Important matters pending include:

1. The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire, requested in a May 2004 presidential statement (S/PRST/2004/17), was never made public. Also on Côte d’Ivoire, the December 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not been published.

2. On 28 May 2010 in resolution 1925 on the mandate of MONUSCO, the operation in the DRC, the Council requested the Secretary-General to elaborate the concept of operation and rules of engagement of MONUSCO, in line with the resolution, and to report back to the Council and the TCCs. The Secretary-General has yet to report back to the Council and the TCCs on this issue.

3. UNAMI reports on human rights in Iraq, in the past were produced every two to three months. They have decreased in their frequency. The last report, released in July 2010, covered the period from 1 July to 31 December 2009.

4. The request in resolution 1460 on Children and Armed Conflict that all the Secretary-General’s reports to the Council on country-specific situations include the protection of children is not yet implemented. In 2010 protection of children elements had been incorporated into just over half of the relevant country-specific reports.

5. The mandate to the Secretary-General to assist with the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially Sheb’a Farms, in accordance with resolution 1701, continues to await completion.

6. The committee established by resolution 1540 (non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism) has not yet completed a report this year on the implementation of that resolution. (Resolution 1810 of 2008 directed it to submit the report to the Council by 24 April 2011. On 24 April the committee informed the Council that it was continuing its consideration of the report and would submit it by 24 May.) The committee also has yet...
Aide-Memoire (continued)

- to complete its programme of work for the current year. (Resolution 1977, which extended the mandate of the committee on 20 April, also decided that the committee should prepare its programme of work by 31 May.)
- In its presidential statement of 22 October 2010 (S/PRST/2010/21) the Council said it looked forward to receiving within six months a report from the Secretary-General which would define the United Nations Secretariat’s strategic vision for UN-AU cooperation in peace and security taking into account the lessons learnt from the various experiences of joint cooperation between the two bodies. The report was expected to be made available in June, but now it appears it has been delayed until late in the year.
- Resolution 1944 (14 October 2010) called on the Secretary-General to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the security environment following the election and transfer of power to a new Haitian government in 2011. The inauguration of the new Haitian president, Michel Martelly, took place on 14 May after a lengthy and delayed electoral process. It is unclear when the Secretary-General’s comprehensive assessment will be concluded.
- The position of Special Envoy for Myanmar has not been filled since Ibrahim Gambari left the post in January 2009. Vijay Nambari, the Secretary-General’s Chef de Cabinet, took on the position of Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Myanmar in what was expected to be temporary role.
- The Secretary-General’s Advisory Committee on the Prevention of Genocide has been dormant since 2008 when it held its last meeting.
- Resolution 1904 in December 2009 indicated that the expert groups assisting the three counterterrorism committees (the 1267 Committee on Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions, the 1373 Committee on CT, and the 1540 Committee on weapons of mass destruction) should be co-located and asked the Secretary-General make the necessary arrangements “as soon as possible.” This request, reiterated in September 2010 (S/PRST/2010/19), is still outstanding.
- On 11 November 2009 in resolution 1894 on protection of civilians, the Council requested the Secretary-General to develop guidance for UN operations and other relevant missions on reporting for enhancing the Council’s monitoring and oversight. There has been no report back to the Council on this.
- The Council requested the Secretariat on 21 November 2006 (S/2006/928) to update the index to Council notes and statements on working methods. This has not been published.

Status Update since our June Forecast

- **Tribunals**: On 6 June, the Council heard a briefing (S/PV.6545) by the presidents and prosecutors of the ICTR and ICTY. They stressed that their courts were imperilled by persistent staffing problems, challenges in enforcing sentences, and the failure to set up a trust fund for the victims. On 29 June, the Council adopted a resolution extending the terms of certain judges of the ICTY till 31 December, 2012. The Council has yet to adopt a resolution amending the Statute of the ICTR in response to the request of the tribunal to allow for an appeals chamber judge to serve as president of the ICTR, or for an ad-litem judge to take on that position when the current president is deployed to the appeals chamber.

- **Council Mission to Africa**: On 6 June, the Council was briefed on the visit to Africa which Council members took from 19 to 26 May (S/PV.6546). The trip’s leaders described concerns over the situation in Abyei, the humanitarian situation in Darfur and Somalia’s institutional infighting (SC/10271).

- **HIV/AIDS**: On 7 June, the president of Gabon presided over a high-level Council debate (S/PV.6547) under the agenda item the “maintenance of international peace and security” focused on the impact of HIV/AIDS on conflict and post-conflict society and the UN’s role in mitigating that impact. The Council heard briefings from the Secretary-General and the head of UNAIDS. The Council adopted resolution 1983 during the meeting. The resolution considerably advanced upon the Council’s previous resolution on this subject (resolution 1308), by including specific language on the vulnerability of women and girls to HIV and highlighting the importance of addressing conflict-related sexual violence. The resolution also recognised the role of peacekeeping operations in contributing to an integrated UN response to HIV and AIDS, especially through SSR and DDR programmes.

- **Iran**: On 9 June, the Council extended the mandate of the panel of experts that supports the Iran sanctions committee for one year (S/RES/1984). The resolution requested that the panel submit to the Council a mid-term report on its work by 9 December and a final report upon termination of its mandate (9 June 2012). The panel is requested to provide each of these reports to the Committee a month before they are submitted to the Council in order to allow for a discussion. In addition, the panel is asked to provide the Committee with a programme of work raised by members like Brazil, South Africa, India, China and Russia was that the Council should not be prescribing precisely how a country should reform itself politically. It seems that there is no longer unequivocal support for the argument made by some members at an earlier stage that this is an internal situation and that President Assad should be given more time to deal with it without international interference. However, at issue is the mode for the Council to express itself and the content. At press time, the initiative on Syria and the Council’s possible political engagement was still an active issue.

- **Syria**: On 8 June, Council members were briefed by Assistant Secretary General Oscar Fernandez Taranco in closed consultations. Discussions followed on a draft resolution on the situation in Syria circulated on 25 May by the UK, France, Germany and Portugal. Some Council members were uncomfortable with what they saw as possible action-oriented language which might lead to robust follow-up by the Council. Another issue
Status Update since our June Forecast (continued)

within 30 days of its appointment. (S/PV.6552)

■ DPRK: On 10 June, the Council extended the mandate of the panel of experts that supports the DPRK sanctions committee until 12 June 2012 (S/RES/1985). The resolution requested that the panel submit to the Council a midterm report on its work by 12 December 2011 and a final report upon termination of its mandate. The panel is asked to provide each of these reports to the Committee a month before they are submitted to the Council in order to allow for a discussion. In addition, the panel is requested to provide the Committee with a programme of work within 30 days of its appointment. (S/PV.6553)

■ Cyprus: On 13 June, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1986, extending the mandate of the UNFICYP until 15 December 2011. The Council also called upon the leaders of the two communities on the island to intensify the momentum of negotiations, engage in the process in a constructive and open manner, and work on reaching convergences on the remaining core issues in preparation for their meeting with the Secretary-General in July. (S/PV.6554)

■ Secretary-General Appointment: On 16 June the Council adopted resolution 1987 recommending to the General Assembly that Ban Ki-moon be appointed Secretary-General of the UN for a second term of office from 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2016 (S/PV.6556). This formal recommendation came after the Council met twice in informal consultations to discuss the appointment, on 10 and 15 June. On 21 June the General Assembly formally appointed Ban to a second term (GA/11102).

■ Counterterrorism (1267 Committee): On 17 June, the Council adopted two resolutions related to the 1267 Committee on Taliban and al Qaeda sanctions. Resolution 1988 proceeds from a recognition that the security situation in Afghanistan has evolved. It now establishes a separate list for Taliban individuals and entities subject to sanctions. It also establishes a new Afghanistan focused sanctions committee to oversee the list. This new list removes Taliban from the consolidated list utilised by the 1267 Committee up to this time and Taliban individuals asking to be taken off the sanctions list will submit their requests to the UN Focal Point mechanism (established in resolution 1730) rather than to the office of the Ombudsperson (established in resolution 1904). The monitoring team that has supported the 1267 Committee up to now will also support the new Taliban committee for a period of 18 months. The monitoring team is to submit two reports to the committee on implementation of the resolution (the first by 31 March 2012 and the second by 31 October 2012), as well as a report within 90 days on linkages between Taliban individuals and entities on the new list and al Qaeda.

In resolution 1989, the Council decided that the al Qaeda-related entries on the 1267 consolidated list will now be known as the “Al-Qaeda Sanctions List”. The resolution extends the mandate of the Ombudsperson and the monitoring team for 18 months. The monitoring team is to submit two reports to the committee on implementation of the resolution by 31 March 2012 and 31 October 2012. Several new procedures were adopted for strengthening the office of the Ombudsperson. When presenting delisting requests to the Committee, the Ombudsperson will now include a recommendation that the committee either retain the listing or consider delisting. When the Ombudsperson recommends delisting, the individual will be taken off the list unless the Committee decides by consensus within 60 days to retain the listing. Likewise, when a designating state requests that an entry now be removed, the entry will be removed unless the Committee decides by consensus to retain the listing within 60 days. (When the Committee cannot come to consensus, a committee member may request the chair to submit the question of whether to delist that individual/entity to the Council, with a decision within 60 days.) The chair of the Committee is requested to continue participating in the joint briefing of the Council by the counterterrorism committee every six months.

■ Peace and Security in Africa: On 21 June, the Council was briefed (S/PV.6561) by the head of the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU), Zachary Muburu-Muita. In his first address to the Council, he said his Office was making solid progress in its transition towards a “new, lean, self-sufficient operation” based in Addis Ababa (SC/10288).

■ Liberia: On 23 June, the Council held consultations on the mid-term report of the Panel of Experts of the Liberia Sanctions Committee (S/2011/367). The report considers in detail the arms embargo and travel bans on individuals identified as a threat to stability in Liberia, and assets freeze against Charles Taylor and his associates. It also details progress made by the Liberian authorities in regulating the natural resource sector, in particular ensuring its diamond industry is in compliance with the Kimberley Process and its forestry and timber sector is being managed in compliance with domestic laws. The panel’s final report is due 1 December.

■ Middle East: On 23 June, the Council was briefed by Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe on the impasse in the Israeli/Palestinian peace process. Pascoe said that US President Barack Obama’s 19 May speech offered important ideas to move the process forward. This was endorsed by the Quartet on 20 May which also called on the parties to overcome obstacles and return to negotiations (S/ PV.6562). The Quartet met an envoy’s level on 26 June. At press time it remained unclear if there will be a follow-up meeting of the principals in July.

■ UNODC: On 24 June, Yury Fedotov, Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) briefed the Council on the illicit drugs trade and organised crime (SC/10295). He called the international drug problem a shared responsibility, stressing the need to bolster regional capacity and strengthen international cooperation when confronting it.

■ Yemen: On 24 June, Ambassador Nelson Messone of Gabon, who holds the Council presidency for June, said in remarks to the press that the Council expressed grave concern on the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in Yemen and urged all parties to show maximum restraint and to engage in an inclusive political dialogue.
These comments followed the briefing by UN envoy Jamal bin Omer after his recent visit to Yemen. (Elements of the press were suggested by Germany on 20 April and 16 May when the Council was briefed on developments in Yemen as part of the regular monthly DPA briefing. However, there was no consensus on those two previous occasions.)

Guinea-Bissau: On 28 June, the Council was briefed by the head of the UN integrated peacebuilding office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), Joseph Mutaboba (S/PV.6569). The briefing drew upon the latest report of the Secretary-General (S/2011/370). The defence minister of Guinea-Bissau addressed the Council, as did the Permanent Representative of Brazil, in her capacity as Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission. The Council held consultations on the situation in Guinea-Bissau following the briefing.

DRC: On 28 June, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1991, extending the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) for another 12 months. The resolution maintains the current strength and priorities of MONUSCO’s mandate and authorises the force to continue to provide technical and logistical assistance to the upcoming national and local elections.

UNDOF: At press time, it was expected that on 30 June the Council would renew the mandate of the UN Disengagement Force in the Golan Heights for a further six months. Still at issue at press time was whether to reflect in the resolution language about the current situation in Syria and implementation for UNDOF and whether to continue to issue the accompanying presidential statement as has been the practice since 1976. On 23 June, the Council held consultations on the Secretary-General’s most recent UNDOF report (S/2011/359).

Libya

Expected Council Action
Council members are expecting the regular monthly briefing on Libya from Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe in late July.

Agreement on the need for an end game in Libya has been a major preoccupation for Council members in recent days. Some convergence may be occurring. However, the dividing point remains over when Muammar Qaddafi might remove himself and his cohorts from political control. Leadership of mediation efforts in that regard has also been contentious. A presidential statement introduced on 14 June by Gabon, Nigeria and South Africa and competing US suggestions to that draft remain on the table for consideration in July.

The next meeting of the Libya Contact Group is anticipated for mid-July in Turkey.

Key Recent Developments
At press time, NATO air strikes against Libyan military capabilities under resolution 1973 continued. (On 1 June, NATO extended the operation to late September.)

On 27 June Pascoe, in the monthly briefing to the Council, said that the political process was in its nascent stages and the international community must send consistent messages to both Benghazi and Tripoli.

Also on 27 June, South Africa’s Ambassador, Baso Sangqu, in remarks to the press said the situation in Libya has deteriorated with loss of civilian life and that South Africa’s intent when it voted for resolution 1973 was to ensure protection of civilians and humanitarian access and that a political, rather than a military, solution is the only way.

The ICC issued arrest warrants for Muammar Qaddafi, his son and his intelligence chief on 27 June for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder and persecution of civilians, recruitment of mercenaries and authorising attacks against protesters. On 8 June, in remarks to the press, the ICC prosecutor said his office was collecting evidence on allegations of sexual violence by regime forces in the Libyan conflict.

On 18 June the UN, AU, Arab League, EU and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference met in Cairo to underscore the UN’s leading role in cooperation with these organisations for a Libyan transition.

On 15 June the foreign minister of Mauritania, in his capacity as chair of the AU High Level Ad-Hoc Committee on Libya, briefed the Council on its mediation efforts. Following the public briefing, the AU Committee members and Security Council members discussed the Libyan situation in an interactive dialogue which did not produce any results.

On 14 June the African members of the Council circulated a draft presidential statement on Libya.

On 16 June the US introduced amendments to the draft underscoring that Qaddafi had lost legitimacy and must leave power and urging member states to recognise the Transitional National Council (TNC).

A revised version was circulated on 22 June that:
- reaffirms the Council’s commitment to the full implementation of resolutions 1970 and 1973;
- calls for a ceasefire and a political solution to the conflict;
- supports the efforts of UN Special Envoy Abdel-Elah Al-Khatib and the partners with the AU committee and other stakeholders (citing the 18 June Cairo meeting);
- calls for humanitarian access; and
- stresses accountability.

On 13 June, Germany recognised the TNC after a visit by its foreign minister to Benghazi.

On 10 June media reports indicate that Turkey had suggested to the Tripoli regime that time was running out for an honourable exit to be negotiated for Qaddafi.

On 9 June, Khatib briefed Council members via video-conference in informal consultations and said that for the first time both sides signalled a willingness to discuss political transition. However, he said, seemingly irreconcilable differences remained as to what that “political transition” means in Benghazi and Tripoli.

Also on 9 June the Libya Contact Group met in Abu Dhabi and:
- reasserted that Qaddafi must leave power and endorsed the TNC’s road map for political transition;
- encouraged those in Qaddafi’s regime who don’t want to be associated with human rights violations to defect;
- reasserted the UN’s lead in facilitating
dialogue and any political process and Khatib’s role in that regard;

- welcomed UN post-conflict planning;
- established a temporary financial mechanism to channel funds to the TNC (media reports indicate $1.3 billion in pledges against Benghazi’s stated need of $3 billion);
- agreed to find a mechanism to unfreeze Libyan assets or use such assets as security for financing TNC obligations (the EU has endorsed such measures and the US is introducing legislation to allow such measures domestically);
- encouraged finding ways the TNC would be able to export oil (there have been limited shipments via Qatar and one confirmed sale to the US); and
- acknowledged AU efforts and looked forward to working with African states to reinforce the message that Qaddafi must go (it seems the AU attended the Abu Dhabi meeting as an observer but left its chair empty at the adoption of the statement).

Aspects of the UN post-conflict contingency planning undertaken by special adviser Ian Martin were shared in Abu Dhabi and include preliminary assessments in six areas: political process, security apparatus, rule of law and human rights, economic recovery, public administration and physical infrastructure. (This was also shared with Council members on 31 May in Pascoe’s briefing.)

On 6 June, President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz of Mauritania said, “Qaddafi can no longer lead…his departure has become necessary.” On 30 May, South African President Jacob Zuma visited Tripoli to discuss an exit strategy with Muammar Qaddafi. (Aziz is the chair and Zuma is a member of the AU’s High Level Ad Hoc Committee on Libya.)

On 27 May the G8 said that Qaddafi must leave power.

### Developments in the Libya Sanctions Committee

On 24 June the Sanctions Committee announced that it had added two more individuals subject to a travel ban and assets freeze and one entity subject to the assets freeze. On 6 June the Committee met with its recently appointed panel of experts. The panel is expected to submit its interim report to the Council in August.

### Key Issues

**Ongoing key issues for the Council include:**

- whether the Council can play a more active role in establishing parameters for political initiatives to secure an end-game in Libya; and
- the divergence among members regarding the interpretation of resolution 1973.

An issue coming to the foreground is the humanitarian impact on the population under Qaddafi’s control and related access issues and the case for a ceasefire.

Potential issues for the Council in the future include:

- the parameters for any ceasefire, including timing;
- a UN role in any ceasefire-monitoring mechanism; and
- a UN role in post-conflict Libya.

### Options

One option for the Council is to find consensus on a presidential statement on the Libyan situation. More precise language on the terms of a ceasefire is one possibility. Another is tackling the question of political transition in a substantial way and finding middle ground between the AU position in this regard and the US position.

Further options are briefings from:

- UN Special Envoy Khatib (at press time there was no confirmed date for his next round of talks but in recent months he has gone to Libya prior to the Contact Group meetings); and
- Special Representative Margot Wallström on the alleged sexual violence aspects of the conflict.

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Another option if mediation efforts seem to be gaining traction is involving Council members in more detail on post-conflict planning.

Another option for the Council in July is to continue to monitor the situation based on the regular Secretariat briefing.

The option to designate more individuals and entities under the sanctions regime is still on the table in the sanctions committee.

### Council Dynamics

Since the G8 statement in late May, there now seems to be some agreement among a majority of Council members that political transition in Libya is an essential part of the end game and a political process leading to this is the way forward.

Council members that have formally or de facto recognised the TNC include France, Germany, the UK and the US. China, Russia and South Africa are also openly engaging with Benghazi. In the context of the contact group, elected Council member Lebanon has sent similar signals.

However, the Libyan situation continues to polarize the Council. There are wide gaps over the best approach and some raw nerves over who is leading that effort. There also seems to be tension in the Council over how best to achieve humanitarian access in Qaddafi-controlled areas.

Regarding the ICC arrest warrants, some Council members welcomed the development in 27 June consultations. Other members remain concerned that the ICC indictments will continue to complicate already delicate mediation efforts.

The format of the 15 June AU Committee briefing was a point of tension among Council members. Some Council members were concerned that a public debate would not be constructive but were able to accept having the AU briefing in a public format. Others felt that without a full airing of the issues between the Committee and Council members, the AU would not get the focus that it wanted. It seems the interactive dialogue format was important in order to allow
the non-Council members of the AU Committee a forum to exchange views with Council members. But despite the format, little was achieved.

Some Council members felt that the 15 June meeting solidified the gaps between the AU and UN approaches.

In regard to the ongoing discussions on a draft presidential statement, some Council members see value in a statement if it enables the Council to bridge those gaps, show a unified position on the Libyan situation and clear the soured atmosphere so that the Council can be effective on other issues that warrant its response.

### Security Council Reports

- S/PV.6555 (15 June 2011) was the most recent monthly briefings on Libya by Pascoe.
- S/PV.6556 (27 June 2011) was the briefing by the AU High-Level Ad-Hoc Committee on Libya.

### Security Council Meeting Records

- S/PV.6566 (27 June 2011) and S/PV.6541 (31 May 2011) were the most recent monthly briefings on Libya by Pascoe.
- S/PV.6555 (15 June 2011) was the briefing by the AU High-Level Ad-Hoc Committee on Libya.

### Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1973 (17 March 2011) authorised all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya and enforce the arms embargo, imposed a no-fly zone, strengthened the sanctions regime and established a panel of experts.
- S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011) referred the situation in Libya to the ICC, imposed an arms embargo and targeted sanctions and established a sanctions committee.

### Security Council Letters

- S/2011/350 (10 June 2011) was the joint communiqué of the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council issued on 21 May in Addis Ababa.
- S/2011/346 (31 May 2011) was from Qatar regarding oil exports from areas in Libya under the control of the TNC.

### Human Rights Council

- A/HRC/17/44 (1 June 2011) was the report of the Commission of Inquiry authorised in resolution A/HRC/S-15/2.

## Chair of the Sanctions Committee

**Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral** (Portugal)

## Sanctions Committee’s Panel of Experts

- Yousef Fahed Ahmed Alserhan, Jordan (maritime)
- Omer Diëye Sidi, Niger (customs)
- Theodore M. Murphy, US (humanitarian and regional)
- Giovanna Perri, Italy (finance)
- Salim Raad, Lebanon (heavy weapons)
- Savannah de Tessières, France (small arms and light weapons)
- Ahmed Zerhouni, Algeria (aviation)

### Additional Facts

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<th>UN Special Envoy</th>
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### Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry

- Cherif Bassiouni, Chair (Egypt);
- Asma Khader (Jordanian/Palestinian);
- Philippe Kirsch (Canada)

### AU High Level Ad-Hoc Committee

- Heads of state of Congo, Mali, Mauritania (Chair), South Africa, Uganda and the chair of the AU Commission.

### International Contact Group

- Bahrain; a rotating seat shared by Belgium and the Netherlands; Bulgaria; Canada; France; Germany; Greece; Italy; Japan; Jordan; Kuwait; Lebanon; Malta; Morocco; a Nordic seat shared by Denmark, Norway and Sweden; Poland; Qatar; Spain; Turkey; United Arab Emirates; UK; USA and representatives from the Arab League, EU, GCC, NATO, OIC and the UN. The AU, Cyprus, Egypt, Romania, South Africa and Sudan attend as observers.

### Commander for NATO Operations under Resolution 1973

- Lt. Gen. Charles Bouchard (Canada)

## South Sudan

### Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to finalise and adopt the mandate of a new mission for South Sudan ahead of its independence on 9 July. The mandate of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) expires on 9 July.

The foreign minister of Germany is scheduled to preside over a high-level debate on Sudan on 13 July to mark the occasion of South Sudan’s independence. It is expected that the Council will use the occasion to adopt a resolution recommending that the Republic of South Sudan be admitted as a member of the UN and issue a separate presidential statement on the independence of South Sudan.

### Key Recent Developments

On 20 June the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) signed an agreement on temporary arrangements for the administration and security of the Abyei area. The agreement provides for the withdrawal of military forces—both Khartoum’s Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Southern Sudan’s Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)—immediately following the deployment of an Interim Security Force for Abyei (ISFA) composed of a brigade of Ethiopian troops. The agreement also indicates that an Abyei police service shall be established to deal with particular issues related to nomadic migration. The agreement also established the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee (AJOC), which is to be composed of four members, with each party nominating two representatives.

On 27 June the Security Council adopted resolution 1990 authorising for six months a mission called the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA) that shall comprise a maximum of 4,200 military personnel, 50 police and appropriate civilian support with the following mandate:

- monitor and verify the redeployment of armed groups from Abyei Area, as defined by the Permanent Court of Arbitration;
- participate in relevant Abyei Area bodies as stipulated in the agreement;
- assist in de-mining;
- facilitate humanitarian access;
- strengthen the capacity of the Abyei Police Service; and
- provide security for oil infrastructure; and, under Chapter VII:
  - protect UNISFA and UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment;
  - ensure security and freedom of movement of UN personnel, humanitarian workers and military observers;
  - protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;
  - protect the Abyei Area from incursions by unauthorised elements; and
  - ensure security in the Abyei Area.
The resolution also requests the Secretary-General to ensure that effective human rights monitoring is carried out in Abyei and report to the Council in 30 days and every 60 days thereafter.

On 20 June the Security Council received a briefing on the Abyei agreement from the head of the AU High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), Thabo Mbeki, and the head of UNMIS, Haile Menkerios. Their briefing also covered progress on negotiations between the parties on other post-referendum issues (such as wealth-sharing and border arrangements) and the humanitarian situation in Southern Kordofan.

Menkerios provided further detail on post-UNMIS planning, including preparations for a new mission in South Sudan. Menkerios said that the AUHIP was continuing discussions with the parties on the possibility of UN assistance for border-monitoring, noting that this possibility had yet to be either accepted or rejected. The AUHIP had suggested that any border-monitoring function be a UN mission integrated with the leadership of the mission in Abyei. Menkerios said that there would also be a need, post-UNMIS, for the UN to assist the AUHIP at the political level, noting it had been proposed that the Secretary-General appoint a special envoy to provide his good offices in support of the AUHIP. It may be that Menkerios himself would be appointed if this position was created.

Mbeki informed the Council that talks between the parties on the security and political situation in Southern Kordofan would start in Addis Ababa on 21 June.

Fighting in Southern Kordofan has entered its fourth week. The UN estimates fighting has displaced more than 70,000 people.

On 22 June the head of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Valerie Amos, said that the treatment of civilians, including reported human rights abuses and targeting of people along ethnic lines in Southern Kordofan, was reprehensible. Amos called for an end to movement restrictions to allow aid agencies to have free access to the civilian population. Amos also expressed concern that the inability of farmers in the Nuba Mountains to sow crops would cause food shortages.

The UN strongly condemned the detention and abuse by SAF of four UNMIS peacekeepers on patrol in Kadugli on 17 June. It is understood that they were detained and subjected to a mock firing squad. On 23 June, six UNMIS national staff were arrested as they were preparing to relocate from Southern Kordofan to Southern Sudan. UNMIS protested the clear violations of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

On 8 June authorities in Southern Sudan provided an update on their planned disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme. The programme focuses on vulnerable groups, such as former combatants and women associated with armed groups. The second phase, starting after independence, will focus on downsizing the SPLA. On 21 June, the UN regional coordinator for Southern Sudan, David Gressly, called for South Sudan to halve the SPLA as the country would be better off with a smaller, better trained army. Gressly noted that the disparate armed groups that the SPLA had absorbed since signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) could continue to cause insecurity. The UN says more than 1,500 people have been killed in Southern Sudan this year due to former SPLA fighters turning on the army.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

On 22 June the deputy UN high commissioner for human rights, Kyung-wha Kang, visited Juba as part of an eight-day visit to Sudan. Kang said that following independence South Sudan should ratify all key global treaties upholding human rights and ensure that its citizens are able to enjoy basic freedoms. Kang said that national laws must be in harmony with these international standards.

**Key Issues**

A key issue will be defining the mandate for a new mission in South Sudan while significant uncertainty continues over the relationship between the north and South Sudan. The uncertainty over the force posture of the SPLA, due to threats from the north, may be an issue for the Council in reaching decisions on the mandate, leadership structure and force strength of a new mission in South Sudan and the UN’s role in DDR and security sector reform.

A further issue is the complication of a possible separate border focused mission or possible separate presence in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states. A related issue is the likelihood that the Council might need to react quickly to agreements reached by the parties on these arrangements.

Another issue is the role the new mission in South Sudan could play in terms of quick impact work in South Sudan to address the links between security and development as identified by the Council in February 2011 in S/PRST/2011/4.

A further issue is ensuring there are sufficient opportunities for all Council members to participate in consultations with the UN Secretariat on the mandate for a new mission in South Sudan, including with the newly appointed special representative of the Secretary-General in South Sudan, Hilde Johnson.

**Underlying Issues**

The ongoing blockade of trade routes from the north into South Sudan—and the resulting soaring food and fuel prices—highlights the vulnerability of the new state.

There is a widespread proliferation of small arms in Southern Sudan, which raises the stakes of inter-tribal conflict and criminal activity.

**Options**

For the follow-on to UNMIS in South Sudan, the Council could:
- decide to re-hat the UNMIS presence in South Sudan to a new mission without a change in mandate for a short period while negotiations continue on a new mandate; or
- decide that a new mission should be mandated by 9 July and negotiate and adopt the mandate by 9 July.

With regard to the mandate of the new mission, the Council could:
- closely follow the Secretary-General’s recommendation on the mandate of the new mission and the force levels for the military and police elements (7,000 and 900 respectively);
- add a border-monitoring role entirely based in South Sudan;
- adjust the recommended force level; or
- ensure the mandate addresses issues of
UN integration and “delivering as one” as well as beginning the process of adapting mission structures and tasks to the security/development nexus.

**Procedural Option: Admission of South Sudan as a New Member of the UN**

After declaring independence, the new government of South Sudan is expected to present a letter to the Secretary-General on 9 July applying for membership of the UN. The Secretary-General will convey the application to the president of the Council, who will establish an ad-hoc committee on admission of new members, composed of all Council members. The ad-hoc committee is expected to quickly reach consensus on a short resolution recommending to the General Assembly that South Sudan be admitted to membership in the UN (S/RES/1691 on Montenegro’s admission in 2006 is the most recent example). The Council is expected to adopt this resolution at the high-level meeting on 13 July. The General Assembly is expected to take up the recommendation quickly. Admission requires the support of two-thirds of the UN membership.

**Council Dynamics**

Recent negotiations on several Council decisions on Sudan continue to highlight the significant differences that remain between Council members.

Many Council members seem concerned that the current issues, while already highly complex, will become much more serious following South Sudan’s independence. While some Council members tend to characterise the current violence as “internal”, after 9 July provocations between north and south will definitely be seen as a threat to international peace and security.

The Council seemed to be somewhat in agreement with the initial recommendations of the Secretary-General on the role of the new mission in South Sudan. But the pace of events, particularly in Abyei, and increasing tensions between the north and south are causing some members to question the ability of a new mission in South Sudan to be entirely quarantined from the realities of events unfolding in Abyei, Southern Kordofan and possibly Blue Nile. For example, some have questioned whether a DDR mandate would even be possible, given the force posture of the SPLA in response to insecurity along the border.

The force level recommended by the Secretariat is of concern to a number of Council members, but for differing reasons. Some feel that the number is too low, particularly if a new mission is going to fulfil a Chapter VII protection of civilians mandate effectively. Others feel that the number is too high, given that UNMIS had a force level of 10,000 and a much wider area of operation. There seems to be a suspicion that budgetary considerations are guiding the decision-making of some member states, based on a rumour that the Secretariat was being lobbied to recommend a mission in South Sudan that was “cheaper than UNMIS.”

At the other end of the spectrum, however, a number of members that are not large donors to the peacekeeping budget also seem to want the size of the new mission to be limited so as to ensure that the UN does not take on functions that the newly sovereign state should be responsible for. These members appear to want South Sudan to face up to the responsibility that comes with being an independent state and not become overly reliant on international assistance.

The US continues to be the lead country on South Sudan in the Council.

**UN Documents**

**Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1990 (27 June 2011) established the UNISFA.
- S/RES/1590 (24 March 2005) established UNMIS.

**Presidential Statements**

- S/PRST/2011/12 (3 June 2011) was on the situation in Abyei.

**Latest Secretary-General’s Report**

- S/2011/314 (17 May 2011) was a special report with recommendations on a new UN mission in South Sudan.

**Other**

- S/2011/384 (23 June 2011) was a letter from the Secretary-General conveying the Abyei agreement.
- S/PV.6559 (20 June 2011) was a briefing from Mbeki and Menkerios on the situation in Abyei.

**Sudan/Darfur**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) ahead of the expiry of its mandate on 31 July.

The Council is expected to receive a briefing on the situation in Darfur from the head of UNAMID, Ibrahim Gambari, based upon the latest quarterly report of the Secretary-General, expected to be issued in mid-July.

**Key Recent Developments**

The All Darfur Stakeholders Conference (ADSC) was held in Doha, Qatar, from 27 to 31 May. The conference brought together more than 500 delegates representing internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, civil society (including women’s groups), the government of Sudan, elected officials, tribal leaders and the Darfuri diaspora. Most rebel movements were not represented. The main outcome of the ADSC was the endorsement by the stakeholders of the “Doha Draft Document for Peace in Darfur” as the basis for reaching a permanent ceasefire, a comprehensive and inclusive peace settlement and sustainable peace and stability in Darfur. The draft peace document is arranged in seven

Chapters: human rights and fundamental freedoms; power-sharing and administrative status of Darfur; wealth-sharing; compensation and return of IDPs and refugees; justice and reconciliation; permanent ceasefire and final security arrangements; and internal dialogue and consultation and implementation modalities.

The stakeholders also endorsed the formation of the Darfur Implementation Follow-Up Committee (IFC)—chaired by the state of Qatar to include other as-yet-undetermined international partners—to work with the AU and UN to assist all parties to reach a comprehensive agreement.

On 22 June the Council held an informal interactive dialogue with the foreign minister of Burkina Faso and former AU-UN joint mediator, Djibril Bassolé, and the state minister for foreign affairs of Qatar, Ahmed bin Abdullah Al-Mahmoud, to discuss the outcomes of the ADSC. It is understood the mediators highlighted the ongoing problem of securing the participation of all belligerent groups in meaningful peace negotiations. On 23 June the Council President delivered a Council press statement welcoming the outcome of the ADSC as a significant step forward and as the basis for achieving a comprehensive peace in Darfur. The AU and UN have yet to appoint a replacement joint mediator.

The security situation in Darfur remains poor, with reports of continued fighting between various rebel groups and Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and pro-government militia, particularly in the areas of Shangil Tobaya in North Darfur and Jebel Marra in West Darfur. There have been reports of SAF planes bombing these areas.

On 1 June a militia raided three ethnically Zaghawa villages near Shangil Tobaya, looting property and stealing cattle. A group of villagers confronted the militia, recovering some cattle. Witnesses later saw SAF personnel apprehend this group as they returned to their village and took them away. Sixteen of the villagers were executed by firing squad.

On 4 June the government of North Darfur formed a commission of inquiry, comprising representatives from the North Darfur governor’s office, the attorney general’s office, police, the National Intelligence and Security Service and a Zaghawa community leader. On 5 June the commission travelled from El Fasher to Shangil Tobaya to commence its investigation. Militia stopped the car carrying the Zaghawa community leader, who was shot and killed. The convoy immediately returned to El Fasher.

Separately, UNAMID confirmed that fighting occurred on 18 and 19 June between unknown armed men and the SAF in Shangil Tobaya, North Darfur state, resulting in close to 1,000 civilians seeking protection at UNAMID’s nearby team site.

Rebel fighters from the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdul Wahid (SLM-AW) and Minni Minnawi (SLM-MM) and SAF fought from 15 to 23 June in the area of Jebel Marra in West Darfur. SLM-AW claimed to have killed 35 SAF soldiers and said SAF planes had bombed the area forcing hundreds of civilians to flee.

UNAMID has posted a map on its website that shows that about a quarter of Darfur is ready for recovery (i.e. development) activities, mainly the area west of Ed Daen north-westward toward Nyala, Kass, Zalingei and El Geneina; however, approximately three-quarters of Darfur is either only potentially ready or not ready for recovery. The following areas are identified as not ready: areas along the border with South Sudan; the area north-east of Nyala; the area of Shangil Tobaya; the area of Jebel Marra; Kutum town; the area north of Malha; and a large area north of Kornoi along the border with Chad.

On 6 June three Bulgarian pilots who had been kidnapped at an airstrip in West Darfur state on 12 January while working for the World Food Programme were released unharmed.

On 8 June the Council received a briefing on the work of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in Sudan from the court’s prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo. Moreno-Ocampo said crimes against humanity and genocide continued unabated in Darfur, citing attacks on the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups. He added that the current governor of Southern Kordofan, Ahmad Harun (who has been indicted by the ICC) provides a good example of the consequences of ignoring information about serious crimes, saying that in the 1990s Harun used local militia to attack civilians in the Nuba Mountains in Southern Kordofan and used the same tactics between 2003 and 2005 in Darfur.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is that Bassolé’s departure effectively ends the formal AU-UN contribution to internationally based peace talks.

A second key issue is the difficulty of proceeding with a Darfur-based process in the absence of a signed comprehensive peace agreement. A related issue is determining how to encourage or pressure all belligerent groups to agree to a ceasefire in the first instance and then consider a comprehensive peace agreement, such as the draft endorsed at the ADSC.

A further issue will be how to support a sustainable Darfur-based process, balancing the preferences of Khartoum, the AU and
the UNAMID leadership to commence the Darfur-based Political Process (DPP) as soon as possible, bearing in mind the deficits in the enabling environment as outlined in the special report of the Secretary-General in April.

A related issue is how UNAMID can best assist in enhancing the enabling environment for the DPP, including working with Khartoum to lift the state of emergency and improve the human rights situation.

Another issue is how the independence of South Sudan on 9 July will affect the situation in Darfur. A related practical issue will be whether to consider basing some leadership components of UNAMID in Khartoum, to facilitate the UN’s good offices role, following the expected departure of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) from Khartoum as of 9 July.

Underlying Issues
While UNAMID patrols have successfully achieved more access recently, the broader lack of access for the media and humanitarian agencies in Darfur limits information on the humanitarian situation. This lack of information directly impacts UNAMID’s ability to investigate possible situations relevant to their protection-of-civilians mandate.

There is still no ceasefire between government forces and rebel groups, let alone a peace agreement. UNAMID therefore continues to operate in an environment in which it has “no peace to keep.”

Options
The Council could:
- renew UNAMID’s mandate for 12 months with no changes to its mandate or force level;
- include specific reference to UNAMID providing assistance to the DPP;
- make the lifting of the state of emergency in Darfur a condition for UNAMID assistance to the DPP;
- highlight how lifting the state of emergency would facilitate the effectiveness of the DPP; or
- urge the appointment of a replacement for Bassolé to ensure there is an AU-UN representative on the IFC set up by Qatar.

Council Dynamics
The Council is very divided in its approach to a number of aspects of the situation in Darfur.

Positions differ on both the DPP and the Doha process and, as a result, the political role of UNAMID in facilitating the DPP is controversial. Some want the DPP to start immediately with UNAMID support. Others believe a DPP would not be successful in the current circumstances. Many Council members are troubled by the human rights situation in Darfur and some are very concerned that any work toward a DPP at this stage would not be inclusive or sustainable. These members are concerned that a DPP process conducted under these conditions would not lead to real peace but would be a Khartoum-dominated charade.

The other view in the Council is that it is wrong to try to set pre-conditions for the DPP, “ideal scenarios”, that would be difficult for many post-conflict societies to meet. The members who support the immediate start of the DPP feel it is important that the peace process move away from talks with the rebel groups or small delegations sent to Doha and include the full spectrum of Darfuri society. Supporters of the DPP also point out that most rebel groups have rejected the Doha peace talks and their intransigence should not prevent others seeking solutions.

There are also differences between Council members on their approach to applying pressure to rebel groups to cease their confrontations with pro-government elements and join established peace processes. Some on the Council seem to feel that the Council focuses too much attention on its condemnation of the actions of Khartoum and that the Sudan sanctions regime might be a possible approach to pressure leaders such as Abdul Wahid to participate more constructively in talks.

There is a strong possibility that the negative dynamics that characterised some recent discussions on the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Sudan and Southern Sudan will exacerbate the divisions on Darfur and strain the atmosphere of the UNAMID negotiations. (The Council will have been intensively negotiating Sudan-related outcome documents for roughly two months without interruption.)
On 24 June, the Council adopted a presidential statement welcoming the signing of the Kampala Accord, to appoint the members of his cabinet and submit the list of names to the president, who should then forward this to the parliament for endorsement.

The security situation remained unstable. The Islamist rebel group Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on 10 June that killed Somali Interior Minister Abdi Shakur Sheikh Hassan. Other developments, however, indicated a continuing weakening of the rebels, including the killing by Somali police in June of Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Al-Qaida’s leader in East Africa and a field commander for Al Shabaab.

On 21 June, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs Patricia O’Brien briefed the Council on the Secretary-General’s 14 June report on modalities for the establishment of Somali anti-piracy courts. The report addressed the legal and practical considerations for the establishment of such courts, including the constitutional and legal basis in Somalia, adequate criminal and procedural legislation, availability of trained judges and other personnel, imprisonment facilities, financing and timelines. It identified a number of significant challenges that would have to be overcome and indicated that Somali authorities oppose the idea of an extraterritorial court. In her statement, O’Brien underlined, however, that the Secretariat would be ready to respond with urgency to any request from the Council aimed at the establishment of specialised courts.

It is unclear whether the Council will consider the proposal made by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy, in her briefing to the Sanctions Committee on 23 May. She called for expanding the listing criteria under the Somalia sanctions regime to include violations against children and appointing an expert on children and armed conflict to the Monitoring Group.

It is also possible that there will be a briefing by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative Augustine Mahiga. The Mogadishu consultative meeting that was initially scheduled for 11 to 16 June has now been postponed until mid-July.

At press time it was unclear whether there would be any follow-up in July to the Secretary-General’s report on the modalities for the establishment of specialised Somali anti-piracy courts. The International Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia is scheduled to meet on 14 July under the chairmanship of Singapore.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 9 June, Somali president Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and speaker of parliament Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden reached an agreement on transitional issues, the Kampala Accord. The accord effectively extends the transitional period for one year by delaying elections for the positions of president and speaker until August 2012 “in order to adequately prepare and complete priority transitional tasks.” (For more details on the accord, please refer to our Update Report on Somalia of 23 June 2011.)

On 24 June, the Council adopted a presidential statement welcoming the signing of the Kampala Accord. It:

- called on the signatories to honour their obligations under the accord;
- called on the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) to build broad-based representative institutions and consult widely with all stakeholders, including local and regional administrations and international partners;
- welcomed the upcoming consultative meeting in Mogadishu, emphasising that the meeting should agree on a roadmap for the next 12 months with clear time-lines and benchmarks (as called for by the Kampala Accord);
- warned that future support to the TFIs would depend on completion of key tasks; and
- recalled the Council’s authority to impose targeted measures.

Also on 24 June, the Somali president nominated Abdiweli Mohamed Ali to succeed Mohammed Abdullahi Mohammed as prime minister, following the latter’s resignation on 19 June as called for by the Kampala Accord. Abdiweli, a Somali-American like his predecessor, served as minister of planning and international cooperation in the previous government. The Somali parliament approved his appointment on 28 June. The new prime minister now has 30 days, according to the Kampala Accord, to appoint the members of his cabinet and submit the list of names to the president, who should then forward this to the parliament for endorsement.

The Human Rights Council (HRC) renewed the mandate of the UN independent expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia for a period of one year, from September 2011. The HRC requested the independent expert to evaluate the sufficiency and effectiveness of the technical assistance provided to Somalia, and to submit comprehensive reports to the HRC at its next two sessions, in September 2011 and March 2012.

Another key issue is whether to expand the sanctions listing criteria for Somalia to include violations against children or to more specifically target piracy leaders.

A third key issue is whether the Kampala Accord can effectively contain the power struggles among Somali leaders, improve the functioning of the TFIs and open the way for real progress on remaining transitional tasks and in improving security. A related issue is whether the Council should take the opportunity of its focus on Somalia in July to include political language reinforcing recent positive developments so as to help keep them on track and underline the need to implement the roadmap to be agreed at the upcoming meeting in Mogadishu.

A final issue is whether to continue in July the discussions on the proposal to establish specialised Somali anti-piracy courts with a view to making further decisions.

**Options**

Key options for the Council include:

- renewing the mandate of the Monitoring Group without any changes;
- expanding the Somalia sanctions regime listing criteria to include violations against children (it could use language similar to
Russia has taken the lead on legal issues related to piracy and drafted resolution 1976 in close coordination with France.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1976 (11 April 2011) welcomed the report of the Special Adviser on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the coast of Somalia and requested a report within two months on the modalities of establishing specialised courts to try suspected pirates.
- S/RES/1950 (23 November 2010) renewed for a period of 12 months the anti-piracy measures of previous Council resolutions.
- S/RES/1807 (31 March 2008) set out the listing criteria under the Democratic Republic of Congo sanctions regime, which include “political and military leaders . . . recruiting or using children in armed conflicts” and “individuals . . . committing serious violations of international law involving the targeting of children or women.”

Latest Presidential Statement


Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2011/360 (14 June 2011) was the Secretary-General’s report on specialised Somali anti-piracy courts.
- S/2011/277 (28 April 2011) was the latest regular report.

Meeting Records

- S/PV.6560 (21 June 2011) was the meeting on the Secretary-General’s report on specialised Somali anti-piracy courts.
- S/PV.6532 (11 May 2011) was the Special Representative’s latest briefing on Somalia.

Other

- S/AC.51/2011/2 (1 March 2011) were the conclusions on Somalia of the Council’s Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict.
- S/2011/30 (24 January 2011) was a letter from the Secretary-General transmitting Jack Lang’s report on piracy.

Children and Armed Conflict

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to discuss children and armed conflict in an open debate in mid-July, which is expected to be presided over by German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle. Germany is also the chair of the Council working group on children and armed conflict. The main focus of the debate will be on the Secretary-General’s 2011 report on children and armed conflict. The Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy, and representatives from DPKO and UNICEF are expected to brief the Council during the session.

A resolution, possibly adding an additional violation to be used as criteria for the inclusion in the Secretary-General’s annexes, is a possible outcome of the debate.

Germany is also organising a side event on attacks on schools and hospitals on 30 June in preparation for the open debate. The keynote speech will be delivered by Her Highness Sheikha Moza Bint Nasser, Consort of the Emir of the State of Qatar and UNESCO Special Envoy on Basic and Higher Education. Among the panellists are representatives from UNESCO, UNICEF, ICRC and the Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict. Other interested parties like the Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict, a network of 35 interested member states chaired by Canada, will also be given the opportunity to make statements.


Key Recent Developments

The Secretary-General’s 2011 report, published on 23 April, highlighted the growing trend of attacks against schools and recommended the Council expand the “gateway to the annexes” to the Secretary-General’s report to include parties that attack schools and hospitals. (Secretary-General’s reports since 2002 have contained two annexes of parties to armed conflict that recruit children: Annex I is made up of situations that are on the Council’s formal agenda and
Annex II are those not on the Council’s agenda.) Other recommendations focused on the application of targeted measures against persistent perpetrators of grave violations against children, including:
- designating child-protection criteria in the renewal or establishment of the mandates of sanctions committees;
- requesting specific child protection expertise in its expert groups; and
- including systematic information on violations against children in reports and recommendations to relevant sanctions committees from the Council and the working group on children and armed conflict.

In 2011 no parties were removed from the annexes but four were added—two in Yemen (placing it for the first time on the Secretary-General’s annexes) and two in Iraq. The report notes the signing of action plans by Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)-Free Will and SLA/Mother Wing (Abu Gasim) in Sudan and the Afghan National Security Forces.

A delegation representing the working group on children and armed conflict visited Afghanistan from 4 to 9 June. Germany, which is the chair of the working group, sent representatives from New York, while the rest of the delegation was made up of representatives from the Kabul missions of the UK, US, France, China and Russia. The main objectives of the trip were to take stock of progress made by the Afghan government in the implementation of the Action Plan signed in January and to assess the impact of the conflict on the safety and accessibility of schools and hospitals for children. During the visit the delegation met with government officials, community and religious leaders, civil society and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

So far in 2011, the working group has adopted four sets of conclusions—on Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Afghanistan and Chad. It is currently discussing conclusions for the Central African Republic, which it is hoping to adopt by the end of July. In the second half of the year, the working group is expected to consider the Secretary-General’s reports on Iraq, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Colombia.

Germany, as chair of the working group, also issued two press statements, on 18 March and 18 May, addressing non-state actors who are parties to the conflicts in the DRC and Afghanistan respectively as a follow-up to the working group’s conclusions on the DRC and Afghanistan.

(For more information on the Working Group’s activities in 2010 please see our upcoming Cross-Cutting Report on Children and Armed Conflict.)

Since the last debate in June 2010, Coomaraswamy has made five field trips: Uganda (June 2010), Somalia and Kenya (November 2010), Afghanistan (January 2011), Philippines (April 2011) and Chad (June 2011). In both Afghanistan and Chad, she witnessed the signing of action plans by the government.

Coomaraswamy briefed the Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee on 23 May and proposed that it consider adding a new listing criteria related to children to its sanctions regime. This was the second briefing of a sanctions committee on the issue of children and armed conflict. She briefed the DRC Sanctions Committee on 21 May 2010, which most likely led in August 2010 to the committee’s adding the practice of recruitment and use of children as criteria against nine individuals already under sanctions. And on 1 December 2010 the committee added an individual who was designated for holding direct and command responsibility for child recruitment and maintaining children within his troops.

**Key Issues**

The key issue for the Council is whether to focus a resolution on expanding the trigger to include attacks against schools and hospitals (and the related need for monitoring and action plans for this new criterion) or to focus also on possible action regarding sanctions committees, persistent violators and non-state actors.

A key issue is whether the Council should try to use specific language for the new trigger based on international humanitarian law or if it should keep the wording more general, and thus allow the Secretariat some flexibility.

Also an issue is whether a possible new trigger should be confined to attacks and threats of attacks against schools and hospitals or if it should also include attacks against teachers and medical personnel.

Another issue is whether there is a need to address the lack of compliance by persistent perpetrators with the working group’s demands.

A related issue is assessing the tools used to reach out to non-state actors and recommending more effective alternatives.

A growing issue for the working group is the difficulty of holding meetings due to a shortage of space and translators.

**Options**

One option is a resolution reiterating resolutions 1882 and the June 2010 presidential statement. Possible new elements may be:
- expanding the criteria for inclusion in the annexes of the Secretary-General’s annual report to include parties that engage in attacks on schools and hospitals in a situation of armed conflict;
- requesting sanctions committees to include the targeting of children in armed conflict as part of their sanctions regime; and
- signalling that the Working Group should be more proactive in recommending that the Council adopt resolutions with targeted sanctions against individuals in appropriate cases; and
- indicating that the Working Group can, if necessary, perform the role of a sanctions committee in situations where there is no sanctions committee.

Other possible options include:
- initiating a discussion on how to address issues like cross-border violations against children, reaching out to non-state actors and persistent violators;
- requesting the Secretary-General to provide alternatives to action plans for non-state actors;
- suggesting a report from the Secretariat reviewing the mechanisms set up by resolution 1612 to be presented in early 2012;
- requesting the Secretary-General include in his country-specific reports on children and armed conflict a section on follow-up to the Working Group’s conclusions; and
- requesting that the chair of the working group explore ways of getting funding for field missions.
Council Dynamics
Most Council members appear to be open to the idea of adding an additional trigger through the adoption of a resolution following the debate. The main concern among members appears to be related to ensuring that the language is appropriate for this new trigger, particularly in the context of international humanitarian law.

Under the German chairmanship, which began in January 2011, the working group has significantly reduced the time-lag between publication of Secretary-General’s reports on children and armed conflict and the working group adopting conclusions. Following a strict schedule of weekly meetings with informal meetings as needed, the working group has been able to generally publish about two conclusions every two months.

The constant interaction among members of the working group has led to a collegial working environment in which members appear keen to cooperate in order to keep to a schedule of reports and conclusions. Among the new elected members, Portugal has given this issue high priority and is playing an active role both within the working group and in mainstreaming the issue in the Council. France and the UK also continue to pay keen attention to the issue.

UN Documents

**Security Council Resolution**
• S/RES/1882 (4 August 2009) was the latest children-and-armed-conflict resolution, which expanded the trigger for inclusion in the Secretary-General’s annexes to include killing, maiming and sexual violence.

**Presidential Statement**
• S/PRST/2010/10 (16 June 2010) was the latest presidential statement.

**Secretary-General’s Reports on Children and Armed Conflict**
• S/2011/250 (23 April 2011) was the latest report on children and armed conflict.
• S/2011/366 (15 June 2011) was on Iraq.
• S/2011/55 (3 February 2011) was on Afghanistan.
• S/2010/577 (9 November 2010) was on Somalia.
• S/2010/369 (9 July 2010) was on the DRC.

**Security Council Debate**
• S/PV.6341 and resumption 1 (16 June 2010) was the latest debate on children and armed conflict.

**Conclusions of the Security Council Working Group**
• S/AC.51/2011/4 (3 May 2011) was on Chad.
• S/AC.51/2011/3 (3 May 2011) was on Afghanistan.
• S/AC.51/2011/1 (8 Mar 2011) was on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
• S/AC.51/2011/2 (8 Mar 2011) was on Somalia.
• S/AC.51/2010/5 (12 November 2010) was on Afghanistan.
• S/AC.51/2010/4 (12 November 2010) was on the Philippines.
• S/AC.51/2010/3 (30 September 2010) was on Somalia.
• S/AC.51/2010/2 (3 June 2010) was on Sri Lanka.
• S/AC.51/2010/1 (16 June 2010) was on Uganda.

**Letter**
• S/2010/410 (2 Aug 2010) was the annual report on the activities of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, established pursuant to resolution 1612 (2005), covering the period 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010.

**Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Impact of Climate Change**

**Expected Council Action**
In July, the Council will hold an open debate on the impact of climate change on the maintenance of international peace and security. The executive director of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), Achim Steiner, is expected to address the Council, and the Secretary-General may attend. Many countries are also expected to participate in the open debate.

**Background**
On 17 April 2007 the Council held a high-level debate on the relationship between energy, security and climate, initiated by the UK, which held the Council presidency that month. It was the first time the Council had addressed the potential impact of climate change on security. Some of the debate, particularly statements by non-members of the Council, focused on the compatibility of the agenda item with the mandate of the Council under the UN Charter. There was no formal outcome. Both the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77+China sent letters to the Council expressing concern about Council encroachment on the prerogatives of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council.

Since 2007, global concern about climate change and its implications intensified. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—established by UNEP and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO)—issued its assessment report, “Climate Change 2007” in November 2007, which highlighted the reality of climate change, its impact and possible consequences.

On 3 June 2009, on the initiative of the small-island developing states of the Pacific Ocean, the General Assembly held a debate on climate change and its possible security implications. At the end of the debate, the Assembly adopted a resolution inviting the relevant organs of the UN to intensify their efforts in considering and addressing climate change, including its possible security implications, within their respective mandates. It also requested the Secretary-General to submit to it a comprehensive report on the possible security implications of climate change.

On 11 September 2009, the Secretary-General presented his report to the General Assembly. The report identified climate change as a “threat multiplier” that exacerbates existing threats, such as persistent poverty, weak institutions for resource management and mistrust between communities. It identified five further ways in which climate change might affect security: climate change could threaten food security and human health and increase exposure to extreme events; it could undermine the stability of states by slowing or reversing development; it could increase the likelihood of domestic conflict due to migration and depleting resources, with possible international ramifications; disappearance of territory might raise issues of sovereignty, rights and security; and international conflict might be a result of climate change’s impact on shared or demarcated international resources.
In December 2009, the 15th session of the Conference of Parties (COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, was held in Copenhagen. The outcome document sets a goal of reducing global emissions so as to hold temperature rises to no more than 2°C but no legally binding commitments to emissions reductions to achieve that goal. It also called for the mobilisation of funds from developed to developing countries, but does not lay down specifics to achieve this end. The outcome was heavily criticised by some developing countries claiming that it did not address their needs.

The 16th session of the COP took place in Cancun, ending in December 2010 with an agreement that set up a new fund to help poor countries adapt to climate changes, and created new mechanisms for transfer of clean energy technology, but again fell short of specific legal obligations to achieve these ends.

Key Issues
A key issue is whether the Council can find common language for a statement which reflects an appropriate role that the Council can play to complement other international efforts to address climate change.

A second issue is how to integrate analysis of the role that climate change may have in sparking or aggravating existing tensions that could lead to conflict into existing conflict-prevention analyses. A related issue is integrating long-term thinking into the Council’s work on the serious implications of climate change dimensions, where they exist, as is evident by the name given to the G-77 countries which strongly support the integration of climate change and security issues; and on having this topic on the Council’s agenda again in the future.

Some NAM and Group of 77 + China countries are still concerned with the Council engaging on an issue that, even given its security dimensions, is not in their view principally part of the Council’s responsibility under the UN Charter, and is the focus of other UN organs and entities. Brazil, for example, has argued that there is no direct link established between climate change and peace and security and that social and economic development provides adequate tools to tackle climate change’s impact. However, the members are also conscious that there are now a number of NAM and G-77 countries which strongly support the Council giving attention to the issue.

There is growing understanding that specific conflicts may have climate change related aspects.

Compared to the impression left four years ago, there seems to be less resistance to having the debate on the Council’s agenda, as is evident by the name given to the agenda item itself, linking climate change to security issues. Some members think that this may be due to the fact that since the debate in 2007, more scientific evidence has been produced on the long-term ramifications of climate change and some have linked recent conflicts to the rising prices of basic foodstuffs and diminishing water resources.

UN Documents
Press Statement
• SC/9000 (17 April 2007) was a statement issued following the debate on energy, security and climate containing divergent views on the relevance of the agenda item to the Council’s mandate.

Meeting Record
• S/PV.5663 and S/PV.5663 Resumption 1 (17 April 2007) was the debate on energy, security and climate.

Secretary-General’s Report
• A/64/350 (11 September 2009) was the report addressed to the General Assembly on climate change and its possible security implications.

Letters
• S/2007/211 (16 April 2007) was sent by the Group of 77 and China to the president of the Council on their concerns regarding the Council’s involvement in matters of climate change.
• S/2007/203 (13 April 2007) was sent by NAM to the president of the Council on their concerns regarding the Council’s involvement in matters of climate change.
• S/2007/186 (5 April 2007) was the letter from the UK to the president of the Council containing its concept note for the debate on energy, security and climate.

Selected General Assembly Resolution
• A/RES/63/281 (3 June 2009) invited UN organs to consider the issue of climate change within their mandates.
Côte d'Ivoire

Expected Council Action
In July the Council is expected to renew the mandate for UNOCI. The current mandate expires 31 July. The Secretary-General’s report on UNOCI, due 30 June, is expected to recommend extending UNOCI for 12 months at current troop levels, with a midterm review. Legislative elections are scheduled to be held before the end of the year.

Key Recent Developments
Although the security situation began to improve in May and June, continuing violence indicated that the post-election crisis had not entirely ended. A report from Human Rights Watch, issued 2 June, asserted that since mid-April forces loyal to Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara had killed at least 149 “real or perceived” supporters of former president Laurent Gbagbo, while pro-Gbagbo forces had killed at least 220 individuals. On 9 June the human rights section of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) reported an increase in attacks and violence by the Forces Républicaines de la Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), loyal to Ouattara, in the south and west of the country.

Reports continued of Liberian mercenariesretreating west, towards the border with Liberia, contributing to insecurity in those areas. On 14 June, the National Liberian Police announced the arrest of a Liberian mercenary, formerly in the employ of Gbagbo, operating under the nom de guerre “Bob Marley.” Human Rights Watch has linked Marley to massacres in which more than 100 people were killed, including the execution of at least 50 people, among them many children, on 25 March in Bloléquin, a village in western Côte d’Ivoire.

On 17 June, Liberian authorities discovered an arms cache consisting of AK-47 rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and several thousand rounds of ammunition near the border with Côte d’Ivoire. Liberia has detained 92 Ivorian refugees for questioning regarding the weapons. A recent report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia highlighted ongoing problems with the movement of arms and armed groups across the border separating the two countries.

Liberian refugees who had taken refuge at the offices of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Abidjan during the immediate post-election violence resumed their repatriation on 27 May. Repatriation had begun in March, but was suspended due to increasing insecurity.

On 14 June, UNHCR reported that it had registered 322,277 internally displaced people across Côte d’Ivoire, mainly in the west, but also in the north and Abidjan. According to UNHCR, there continue to be more than 180,000 Ivorian refugees in Liberia and more than 25,000 Ivorian refugees in other countries in West Africa.

On 1 June, Ouattara announced a new government that notably lacked representation from Gbagbo’s Popular Front Party.

The international commission of inquiry on Côte d’Ivoire submitted its report to the Human Rights Council on 9 June.

On 23 June, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, formally submitted a request to open an investigation into crimes committed in Côte d’Ivoire following the elections in November. Earlier, on 17 June, he gave public notice that victims of the post-election violence have 30 days to submit testimony to the Court. Moreno-Ocampo is scheduled to visit Côte d’Ivoire from 27 June to 4 July.

On 16 June the Ivorian government announced the establishment of a national commission to investigate human rights violations perpetrated during the post-electoral crisis.

On 22 June, Amnesty International reported that authorities in Côte d’Ivoire had detained at least 50 individuals, including high profile politicians from Gbagbo’s party, without charge. The UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations conducted a military capability study in Côte d’Ivoire from 21 to 29 April and in Liberia from 3 to 6 May. An interdepartmental assessment mission also visited Côte d’Ivoire from 1 to 14 May. Based on these visits, the Secretary-General wrote to the Security Council on 10 June recommending an extension of the redeployment of three armed helicopters to UNOCI and the return of two deployed utility helicopters to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

On 29 June, the Security Council adopted resolution 1992 extending the redeployment of troops and helicopters from UNMIL to UNOCI.

Human Rights-Related Developments
The international commission of inquiry established by the Human Rights Council (HRC) in its resolution 16/25 visited Côte d’Ivoire from 4 to 28 May and submitted its report on 9 June. The Commission found that serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law had been committed following last November’s presidential election. Violations were committed both by forces loyal to Gbagbo and to Ouattara. The HRC expressed concern over the humanitarian situation in Côte d’Ivoire, called for an immediate end to the violence there and established a mandate for a UN independent human rights expert for a period of one year. The expert will assist the government in the implementation of the resolutions of the HRC and of the recommendations of the commission of inquiry. It will report to the March 2012 session of the HRC.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is determining focus for UNOCI’s mandate in the new situation. A related issue is whether to make permanent the earlier ad hoc troop increases.

Another key issue is determining the new role for UNOCI in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of all combatants and reform of the security sector.

A final issue is whether to apply, in the specific case of Côte d’Ivoire, the key element arising from its thematic debate in February on security and development of the need to address root causes (S/PRST/2011/4) and the implications of it for UNOCI’s role in promoting national reconciliation.

Underlying Problems
Though there has been some improvement on the ground in Côte d’Ivoire, major challenges remain. Reconciling supporters of Gbagbo and Ouattara in order to reunify the country is the foremost issue facing Côte d’Ivoire. At the same time, the continuing presence of unofficial armed groups—including Liberian mercenaries—is having a destabilising effect throughout the country. While police have gradually been returning to their posts, many precincts and policing functions remain in the hands of FRCI soldiers.

Given the lack of effective control by Ouattara over the various armed groups that
supported him in the post-election crisis, disarming and demobilising militias active throughout the country is an issue, as is the question of impunity for those responsible for the ongoing violence. The refusal of militia leader Ibrahim Coulibaly, formerly loyal to Ouattara, to disarm his troops in April, and his subsequent death in an assault on his compound by the FRCI, provides evidence of the complexity of the relationship between Ouattara and his allies.

**Options**
The Council could:
- renew UNOCI for six months, focusing the mission’s role on assisting with legislative elections;
- renew UNOCI for 12 months, with a mid-term review and a much wider focus;
- increase the authorised troop level to permanently include the previous ad hoc troop authorisations, including the elements temporarily transferred from UNMIL;
- maintain the current number of authorised troops in UNOCI;
- enhance UNOCI’s current mandate for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration;
- note the emerging evidence of major human rights violations and enhance UNOCI’s current mandate to support the promotion and protection of human rights, including the importance of women’s and children’s issues;
- add provisions for UNOCI to assist Ivorian authorities with security sector reform to the mandate; or
- highlight national reconciliation issues and reinforce the good-ofices role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in promoting reconciliation and the importance of his leadership of the security and development work of the UN with specific responsibilities to integrate efforts to address root causes.

Regarding support for the electoral process, the Council could:
- limit UNOCI’s role to providing logistical support for the elections;
- mandate UNOCI to provide more detailed technical support to Ivorian electoral authorities throughout the electoral process; or
- reiterate the certification role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the legislative elections.

**Council Dynamics**
Many members seem to want to ensure that the recent gains made in Côte d’Ivoire are not allowed to slip. As a result there appears to be some consensus amongst Council members on the need to reinforce disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and add security sector reform to the mandate of UNOCI.

It seems also that most Council members also agree that UNOCI should maintain currently mandated troop levels, including the temporary increases authorised in resolutions 1942 and 1967.

It is likely that there would be resistance from some members of the Council to continuing the certification role mandated for the special representative of the Secretary-General in the presidential elections. Resolution 1765 mandated that the special representative would certify both the presidential and legislative elections. However, some seem to feel that the problems following the presidential election were complicated, rather than helped, by the special representative’s certification role.

Some Council members seem concerned about the national reconciliation path and see risks in the lack of representation of members of Gbagbo’s party in the new Ivorian government. They appear interested in emphasising the need for national reconciliation.

Some differences seemed apparent in the Council in discussions over extending the redeployment of certain assets from UNMIL to UNOCI. It seems a number of Council members were concerned by the continued redeployment of resources from UNMIL to UNOCI, particularly ahead of potentially difficult Liberian elections expected later this year. It seems that the compromise to return utility helicopters to UNMIL, whilst retaining the attack helicopter capacity in UNOCI, addressed some of these concerns.

France is the lead country on this issue in the Council.

**UN Documents**

**Security Council Resolutions**
- S/RES/1981 (13 May 2011) extended the mandate of UNOCI until 31 July and authorised the Secretary-General to extend until 30 June the temporary redeployment of UNMIL assets to UNOCI.
The briefing came after an increase in LRA activities in the previous months. Following the meeting, the Council issued a press statement (SC/9791) expressing concern at the direct and serious threat the activities of the LRA posed to the civilian population, humanitarian operations, and regional stability.

On 24 November 2010, US President Barack Obama presented a new strategy to address the LRA problem. The US military has been providing intelligence and financial support to the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF)—operating in CAR, the DRC and southern Sudan, as well as Uganda—for several years. The four main objectives of the strategy were to increase protection for civilians, encourage rebel defections, improve humanitarian access and “apprehend or remove from the battlefield Joseph Kony and senior commanders” (Kony, facing charges for international crimes before the International Criminal Court (ICC), is still at large and believed to be in the DRC). The US Senate Armed Services Committee set aside $35 million to fund the strategy on 17 June.

In 2011, LRA attacks have continued, most noticeably in the DRC. In March, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that since January, the LRA had intensified its attacks in Orientale province of the DRC, killing some 35 people, abducting 104 others and displacing more than 17,000 people. Since 2008, according to Human Rights Watch, the LRA has killed over 2,400 civilians in the region, abducted 3,400 others—many of whom are children—and displaced over 400,000 people from their homes.

During the second half of May, a joint UN assessment mission was sent to the region, led by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and DPKO. The mission visited Sudan, the DRC, the Central African Republic and Uganda and then met with AU officials in Addis Ababa. The mission was to report to the Secretary-General’s policy committee towards the end of the month.

The mission found that the LRA has weakened in capabilities and numbers yet continues to be a disruptive and life-threatening force in the region. The report may also note that the governments in the region do not see the LRA as a major strategic threat and are in disagreement as to whether and to what extent the LRA is active in a regional sense. Animosities between the different government forces active in the region have been a factor in pursuing any kind of joint strategy. The mission seems to have concluded that these issues must be addressed for a regional response to the LRA to succeed.

On 8 June, the defence and security ministers of those countries affected by the LRA (CAR, DRC, Uganda and southern Sudan) met to consider the establishment of a regional task force authorised by the AU with the support of the international community. They decided to set up a joint mechanism to coordinate their efforts, as well as those of the AU and other partners. In a press release, the ministers agreed to submit the outcome of the meeting to their governments and to the AU summit of heads of state to be held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea on 30 June to 1 July.

The International Working Group on the LRA, a group of interested states, met in Washington, D.C., on 27 June.

On 28 June, the Council adopted resolution 1991 renewing the mandate of the Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). The resolution contains language supporting MONUSCO’s efforts in assisting those resisting the LRA. Regarding the priorities of the mission, the resolution refers to MONUSCO’s mandate protection of civilians as laid out in resolution 1925, which contains language on efforts to address the LRA issue, both in terms of military assistance and integration.

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is that the briefing is the first step in a process. The next step will be the possible AU initiative for a regional response to address the LRA. And for later in the year, once more information is available, the question would be identifying the Council’s best role in supporting or endorsing AU efforts and what other steps can be taken by the Council to enhance existing and future peacekeeping missions’ (as the new mission in Southern Sudan) response to the LRA.

Another factor is the role that the newly established UN Regional Office in Central Africa (UNOCA) can play in coordinating UN efforts on this issue.

Options

Options for the Council in July include:

- issuing a press statement indicating its ongoing concerns and future intentions to keep a focus on the issue;
- requesting UNOCA to enhance cooperation between the UN missions and information-sharing related to LRA;
noting the upcoming AU regional discussions and requesting that the Secretary-General keep the Council informed of the particulars of the initiative as they unfold;

urging better cooperation among countries in the region in prioritising the need for protection of civilians in LRA-affected areas;

including language on the LRA in the resolution establishing the mandate for the new mission in Southern Sudan; or

taking no action at this time.

Council Dynamics

Though the LRA has not been discussed in the Council as a standalone issue since November 2009, it has come up in country-specific contexts, and Council members have continued to discuss the LRA regularly at the expert level. Against the backdrop of the recent changes in LRA activity, and in light of the recent UN assessment mission and the AU initiative, some members feel that this is an opportunity to regain momentum towards addressing the issue.

Most Council members seem supportive of a strong regional response to the LRA. At this juncture, it is unclear whether and to what extent this includes agreement on the role for the Council, and the UN as a whole. Some Council members seem conscious that taking a leading role on the LRA issue at this time may complicate rather than facilitate regional initiatives. Council members are likely to gain more knowledge following the AU summit and the meeting of the international working group in Washington.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/ (28 June 2011) extended MONUSCO’s mandate for another year. It condemned the attacks by LRA in the Orientale Province of the DRC and demanded that LRA immediately stop recruiting and using children and release all children associated with it.
- S/RES/1919 (29 April 2010) renewed the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sudan UNMIS and encouraged cooperation among UN peacekeeping missions in addressing regional threats such as the LRA.

Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2008/48 (22 December 2008) condemned Joseph Kony’s repeated failure to sign the Final Peace Agreement, strongly condemned the recent attacks by the LRA in the DRC and southern Sudan, recalled the ICC arrest warrant for certain LRA leaders, welcomed the joint efforts made by countries in the region to address the security threat posed by the LRA and welcomed the reestablishment of peace and security in northern Uganda.

Press Statement

- SC/9791 (17 November 2009) expressed concern at the threat posed by LRA activities to civilian populations and regional stability. It called for the relevant UN peacekeeping missions to coordinate strategies and share information to address the issue.

Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2011/298 (12 May 2011) was the latest report on the DRC, stating that the LRA continues to attack and abduct civilians in Orientale Province.
- S/2011/239 (12 April 2011) was on UNMIS, recognizing a decline in LRA attacks in southern Sudan.
- S/2006/478 (29 June 2006) was on the LRA.

Lebanon

Expected Council Action

In July Council members are expected to hold consultations on the Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of resolution 1701, which in August 2006 called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams is expected to brief.

The situation in southern Lebanon has not been as quiet as in previous reporting periods. And Council members will also have in mind the recent formation of a government and its potential effects for cooperation with UNIFIL and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

Council members will also have in mind the current regional political climate and in particular effects on Lebanon and spill over effects from the crisis in Syria.

No formal action is expected. The UNIFIL mandate expires on 31 August.

Key Recent Developments

At press time, the Secretary-General’s report was expected on 30 June. It is expected to underscore that for most of the reporting period Lebanon was without a government which curtailed progress with Lebanon’s national dialogue, border issues and Ghajar. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has had to cope with two significant events during the reporting period: the 15 May Nakba protests and a 27 May attack on a UNIFIL convoy. The report is also expected to track ongoing issues such as demarcation of the Blue Line, Israeli overflights and security along the line of buoys.

On 13 June Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati announced his cabinet in which 18 of the thirty seats go to two Hezbollah MPs and its allies. Former Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s 14 March coalition did not join the new government. Key portfolios including defence, foreign affairs, justice and telecommunications ministries are held by Hezbollah-aligned ministers. (The previous Hariri-led government fell on 12 January when 11 Hezbollah-aligned ministers withdrew.)

The immediate focus of the new government will be to agree on a ministerial statement which requires parliamentary approval (it seems the current government has a slight majority, 66 of 128 seats). Media reports indicate that policy is stalled on the issue of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

Mikati has said there would be no radical shift in policy and the government would maintain close ties with other Arab states. Previously, he said that the future Lebanese government would respect international obligations, including resolution 1701. However, he has yet to comment specifically on Lebanon’s continued cooperation with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

Analysts note that the Syrian crisis and expected Tribunal indictments may have influenced the recent cabinet formation. (Syrian President Bashar al-Assad met with Lebanese MP Walid Jumblatt on 9 June in Damascus and said a new Lebanese cabinet was essential to Lebanon’s stability.)

On 27 May the Council issued a press statement condemning an attack on a UNIFIL convoy. A bomb exploded on a road...
regularly travelled by UNIFIL injuring six Italian peacekeepers and two Lebanese civilians. (The last such attack was in January 2008.)

On 15 May it seems that Israeli forces killed 11 civilians and injured 130 when crowds of Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon approached the Blue Line near Maroun al Ras in southern Lebanon during al-Nakba protests. Coordination between UNIFIL, Israeli and Lebanese forces effectively avoided a repeat event anticipated for 5 June, the anniversary of the 1967 war.

On 6 May the Tribunal’s prosecutor filed a second amendment to the original sealed indictment. Media reports indicate confirmation of the indictments may be ready very soon but any trial activity is unlikely until later in the year. Hezbollah has said it expects the indictments to implicate its members. (The indictments were a key factor in the Hariri government’s collapse in January.)

On 6 May, Special Envoy Terje Rød-Larsen briefed Council members on the Secretary-General’s 1559 report. The discussion in consultations focused on the ongoing disarmament challenge and related border security issues, the then lack of a government and developments in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. It seems the Syrian situation was also brought up during consultations.

**Key Issues**

A key issue is how to get Israel and Lebanon to move from the status quo—a fragile cessation of hostilities—toward a ceasefire and permanent solution. But in the current climate progress seems more remote than ever.

Related issues include the regular Israeli overflights and its occupation of Ghajar in violation of resolution 1701 and the fact that Hezbollah now maintains significant military capacity in violation of resolutions 1559 and 1701.

The issue of Sheb’a Farms also remains frozen.

Regarding the Tribunal, there are no immediate issues for the Council. However, if the expected Lebanese ministerial statement rejects cooperation with Tribunal the issue may come to the fore.

**Options**

The Council’s most likely option is to take no action, as has been the practice since April 2008 (the last time the Council issued a presidential statement on resolution 1701). But, given the apprehension about the possible heightened spill over effects into Lebanon from the situation in Syria, a press statement is one possibility.

**Council Dynamics**

Council members agree that UNIFIL is an important stabilising factor between Israel and Lebanon—especially in light of the current developments in the region. Most realise that continued quiet in southern Lebanon may be the only achievable goal in the medium term.

Most Council members agree that arms smuggling and disarmament remain key concerns but seem to accept that progress is only likely in the context of an inter-Lebanese dialogue and improvement on the Israel-Syria track, which at this juncture seems unlikely to yield progress any time soon.

On the issue of the formation of a new Lebanese government, Council members clearly attach value to the fact that Lebanese constitutional process is being followed. Council members will be hoping for an explicit statement from Lebanon that it remains committed to its international commitments, including Council resolutions. On resolution 1701, Lebanon—an elected member of the Council—reiterated this commitment in a 26 January letter to the Council.

Regarding the Tribunal, Council members seem to anticipate continued tension in Lebanon as indictments wind their way through the judicial process. Council members in past practice have generally underscored the importance of the Tribunal’s independence and foresee no Council role in its activities. However, if Lebanon’s ministerial statement is problematic vis-à-vis the Tribunal then some Council members may consider it necessary to address that development in some way.

Lebanon, for its own domestic political reasons, is likely to be uneasy about any deviation from past practices when it comes to the UNIFIL renewal or addressing Tribunal issues in the Council.

France is the lead country on Lebanon in the Council.

**Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1757 (30 May 2007) established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to investigate the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others.
- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel.
- S/RES/1680 (17 May 2006) strongly encouraged Syria to delineate its common border with Lebanon.
- S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) urged the disarmament of all militias and extension of the Lebanese government’s control over all Lebanese territory.

**Security Council Press Statement**

- SC/10264 (27 May 2011) condemned the attack on a UNIFIL convoy.

**Secretary-General’s Reports**

- S/2011/312 (15 May 2011) and S/2011/309 (16 May 2011) were letters from, respectively, Lebanon and Israel regarding the 15 May al-Nakba protests.
- S/2011/47 (26 January 2011) was a position paper by Lebanon on implementation of resolution 1701.

**Special Coordinator for Lebanon**

Michael Williams (UK)

**Special Envoy for the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559**

Terje Rød-Larsen (Norway)

**UNIFIL Force Commander**

Maj. Gen. Alberto Asarta Cuevas (Spain)

**Troop Contributors:** Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, El Salvador, France, FYR of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary,
Key Recent Developments

Ambassador Gennady Tarasov, the high-level coordinator for Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property, briefed the Council on 22 June. The members of the Council released a press statement the same day welcoming the commitment to full implementation of all Iraqi obligations to Kuwait. The statement also welcomed efforts undertaken in the framework of the technical subcommittee of the Tripartite Commission to develop a functional mechanism for exploratory missions to search for missing persons. (The Tripartite Commission was established under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1991 after the invasion of Kuwait to investigate missing persons. France, Saudi Arabia, the UK and the US participate in the commission along with Iraq and Kuwait. The technical subcommittee focuses on practical aspects of the search.)

However, the statement also noted that limited progress had been made on clarifying the fate of the Kuwaiti national archives and urged Iraq to fulfil as soon as possible its pledge to establish a national body for coordinating efforts with regard to missing property, including the archives. The statement also supported extending the financing of the activities of the high-level coordinator for six months to build on the present momentum.

The speaker of Iraq’s Council of Representatives, Osama al Nujaifi, met with US Vice President Joseph Biden on 22 June in Washington to discuss a range of issues. A statement issued after the meeting reported that Biden thanked Nujaifi for his support of a $400 million compensation package for US victims of the Saddam regime and offered continued support for the development of democratic institutions in Iraq.

Leon Panetta, the nominee to be the next US Secretary of Defense, told a Senate panel on 9 June that Iraq was considering the possibility of requesting some US troops to stay in the country after 2011 and that he believed such a request would be forthcoming. The next day, a US State Department spokesperson said the US was continuing with its scheduled withdrawal. Any possible request for some troops to remain in Iraq was up to the Iraqi government.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki held meetings with his cabinet on 7 and 8 June to discuss chronic power shortages and related issues. There has been increasing pressure on the government to tackle problems related to the delivery of social services. (In the wake of public protests, Maliki had directed government ministers on 27 February to accelerate public-service reforms within the next 100 days.)

On 26 May thousands of supporters of Iraqi political leader and cleric Moktada al Sadr marched in Baghdad in support of a complete US troop withdrawal by the end of the year.

Violence in Iraq has continued. Several bombs killed almost two dozen people near a Shiite religious site in Baghdad on 23 June. On 21 June two car bombs killed more than 20 people in the city of Diwaniya, and on 3 June two suicide bombings in Tikrit killed nearly the same number. Scores more were wounded in the attacks. According to an Oxfam report on the protection of civilians issued in May, civilian deaths in Iraq in 2010 exceeded 4,000, making it the conflict-affected country with the highest number of civilians killed that year.

Human Rights-Related Developments

The UN working group on the use of mercenaries completed a visit to Iraq on 16 June. The group, which reports to the Human Rights Council, examined the government’s efforts to regulate and monitor the activities of private military and security companies in Iraq to prevent human rights abuses. While noting a decrease in such incidents in Iraq, the working group urged the Iraqi government to bring into force as a matter of priority its legislation regulating security companies.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is whether to extend the UNAMI mandate. A related question is the contribution UNAMI makes to the stability of Iraq.

Another issue is whether the composition of the mission should be altered in some way to better address the challenges it faces. A related issue is how best to ensure that UNAMI is provided with adequate protection in light of the imminent US withdrawal (US troops will apparently cease direct support of UNAMI in July and be fully withdrawn from the country by December). Possible implications for the UN budget fall within the purview of the General Assembly.

Underlying Problems

A key underlying problem is the fact that significant sectarian and political divisions persist in Iraq. In addition, key ministerial posts such as that of defence have been unfilled for months and tension remains over the extent to which political power should be consolidated in the central government. Disagreement over whether to request some limited continuation of US troop presence in the country may cause further contention among political actors.

Options

Options for the Council include:

- renewing the UNAMI mandate without substantial changes to its scope or composition;
- including some acknowledgement of the increasing security needs of the mission (and the related increased cost) and the persistent violence impacting on Iraqi civilians with some reference to protection of civilians norms developed by the Council;
- urging Iraq to finalise its government formation by filling all vacant ministerial posts; or
- reiterating the importance for Iraq to make progress on resolving outstanding...
issues related to Kuwait (including borders, missing persons and property).

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

Most Council members view UNAMI as providing important support to Iraq and favour the extension of the mission’s mandate. Many members remain concerned about the overall security situation in the country, as well as the significant social unrest over the provision of government services that has been apparent during the last several months.

Members are also aware of the mission’s expanding security needs in light of the US withdrawal and are sensitive to the memory of the 2003 bombing of the mission’s compound in Baghdad. Members are mindful that in April’s UNAMI briefing Melkert stressed the need for the mission to generate a full range of logistics and security resources and hoped for continuing member state support through the provision of additional UN guards and approval for enlarging the UNAMI compound in Baghdad.

Most Council members continue to view the three resolutions adopted in December 2010 as significant steps in restoring Iraq’s international standing. (The resolutions lifted Chapter VII measures related to weapons of mass destruction, ended the Oil-for-Food programme and provided a final six-month extension for the Development Fund for Iraq, or DFI.) As expressed in June’s press statement, members are concerned with the lack of progress on locating the Kuwaiti national archives. Many Council members continue to stress that it is important for Iraq to make further efforts to fulfill its obligations to Kuwait.

The US is the lead country on Iraq issues in general, and the UK is the lead on Iraq/Kuwait issues.

**UN Documents**

**Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1958 (15 December 2010) terminated the Oil-for-Food programme and established an escrow account to provide indemnification to the UN with regard to the programme for a period of six years.
- S/RES/1957 (15 December 2010) terminated the WMD-related Chapter VII measures Iraq was subject to and urged Iraq to ratify the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA as soon as possible.
- S/RES/1956 (15 December 2010) extended the DFI and related immunities a final time until 30 June 2011 and affirmed that five percent of Iraqi proceeds from oil sales would continue to be deposited into a compensation fund after that date.
- S/RES/1956 (5 August 2010) extended UNAMI’s mandate through 31 July 2011 and welcomed Iraq’s provisional application of the IAEA additional protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, though reaffirming the need for its ratification.

**Press Statement**

- SC/10289 (22 June 2011) expressed the Council’s intention to continue funding for the activities of the high-level coordinator for missing Kuwaiti persons and property.

**Meeting Record**

- S/PV.6511 (8 April 2011) was the latest briefing on UNAMI.

**Secretary-General’s Reports**

- S/2011/373 (20 June 2011) was the most recent report on Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property.
- S/2011/213 (31 March 2011) was the most recent report on UNAMI.

**Other Relevant Facts**

- Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Iraq
  - Ad Melkert (Netherlands)
- Secretary-General’s High-Level Coordinator for Iraq/Kuwait Missing Persons and Property
  - Gennady Tarasov (Russia)

**Peacekeeping**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council is expected to have a briefing on UN peacekeeping from a number of UN force commanders and the Secretariat in late July. At press time the format and participants had not been decided.

**Background**

A similar session was held last year when the Council was briefed during an open debate (S/PV.6370) by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Alain Le Roy and the Force Commanders of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), as well as the chief of staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO). The Force Commanders shared lessons learned, laid out the challenges ahead and were given a chance to respond to questions raised in members’ statements. Bangladesh, Canada, India, Pakistan, the Philippines and the Republic of Korea also participated in the debate last year.

The Council has had regular consultations on peacekeeping since its August 2009 presidential statement (S/PRST/2009/24) calling for regular briefings from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support. The statement also called for better information-sharing on military operational challenges and more meaningful engagement with police and troop-contributing countries (TCCs). In 2010 these briefings took place every three months. There seems to have been no recorded decision on reducing the frequency but the briefings now appear to be occurring on a six-monthly cycle in 2011.

**Key Recent Developments**

The Working Group on Peacekeeping has held four meetings under Nigerian leadership this year. It adopted its programme of work for the first half of 2011 at its first meeting on 18 February. On 7 and 27 April the working group was briefed by DPKO on challenges facing UN missions due to the evolving political situations in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At its fourth meeting, the Working Group discussed peacekeeping transitions and exit strategies.

In the second half of the year, the working group may focus on issues that were raised by the TCCs during the UN’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) 2011 session. It also hopes to provide inputs to the Council ahead of the renewal of peacekeeping mandates and may work with the Secretariat on case studies on UNMIL and MINUSTAH, the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) all of which will have mandates coming up for renewal in the second half of 2011.

On 17 February, Le Roy and Under-Secretary-General for Field Support Susana Malcorra briefed the Council on the issues related to national consent by
host countries that have peacekeeping missions. Following the briefing, Council members discussed issues related to managing consent in peacekeeping operations, including the idea of qualified consent and the implications of a more legal contract with host governments.

The C-34 substantive session ran from 22 February to 18 March. However, it took delegates until 9 May to agree on the final report (A/AC.121/2011/L.3) due to significant differences over the issue of troop cost reimbursement.

**Issues**
The key issue for the Council in July is how to make the best use of the presence of the force commanders to obtain a better understanding of the operational challenges.

An issue is whether receiving feedback from the field in this form can be translated into more realistic peacekeeping mandates.

Another issue for the Council is how best to maximise the Working Group’s activities in a way that is useful to the Council, particularly ahead of mandate renewals or setting up new missions.

**Options**
Options for the Council include:
- listening to the briefings and responding with statements in an open meeting;
- moving into a closed meeting after the Force Commanders brief in order to allow for a more open and interactive discussion; and
- agreeing to more regular briefings of the Council and the working group by relevant Force Commanders as mission mandates come up for renewal.

**Council Dynamics**
Most Council members are open to being briefed by the Force Commanders and appear to have found last year’s discussion constructive. Russia, which had initiated last year’s debate, and India appear particularly keen to keep a conversation going with the Force Commanders. There appears to be a slowing of momentum, however, with peacekeeping issues generally. In 2009 the UK and France had been pushing for peacekeeping to be taken up on a regular basis by the Council. But this appears to have waned and may be due to other priorities, such as emerging crisis situations in the Middle East and the pressing need for regular briefings from DPKO on these situations, rather than on peacekeeping as a thematic issue.

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**Afghanistan**

**Expected Council Action**
The Council is expected to hold an open debate on Afghanistan, during which it will receive a briefing from the head of UNAMA, Staffan de Mistura, drawing upon the latest quarterly report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan. UNAMA’s mandate expires on 23 March 2012.

No outcome is expected.

**Key Recent Developments**
On 22 June US President Barack Obama announced the US would reduce its troop presence (currently over 90,000) in Afghanistan by 33,000 over the next 12 months. US troops would continue to reduce their presence until a complete transition to Afghan responsibility for security in mid-2014. France indicated it would likewise draw-down its forces (currently just under 4,000) along the same timeline. On 22 March the Security Council renewed the mandate of the UN Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) mandate for 12 months. The Council’s negotiations seemed to focus on how best to incorporate Afghan government views on UNAMA’s role in the eventual transition to full Afghan ownership, assistance for reconciliation and reintegration processes and broader UN assistance to Afghan development priorities.

The foreign minister of Afghanistan, Zalmay Rassoul, had written to the Council on 1 March, outlining the government’s requests for UNAMA’s mandate. The letter was not distributed as a document of the Council (i.e. made public), but it is understood that Rassoul emphasised the importance of the UN “delivering as one” in Afghanistan by better integrating the work of UNAMA and UN funds and programmes, as well as the UN better coordinating other international assistance. A key request of the Afghan government was a comprehensive review of UNAMA’s mandate.

In the new mandate, the Council requested the Secretary-General to conduct a comprehensive review of UNAMA's mandated activities and UN support in Afghanistan by the end of 2011, with a view to informing the Council’s review of UNAMA's mandate in March 2012. The review would be conducted at around the same time as the Bonn international conference on Afghanistan, scheduled for November, allowing the outcomes of Bonn to feed into the review process. The Council also strengthened the language on the importance of Afghan leadership and the transition process, women’s rights, sustainability of electoral processes and the threat posed by illicit drugs.

On 17 June the Council adopted resolutions 1988 and 1989, which split the sanctions regimes set up under resolution 1267 into two separate regimes covering the Afghanistan Taliban (resolution 1988) and Al-Qaida (resolution 1989). Resolution 1988 replaces resolution 1267 as far as Afghanistan is concerned and the new sanctions regime is now a country-specific one for Afghanistan. This gives both the Council and Afghan authorities greater flexibility in its implementation. The resolution recognised that the sanctions regime can play a part in the Afghan-led reconciliation processes and, for example, detail delisting criteria for reconciled individuals, as well as re-listing criteria for reconciled individuals who resume activities proscribed by the sanctions regime.

Violence has continued in Afghanistan in recent months, as the country enters what is known as the “spring/summer fighting season”. Violence has been particularly targeted against Afghan police. In April, Taliban fighters carried out a string of bomb attacks, assassinations and suicide attacks in Kandahar city. On 15 April a suicide attacker dressed in a police uniform detonated explosives in the police headquarters, killing the police chief of Kandahar.

On 25 April more than 541 inmates escaped from the jail in Kandahar city, including about 106 Taliban commanders. Taliban forces facilitated the escape by digging a 360-metre tunnel under the prison from a nearby residential compound. The tunnel took more than five months to dig.

On 7-9 May approximately 60 Taliban fighters launched a coordinated assault on government installations in Kandahar, effectively paralysing the city. Senior police in Kandahar blamed the prison escape for the raid, noting that the complex nature of the assault was due to the presence of many of the experienced fighters and commanders who had escaped.
Most of the 25 insurgents killed were identified as prison escapees.

On 11 June a suicide bomber attacked a police station in Khost province, killing two policemen and a civilian and wounding 12 others. On 22 June at least six policemen were killed in an attack on a checkpoint in Ghazni province.

UNAMA’s director of human rights announced on 11 June that more civilians were killed in May than in any other month since 2007, when UNAMA began documenting civilian casualties. At least 368 civilians were killed in combat in May, with anti-government elements responsible for 301, or 82 percent, of the deaths and pro-government forces, including NATO forces, responsible for 45 deaths, or 12 percent. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) set by anti-government elements were responsible for 41 percent of the total number killed. Coalition airstrikes were blamed for 3 percent of the total deaths. On the same day the figures were announced, a roadside IED killed 15 civilians, including eight children and four women, in Kandahar province.

On 25 June a suicide attack on a hospital in Logar province, south of Kabul near the Pakistan border, killed 38 people, including pregnant women, children and medical staff.

On 28 June a coordinated assault by up to nine suicide attackers on the Intercontinental hotel in Kabul resulted in the deaths of two police and 11 civilians. Afghan forces fought the attackers for five hours, eventually calling in NATO support.

UNAMA was directly affected by violence on 1 April when the UN compound in Mazar-i-Sharif in the northern province of Balkh came under attack by armed elements within a crowd that had gathered to protest the burning of a Koran by an American pastor in Florida weeks earlier. Armed elements overwhelmed the guards at the compound, killing four Nepalese Gurkhas, and then hunted for international staff within the compound. Three staff members were executed.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council in July is whether the meeting can be used to build up momentum ahead of the Bonn conference, particularly on the UN’s role in political and development processes in Afghanistan relevant to the transition to full Afghan ownership and responding to the Afghan government concerns in Rassoul’s letter of 1 March.

A further issue, following the adoption of resolution 1988, is how further to integrate the work of the 1988 Sanctions Committee with the broader political consideration in the Council of the situation in Afghanistan, particularly as it pertains to Afghan-led efforts to reconcile with former members of the Taliban. A related procedural issue may be to elect a chair of the new 1988 Committee.

Options
One option is a presidential statement following the debate highlighting key political issues relevant to the work of the UN in Afghanistan, drawing upon observations from the Secretary-General’s report and key points in Rassoul’s letter.

Council Dynamics
Although it is only a short period of time since the Council’s detailed discussions surrounding the renewal of UNAMA’s mandate, the US decision to downsize and growing domestic political opposition to the war could add new angles to the debate. However, few Council members seem to be expecting any new Council decisions, with the focus remaining on the importance of transition to Afghan authority. Previously some members had proposed pushing Afghanistan reports and debates to every four months rather than every three to avoid unnecessary repetition. Other members, however, preferred to maintain the current reporting cycle given the dynamic situation on the ground.

The issue of reconciliation with the Taliban remains a highly sensitive issue for a number of Council members, particularly with respect to domestic approaches to counter-terrorism. It seems some members are already wondering what it will mean for the Bonn conference, and the implications if known Taliban attend.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1401 (28 March 2002) created UNAMA.

Latest Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2011/381 (28 June 2011)

Other

- S/10216 (1 April 2011) was the press statement issued after the attack on the UN premises in Mazar-i-Sharif.

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Peace Agreement. CPJP attacks have been behind several anti-government attacks, including election-related violence in February and an attack in the north-eastern city of Birao in November 2010, in which six people were killed and several soldiers were captured.

The ceasefire will allow for progress in the areas of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR). While DDR has yet to begin in the northern areas of the country, considerable progress has been made in the development of a national reintegration strategy for former combatants.

In his latest report, the Secretary-General noted that the average number of Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) attacks had decreased by nearly half in the last six months and that LRA groups previously operating in the northeast have apparently left. Nevertheless, LRA attacks have continued elsewhere. On 13 March the LRA attacked a village in the central mining area of Nzako, killing at least six people, including four CAR soldiers, and abducting between 30 and 50 others. On 16 January the LRA attacked two villages, Agoumar and Madabazouma, in southern CAR, abducting 12 civilians, mostly women.

On 23 January, François Bozizé was re-elected as president of CAR after receiving 66 percent of the vote. The results were widely contested, and the outcome was rejected by three of the five candidates, who called the balloting a “masquerade.” Three electoral commission officials were subsequently arrested on 11 February as part of a fraud investigation. Following these events, the government has planned to revisit the electoral code and look into lessons learned to avoid irregularities in future elections.

On 19 May, the Secretary-General announced the appointment of Margaret Vogt of Nigeria as his special representative and head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in CAR (BINUCA), replacing the outgoing Sahle-Work Zewde.

On 2 March the UN opened a new political office designed to support Central African nations in consolidating peace, preventing conflict and tackling cross-border arms trafficking and organised crime. The UN Regional Office in Central Africa (UNOCA), located in Libreville, Gabon, has an initial mandate of two years and will work closely with the Economic Community of Central African States, composed of Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and São Tomé and Príncipe.

**Developments in the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)**

On June 16 and 17 the PBC hosted a donor’s roundtable in Brussels in collaboration with the government of CAR, the UN Development Programme and the African Development Bank. The event, which drew approximately 250 attendees from various delegations, institutions, foundations and NGOs and sought to sensitise partners to the priority areas of CAR’s new poverty reduction strategy, was seen as successful. The poverty reduction strategy focuses on security, peace, governance, rule of law, economic revival, regional integration and essential social services.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

In his report tabled at the March session of the Human Rights Council, the representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Walter Kälin, was sharply critical of the international community for not paying enough attention to the brutal mass atrocities committed by the LRA, which resulted in arbitrary displacements in the south-east of the country. According to Kälin’s report, CAR security forces did not have the capacity to protect the population adequately. He foresaw that a reduction in MINURCAT’s small military force and a rapid demobilisation of armed groups would exacerbate the situation.

**Key Issues**

A key issue is the security situation in northeastern CAR, which remains precarious following MINURCAT’s withdrawal.

A second issue is the threat to stability posed by the LRA and determining how this can best be addressed within the Council’s wider approach to tackling the LRA threat in the subregion.

A third issue is the need for progress on SSR and good governance, including establishing rule-of-law capacity in terms of moving forward with the peacebuilding process and proceeding with the DDR process.

### Options

One option for the Council is to simply receive the briefing.

A second option would be to make a determined effort to build on the thematic conclusion reached by the Council in its debate in February on security and development and the need to address root causes. Further integrating its efforts with the PBC country-specific configuration would be a related option.

Another option would be to lift the profile of the security situation in the country by issuing a statement.

### Council Dynamics

There continues to be general consensus among Council members on the need to support the peacebuilding process in CAR. But Council members tend to take a wait-and-see perspective on how to address the situation. The Secretary-General’s report and Vogt’s briefing may influence the Council’s next steps.

France is the lead country on this issue in the Council.

### UN Documents

**Presidential Statements**

- S/PRST/2010/29 (20 December 2010) was on the situation in Chad and CAR.
- S/PRST/2010/26 (14 December 2010) extended the mandate of BINUCA for another 12 months.
- S/PRST/2009/35 (21 December 2009) welcomed the establishment of BINUCA, called for all political stakeholders to “ensure free, fair, transparent and credible preparation and conduct of the 2010 elections” and asked that the elections take place within the timeframe set by the constitution.

**Secretary-General’s Reports**

- S/2011/311 (16 May 2011) was the most recent report on the situation in CAR.
- S/2011/241 (13 April 2011) was the report on children and armed conflict in CAR.
On 3 May the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (KIC) published its report investigating the circumstances surrounding the ethnic violence that broke out in June 2010 in southern Kyrgyzstan. The report describes how 470 people were killed, 1,900 people were injured, more than 400,000 were displaced and an unknown number of women suffered sexual violence. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay on 4 May welcomed the report and urged the government of Kyrgyzstan to act quickly on the report’s recommendations that it carry out further investigations and prosecutions.

Jenča visited Kyrgyzstan in mid-April with Pierre Morel, the EU Special Representative for Central Asia, and Herbert Salber, Special Representative of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Kyrgyzstan. In a 14 April statement in Bishkek, the envoys praised the citizens of Kyrgyzstan who “have brought to life a new constitution based on the principles of parliamentary democracy,” which were “strengthened through the successful 2010 parliamentary elections.” They also emphasised that the tragic events of June 2010 must be addressed through continued dialogue, tolerance and reconciliation, and they expressed their expectation that the recommendations of the KIC will contribute to this process.

On 31 May, UNRCCA held the third annual meeting of deputy foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. They discussed enhancing regional cooperation and facilitating interaction between UNRCCA and Central Asian states to consolidate joint efforts to eliminate threats to stability and development in the region.

On 5–6 May, Jenča visited China, where he met with Foreign Minister Chen Guo Pin to discuss current trends in Central Asia. Their talks covered efforts to combat terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking, finding solutions to problems of resource management and environmental degradation and the role of Central Asian states in response to the situation in Afghanistan.

**Background on UNRCCA**

UNRCCA was inaugurated on 10 December 2007 as a special political mission by the Department of Political Affairs with the aim of assisting the countries of the region in building their conflict-prevention capacities. The Centre’s programme of action for the period January 2009 to December 2011 identifies three priority areas:

- cross-border threats from illicit activities (terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking);
- environmental degradation and management of common resources such as water and energy; and
- implications for the region in relation to the situation in Afghanistan.

**Key Issues**

An issue for Council members is whether opportunities may exist for better use of preventive diplomacy tools in the region.

Another issue is the general security situation in the region, including threats posed by ethnic conflict, resource management concerns, terrorism and instability in neighbouring Afghanistan.

**Options**

One option is for Council members to simply receive the briefing.

Another option, following recent practice, is for Council members to issue a press statement following the briefing reaffirming support for UNRCCA’s activities in the region.

**Council Dynamics**

Council members seem to find the semi-annual briefings to be a useful tool for facilitating discussion on the situation in Central Asia as a whole and welcome the work of UNRCCA, particularly in light of the Council’s thematic work on preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention.

**UN Documents**

**Press Statement**

- SC/10151 (13 January 2011) welcomed the most recent briefing by Miroslav Jenča and expressed appreciation for the work of UNRCCA in responding to challenges in the region, in particular in the context of recent developments in Kyrgyzstan.

**Letter**

- S/2007/280 (15 May 2007) and S/2007/279 (7 May 2007) was an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Security Council about the establishment of UNRCCA.
West Africa (UNOWA)

Expected Council Action
In July the Council is expected to consider a report of the Secretary-General on UNOWA. It is also expecting a briefing by Special Representative Said Djinnit.

UNOWA’s mandate expires on 31 December 2013.

Key Recent Developments
On 17 December 2010, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Office in West Africa Said Djinnit briefed the Council on developments affecting peace and security in the West African subregion. In his briefing, Djinnit stressed that the international community must apply innovative thinking to reduce election-related tensions in West Africa. Djinnit outlined UNOWA’s priorities, which include:
- security sector reform;
- preventing and combating drug trafficking and organised crime, in collaboration with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime;
- supporting the work of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); and
- promoting respect for human rights and mainstreaming of a gender perspective in conflict prevention and management initiatives in the subregion.

Djinnit also stressed that UNOWA intends to continue to enhance regional cooperation, promote social and economic development and address common security threats, including terrorism, and that UNOWA will continue to work alongside ECOWAS, the AU and other regional stakeholders.

To these ends, UNOWA has recently engaged regional actors on issues of common concern in the region. On 18 to 20 May, UNOWA organised a conference on elections and stability in West Africa in Praia, Cape Verde, in collaboration with the host country and the UN Development Programme and with support from the UN Department of Political Affairs, ECOWAS, the AU, Organisation internationale de la Francophonie and the EU. The conference reviewed recent elections in the subregion in order to identify best practices and propose practical solutions to support states, particularly those with upcoming elections scheduled between 2011 and 2013.

On 28 February, Djinnit chaired the 20th high-level consultation in Dakar in order to coordinate the action of the UN in promoting peace and stability in West Africa. The consultations were attended by the heads of the various UN missions in the subregion, including the UN Mission in Liberia, the UN Operation in Cote d’Ivoire and the Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau.

On 20 December the Council extended the mandate of UNOWA for three years.

Key Issues
The key issue for Council members is assessing whether and how UNOWA’s regional approach to trends in, and challenges to, peace and security in the West Africa is adding value to peace consolidation in the subregion.


Options
Options for the Council include:
- simply receiving the briefing and considering the Secretary-General’s report;
- adopting a statement highlighting key issues raised in the Secretary-General’s upcoming report and reiterating the Council’s support for the work of UNOWA; and
- discussing, in an interactive dialogue involving the countries from the subregion and the chairs of the relevant PBC Country-Specific Configurations, the key underlying issues, along with relevant thematic issues such as drug trafficking.

Council Dynamics
Council members are generally supportive and feel that the UNOWA office is useful, especially in monitoring and addressing issues that threaten the subregion’s peace and security but may not be on the Council’s agenda. Council members seem to have confidence in the work being done by Djinnit.

Nigeria is the lead country on this issue in the Council.

UN Documents

Selected Presidential Statements
- S/PRST/2009/32 (8 December 2009) was on threats posed by drug trafficking.
- S/PRST/2009/20 (10 July 2009) was on the situation in West Africa.
The Liberian constitutional referendum is scheduled for August.

There will be an open meeting organised by the Counterterrorism Committee to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1373 and the establishment of the Committee in late-August or September.

Legislative and presidential elections in Liberia are expected in October.