Overview

Colombia will hold the presidency of the Security Council in July. An open debate is planned to discuss the annual report of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and receive briefings from the PBC country configurations’ chairs. The debate will be chaired by Colombia’s Foreign Minister, María Angela Holguín Cuéllar. There will also be an open debate on the Middle East with a briefing by the Secretariat.

The Council is due to also receive briefings, to be followed by consultations on:
- Iraq by the head of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Martin Kobler;
- Libya by the head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), Ian Martin;
- Côte d’Ivoire, by the head of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), Albert Gerard Koenders;
- Darfur and the work of the AU/UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), most likely by UN Secretariat;
- Guinea-Bissau, by the head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), Joseph Mutaboba;
- Burundi, by the exiting head of the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB), Karin Landgren and the Chair of the PBC Burundi Configuration Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland); and
- the work of the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), by its head Said Djinnit.

Briefings in consultations will likely be given on:
- Syria, probably twice, one likely by the UN- Arab League Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan and another by the High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, and the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS);
- the human rights situation in Libya, by Pillay;
- the human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, by Pillay;
- the human rights situation in Sudan, by Pillay;
- Cyprus, by the head of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), Lisa M. Buttenheim and possibly also by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser, Alexander Downer;
- Yemen by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser, Jamal Benomar;
- the status of compliance by Sudan, South Sudan, and the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement-North with Council resolution 2046 (likely twice during the month);
- the implementation of resolution 1701 (that called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel) by Special Coordinator Derek Plumbly; and
- the work of the Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee, by its Chair, Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri (India).

Consultations are also expected on the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), prior to the renewal of its mandate.

Formal sessions will be needed to adopt resolutions extending:
- the mandate of UNMISS;
- the mandate of UNFICYP;
- the mandate of UNAMID;
- the mandate of UNAMI;
- the mandate of UNOCI;
- the mandate of the Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Monitoring Group; and
- the mandate of UNSMIS.

An interactive dialogue will most likely be held with the chairs of the PBC country-specific configurations.

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Eritrea

Expected Council Action

In July, the Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea sanctions is due to submit for the first time a separate report on Eritrea as part of its final reporting obligations and is scheduled to brief the 751/1907 Sanctions Committee on the report. The Council is expected to renew the Monitoring Group’s mandate before it expires at the end of July.

The Council is also due to consider the Secretary-General’s report on Eritrea’s compliance with resolutions 1844, 1862, 1907 and 2023 which demanded that...
**Central African Republic:** On 6 June, Margaret Vogt, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the CAR (BINUCA), briefed (S/PV.6780) the Council on the Secretary-General’s latest report (S/2012/374) on the situation in the country. Vogt noted that though the overall security situation has improved, the CAR remains fragile. The arrest of four politico-military leaders early in the year on charges of plans to re-launch an armed rebellion and the suspension of consultations between the government and political parties on electoral matters exemplified the fragility of the situation, she said. The representative of the CAR also briefed the Council. No action was taken after the briefing.

**Iran:** On 7 June, the Council adopted resolution 2049 renewing the mandate of the Iran Sanctions Committee’s Panel of Experts (PoE) until 9 July next year. The only change from the previous year’s equivalent text was that the mandate was extended for 13 months instead of 12, so as to enable greater continuity of the PoE’s work during the mandate renewal period. (The Council will consider further extension of the mandate by 9 June 2013.) Agreement has been reached for this year’s PoE’s final report of 9 May (S/2012/395) to be published. The report contains 11 recommendations to the Sanctions Committee, including the designation of two companies for transporting prohibited arms from Iran bound for Syria. On 12 June, the Chair of the Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Néstor Osorio (Colombia), briefed the Council on the Committee’s work (S/PV.6786). An open brief on the Committee’s work for the benefit of the membership at large is scheduled for 9 July.

**Tribunals:** On 7 June the Council held a debate on the ICTR/ICTY (S/PV.6782) where top officials of the two tribunals briefed the Council. The Presidents and Prosecutors of the tribunals told the Council that they had recently made great strides in completing their work and ensuring a transfer of remaining tasks to the so-called “Residual Mechanism”. They reported, however, that challenges to finishing all work on schedule by the completion date of December 2014 remained. Following the debate the Council adopted a press statement (SC/10676). On 29 June the Council adopted a resolution (S/RES/2054) extending three ICTR judges’ terms.

**DPRK (North Korea):** On 12 June, the Council adopted resolution 2050 extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) which assists the DPRK Sanctions Committee until 12 July 2013. The resolution was essentially a technical roll-over of last year’s resolution, although the Council extended the mandate for 13 instead of 12 months so as to enable greater continuity of the PoE’s work during the mandate renewal period. (The resolution expresses the Council’s intent to review the mandate and take appropriate renewal action by 12 June 2013.) Agreement was reached for the PoE’s final report of 12 May to be published (unlike the previous year’s report), and resolution 2050 gives the final report a UN document number (S/2012/422), although it has not yet been published on the Committee’s website.

**Consultations with the AU PSC:** On 13 June, at UN headquarters, Council members held their sixth annual consultative meeting with the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC). Issues discussed included: Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan, developments in the Sahel region of Africa, as well as the further strengthening of methods of work and cooperation between the two bodies. The closed informal meeting lasted about three hours and appears to have been less contentious and more substantive than some of the previous consultations. A detailed communiqué (S/2012/444) from the meeting possibly signals a shift toward a more substantive and less process-oriented phase in this relationship.

**Mali:** On 18 June, the Council issued a press statement (SC/10676) declaring its readiness to consider backing a military intervention in Mali as proposed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) “once additional information has been provided regarding the objectives, means and modalities of the envisaged deployment and other possible measures.” The statement followed a 15 June meeting between Council members and a high-level delegation from ECOWAS to discuss the situation in Mali. The statement encouraged “a close cooperation between the Commission of ECOWAS, the Commission of the African Union, the United Nations Secretariat and countries in the region in order to prepare detailed options.”

**Peacekeeping:** On 20 June, the Council held a meeting (S/PV/6789) with Force Commanders from UN peacekeeping missions. The Force Commanders from the UN Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Lieutenant General Chander Prakash), UN Interim Force in Lebanon (Major General Paolo Serra), UN Mission in South Sudan (Major General Moses Bisong Obi), and UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (Major General Fernando Rodriguez Goulart) made presentations to the Council during the debate. No Council action resulted.

**Myanmar:** On 20 June, Council members were briefed in consultations on Myanmar by the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Myanmar, Vijay Nambiar, who had recently returned from a visit to the country. Nambiar attended the Peace Donor Support Group, established by Norway to work with the government of Myanmar and other partners. Council members were updated on the recent troubles in the western Rakhine State, where the communal violence between the ethnic Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims has led to a humanitarian crisis.

**Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict:** On 25 June, the Council held its biannual open debate on protection of civilians in armed conflict (S/PV.6790 and Resumption 1). It featured briefings by the Secretary-General and by Under-Secretary-General for Human Rights Navi Pillay), as well as the Director for International Law and Cooperation at the International Law and Cooperation at the International Committee of the Red Cross, Philip Spoerri (via video-link). In addition to Council members, more than 30 member states spoke. A key focus of the debate was the Secretary-General’s 22 May report on protection of civilians (S/2012/376), but speakers also raised a number of country-specific protection concerns, including Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. There was no outcome.

**Golan Heights:** On 27 June, the Security Council adopted resolution 2052 renewing the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) through 31 December 2012 and noted that events elsewhere in Syria have started to manifest themselves in the area of
unilateral Security Council report interventions by member countries of abstained, while the other 13 Council spoilers in Somalia and engage in other from using the diaspora tax or revenues imposed new measures to prevent Eritrea bilise other states in the region. It also with Djibouti and cease all efforts to desta-

1862 and 1907, called on it “to engage con-

Key Recent Developments
On 5 December 2011, the Council adopted resolution 2023, which condemned Eritrea’s violations of resolutions 1844, 1862 and 1907, called on it “to engage con-

Eritrea cease all efforts to destabilise other states and engage constructively to resolve its border dispute with Djibouti. At press time it was unclear whether there would be a separate briefing on the report.

Eritrea (continued)
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Development (IGAD), all speaking in support of the proposed resolution. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki had been invited to speak, but on 3 December Eritrea informed the Council that his participation would be logistically impossible and “a mere formality and utterly meaningless” because of the short notice. (The invitation was extended on 30 November 2011).

Following the adoption of resolution 2023, Eritrea has written a series of letters to the Council protesting the sanctions against it and calling for the establishment of “an independent, impartial and credible body” in place of the Monitoring Group which it claims lacks independence and impartiality. (The Monitoring Group’s 2011 report accused Eritrea of continued violations of resolutions 1844 and 1907 as well as involvement in a plot to disrupt the AU summit in Addis Ababa on 30-31 January 2011.)

In its letters, Eritrea has also consistently accused the Council of being one-sided in its approach to the issues in the region. More specifically, it has repeatedly called on the Council to address the unresolved border dispute with Ethiopia and ensure respect for the final and binding 2002 ruling of the Eritrea and Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC). It has also accused Ethiopia of flouting international law and the UN Charter by occupying territory awarded to Eritrea by the EEBC ruling.

For its part, Ethiopia — in an 18 January letter to the Council — accused Eritrea of being responsible for a 16 January “terrorist attack” on its territory against a group of 22 tourists in which five people were killed, something Eritrea subsequently denied. On 14 March, Ethiopia wrote a letter to the Council invoking its right of self-defense and then on 15 March announced that it had launched a military attack against positions on Eritrean territory, accusing Eritrea of training Ethiopian rebel groups. In response, Eritrea, in a 16 March letter, called on the Council to “shoulder its legal and moral responsibilities” and take “appropriate measures to rectify acts of aggression” against Eritrea.

Liberia: On 29 June, the Council held consultations on Liberia after a briefing by DPKO Assistant Secretary-General Edmond Mulet. The briefing focused on the Secretary-General’s special report (S/2012/230) on the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) of 16 April 2012 requested by Resolution 2008. Also on 15 June, the Chair of the Liberia Sanctions Committee submitted the midterm report (S/2012/448) of the Panel of Experts supporting the sanctions regime. This report was also discussed in consultations on 29 June. No Council action was taken.

UNOCA/LRA: On 29 June the Council received a briefing on the UN Office in Central Africa (UNOCA) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) (S/PV.6794). Following the briefing the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2012/18) strongly condemning the ongoing attacks carried out by the LRA in parts of central Africa; welcoming the development of the UN Regional Strategy to address the Threat and Impact of the Activities of the LRA; welcoming the strong collaboration between the UN and the AU in addressing the LRA threat, and encouraging its continuation; and welcoming the official launching of the AU-led Regional Cooperation Initiative against the LRA in March.

Democratic Republic of the Congo: The Council met several times in June regarding the DRC. On 6 June, the Council met with troop-contributing countries to the UN Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. (MONUSCO). On 12 June, the Council received a briefing (S/PV.6785) by Roger Meece, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of MONUSCO, on recent developments in the DRC, including a recent mutiny led by army officers which has caused a serious deterioration of security in the Kivus. Following the briefing the Council issued a press statement (SC/10672). On 26 June, the Council held consultations on DRC sanctions following receipt of the interim report of the Group of Experts on the DRC (S/2012/348). Ambassador Agushi Mehdiyev (Azerbaijan) briefed the Council in his capacity as Chair of the DRC Sanctions Committee. Finally, on 27 June the Council renewed MONUSCO’s mandate until 30 June 2013 (S/RES/2053).
On 18 April, the Sanctions Committee met with Ambassador Araya Desta (Eritrea). Desta reiterated previous criticism of the Monitoring Group, accusing it of having “glaringly failed to observe minimum standards of objectivity and political neutrality,” in particular with regard to its sources of information, and for operating outside its mandate. He also said Eritrea would welcome a visit by the Committee to discuss the sanctions regime and called on it to address continued violations by Ethiopia of Eritrea’s “sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

A second key issue is the Monitoring Group’s lack of access to Eritrea and to some extent Somalia and whether this impacts the quality and credibility of its work. (Eritrea has refused to issue visas to the group, while its coordinator, Matt Bryden, was declared persona non grata by the TFG of Somalia.)

A further issue is whether there is any merit to the concerns and requests brought forward by Eritrea.

Another issue is whether the Council should adopt a more comprehensive approach to the region and address the unresolved border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Options
Main options for the Council include:
- renewing the Monitoring Group’s mandate relating to Eritrea without any significant changes;
- re-engaging on the issue of the unresolved border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea by explicitly addressing Ethiopia’s noncompliance with the EEBC’s border-demarcation decision; and
- considering the Secretary-General’s report on Eritrea in a public meeting in order to provide Eritrea and other states with another opportunity to present their views on the situation in the region.

Options in the Sanctions Committee include:
- considering the recommendations of the Monitoring Group relating to Eritrea with a view to endorsing some or all of them;
- moving to make the first designations for targeted sanctions under the provisions of resolutions 1844 and 1907 on Eritrea; and
- finalising, with the assistance of the Monitoring Group, the due diligence guidelines relating to the Eritrean mining sector called for by resolution 2023.

UN Documents
Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/2023 (5 December 2011) condemned Eritrea’s violations of resolutions 1907, 1862 and 1844 and imposed new measures to prevent Eritrea from using the diaspora tax or revenues from its mining sector to commit further violations.
- S/RES/2002 (29 July 2011) extended the mandate of the Monitoring Group for Eritrea and Somalia for another year and requested for the first time a separate report on Eritrea.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is whether the sanctions on Eritrea are being effectively implemented. A related issue is whether they are having an impact in terms of changing behavior and ensuring compliance with relevant Council resolutions.
• S/RES/1907 (23 December 2009) imposed an arms embargo and targeted sanctions on Eritrea for its destabilising role in Somalia and its failure to comply with resolution 1862.
• S/RES/1862 (14 January 2009) demanded that Eritrea withdraw its forces within five weeks to the positions of the status quo ante in its border dispute with Djibouti.
• S/RES/1844 (20 November 2008) imposed targeted sanctions relating to the situation in Somalia.

Secretary-General’s report
• S/2012/412 (8 June 2012) was the Secretary-General’s report requested by resolution 2023.

Meeting record
• S/PV.6674 and resumption 1 (8 June 2012) was the adoption of resolution 2023 with explanations of vote, including by China and Russia, which abstained.

Letters to the Council
• S/2012/181 (27 March 2012) was a letter from Eritrea accusing the US of playing a destabilising role in the Horn of Africa region and calling for an independent inquiry.
• S/2012/164 (16 March 2012) was a letter from Eritrea on Ethiopia’s 15 March incursion into Eritrean territory.
• S/2012/158 (14 March 2012) was a letter from Ethiopia calling on the Council to ensure Eritrea’s compliance with relevant resolutions and stressing its own right of self-defense.
• S/2012/126 (29 February 2012) was a letter from Ethiopia calling on the Council to ensure respect for the EEBC ruling and reiterating its request for lifting of sanctions and establishment of an “enquiry committee.”
• S/2012/57 (23 January 2012) was a letter from Eritrea urging the Council “to ensure Ethiopia’s prompt compliance with its treaty obligations and to respect international law.”
• S/2012/47 (19 January 2012) was a letter from Eritrea rejecting the accusations in Ethiopia’s 18 January letter.
• S/2012/44 (18 January 2012) was a letter from Ethiopia accusing Eritrea of being behind the 16 January attack against a group of tourists.
• S/2011/792 (20 December 2011) was a letter from Eritrea requesting the Council to “review and annul” all measures against it and to establish “an independent, impartial and credible body” in place of the Monitoring Group.
• S/2011/753 (3 December 2011) was a letter from Eritrea declining the invitation for its president to address the Council on 5 December.
• S/2011/663 (25 October) was from Eritrea to the Council requesting that the Eritrean president be invited to address the Council.
• S/2011/652 (20 October 2011) was from Eritrea to the Council submitting its response to the report of the Monitoring Group.
• S/2011/433 (18 July 2011) was from the Sanctions Committee chair transmitting the Monitoring Group’s latest report to the Council.
• S/2011/434 (14 July 2011) was from Ethiopia to the Council transmitting the 4 July IGAD Assembly of Heads of Government communiqué calling for Council action against Eritrea.

Somalia

Expected Council action
The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea which expires on 29 July and is likely to then also extend the humanitarian exemption to the targeted sanctions regime for Somalia.

The Chair of the Sanctions Committee for Somalia and Eritrea is due to brief the Council on the work of the Committee.

Also in July, it is possible that the Council will request a briefing on the status of the transitional process.

The Council is expecting several reports relating to the situation in Somalia:

• The Monitoring Group is due to submit two separate final reports—one on Somalia and one on Eritrea—and to brief the Sanctions Committee. (For sanctions issues related specifically to Eritrea, please refer to a separate brief in this Forecast.)
• The Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia is due to submit a report by 15 July on implementation of the humanitarian exemption provision and any misuse or obstruction of humanitarian assistance. A briefing in the Sanctions Committee on this report by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is expected.

Several Council members will also participate in the meeting of the International Contact Group for Somalia scheduled for 2-3 July in Rome, as well as the meeting of the International Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia to be held in New York on 26 July.

Key recent developments
The situation in Somalia was last considered by the Council in a 15 May meeting featuring briefings by Somali president Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga. Mahiga, who briefed the Council on the Secretary-General’s latest report and more recent developments, emphasised that the transitional process had entered its most critical stage. He called for logistical and financial support and international cooperation and coordination to enable implementation of the roadmap for ending the transition before the 20 August deadline. He also raised the issue of spoilers, warning that such elements must be dealt with “before they succeed in undermining the peace process.” (Mahiga met with the Sanctions Committee on 14 May to discuss this issue in more detail.)

Following the meeting, Council members issued a press statement expressing concern that some of the roadmap’s deadlines had been missed, calling on all the signatories to “redouble their efforts to complete the roadmap tasks,” emphasising the importance of a transparent and legitimate political process and reiterating their readiness to support measures against internal or external actors seeking to undermine or block the peace process.
Subsequently, the roadmap signatories met twice to resolve remaining implementation issues and revise timelines, first in Addis Ababa on 23 May and then from 20-22 June in Nairobi. Among other things, they decided at the second meeting on protocols for the establishment of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) and the Federal Parliament and also agreed on the official draft of the provisional constitution to be forwarded to the NCA. It was agreed that the NCA will convene on 12 July and should conclude its work by 20 July.

On 31 May and 1 June, Turkey hosted an international conference on Somalia in Istanbul attended by representatives from 57 countries and 11 regional organisations, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and regional administrations as well as civil society. The objective was to reaffirm international support for Somalia, ensure a smooth end of the transition and build consensus on a long-term approach for the post-transition period.

The communiqué, which focused on political, security and economic development issues, reiterated many of the key messages from the 23 February London conference with regard to the political process as well as support for AMISOM and strengthening Somali security and rule of law institutions. It also emphasised the importance of economic development and reconstruction and called for the early conclusion of negotiations to establish a joint financial management board. (The role of this new mechanism is to ensure transparency and accountability with regard to public funds. According to a World Bank report circulated at the conference, the TFG collected $164 million in revenue in 2009 and 2010 but only reported $33 million.)

AMISOM and Somali security forces continued to expand their control beyond Mogadishu. On 25 May they captured Afgoye (a strategic town situated approximately 30 kilometres from the capital that had been held by the Islamist rebel group Al Shabaab) and on 27 May secured control of the corridor linking it with Mogadishu, an area with one of the highest concentrations of internally displaced persons in the world.

On 2 June, the AU signed a long-awaited Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Kenya as a troop-contributor to AMISOM.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

**On 2 May the UN independent expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, Shamsul Bari, urged the Somali authorities and the international community to re-establish a legitimate justice system in Mogadishu and South Central Somalia.** Bari stressed that strengthening access to justice and the rule of law was crucial to protect and promote the fundamental rights of the Somali people. Expressing deep concern about the collapse of institutions for law enforcement and administration of justice, he noted that women, internally displaced persons and minorities suffered particularly from the lack of access to justice and due process. Bari pointed out that participants at the 23 February London Conference had underscored that human rights should be at the heart of the peace process and rebuilding of Somalia.

**Key Issues**

A key issue for the Council in July is the effectiveness of the sanctions regime for Somalia, including the recently established international trading ban on Somali charcoal and the impact of the expansion of the sanctions criteria to include recruitment and use of child soldiers and targeting of civilians.

A closely related issue is how to respond to the findings of the Monitoring Group and recommendations for follow-up Council action.

Another key issue is the renewal of the Monitoring Group’s mandate and whether any changes should be considered.

Another related issue is the fact that the Monitoring Group’s coordinator, Matt Bryden, was declared persona non grata by the TFG.

A separate key issue for the Council is how best to support the constitutional process and help ensure an orderly end to the transition by the 20 August deadline.

A further issue is the continued implementation of AMISOM’s new strategic concept endorsed by resolution 2036 and progress achieved so far.

**Options**

Main options for the Council include:

- renewing the mandate of the Monitoring Group and the humanitarian exemption for a further 12 months without any significant changes;
- renewing the mandate for 13 months (this was recently done in the cases of the sanctions regimes for Iran and DPRK in order to ensure that the inevitable delay between mandate adoption and appointment of experts would not unduly shorten the time available for the experts to do their work);
- in the Sanctions Committee, considering and possibly endorsing some or all of the recommendations of the Monitoring Group; and
- depending on developments, adopting a statement on the transitional process.

**Council Dynamics**

At press time, Council members had yet to receive the final report of the Monitoring Group or that of the Humanitarian Coordinator and had not started considering the Group’s mandate renewal. It was expected, however, that the mandate would be renewed without any major changes and that the humanitarian exemption would also be extended.

With regard to the political process, the focus seems to be very much on the end of the transition and on keeping up the pressure on the Somalis to finalise the constitutional process, and there has been little discussion of post-transitional issues. There are expectations, however, that the 2-3 July Contact Group meeting, which is viewed as important, will consider concrete proposals for the post-transitional period that can provide the basis for an international consensus.

On the security front, there seems to be some concern among Council members about the lack of transparency surrounding Kenya’s engagement in Somalia. While the understanding is that, following the signing of the MoU on 2 June, Kenyan troops are now under AMISOM command, it seems they are not yet fully integrated and the exact size and composition of the Kenyan contingent is still unclear.

The UK is the lead country on Somalia in the Council, while India chairs the Sanctions Committee and Russia has taken the lead on legal issues related to piracy.
Sudan and South Sudan

Expected Council Action

The Council will likely hold consultations twice during July on the situation between Sudan and South Sudan in accordance with resolution 2046. This resolution, adopted on 2 May, asks the Secretary-General to inform the Council at two-week intervals on the status of compliance by Sudan, South Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) with the resolution.

Navi Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, is also expected to brief the Council in consultations on Sudan and South Sudan in early July.

The Council further expects to hold consultations on, and renew the mandate of, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) prior to its expiration on 9 July.

Key Recent Developments

From 25 May to 7 June, Sudan and South Sudan returned to the negotiating table in Addis Ababa for the first time since they clashed militarily in late March and April. At the talks, both parties discussed the geographic parameters of the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone that the countries had agreed to establish along their mutual border. They also agreed to dispatch national monitors to a temporary base in Assosa, Ethiopia, in preparation for their deployment as part of the joint border verification and monitoring team.

The parties resumed the negotiations in Addis Ababa from 21 to 28 June, continuing their efforts to define the territory of the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone and establish the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism. It does not appear that much progress was made in the discussions, and the two parties agreed to reconvene in Addis on 5 July.

The Council maintained its intensive engagement on Sudan-South Sudan issues in June. On 14 June, Haile Menkerios, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan and South Sudan, and Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Edmond Mulet briefed Council members during consultations (Menkerios participated via videoconference). Council members were informed that no significant cross-border incursions appeared to have occurred in the prior two weeks.

Menkerios discussed the planning for the establishment of the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone and the Joint Border Monitoring and Verification Mechanism along the Sudan-South Sudan border. He told Council members that South Sudan had accepted the map that the AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), which is responsible for facilitating negotiations between the parties, had presented as a basis for negotiation on the geographic parameters of the zone, while Sudan is reluctant to accept the map. (While the AU map is meant to be used for the technical purpose of establishing border mechanisms, the parties appear to be concerned that it could prejudice negotiations on border demarcation, as several of the areas along the border are disputed.)

During the consultations, Mulet reportedly noted that there were roughly 100 to 130 lightly armed Sudanese police remaining in the Abyei region, guarding the Difra oil facilities. (While these “oil police” do not have much force capacity, their presence is nonetheless a violation of resolution 2046, which demands that all Sudanese and South Sudanese security forces withdraw from the area.)

On 18 June, Lt. General Tadesse Werede Tesfay (Ethiopia), the Force Commander of the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA), briefed Council members in consultations. He noted that regular UNISFA patrols enhanced the mission’s visibility. He also reportedly said that UNISFA had already sent 32 of 35 UN monitors to the temporary headquarters of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism in Assosa, but that Sudan and South Sudan had not yet fulfilled their commitment to dispatch their monitors there. Tesfay also added that once both parties deployed their monitors, the Mechanism could begin to function within two weeks, although it would not be fully operational for several months.

Council members issued a press statement (SC/10677) on Sudan and South Sudan on 18 June. They welcomed the resumption of
negotiations between both parties and noted the decrease in violence along the mutual border. The statement nonetheless expressed strong concern about the lack of progress by the parties in addressing the fundamental issues separating them and highlighted the importance of establishing border security mechanisms. In the statement, Council members furthermore reiterated their grave concern about the humanitarian situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states in Sudan.

Council members met in consultations on 28 June to discuss Sudan/South Sudan issues. Philippe Lazzarini, Deputy Director of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and Menkerios briefed during the consultations. Lazzarini reportedly said that over 200,000 refugees from Sudan were now in South Sudan and Ethiopia, having fled violence and food insecurity. Menkerios noted that while relations between Sudan and South Sudan remained fragile, there had not been significant violence between the countries in recent weeks. He noted that at a certain point during the recent talks in Addis (21-28 June) the parties began negotiating without the presence of AUHIP mediators in the room.

At press time, Sudan had been engulfed in protests for nearly two weeks. Initially focused on rising commodity prices, the protests started on 16 June at the University of Khartoum. They quickly spread throughout Khartoum and to other cities after President Omar al-Bashir announced an austerity plan on 18 June to bolster the faltering economy that includes eliminating fuel subsidies, increasing taxes, devaluing the currency and cutting government posts.

In June, South Sudan maintained its shutdown of oil production, which it initiated on 22 January after accusing Khartoum of confiscating $815 million worth of oil flowing through a pipeline that runs from South Sudan to Port Sudan on the Red Sea. The shutdown by South Sudan, which had received 98 percent of its income from oil revenue, has plunged the country into a severe economic crisis, with inflation rising quickly and rapidly depleting currency reserves. In a 7 May letter to the Sudan Tribune, Lillian Foo, Communications Officer for the World Bank in Africa, wrote that the Bank “is deeply concerned with the economic and development impact of the unresolved oil issues and how this will affect the people of both South Sudan and Sudan, particularly the most vulnerable.”

Corruption in South Sudan seems to have compounded the economic woes. In a 3 May letter to 75 former and current government officials, President Salva Kiir of South Sudan offered amnesty to officials for the return of funds amounting to $4 billion that have allegedly been stolen from the government. (Reuters has indicated that $4 billion could constitute approximately one-third of the total oil revenue the South received from the time of the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 to its independence on 9 July 2011.)

On 13 June, the government of South Sudan wrote a letter (S/2012/429) to the Council expressing its views on the renewal of the mandate of UNMISS. In it, it expressed that it had “taken responsibility for the safety and security of [its] citizens” since independence and therefore UNMISS should no longer be authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It further argued that the principle threats to its international peace and security related to military actions by Sudan and unresolved CPA issues.

South Sudan also affixed an evaluation of UNMISS that it had conducted, which it requested that the Council consider when renewing the mission’s mandate. The evaluation praised some areas of cooperation between UNMISS and South Sudan, including, inter alia, addressing inter-communal violence, promoting human rights, and making progress on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration issues.

However, there were several areas in which the evaluation questioned the role of UNMISS. It criticised the mission for its failure to protect civilians from aerial bombardments by Sudan and said that it had made a “negligible contribution” to economic development. In particular, it argued that UNMISS had failed in its efforts to build infrastructure, including roads, bridges, airfields and community centres. The evaluation further alleged that the mission had not coordinated adequately with relevant government organs about its activities and was not transparent about its hiring practices. As such, it requested a renegotiation of the Status of Forces Agreement of the mission.

Human Rights-Related Developments

In her opening address on 18 June to the Human Rights Council, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay noted that South Sudan faced many major challenges. Governance was weak and impunity from prosecution prevailed, particularly among the security forces. Persistent inter-communal violence had had a devastating impact, particularly as the capacity of the nation to overcome this phenomenon remained limited. Robust institutions were needed to overcome these critical gaps. Pillay was encouraged, however, by the government’s commitment to address human rights issues.

Key Issues

Regarding Sudan and South Sudan relations:

- An important issue is the need for the Council to maintain the pressure on the parties to adhere to the decisions in resolution 2046.
- A related issue is for the parties to establish the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism and the Safe Demilitarised Border Zone, given the clashes between Sudan and South Sudan in the border areas over the past several months.
- Another related issue is Sudan’s unwillingness to remove its remaining police from the Abyei region, a violation of resolution 2046, which states that all security forces should be withdrawn from the area.
- A further key and ongoing issue is how the Council can best support the AUHIP in its efforts to facilitate the negotiations between the parties on residual CPA issues such as oil wealth sharing, border demarcation and the final status of Abyei.
- An additional important and ongoing issue is the humanitarian crisis in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states in Sudan.

Among key issues relevant to the Council’s work in South Sudan are:

- whether and how the Council decides to address South Sudan’s suggestions from its assessment of UNMISS when renewing the mission’s mandate;
- how to most effectively address reports of human rights violations committed by South Sudanese troops during the disarmament campaign in Jonglei;
the status of the constitutional review process that South Sudan has been conducting for several months and how UNMISS can continue to support this process as effectively as possible; and
- how to help South Sudan meet the humanitarian challenges that have been exacerbated by refugees and returnees from Sudan during the past year.

**Options**

With respect to Sudan-South Sudan issues, options for the Council include:
- recommending that both parties refer their unresolved border demarcation issues to the International Court of Justice (or alternatively, the Permanent Court of Arbitration) in accordance with article 36 (3) of the UN Charter, which states that “legal disputes should as a general rule be referred to the International Court of Justice”;
- requesting that the chair of the AUHIP, Thabo Mbeki, brief the Council during one of the biweekly consultations, in order to get the AU’s perspective on the situation between Sudan and South Sudan; and
- holding an “Arria formula” meeting with human rights and humanitarian organisations as well as other well-informed actors about the situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

With respect to South Sudan, options for the Council include:
- renewing UNMISS under Chapter VII, with or without modifications to the mandate;
- considering a renewal of the mandate under Chapter VI; and
- using the Council’s Working Group on Peacekeeping as a forum for discussing how to address areas of concern that South Sudan has raised about UNMISS’s activities.

**Council Dynamics**

While encouraged that Sudan and South Sudan have returned to the negotiating table, Council members are nonetheless concerned that the parties have made little progress in implementing resolution 2046. Several members regret in particular the inability of the parties to take the necessary actions and make the fundamental decisions required to establish border-monitoring mechanisms. It also appears that there is widespread disappointment on the Council with Sudan’s decision to maintain “oil police” in the Abyei region, in violation of the resolution. Although the Council expresses its intention in resolution 2046 to consider Article 41 measures (e.g. sanctions) in case of non-compliance with the resolution, it appears clear that Council members would prefer to avoid this scenario.

There is also continuing alarm among several Council members about the ongoing humanitarian crisis in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. It seems that these members are keen to maintain the Council’s focus on this aspect of the situation, given reports of civilian malnutrition and suffering.

Regarding South Sudan, several members are interested in issues such as the progress of civilian disarmament in Jonglei, reported human rights violations related to the disarmament process and the constitutional review process. While sensitive to input from South Sudan as a host country, most Council members do not seem to have an appetite to provide UNMISS with a Chapter VI mandate, given the significant inter-communal violence in South Sudan over the last year.

The US is the lead country on Sudan-South Sudan issues and UNMISS.

**Key Recent Developments**

There were several recent reports of fighting between Sudanese Armed Forces and rebels. On 2 June, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) said that it had killed several troops during an assault on an army base in north-eastern Darfur.

On 9 June, the JEM announced that it had seized an area called Um Ajaja in eastern Darfur, capturing several militia members loyal to Khartoum and 20 army vehicles. Sudan denied the allegation that fighting had occurred, claiming instead that the JEM had merely stolen property from civilians in the area.

On 15 June, rebels apparently linked to the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) attacked Abu-Ajora, a town southwest of Nyala in South Darfur, and seized five vehicles from an American Refugee Council facility. Two civilians reportedly died while the rebels confiscated supplies from a local market.

Fighting was also reported on 16 June between the army and the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), an alliance of rebel groups, in northern Darfur between El Fasher and Nyala. The army said that it had initiated the attack against the SRF, which had apparently been obstructing the passage of goods in the area.

On 18 June, President Omar al-Bashir declared austerity measures in Sudan that include eliminating fuel subsidies, increasing taxes, devaluing the currency and cutting government posts. The measures are meant to bolster the deteriorating economy, which has been hard hit since South Sudan gained independence in July 2011 and left Sudan with approximately 75 percent less in oil reserves. Several days of protests ensued in Khartoum and other cities in Sudan following the announcement, which were ongoing at press time.

**Security Council Report**

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The Council was last briefed on UNAMID on 26 April by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous. He highlighted the need for Sudan to provide financial support for the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA), an entity established in February 2012 to help implement provisions of the Doha Document for Peace related to human rights, justice, reconciliation and development. Ladsous noted in particular that the DRA Chair, El-Tigani Sessi, warned in an address to the Sudanese parliament on 23 April that without requisite funding the peace process could collapse.

Ladsous also said that the potential for a resumption of negotiations between the government and rebel movements that have not signed the Doha document did not look favourable. He explained that the JEM and the SLA-MM have indicated a desire to discuss only national economic and political reforms, while the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) has said that it will only negotiate when the government deals with the underlying sources of the conflict. (Khartoum has said that it is only willing to discuss the situation in Darfur, and in this respect, only particular elements of the Doha document related to security arrangements and political appointments.)

Ladsous further outlined the findings of the conflict assessment and review of UNAMID uniformed personnel that the UN conducted in February in collaboration with the AU in accordance with resolution 2003. According to the Secretary-General’s report (S/2012/231), the review found that while there had been an overall reduction of fighting between rebel groups and the government since UNAMID was established in 2008, conflict nonetheless continued, especially in central Darfur. The report also noted that “criminality has emerged as the most significant threat to civilians and humanitarian workers” because of a lack of governmental, judicial and policing capacity and the challenging political environment in the region.

As the review found that the mission could reduce inefficiencies and overlapping responsibilities among personnel, the Secretary-General expressed his intention “to proceed with downward adjustments in UNAMID consisting of approximately 4,200 military elements, 280 formed police unit elements and 1,460 individual police officers, and a reconfiguration of the remaining elements as appropriate.” He further recommended that the Council reduce the authorised strength of the different types of mission personnel correspondingly.

Ladsous noted in his 26 April briefing to the Council that, according to the review, a large number of UNAMID infantry could be moved from the Chadian and Libyan borders to the relatively populous central belt of Darfur. (According to Ladsous, the basis for this finding is that Sudan’s relations with Chad and Libya have improved, as has security along its border with these countries.)

On 21 June, the Sudan Sanctions Committee met in consultations. It seems that much of the discussion focused on the fact that the members of its Panel of Experts (PoE), appointed in April, had yet to receive visas to enter Sudan and conduct their investigations. (At press time, it appeared that Khartoum had approved the visa requests, and the panel planned to submit an interim report to the Committee by the end of July.) The release of this report had been expected in June, but the Committee requested an extension given the fact that the PoE has not been able to enter Darfur to conduct its investigations. The 2011 final report of the PoE, submitted to the Council in early 2012 in accordance with resolution 1982, has also not been publicly released, as some Council members believe that it contains inaccuracies.

On 5 June, Luis Moreno-Ocampo delivered his final briefing to the Council as Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC). He said that the failure of the government of Sudan to apprehend and surrender four ICC indictees—al-Bashir, Ahmed al-Harun, Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein and Ali Kushayb—directly challenges the authority of the Council. Ocampo suggested that the Council consider as an option asking member states and regional organisations to conduct operations to arrest these individuals.

On 15 June, Fatou Bensouda (Gambia) was sworn in as Prosecutor of the ICC. In a speech on 13 June, she said that the Court’s focus was on “individual criminal behaviour against innocent victims”, alluding in particular to al-Bashir, al-Harun, Joseph Kony and Bosco Ntaganda. In Khartoum, on 12 June, the Special Prosecutor of Darfur Crimes, Ahmed Abdel Motalib, submitted his resignation to al-Bashir for undisclosed reasons. Motalib was the third person to hold the post since October 2010. A new prosecutor, Yassir Ahmed Mohamed, was appointed on 19 June. (The government established the Special Prosecutor position in 2010 to investigate alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur; however, Sudanese officials have benefited from immunity, which makes the work of the prosecutor problematic.)

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

The UN independent expert on the situation of human rights in Sudan, Mashood Adebayo Baderin, conducted his first mission there from 10-14 June to identify areas of technical assistance and capacity-building that could help the country fulfill its human-rights obligations. Baderin recognised the initial measures taken by Sudan, such as the establishment of the National Commission for Human Rights, but highlighted the need for further steps to be taken, including in the area of protecting freedom of expression and the press. Noting the need for capacity-building in human rights training for judges, justice officials and the police, the expert also identified the need for the government to include the promotion of human rights among its priority funding considerations. Baderin will present his findings and recommendations to the September session of the Human Rights Council.

**Key Issues**

A key issue is whether to renew UNAMID’s mandate with a reconfigured and streamlined force structure in accordance with the Secretary-General’s recommendation. If the Council were to take this step, a related issue would be how well the mission would be able to carry out its mandate with this adjusted force structure.

An ongoing issue is the fact that key rebel movements in Darfur—including JEM, SLA-MM and SLA-AW—continue to fight the Sudanese government and refuse to participate in the peace process in Darfur.

Another important and recurring issue is the lack of timeliness by the government of...
Sudan in granting visas to UN personnel. In the context of Darfur, this is reflected by the delay that the current PoE has experienced in receiving its visas.

Options
The most likely option for the Council is to renew the mandate of UNAMID for an additional year at the reduced force level recommended by the Secretary-General.

Other options for the Council include:
- reducing the force level in an incremental fashion given the recent clashes between Sudan and rebel groups;
- reducing the force level and calling for a review of UNAMID’s reconfiguration at a future date to ensure that the streamlined mission is achieving maximum operational effectiveness;
- emphasising the need for progress in implementing the Doha Document for Peace;
- reiterating calls on rebel groups to accede to the Doha Document and threatening sanctions in case of non-compliance;
- demanding progress by the government in issuing visas more expeditiously; and
- expressing eagerness to consider the assessment called for by paragraph 21 of resolution 2033 adopted on 12 January, which requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the AU, to “conduct a comprehensive analysis of lessons learned from practical cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union, in particular with regard to” UNAMID and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). (At press time, the analysis had yet to be undertaken.)

The Council’s ad-hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa might also provide a useful forum for discussing strategies to foster negotiations between Sudan and the rebel groups in Darfur.

Council Dynamics
There is widespread support for reconfiguring and reducing the size of UNAMID. Several Council members believe that, especially in an era of financial austerity, UNAMID should be able to fulfil its mandate with a smaller force level through enhanced operational efficiency. However, although several members believe that the security situation in Darfur has improved in recent years, there are concerns among some members about the recent fighting between the government and rebel groups, especially at a time when the Council is likely to reduce the force level of UNAMID.

While Council members support the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, there is ongoing concern that key rebel movements have not acceded to the peace process. Some members are also particularly worried that the government of Sudan has yet to fund the DRA, a point raised by the UK and Morocco during Moreno Ocampo’s briefing on 5 June.

There are sharp differences of perspective on the Council regarding the ICC’s role in Sudan. These were clearly reflected during the 5 June briefing. Several members—Colombia, France, Germany, Guatemala, Portugal, Togo, the UK and the US—criticised Sudan, often in strong terms, for its lack of cooperation with the ICC. A number of these countries also spoke in complementary terms of the ICC’s efforts in Sudan.

Other members are more wary of the ICC’s work in the country. Pakistan and South Africa emphasised at the briefing that the pursuit of justice should not interfere with the search for peace, while India indicated that the Court should be guided by “objectivity, not politicisation.”

The UK is the lead country on Darfur.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/2033 (12 January 2012) focused on UN-AU cooperation.
- S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.

Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2012/231 (17 April 2012) was the most recent quarterly report of the Secretary-General on UNAMID.
- S/2011/252 (15 April 2011) was on implementation of the Darfur Political Process.
On 7 June, Annan briefed Council members saying that the violence was worse than before the 12 April deadline for the cessation of violence, the government of Syria was primarily responsible for not implementing the six-point plan, UNSMIS had been deliberately targeted and there needed to be consequences for non-compliance with the six-point plan.

Prior to this briefing, Council members held an interactive dialogue with Arab League Secretary-General Nabil al-Araby on the League’s 2 June resolution urging the Security Council to take measures to ensure the protection of civilians in Syria. (Syria was a focus of the Council’s 25 June open debate on the protection of civilians.)

Incidents affecting UNSMIS continued in June. Media reports indicate that as many as 78 people were killed in Mazarat al-Qubeir near Hama on 6 June by government forces and pro-government militias (Shabihah). When UNSMIS reached the site on 8 June, the village was empty, with evidence of shelling, burned homes and tank tracks; there were local reports that most of the bodies had been removed. (UNSMIS was shot at and obstructed from reaching the site on its 7 June attempt.) On 11 June, Annan expressed concern about the use of mortars, helicopters and tanks in el-Haffa near Lattakia. UNSMIS reached the town on 14 June, reporting that it appeared deserted with many government buildings burnt and a strong stench of dead bodies. (UNSMIS was also shot at and obstructed from reaching the town on its 12 June attempt.)

On 16 June UNSMIS head, Major General Robert Mood, decided to suspend mission activities due to the continued deliberate targeting of the mission and related security concerns. (Media reports at the time indicated the government’s use of attack helicopters and opposition fighters in possession of anti-tank capabilities.) Mood briefed Council members on 19 June on developments and the suspension.

On 22 June, Annan said it was time for countries with influence to raise the level of pressure on the parties and that planning was underway for an Action Group meeting on Syria in Geneva on 30 June. (The idea for the Action Group originated as a proposal for a “contact group” during the 7 June UNSMIS consultations.)

Annan’s deputy, Nasser al-Kidwa, briefed Council members on 26 June on the planning for the Action Group meeting. During the same consultations, DPKO head Hervé Ladsous said the violence prevented UNSMIS from resuming its activities. (At press time, there were reports of explosions in Damascus on 28 June as well as clashes and shelling earlier in the week near where the elite Republican Guard is located. Government shelling of Homs has been severe in June despite appeals by UNSMIS and ICRC for a pause to evacuate civilians.)

On 27 June Annan announced the Action Group would meet in Geneva at ministerial-level on 30 June to discuss ways to implement the six-point plan—in particular a Syrian-led political transition. (It seems this proposal calls for an interim, unity government that does not specify President Bashar al-Assad’s resignation but rather stipulates such a government could not include figures who jeopardise stability.) Besides the P5, invited participants include Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar in their relevant Arab League capacities; the Secretaries-General of the Arab League and the UN; the EU; and Turkey. (Iran and Saudi Arabia weren’t invited.)

Regarding the Syrian opposition, Abdel Basset Sayda, a Kurd, was elected to lead the Syrian National Council (SNC) on 10 June after Burhan Ghalioun resigned on 23 May due to criticism that the SNC was not inclusive enough. Sayda has called on Assad to leave office and urged defections from the Syrian government.

Media reports indicate several high-level defections by Syrian military officers, including an air force colonel who flew his jet to Jordan on 21 June and a general, two colonels, two majors, and thirty soldiers who defected to Turkey on 24 June.

Various Syrian opposition groups, including the SNC, met in Brussels on 24-25 June to work on a common platform for a democratic transition in Syria that could bridge rifts over views on military intervention, dialogue with the Assad regime and Islamic political parties.

The next Friends of Syria meeting is slated for 6 July in Paris. (The Friends of Syria Working Group on Sanctions met on 6 June in Washington, D.C.)

On 26 June NATO condemned Syria’s shooting down of a Turkish F-4 Phantom jet on 22 June. In a 24 June letter to the Council, Turkey said it considered the attack a hostile act by Syria and reported that the unarmed jet had been shot down in international airspace without warning after it had strayed into Syrian airspace.

On 26 June, Assad swore in a new cabinet saying that Syria now faced a real situation of war. The cabinet was formed by Prime Minister Riyad Hijab—appointed on 6 June—with the heads of the defence, interior and foreign ministries remaining the same. The SNC dismissed the new government as illegitimate.

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Human Rights-Related Developments

In a 1 June special session on Syria, the Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted a resolution tasking its Commission of Inquiry on Syria to conduct a special inquiry into May’s el-Houleh attacks and invited the Special Envoy to brief the HRC during its current session (A/HRC/RES/ S-19/1). Annan’s deputy, Jean-Marie-Guéhenno, briefed the HRC on 27 June.

On 27 June, the Commission’s head, Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, updated the HRC after returning from his first visit to Damascus between 23-25 June. (The Commission’s final report is expected in September.) He said the human rights situation in Syria had deteriorated rapidly noting a shift to increasingly militarised fighting. Regarding the el-Houleh attacks, the Commission considered that forces loyal to the government may have been responsible for many of the deaths. In its conclusions, the Commission considered that government forces and the Shabiha have perpetrated unlawful killings, arbitrary arrest and detention, and torture including sexual violence against women, children and men. The Commission also detailed violations by anti-government forces including extra-judicial execution and torture of government forces and/or their alleged supporters, abductions of civilians and government forces and the use of children as porters, messengers and cooks exposing them to risk. (The Secretary-General’s recent report on Children and Armed Conflict also listed Syria as a perpetrator of grave violations against children.)
**Key Issues**
The key issue for the Council is the broken commitment by the Syrian government to withdraw troops and heavy weapons from population centres. The opposition’s more sophisticated tactics, including in its offensive posture, have become a complicating factor over the past month. Additionally, the 4 June declaration by the Free Syrian Army that it was no longer committed to the cessation of violence is another complicating factor.

A related issue is the militarisation of the crisis with implications that the situation is evolving toward a full-scale civil war.

Another issue is whether the opposition will be sufficiently galvanised to hold talks with the Syrian government in the event that the political dialogue gets underway. (On 28 June the SNC said that if Annan’s proposal for an interim government is not explicit that Assad must step down then they would find it unacceptable.)

UNSMIS-related issues that will need to be addressed if the mission is to be renewed in its current capacity include:
- safety and freedom of movement and access for UN personnel;
- the lack of a finalised status of mission agreement; and
- the lack of independent air support.

**Underlying Problems**
Shelling and the use of heavy weapons by the government continue while opposition armed groups appear more capable both in terms of organisation and weaponry. Media reports indicate Russia is attempting to send refurbished attack helicopters to Syria under an existing contract. The US is providing logistics and communications assistance to the opposition. Media reports indicate the US—while not providing arms to the opposition—might be providing intelligence assistance in vetting which anti-government fighters receive weapons.

Increasing tension between Turkey and Syria over the downed jet, Turkish military build-up on the border and issues around the Syrian wing of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which is outlawed in Turkey, and the spill-over effects of the Syrian situation to Lebanon and beyond, all have the potential to negatively impact regional security.

**Options**
The Secretary-General’s UNSMIS recommendations might include:
- withdrawal of the mission;
- reducing the mission to a small political office with liaison tasks and limited verification and reporting capacity;
- maintaining the mission with its current mandate and observer levels; or
- enhancing the mission by including more military and civilian observers.

It seems the most likely option—in the absence of a political breakthrough and if the level of violence persists—would be to retain a small political mission. A further option, if such a reduction occurs, is to maintain a provision for the redeployment of military observers in the event that there is again a conducive environment.

It appears highly unlikely that the Secretary-General will include force protection in his recommendations. DPKO’s view is that unarmed monitors more transparently convey the message that UNSMIS is there to liaise, observe and report and does not have a mandate to use force.

An option for the Council to encourage implementation of the six-point plan could be a Chapter VII resolution with a credible threat of targeted sanctions (travel bans and assets freeze) and perhaps even arms embargo, given the increasingly militarised nature of the conflict. Such a resolution could set out timelines for progress on the six-point plan with sanctions if benchmarks are not met.

Alternatively, given the severity and the duration of the crisis, a more robust Chapter VII option for the Council could be a resolution imposing sanctions with a timeline for the removal of such measures directly linked to progress on the six-point plan.

If the Action Group meeting is productive, the Council has the option to endorse the outcome and perhaps enforce implementation through the calibrated pressure mentioned above in a Chapter VII resolution imposing sanctions or the threat of sanctions.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**
Council members are unanimous in their concern about the devastating level of violence, which has already significantly undermined UNSMIS’s ability to operate and be an effective calming presence on the ground (as well as its own safety). Several Council members think that if the crisis continues to deteriorate and the mission is unable to resume its activities then UNSMIS should not be extended in its current configuration.

Council members see signs of increasing frustration from Annan at the lack of progress and note that he has taken a more critical posture vis-à-vis the Syrian government and its commitments and responsibilities. There is a sense that Annan may be close to ending his mediation efforts if there is not a meaningful outcome on 30 June.

It seems Council members are aware that a more concerted approach by the Council, particularly the P5, and the international community is needed if mediation efforts are to succeed and to avoid a full-scale civil war.

However, the strain among the P5 is palpable. Fundamental differences remain over how a Syrian political transition can come about. While Russia has publicly said that it is not insisting Assad stay in power, it does not want any Council involvement in regime change. This dynamic seemed to be in play vis-à-vis Annan’s proposed plan for a unity government. (Some Council members were under the impression that Russia had accepted this plan as a basis for an outcome from the Action Group meeting. However, it seems Russia still has several concerns in that regard.) These issues are expected to come up during the meeting between US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, on 29 June in St. Petersburg on the eve of the Action Group meeting.

It seems some Council members have heightened expectations for an Action Group outcome, especially as there was no breakthrough during the 18 June meeting between US President Barack Obama and Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the G20. On the other hand, several Council members are concerned that the deadlock in the Council has led to a process-oriented approach towards the crisis instead of a
substantive response (a dynamic that the Action Group may simply reinforce). They are uneasy that the Council might soon be in the position of having to react to a catastrophe they all saw on the horizon versus having a proactive and effective response now.

Council members are aware that a Chapter VII resolution is a possible next step. Russia and China are still opposed to such measures. However, given the increasing levels of violence and the suspension of UNSMIS activities, it seems a significant majority of Council members might be more comfortable with a Chapter VII approach than was the case a month ago.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolution
• S/RES/2043 (21 April 2012) established UNSMIS.

Secretary-General’s Reports
• S/2012/363 (25 May 2012) was the first UNSMIS report.
• S/2012/376 (22 May 2012) was on protection of civilians and noted Syria as an issue of concern.
• S/2012/261 (26 April 2012) was on children and armed conflict and listed Syria as a perpetrator of grave violations against children.

Security Council Letters
• S/2012/394 (4 June 2012) contained the 2 June Arab League resolution urging the Security Council to protect civilians in Syria.

Israel/Palestine

Expected Council Action
In late July the Security Council will hold its quarterly open debate on the Middle East with a likely focus on the fragile situation on the ground, which could be exacerbated by regional developments and the failure to revive in any meaningful way the Israel/Palestine peace process.

At press time, it was unclear whether newly appointed Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman or Special Coordinator Robert Serry would brief the Council prior to the open debate.

It was also expected that High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay would brief the Council on the Occupied Palestinian Territories in early July.

Key Recent Developments
When Serry last briefed the Council on 29 May, he said that a continuously stalled peace process and continued Israeli settlement activity would move the situation towards a one-state reality. (On 14 May, the EU criticised Israeli settlement policy, saying that it posed a threat to the two-state solution.)

On 19 June, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Oscar Fernández Tananco briefed the Council. He reported on several developments that posed a challenge to creating any positive environment for peace talks including: announcements of new Israeli settlement construction, increased clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians, hunger strikes by Palestinian prisoners held by Israel and significant exchanges of fire between Israel and Gaza in late June along with serious security incidents on the Egyptian-Israeli border.

Fernández Tananco also noted that the closure of Gaza was entering its sixth year. On 13 June, OCHA head Valerie Amos said the blockade of Gaza affects 1.6 million Palestinians, with 80 percent of families there dependent on humanitarian aid. Restrictions on the movement of goods and people amount to collective punishment in contravention of international law. (On 14 June, a similar statement was jointly released by fifty UN agencies and NGOs.)

Regarding the peace process, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas sent a letter to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on 15 April, outlining the Palestinian Authority’s position on renewing direct talks based on 1967 borders and ceasing all settlement activity and warning that the two-state solution might not be possible if the status-quo continues. Netanyahu responded on 12 May, calling for a return to talks without preconditions.

Envoys of the Quartet—comprising the EU, Russia, the UN and the US—met on 15 June in Brussels, following up the 11 April meeting in Washington, D.C. The Quartet’s 11 April statement noted increasing fragility on the ground and welcomed plans for dialogue between the parties.

On 20 June, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton held separate meetings with chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat and Israeli Vice-Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz in Washington, D.C. Erekat asked the US to exert pressure on Israel to stop settlement expansion and release Palestinian prisoners in order to resume negotiations. Mofaz said Israel would resume negotiations without preconditions and suggested the need for an interim agreement on security and borders. (On 30 May, Israeli Minister of Defense Ehud Barak indicated Israel might find it necessary to unilaterally impose an interim agreement.)

Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Israel on 25 June and the Occupied Palestinian Territories on 26 June where he said that unilateral actions (in reference to settlements and the stalled peace process) are not constructive. Abbas asked Putin to consider convening an international conference in Moscow on the peace process—an idea originally proposed by Russia in December 2008 in resolution 1850.

At press time, it seemed possible that Abbas might meet with Mofaz on 1 July in Ramallah.

Despite the recent activity around the peace process and several high-level meetings, there has been little progress towards meeting the timeline set out by the Quartet on 23 September 2011 for an agreement by the end of 2012. (Jordan hosted a series of exploratory talks in January. The most recent direct talks started in September 2010 and quickly ended that same month over the issue of settlements. Previous direct talks were terminated in late 2008 after the outbreak of the Gaza war.)

Analysts are of the opinion that both parties have focused on strengthening their domestic constituencies and there is unlikely to be any substantive progress on direct talks before the US presidential election in November. On 8 May, Netanyahu formed a new coalition government with Mofaz’s Kadima party, giving him 94 out of 120 votes in parliament. On 16 May, Abbas formed a new cabinet followed by an agreement on 20 May between Fatah and Hamas to prepare for elections and a unity government.

On 3 April the ICC prosecutor’s office said that it was unable to proceed with an investigation of the 2008-2009 Gaza war as it did not have the authority to determine if Pales-
Options regarding the February invitation from the Palestinian Observer Mission for the Council to undertake a visiting mission to the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including East Jerusalem, seem limited. It seems that both an official visiting mission by the Security Council and the back-up option for permanent representatives to visit in their national capacity seem highly unlikely.

**Council Dynamics**

The US has an established position that the Council is not the appropriate body for establishing parameters regarding the Israel/Palestine peace process. This position is likely to remain particularly rigid in the near term due to domestic political concerns in the run-up to the November presidential election.

Few, if any, Council members would disagree that the fundamentals of any agreement must be reached through direct talks. However, most consider that this does not necessarily rule out a Council role in the peace process. Nevertheless, the Council is unlikely to take any action to breathe life into the peace process despite reports from the Secretariat that the situation on the ground is unsustainable and undermines the possibility of a two-state solution.

Council members are aware of the fragile situation but have found it difficult to forge a role for the Security Council that might positively impact the peace process. Currently, the Council is at a standstill on Israeli/Palestine because an overwhelming amount of political energy is being consumed by the Syrian crisis, with little left over to confront the particularly rigid US position on this issue.

**UN Documents**

**Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1860 (8 January 2009) called for an immediate ceasefire leading to the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and the sustained reopening of Gaza’s crossing points.
- S/RES/1850 (16 December 2008) supported the Annapolis peace process and its commitment to the irreversibility of bilateral negotiations.
- S/RES/1515 (19 November 2003) stated the necessity for a two-state solution and unanimously endorsed the Quartet’s Road Map.
Security incidents in the south seem to have been minor compared to previous reporting periods. On 23 April an explosion in Tyre injured seven people. (Similar incidents occurred in Tyre on 16 November and 28 December 2011. Media reports indicate the incident occurred after a prominent anti-Syrian Sunni cleric was shot and killed at an army checkpoint in northern Lebanon.

On 20 June the UNIFIL force commander briefed (S/PV.6789) the Council as part of a larger meeting on UN peacekeeping operations. He said that UNIFIL is an effective tool to maintain the cessation of violence but that it cannot tackle the larger political issue of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah and that it is vital to take advantage of the relative calm UNIFIL’s presence has created to establish a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution of the conflict.

The upcoming report may also update Council members on the 12 March findings from DPKO’s strategic review of UNIFIL which identified three priorities:

- enhancing coordination between UNIFIL, the UN country team and the Special Coordinator’s office;
- increasing the involvement of Lebanese security institutions in implementing resolution 1701 in the south; and
- increasing the capacity of the Lebanese Armed Forces to attain sustained security control in the south.

Regarding the spill-over effects of the Syrian crisis in Lebanon and allegations of arms smuggling, Terje Rod-Larsen, Special Envoy for implementation of resolution 1559, reported to Council members during his 8 May briefing that the Secretary-General had raised the issue of cross-border arms transfers and the need for improved border control with Beirut during a visit in January. On 13 June, Plumbly said that the UN is concerned that Lebanon not become a conduit for the flow of weapons to Syria. The upcoming 1701 report is likely to note two incidents of concern:

- on 28 April the Lebanese navy seized weapons from a ship, allegedly bound for rebel groups in Syria (apparently UNIFIL had the ship during a regular exercise with the Lebanese navy); and
- on 8 May Lebanese customs authorities in Tripoli found ammunition aboard a container ship.

On 20 May a street battle in Beirut between pro- and anti-Syrian Sunni groups left two people dead and 18 injured. Media reports indicate the incident occurred after a prominent anti-Syrian Sunni cleric was shot and killed at an army checkpoint in northern Lebanon.

Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Oscar Fernández Taranco on 19 June reported (S/PV.6788) that the situation in the north remained fragile, citing a 1 June outbreak of violence between Sunni and Alawite neighbourhoods in Tripoli. He also reported on Syrian incursions in northern Lebanon that resulted in two deaths. There had also been several incidents of abductions of Lebanese citizens who had been taken across the border to Syria; most had been released.

Regarding the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the trial chamber held sessions in June to hear arguments challenging the establishment and jurisdiction of the Tribunal. A decision is expected by the end of July. (Similar motions against other tribunals established under a Chapter VII resolution have all been rejected in the past.) The trial in absentia of those accused in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others is not anticipated until late 2012 at the earliest.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is how to encourage Israel and Lebanon to move from the status quo — cessation of hostilities — toward a ceasefire. But the current regional political climate makes the likelihood of near-term progress on this issue remote.

Other issues include recurring Israeli overflights and its occupation of Ghajar in violation of resolution 1701 and the fact that Hezbollah maintains significant military capacity in violation of resolutions 1559 and 1701.

Options

The Council’s most likely option is to take no action, as has been the practice since April 2008, when the Council last issued a presidential statement on resolution 1701. However, Council members will likely begin preliminary discussions on UNIFIL’s forthcoming renewal during the July consultations.

Council Dynamics

Council members agree that UNIFIL is an important stabilising factor between Israel and Lebanon—especially in light of the current developments in Syria. However, achieving a permanent ceasefire seems remote and Council members realise that continued quiet in southern Lebanon may at present be the only achievable goal.

Most Council members agree that arms smuggling and disarmament remain key concerns but seem to accept that progress is only likely in the nexus of the recently revived inter-Lebanese dialogue and improvement on the Israel-Syria track, which seems indefinitely postponed given the current Syrian crisis.

Council members underscore the importance of the Tribunal’s independence and do not foresee any Council role in its activities.

France is the lead country on Lebanon in the Council.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1757 (30 May 2007) established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to investigate the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others.
- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel.

Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2012/244 (20 April 2012) was the latest report on resolution 1559.
- S/2012/124 (28 February 2012) was the latest report on resolution 1701.

Security Council Letters

- S/2012/151 (12 March 2012) was the strategic review of UNIFIL requested in resolution 2004.
Other Relevant Facts

Special Coordinator for Lebanon
Derek Plumbly (UK)

Special Envoy for the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559
Terje Rod-Larsen (Norway)

UNHCR figures for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon as of 27 June 2012
24,024 Syrian refugees registered by the UN in Lebanon with an additional 5,250 pending registration.

UNIFIL Force Commander
Maj. Gen. Paolo Serra (Italy)

Size and Composition of UNIFIL as of 31 May 2012
Authorised: 15,000 troops
Current: 11,845 military personnel

Troop Contributors: Armenia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, El Salvador, France, FYR of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Timor-Leste and Turkey

Duration
March 1978 to present; mandate expires 31 August 2012

Cost
1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012: $545.47 million (A/C.5/66/14)

Iraq

Expected Council Action

The Council is due to receive the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and a briefing on its contents and developments in the country from Martin Kobler, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNAMI.

The Council seems likely to extend the mandate of UNAMI, which expires on 28 July.

The Council also expects the second report of the Secretary-General on the post-Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) mechanism. At press time it was unclear whether the Council would consider the report in July.

Key Recent Developments

A number of notable political developments continued to highlight divisions amongst Iraq’s political elite. On 30 April, the Higher Judicial Council (HJC) brought further charges against Vice-President Tariq al-Hashemi in the killing of six judges. On 8 May, Interpol issued a Red Notice alert for the arrest of al-Hashemi, who was in Istanbul at the time. (An Interpol Red Notice seeks the arrest or provisional arrest of wanted persons with a view to extradition.)

On 11 May, Turkish President Abdullah Gül said in response to a press question that al-Hashemi was receiving medical treatment in Turkey. On 15 May, a trial in absentia commenced, with al-Hashemi continuing to deny the allegedly politically motivated charges against him.

On 13 April, Faraj al-Haidari, head of the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), was detained on suspicion of misusing state funds, according to a statement released by the HJC. Commenting on the arrest, Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr said in a 14 April press statement that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki was “seeking to postpone or cancel the election.” (Al-Maliki has been repeatedly accused of seeking to consolidate control over the IHEC, whose independence is viewed as essential in ensuring that the provincial elections early next year and parliamentary elections in 2014 are free and fair.)

On 28 April, senior Iraqi politicians met in Arbil, including President Jalal Talabani; Speaker of Parliament Osama al-Nujaifi; Massud Barzani, President of the autonomous Kurdish region; Iyad Allawi, head of the Sunni-backed Iraqiya bloc; and al-Sadr. In a statement, the leaders called for “mechanisms that can solve the instability” and highlighted “the necessity of looking into solutions to end the (political) crisis.”

On 2 June, Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlak said in a statement that “Maliki staying on as prime minister will expose national unity to danger and will lead to the division of the country.”

Kobler encouraged all parties to engage in inclusive dialogue following a meeting with Talabani and Barzani on 13 June.

Violent incidents continued to mar Iraq’s security. Reports that up to 132 Iraqis died and a further 248 were wounded were attacks in May. Moreover, by 18 June, a series of bombings and attacks across Iraq had reportedly resulted in at least 135 deaths and more than 500 injured.

On the issue of Camp Ashraf, in an 11 June UNAMI statement, Kobler “urged the remaining residents of Camp Ashraf to relocate to Camp Hurriya without delay.” (Camp Ashraf, situated in Diyala province, once housed more than 3,000 Iranian exiles belonging to the Mujahedin-e Khalq Iran [MEK], an organisation opposed to the government in Tehran and also on the US terrorist list. Some two-thirds of the residents moved to the new camp after UNAMI signed a memorandum of understanding with the government of Iraq on 25 December 2011. However, the MEK has reportedly halted its transfer of the remaining residents and has reduced contact with the Iraqi government and the UN.)

Gennady Tarasov, the High-Level Coordinator for Iraq-Kuwait missing persons and property, briefed Council members in consultations on the latest report of the Secretary-General (S/2012/443) on 19 June. Council members released a press statement (SC/10680) the next day stating they were “encouraged by the recent positive developments in Iraqi-Kuwaiti bilateral relations.” Council members also supported the Secretary-General’s opinion that both sides should begin exploring other arrangements on Iraq-Kuwait issues. The financing of the high-level coordinator was renewed for another six months.

Human Rights-Related Developments

According to a joint report published on 30 May by the Human Rights Office of UNAMI and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “the human rights situation in Iraq remains fragile as the country continues its transition from years of dictatorship, conflict
Commenting on the report, Kobler added that it “highlights a number of shortcomings, some of which are of serious concern and need to be urgently addressed by the Iraqi authorities. There is no democracy without respect for human rights.”

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is to determine UNAMI’s contribution towards the stability of Iraq.

Another key issue for the Council is the ongoing high level of sectarian violence in the aftermath of the arrest warrant issued for al-Hashemi.

A closely related issue is the extent to which UNAMI can be helpful in mitigating this situation.

A further issue for the Council is whether the post-DFI mechanism is functioning in a satisfactory fashion.

Underlying Problems
Different political blocs remain divided over power-sharing, with key ministerial posts, such as defence and interior, being vacant for months.

Options
On UNAMI, the Council could renew the mandate without substantial changes to its scope or composition. The Council could also address Iraq’s political situation in the same resolution, including some or all of the following elements:
- expressing concern about the impact of violence on Iraqi civilians;
- urging Iraq’s political leaders to resolve differences through political dialogue; and
- urging Iraq to finalise the formation of its government by filling all vacant ministerial posts based on inclusiveness.

On the post-DFI issues the Council could take no action at present while continuing to monitor the progress of the post-DFI mechanism until the audit is conducted. (The Secretary-General’s report [S/2011/795] notes the appointment of the firm Ernst & Young to conduct the 2011 audit of the DFI and its successor account.)

Council and Wider Dynamics
Most Council members continue to view Iraq as a routine issue. Some Council members feel that the current mandate of UNAMI is peripheral and that, as a political mission, it should be more focused on mitigating Iraq’s domestic political impasse and the ensuing violence. These members feel that there remains a serious threat to Iraq’s overall stability under the current volatile political and security climate. However, other members do not view the surge in violence following the US withdrawal as particularly abnormal.

The US is the lead country on Iraq issues in general, and the UK is the lead on Iraq-Kuwait issues.

The Secretary-General’s report [S/2012/782] (13 September 2012) urged Iraq to finalise the formation of its government by 30 September and to proceed from oil sales would continue to be deposited into a compensation fund after that date.

Letters
- S/2012/309 (9 May 2012) was from Iraq’s Ambassador Hamid al-Bayati to the President of the Council, noting the handover of some of the missing Kuwaiti belongings.

Kuwait Issues
- S/2012/332 (4 May 2012) was from the President of the Governing Council of the UN Compensation Commission to the President of the Council.

Security Council Resolution
- S/RES/1958 (15 December 2010) terminated the Oil-for-Food programme and established an escrow account.
- S/RES/1957 (15 December 2010) terminated the weapons of mass destruction-related Chapter VII measures and urged Iraq to ratify the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA as soon as possible.
- S/RES/1956 (15 December 2010) extended the DFI and related immunities a final time until 30 June 2011 and affirmed that five percent of Iraqi proceeds from oil sales would continue to be deposited into a compensation fund after that date.

Security Council Press Statements
- SC/10680 (20 June 2012) renewed the funding for the high-level coordinator for Iraq-Kuwait missing persons and property.
- SC/10490 (15 December 2011) renewed the funding for the high-level coordinator for Iraq-Kuwait missing persons and property.
- SC/10307 (30 June 2011) welcomed the Iraqi government’s assumption of autonomy over the DFI.

Security Council Meeting Record
- S/PV.6747 (10 April 2012) was Kobler’s briefing to the Council.

Security Council Meeting Record
- S/PV.6747 (10 April 2012) was Kobler’s briefing to the Council.

Other Relevant Facts
- Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Iraq and head of UNAMI
  - Martin Kobler (Germany)
- Secretary-General’s High-Level Coordinator for Iraq-Kuwait Missing Persons and Property
  - Gennady Tarasov (Russia)

Yemen
Expected Council Action
In July, the Council is expecting a briefing in consultations on the situation in Yemen by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser, Jamal Benomar.

No Council action is expected at this point.

Key Recent Developments
On 29 May, Benomar briefed the Council followed by closed consultations. Benomar presented an alarming picture highlighting interference from former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and relatives, to reforms undertaken by President Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi, as a key obstacle that could “derail Yemen’s fragile transition process.” Benomar also noted that the security and humanitarian situation remain sources of major concern.

On 12 June, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2051, expressing its “readiness to consider further measures,
including under Article 41” should actions to undermine the government of National Unity and the political transition continue. (Under Article 41 of the UN Charter the Security Council “may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.”) The resolution also “stresses that all those responsible for human rights violations and abuses must be held accountable.”

Furthermore, the resolution focused on the second phase of the transition process and called for:

- an all-inclusive National Dialogue Conference;
- the restructuring of the security and armed forces;
- transitional justice and national reconciliation; and
- constitutional and electoral reform.

On 18 June, the Secretary-General notified the Security Council of his intention to establish a small office, consisting of five staff members, of the Special Adviser on Yemen for an initial period of 12 months. The letter also noted that the Special Adviser will head the office at the level of Assistant Secretary-General.

There were a number of other key domestic and international political developments. On 23 May, the Friends of Yemen met at ministerial level in Riyadh and agreed to take concrete steps to assist the country through its political, economic and security reform process before the next ministerial meeting on the margins of the General Assembly in late September. (Saudi Arabia, the UK and Yemen jointly chair the Friends of Yemen, which includes key Gulf countries, the G8 and intergovernmental organisations.)

During informal comments to the media following the adoption of resolution 2051, Tawakul Karman, the Yemeni 2011 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, said that the new resolution “sends a clear message to those people who deny or who are trying to damage the transitional period in Yemen that they will face the international community.”

On 31 May, the National Dialogue Communication Committee, in charge of talks with various factions in Yemen, stated through the official Saba news agency that “the Houthis have agreed to take part in a serious dialogue...to resolve the country’s problems and achieve the objectives of the popular revolution.” (The Houthis, Shia Muslims living in the remote northwest, have historically been discriminated against by the central government. In 2004, the Houthis launched a rebellion against the government and tensions have remained high despite a ceasefire in 2012. The Houthis had previously refused to take part in the national dialogue, a crucial element of the transition process.)

The overall security situation continues to be worrisome. On 21 May, some 96 soldiers died and many more were injured by a uniformed suicide bomber in the midst of a military parade rehearsal in Sana’a, the day before Yemen was to commemorate its National Unity Day. Council members immediately condemned the attack in a press statement (SC/10656).

On 6 May Fahd al-Quso, the leader of Al-Qaida in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), was killed in a U.S. drone strike in the southern Shabwa province. (Al-Quso was under a U.S. indictment for his role in the 2000 bombing of the American navy destroyer USS Cole in the harbour of Aden, in which 17 American sailors were killed and 39 injured.)

Ongoing clashes that started in early May between pro-government forces and an Al-Qaida-affiliated group called Ansar al-Sharia (Partisans of Islamic Law) in the southern Abyan province, had reportedly led to more than 600 deaths and several wounded by mid-June.

On 18 June, Maj. Gen. Salim Ali Qath, head of the southern command, was killed when a suicide bomber blew himself up in front of his vehicle in Aden.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is to determine what further role it can play in assisting Yemen to foster a peaceful political transition that abides by the timetables of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative and the accompanying Implementation Mechanism.

A related issue for the Council is dealing with the continuously precarious security, human rights and humanitarian situation in Yemen, which could undermine the new government’s position and the prospects for the political transition process.

Options

The Council’s options include:

- keeping abreast of the developments in Yemen and receiving regular briefings from Benomar and the Department of Political Affairs;
- visiting Yemen to send a strong signal about its support for the peaceful and successful transition (a less likely option); and
- requesting briefings regarding the human rights situation and humanitarian crisis from the relevant UN actors as well as international and regional organisations.

Council Dynamics

The apparent unity of the Council on Yemen, particularly within the context of its current discussions on Syria, is notable. It would appear that most Council members are concerned about the deteriorating security, human rights and humanitarian picture in Yemen. They consider that the recent increase in terrorist activity further underlines the urgency of political, military and security reforms. In addition, some members emphasise the need to distinguish between Al-Qaida-related violence and the more traditional inter-tribal clashes.

Some P5 members were wary of the reference to Article 41 in resolution 2051 and its implicit threat of sanctions against Saleh and his relatives. However, they set their concerns aside and adopted the resolution unanimously as most Council members seem to agree that they pose a serious threat and have the capacity to potentially derail the current phase of transition. As a result, Council members were able to send a strong signal to any spoilers.

The UK has the lead in the Council on Yemen.
Latest Meeting Records

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29 March 2012</td>
<td>• S/PRST/2012/8</td>
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<tr>
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Letters

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<tr>
<td>21 June 2012</td>
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Security Council Presidential Statement

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<td>• S/RES/2014 endorsement of the GCC initiative for a peaceful transition of power.</td>
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<td>• S/PRST/2012/8 (29 March 2012) noted Council members’ concern over the deterioration in the situation since the transfer of power to President Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi on 25 February.</td>
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Security Council Press Statements

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<tr>
<td>21 May 2012</td>
<td>• SC/10656 (21 May 2012) condemned the suicide attack that killed 96 soldiers in Sana’a on 21 May.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>• SC/10571 (7 March 2012) condemned the terrorist attacks that occurred in Abyan province.</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 February 2012</td>
<td>• SC/10553 (22 February 2012) noted the significance of presidential elections and encouraged further transitional steps to be taken promptly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 November 2011</td>
<td>• SC/10460 (28 November 2011) welcomed the signing of the GCC initiative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 June 2011</td>
<td>• SC/10296 (24 June 2011) expressed grave concern at the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation.</td>
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Expected Council Action

In July, Ian Martin, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), is expected to brief the Council on the latest developments in Libya, including the elections for a Constituent Assembly now scheduled for 7 July. In addition, it is expected that High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay will brief on the human rights situation in early July.

UNSMIL’s mandate expires on 16 March 2013.

Key Recent Developments

On 10 May, the Council received a briefing from Martin in which he said that the high expectations for quick progress were straining the political system. He also highlighted continuing cases of mistreatment and torture and raised concern about thousands of prisoners remaining in conflict related detention, including some at secret detention facilities and not under the control of the Ministry of Justice. At the same meeting, Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral (Portugal)—as chair of the Libya Sanctions Committee—provided a regular update on the Committee’s work, including a working document assessing the regional threats posed by the proliferation of arms from Libya and a final report by the Panel of Experts.

The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno-Ocampo, briefed the Council on 16 May on the ICC’s recent activities, particularly those concerning Saif al-Islam Qaddafi. The prosecutor also briefed on gender-related crimes and allegations of crimes committed by NATO forces as well as by forces under the auspices of the National Transitional Council (NTC).

A four-person ICC-appointed defence team has been detained in Zintan following their visit to Qaddafi on 7 June. (Defence counsel Melinda Taylor has been accused of clandestinely passing Qaddafi a coded letter from a fugitive former aide, Mohammed Ismail.)

Members of the Security Council issued a press statement (SC/10674) on 15 June, expressing serious concern over the detention of ICC staff members and emphasising Libya’s legal obligation under resolution 1970 “to cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the ICC”.

On 22 June, Libyan Attorney General Abdelaziz al-Hassadi met with the ICC President, Judge Sang-Hyun Song, at The Hague. An ICC statement issued after the meeting said the Court would investigate allegations of wrongdoing by its staff in Libya.

There were several notable political, constitutional and electoral developments. On 29 April, NTC Chairperson Mustafa Abdul Jalil stated that the NTC had decided to keep the interim government in place to guarantee the success of the forthcoming elections. Earlier, on 25 April, Prime Minister Abdurrahim El-Keib had accused members of the NTC of hindering the interim government’s efforts to hold elections for the Constituent Assembly on time. The elections, originally planned to be held on 19 June, were on 10 June postponed to 7 July.

On 2 May, the NTC adopted several new laws, including a law granting immunity to former rebels, saying “there is no punishment for acts made necessary by the February 17 revolution.” Another law, according to which “praising or glorifying Muammar Qaddafi, his regime, his ideas or his sons” was punishable by a prison sentence, was also passed on 2 May but revoked on 14 June by the Supreme Court.

A number of security-related incidents continued to highlight various challenges. On 8 May, a group of armed ex-rebels stormed government headquarters in Tripoli, protesting the non-payment of cash stipends to former rebels. At least one person was reported killed and four people wounded.

Tripoli’s international airport was occupied for several hours on 4 June by members of the Al-Awfeea Brigade protesting the reported detention of their commander by security forces in Tripoli. The militia agreed to surrender the airport after a promise from Jalil that their missing commander would be found.

Libya

Jamal Benomar (Morocco)
On 9 and 10 June, clashes between members of the Tabu tribe and the Libya Shield Brigade, a pro-government force, reportedly resulted in 23 deaths and more than 50 wounded. Also, on 10 June, Ras Jdir, the main border crossing between Libya and Tunisia, was closed after fighting between Libyan armed forces and former rebels over control of the frontier.

In a statement on 17 June, Martin expressed his concerns about the recent resumption of fighting in a number of Libyan localities, in which children, women and other unarmed civilians have been among those killed, injured and displaced.

On 20 June, Nasser al-Manaa, an interim government spokesman, said that the casuaty toll following clashes in Sheguiga and Zintan was 105 dead and more than 500 wounded. (The fighting between the Mashashia tribe and militia from the Gontran tribe and Zintan erupted on 11 June.)

Targeted killings of prominent figures have continued. On 21 June, Judge Jumah Hasan al-Jazwi, who was investigating the murder of Gen. Abdel Fattah Younes, was shot dead in Benghazi. Younes, who defected from the late Col. Muammar Qaddafi regime shortly after the start of the 17 February revolution to become the military chief of the NTC, was killed on 28 July 2011 in Benghazi.

There have also been several recent incidents with international implications. On 21 May, the ICRC office in Benghazi was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade. The ICRC office in Misrata was also attacked on 12 June, wounding one bystander. On 5 June, the premises of the US diplomatic mission in Benghazi were targeted with a home-made bomb. On 12 June, a convoy carrying British Ambassador Dominic Asquith was attacked with a rocket-propelled grenade, slightly injuring two close protection officers.

On 24 June, Tunisia extradited former Libyan Prime Minister Al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi to Tripoli, a decision that Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki considered "illegal" as it was taken without his consent. (After the fall of Tripoli, al-Mahmoudi fled to Tunisia, where he was arrested on 21 September 2011 for illegal entry.)

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 14 May, NATO said in a statement that it “did everything possible to minimise risks to civilians, but in a complex military campaign, that risk can never be zero.” (The statement was in response to a Human Rights Watch report released on the same day that claimed NATO had failed to acknowledge at least 72 civilian casualties from the air strikes during its 2011 Libya campaign.)

On 21 May, the Human Rights Council’s Working Group on the use of mercenaries postponed its visit to Libya scheduled for 21-25 May, “due to technical reasons.” This would have been the group’s first visit to assess allegations of the use of mercenaries in the recent conflict and measures taken by the government to address this phenomenon. The visit aimed to obtain first-hand information on activities of private companies offering military assistance, consultancy and security services in Libya and the potential impact of these activities on human rights. “The new dates of the visit will be announced to the media as soon as possible”, according to the Working Group’s website.

Key Issues

Ensuring that the forthcoming elections are free and fair and held in a timely manner is a key issue for the Council.

An overarching issue for the Council continues to be the determination of UNSMIL’s long-term role in Libya, in particular, following the elections next month.

The Council’s role helping to secure the release of the ICC staff and the implementation of resolution 1970 with regard to its referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC, and any referral-related trials is another important issue.

Preventing large-scale reprisals and killings in a post-conflict Libya as well as preventing human rights violations and reported torture of detainees are closely related issues for the Council.

The prevention of proliferation of heavy weaponry in Libya as well as the spillover effect in the Sahel region is an ongoing issue for Council members.

Underlying Issues

The divisions within Libya’s political and military elite have become a growing concern.

Instances of settling old disputes between anti and pro-Qaddafi forces, often accompanied by human rights violations continue to pose serious challenges.

Options

An option for the Council could be to encourage, through a presidential statement, the forthcoming government to be formed by the Constituent Assembly following the 7 July elections, to recommit to the long-term state-building, and re-emphasise the mandate of UNSMIL.

Another option for the Council could be to wait for the formation of the new government and then reconsider UNSMIL’s long-term role in September, consistent with resolution 2040.

Regarding human rights, rule of law and transitional justice in Libya, the Council could ask for regular briefings from UNSMIL and other relevant UN actors on issue specific developments.

With regard to the ICC, the Council could ask for a briefing from the ICC prosecutor to receive an update.

Council Dynamics

Some Council members seem to acknowledge that the Libyans face considerable challenges but seek to advance the discussion on Libya beyond issues related to resolutions 1970 and 1973 and focus on next steps, including the 7 July election of the Constituent Assembly and the adoption of a new constitution. However, some Council members are reluctant to highlight various challenges that Libyan authorities have struggled with since the toppling of the Qaddafi regime.

Council members seem to be in agreement that the forthcoming elections would be another significant milestone in the new Libya. They are also mindful that any changes to UNSMIL’s mandate would have...
to take into account the new makeup of Libyan political and military institutions.

Some Council members are particularly alarmed by the detention of the ICC staff members. To them, it is a clear violation of Libya’s commitment under international law. However, other members are hopeful for a quick resolution of this matter.

The UK is the lead country on Libya.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions
• S/RES/2040 (12 March 2012) extended the mandate of UNSMIL and the Panel of Experts by 12 months, with a requirement to review and adjust the mandate within six months.
• S/RES/1973 (17 March 2011) authorised all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya and enforce the arms embargo, imposed a no-fly zone, strengthened the sanctions regime and established a panel of experts.
• S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011) referred the situation in Libya to the ICC, imposed an arms embargo and targeted sanctions and established a sanctions committee.

Security Council Press Statement
• SC/10674 (15 June 2012) expressed concern at the detention of the ICC staff members.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report
• S/2012/129 (1 March 2012)
• S/2012/163 (17 February 2012)

Meeting Records
• S/PV.6772 (16 May 2012) was Moreno-Ocampo’s briefing to the Council.
• S/PV.6768 (10 May 2012) was Martin and Cabral’s briefing to the Council.

Other
• S/2012/471 (20 June 2012) was from the Permanent Representative of Libya to the Secretary-General and the Council President conveying information regarding the arrest of the delegation of the ICC.
• S/2012/440 (13 June 2012) was Secretary-General’s letter conveying the President of the ICC’s letter to the Council President.

• S/2012/178 (23 March 2012) was the working document of the Sanctions Committee assessing the regional threats posed by the proliferation of arms.

Other Relevant Facts

Chair of the Sanctions Committee
José Filipe Moraes Cabral (Portugal)

Sanctions Committee’s Panel of Experts
• Simon Dilloway, UK (finance)
• Theodore M. Murphy, US (humanitarian and regional)
• Giovanna Perri, Italy (finance)
• Salim Raad, Lebanon (heavy weapons)
• Savannah de Tessières, France (small arms and light weapons)

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNSMIL
Ian Martin (UK)

UNOWA (West Africa)

Expected Council Action
In July the Council expects to consider the semi-annual report of the Secretary-General on the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), including an update on the Gulf of Guinea piracy problem. Said Djinnit, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of UNOWA, will brief.

No Council action is envisaged at press time.

UNOWA’s mandate expires on 31 December 2013.

Key Recent Developments
Several West African issues have been on Council members’ minds in recent weeks, both prior and following their trip to the region from 19-23 May.

Since 22 March, when soldiers in Mali abandoned their faltering campaigns against Tuareg rebels in the north of the country and seized power, Mali has been the focus of intense diplomatic activity involving ECOWAS, the AU and the UN. On 11 May, Djinnit briefed Council members on the situation in Mali and Guinea-Bissau, where soldiers had also seized power on 12 April, aborting an electoral process. Djinnit expressed concern at the resurgence of coups in the region and the impact this would have on international peace and security. (Djinnit previously briefed the Council on 16 January. At the time, he mentioned the growing insecurity in the Sahel region of West Africa, in particular Mali, Mauritania and Niger, due to the influx of arms from Libya.)

On 6 April, a framework agreement brokered by ECOWAS resulted in the military junta in Mali agreeing to give up power in return for an amnesty and the lifting of sanctions imposed by the West African regional body. The junta also agreed to a timetable for a return to constitutional rule and elections. The Speaker of Parliament, Dioncounda Traoré, was made the new interim President, ruling with a transitional government (which includes the junta) until elections within a year. Meanwhile, the Tuareg rebels captured the three northern regions of Mali (Gao, Kidal, Timbuktu) and, reports say, have since imposed a regime of terror in the areas. The humanitarian and human rights situation has worsened in those areas, and it is reported that a third of the people there have fled.

During their trip, on 21 May, Council members held a high-level meeting with ECOWAS in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. The participants included ECOWAS Commission Chair Kadré Désiré Ouedraogo, as well the Foreign Ministers of Côte d’Ivoire (current chair of ECOWAS), Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Senegal. Benin also attended as the current chair of the AU. On 15 June in New York an informal interactive meeting on Mali, requested by Togo, was held between Council members and representatives of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and ECOWAS. The Foreign Minister of Burkina Faso, Djibril Yipènè Bassolé, who is leading ECOWAS’ mediation efforts on Mali, provided an update on his efforts and requested a mandate from the Council for the planned ECOWAS military deployment in Mali. The Council agreed on dispatching a joint UN-AU-ECOWAS team that would also have representatives from the EU, Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger, to assess the feasibility of deploying an intervention force in Mali.

On 18 June, the Council issued a press statement (SC/10676) declaring its readiness to consider backing a military
intervention in Mali as proposed by ECOWAS “once additional information has been provided regarding the objectives, means and modalities of the envisaged deployment and other possible measures.”

Earlier, on 13 June, the Secretary-General transmitted a letter (S/2012/439) dated 1 June from President Boni Yayi of Benin, who writing in his capacity as chairperson of the AU, raised the issue of the “very worrying” developments relating to Mali and the wider Sahel. The collapse of the army in Mali, the letter said, and “the removal of all state structures [have] created the conditions for Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), along with various organised crime networks, to control the entire North (over 800,000 square km).” The rebel groups, National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar Eddine, are merely fronts for AQIM, the letter asserted, with the intention to make the Sahel a sanctuary and training base “for all Salafist and Islamist groups of the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa and the global jihadist movement.” In addition, the letter said, there is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region and “a phenomenon that is no less dangerous, transnational organised crime, in particular drugs and narcotics.” The letter notes that an average of 100 tons of cocaine, or 40 percent of Europe’s consumption, transit each year through the Sahel.

The letter requested the adoption of a Security Council resolution mandating an “inter-African” force that would rapidly intervene in Mali “for the purpose of ridding this part of Africa of the peril of terrorism”. The resolution should also call for UN support for the force with “logistics, aircraft and other materiel” that would allow it to restore governance and security in Mali. In the absence of this, the country would become “a West African Afghanistan”. (On 12 June, the AU PSC, meeting in New York, issued a communiqué calling on the Security Council “as a matter of urgency” to “endorse the envisaged deployment of an ECOWAS force [in Mali] and to lend its full support to the efforts being exerted to this end.”)

On piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, the Council on 21 February issued a presidential statement (S/PRST/2012/2) expressing concern about “the serious threats to international peace and stability in different regions of the world, in particular in West Africa and the Sahel Region, posed by transnational organised crime, including illicit weapons and drug trafficking, piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as terrorism and its increasing links, in some cases, with transnational organised crime and drug trafficking.” The statement followed a high-level debate on the impact of transnational organised crime on peace and security in West Africa and the wider Sahel region. The Secretary-General’s latest report on the UN Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) (S/2012/421) reports that the UN initiated a meeting in Libreville, Gabon, from 29-31 May on the issue. At the meeting, a steering committee was set up to “lead preparations for a summit of heads of state and government on maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea.” The committee’s “first priority will be to convene a meeting of experts from the Gulf of Guinea countries and interested partners to develop the first draft of the regional strategy.”

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 18 June, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay noted that since the military coup in Mali, the security and human rights situation has significantly deteriorated in the region. Human rights abuses and the disruption of basic services in the north of Mali have led to massive displacement towards the south and neighbouring countries, exacerbating the severe humanitarian crisis in Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania and Niger. The level of insecurity and other difficulties severely hampered efforts to gain access to affected populations to address the humanitarian and human rights situation.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is determining the appropriateness and feasibility of an inter-African troop deployment and what level of support the Council may give to the force.

A related issue is to fashion a policy to coordinate international response to the apparent resurgence of coups in West Africa and the growing threat of terrorism in the region.
a further three years, from 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2013.

**Latest Secretary General’s Reports**

- S/2012/421 (11 June 2012)

**Press Statement**

- SC/10676 (18 June 2012) was on Council’s readiness to back military in Mali once additional information provided by ECOWAS.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General**

Said Djinnit (Algeria)

**UNOWA: Size and Composition of Mission**

Staff strength (as of 31 May 2010): 19 international civilians, 17 local civilians and three military advisers.

**UNOWA: Duration**

Mandate expires on 31 December 2013

### Côte d’Ivoire

#### Expected Council Action

In July the Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) before it expires on 31 July. Albert Gerard Koenders, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Côte d’Ivoire and head of UNOCI, will likely brief the Council on developments and the Secretary-General’s most recent report (S/2012/186). Hervé Ladsous, head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), is also expected to brief the Council, followed by consultations.

#### Key Recent Developments

Seven UN peacekeepers from Niger were killed in Côte d’Ivoire on 8 June. The peacekeepers were apparently attacked by unknown militia fighters in the southwest of Côte d’Ivoire, near the border with Liberia. Eleven others, including local security personnel, were also killed. A few hours after news of the attack reached New York, the Council issued a press statement (SC/10668), introduced by France, condemning it “in the strongest terms.” The statement expressed concern about the “prevailing insecurity in western Côte d’Ivoire and the border area and continued cross-border movements of armed elements, including militias and mercenaries.” On 11 June, Ladsous briefed the Council on the killings.

The attack happened two days after Togo—responding to a request by Côte d’Ivoire—arrested and deported a former Defence Minister, Moïse Lida Kouassi, who served under former Côte d’Ivoire President Laurent Gbagbo. Kouassi is currently detained in Côte d’Ivoire and is the first senior ally of Gbagbo to be captured almost a year after the government of President Alassane Ouattara issued an arrest warrant for 24 allies of Gbagbo.

Four days after the attack on the peacekeepers, Côte d’Ivoire announced that it had foiled a coup attempt by officers loyal to Gbagbo. The government also blamed the killings on a pro-Gbagbo network reportedly operating in neighbouring Ghana and alleged that this network was funding mercenaries in Liberia operating next to the Ivorian border.

The activities of mercenaries in this border area were highlighted in the 18 November 2011 report by the Panel of Experts on Liberia (S/2011/757), which the Council discussed on 9 December 2011. A substantial part of that report dealt with the impact of the return of an estimated 4,500 Liberian mercenaries whom Gbagbo had hired and deployed. The report noted that many of these mercenaries are now engaged in illicit gold mining and can be easily mobilised.

Additionally, the mid-term report of the Group of Experts (GoE) on Côte d’Ivoire (S/2011/642), which was submitted on 17 October 2011, reported that after the serious nation-wide violence following the 2010 presidential elections, “thousands of weapons still remain unaccounted for” and these weapons “pose a threat to the stabilisation of the country.” The report cited the views of government interlocutors that the threat is particularly significant in the west of the country, bordering Liberia. (The 16 March final report of the GoE (S/2012/196), reiterated concerns about the need for the Ivorian authorities to effectively address disarmament and related issues.)

Some reports suggest that Thomas Yaya Nimely, a former Liberian Foreign Minister and chairman of the defunct Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)—which was funded by Gbagbo in 2003 in the last rounds of the civil war in Liberia—may be the key link between the pro-Gbagbo network in Ghana and the restive mercenaries in the border area. (Gbagbo had accused then Liberian President, Charles Taylor, of supporting anti-government rebels in Côte d’Ivoire, and he retaliated by supporting the anti-Taylor MODEL.)

On 7 June, after reports about the increasing threats posed by these militias, Liberia announced in a statement that it had taken “numerous initiatives” to “mitigate and eliminate the threats of insecurity to both countries (Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire) posed by the presence of non-state actors along the vast border areas”. It then announced a wanted list of ten ex-leaders of MODEL, including Amos Cheyee, Isaac Sayou Chegbo and Charles Blé Goudé.

Violence in which scores of people were killed had been ongoing for several months. In early February DPKO sent an assessment mission to Côte d’Ivoire to look at various contentious issues, including security relating to overall stability in the country. The mission’s report (S/2012/186), submitted to the Council on 29 March, expressed unease about the whereabouts of thousands of Liberian mercenaries who had served in Côte d’Ivoire and about weapons caches that are believed to be in the border areas between Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia. It noted that despite the “political will expressed at the highest levels in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, so far no national strategy has been developed in either country to address, in a more comprehensive manner, border security and the issue of Ivorian and Liberian former combatants.”

The report, however, did not anticipate the scale of the insecurity, in particular the targeting of UN troops and, apparently, the threat to the Ivorian government. It noted only that “incidents by various perpetrators continued to take place throughout the country, highlighting the vulnerability of civilians.”

Council members visited the Côte d’Ivoire-Liberia border on 22 May during their mission to West Africa. Briefing the Council on the visit on 31 May, Deputy Permanent Representative Martin Briers (France), noted that the field visit to western Côte d’Ivoire was “a turning point” in the trip. He
said the Council “was able to take stock of the new threats to peace and security that justify the enhanced UNOCI presence in that part of the country and strengthened means to protect civilians, including through inter-mission cooperation with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).” He also said that people on the ground expressed to members of the delegation “their serious concerns about the movement of weapons, attacks by combatants based in Liberia, the insecurity caused by the traditional Dozo hunters, problems with the Ivorian security forces, the humanitarian challenges to returns and the confusion surrounding land ownership.”

On 11 June, the Secretary-General transmitted a 25 May letter (S/2012/430) from the Prime Minister of Côte d’Ivoire, Jeannot Kouadio-Ahoussou, requesting the extension of the mandate of UNOCI in all its aspects beyond 31 July, so as to ensure the successful conduct of local elections, which are expected to take place during the last quarter of this year.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 13 June, Doudou Diène, the UN independent expert on the human rights situation in Côte d’Ivoire, urged all Ivoirians and the international community to maintain their commitment to national reconciliation in the aftermath of the attack that killed seven UN peacekeepers. Earlier this year, Diène had reported to the UN Human Rights Council that most human rights violations in the country resulted from the difficulty of reforming the security sector and re-establishing governmental authority over the entire territory. Following this latest incident, Diène exhorted the authorities in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia to work together to prevent cross-border attacks as well as to conduct investigations to identify, arrest and prosecute those responsible.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is containing the emerging security threats in the western region of the country and ensuring that the perpetrators of the attacks on UN peacekeepers are identified and held responsible.

A related issue is further developing the inter-mission cooperation between UNOCI and UNMIL to ensure that the border regions between the two countries are pacified.

Options

Options include:

- adopting a resolution extending the mandate of UNOCI and underscoring the importance of the inter-mission cooperation between it and UNMIL;
- and renewing the mandate of UNMIL in advance of its 30 September expiry to ensure more robust action against the mercenaries in the border region and facilitate better coordination between the two missions.

Council Dynamics

Following the visit to West Africa from 19-23 May, there is consensus among Council members on the need to pacify the western region of Côte d’Ivoire and particularly on the need to maintain inter-mission cooperation between UNOCI and UNMIL for that purpose.

France is the lead country in the Council on Côte d’Ivoire.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/2008 (16 September 2011) extended the mandate of UNMIL until 30 September 2012 and called on UNOCI and UNMIL to coordinate strategies and operations in the Liberia-Côte d’Ivoire border regions.
- S/RES/2000 (27 July 2011) renewed the mandate of UNOCI at its current force levels (including the earlier ad-hoc increases) until 31 July 2012.
- S/RES/1992 (29 June 2011) extended the temporary redeployment of helicopters from UNMIL to UNOCI until 30 September.
- S/RES/1967 (19 January 2011) authorised the redeployment of aviation assets from UNMIL to UNOCI.

Latest Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2012/186 (29 March 2012) was a special report by the Secretary-General on UNOCI.
- S/RES/1992 (29 June 2011) extended the sanctions regime and the mandate of UNOCI.

Selected Letters

- S/2011/387 (24 June 2011) was the 28th progress report of the Secretary-General on UNOCI.

Options

- S/2012/430 (26 July 2011) and S/2011/468 (28 July 2011) was an exchange of letters containing the Secretary-General’s intention to appoint Albert Gerard Koenders as Special Representative for Côte d’Ivoire and head of UNOCI.
- S/2011/419 (7 July 2011) appointed four individuals to the Group of Experts for the Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee.
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- S/2011/419 (7 July 2011) appointed four individuals to the Group of Experts for the Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee.

Other Relevant Facts

- S/PV.6777 (31 May 2012) was the briefing on the Council’s visit to West Africa from 18 to 24 May.

Other

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission

Albert Gerard Koenders (Netherlands)

UNOCI Force Commander

Maj. Gen. Muhammad Iqbal Asy (Pakistan)

UNOCI: Size, Composition, Cost and Duration

Strength (as of 31 May 2012): 10,933 total uniformed personnel including, 9,400 troops, 196 military observers, 1,337 police personnel
Guinea-Bissau

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council is expecting a briefing by Joseph Mutaboba, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) on the latest developments and the Secretary-General’s report on Guinea-Bissau (S/2012/280). A press statement is the expected outcome.

The mandate of UNIOGBIS expires on 28 February 2013.

Key Recent Developments
On 13 June, the Council announced the appointment of Ambassador Mohammed Loulichki (Morocco) as chair of the new Guinea-Bissau Sanctions Committee, which was established by resolution 2048, adopted on 18 May. The Committee briefed the Council on 26 June.

The adoption of resolution 2048 followed intense diplomatic activity since the military seized power in Guinea-Bissau on 12 April. Calling themselves the Military Command, the participants in the coup aborted preparations for run-off presidential elections slated for 22 April. Resolution 2048 imposed a foreign travel ban on the leaders of the Military Command and tasked the sanctions committee to monitor the implementation of the travel ban. It authorised the Committee to review “on a case-by-case basis” requests for the ban to be suspended or lifted if “an exemption would further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau and stability in the region.”

On 23 May, five days after the adoption of the resolution, the Military Command announced that it had set up a transitional civilian government headed by Prime Minister Rui Duarte Barros and including two army officers to steer the country toward elections within a year under a deal brokered by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Shortly after this, ECOWAS deployed 600 troops in Guinea-Bissau, allowing the Angolan Military Mission in Guinea-Bissau (MISSANG), which was established on 21 March 2011 to assist with Guinea-Bissau’s security sector reform (SSR) programme, to withdraw without incident.

The leaders of the Military Command had cited the presence of MISSANG in the country as a prime cause of the coup. Resolution 2030 of 21 December 2011, which renewed UNIOGBIS’s mandate, while not mentioning MISSANG, nevertheless welcomed the ECOWAS-Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) partnership to support the SSR and called on Guinea-Bissau, ECOWAS and CPLP “to fulfil their commitments.” The resolution called on Guinea-Bissau to “complete the adoption of the basic legislation and framework related to the reform of the defence and security sectors including the pension fund.”

Serious problems began, however, after President Malam Bacai Sanhá took ill and was hospitalised in Paris. On 26 December 2011, while Sanhá was convalescing in the hospital, the army attempted a coup, which was foiled by MISSANG. The relationship between MISSANG and the army completely broke down as a result, with the latter accusing MISSANG of acting as the personal guard of Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior, while Angola was targeted for allegedly agreeing to a secret pact with the government to take over the defence apparatuses of Guinea-Bissau.

President Sanhá died on 9 January 2012. On 18 March, presidential elections were held to find his successor. Gomes Júnior, who ran as head of the ruling Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), failed to win outright victory, and a run-off was scheduled for 22 April. The opposition candidate, Kumba Yala, who came in second (23 percent) and was scheduled to face Gomes Júnior (49 percent) in the run-off, announced that he would boycott the polls, claiming that the ruling party had rigged the election. The polls were accompanied by the assassination of the former head of military intelligence, Col. Samba Djalo, who was killed by uniformed men shortly after the polls closed.

On 2 April, ECOWAS appointed President Alpha Condé of Guinea to mediate the electoral dispute in Guinea-Bissau. On 5 April, Kadré Désiré Ouedraogo, President of the ECOWAS Commission, wrote a letter to the UN Secretary-General drawing attention to “disturbing developments that could jeopardise the holding” of the run-off elections on 22 April. As a result of serious controversies arising from the first-round of the presidential election, Ouedraogo undertook a joint high-level ECOWAS-AU-UN fact-finding mission to Guinea-Bissau on 31 March. In his letter, Ouedraogo mentioned the tension between MISSANG and the Guinea-Bissau military.

On 10 April, Angola announced it was withdrawing MISSANG. Two days later, and just ten days before the second round of the presidential elections, the military mounted a successful coup.

The 12 April coup triggered intense diplomatic efforts to restore constitutionality. The Council of Ministers of the CPLP held an emergency session on 14 April in Lisbon and adopted a resolution that was transmitted to the CPLP on 16 April. The resolution called for a UN-mandated “interposition” force in Guinea-Bissau.

The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) meeting on Guinea-Bissau on 17 April decided to initiate consultations with ECOWAS, the CPLP, the UN and other partners on the possible deployment of an international stabilisation operation. It also suspended Guinea-Bissau as a member state of the AU until the effective restoration of constitutional order. On 24 April, the PSC issued a report noting that events in Guinea-Bissau constituted “a serious setback for the democratic process initiated since the 1990s, while also highlighting the need to further enhance the deterrence potential of the instruments adopted by the AU on unconstitutional changes of government.”

On 19 April, the Council discussed Guinea-Bissau with briefings by three Foreign Ministers: Mamadú Salú Jaló Pires of Guinea-Bissau (who was out of the country on 12 April); Georges Chikoti of Angola (in his capacity as chair of the CPLP); and Paulo Portas of Portugal. Côte d’Ivoire, which chairs ECOWAS, delivered a statement on behalf of the regional body, while
Mutaboba briefed via video-conference on the latest developments.

While visiting West Africa on 21 May, Council members held a high-level meeting on Guinea-Bissau with ECOWAS in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire under the framework of the PSC-UN partnership. Guinea-Bissau was also discussed during the annual meeting between the PSC and members of the Security Council, held in New York on 13 June.

The transitional government that the Military Command announced on 23 May does not include any members of the PAIGC, which won 67 out of 100 parliamentary seats in the March elections, and was expected to win the presidential run-off. The government on 23 June released Rear Admiral José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto, who had been arrested in connection to the coup attempt on 26 December, along with five other officers associated with that plot.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

On 25 May, Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, expressed concern about reports of human rights violations, including violent repression of a peaceful demonstration, looting and arbitrary detention of civilians, in Guinea-Bissau since the 12 April coup. She urged the authorities to withdraw a list reportedly circulated by the Military Command containing the names of 57 people forbidden to leave the country until further notice.

**Key Issues**

The key issue for the Council remains restoration of constitutional order and the prevention of further military incursions in politics.

Other issues include combating the stranglehold of drug-trafficking and organised-crime networks on the military and political elite, as well as undertaking a comprehensive SSR process.

**Options**

Options for the Council include:
- issuing a presidential or press statement calling for clear steps towards constitutionality by the transitional government; or
- taking no action at this moment.

**Council Dynamics**

There remains unanimous agreement about the need for restoring the constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau, but Council members appear divided over approach. Togo, which leads on Guinea-Bissau in the Council, has stuck to the line adopted by ECOWAS, which is to allow the transitional government one year to conduct elections and to avoid any reference to the legitimacy of the 18 March vote. Other Council members are concerned about the apparent lack of inclusiveness of the transitional government, as well as ignoring the 18 March vote. These Council members are anxious not to appear to endorse the dictates of an illegitimate military intervention.

**UN Documents**

**Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/2048 (18 May 2012) imposed travel bans on coup leaders and set up a new sanctions committee.
- S/RES/1876 (26 June 2009) extended the mandate of UNOGIBS until 31 December and requested the Secretary-General to establish UNIOGBIS to succeed UNOGBIS for an initial period of 12 months after that.

**Presidential Statement**

- S/PRST/2012/15 (21 April 2012) was on the coup in Guinea-Bissau.

**Latest Secretary-General’s Report**

- S/2012/280 (30 April 2012)

**Press Statements**

- SC/10640 (8 May 2012) was issued after the 7 May briefing by Joseph Mutaboba and Ambassador Maria Luiza Viotti (Brazil).
- SC/10521 (13 January 2012) was issued after the briefing by Lynn Pascoe, head of the Department of Political Affairs, on 10 January.

**Meeting Records**

- S/PV.6755 (21 April 2012) was a meeting on the situation in Guinea-Bissau.
- S/PV.6743 (28 March 2012) was a briefing on the situation in Guinea-Bissau by Mutaboba and Viotti.
- S/PV.6648 (3 November 2011) was a briefing on the situation in Guinea-Bissau.

**Letter**

- S/2012/254 (23 April 2012) was from Kadré Désiré Ouedraogo, president of the ECOWAS Commission.

**Other Relevant Facts**

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNIOGBIS

Joseph Mutaboba (Rwanda)

**Duration**

From 1 January 2010 until 28 February 2013

**Chair of the Guinea-Bissau Configuration of the PBC**

Brazil

**Useful Additional Source**

Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Guinea-Bissau, Mali and between the Sudan and South Sudan, AU, 24 April 2012.

**Burundi**

**Expected Council Action**

In July, the Council is expecting a briefing via video-teleconference on Burundi by the exiting Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB), Karin Landgren. The chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Ambassador Paul Seger (Switzerland), is also expected to brief the Council. The briefing will be followed by consultations.

BNUB’s mandate expires on 15 February 2013.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 7 December 2011, Landgren briefed the Council on the most recent Secretary-General’s report (S/2011/751), which recommended that BNUB’s mandate be renewed at its current composition. Landgren told the Council that Burundi was showing progress in its peacebuilding efforts. In particular she noted progress in the normalisation of relations between the
government and the extra-parliamentary political parties, as the quarterly meetings of the government with registered political parties had been launched. However, Landgren also stressed that prospects for normalising relations with extra-parliamentary opposition parties were overshadowed by the arrests and assassinations of members of some of those parties, as well as by reliable information about recruitment and paramilitary training carried out by members of certain opposition parties.

On 20 December, the Council adopted resolution 2027, extending BNUB’s mandate until 15 February 2013 under the same terms as the previous mandate, stressing that BNUB should support Burundi’s efforts in the area of socioeconomic development. It requested that the Secretary-General update the Council by 31 May on the development of benchmarks for the evolution of BNUB into a UN country team presence and that a briefing be held in July.

The resolution also stressed the need for a thorough, credible, impartial and transparent investigation of serious crimes, in particular extrajudicial killings, and called upon the authorities of Burundi to put an end to such criminal acts and to ensure that those responsible are brought to justice. It also noted with grave concern continued human rights violations, including torture, and restrictions on civil liberties, including harassment, intimidation and limitations on the freedom of opposition political parties, media and civil society organisations.

Addressing the Council after the adoption of the resolution, Ambassador Herménégilde Niyonzima (Burundi) stressed dismay with the Council’s reference to extrajudicial killings and its criticism of Burundi’s efforts to address impunity. He also noted that the government had made several appeals to the extra-parliamentary opposition for direct dialogue, which have not resulted in any response.

On 10 May, the Secretary-General sent a letter (S/2012/310) to the Council with benchmarks and indicators for the future evolution of BNUB in the fields of security and stability, democratic process, transitional justice, governance and institution-building, rule of law, human rights, regional integration and social and economic development.

On 7 June, the Secretary-General appointed Parfait Onanga-Anyanga (Gabon) as the new Special Representative and head of BNUB. Landgren is the Secretary-General’s new Special Representative in Liberia.

In a 2 May report, Human Rights Watch canvassed political violence in Burundi in 2011 and the early months of 2012. Despite a decrease in violence in 2012, the report found that political killings have continued to plague the country. The report concluded that not only has the state failed to take reasonable steps to ensure security and provide protection for its citizens, it has also not fulfilled its duty to take all reasonable measures to prevent and prosecute these types of crimes.

### Developments in the Peacebuilding Commission

The Burundi configuration, headed by Seger, visited Burundi from 18-25 April. In a letter (S/2012/320) sent to the Council afterwards, Seger reported substantial improvement in the relationship between the ruling political party and the opposition, which is not represented in parliament, noting that this improvement may be jeopardised by economic conditions.

A draft annual review of the fifth and final review of the implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Burundi was circulated in June within the Burundi configuration. The review is based on another review carried out by the Burundi government and international partners with the participation of civil society and was endorsed in a Forum Politique that took place in Bujumbura on 8 June. The review includes recommendations and future commitments of Burundi and the PBC.

A draft reaffirms the two-track approach (political and socioeconomic) to the engagement of the PBC with Burundi and the priorities set out in the Outcome Document of 26 April 2011. It conveys an agreement that subsequent reviews of progress in peacebuilding would be undertaken under the monitoring and evaluation framework of the new poverty-reduction strategy paper (PRSP II).

### Key Issues

The key issue is the adequacy of the benchmarks and accompanying indicators for the assessment of progress in Burundi moving forward.

A further issue is addressing the role of the PBC in relation to the benchmarks.

Also an issue is how to encourage a political dialogue between the government and the opposition and strengthen good governance, human rights and the rule of law in the country.

### Options

Options for the Council include:
- issuing a presidential or press statement taking note of or endorsing the benchmarks;
- requesting BNUB to further develop the benchmarks and report back to the Council;
- encouraging the work of the PBC and stressing the importance of PBC involvement in implementing the benchmarks; or
- taking no action at this time.
Council Dynamics

July’s briefing is not preceded by a written report, and therefore Council members are particularly keen on hearing Landgren’s assessment of the situation on the ground.

Council members see the current BNUB arrangements as a transition phase. During the negotiations on its mandate renewal last December, some countries emphasized the importance of taking into account the position of the government and the need for benchmarks for BNUB’s eventual withdrawal. Therefore, Council members are focusing their attention on the benchmarks they received in May for BNUB’s further reconfiguration.

Several members are of the view that an outcome (whether in the form of a presidential statement or a press statement) is necessary to signal the importance of the benchmarks and their indicators as a working basis to assess the progress of BNUB.

Some members are of the view that the PBC—which was not involved in developing the benchmarks—should be involved in the evaluation process.

The lead country on Burundi is France.

**Peacebuilding Commission**

Expected Council Action

In July, the Council is expected to discuss the annual report of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). Both the outgoing PBC chair, Ambassador Eugène-Richard Gasana (Rwanda), and the current chair, Ambassador A.K. Abdul Momen (Bangladesh), are expected to brief. Judy Cheng-Hopkins, the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, is also expected to brief the Council. All the chairs of the country-specific configurations are also likely to brief.

It is likely that the Council will hold an interactive dialogue with chairs of country-specific configurations on 13 July.

A presidential statement will likely be issued after the briefings.

**Key Recent Developments**

The fifth annual report of the PBC was published on 30 January (S/2012/70). It covers the period from 1 January to 31 December 2011, and focuses on key aspects of the PBC’s work, including implementation of the key recommendations of the 2010 “Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture” (S/2010/393), resource mobilisation, national capacity development of the countries on the PBC’s agenda, political advocacy and cross-configuration work by the commission. Though Council members never formally discussed the 2010 review, the Council welcomed it in resolution 1947, adopted on 29 October 2010. The resolution reaffirmed the “importance of the peacebuilding work carried out by the UN and the need for sustained support and adequate resources for this work.” The resolution underlined the role of the PBC as a dedicated intergovernmental advisory body to “address the needs of countries emerging from conflict towards sustainable peace.” It requested all relevant UN actors to “take forward, within their mandates and as appropriate, the recommendations of the report with the aim of further improving the effectiveness of the Peacebuilding Commission” and called for a further comprehensive review in 2015.

The annual report for 2011 signalled “increased appreciation of the potential role that the commission can play to promote renewed commitment by the international community to countries emerging from conflict” and called on the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) to provide “high-quality support to the country configurations” so that the “increased expectations” generated in the countries on the PBC’s agenda would be met. (The PBSO has been working on its strategy for 2012-2015, focusing on three key areas: increasing the peacebuilding impact of key national and international actors at country-level through the PBC and Peacebuilding Fund (PBF); strengthening the UN system’s leadership, coherence and coordination on key peacebuilding priorities; and improving communication and understanding of peacebuilding through the PBC, UN and external actors.)

However, even before the end of the reporting period, the 2011 report seemed to have been overtaken by events. For example, on Guinea-Bissau, the annual report notes that the reporting period was “marked by continuous political instability.” In fact, there was an attempted military coup on 26 December 2011. Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe briefed the Council on the situation in Guinea-Bissau on 10 January following the death of President Malam Bacai Sanhá in Paris the day before. Pascoe mentioned the attempted military coup on 26 December 2011. The Council issued a press statement (SC/10521) after the briefing, expressing condolences and welcoming Guinea-Bissau’s decision to investigate the coup attempt and to hold presidential elections. Held on 18 March, the elections were inconclusive. On 12 April, the military staged a coup and arrested interim President Raimundo Pereira and former Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior (who was favoured to win run-off presidential elections scheduled for 22 April). On 18 May, the Council adopted resolution 2048, imposing a ban on foreign travel on army leaders who staged the coup.

On 19 and 20 May, Council members visited Liberia, and then Sierra Leone on 23 May. It appeared that some Council members were taken aback by the fact that the work of the PBC was not mentioned by the national stakeholders (including government officials) they met with in Liberia and...
Sierra Leone. This is of particular interest, since the 2010 review of the PBC had stressed the effectiveness of the PBC and the “imperative” of bringing national actors in the countries on its agenda on board the commission’s work.

Key Issues
The key issue is sustaining the Council’s interest in the work of the PBC, which is after all one of its subsidiary bodies (albeit a unique one as it is also subordinate to the General Assembly), and in post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding more broadly.

A related issue is whether the Council’s approach to countries that are on the agenda of both bodies can be enhanced by better incorporation of the input from the PBC.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- discussing the annual report and taking no action;
- issuing a presidential statement welcoming the report and calling for greater synergies between the PBC, PBSO and PBF; and
- holding a discussion in consultations with the chairs of the country-specific configurations as well as with heads of the PBSO and PBF.

Council Dynamics
It appears that the Council is not particularly focused on the work of the PBC (the annual report was published five months ago, and the Council is only discussing it in July). But the events in Guinea-Bissau and the Council’s recent visit to Liberia and Sierra Leone may be changing this. The UK appears to be particularly interested in developing a new approach. South Africa has been supportive of these efforts and has consistently shown a committed interest in the work of the PBC.

UN Documents
Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/2048 (18 May 2012) imposed travel bans on coup leaders and set up a new sanctions committee for Guinea-Bissau.
- S/RES/1947 (29 October 2010) reaffirmed the importance of the peacebuilding work carried out by the UN and the need for sustained support and adequate resources for this work.

- S/RES/1646 (20 December 2005) decided that the five permanent members will have seats on the PBC’s Organisational Committee and that the PBC will report annually to the Council.
- S/RES/1645 (20 December 2005) created the PBC and the Peacebuilding Fund, concurrent with General Assembly resolution A/RES/60/180.

Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2012/15 (21 April 2012) was on the coup in Guinea-Bissau.
- S/PRST/2011/4 (11 February 2011) was on the interdependence between security and development, wherein the Council reiterated its support for the work of the PBC and its readiness to make greater use of the PBC’s advisory role.

PBC Reports

- S/2012/70 (30 January 2012) was the PBC’s fifth report.
- S/2010/393 (21 July 2010) was the report of the co-facilitators of the “Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture.”

Press Statement

- SC/10521 (13 January 2012) was on the death of President Malam Bacai Sanhá and an abortive coup in Guinea-Bissau on 26 December 2011.

Cyprus

Expected Council Action
In July, the Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for six months, as has been customary since the mission was established in 1964. (Resolution 2026 of 14 December 2011 had previously extended the mandate for seven months as part of the Council’s wider effort to spread mandate renewals throughout the year.)

A briefing in consultations is expected by the Special Representative and head of UNFICYP, Lisa M. Buttenheim, on the Secretary-General’s latest report, due by 1 July. Alexander Downer, the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser, will also likely brief Council members.

UNFICYP’s mandate expires on 19 July.

Key Recent Developments
Since the Council last extended UNFICYP’s mandate, the UN has expended considerable effort in attempting to facilitate a final settlement of the Cyprus issue. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon most recently met with the two sides at the Greentree estate on Long Island on 23-24 January. Before the talks, the Secretary-General wrote to both leaders expressing the understanding that the talks had entered their final phase.

In the lead-up to what was dubbed “Green-tree II” (following similar trilateral talks on 30-31 October 2011), there seemed to be some “positive movement” according to the Secretary-General, and both sides agreed on the so-called remaining “core core” issues. These were:

- the election of the executive;
- the number of persons who would become citizens of a united Cyprus; and
- the basic design of a property regime.

In his correspondence, the Secretary-General urged both leaders to unblock the remaining obstacles in the negotiations so that substantive discussions at Greentree could lead to a multilateral conference and, ultimately, a settlement. Part of the impetus for concluding a final settlement by mid-2012 was that Cyprus takes over the EU Presidency on 1 July. Additionally, presidential elections are scheduled in Cyprus for February 2013.

Despite some optimism leading into “Greentree II”, the talks were not productive. The Secretary-General, who conveyed his disappointment to the two leaders following the talks, said that while the discussions were “robust and intensive, only limited progress was achieved.” In his 12 March assessment report on the status of the negotiations, the Secretary-General observed that negotiations on the remaining crucial issues “are close to deadlock.”

On 29 March, following further discussions with the two leaders in Cyprus, Downer briefed Council members in consultations via videoconference on his “good offices” mission concerning the settlement
negotiations. This included the lack of convergence on the main remaining issues, as detailed in the Secretary-General’s report of 12 March (S/2012/149). The Special Adviser then met with Ban in New York on 19 April, having provided the Secretary-General with his own private report on the state of negotiations. Later in April, the Secretary-General decided not to call a multilateral conference as he had hoped, given the insufficient progress on the remaining “core core” issues.

In a press conference on 27 April, Downer stated that it was clear that the UN-facilitated negotiations had “recently come to something of a standstill.” As consistently articulated, he emphasised that, ultimately, the talks were a “Cypriot-owned and Cypriot-led” process. No further trilateral meetings are scheduled and — while Downer has made clear that the UN is there to facilitate any future high-level discussions — it seems that there is acknowledgement that a different path is now needed.

The UN’s approach now appears to be two-fold: to maintain dialogue with both sides and to encourage confidence-building steps at the technical level. (There are seven such technical committees.) One issue where progress might be feasible is the opening of new crossing points at the Green Line which divides the two Cypriot communities.

During a visit to Cyprus on 19-20 June, the EU’s Commissioner for Enlargement, Štefan Füle, expressed his concern at the stalemate between the two sides. In statements to the press, Füle emphasised the need for both sides to be prepared to compromise, saying that the price of not achieving a solution was going to be bigger than the price of any reasonable compromise. In an address on 19 June, Füle said that discussions suggesting that the status quo could continue were “nonsense” and that “unfinished business” in Cyprus was becoming “unfinished business in the EU.”

Füle also said that the notion that no progress could be achieved during Cyprus’s EU Presidency was a fallacy and that the increased attention on Cyprus over the next six months would result in a sense of urgency to solve the problem. (The Turkish Cypriot side has said Cyprus’s assumption of the presidency would undermine efforts to reach an agreement. Meanwhile, on 20 June a Cyprus government representative said that Cyprus should focus on its EU Presidency duties and that reunification talks would be “put on the backburner.”)

Key Issues
The main issue for the Council is whether there should be a review of UNFICYP’s mandate, given the continuing lack of progress towards reaching a settlement.

Concerning the talks, a key issue is the complicating factor that Cyprus assumes the EU Presidency on 1 July and that President Demetris Christofias will be in office only until 1 March 2013 (he is not seeking re-election).

Options
In July, the Council could:
- extend UNFICYP’s mandate for six months;
- renew UNFICYP’s mandate but agree to revise and reconfigure the mission;
- send a clear message that UNFICYP’s presence will not be indefinite and that the Council expects to see tangible progress in the negotiations; or
- discuss replacing UNFICYP longer term with a political mission.

Council Dynamics
The P5 members have traditionally had a dominant role within the Council on Cyprus and the drafting of resolutions extending UNFICYP’s mandate. To varying degrees, however, the elected members also take an interest in the issue, most notably perhaps the two other EU members—Germany and Portugal. Given the lack of progress this year towards reaching a settlement, there is likely to be frustration among several members that the recent high-level efforts have not borne fruit.

It seems that the UK in particular, which leads on Cyprus in the Council, might be interested in discussing the benefits of revising UNFICYP’s mandate. There might also be some appetite among other members to discuss reconfiguring the long-standing mission, given the present stalemate. However, some Council members are wary of trying to use UNFICYP’s renewal as leverage to compel the two sides to make progress in the reunification talks and have emphasised that any final deal must be acceptable to both sides.

In the past, some members — including Russia — have emphasised that the talks were at a sensitive stage and the Council should be careful about not sending the wrong message to the parties. (The concern seems to be that a change to the mandate could be interpreted by the Greek Cypriots as a sign that the situation with respect to northern Cyprus was being normalised and accepted.) Those Council members who are more sympathetic to the Greek Cypriots’ position therefore are likely to resist calls for UNFICYP’s mandate to be altered, and assert that such a move will not accelerate a final settlement.

UN Documents
- Security Council Resolution
  - S/RES/2026 (14 December 2011) renewed UNFICYP’s mandate until 19 July.
- Secretary-General’s Report
  - S/2012/149 (12 March 2012) was an assessment report on the status of the negotiations on Cyprus.

Other Relevant Facts
UNFICYP: Size, Composition and Cost
- Strength (as of 31 October 2011): 856 military personnel, 66 police, 41 international civilian personnel and 112 local civilian staff
- Budget Appropriation (1 July 2012 – 30 June 2013): $56.97 million (one-third of which is funded by the Government of Cyprus; and $6.5 million from Greece)
Notable Dates for July

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Mandates Expire | Relevant Document
---|----------------|
9 July | UNMISS (South Sudan) | S/RES/1996 |
19 July | UNIFICYP (Cyprus) | S/RES/2026 |
20 July | UNSMIS (Syria) | S/RES/2043 |
28 July | UNAMI (Iraq) | S/RES/2001 |
31 July | UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire) | S/RES/2000 |
31 July | UNAMID (Darfur) | S/RES/2003 |

Other Important Dates

2-3 July | The International Contact Group for Somalia will meet in Rome. |
6 July | The Friends of Syria will meet in Paris. |
7 July | Constituent Assembly elections are scheduled in Libya. |
7 July | Parliamentary elections are schedule in Timor-Leste. |
8 July | The Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan is scheduled. |
12 July | The Council is expected to discuss the annual report of the PBC. |