Overview

The Republic of Korea (ROK) will preside over the Security Council in February.

An open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict is planned with ROK Foreign Minister Kim Sung-Hwan expected to preside. In addition to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, briefers are likely to include the High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos.

A quarterly debate on Kosovo is planned, with a briefing by Farid Zarif, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo.

A briefing on cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional organisations, particularly with the EU, is expected by Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

Briefings, followed by consultations, are likely on:
- developments in Yemen, by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser Jamal Benomar; and on the 27 January Council visiting mission to the country, by the UK;
- developments in the Middle East, by the Secretariat;
- developments in Guinea-Bissau and the latest Secretary-General’s report on the work of the UN Integrated Peace-Building Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), most likely by the head of the Department for Political Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman;
- developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC, Roger Meece;
- the Secretary-General’s report on Somalia with options and recommendations for the future UN presence in the country, also by Feltman; and
- the sixty-day report from the AU on the African-led International Support Mission in Mali, requested by resolution 2085.

Briefings in consultations are likely on:
- Sudan and South Sudan issues, twice (in line with resolution 2046), by the Secretariat;
- the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Sanctions Committee, by its chair, Ambassador Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg);
- possible responses to address the threat by the rebel group M23 in the DRC, by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Hervé Ladsous;
- the Sudan Sanctions Committee, by its chair, Ambassador María Cristina Perceval (Argentina); and
- the most recent Secretary-General’s report on the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei.

Formal sessions will be needed to adopt:
- a resolution renewing the mandate of the UN Office in Burundi;
- a resolution renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee;
- a resolution extending the current mandate of UNIOGBIS; and
- a resolution re-authorising AMISOM.

Throughout the month, Council members will be following closely developments in Mali and in Syria and additional meetings on these issues may be scheduled.

At the end of the month, the ROK is planning a wrap-up session in a private meeting.
Central African Republic
On 3 January, Council members were briefed in informal consultations by Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, on recent developments related to the uprising by the Seleka rebel alliance in CAR. The following day, Council members issued a press statement calling for a cessation of hostilities and for parties to engage in political dialogue (SC/10877). On 11 January, the Council was briefed by Margaret Vogt (Nigeria), the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of BINUCA via videoconference from Libreville, Gabon where she had been participating in peace talks (S/PV.6899). The Council also heard from Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict Zainab Hawa Bangura (Sierra Leone) during the same briefing on her recent visit to the country. The same day, Council members issued another press statement (SC/10880)—the fourth over a period of four weeks—welcoming the signing of the Libreville agreements and calling for their implementation. On 24 January, the Security Council adopted resolution 2088 extending BINUCA for twelve months and requesting the Secretary-General to provide a report on the situation on the ground, as well as an assessment of the implementation of the mission’s priorities by 31 March, possibly allowing for an adjustment to the mandate.

Counterterrorism
On 15 January, the Council held an open debate on a comprehensive approach to counterterrorism chaired by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Hina Rabbani Khar (S/PV.6900). The Secretary-General, the EU, and 32 member states in addition to Council members participated. The Council adopted a presidential statement stressing that counterterrorism requires a sustained and comprehensive approach with active participation and collaboration of all states, international and regional organisations (S/PRST/2013/1). It also took note of the recommendation by the Secretary-General to appoint a coordinator for all UN counterterrorism activities.

Cyprus
On 17 January, Council members were briefed in informal consultations on the latest UNFICYP report (S/2013/7) by Special Representative and head of mission, Lisa Buttenheim (US). (Alexander Downer, the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser who assists the two Cypriot parties in their negotiations, did not brief on this occasion.) The Council adopted resolution 2089 on 24 January, renewing UNFICYP for six months. It was adopted with 14 votes in favour and one abstention by Azerbaijan (S/PV.6908). The text closely resembled resolution 2058 (2012), on which both Azerbaijan and Pakistan had abstained. In its explanation of vote, Azerbaijan said that it fully supported the renewal of UNFICYP. Its concern was that the resolution contained “outdated” elements and that references to the move towards “intensive” negotiations were obsolete as talks had come to a substantive halt by mid-2012. It also claimed that the resolution contained references which were “no longer an issue” and lamented that the bulk of its proposals had not been taken into account. (The UK is the lead on Cyprus and had several meetings with Council members to discuss the text.)

Côte d’Ivoire
On 17 January, the Council was briefed by Albert Gerard Koenders, Special Representative and head of UNOCI, followed by consultancies (S/PV.6902). The briefing focused on the key issues raised in the most recent UNOCI report (S/2012/964), in particular the current status of the reconciliation process in Côte d’Ivoire, as well as in the areas of security sector reform and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. Following Koenders’ briefing, the Permanent Representative of Côte d’Ivoire addressed the Council, underlining his country’s concern about the crisis in Mali, not only in terms of the threat of spillover across the border it shares with Côte d’Ivoire but also in the context of President Alassane Ouattara’s current role as Chairman of ECOWAS.

Syria
On 18 January, High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay and OCHA head Valerie Amos briefed Council members in consultations on, respectively, the human rights and humanitarian situations in Syria. Amos reported that there were as many as 4 million in need within Syria, including 2 million internally displaced persons, and 650,000 Syrian refugees negatively impacting the economic and political situations in host countries. She also highlighted the indiscriminate nature of the violence, distressing reports of sexual violence and the need for unhindered humanitarian access. Pillay reiterated the findings of an independent study commissioned by her office that more than 60,000 people had died in the Syrian conflict and repeated her call for the Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC. (On 14 January, Switzerland submitted a letter to the Council requesting that it refer the situation in Syria since March 2011 to the ICC [S/2013/19]. The letter was co-signed by 56 other member states including Council members Australia, France, Luxembourg, the Republic of Korea and the UK.) The five Council members who signed the letter urging a referral to the ICC made a joint statement to the press following the Pillay and Amos briefing that without accountability there will be no sustainable peace. On 29 January, Council members were briefed in consultations by the UN-Arab League Joint Special Representative for Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi, on his efforts towards a political solution to the Syrian conflict. Brahimi reported that the international community was facing a scenario of a failed state in Syria, putting the stability of the region at risk. It seems Brahimi also suggested the Council might want to set up inquiries into war crimes and crimes against humanity in Syria to complement the work being done by the Human Rights Council’s Commission of Inquiry.

Terrorism
On 18 January, Council members issued a press statement condemning a deadly hostage situation at the In Amenas natural gas facility in Algeria, which began on 16 January (SC/10887). Terrorists claiming to be affiliated to the Islamist militants operating in northern Mali occupied the facility and held hundreds of people hostage. About 37 hostages were killed before and during an assault on the facility by Algerian forces in an attempt to free them. Though the
hostage-takers claimed that they were acting in reaction to the emergency military intervention by France in Mali, Council members did not draw the connection in the press statement.

Peacekeeping
On 21 January, the Council held a debate on “UN Peacekeeping: a Multidimensional Approach” which was chaired by Pakistani Foreign Secretary Jalil Jilani with Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon briefing (S/PV.6903). The Council unanimously adopted resolution 2086 emphasising the relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. This marked the first time the Council has adopted a thematic resolution on peacekeeping since resolution 1353 (2001).

Haiti
On 22 January, Council members were briefed in consultations by Mariano Fernández Amunátegui (Chile), the outgoing Special Representative and head of MINUSTAH. During his final briefing to Council members after 20 months as Special Representative, Fernández provided a frank overview highlighting key issues confronting Haiti and MINUSTAH today, including progress in the electoral process and the urgent need to conduct local, municipal and legislative elections, as well as building the capacity of the Haitian National Police and the reduction in MINUSTAH troops currently underway and due for completion by June 2013. In a 28 January press statement, Council members recognised MINUSTAH’s contribution to progress achieved in the area of security while emphasising remaining challenges in strengthening the rule of law and security sector reform. They also echoed Fernández’s call for the holding of elections by the end of 2013 and urged all political actors to increase their efforts to preserve stability in Haiti (SC/10901). At press time, there was no indication of who would replace Fernández.

Israel/Palestine
On 23 January the Security Council held its quarterly open debate on the Middle East. Following a briefing by Special Coordinator Robert Serry (Netherlands), who reiterated the need for “concerted action...to salvage the two-state solution”, Palestinian Foreign Minister Riad Malki along with more than 40 states made statements in either their national capacity or on behalf of regional organisations or groupings (S/PV.6906 and Resumption 1). This was the first time the observer mission of Palestine addressed the Council as a state since the General Assembly conferred non-member state status to Palestine on 29 November.

West Africa
On 25 January, Said Djinnit, Special Representative and head of UNOWA, briefed the Council on the Secretary-General’s latest report (S/2012/977), followed by informal consultations (S/PV.6911). Djinnit focused on Mali and the risk that the conflict may spread to neighboring states as a result of infiltration by militants fleeing the emergency military intervention by France. Djinnit reported that, though Ghana and Sierra Leone recently conducted peaceful elections, overall the region continues to face significant challenges to governance, peace consolidation and conflict prevention. He cited the ongoing crisis in the Sahel, especially in Mali, as well as in Guinea-Bissau, and the overall threat posed by transnational organised crime and terrorism.

Libya
On 29 January, the Council was briefed on the situation in Libya by Tarek Mitri (Lebanon), Special Representative and head of UNSMIL, followed by informal consultations (S/PV.6912). At press time, it seemed that the briefing and consultations would serve as an opportunity to discuss the UNSMIL mandate in the lead-up to its renewal in March. On 17 January, Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi—an ICC indictee—made his first appearance in a Libyan court since his capture more than a year ago.

UNRCCA (Central Asia)
On 29 January, Miroslav Jenča (Slovakia), Special Representative and head of UNRCCA, briefed Council members in informal consultations. In a press statement following the briefing, Council members, while noting the Centre’s fifth anniversary, expressed their appreciation for its work as a preventive diplomacy tool contributing to strengthening peace and stability in the region, fostering good neighbourly relations and cooperation and assisting Central Asian States to respond to domestic and transnational threats to peace and sustainable development of the region. In particular, Council members welcomed the Centre’s role in facilitating the implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy and facilitating assistance by Central Asian states to normalising the situation in Afghanistan to boost broader stability and development in the region (SC/10903).

Rule of Law
At press time, the Council was expected to be briefed by Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson on 30 January (S/PV.6913), followed by informal consultations. The Secretary-General’s next rule of law report was due on 19 January, however its submission may be delayed by several months (S/2012/958 and S/2012/959).

Working Methods
At press time, the Council was scheduled to hold a private meeting on 31 January under the agenda item “Implementation of Note S/2010/507”. The meeting was convened by Pakistan—Council President in January—as a wrap-up session of its presidency. Such sessions are not a common fixture on the Council’s monthly programme of work, but it is not unprecedented. Several were held in the early 2000s, though the practice seems to have disappeared by 2005. During a November 2012 open debate on working methods, several member states encouraged holding such sessions as a means of increasing Council accountability and transparency (S/PV.6870 and Resumption 1).
Expected Council Action

In February, the Council is expected to report from the AU on the deployment and activities of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), in line with resolution 2085 of 20 December 2012. It will also likely be following a range of issues relating to the fast-developing situation in Mali, including the deployment of a multidisciplinary UN presence in the country.

AFISMA’s authorisation expires on 20 December 2013.

Key Recent Developments

On 10 January, the rebel group Ansar Dine and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) seized Konna, barely 56 kilometres from the strategic town of Sévaré (which has the only other airport in Mali, apart from that in Bamako, capable of handling military cargo planes and is an easy gateway to the south of the country). That same day, Council members met in consultations to discuss a request by Mali’s interim government for French assistance and issued a press statement condemning the movements and attacks by terrorist and extremist groups in the northern Mali as constituting a threat to international peace and security (SC/10878). On 11 January, France launched Opération Serval attacking the rebels’ positions. Council members met again in consultations on 14 January to get an update on the situation from Jeffrey Feltman, head of the Department of Political Affairs.

On 17 January, the EU established a Common Security and Defence Policy mission, headed by Brig. Gen. François Lecointre (France), which is expected to be deployed in Mali by mid-February to support the training and reorganisation of Mali’s military. On that same day, Said Djinnit, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in West Africa and head of the UN Office for West Africa, met in Bamako with interim President Dioncounda Traoré and emphasised the importance of the political process.

On 19 January, ECOWAS, which is providing the core of AFISMA’s forces, held an extraordinary summit in Côte d’Ivoire to agree on options for an accelerated deployment of West African troops in light of “Opération Serval”. The initial plan was for AFISMA’s forces to be in place by September 2013, but Nigeria began deploying its air force in Mali on 17 January. The next day, troops and headquarters staff officers began to arrive, and by 20 January, 855 troops from Benin, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo had been deployed, along with a full battalion of troops from Niger to the border with Mali. (France had already sent several hundred troops to Mali and was planning to have at least 2,500 troops there.) Chad, which is not a member of ECOWAS, pledged 2,000 troops to the operation. Originally, AFISMA was envisaged as a force of 3,300 personnel, including 2,900 troops, 30 individual police officers and two formed police units of 280 personnel in total, but Feltman told Council members that it is now generally agreed that the number needs to increase. The ECOWAS summit endorsed the appointment of AFISMA’s military command: Maj. Gen. Shethu Abdelkadir (Nigeria) as force commander and Brig. Gen. Yaye Garba (Niger) as deputy commander. Both arrived in Mali on 12 January. The summit requested immediate funding and logistical support from the UN, noting that the unfolding situation in Mali had necessitated the accelerated deployment of AFISMA.

On 20 January, Nigerian troops deploying to Mali were attacked in northern Nigeria by the terrorist group Boko Haram, which is believed to be an affiliate of the Islamist forces in northern Mali. Three soldiers were killed.

The accelerated military activity has led to a speeding-up of efforts to establish a UN presence in Bamako that would, among other things, assist in the deployment of AFISMA. An advance team from the Department of Political Affairs and personnel from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations arrived in Mali on 20 January to establish a UN office in Bamako. (Resolution 2085 adopted on 20 December 2012 requested the establishment of a UN presence in Mali to provide support to the ongoing political and security processes in the country and regular and detailed reporting. João Hovunana—the head of DPA’s Africa II Division—is in charge of this UN team.)

On 22 January, Feltman provided the Council with a detailed update on the latest developments in Mali and said that while the French operations were commendable, the capabilities of the armed groups occupying northern Mali have proven to be stronger than expected. Also, of key interest during the Council’s 22 January consultations on Mali was the Secretary-General’s letter detailing funding and logistical support options for AFISMA (S/2013/37). The three options set out by the Secretary-General are similar to those included in his 13 December letter to the Council (S/2012/926).

The first option would be for bilateral channels to provide all logistics support to AFISMA. Under the second option, the UN would provide, through assessed contributions, a logistics support package to AFISMA in all phases of its operations. However, because a finalised concept of operations for AFISMA is under development, the Secretary-General said it is currently not possible to produce a detailed plan for such a support package. The third option calls for bilateral partners to provide logistics support to AFISMA during the combat phase of operations and for the UN to provide support to the mission during the deployment and stabilisation phases.

The Secretary-General stated his preference for this last option, as it would “significantly reduce some of the risks to the United Nations and the personnel that are associated with the second option.” A UN support package to AFISMA, in any case, could be similar in level and type of support to the AU Mission in Somalia, he said, and it would exclude the provision of “critical military enablers” like military aviation assets.

The letter has an annex containing the terms of reference for a UN trust fund for AFISMA. The fund will be managed by the UN office in Mali, which will coordinate all aspects of the UN’s work in the country. A donors’ conference aimed at raising funds for AFISMA—in line with the Secretary-General’s recommendation with respect to voluntary contributions for the mission—was held on 29 January in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
It raised $455 million.

On 25 January, Djinnit briefed the Council on recent developments in West Africa, focusing on Mali. The overall terrorism threat in the region has heightened, Djinnit said, adding that the international community must enhance counter-terrorism support for neighbouring countries. He also mentioned refugee flows from Mali as a humanitarian as well as a potential security issue. The latest estimate by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees states that more than 150,000 people have fled to neighbouring Mauritania, Niger and Burkina Faso, while an additional 230,000 have been internally displaced.

Human Rights-Related Developments

In January, the High Commissioner for Human Rights released a report on the situation in Mali, as requested by the Human Rights Council in resolution 21/25 of 28 September 2012. The report is based on a mission from 11-20 November 2012 to Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Niger and covers human rights violations committed since January 2012. The report documents summary executions, rape, torture, the recruitment of children and arbitrary detention perpetrated by the rebel or terrorist groups in northern Mali, including Movemenmt National de Libération de l’Azawad, AQIM, Ansar Dine and Mouvement pour l’Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest. The report states that civilians in the north have been victims of degrading treatment by these groups based on an extreme interpretation of Sharia, including sexual violence and amputations. The report also documents human rights violations committed in areas controlled by the government, including extra-judicial killings. It documents the killing of 16 pilgrims as well as cases of forced disappearances, arbitrary detention and torture perpetrated against members of the police and the military suspected of supporting a failed coup on 30 April 2012.

On 17 January, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda opened investigations into war crimes in Mali. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights welcomed the announcement.

Responding to questions about reports of human rights violations committed against civilians in the course of military operations in the north, the Secretary-General’s spokesman stressed on 24 January that the UN office in Mali will conduct human rights monitoring to ensure accountability and that impunity will be firmly opposed.

Key Issues

Supporting AFISMA’s logistical and funding requirement is a key issue.

Addressing the various dimensions of the ongoing operations in Mali, including the new UN office in the country, is a related issue.

The massive humanitarian crisis resulting from the raids of the Islamists and the ongoing military operations against them is another key issue.

Options

Options for the Council include:

• authorising funding and logistical support for AFISMA through UN assessed contributions;
• accepting the Secretary-General’s preference for only voluntary contributions for the combat phase of the operations and UN support for the stabilisation phase;
• transforming AFISMA into a full-scale UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, an unlikely option at this stage; and
• establishing a sanctions regime in an effort to further isolate the Islamist and insurgent forces operating in northern Mali (also unlikely).

Council Dynamics

Opération Serval appears to have the unanimous support of all Council members. There are, however, emerging differences of opinion among Council members about the way forward. Most support providing logistical, funding and diplomatic support to AFISMA, but the US appears to be wary of endorsing any support that would extend to the interim government that issued from the 22 March 2012 coup.

The US is especially concerned about providing further support for the army, which it had trained and armed in the past, only to see some of the army personnel defect to the Islamists while others staged the 22 March coup.

France leads on this issue in the Council.

Guinea-Bissau

Expected Council Action

In February, the Council will likely renew the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) for a limited period of three months, as recommended by the Secretary-General in his latest report on developments in the country and on the activities of the office (S/2013/26).

This would allow the newly-appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNIOGBIS, José Ramos-Horta (Timor-Leste), to make a thorough assessment of the situation in the country and for the Secretary-General to recommend a new mandate for the mission in May. Jeffrey Feltman, the head of the Department of Political Affairs, is expected to brief the Council, to be followed by consultations. It is likely that the Council will then adopt a resolution extending the current mandate of the mission for three months.

The mandate of UNIOGBIS expires on 28 February.

Key Recent Developments

The Secretary-General’s 11 January report covers developments in the country since 17 July 2012. It documents a series of regressive steps the country has taken during those months, citing serious deterioration of the security situation and grave violations of human rights and the rule of law following an alleged coup attempt on 21 October. These
violations included, the report said, “politically-motivated assassinations” with “total impunity” and dashed all hopes that the country would pursue political inclusiveness leading to the restoration of constitutional order.

According to the report, aside from targeting certain military officers for assassinations, the “transitional government” (which is not recognised by the UN) has during the reporting period targeted for abuse senior members of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), which was in power until the coup of 22 April 2012. (On 22 January, deposed Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior was named PAIGC presidential candidate by the PAIGC and will contest presidential elections whenever they are held.)

Meanwhile, the economy of the country has collapsed, with the growth rate estimated to have declined from 5.3 percent in 2011 to negative 1.5 percent in 2012, according to the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Office in West Africa of 31 December 2012 (S/2012/977). All major financial and donor agencies, including the African Development Bank, the EU, the World Bank and the IMF, have maintained their suspension of assistance to the country since the coup. During the reporting period, the transitional government faced a $50 million budget deficit. Contributions by Nigeria ($10.6 million), Côte d’Ivoire ($2 million) and the West African Monetary Union ($5.5 million) barely allowed the government to pay salaries of the military and civil servants.

Council members were last briefed on Guinea-Bissau on 11 December 2012 by Joseph Mutaboba, the outgoing head of UNIOGBIS. (Prior to this briefing, on 9 October, the transitional government wrote to the Secretary-General requesting the replacement of Mutaboba on the grounds that he did not serve the interest of the transition programme underway.) On 13 December, members issued a press statement expressing “serious concern” over the lack of progress in the restoration of constitutional order in the country (SC/10857). On 2 January, the Secretary-General named Ramos-Horta, former President of Timor-Leste and 1996 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, as Mutaboba’s replacement.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) issued a communiqué on 19 January stating that it was satisfied with progress in the transition and vowing to assist Guinea-Bissau in the holding of “inclusive, free, fair and transparent elections.”

From 16–21 December, the AU, which suspended Guinea-Bissau shortly after the coup, led a joint assessment mission to the country comprising personnel also from ECOWAS, the EU, the UN, and the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries. On 26 January, the AU convened a meeting in Addis Ababa of all the organisations involved in the joint assessment, including the UN (represented by Feltman and Ramos-Horta). The result of the meeting was agreement to send a second joint assessment mission to Guinea-Bissau once the “transitional government” adopted a “transition road map” agreed to by the National Assembly (which is dominated by PAIGC).

Earlier, on 21 January, news reports quoted Transitional President Manuel Serêfo Nhamadjo as saying that holding general elections planned for May would be impossible for technical reasons (the previous arrangement brokered by ECOWAS had scheduled the elections for April).

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

The latest Secretary-General’s report on UNIOGBIS noted ongoing serious human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, house searches and cases of individuals suspected of political involvement being threatened, abducted, beaten up and abandoned in unknown locations on the outskirts of the capital. Some of the alleged perpetrators were said to be wearing uniforms and others were in civilian clothing. The Secretary-General urged the de facto authorities to “take swift action to fight impunity and promote justice.”

**Key Issues**

The key issue for the Council remains the return of constitutional rule to Guinea-Bissau following free, fair and transparent elections.

The implementation of comprehensive security sector reforms (with an emphasis on civilian control of the military), respect for the rule of law and an end to impunity are important underlying issues.

An ongoing issue is Guinea-Bissau’s involvement in international narcotics trafficking, particularly as recent reports indicate that key military leaders who control the state are implicated in the trafficking.

**Options**

Options for the Council include:

- adopting a resolution extending without modification the mandate of UNIOGBIS by three months pending a report by the Secretary-General on the need for a new mandate for the office;
- adopting a resolution granting a new political mandate to UNIOGBIS for a period of one year (a less likely option); or
- establishing a panel of experts to assist the 2048 Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Committee in monitoring the violations to the sanctions regime in place (an unlikely option).

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

Guinea-Bissau presents a critical challenge to the Council: how to balance the interests of an important regional partner—ECOWAS, which brokered the agreement leading to the establishment of the transitional government—against the principle of respect for constitutionality and the rule of law. ECOWAS has been urging the AU to lift its suspension of Guinea-Bissau, a position it reiterated in its 19 January communiqué. The AU for its part has been more cautious, and has insisted on seeing concrete progress in the political transition process before doing so.

As the only ECOWAS member currently on the Council, Togo firmly supports the transitional government. The US, a close ally of ECOWAS, is critical of the lack of constitutionality in Guinea-Bissau but appears nevertheless to support the efforts and agenda of ECOWAS in Guinea-Bissau. The EU members of the Council remain united in their lack of support for the current government in Guinea-Bissau, despite the acknowledged need to work with ECOWAS on the pressing issue of Mali and the wider Sahel.

Council members are generally of the opinion that the mandate of UNIOGBIS needs to be radically changed to warrant an extension beyond the three months necessary for the new head of UNIOGBIS to make an assessment of what needs to be done in the country in the short, medium and long terms. Togo is the lead country on Guinea-Bissau, and Morocco is the chair of the 2048 Sanctions Committee.
Expected Council Action
The Council will likely renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, which expires on 17 February. (The Panel’s final report was circulated to the Committee on 24 January.)

Key Recent Developments
The security situation in Darfur has remained precarious due to fighting between the government and rebel forces and inter-communal violence. Reports have indicated that the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) killed 20 members of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) on 24 December 2012 while attempting to seize Golo town in the western Jebel Marra area of Darfur. The SLA-AW said that it had gained control of Golo and rockero towns, a claim the government disputed. In early January, clashes between the Abbala and Beni Hussein communities in Jabel Amir, North Darfur, led to 100 deaths and 70,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs). It appears that the fighting was precipitated by a disagreement over access to a gold mine.

Relations between the government and UN staff have recently been marked by increased tension. On 2 December 2012, upon arriving at the airport in Khartoum, Ghassan Schbley (US), the finance expert on the PoE, was prevented from entering Sudan even though he had a visa. (Sudan explained that he denied him entry because of concerns about his activities when he was a member of the PoE for the Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee.) On 24 and 25 December, Sudan security officers arrested three national staff from the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in Nyala, South Darfur, for alleged anti-government activities. After UNAMID asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for assistance they were released with all charges dropped on 22 January.

On 20 January, the government and the Justice and Equality Movement-Military Council (JEM-MC), an offshoot of the rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), began peace talks in Doha, using the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) as the basis for their negotiations. Ahmed Bin Abdullah Al-Mahmoud, Deputy Prime Minister of Qatar, and Aichtahat Mindaoudou Souleymane, acting Joint AU-UN Special Representative, participated as mediators. (The government and the JEM-MC had pledged their commitment to ceasing hostilities and initiating negotiations in October 2012.) From 10-14 January, a joint AU-UN mediation support team trained 36 JEM-MC delegates to build their negotiating capacity and to educate them on the elements of the DDPD. (The DDPD is a peace agreement focusing on seven areas: human rights; power-sharing; wealth-sharing; justice and reconciliation; compensation of refugees and internally displaced persons; ceasefire and security arrangements; and internal dialogue and consultation. To date, the Liberation and Justice Movement is the only Darfur rebel group that has signed the document, having done so in July 2011.)

Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, briefed the Council on Darfur and the latest Secretary-General’s UNAMID report, prior to its consultations on the issue on 24 January. Mulet expressed concern at the recent deterioration of the security situation in certain parts of Darfur, particularly western Jebel Marra and North Darfur. He said that the government needed to provide “a holistic settlement of the issues of political and economic marginalisation affecting not only Darfur but Sudan as a whole” to achieve a durable and comprehensive peace in Darfur. Speaking after Mulet, Ambassador Daffa-Alia Elhag Ali Osman (Sudan) urged the Council to take stronger measures against rebel groups that have not joined the Doha peace process. He also alleged that rebel movements in Darfur received logistical and political support from South Sudan and claimed that they initiated attacks from South Sudan on Darfur.

Human Rights-Related Developments
According to the latest UNAMID report, covering October–December 2012 (S/2013/22), the overall number of documented human rights violations decreased to 94 cases involving 204 victims (as compared to 159 cases involving 521 victims in July–September). Of the 204 victims, 44 were victims of violations of the right of life, 100 of violations of the right of physical integrity, 13 of arbitrary arrests and detention and 47 of sexual and gender-based violence. While the number of attacks on IDPs and arbitrary arrests and detentions recorded by UNAMID declined during the reporting period, the number of incidents of sexual and gender-based violence documented increased.

Key Issues
An immediate key issue is whether the final report of the PoE will be published. (The 2011 final report—which would have been made public in early 2012—has yet to be published, as it seems that one or more Council members expressed concerns about its accuracy.) A key overarching issue is how the Council can make the sanctions regime more effective so that arms do not enter Darfur illegally. A related issue is what other steps the Council can take to address the deteriorating security situation in western Jebel Marra and North Darfur and the impact of this violence on civilian populations.

Options
One option is renewing the PoE and making no changes to the sanctions regime. Another option would be to include in the resolution additional elements such as:
• strengthening the language obliging states supplying arms to Sudan to obtain credible end-user documentation ensuring that these arms do not enter Darfur;
• adding rebel leaders to the sanctions list; and
• demanding full cooperation by Sudan with the work of the PoE.
Other options, although unlikely, would be to expand the arms embargo to the whole of Sudan and to add one or more of those indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes committed in Darfur to the 1591 sanctions list.

Council Dynamics
Ongoing concerns persist among several Council members about the difficult security environment in Darfur and its impact on civilians, especially in light of the recent violence in North Darfur and western Jebel Marra.

There seem to be different perspectives in the Council regarding Schbley, the finance specialist who was denied access to Sudan. Some Council members believe that he should not have been denied access as he is a member of a PoE authorised by the Council. Others believe that Sudan, as the host country, has the...
sovereign prerogative to grant or restrict access. Another matter on which there appears to be a difference of opinion on the Council is whether or not there should be an obligation to publish PoE reports as a matter of principle. Some members seem to believe that publishing the reports is important for the sake of transparency. Others do not believe that there should be an obligation to do so, arguing that sometimes there are inaccuracies in the reports.

The UK is the lead country in the Council on Darfur, while Argentina is the chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee.

### Sudan and South Sudan

**Expected Council Action**
In February, the Council is scheduled to hold two meetings on Sudan/South Sudan relations in accordance with resolution 2046. The Council is also likely to discuss in consultations the most recent Secretary-General’s report on the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), whose mandate expires on 31 May. At press time, it was unclear whether there would be an outcome.

**Key Recent Developments**
On 26 December, clashes were reported in border areas separating the western regions of Sudan and South Sudan, with the latter alleging that Sudan conducted aerial and ground attacks in the disputed Mile 14 area, leading to at least five deaths. Sudan has argued that while skirmishes occurred, the army of South Sudan clashed with the nomadic Rizigit group, not with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). South Sudan also alleged that it engaged in fighting on 29 December with the SAF in Raja County in Western Bahr el Ghazal state. South Sudan has further alleged that it repelled a SAF land assault in Western Bahr el Ghazal and that Sudan bombed the town of Kitkit on 2 January. Reports indicate that more than 32 South Sudanese troops and civilians died in the 2 January attacks.

Presidents Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan and Salva Kiir of South Sudan convened in Addis Ababa from 4–5 January for a summit meeting also attended by Prime Minister Haile Mariam Desalegn of Ethiopia and Thabo Mbeki, chair of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP). The presidents discussed the need to implement the 27 September agreements (on security, cross-border trade, oil revenue-sharing and other matters) and the future status of the disputed Abyei region. They also agreed to reconvene to determine Abyei’s final status once the Abyei Area Administration, the Abyei Area Police and the Abyei Area Police Service have been established and the matrix with timeframes has been completed.

On 8 January, Haile Menkerios, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan and South Sudan, and John Ging, director of operations for the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, briefed the Council in consultations. Menkerios said that differences of perspective between Sudan and South Sudan on the boundaries of the disputed Mile 14 area along the Darfur (Sudan) and Bahr el Ghazal (South Sudan) border and Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) activity within this area were holding up the implementation of the JBVMM and the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone (SDBZ). Menkerios also confirmed that there had been no progress in discussions on the final status of Abyei. Ging gave a detailed description of the humanitarian crisis in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states, emphasising the ongoing lack of humanitarian access and urging the Council to take action.

Sudan and South Sudan held negotiations in Addis Ababa from 14–19 January with the support of AUHIP. The negotiations focussed primarily on the implementation of the 27 September agreements (especially security-related arrangements) and the administration of Abyei.

The parties seemed disappointed by the discussions. In a statement, South Sudan said that it had not been able to agree with Sudan on how to make the SDBZ operational, largely because of differences of perspective on the scope of the Mile 14 area. South Sudan also noted that, although it was willing to resume oil production, Sudan was unwilling to permit oil transit through its territory until the SDBZ had been established. Regarding the establishment of administration bodies in Abyei, South Sudan argued that Sudan demanded 50 percent representation in the Abyei Area Council, contravening a prior arrangement that it would be allotted 40 percent of those seats.

Sudan also raised concerns about the negotiations. Foreign Minister Abdel-Rahim Mohamed Hussein stated that South Sudan continued to support rebels in Sudan. He furthermore alleged that South Sudan was not committed to full withdrawal of its troops from the Mile 14 area and argued that such security matters must be addressed prior to implementation of the 27 September agreements.

The Council held consultations on Sudan-South Sudan relations on 22 January with Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous briefing. Members emphasised the need for progress in implementing the 27 September agreements and reiterated their concern about the humanitarian situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.

On 25 January, at the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), convening during the AU Summit in Addis Ababa, adopted a communiqué on Sudan-South Sudan. The communiqué, inter-alia:
- stressed the need for unconditional implementation of the 27 September agreements;
- reaffirmed the PSC’s support of the AUHIP 21 September proposal, calling for a referendum to determine Abyei’s final status, as a “fair, equitable and workable solution”;
- called on the AUHIP to submit a proposal to Sudan and the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) for an agreement to cease hostilities in order to facilitate humanitarian access to South Kordofan and Blue Nile; • urged Sudan and the SPLM-N to engage in direct negotiations without preconditions; and • extended the mandate of the AUHIP until 31 July.

On 27 January, Al-Bashir and Kiir met on the margins of the AU Summit. However, they failed to make progress on how to implement the 27 September agreements. Media reports indicate that two areas of disagreement were the scope of the Mile 14 area and the composition of the Abyei Area Council.

Hostilities in South Kordofan and Blue Nile have continued. On 11 January, the SAF and the SPLM-N clashed about ten miles east of Kadugli, South Kordofan’s capital. Sudan claimed that it killed 50 SPLM-N combatants, while the SPLM-N alleged that it had killed 43 SAF troops and had lost eight soldiers. The SPLM-N also claimed that four civilians had been injured during SAF aerial bombardments from 12-13 January in Tess village and Buram town. From 15 January and 17 January, Sudan bombed Umdorain and Boram counties in the Nuba Mountains, killing cattle and wrecking homes.

On 5 January, members of the Sudan Revolutionary Front (an umbrella group of the major Sudanese rebel movements), several political parties (the National Umma Party, the Popular Congress Party, and the Sudanese Communist Party) opposed to Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party (NCP), and civil society groups signed the “New Dawn Charter”—a document calling for an end to NCP rule and a transition to a government of national unity—in Kampala, Uganda.

A high-level delegation of the SPLM-N—including Secretary-General Yasir Arman, Chairman Malik Agar and Humanitarian Coordinator Neuron Phillip—visited New York City during the week of 20 January. They met with several Council members and the NGO community in order to provide suggestions for addressing the humanitarian and political crisis in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

Key Issues
A key issue is what measures the Council can take to encourage or compel Sudan and South Sudan to implement the 27 September agreements.

Another key issue is whether the Council can develop an effective strategy with respect to the humanitarian crisis in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

An additional important issue is whether and how the Council can exert leverage on the parties to establish institutions in Abyei, including the Abyei Area Administration, the Abyei Area Council, and the Abyei Area Police Service.

An important related issue is what role the Council can play in enabling the parties to make progress in their negotiations on the final status of Abyei.

Another issue is whether and how the Council chooses to respond to the 25 January communiqué of the PSC.

Options
The Council may consider adopting a resolution or a presidential statement that endorses the 25 January communiqué of the PSC (or at least those elements of the communiqué on which there is agreement).

An additional option for the Council is to conduct a visiting mission to Sudan and South Sudan to meet with officials from both countries to underscore the importance of honouring the 27 September agreements.

A final, but less likely, option would be to follow through on its reference in resolution 2046 “to take appropriate additional measures under Article 41 of the Charter,” given the continued lack of progress in implementing agreements.

Council Dynamics
Council members are generally encouraged that the parties have remained at the negotiating table. However, there is serious concern at the lack of progress in implementing the 27 September agreements. Several members are also keen for Sudan and South Sudan to expedite implementation of the SDBZ and the JBVM along their troubled border.

While there appears to be widespread alarm on the Council about the humanitarian crisis in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, the Council remains divided on how to approach this issue. Some members seem to favour stronger efforts to compel humanitarian access; others are reluctant to press Sudan too hard, asserting that it is a sovereign state fighting a rebel group.

The Council appears divided as well on its approach to the final status of Abyei. The US and others are supportive of the AUHIP’s 21 September proposal for resolving the impasse on Abyei. (This proposal, which has been endorsed by the PSC, calls for a referendum on Abyei.) These members believe that the 21 September proposal is consistent with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and that it provides a solution to the current impasse. However, Russia and other members believe that Abyei’s final status should be determined in a way that is mutually acceptable to Sudan and South Sudan. These members are concerned that holding a referendum could be tantamount to imposing a decision on Sudan.

The US is the lead country on Sudan-South Sudan issues.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Expected Council Action
In February, the Council expects a briefing by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Hervé Ladsous about possible modifications to the mandate of the UN Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to address the threat by the rebel group the March 23 Movement (M23)—a source of instability in the region and of massive displacement of civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Roger Meece, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of MONUSCO, is expected to also brief the Council on the forthcoming report by the Secretary-General. The 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee
Democratic Republic of the Congo (con’t)

expects to meet with the newly appointed Group of Experts (GoE) assisting it before the GoE deploys to the region. MONUSCO’s mandate expires on 30 June.

Key Recent Developments
The M23 group has been at the centre of DRC-related Council activities in recent months.

On 17 November 2012, the Council issued a press statement following a briefing by Ladsous, strongly condemning the resumption of attacks by the M23 (SC/10819). On 20 November, as the M23 rebels captured Goma, the Council adopted resolution 2076, signalling its intention to consider additional targeted sanctions against the leadership of the M23 and those providing it with external support. (According to the GoE’s latest report [S/2012/843], both Rwandan and Ugandan officials have been assisting the rebels to varying degrees. Both countries deny the allegations.) The resolution asked the Secretary-General to report “in the coming days” on the situation on the ground, on allegations of external support to M23 rebels and on possible modifications in the deployment of MONUSCO to address the issue.

On 21 November, Meece briefed the Council (S/PV.6868), followed by a briefing on 27 November by Ladsous and the Secretary-General’s Chef de Cabinet, Susana Malcorra, following her participation in the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) summit in Kampala, Uganda. She met there with, among others, Col. Sultani Makenga, the head of the M23’s military wing. (The 1533 Committee listed Makenga on 12 November [SC/10812].)

On 26 November, the ICGLR—which is currently chaired by Uganda and includes the DRC and Rwanda—issued a declaration calling on the M23 to withdraw to a distance of at least 20 kilometres from Goma and for MONUSCO to stand as a buffer between the M23 and the DRC army. The declaration also called on the DRC government to negotiate with the M23. The M23 withdrew from Goma on 1 December.

Ladsous briefed Council members again in consultations on 7 December and was again joined by Malcorra on 18 December, following her recent visit to Kinshasa.

On 8 January, Ladsous again briefed Council members in consultations. The meeting followed a 27 December letter from the Secretary-General to the Council President (S/2013/43), outlining the additional capacities that MONUSCO needed immediately to ensure that it has the resources to fulfil its mandate in light of the ongoing activities by the M23. (In a presidential statement of 19 October 2012 [S/PRST/2012/22] and in resolution 2076 of 20 November 2012, the Council had asked for a report on options for improving MONUSCO’s ability to implement its mandate. At press time, a full report was expected by early February.)

The letter also states that capabilities—such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—are necessary for “advanced information collection, analysis and dissemination to enhance situational awareness and to permit timely decision-making.”

The issue of UAVs has given rise to numerous questions, including about the need and feasibility of using such equipment, possible legal ramifications, the source of funds to pay for them and the logistics of operating them. (The UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations [C34] has been discussing the issue of using modern technologies, including UAVs, in peacekeeping operations more generally. In its 2012 annual report to the General Assembly [A/66/19], it said it looked forward to further consideration by the Secretary-General of the topic and stressed the importance of the consent of the countries concerned with the deployment of such technologies. It also noted the Secretariat’s intention to use these technologies, if available, on a case-by-case basis.)

During the 8 January briefing, Ladsous gave Council members initial information on the operative and financial implications of employing UAVs and protocols for using the information they retrieved. Additional informal meetings at the experts’ level were held with Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ (DPKO) military experts on the use of UAVs. Several Council members, including Rwanda, initially expressed reservations about MONUSCO’s use of UAVs, but after further clarifications, Council members agreed in principle that deploying UAVs in the DRC on a trial basis is in line with the case-by-case approach regarding modern technologies.

UN Military Adviser Lt. Gen. Babacar Gaye met with the Presidents of Tanzania and Uganda in January in their capacities as chairs of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and ICGLR, respectively. He also attended a ministerial meeting of the AU on a proposed neutral international force and the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism (EJVM) for the eastern DRC. The suggested neutral force—an ICGLR initiative—would monitor the DRC-Rwanda border area. Media reports suggest that the SADC countries are ready to deploy their troops as part of this initiative. The EJVM, which has been deployed since 20 November, is a technical body, comprising experts from the DRC, Rwanda, the UN and the AU to address DRC-Rwanda border security issues.

On 7 January, the M23 declared a unilateral ceasefire. The DRC has since said that the M23 has not put down its arms or respected the ICGLR declaration regarding their retreat from the Goma area. Negotiations between the warring parties are ongoing in Kampala. On 28 January, during the AU Summit, the Secretary-General was scheduled to sign, along with countries in

**UN DOCUMENTS ON THE DRC**

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<td>S/RES/2078 (28 November 2012) extended the DRC sanctions and the GoE to 1 February 2014.</td>
<td>Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2012/22 (10 October 2012) was on the use of modern technologies and the Council’s response. S/2013/1 (2 January 2013) and S/2012/967 (31 December 2012) were from the Secretary-General on the appointment of the GoE.</td>
<td>Security Council Letter S/2013/8 (22 January 2013) was the Secretary-General’s letter on the use of modern technologies and the Council’s response.</td>
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OTHER RELEVANT FACTS
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission Roger Meece (US) MONUSCO Force Commander Lt. Gen. Chander Prakash (India) MONUSCO Size, Composition and Cost of Mission Strength as of 30 November 2012: 17,049 troops, 693 military observers, 1,412 police, 977 international civilian personnel, 2,895 local civilian staff and 579 UN volunteers

Approved budget (1 July 2012-30 June 2013): $1,348 billion Mission Duration 30 November 1999 to present: mandate expires on 30 June 2013
the region, a political framework agreement in which the DRC committed to enhancing the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process and countries in the region agreed not to assist rebel groups operating in the DRC. According to open sources, the signing of the agreement was cancelled shortly beforehand and at press time had been postponed indefinitely.

The Council and the DRC Sanctions Committee have also been active on the sanctions front. On 12 November 2012, the Committee met with the GoE to discuss their annual report. In a press statement (SC/10872), the Committee stressed two of the recommendations contained in the report:

• that armed groups immediately release all child soldiers and cease any future recruitment of minors; and

• that exporters, processing industries and consumers of tin, tantalum and tungsten mineral products from eastern DRC act with diligence to trace their origin.

On 21 November, the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Agshin Mehdiyev (Azerbaijan), briefed the Council in consultations on the GoE annual report. On 28 November, in resolution 2078, the Council renewed the DRC sanctions and the mandate of the GoE until 1 February 2014, while taking note of the report.

On 30 November, the Committee added two M23 leaders—Baudoin Ngaruye and Innocent Kaina—to the sanctions list (SC/10842). On 31 December, two more M23 leaders—Éric Badège and Jean-Marie Lugendo Runiga—were placed on the list. The M23 group itself, along with the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) rebel group, were listed as well (SC/10876). Both are believed to be responsible for serious violations of international law involving the targeting of women and children. The Committee noted in a press release that according to several witnesses, the M23 receives general military assistance from the Rwandan Defence Forces.

Some members of the Sanctions Committee had urged the appointment of the GoE before the beginning of 2013 and the new configuration of the Council. Accordingly, after consultations with the Committee, on 28 December the Secretary-General informed the Council of the appointment of five experts, from Belgium, Cameroon, France, Kenya and Moldova (S/2012/967). On 2 January, the Secretary-General informed the Council of the appointment of the sixth and final expert, from the US (S/2013/1).

Human Rights-Related Developments

In November 2012, the UN Joint Human Rights Office (composed of personnel from MONUSCO and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in the DRC) released a report on serious human rights violations perpetrated against civilians between April and September 2012 in Masisi territory, North Kivu, confirming the arbitrary executions of at least 264 people. The report noted that other serious violations were committed, including violations of physical integrity and rape, large-scale destruction and looting of private property and forced displacement of civilians. These violations, which could constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity, were perpetrated with extreme violence by combatants belonging to the rebel groups Raia Mutomboki, Mayi Mayi Khiafaa, the FDLR and Nyatura. The report underlined the ethnic dimension of the attacks and stressed that victims were mainly children, women and the elderly.

Following his briefing to the Security Council on 18 December 2012, Ladsous told the press that a report on human rights violations during the M23’s offensive would probably be released in January (at press time the report had not been released). He said that at least 126 women had been raped and that it appeared that most of the rapes were committed by elements of the DRC army. On 21 December, Rupert Colville, the spokesman for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, said during a press briefing in Geneva that UN human rights teams had also documented cases of arbitrary execution, enforced disappearances, degrading treatment and rape by M23 fighters in Goma and surrounding areas.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is to determine what changes are to be made in MONUSCO’s mandate in order to respond to the M23 crisis.

An immediate issue to address will be to decide whether the proposed international neutral force should be integrated into MONUSCO or, if it is to constitute an independent force in the region, how MONUSCO is to interact with it.

Options

Options for the Council include:

• amending MONUSCO’s mandate to incorporate the international neutral force and make further adjustments to allow for its operation;

• adopting a decision on the establishment of an independent force;

• welcoming the establishment of an international force and amending MONUSCO’s mandate to cooperate with it;

• calling on the states and groups concerned to negotiate a political solution to the crisis in North Kivu;

• welcoming the appointment of a UN Special Envoy; and

• emphasising the importance of accountability because ignoring the actions of persistent perpetrators of human rights violations and international crimes has played into the hands of those interested in destabilisation (a less likely option).

Regarding the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee, one potential, though unlikely, option is imposing sanctions against violators of the DRC sanctions regime, including foreign officials.

Council Dynamics

The Secretary-General’s expected report on the strategy for the response to the M23 threat is likely to include information on the role of the proposed UN Special Envoy to the region, the regional political processes and recommendations on the establishment of an international neutral force either as a separate entity or within MONUSCO. Council members are expecting the report to include the positions of the regional actors on the structure of the force, its modalities and rules of engagement and requests for possible UN assistance to its operation. The Secretariat is inclined to have the force operate as part of MONUSCO, media reports suggest that the regional actors prefer a force operating independently, possibly with UN assistance. Several Council members are sceptical that the deployment of a completely independent force is feasible.

Council members, in formulating their positions on the proposals, will likely be weighing the views of the regional actors, the DRC and DPKO. For some Council members, the preference of the DRC and regional actors, including those contributing troops to the force, is critical. Another consideration is the level of control and influence the Council will have on the force if it remains a separate entity and whether it could become a disruptive element in the already complicated situation. Another factor that may influence Council members’ reaction to the establishment of the force is the financial implication of either including it within MONUSCO’s budget or funding it as...
an independent force. For the troop-contributing countries on the Council, there are concerns that integrating a force that carries out enforcement activities within MONUSCO’s mandate may endanger their own troops. A visit to the DRC, Kigali and Kampala had been planned for February but has been postponed due to scheduling problems and other pressing issues on the Council agenda. France is the lead country on the DRC.

**Burundi**

**Expected Council Action**

In February, the Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB).

BNUB’s mandate expires on 15 February.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 10 May 2012, the Secretary-General sent the President of the Council a letter with benchmarks and indicators for the future evolution of BNUB into a country team presence (S/2012/310). The benchmarks and indicators concerned the areas of security and stability, democratic process, transitional justice, governance and institution-building, rule of law, human rights, regional integration and social and economic development.

On 7 June, the Secretary-General appointed Parfait Onanga-Anyanga (Gabon) as his new Special Representative and head of BNUB.

Karin Landgren, the outgoing Special Representative and head of BNUB gave her last briefing to the Council on 5 July (S/PV.6799). The chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland), also briefed the Council. The briefing was followed by consultations attended by Landgren and Council members.

On 26 July, the Council sent a letter to the Secretary-General, requesting data and assessments for each issue mentioned in the benchmarks, including observations on timing, trends and the role of BNUB in their implementation (S/2012/584).

A high-level donor conference on Burundi was held in Geneva on 29-30 October, harnessing more than $2 billion in pledges in support of Burundi’s Second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.

Onanga-Anyanga briefed the Council on 24 January on developments and the Secretary-General’s latest report on BNUB which analyses progress regarding the benchmarks (S/2013/36). The report notes that overall the security situation remains stable, yet expresses concern over the violent activities of some in the youth league of the ruling party, aimed at intimidation and repression of certain populations, and a need for greater emphasis on justice and ending impunity. In his briefing, Onanga-Anyanga warned of the undermining effect that the distrust between the government and the opposition—manifest since the 2010 general elections, which were boycotted by the opposition—could have on democratisation, progress and holding successful elections scheduled for 2015. He concluded that BNUB’s mandate should be renewed as is for another year, during which an assessment mission should evaluate the UN’s future presence in Burundi, and called on Burundi to accelerate efforts to reach the benchmarks to allow a transition from BNUB to a UN country team as soon as possible.

Seger also briefed the Council, noting Burundi’s wish to continue its engagement with the PBC in future years, the strong cooperation between the PBC and BNUB and the importance of BNUB’s presence in Burundi until 2015. He added that the PBC’s future engagement with Burundi will continue to focus both on social-economic development and on political-institutional issues, stressing their interdependence. On the political-institutional side, the PBC will assist with political dialogue, reconciliation and transitional justice, rule of law and good governance. Albert Nshingiro, Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Burundi, told the Council that BNUB should be converted into a UN country team in 12 months. The briefing was followed by consultations.

**Developments in the Peacebuilding Commission**

As a follow-up to the Geneva conference, the African Development Bank, the EU, the IMF, the UN Development Program and the World Bank pledged their continued support to the country’s achievements and commitments in a meeting of the Burundi configuration on 16 November. The five organisations and donor countries also singled out the need to further intensify the fight against corruption and impunity and to ensure an open dialogue with all actors in society.

Seger visited Burundi from 14-16 January, where he met with President Pierre Nkurunziza and the regional director of the World Bank. He also held meetings with other political figures from the ruling party and the opposition, the President of the electoral commission, the President of the Independent National Human Rights Commission (INHRC), the head of the tax authority, international partners and representatives of civil society. Seger then met with the director of the World Bank’s Center on Conflict, Security and Development in Nairobi on 17 January.

In a meeting of the PBC Burundi steering group on 22 January, Seger identified two main political concerns in Burundi: the need to include opposition parties in the process leading up to the 2015 elections and problems with a draft law on the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission currently before the legislature. The draft has been criticised by some as not meeting international standards and focusing only on reconciliation while ignoring justice aspects. In particular, a special tribunal as called for in the Arusha Peace Accords is absent from the draft, and it excludes international commissioners.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

In his latest report on BNUB, the Secretary-General noted that the number of extrajudicial, arbitrary or summary executions and politically motivated killings remained unacceptably high. The Secretary-General, however, noted signs of improvement in the human rights situation in 2012.
compared with the preceding two years. In particular, he noted the work of the INHRC, which submitted its first report to the National Assembly in March 2012. He called for further efforts to ensure that all human rights violations are seriously investigated and that those responsible are brought to justice. He called for greater discipline and professionalism in the security forces and for protecting and encouraging civil society organisations and independent media.

On 29 January, the Human Rights Council’s (HRC) working group on the Universal Periodic Review adopted a report on Burundi following the 24 January review. Burundi accepted all 174 recommendations that were put forward by over 70 delegations and said it would provide responses before the 23rd HRC session scheduled for June.

Key Issues
A key issue is assessing Burundi’s progress in achieving the benchmarks and how such progress may be reflected in BNUB’s mandate.

A further issue is addressing the role of the PBC in relation to the benchmarks.

Options
Options for the Council include:

• renewing BNUB’s mandate in its current configuration;
• indicating its support for an assessment mission in order to consider adjustments to BNUB’s mandate in 2014;
• emphasising the importance of political dialogue in Burundi;
• highlighting that the successful conduct of the 2015 elections will be key to measuring Burundi’s progress; and
• specifying the role of the PBC in assisting Burundi in achieving the benchmarks.

Council Dynamics
As the Council was last briefed on Burundi only orally, the main issue of interest for Council members is receiving the first written report on the benchmarks and the progress made towards achieving them. Council members see the current BNUB arrangements as a transition phase. During the negotiations on its mandate renewal in December 2011, some countries emphasised the importance of taking into account the position of the government and the need for benchmarks for BNUB’s eventual withdrawal.

As both Burundi and the Secretary-General are in agreement on the mandate renewal, it is likely that a comprehensive discussion on BNUB’s future will be postponed until the future, in particular as Burundi conveyed its wishes to see BNUB’s drawdown take place in 2014, though that position may change within the course of a year. Several Council members are of the opinion that in order to ensure future progress in Burundi, BNUB should remain on the ground until the conclusion of successful elections in 2015.

Some Council members will also want to hear about BNUB’s cooperation with the PBC. It seems that cooperation between the two has improved much in the last few months. Some Council members feel that the chair of the Burundi configuration of the PBC should participate in consultations and not only in the public briefing, which is current practice.

The lead country on Burundi is France.

Somalia

Expected Council Action
In February, the Council will consider the Secretary-General’s report on Somalia (due 31 January), which will provide options and recommendations for the future UN presence in the country. A briefing by Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman is expected.

The Council is also likely to start discussing the future of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and is expecting a separate report on the AU’s strategic review of the operation.

Also in February, the Monitoring Group assisting the 751/1907 Somalia and Eritrea Sanctions Committee is due to present its mid-term briefing to the Committee and the Council’s informal expert group on the protection of civilians is scheduled to receive a briefing by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in preparation of the AMISOM renewal.

At press time it was unclear whether there would be any outcome in February or whether the Council would wait until March to adopt any decisions. The Council authorisation of AMISOM does not expire until 7 March.

Key Recent Developments
The Council has not considered the situation in Somalia since November. On 7 November, it adopted resolution 2073 renewing the authorisation of AMISOM for four months and expanding the UN logistical support package for the mission to include funding for an additional 50 civilian personnel. While the adoption was unanimous, several Council members gave explanations of their vote, expressing disappointment that the resolution did not fully address issues of concern to them. The UK, as the penholder, had initially proposed a much more comprehensive text but decided after protracted negotiations to withdraw it.

On 21 November, the Council adopted resolution 2077 renewing for 12 months the authorisation for international counter-piracy action to be carried out within Somali territorial waters and on land in Somalia.

In Somalia, the security situation continued to improve as AMISOM and the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) expanded their areas of control. AMISOM has been fully deployed since the end of November, with a troop strength of 17,709. (The authorised troop ceiling is 17,731 uniformed personnel.)

According to OCHA, humanitarian access also continued to improve with a marked reduction in the number of attacks on personnel and fewer reports of interference with implementation of aid programmes. However,
Al-Shabaab is still considered a major threat and has relocated to new areas, including Puntland and Somaliland. According to the latest report of the Panel of Experts assisting the Democratic Republic of the Congo Sanctions Committee, Al-Shabaab is also collaborating with the Ugandan rebel group Allied Democratic Forces.

On 18 January, Leila Zerrougui, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, expressed deep concern about the killing of several children during military operations conducted by AMISOM near the southern town of Leggo on 15 January and urged the AU to further strengthen its efforts to minimise child casualties in its operations. AMISOM said civilians had been caught in crossfire as its forces repelled an attack by Al-Shabaab and announced it would conduct an investigation.

Attacks against journalists continued. On 18 January, a journalist working for Radio Shabelle was killed by unidentified gunmen, the first victim this year. The Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga condemned the assassination and called on the government to expedite the establishment of the task force announced last November to investigate the killings of Somali journalists with a view to bringing those responsible to justice. Shamsul Bari, the Human Rights Council’s expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, also condemned the murder and called for a thorough investigation into the assassination.

There were also concerns about the government’s commitment to press freedom following the arrest of a Somali journalist on 10 January after he interviewed a woman who claimed she had been raped by government forces.

During a meeting with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Washington, D.C. on 17 January, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the US had decided, for the first time since 1991, to officially recognise the Somali government. This will allow new types of US assistance to Somalia and will also facilitate additional support through other channels, such as the World Bank and the IMF.

On 14 January, the AU Peace and Security Council extended AMISOM’s mandate for another six months, “pending the outcomes of the consultations between the AU Commission and the UN Secretariat on the future of AMISOM” (PSC/PR/COMM.1 [CCCL]). It underscored the need to guarantee sustainable and predictable funding for the next phase of the mission.

In a 23 January communiqué, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) called on the government to prepare a detailed proposal on the integration of IGAD’s stabilisation plan for Somalia into the government’s six-pillar policy framework (which focuses on stabilisation through the rule of law and good governance; economic recovery; peacebuilding and reconciliation; public service delivery; improved international relations; and national unity), along with a proposal for the lifting of the UN arms embargo. It also stressed that AMISOM must be provided with support “equal to the support provided to UN missions.”

The UK announced on 11 January that it would host another conference on Somalia in London on 7 May aimed at sustaining continued international support for the stabilisation and rebuilding of the country.

**Key Issues**

A key issue for the Council in February is whether to endorse any of the Secretary-General’s options for the future UN presence in Somalia.

A second key issue is the future of AMISOM in light of the outcome of the strategic review. (It is likely that the AU will submit specific requests to the Council, in particular on the issue of funding.) A related issue is how to ensure coherence between the military and political strategies.

A continuing issue is whether to review the arms embargo as called for by the government to facilitate the delivery of arms and other military equipment to the SNSF.

A further issue is the impact of the ban on export and import of Somali charcoal. It is not clear whether accumulation of charcoal in Kismayo resulting from the ban is still a problem and whether the task force appointed by the government to assess the situation has made any progress.

**Options**

The Secretary-General is expected to present four options:

- a UN assistance mission that would integrate the functions of the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) but keep the UN humanitarian country team separate;
- a UN peacebuilding mission that would integrate the functions of UNPOS and the country team but keep UNSOA outside;
- a UN peacebuilding mission that would integrate UNSOA as well; and
- a joint AU-UN mission replacing AMISOM, UNPOS and UNSOA, but with a separate country team.

Main options for the Council include:

- adopting a resolution that would endorse one of the Secretary-General’s options for the future UN presence while requesting him to report back with further details and at the same time renew the authorisation for AMISOM and respond to any requests and recommendations resulting from the AU’s strategic review; or
- adopting two separate decisions: one on the future UN presence and the political process and another on AMISOM.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

Of the four different options for the future UN presence described above, the Secretary-General is expected to recommend that the Council endorse the first option, which would create a UN assistance mission. It seems the option of creating a joint AU/UN mission was included since this was the AU’s preference, but does not have much support elsewhere. (Excluding a UN peacekeeping operation, such a solution would address African concerns about funding for AMISOM.) As for the other two options, the humanitarian community has strong reservations about any proposal calling for structural integration of the UN country team because of concerns about the risk of politicisation of humanitarian assistance.

Among Council members, views differ and it is not clear how much support there is for the recommended option. It seems the P3’s preferred option would be a peacebuilding mission, although they may not agree on whether UNSOA should be integrated or kept separate. African members are likely to
support AU’s preferred option, while other members do not necessarily have very strong views. There seems to be a sense, however, that in the end the Council will support the Secretary-General’s recommendations.

Concerning the future of AMISOM, some of the issues that remained unresolved after the renewal of the mission’s authorisation last November are likely to come up again this time, in particular with regard to securing long-term funding and providing support for a maritime component. There seems to be some frustration among Council members that they have not yet been informed about the conclusions of the strategic review or received any specific proposals.

The request for a revision of the arms embargo is also likely to be discussed in the context of any new resolution on AMISOM and possibly the charcoal issue as well. With South Africa no longer on the Council and a renewed Council configuration, however, dynamics will likely be different this time. (For more background on the discussions in November, see our 6 November 2012 What’s In Blue story.)

The UK is the lead country on Somalia in the Council, while the Republic of Korea has assumed the chairmanship of the 751/1907 Sanctions Committee.

Somalia (con’t)

Yemen

Expected Council Action
In February, the Council expects a briefing on Yemen by Jamal Benomar, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the situation in Yemen, as well as by the UK and Morocco on the Council’s 27 January visit to the country. The briefing is likely to be followed by consultations.

A presidential or press statement is a possible outcome.

Key Recent Developments
Since Benomar’s last briefing on 4 December 2012 (S/PV.6878), the Preparatory Committee for the National Dialogue Conference submitted its final report to President Abdurahman Mansour Hadi. While the government has yet to confirm the starting date of the National Dialogue—originally planned for November 2012—some media reports suggest that it will begin in February. The National Dialogue is expected to conduct its work over a period of six months in the lead-up to general elections scheduled for February 2014.

There remain concerns regarding the question of southern separatism and how the issue will be addressed in the National Dialogue. Unrest in the south of the country continues, with hundreds of thousands rallying in support of self-rule for the formerly independent south on 13 January. Some southerners see the National Dialogue as a unique opportunity for redress; however, it remains to be seen how this will play out throughout the political transition.

Following the 19 December 2012 presidential decrees related to the structure and centralisation of the armed forces—including the disbanding of the Republican Guard and the appointment of a new chief of staff at the Central Security Forces, thus removing key remnants loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh—many have applauded Hadi’s boldness in taking a step that some say has the potential to herald a systemic break with the fragmented military of the past. Hadi’s rivals accepted the changes, with the deposed chief of staff (and Saleh’s nephew), Brigadier General Yahya Mohammed Abdullah Saleh describing Hadi’s action as “courageous”.

A conference entitled “Yemen: challenges for the future” was held in London on 11–12 January and provided an opportunity for Yemen’s Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Planning and International Cooperation as well as the Minister of State for International Development of the UK to raise a range of issues that are expected to emerge during the National Dialogue. The conference also sent a clear message to donors, who pledged almost $8 billion in 2012, to unlock funds to allow the implementation of projects focusing on urgent priorities, including the restoration of basic services and repair of damaged infrastructure.

The security situation in Yemen remains a concern. Many blame Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) for a recent series of assassinations, including the drive-by shootings of 40 members of the security forces and four civilians during 2012. On 24 January, the government announced that Said Ali Al-Shihri, AQAP’s deputy commander and former Guantanamo detainee, died recently from wounds received during a drone strike on 28 November in northern Yemen.

Meeting humanitarian needs continues to pose challenges in Yemen. An estimated 107,500 refugees and migrants travelled by boat to Yemen across the Gulf of Aden from the Horn of Africa in 2012, the largest such influx since the UN began compiling these statistics in 2006. According to the UN, nearly one million Yemeni children under five are acutely malnourished. Furthermore, almost half of the population lacked sufficient food supplies and more than half had no access to safe water and basic sanitation. On 22 January, the UN appealed to donors to provide $716 million in humanitarian aid, which could potentially tap into those funds pledged by donors in 2012.

The fifth ministerial-level meeting of the Friends of Yemen is to be held on 7 March in London, hosted by the UK and co-chaired by Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

On 27 January, Council members visited Yemen and met with President Hadi, parliamentarians, civil society and Gulf Cooperation Council members. The mission—co-led by the UK and Morocco and composed of all 15 members—represented the first Council visiting mission to Yemen and its first visit to the Middle East in five years. Council members demonstrated their support for Yemen’s stability, warning against spoilers and stressing that the Council stands ready to take
Yemen (con’t)

measures against those seeking to derail the political transition process.

Human Rights-Related Developments

At a press conference in London on 24 January, the Human Rights Council’s (HRC) Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, Ben Emmerson, announced the launch of an inquiry into the civilian impact of the use of drones and other forms of targeted killing. The inquiry is a response to requests made by several states at the 20th session of the HRC in June 2012 to carry out an investigation on drone attacks. The rapporteur, assisted by a team of nine experts, will examine 25 cases from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, and the State of Palestine with a view to determining whether there is a plausible allegation of unlawful killing that should trigger international law obligations to investigate. Emmerson will report his findings to the General Assembly in October. This announcement comes two days after Yemeni Human Rights Minister Hooria Mashhour publicly denounced the use of drones to target AQAP militants, calling for changes in the anti-terrorism strategy to avoid civilian casualties. At least 42 US airstrikes were recorded in Yemen in 2012 by the Long War Journal, a non-profit organisation that tracks American drone attacks.

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is how it can contribute to ensuring the success of the National Dialogue, the constitution-drafting process and of the work of the electoral commission in preparation for the general elections scheduled for February 2014.

A related issue is the role of former President Saleh in the National Dialogue, in addition to the threat from those seeking to obstruct the political transition process.

Ongoing issues are the security situation, the restructuring of the armed forces and the threat of AQAP, all of which could negatively impact the political transition, as well as the humanitarian and economic situations in the country.

Options

One option is for the Council to issue a presidential or press statement. Such a statement could:

- welcome the work of the Preparatory Committee and urge the start of the National Dialogue;
- welcome the decrees on the restructuring of the armed forces and call for their implementation in support of the transition process, as well as contributing to the fight against AQAP; and
- call for the unlocking of funds pledged in 2012 for humanitarian and infrastructure-related projects.

A less likely option is following through on its threat to consider targeted sanctions against spoilers as warned in resolution 2051 (2012).

Council Dynamics

Council members are united in their support for President Hadi and the National Dialogue, as demonstrated by their visit to Yemen. They continue to be concerned with potential spoilers, which may prove to be a contentious issue when Council members discuss possible means of curbing those who threaten to impede the political transition process. The UK is the lead country on Yemen.

Kosovo

Expected Council Action

Farid Zarif, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), is scheduled to brief the Council in February during a quarterly debate.

The Special Representative will update the Council on the Secretary-General’s report, covering the period from 16 October 2012 to 15 January 2013, as well as on the most recent developments.

No Council action is expected.

Key Recent Developments

On 17 January, Prime Minister Ivica Dačić of Serbia and Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi of Kosovo met in Brussels, where they held the fourth meeting of an EU-sponsored dialogue. This “Belgrade-Pristina dialogue” involving the two prime ministers began in October 2012 and is mediated by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton. (The previous meeting was held on 4 December 2012.) The unusually lengthy 17 January meeting was constructive, and the two leaders reached a “provisional understanding” on the collection of customs duties at their border.

Following the meeting, Thaçi said that customs duties collected along the border with Serbia would go into a special fund for the northern part of Kosovo, which is predominantly inhabited by Serbs. Thaçi added that he was “more optimistic” than previously that “there will be progress in the building of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.” He also said Kosovo would “respect the will of the citizens in the north to elect their representatives.” Meanwhile, Dačić said that although Serbia does not recognise Kosovo’s independence, it would “temporarily respect its territory.” The two sides agreed to meet again in February.

Dačić’s remarks about respecting Kosovo’s territory came on the back of other significant developments, including the adoption of a resolution by Serbia’s parliament on 13 January stating that all solutions to the Kosovo issue must be in line with Serbia’s constitution and Council resolution 1244 (1999). However, the resolution was interpreted as an implicit offer by Serbia to recognise Pristina’s authority over northern Kosovo, in exchange for broad autonomy for Serbs living in the north.

Dačić—formerly a spokesperson for former President Slobodan Milošević—addressed the parliament on 13 January, saying that Belgrade could no longer afford to “keep its head in the sand” as its sovereignty over Kosovo was “practically non-existent.” On 15 January, Dačić called for a “comprehensive” settlement of issues with Kosovo. He remarked that Kosovo was pressuring Serbia through the EU and that Serbia was preventing Kosovo from joining the UN. “Are we supposed to go on sparring like that for years?” he asked rhetorically.

While Dačić has a reputation for espousing views that do not necessarily represent those of Serbia, his evaluation of the situation was notable. Some inferred from his comments that Serbia may be willing to accept UN membership for Kosovo (de facto recognition), while not formally accepting its independence (de
Kosovo (con’t)

jure recognition). Notably, there was little public backlash against Đačić in Serbia, perhaps suggesting that ultra-nationalist sentiments in the country are giving way to concerns over improving the economy and standard of living, which EU membership is seen as aiding. (The EU has indicated that in order for Serbia to make progress in its bid, it must establish functional relations with Kosovo, even if formal recognition is not forthcoming.)

Approximately half of UN member states have recognised Kosovo. At press time, Pakistan—currently serving a two-year term on the Council—was the most recent member state to do so (on 24 December 2012).

In other developments, following weeks of tension, on 20 January the Serbian police—backed by armoured personnel carriers—removed a memorial to fighters in a town in the Preševo Valley in southern Serbia. (The region is predominantly ethnic Albanian.) The monument bore the names of ethnic Albanian fighters who were killed in 2000 during a spill-over from the 1999 conflict in the region.

The removal resulted in demonstrations in Preševo Valley and retaliatory acts against Serb interests in Kosovo, with President Atifete Jahjaga stating that it showed a lack of readiness on the part of Belgrade to find a solution through dialogue. Responding to the retaliatory actions, UNMIK issued a statement on 21 January condemning the desecration of cemeteries and vandalism of historical monuments throughout Kosovo, saying that more needed to be done to identify the perpetrators of “these despicable acts”. (Serbia complained about the incidents in a 24 January letter to the Council.)

UNMIK’s statement followed its 15 January press release, which condemned the desecration of an Orthodox cemetery in Kosovo.

In New York, a 14 January concert in the General Assembly hall resulted in controversy when an unlisted Serb military song—which some said had associations with atrocities committed in the 1990s—was played with Ban Ki-moon in attendance. A spokesperson for the Secretary-General expressed regret at the incident while the President of the General Assembly, Vuk Jeremić (Serbia), said through his spokesman that it was regrettable that some were trying to twist the meaning of Serbia’s “musical gift”.

In other developments, a Serbian letter was circulated among Council members on 21 January concerning Kosovo’s refusal to allow Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić to enter Kosovo to attend a Christmas liturgy on 7 January. The letter described the act as a “stark indication of the lack of good intentions and readiness to cooperate.”

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is stability in the region and ensuring that tensions, particularly in northern Kosovo, do not flare up and result in violent confrontations as they did in mid-2011.

In practice, the issue of Kosovo is largely addressed outside the Council and the principal issue that members will be focusing on is the productivity of the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue.

Options

The Council has numerous options at its disposal, but has seldom utilised these tools in relation to the divisive issue of Kosovo. (It usually takes no action following the regular UNMIK briefings.)

One potential—though unlikely—option would be to issue a press statement either urging calm and restraint if further provocative and retaliatory acts continue in the region or encouraging the positive signs emerging out of the recent talks in Brussels, or both.

Council Dynamics

One of the primary reasons why Kosovo attracts relatively little attention in the Council, and why the EU plays an increasingly prominent role, is the clear divide—particularly among the permanent members—on the issue.

February’s briefing will be notable in that the issue will be addressed for the first time by the new 2013 Council configuration. Three of the five new Council members recognise Kosovo (Australia, Luxembourg and the Republic of Korea), while Argentina and Rwanda do not.

Russia has traditionally been supportive of Belgrade and denounced Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence as illegal. It is likely to vocally protest the recent desecration of Orthodox cemeteries and attacks against Serbian interests in Kosovo. It has been starkly at odds with NATO countries on the Council.

Following indications that Serbia may be willing to take a more pragmatic approach towards acknowledging Kosovo’s authorities, there may be signs from some Council members that do not recognise Kosovo that they cautiously welcome recent progress.

DPRK (North Korea)

Expected Council Action

In February, Ambassador Sylvie Lucas (Luxembourg), the new chair of the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee, is scheduled to provide a 90-day report to Council members.

These quarterly briefings on the Committee’s work tend to be technical in nature, and no Council action is expected following the meeting.

Key Recent Developments

Significant developments have taken place since Council members received their last briefing on the DPRK sanctions on 29 November 2012. In keeping with its earlier announcements, on 12 December the DPRK launched the second version of what it called a Kwangmyongsong-3 satellite into orbit. The launch took place amidst widespread calls from the international community for Pyongyang not to proceed and warnings that it would be in violation of Security Council resolutions. (Following a DPRK nuclear test on 25 May 2009, resolution 1874 demanded that Pyongyang not conduct “any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology” and stated that the country must “suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme.”)

Unlike a failed 13 April 2012 attempt, the DPRK’s most recent launch successfully

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entered its satellite into orbit. In a 13 December news release, the KCNA news agency quoted Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un as saying that the launch showed the “unshakeable stand” of the DPRK to exercise its right to use space for peaceful purposes and to develop its science, technology and economy.

The launch was widely and swiftly condemned. The US said that the rocket used ballistic missile technology expressly prohibited by Council resolutions, threatened regional security, violated resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 and undermined the global non-proliferation regime. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon—whose own nation, the Republic of Korea (ROK), is still technically at war with its northern neighbour and is serving a two-year term on the Council—deplored the launch. China expressed “regret”, while Russia said the action flouted the opinion of the international community.

As for the Council, consultations were held on 12 December to discuss the launch. The private meeting—to which five incoming members, including the ROK, were invited as observers—saw a robust exchange of ideas, with differences reportedly most pronounced between China and the US.

Following the meeting, the Council President (Morocco) read out “elements” to the press that had been agreed by members. The remarks condemned the launch as a “clear violation” of resolutions 1718 and 1874. The statement also recalled the 16 April 2012 presidential statement (S/PRST/2012/13) in which the Council demanded that the DPRK not proceed with further launches and expressed its “determination to take action accordingly in the event of a further DPRK launch.” Finally, the statement noted that Council members would “continue consultations on an appropriate response.”

Following what Washington described as “intense deliberations” between China and the US, reports emerged on 18 January that a ten DPRK not proceed with further launches with differences reportedly most pronounced between China and the US.

China said that it was working “constructively” on an appropriate response, it noted that the Council’s reaction should be “prudent, moderate, and conducive to peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula” and should prevent the situation from escalating further.

The end result was a compromise, with China and the US agreeing that the Council pronouncement would be a resolution, as Washington had sought. However, rather than imposing another round of sanctions on the DPRK, the two agreed that the text would simply strengthen the existing sanctions. Following the announcement that a deal had been struck, Ambassador Vitaly Churkin (Russia) said that he both expected his country to support the text and that members would not have any “serious problems” with it. On 21 January, the US circulated the draft resolution among all Council members.

The text, which was adopted on 22 January as resolution 2087, condemned the launch, noting that it used ballistic missile technology and violated existing resolutions. The resolution demanded that Pyongyang not proceed with further prohibited launches and that it suspend activities related to its ballistic missile programme. (In the penultimate paragraph, the Council expressed its determination to take “significant action in the event of a further DPRK launch or nuclear test.”) The resolution also contained two annexes. The first listed four DPRK individuals to be subject to the existing travel ban and asset freeze; the second annex designated six entities—five in the DPRK and one in Hong Kong—to be subject to an asset freeze. This included the “Korean Committee for Space Technology”, which—according to the resolution—orchestrated the DPRK’s launches on 13 April 2012 and 12 December 2012.

The Council also directed the 1718 Committee to issue an implementation assistance notice concerning the authorised inspections of vessels relevant to the sanctions regime.

Pyongyang’s response to the 22 January resolution was swift. In a 24 January statement it said that the Council had turned into a “defunct marionette international body on which no hope can be pinned.” It singled out the US as the “sworn enemy of the Korean people” and held Washington and its “hostile policy” primarily responsible for what it deemed to be an encroachment of its sovereignty. Most notably, Pyongyang said that it would launch further long-range rockets and conduct “a nuclear test of higher level.”

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 14 January, Navi Pillay, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, called for an independent international inquiry into serious human rights crimes committed over decades in the DPRK, urging the international community to focus more on the deplorable human rights situation in the country. She expressed dismay at the living conditions and practices surrounding political prison camps, deplored the use of the death penalty for minor offenses after inadequate judicial processes and highlighted the need to clarify the fate of ROK and Japanese citizens who have been abducted by DPRK agents over the years.

Key Issues
The principal concern for the Council is that events do not further escalate tensions on the Korean Peninsula to the point where the fragile peace and stability is gravely jeopardised.

Preventing the DPRK from continuing to flout Council resolutions, in particular by undertaking another nuclear test, is a key related concern for the Council.

A broader issue is whether Council pronouncements tightening the sanctions regime against the DPRK are effective in dissuading Pyongyang from taking prohibited actions.

Options
The Council could wait and see if Pyongyang follows through on its assertion that it will launch additional rockets and test a nuclear device and then determine what “significant action” it should take. (This could involve implementing a third round of sanctions against the DPRK or adding further designations.)

Another option would be for the Council to take a different approach—using “carrots” rather than “sticks”—and undertake easing existing sanctions if the DPRK commits no further violations, say, by the end of 2013.

One unlikely option would be for the Council to recommend the DPRK’s suspension from the UN, pursuant to Article 5 of the UN Charter or, if it deems that Pyongyang has “persistently violated” the principles of the Charter, it could recommend to the General Assembly that it be expelled (Article 6).

It is more likely that efforts to influence the DPRK’s conduct will be pursued at the regional level among key actors.
Protection of Civilians

Expected Council Action

In February, the Council is scheduled to hold its biannual open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. The Secretary-General is expected to brief along with Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos and High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay and ICRC Director for International Law and Cooperation Philip Spoerri. The meeting will be chaired by Foreign Minister Kim Sung-Hwan of the Republic of Korea (ROK).

In preparation for the debate, the ROK circulated a concept paper on 25 January. A presidential statement requesting the Secretary-General to submit another report on protection of civilians later this year is a possible outcome.

Key Recent Developments

The Council last discussed protection of civilians as a thematic issue in an open debate on 25 June 2012. It featured briefings by the Secretary-General, Amos, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights Ivan Šimonović (on behalf of Pillay) Spoerri.

Presenting his 22 May report (S/2012/376), the Secretary-General emphasised in particular the need for greater focus on the growing use of explosive weapons in populated areas as a violation of international law, as well as attacks against health-care facilities, and said there was an urgent need for a “more systematic engagement” with non-state armed groups. He also called on the Council to exercise strong leadership in guiding the international response to ensure justice for perpetrators of violations against civilians.

Amos expressed specific concerns relating to the situations in Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Mali, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen. She echoed the Secretary-General’s call for action to address the humanitarian impact of the use of explosive weapons and also called for a comprehensive and robust arms-trade treaty and more systematic recording of civilian casualties.

On the issue of accountability, she said the Council had a responsibility to ensure justice and urged it to consider taking forward the recommendations from the 1 November 2011 workshop co-hosted by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Portugal (S/2012/373).

Šimonović focused on the Council’s responsibility for ensuring accountability. He reiterated his call for the Council to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC. While welcoming the Council’s increased practice of referring to the findings of commissions of inquiry established by other bodies, Šimonović said it could do more to enhance the impact of such commissions by calling on parties to cooperate with them, making more use of their reports and itself establishing commissions. He also stressed that civilian casualty tracking mechanisms could serve as an important tool to ensure greater accountability and welcomed the recently adopted human rights due-diligence policy for UN support to non-UN security forces.

Spoerri focused on threats against the security and delivery of health care; the availability and use of arms; and the failure to comply with international humanitarian law. He said the ICRC strongly supported the adoption of a global arms-trade treaty as a means to prevent the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law and other relevant legal instruments.

On 19 September, the Council held an open debate on children and armed conflict and adopted resolution 2068, which expressed concern about persistent perpetrators of violations against children, called on member states to bring them to justice and reiterated its readiness to adopt targeted measures against them.

On 17 October, under the presidency of Guatemala, the Council held an open debate on peace and justice with a special focus on the role of the ICC. Guatemala had circulated a concept note (S/2012/731) setting out as one of the debate’s objectives exploring how the ICC could assist the Council in carrying out its mandate to uphold the rule of law, maintain peace and security and combat impunity while ensuring accountability for mass atrocities. (For more details on the debate, please see our Cross-Cutting Report on the Rule of Law published on 18 January.)
An immediate issue for the Council is whether to consider the mandates of the following missions:

- UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (June);
- UN Mission in South Sudan (June);
- UN Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (July);
- AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (July);
- UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (July);
- International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (October); and
- the proposed African-led International Support Mission to Mali (December).

**Key Issues**

An immediate issue for the Council is whether to address any of the questions raised in the ROK’s concept paper or take up any of the additional recommendations and proposals put forward by the Secretary-General and others on ways to strengthen the protection of civilians. The concept note emphasises the need to translate normative progress into concrete improvements in the protection of civilians on the ground and proposes that discussions focus in particular on three of the five core protection challenges outlined in the Secretary-General’s most recent reports: enhancing compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law, ensuring accountability for violations of the law and strengthening implementation of peacekeeping protection mandates. (The other two are improving humanitarian access and enhancing compliance with the law by non-state actors.)

A continuing issue is the importance of consolidating and ensuring implementation of the existing normative framework on the protection of civilians in country-specific situations, bearing in mind the five core challenges. A related issue is how to ensure that the Council is comprehensive and consistent in its approach.

**Options**

The main option for the Council is to adopt a presidential statement requesting another thematic report on protection of civilians by the end of November and every 18 months thereafter. By establishing such a regular reporting cycle, the Council would avoid having to issue an ad hoc request for each report as it has done in the past. (The Council did this for children and armed conflict when in resolution 2068 it requested the Secretary-General to report on an annual basis instead of asking for only one more report.)

In addition, the presidential statement could:

- reaffirm the Council’s commitment to the protection of civilians;
- express concern about the increase in attacks against health care facilities and condemn such attacks;
- call on parties to conflict to refrain from using explosive weapons in populated areas and express its willingness to consider more robust action to prevent such use, including the imposition of targeted measures against the leadership of parties that use explosive weapons in violation of applicable international law;
- encourage the creation of civilian casualty tracking mechanisms in situations of conflict; and
- express the Council’s intention to carefully consider the recommendations from the 1 November 2011 workshop on ways to strengthen accountability for violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. (For more details on these recommendations, please see our 2012 Cross-Cutting Report on the Protection of Civilians.)

Alternatively, the Council could adopt a resolution. (This would change the dynamics of the negotiations because a resolution, contrary to a statement, does not require consensus.)

A further option would be to request a new report on protection of civilians from the Secretary-General in a letter from the Council President.

**Council Dynamics**

There seems to be some expectation that the 2013 Council composition might be more favourable to the protection of civilians agenda than in 2012, as all of the newly elected members are seen as supportive of protection issues. (Argentina, Australia, Luxembourg, ROK and Portugal and South Africa.)

At press time, however, it was still too early to tell how the new dynamics would play out. The UK had indicated it would propose a presidential statement, but had yet to circulate a text. There seems to be continuing concern among the UK and like-minded Council members that any attempt at advancing the thematic agenda at this stage may result in push-back from those who favours a more limited Council role, such as Azerbaijan, China, Pakistan and Russia. The aim seems to be to consolidate what has already been achieved and a very forward-leaning text is therefore unlikely.

The UK is the lead country in the Council on protection of civilians and chairs the informal expert group.

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**Subsidiary Chairs and Pen Holders for 2013**

Every year, the Security Council revisits its allocation of chairmanships of its subsidiary bodies, a task entrusted to the elected Council members following deliberations between the P5 and separate consultations with the elected members. Decisions regarding the 2013 distribution were finalised during the last week of December 2012. As this chart illustrates, there is scant correlation between the “pen-holders” for situation-specific agenda items and the chairs of the relevant subsidiary bodies. In most, though not all cases, “pen-holders” are permanent members. As the “pen-holders” take the lead in drafting Council decisions, they normally “trump” chairs notwithstanding the chairs’ formal title and mandate. The table below lists those agenda items of which the Council is or was seized since 1 January 2009 and which have a designated “pen-holder”. For the full name of the agenda items please refer to the latest summary statement by the Secretary-General of 2 January 2013 (S/2013/10).
## Subsidiary Chairs and Pen Holders for 2013 (con't)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITUATION-SPECIFIC OR THEMATIC MATTER</th>
<th>“PEN-HOLDER” IN THE COUNCIL</th>
<th>CHAIR OF RELEVANT COUNCIL SUBSIDIARY BODY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Australia, 1988 Taliban Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Chair of rotating Contact and Drafting Group</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa Region</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>Guatemala, 1572 Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism (1267 and 1988)</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>Australia, 1267/1988 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Azerbaijan, 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK (Non-Proliferation)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Luxembourg, 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Group of Friends</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Lakes Region</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Morocco, 2048 Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTR</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Guatemala, International Tribunals Informal Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Guatemala, International Tribunals Informal Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran (Non-Proliferation)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Australia, 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>Togo, 1518 Iraq Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Chair of rotating Contact and Drafting Group</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Pakistan, 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Rwanda, 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Syrian (France); UNDOF (US and Russia); UNIFIL (France); Yemen (UK) Togo, 1636 Lebanon Sanctions Committee</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East, including the Palestinian Question</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>UK or US</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>UK; US on piracy; Russia on legal issues on piracy</td>
<td>Republic of Korea, 751/1907 Somalia-Eritrea Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>UK on Darfur; US on Sudan/South Sudan</td>
<td>Argentina, 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>Currently N.A. (Previously South Africa)</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children and Armed Conflict</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Luxembourg, Children and Armed Conflict Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism (1373)</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Morocco, 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism (1566)</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Morocco, 1566 Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Proliferation of WMD</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>Republic of Korea, 1540 WMD Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and Security in Africa</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Rwanda, Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa Ad Hoc Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping Operations</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Pakistan, Peacekeeping Operations Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UK, Protection of Civilians Informal Expert Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women and Peace and Security</td>
<td>UK on 1325 women’s participation agenda;</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US on 1820 sexual violence in conflict agenda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Methods</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Argentina, Informal Working Group on Documentation and other Procedural Questions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.A.: Not Applicable
Security Council Statistics in 2012

Decreased Activity
With 53 resolutions adopted in 2012, the year saw a sharp decline (-19.7 percent) in resolutions relative to 2011 (when 66 resolutions were adopted) and a decrease in total decisions (-6.8 percent) that was attenuated by the adoption of 29 presidential statements. The increase in presidential statements (+31.8 percent), up from 22 in 2011, breaks the steady decline that began in 2005 as press statements gained added relevance. Overall, the Security Council adopted 82 decisions in 2012 compared to 88 in 2011, hitting their lowest point since 1991, when 63 decisions were adopted (see the graph below).

Meetings also registered a significant decrease (-15.3 percent), with the Council holding 199 in 2012, including meetings with troop-contributing countries, compared with 235 in 2011. The decision-to-meeting ratio, however, improved slightly in 2012 (0.41) relative to 2011 (0.37), as the overall decline in meetings outpaced the decrease in the number of decisions. There were, however, 174 consultations in 2012, which was slightly more than the 170 scheduled in 2011. Despite these changes, the decision-to-meeting-and-consultation ratio for 2012 remained unchanged (0.22).

Whereas two missions were established in 2011, the UN Mission in South Sudan and the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei, the Council created a single new mission in 2012, the UN Supervision Mission in Syria, which quickly expired on 19 August due to the opposition of China and Russia. As in 2011, when the Council closed the UN Mission in Nepal and the UN Mission in the Sudan, it only terminated one mission in 2012, the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste. Contrary to 2011, when Council members only undertook one visiting mission (Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya from 19-26 May), 2012 saw three visiting missions (Haiti from 13-16 February; Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire from 18-24 May; and Timor-Leste from 3-6 November).

Decreased Consensus
Non-consensual resolutions were on the rise relative to 2011, as four resolutions (2058, 2063, 2068 and 2081) were adopted by a vote and two draft resolutions (S/2012/77 and S/2012/538, both on the situation in Syria) were jointly vetoed by China and Russia. Although nominally not significant because other years registered a similar or larger number of non-consensual decisions, 2012 registered the highest percentage (10.9 percent) of non-consensual decision-making by the Security Council since 2004 (see the graph to the left). Interestingly, it was Azerbaijan that most frequently broke ranks with the majority, abstaining in three resolutions.

Breakdown by Region
As in previous years, the attention of the Council varied from region to region, with agenda items pertaining to Africa totaling 95 meetings (47.7 percent), of which 83 (41.7 percent) dealt with sub-Saharan Africa. The Council held 53 meetings (26.6 percent) on situations in North Africa and the Middle East and 48 meetings (24.1 percent) on situations in Asia (some of which are also included in the Middle East). The Council only had 18 meetings (9.0 percent) on agenda items pertaining to Europe and only five (2.5 percent) on the sole situation in the Americas (Haiti).

Relative to 2011, 2012 registered decreased attention to situations in Africa (-24.6 percent) and sub-Saharan Africa (-14.4 percent), increased attention to situations in Europe (+28.6 percent) and Asia (+6.7 percent), while remaining constant in regard to North
Y emen was on the rise relative to 2011 (when Africa and the Middle East, and the Americas.

**Breakdown by Agenda Item**

In 2012, the Council continued to address three of the situations arising from the Arab Spring. It held ten meetings on Libya and adopted one decision (resolution 2040); nine meetings on Syria (not including meetings pertaining to the UN Disengage-ment Observer Force in the Golan Heights), leading to five decisions (resolutions 2042, 2043 and 2059 and S/PRST/2012/6 and S/PRST/2012/10); and four meetings and two decisions on Yemen (resolution 2051 and S/PRST/2012/8). Consideration of Libya suffered a sharp decline from 2011 (when there were 23 meetings) as expected as the situation improved, but attention to both Syria and Yemen was on the rise relative to 2011 (when there were four meetings and one meeting, respectively). On Lebanon, there were no year-to-year changes, with two meetings and the adoption of the annual UN Interim Force in Lebanon renewal (resolution 2064). As for the “Middle East, including the Palestinian Question”, the Council continued to hold a significant number of meetings (14) without adopting a single decision.

Regarding the situations in Sudan and between Sudan and South Sudan, consider-ation by the Council decreased to 17 meetings in 2012 compared to 35 in 2011. Prob-ably as a result of the lead taken by the AU Peace and Security Council in formulating the 24 April 2012 roadmap to ease the tensions between the two countries, in 2012 the Council adopted nine decisions (resolutions 2035, 2046, 2047, 2057, 2063 and 2075 and S/PRST/2012/5, S/PRST/2012/12 and S/PRST/2012/19), compared to 13 in 2011. Somalia also registered a decrease in attention from 16 to 11 meetings and from nine to seven decisions (resolutions 2036, 2060, 2067, 2072, 2073 and 2077 and S/PRST/2012/4) as the situation on the ground improved with the routing of Al-Shabaab by the AU Mission in Somalia and the swearing-in of a new national government.

As for West Africa, Council activity regarding Côte d’Ivoire was expectedly much lower in 2012, with five meetings and two decisions (resolutions 2045 and 2062) compared to 11 and seven respectively in 2011, when it had to address the post-election violence and political crisis provoked by the refusal of former President Laurent Gbagbo to concede defeat. Not surprisingly, in light of the 22 March and 12 April coups that affected Mali and Guinea-Bissau, the Council not only added Mali to its agenda but also dedicated seven and six meetings, respectively, to address the two situations and adopted five decisions on Mali (resolutions 2056, 2071 and 2085 and S/PRST/2012/7 and S/PRST/2012/9) and two on Guinea-Bissau (resolution 2048 and S/PRST/2012/15). With progress continuing to build in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Coun-cil held four and six meetings, respectively, in the run-up and follow-up to the presiden-tial elections that reelected the incumbent presidents. It also adopted two resolutions on Liberia (2066 and 2079) and four decisions on Sierra Leone (resolution 2065 and S/PRST/2012/11, S/PRST/2012/21 and S/PRST/2012/25).

Despite the emergence of new rebel movements that threatened the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Council attention to both situations did not increase statistically in 2012. In fact, it held exactly the same number of meetings on the DRC (eight), albeit adopting one more decision (resolutions 2053, 2076 and 2078 and S/PRST/2012/22), and met four instead of five times on the CAR or the more expansive agenda item “Central African Region”, adopting two decisions (S/PRST/2012/18 and S/PRST/2012/28) entirely unrelated to the Seleka rebellion.

Regarding the situations in Afghanistan, Haiti and Iraq, there were no significant vari-ations in the number of meetings held relative to 2011. The Council held four meetings on Iraq and adopted one resolution (2001); five meetings on Haiti, likewise leading to one resolution (2070); and seven meetings on Afghanistan resulting in three resolutions (2041, 2069 and 2082). Council attention to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Western Sahara likewise remained unchanged with three and two meetings, respectively, leading to one resolution in each case (2074 and 2044).

The Council met twice as much as it did in 2011 on Timor-Leste, holding six meetings and adopting two decisions (resolution 2037 and S/PRST/2012/27) as it concentrated on closing UNMIT due to the achievements made since independence in 2002. In con-trast, the Council met only half as much on Cyprus in 2012, scheduling two meetings and adopting one resolution (2058), and, on Burundi, held only one meeting (with no out-come) compared to three in 2011. Another agenda item without an outcome in 2012 was Kosovo, which was considered at four meetings.

On the ad hoc international tribunals, which were considered at eight meetings in 2011, the Council met six times and adopted four decisions (resolutions 2038, 2054, 2080 and 2081) as it prepared the transition to the International Residual Mechanism that will continue the functions of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugosla-via (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR). Finally, regarding “Non-Proliferation” in a country-specific context, there were no drastic changes, with the Council meeting five times on Iran in 2012 and adopting one resolution (2049), and twice on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with an equal number of decisions (resolution 2050 and S/PRST/2012/13).

The thematic agenda items suffered less variation altogether. The agenda items “Threats to International Peace and Security” and “Children and Armed Conflict” suf-fered no variations, each being considered at one meeting leading to one decision (S/PRST/2012/16 and resolution 2068, respectively). “Threats due to Terrorist Acts” were discussed at two meetings, as in 2011, with three decisions adopted (resolutions 2082 and 2083 and S/PRST/2012/17). The Coun-cil also met twice on “Non-Proliferation”, adopting two decisions (resolution 2055 and S/PRST/2012/14), compared to once in 2011. Whereas the Council dealt with “Peacekeeping” and “Peacebuilding” in three and two meetings, respectively, adopting one decision on the latter (S/PRST/2012/29), in 2011 it devoted four meetings to the lat-ter and two to the former. On “Women and Peace and Security”, it met twice as much as in 2011, with four meetings at which two decisions were adopted (S/PRST/2012/3 and S/PRST/2012/23). Finally, the Council only met once each on “Protection of Civilians” and the “Rule of Law”, without any outcomes.
Notable Dates for February

REPORT DUE | REPORTS FOR CONSIDERATION IN FEBRUARY | REQUESTING DOCUMENT
--- | --- | ---
16 January | SG report on UNIOGBIS (Guinea-Bissau) | S/RES/2030
24 January | Panel of Experts final report to the 1591/Sudan Sanctions Committee | S/RES/2035
25 January | SG report on UNISFA (Abyei) | S/RES/2075
29 January | SG report on UNMIL (Kosovo) | S/RES/1244
31 January | SG report on Somalia, including options for an integrated UN presence (originally due 31 December 2012) | S/RES/2067 S/2012/828
early February | SG report on options for improving MONUSCO’s ability to implement its mandate and a strategy for the response to the M23 threat | S/RES/2076 S/PRST/2012/22
mid-February (overdue) | AU report on AMISOM (Somalia) | S/RES/2073
mid-February | AU report on AFISMA (Mali) | S/RES/2085
14 February | SG report on MONUSCO (DRC) | S/RES/2053

MANDATES EXPIRE | RELEVANT DOCUMENT
--- | ---
15 February | BNUB (Burundi) | S/RES/2027
17 February | Panel of Experts to the 1591/Sudan Sanctions Committee | S/RES/2035
28 February | UNIOGBIS (Guinea-Bissau) | S/RES/2030

OTHER IMPORTANT DATES

12 February | The Council is expected to hold its biannual open debate on protection of civilians in armed conflict.

17 February | First round presidential elections are slated for Cyprus.