

Since that debate, the Council has received two additional briefings on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question. In his briefing on 26 February, Feltman described 2013 as “a year that could…extinguish what hope remains for a two-state solution”, and added there is “no process of negotiation…on the horizon.” On 25 March, Serry asserted that it was time for “concerted action” to support a “serious international initiative” including through the Middle East Quartet (comprising the UN, the EU, Russia and the US).

Israel held parliamentary elections on 22 January. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s conservative Likud party, running in alliance with the nationalist Yisrael Beitenu party, won 11 fewer Knesset seats than they had previously held, though still more than any other ticket. A new centrist party, Yesh Atid, won the second-most seats. Following weeks of negotiations, a new government coalition was announced on 15 March that included Likud, Yesh Atid, the far-right Jewish Home party and the centre-left Hatenu’a party but excluded the ultra-orthodox Shas and United Torah Judaism parties, both of which had been part of Netanyahu’s last government. The new government is expected to focus on domestic issues more than the Palestinian question.

In February, significant tensions arose in the West Bank regarding the situation of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel. Protests in support of four Palestinian prisoners engaged in hunger strikes led to clashes with the Israeli army on 21 February that injured more than 60 people. On 23 February, Arafat Jaradat, a Palestinian man arrested on 18 February on suspicion of throwing stones at Israeli settlers, died while in Israeli custody. Though Israel’s health ministry asserted that Jaradat was tortured. In response, a significant portion of the more than 4,500 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons took part in a hunger strike on 24 February, while concurrent protests were held in several towns throughout the West Bank.

During consultations following the 26 February briefing, it appears that Morocco suggested elements to the press expressing concern about the circumstances surrounding the detention and death of Jaradat, though ultimately no agreement was reached. On 17 March, one of the four original hunger-strikers was released into Gaza after ending his strike and agreeing to a plea bargain. Two of the remaining strikers—who had been held without trial since November—ended their strikes on 28 February in advance of a hearing on their case.

On 20 March, US President Barack Obama arrived in Tel Aviv for a four-day visit to the region. Prior to the visit, the White House made clear that Obama would not bring any new proposals with him but that the visit was rather a “listening tour”. Speaking in Ramallah on 21 March following a meeting with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, Obama was critical of Israeli settlement activity but did not call for a construction freeze, adding that both sides would have to “think anew” to resolve outstanding issues. In a speech in Jerusalem that afternoon, Obama reiterated the need for negotiations and the fact that they must lead to “two states for two peoples”. Also on 21 March, two rockets fired from Gaza struck southern Israel, but caused no injuries.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

In March 2012, the Human Rights Council (HRC) decided to establish an independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the implications of Israeli settlements on the human rights of the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including East Jerusalem. Following the adoption of this resolution, Israel decided to suspend its cooperation with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the HRC and its mechanisms. Israel did not submit its national report on human rights to the working group of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) due last October, and failed, on 29 January 2013, to appear before the working group of the UPR for its second review scheduled on that day. (This was the first time that a state was absent for its own review.) The HRC decided by consensus to reschedule Israel’s UPR to the 17th session of UPR in October-November.

On 18 March, the HRC held an interactive dialogue with the fact-finding mission, which presented its report released on 7 February (A/HRC/22/63). Also on 18 March, High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay introduced to the HRC her report on the implementation of HRC resolutions on the human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories covering November 2011-November 2012 and its addendum covering the period of escalating hostilities from 14-21 November 2012 (A/HRC/22/35 and Add1).

On 22 March, the HRC adopted four resolutions on the Occupied Palestinian Territories and a resolution regarding the follow-up to the report of the UN independent international fact-finding mission on the Gaza conflict.

**Syria**

Syria is also likely come up for discussion during the open debate, as it has regularly for over a year. (The ongoing Syrian crisis was first included in the regular monthly briefing to the Council on the Middle East on 25 August 2011.)

Council members will likely be particularly interested in hearing about developments relating to the Secretary-General’s investigation of allegations that chemical weapons had been used in the conflict. On 19 March, the Government of Syria and the opposition each accused the other of employing chemical weapons in an attack that killed dozens in Aleppo province. France raised the issue in the Council under “other matters” on 20 March. At the media stakeout following those consultations, the president of the Security Council, Ambassador Vitaly Churkin (Russia), indicated that Syria had sent a letter to the Secretary-General requesting an “impartial” investigation of the 19 March
incident. Answering questions in his national capacity, he added that the discussions in the Council had included “such exotic proposals” as an investigation of “rumours” of other uses of chemical weapons inside Syria, which he took to be an effort to derail a focused investigation of the Syrian government’s allegations. Ambassador Gérard Araud (France) and Deputy Permanent Representative Philip Parham (UK) spoke subsequently, to provide, as Araud put it, “the other side of the truth, after this fascinating reconstruction of our meeting”. Parham noted that the Syrian National Coalition had alleged two incidents of the use of chemical weapons by the government and that the UK and France would be requesting the Secretary-General to investigate “any reports” of the use of chemical weapons.

On 21 March, in response to the request for an investigation from the Government of Syria, the Secretary-General announced his intention to establish a technical mission to investigate the Aleppo incident. The same day, the Secretary-General received letters from both France and the UK requesting an investigation of several other incidents. In his responses to Syria, France and the UK, the Secretary-General made clear that the current investigation would focus on the specific incident alleged in Aleppo on 19 March, but requested all three governments to provide additional information pertaining to each alleged incident. The Secretary-General reiterated his intentions and his requests in a letter to the Security Council dated 22 March (S/2013/184).

On 25 March, speaking again at the media stakeout, Churkin indicated that he was “perplexed” that the mandate of the mission would not include identifying who deployed the weapons on 19 March. (The Spokesperson for the Secretary-General confirmed on 26 March that the mission would focus on verifying whether or not chemical weapons were used. He also said that additional information regarding the alleged incidents had been received from Syria and the UK.) At the same stakeout, Churkin also confirmed that Russia and China had both requested to have representatives participating as experts in the mission, but had been told by the Secretariat that it was their belief that P5 representatives should not be included. (Speaking to the press on 25 March, US State Department Acting Deputy Spokesperson Patrick Ventrell indicated that the US would support a team that included Russia and China, but that the final determination would be up to the UN.)

On 26 March, Churkin told reporters that experts from the P5 would probably not be included in the mission.

Regarding the mission’s composition and mandate, at press time the terms of reference for the investigation had not been finalised. On 26 March, the Secretary-General appointed Ake Sellstrom, the former Chief Inspector with the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) established in 1991 and tasked with ensuring Iraq’s compliance with its disarmament obligations following its invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1991, to head the mission.

The work of the chemical weapons probe will most likely considerably depend on the security situation in Syria. On 22 March the Security Council adopted a press statement condemning a terrorist attack on a mosque in Damascus that killed more than 40 people, including a senior Muslim cleric (SC/10953). On 24 March, several mortar rounds landed near the hotel in Damascus housing UN staff, prompting the UN to remove nearly half of its international staff from Damascus until the security situation improved.

**Key Issue**

The key issue remains the lack of progress in the Israel/Palestine peace process and whether or not the Security Council can have any impact on that process.

**Underlying Problems**

The major obstacles facing the Middle East peace process remain unchanged: the Palestinian Authority requires an end to settlement activity as a prerequisite to negotiations, while Israeli only accepts talks without preconditions. The prominence of the Jewish Home party (which is popular among Israeli settlers) in the new government and the government’s stated interest in focusing on domestic issues suggest that returning to negotiations will not be a priority for Israel.

Further complicating matters is the possibility that the Palestinian Authority could use its upgraded status at the UN to press claims against Israel through the International Criminal Court, an action that Israel would find counter-productive to returning to negotiations. (In November the General Assembly adopted a resolution conferring non-member observer state status on Palestine.)

Finally, the financial crisis facing the Palestinian Authority has continued to worsen in 2013, a situation some have speculated could lead Abbas to dissolve it altogether, returning the administration of the West Bank to Israel in an effort to compel it to return to negotiations.

**Options**

The Council has very few options in April on the Middle East peace process, and it is likely that the open debate will again feature the reiteration of Council members’ previously stated positions.

The Council’s last substantive outcome specifically addressing the Middle East peace process was resolution 1850 adopted on 16 December 2008.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

Most Council members believe that no activity will be possible in the Security Council on the Middle East peace process without the active support of the US and are waiting to see what, if anything, develops in the region in the wake of Obama’s visit. The most recent effort to adopt a resolution on Israel/Palestine took place on 18 February 2011, when a draft resolution (S/2011/24) condemning Israeli settlement activity was vetoed by the US.

Some Council members believe a new initiative could begin elsewhere, beyond the Council, either in the form of renewed activity by the Middle East Quartet or a new initiative from the League of Arab States, which, at press time, was holding its annual summit in Doha, Qatar.
Women, Peace and Security

Expected Council Action
In April, the Council is expected to consider the Secretary-General’s report on sexual violence in conflict (S/2013/149) during an open debate. Rwanda’s Foreign Affairs Minister Louise Mushikiwabo is expected to present. The Secretary-General and Zainab Bangura, the Special Representative on the issue, will brief. Bangura is also likely to update the Council on her trip to the AU Summit in Addis Ababa in January which led to invitations for field visits to the Democratic Republic of Congo in late March and to Somalia in early April.

At press time, it was unclear whether there would be an outcome.

Key Recent Developments
Bangura was appointed on 22 June 2012 and took up her office in September. Her first visiting mission was to the Central African Republic (CAR) on 5-13 December 2012 and she subsequently briefed the Council on 11 January (S/PV.6899). She also briefed Council members on Syria in consultations on 27 February. (The Syrian government has committed to a visit by Bangura in 2013.) It seems her 22 January visit to Addis also led to an invitation to visit Mali in the near future.

The 2013 report on sexual violence in conflict highlighted several emerging concerns, such as sexual violence against men and boys, particularly in the context of detention; the practice of forced marriage by armed groups; the links between sexual violence and natural resource extraction; and the correlation between sexual violence and inadequate security sector reform and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration efforts (SSR and DDR). It provided country-specific information in three categories:

- parties to armed conflict credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for rape or other forms of sexual violence (in Afghanistan, CAR, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Mali, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan/Darfur, Syria and Yemen);
- sexual violence in post-conflict situations (in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka and Timor-Leste); and
- other situations of concern (in Angola, Guinea and Kenya).

Compared with the 2012 Secretary-General’s report (S/2012/33), situations added were Afghanistan, Mali and Yemen, and situations dropped were Chad and Egypt. The category of sexual violence in the context of elections, political strife or civil unrest that was part of the 2012 report was removed.

As in 2012, the current report also has an annex with three significant additions: the Syrian government forces and their allied militia, the Shabbiha; the Séléka rebels in the CAR; and several armed groups in Mali. There were also additions under the existing DRC listing, such as the Congolese national police, the M23 and several more Mai-Mai groups in the Kivus.

The Council held its annual open debate on women, peace and security on 30 November 2012 (S/PV.6877), and the head of UN Women, Michelle Bachelet, briefed. (On 15 March, Bachelet announced her plans to step down as head of UN Women.)

On 31 October 2012, the Council adopted a presidential statement highlighting the need in the Council’s own work for more systemic attention to the women, peace and security agenda (S/PRST/2012/23). (The debate was originally scheduled for 29 October but was postponed when UN headquarters closed due to Hurricane Sandy.)

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is maintaining consensus around the importance of the overall women, peace and security framework and ensuring that it is integrated into all of the Council’s work.

A related issue is how to best respond to the information contained in the Secretary-General’s report on sexual violence in conflict. How to quickly, yet effectively, act with regard to those included in the annex of the report will be another key consideration for Council members.

Options
At press time it was unclear whether there would be sufficient appetite or time to negotiate an outcome. However, an option for the Council is to adopt a presidential statement or resolution that takes up recommendations from the 2013 report. The Council could:

- take note of the parties named in the report and express the Council’s intention to consider appropriate action when renewing or establishing relevant political or peacekeeping missions, especially in the context of DDR and SSR processes and the deployment of gender expertise, in particular women’s protection advisers;
- endorse the Special Representative’s work of engaging with governments and armed groups to establish commitments for accountability for sexual violence and form procedures to allow for the systematic monitoring of such commitments;
- direct relevant sanctions committees to consider whether parties named in the annex should be subject to existing sanctions or whether designation criteria should be expanded to include sexual violence;
- commit to regularly including sexual violence considerations as part of its terms of reference for Council visiting missions; or
- commit to calling for the inclusion of addressing sexual violence concerns in mediation and peace processes, particularly in the context of security arrangements and transitional justice mechanisms.

Council Dynamics
It was difficult in 2012 to advance this thematic issue in the Council, particularly due to the concerns expressed by China, India, Pakistan and Russia.

Regarding the 2012 report on conflict-related sexual violence, these members were resistant to the inclusion of countries that in their view did not constitute threats to international peace and security and were therefore considered to be outside the purview of the Security Council. Similar arguments arose during the negotiations on the 31 October 2012 presidential statement, when these
members suggested the Council should limit its commitments to the 1325 women’s participation agenda to armed conflict and post-conflict situations.

It is too early to tell whether this trend will be reversed in the near term. However, it seems many of the criticisms were addressed in the 2013 report and initial reactions by Council members seem to be cautiously positive, even amongst Council members who registered significant concern last year. New Council members Argentina, Australia and Luxembourg are strong advocates of the women, peace and security agenda. The other two new Council members, the Republic of Korea and Rwanda, are also expected to be supportive of the issue. It seems possible the Council may address the issue of sexual violence again in June. The UK initiative on preventing sexual violence will likely be highlighted in the Council and at the G8 summit that month since the UK will have the presidency of both in June.

The UK is the penholder on women, peace and security in the Council. The US is the penholder on sexual violence issues.

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**Peacebuilding**

**Expected Council Action**

In April, the Council is expected to receive a briefing by Ambassadors Abulkalam Abdul Momen (Bangladesh) and Ranko Vilović (Croatia), the former and current Chairs of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) on the sixth annual report of the PBC (A/67/715-S/2013/63), covering the period from 1 January to 31 December 2012. A representative of the PBC Working Group on Lessons Learned may also brief.

Planned for the next day is an interactive dialogue with the chairs of the PBC’s six country-specific configurations (Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone). No outcome is expected.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 12 July 2012, the Council held an open debate to discuss the previous annual report of 30 January 2012 (S/2012/70), chaired by Maria Angela Holguín, the foreign minister of Colombia (which held the Council presidency that month). The debate included briefings by the Secretary-General; the then-PBC Chair Ambassador Abdulkalam Abdul Momen (Bangladesh); and former PBC Chair Ambassador Eugène-Richard Gasana (Rwanda). An interactive dialogue with the chairs of the country-specific configurations followed the briefing on the next day.

Following the open debate on post-conflict peacebuilding on 20 December 2012 during which the Council discussed the Secretary-General’s report on peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict (S/2012/746), a presidential statement was issued (S/PRST/2012/29). The statement reiterated the Council’s support for the PBC and expressed its willingness to “make use of its advisory, advocacy and resource mobilisation role”. It also emphasised the PBC’s role in supporting the transition of UN missions in PBC-agenda countries.

On 21 February, Vilović addressed the annual formal briefing to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, during which he emphasised the importance of including peacebuilding in the mandates of peacekeeping operations.

The PBC country configuration chairs had been invited to speak when the Council discussed the first three annual reports, however more recently this practice appears to have been dropped.

**Recent Developments in Country-Specific Configurations of the PBC**

On 14-16 January, the Burundi configuration visited Burundi, following which the chair, Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland), and the Special Representative and head of the UN Office in Burundi, Parfait Onanga-Anganga, briefed the Council on 24 January (S/PV.6909).

On 5 February, the chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration, Ambassador Maria Luíza Ribeiro Viotti (Brazil), briefed the Council alongside Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs (S/PV.6915). Viotti noted the continued suspension of projects under the Peacebuilding Fund since the 12 April 2012 coup.

A PBC delegation comprising members of the Liberia and Sierra Leone configurations engaged in a joint visit to both countries on 11-20 February. Led by configuration chairs for Liberia and Sierra Leone, Ambassadors Staffan Tillander (Sweden) and Guillermo Rishchynski (Canada), respectively, the visit reviewed the commonalities of the two countries’ experiences in peacebuilding, as well as highlighted the importance of strengthening collaboration with other countries on the PBC’s agenda in the region. The UN missions in both countries are undergoing a transition, and the visit highlighted the important role the PBC can play in their drawdown. The visit also looked at cooperation with regional partners. Tillander briefed the Council on 25 March alongside Karin Landgren, Special Representative in Liberia (S/PV.6941). Rishchynski briefed the Council on 13 March alongside Jens Anders Toiyberg-Frandzen, the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General in Sierra Leone (S/PV.6933).

The chair of the Guinea configuration, Ambassador Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg), visited Guinea on 17-19 February. Her visit focused on preparations for the second review of the Statement of Mutual Commitments, support for the upcoming legislative elections and the third poverty reduction strategy paper. It also reviewed links between development and peacebuilding efforts, as well as the role of the PBC in resource mobilisation.

Consultations have been underway to identify a new chair for the CAR configuration since the resignation of Ambassador Jan Grauls (Belgium) on 1 June 2012. In the interim, Vilović has assumed the chairmanship.

**Key Issues**

A key issue for the Council is being able to take advantage of the PBC’s added value (both actual and potential), in particular its role in the drawdown of UN missions.

A related issue for the Council, with respect to the situations on both bodies’ agendas, is taking full advantage of the country-specific
Expertise of the chairs of the PBC country configurations.

Options
One option is for the Council to discuss the annual report and take no action.

A second option is for the Council to issue a presidential statement:
• welcoming the report and encouraging progress and concrete initiatives that would strengthen the PBC’s role in peacebuilding in countries on both bodies’ agendas; and
• calling for a discussion with the PBC Working Group on Lessons Learned, chairs of country-specific configurations and representatives of UN missions on reviewing past experience and looking toward future collaboration.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Ongoing instability in countries on the PBC’s agenda—such as CAR and Guinea-Bissau—may result in Council members showing more interest in the work of the PBC than in the past. Positive and tangible results in PBC initiatives, such as the role it is playing in the drawdown of the UN Mission in Liberia and the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone, may also prompt renewed support for, and interest in, its work.

No Council member is penholder on peacebuilding. The issue tends to be a discretionary item on which the Council president holds the pen.

Notable Dates for April

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REPORT DUE</th>
<th>REPORTS FOR CONSIDERATION IN APRIL</th>
<th>REQUESTING DOCUMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29 January</td>
<td>Sixth annual report of the Peacebuilding Commission</td>
<td>S/RES/1646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 March</td>
<td>SG report on sexual violence in conflict</td>
<td>S/RES/1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 March</td>
<td>SG report on Mali</td>
<td>S/RES/2085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 March</td>
<td>SG report on UNISFA (Abyei)</td>
<td>S/RES/2075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March</td>
<td>SG report on BINUCA (Central African Republic)</td>
<td>S/RES/2088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March</td>
<td>SG special report on UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire)</td>
<td>S/RES/2062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 April</td>
<td>SG report on MINURSO (Western Sahara)</td>
<td>S/RES/2044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 April</td>
<td>SG report on UNAMID (Darfur)</td>
<td>S/RES/2063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 April</td>
<td>Group of Experts final report to the 1572 Côte d’Ivoire sanctions Committee</td>
<td>S/RES/2045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 April</td>
<td>SG to transmit the findings of the technical assessment mission to Somalia</td>
<td>S/RES/2093</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MANDATES EXPIRE</th>
<th>RELEVANT DOCUMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 April</td>
<td>MINURSO (Western Sahara)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 April</td>
<td>1572 Côte d’Ivoire sanctions and Group of Experts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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