



SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT

MONTHLY FORECAST

MAR 2011



28 February 2011

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OVERVIEW FOR MARCH

China will hold the presidency in March.

In an effort to ensure a more strategic Council approach to the **Somalia** issues, China is planning to organise an open debate on the situation. Statements by the Secretary-General are also likely. A presidential statement is expected. An open debate on **Afghanistan** is also planned in conjunction with adoption of an extension to the UNAMA mandate and by a briefing by the head of UNAMA, Staffan de Mistura

Several briefings are expected on:

- **Iran**, by the chair of the 1737 Sanctions Committee on Iran in March (this will be the first briefing by the current chair, Ambassador Néstor Osorio of Colombia);
- **Liberia**, by the head of UNMIL, Ellen Margrethe Løj, as well as by the chair of the Liberia configuration of the Peace-

building Commission, the permanent representative of Jordan, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein;

- **Sierra Leone**, by head of UNIPSIL Michael von der Schulenburg, as well as on the latest report of the Secretary-General;
- **Sudan** sanctions, by the new chair of the Sudan Sanctions Committee, Colombia's Ambassador, Néstor Osorio;
- **Cyprus** and the Secretary-General's good-offices report by Secretary-General's special adviser on Cyprus, Alexander Downer, in consultations; and
- **Lebanon**, also in consultations, on the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of resolution 1701, most likely by the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams.

Consultations are also likely on the ongoing events in **Côte d'Ivoire**.

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Aide-Memoire

Important matters pending include:

- In October 2009 the Council renewed the mandate of the panel of experts of the Security Council **Sudan Sanctions Committee** in resolution 1891 and requested the panel to submit a final report on its findings and recommendations no later than November 2010. The panel submitted its report to the Sanctions Committee in October 2010. The Committee conveyed the report to the Security Council in December 2010, but the Council has yet to decide to publish the report in accordance with its usual practice.
- The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights

violations in **Côte d'Ivoire**, requested in a May 2004 presidential statement (S/PRST/2004/17), was never made public. Also on Côte d'Ivoire, the December 2005 report by the Secretary-General's Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not been published.

- The position of **Special Envoy for Myanmar** has not been filled since Ibrahim Gambari left the post in January 2009. At the time Vijay Nambiar, the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General, took on the position of Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Myanmar in what was expected to be temporary role.
- On 11 November 2009 in resolution 1894

on **protection of civilians**, the Council requested the Secretary-General to develop guidance for UN operations and other relevant missions on reporting for enhancing the Council's monitoring and oversight. There has been no report back to the Council on this.

- On 28 May 2010 in resolution 1925 on the mandate of MONUSCO, the operation in the **DRC**, the Council requested the Secretary-General to elaborate the concept of operation and rules of engagement of MONUSCO, in line with the resolution, and to report back to the Council and the TCCs. The Secretary-General has yet to

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Aide-Memoire (continued)

report back to the Council and the TCCs on this issue.

- Resolution 1904 in December 2009 indicated that the **expert groups assisting the three counterterrorism committees** (the 1267 Committee on Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions, the 1373 Committee or CTC, and the 1540 Committee on weapons of mass destruction) should be co-located and asked the Secretary-General make the necessary arrangements “as soon as possible.” This request, reiterated in September 2010 (S/PRST/2010/19), is still outstanding.
- UNAMI reports on human rights in Iraq, in the past were produced every two to three months. They have decreased in their frequency. The last report, released in July 2010, covered the period from 1 July to 31 December 2009.
- The request in resolution 1460 on **Children and Armed Conflict** that all the Secretary-General's reports to the Council on country-specific situations include the protection of children is not yet implemented. In 2009 protection of children elements had been incorporated into only half of the relevant country-specific reports.
- The Secretary-General has not yet re-energised his Advisory Committee on the **Prevention of Genocide** (it has not met since 2008).

- A biennial report by the Secretary-General on **small arms** requested on 29 June 2007 in a presidential statement is yet to be produced for 2010. The last report on small arms was published in April 2008.
- The mandate to the Secretary-General to assist with the delineation of the international borders of **Lebanon**, especially Sheb'a Farms, in accordance with resolution 1701, continues to await completion.
- The Council requested the Secretariat on 21 November 2006 (S/2006/928) to update the index to Council notes and statements on **working methods**. This has not been published.

Status Update since our February Forecast

- **DRC:** On 7 February, Special Representative for the DRC Roger Meece briefed the Council on the situation in the country (S/PV.6476). In a press statement issued following the briefing (SC/10167), the members of the Council expressed concern over lack of progress in security and judicial sector reform and the high levels of insecurity in eastern DRC. Members also condemned the recent sexual violence in North and South Kivu by elements within the Congolese army. They called for the swift prosecution of all perpetrators of human rights abuses and called upon the Congolese authorities to advise the Secretary-General on measures taken.
- **Interdependence between Security and Development:** On February 11, at the initiative of Brazil, the Council held an open debate (S/PV.6479 and resumption 1) on the interdependence between security and development. Representatives of 46 non-Council member states participated in the debate, two of which were at the ministerial level. The debate was also attended by six foreign ministers of Council members and the Secretary-General. Following the debate, the Council issued a presidential statement (S/PRST/2011/4), emphasizing that security and development are closely interlinked and mutually reinforcing for the achievement of sustainable peace. The Council further reiterated that a comprehensive and coherent approach, addressing the roots of each conflict and incorporating political, security, development, human rights and rule of law activities is crucial for a country's sustainable recovery from conflict.
- **Thailand/Cambodia:** On 14 February, the Council held a private meeting under the agenda item “Letter dated 6 February 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Cambodia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2011/58)” (S/PV.6480). The Council heard a briefing by Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe and the chair of ASEAN, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia Marty Natalegawa. The Council also heard statements from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia, Hor Namhong, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Kasit Piromya. The Council issued a press statement (SC/10174) expressing grave concern about the recent armed clashes between Cambodia and Thailand. Members called on the two sides to display maximum restraint and avoid any action that may aggravate the situation. They further urged the parties to establish a permanent ceasefire, and to implement it fully and resolve the situation peacefully and through effective dialogue; expressed support for ASEAN's efforts and encouraged the parties to continue to cooperate with the organisation in this regard. At the ASEAN meeting on 22 February Thailand and Cambodia agreed to allow unarmed Indonesian observers to monitor a ceasefire. Indonesia is sending around forty military and civilian observers to be positioned on both sides of the border.
- **Peacekeeping:** On 17 February, the Council was briefed by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Alain Le Roy and Under-Secretary-General for Field Support Susana Malcorra on the issue of national consent in host countries that have peacekeeping missions. Brazil as Council president had earlier circulated a concept note on this issue. Council members had discussed a range of issues related to managing consent in peacekeeping operations including the idea of qualified consent

and the legal implications of a contract with host governments.

- **Guinea-Bissau:** On 15 February, the Secretary-General issued the latest report of the Secretary-General on activities of UNIOGBIS. On 25 February the Council was briefed by the head of UNIOGBIS, Joseph Mutaboba, on developments in the country.
- **OSCE:** On 15 February, the Chair of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Lithuanian Foreign Minister Audronius Ažubalis, briefed the Council (S/PV.6481). Among the priorities identified by Ažubalis was seeking tangible progress in addressing protracted conflicts, increasing media freedom and education on tolerance and intensifying the OSCE's work in supporting UN-led stabilisation efforts in Afghanistan. He also noted intent to cooperate with the UN in promoting a universal legal framework on terrorism and pledged to enhance the OSCE's response to organised crime.
- **Kosovo:** On 16 February, Special Representative and head of UNMIK, Lamberto Zannier, briefed (S/PV. 6483) the Council on the Secretary-General's latest report on Kosovo (S/2011/43). He stated that political instability and uncertainty had characterised the last three month reporting period and that no long-term stability and development of Kosovo depended on a successful process of reconciliation among the communities. He also called for the immediate investigation of allegations made against members of the Kosovo Liberation Army of organised crime, including trafficking in illegal organs and noted that the EULEX was ready to undertake the probe. Zannier also criticised the conduct of recent elections.
- **Protection of Civilians:** On 18 February, at the initiative of Brazil, Council members met in informal consultations to discuss the three protection issues on the Council's agenda: protection of civilians; women, peace and security; and children and armed conflict. There were

briefings by Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Atul Khare, Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict Radhika Coomaraswamy and Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict Margot Wallström. The goal of the consultations was to help ensure a coherent Council approach and mutually supportive Secretariat actions on all three protection issues. There seemed to be agreement that the current protection framework functions well, but that coordination on the ground needs to improve.

- **Libya:** On 22 February, the Security Council issued a statement (SC/10180) on the situation in Libya in response to government violence against peaceful demonstrators. Members condemned the use of force against civilians, called on Libya to meet its responsibility to protect its population and stressed the importance of accountability. The Council held a closed meeting under the agenda item "Peace and security in Africa" with 75 member states, including the Libyan permanent representative, also in attendance (S/PV.6486), followed by informal consultations. The Arab League on 22 February and the AU on 23 February also issued statements condemning the use of force against civilians. On 25 February the Council was briefed by the Secretary-General followed by informal consultations where members were expected to discuss a range of Chapter VII deterrent measures against the Libyan regime. (For more information please see our *Update Report on Libya* of 25 February 2011.)
- **Timor-Leste:** On 22 February, the head of UNMIT, Ameerah Haq, briefed an open debate of the Council (S/PV.6485). The prime minister of Timor-Leste, Xanana Gusmão, addressed the Council. Representatives of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines and the EU also participated in the debate. On 24 February the Council

extended the mandate of UNMIT for a further 12 months (S/RES/1969).

- **DPRK:** On 23 February, the chair of the 1718 Committee on DPRK sanctions briefed Council members in informal consultations.
- **Middle East:** On 24 February, UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Robert Serry briefed the Council and called for credible and effective international intervention in the peace process. On 18 February, a draft resolution (S/2011/24) condemning Israeli settlement activity was vetoed by the US (the first use of the veto by the Obama administration and the first US veto since 2006). The other 14 members of the Council voted in favour (S/PV.6484). The US said that while it agreed with Council members about the illegitimacy of settlement activity it was unwise to resolve core issues of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict in the Council. In the days leading up to the vote, the US proposed a three pronged package to the Palestinians in lieu of the resolution: a presidential statement broadly along the lines of the draft resolution, taking up the 8 February Russian proposal for a visiting mission to the region and stronger language on 1967 borders coming out of the next ministerial-level Quartet meeting (at that time expected in mid March). The incentives were not sufficient for the Palestinians to withdraw the draft resolution originally tabled on 18 January with 122 co-sponsors. At the time of the vote a month later the draft had a very different and much smaller set of 79 co-sponsors (18 countries, mainly European joined the list, while some 61 others, mainly from NAM, dropped out). Some states formally withdrew sponsorship. However, it seems that much of the reduced number was due to the fact that the US raised a procedural objection to the co-sponsorship list claiming that many states had not followed the correct procedure in attaching their names to the draft.

Somalia

Expected Council Action

In March, at the initiative of China, the Council is expected to hold an open debate on Somalia with the participation of the Secretary-General. The Somali government and the AU have also been invited to speak. A presidential statement seems likely. A key objective for the debate is to demonstrate a more strategic Council approach to the issue of Somalia.

Also, in March, it seems likely that there will be some action on the assets-freeze provision of the Somalia sanctions regime. In resolution 1916 the Council decided to establish an exemption to this provision for payments “necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia” and this is set to expire on 19 March. The Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia is due to report to the Sanctions Committee on the impact of the exemption, and a briefing is expected by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. In addition, the chair of the Sanctions Committee, Indian Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri, is due to report to the Council on the work of the Committee. (Resolution 1844 calls for the Committee to report to the Council every 120 days.)

It is also possible that the Council will act on the recommendations presented in January by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Legal Issues related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, Jack Lang. At press time negotiations were underway on a draft resolution prepared by Russia, taking up many of Lang’s proposals.

The International Contact Group on piracy off the Coast of Somalia is scheduled to meet on 21 March in New York and the International Contact Group on Somalia is also expected to meet in March, in Kampala.

Key Recent Developments

Following a briefing in the Council on 14 January by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, Council members agreed on a press statement expressing support for Mahiga’s work “in helping Somalis work towards post-transitional arrangements” and expressed their intention to monitor the situation closely. They also called on the Somali government to “redouble its efforts” to complete the remaining transitional tasks and on the international community to

provide additional resources and support to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

In recent weeks, discussions on Somalia have intensified in various forums and in the process it has become clear that there is no real strategic consensus on how to handle the end of the so called “transitional period” in Somalia. (The five year transitional period as defined by the 2004 Transitional Federal Charter of Somalia was extended by two years by a parliament vote in January 2009 and expires in August this year.)

On 26 January, Mahiga announced that he had started consultations with key stakeholders on the remainder of the transitional period and the nature of “post-transitional” arrangements. He said there was “unanimous agreement” both inside and outside Somalia that the transition could not be extended beyond August. He admitted, however, that the constitutional process would not be completed in time and stressed the need for a political solution.

On 30 January, the subregional organisation, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), took a contrary position, saying that it was important “to extend the term of the current Transitional Federal Parliament while the remaining political dispensation be handled by the people of Somalia.” IGAD also expressed disappointment that the Council in resolution 1964 had ignored the AU Peace and Security Council’s requests to the UN Security Council relating to Somalia, which included authorisation for increased funding for AMISOM from UN-assessed contributions, imposition of a naval blockade and no-fly zone over Somalia and effective implementation of sanctions. (Please see our 8 December 2010 *Update Report on Somalia* for more details.)

The AU, at its summit on 31 January, increased the pressure by calling on the UN Security Council to provide greater support to AMISOM and “fully assume its responsibilities towards Somalia and its people,” including through increased funding from UN-assessed contributions. It also emphasised the need to broaden the reconciliation process and complete all remaining transitional tasks.

On 3 February the Somali parliament, ignoring Mahiga’s position, voted to extend its mandate for another three years. The vote

was widely criticised. Mahiga called it a disappointing decision taken in haste without the required level of discussion and consultation and said the UN, the AU and IGAD would meet soon with the Somali political leadership to discuss the way forward.

On 23 February, AMISOM, IGAD and the UN Political Office in Somalia announced in a joint communiqué that they had adopted a joint regional strategy to support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in the management of the transitional period.

Also in February, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos, following her first official visit to Somalia, said severe drought had exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in the country. Malnutrition rates among children had risen and 2.4 million people or 32 percent of the population were now in need of aid.

According to recent reports by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the number of casualties registered in Mogadishu in 2010 was the highest since 2000, when record keeping began. It increased from 5,000 in 2009 to more than 6,000 last year, of which nearly 40 percent were women and children.

Violence in Mogadishu appeared to intensify over the last few weeks. There were reports of heavy fighting between Al Shabaab and pro-government forces supported by AMISOM. On 21 February a suicide car bomb exploded at a police base in Mogadishu, reportedly killing at least six policemen and several civilians. On 25 February, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission for Somalia, Boubacar Gaoussou Diarra, congratulated AMISOM on its recent offensive in Mogadishu and said the mission had succeeded in gaining control of three key strategic positions.

Late in February, in response to Lang’s call in January for urgent action to strengthen international counter-piracy efforts, Russia started consultations with Council members on a draft resolution. A key focus of the text appeared to be on legal issues related to piracy. It would request the Secretary-General to explore further Lang’s proposal to establish a new court system for prosecution of suspected pirates comprising specialised courts in Somaliland and Puntland and a specialised extraterritorial Somali court in a third country.

Developments in the Sanctions Committee

The Sanctions Committee on 9 February met for the first time under its new chair, Indian ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri, and heard the mid-term briefing by the coordinator of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, Matt Bryden. Among Bryden's key points was the fact that Al Shabaab, the Islamist rebel group, is now financially self-sufficient, having enough tax income from areas under its control not to rely on outside assistance. The government forces are still very poorly organised and lack a command and control structure. Moreover, Bryden expressed concern over the presence of private security companies in Somalia and said the Monitoring Group would investigate their operations. The Committee was also briefed by Interpol's Special Representative to the UN, Michael Olmstead.

Human Rights-Related Developments

During a press conference at UN headquarters on 3 February, Radhika Coomaraswamy, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, commented on the use of child pirates in and around Somalia. Coomaraswamy said that she had visited Somalia in November and engaged with underage pirates in Puntland, where children were clearly being used for criminal activities. Her office took the view that the children should not be prosecuted as adults.

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council in March is the growing sense that the former strategy of building a credible transitional authority in Somalia is failing. Related issues include whether anything can be salvaged from the old strategy or whether a new approach is needed that is less centred on creating a strong central government and relies more on local and regional authorities. A closely connected issue is whether the Council needs to be more accommodating to the views of the AU on this issue and, as a result, be much more engaged on Somalia itself rather than on symptomatic issues such as piracy.

A key immediate issue is how to respond to the Somali parliament's decision to unilaterally extend its mandate.

Another key issue is the slow progress toward the deployment of the additional 4,000 AMISOM troops authorised by the Council in December and the related issue of UN support for AMISOM.

An interesting question is whether Council members will be ready to enter into a frank assessment of whether there has been measurable progress on the four objectives listed in resolution 1964 to be taken into account for future Council decisions on AMISOM. Those objectives are progress on transitional tasks; adoption of a national security and stabilisation plan; development of Somali security institutions; and reconciliation and consolidation of security in Somalia based on military objectives integrated into a political strategy.

A further issue relating to the Council's thematic work is the continuing violations against civilians being committed in Somalia, including against women and children. The Council's repeated call on the parties to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law have had little impact. (Human Rights Watch recently reiterated its call for an international commission of inquiry to investigate such violations.) A related issue is whether the TFG has made progress in developing an action plan to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers.

The extremely difficult humanitarian situation, which may deteriorate even further as a result of the drought, remains an issue.

While it is symptomatic of the wider issues in Somalia, the question of piracy is still real and the recommendations presented by Lang are now squarely on the table as an issue for the Council in March.

On the sanctions side, an issue is whether to take up the message from the AU (which seems to be to do it properly and enforce the resolutions). A more minor but practical issue is whether to extend the humanitarian carve-out relating to the assets-freeze provision and whether to continue the reports every 120 days from the Humanitarian Coordinator. (Some in the humanitarian community consider this reporting requirement to be excessive.)

A final issue is whether the Sanctions Committee should designate additional individuals or entities for targeted sanctions, in particular pirate leaders.

Options

One option for the Council in March is to continue the status quo — essentially deferring the question of a new strategic approach.

A second option is to continue the status quo on the situation in Somalia itself, and for the piracy issue to become the main focus.

A third option is to use creatively the very rare opportunity of a month in which both China and Russia are separately leading with initiatives in the Council. Coincidentally both these permanent members are focusing on Somalia. Their initiatives do not seem to be in competition with each other and this situation perhaps presents an option of two separate outcomes during the month — one addressing the issues on land including the conditions under which support would continue to be given to the TFG and another in a separate meeting to adopt a resolution on piracy.

A possible option, given the presentational appeal of a single combined strategy, might be to address all these issues in one decision. But given the technical issues involved in the piracy issue and the complex issues on the political side, and the consequent need to conduct negotiations involving different sets of experts, that could be problematic.

Procedurally, in view of the strong interests by many states not members of the Council, one option for the Council would be to finalise the terms of any decisions only after the expected open debate so as to allow the views of all interested parties to be taken into account.

If the Council is ready to move towards a substantive political outcome some options might include:

- deciding to signal higher priority for the situation in Somalia by meeting much

more frequently and requesting more briefings (as it did with the situation in Sudan) and undertaking a small Council mission to the region;

- expressing full support for the Special Representative's positions on the transitional period and the AU position on a broader reconciliation strategy;
- noting that the Somali parliament through its unilateral extension of its "transitional" mandate risked losing the support of the international community;
- stressing the need for a broader and more devolved approach to the reestablishment of state institutions in Somalia—consistent with maintaining the territorial integrity of the state but involving all Somali players, including Somaliland and Puntland—in effect a regions up approach as opposed to a top down approach; and
- convening a frank private meeting with the AU and Uganda and Burundi (the AMISOM troop-contributors) to clarify whether the Council really does support the AU position of using military force to defend the institutions of a centrally governed state in Somalia, and if so what it is prepared to do to respond to the AU requests for assistance, and if not, to explore what this means in terms of alternatives including possibilities of building capacity and strengthening security from a regions up perspective and the role for and levels of support for AMISOM in such a scenario.

On piracy, Lang has set out a number of options which he describes as a comprehensive approach. Options for the Council include:

- limiting its focus to strengthening existing solutions and leaving it to the international contact group on piracy to continue discussions on ways to strengthen prosecution;
- endorsing Lang's set of proposals;
- expressing support for the establishment of a new court system as proposed by Lang but adding a more international component; or
- deciding on a more radical approach based on the idea that treating Somali piracy as essentially a criminal law problem is no longer sufficient. In addition to enhanced provisions for prosecution and trial of captured pirates, the Council could also adopt a new determination that Somali piracy has now become a

serious threat to international peace and security and justifies the application of wider force. The Council could under Chapter VII authorise UN member states acting under an organised coalition to declare wide areas of ocean, including high seas, as enforcement zones and in such zones to use "all necessary means" against pirate vessels or suspected pirate vessels and require that all legitimate vessels in such areas travel in designated lanes or convoys. It could also request the coalition to provide assets to enforce the arms embargo utilising the kind of language used in its "no fly" resolutions for the former Yugoslavia.

Regarding the Somalia sanctions regime, options include:

- adopting a resolution extending for another four months the humanitarian exemption to the assets freeze provision of the Somalia sanctions regime as established by resolution 1916 (it would then expire at the same time as the mandate of the Monitoring Group) and requesting the Humanitarian Coordinator to report to the Sanctions Committee every 180 days instead of every 120 days; or
- deciding not to renew the humanitarian exemption.

Council and Wider Dynamics

The situation in Somalia appears to be of increasing concern to Council members. There seems to be a general sense that the Council needs to step up its approach. Many members cite Sudan and the successful holding of the referendum in January as an example of how consistent, high-level Council attention can have a positive impact. They would like to see a similar strategic approach to Somalia and have welcomed the willingness of China, as Council President in March, to organise an open debate. Historically, China has played an active role on Somalia in the Council, including a period when it was the lead country.

At press time, no details had yet emerged on the specific directions that the Council might go in the planned presidential statement. Members were still waiting to see if Mahiga would succeed in ironing out some of the differences among key stakeholders and provide some guidance on the way forward. But given the underlying differences, including resistance by France, the UK and

the US to the AU requests, it is unclear whether there is a willingness to find real compromises that would add up to a comprehensive strategy.

The Council is also divided on what action to take on piracy. Russia and France favour the establishment of specialised piracy courts, a view that is also shared by most other Council members. The UK and the US, however, are not convinced about this option as they have concerns about the costs and time lags involved. It remains to be seen whether the recent killing of four Americans who had been taken hostage by Somali pirates off the coast of Oman, will have an impact on the US approach.

On sanctions, the extension of the humanitarian carve-out in resolution 1916 seems uncontroversial, but most Council members are waiting for the conclusions of the Humanitarian Coordinator's report to inform their position. The US, however, seems to favour an extension.

The UK is the lead country on Somalia in the Council.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1964 (22 December 2010) renewed the authorisation of AMISOM until 30 September 2011 and raised its troop level to 12,000.
- S/RES/1950 (23 November 2010) renewed for a period of 12 months the anti-piracy measures of previous Council resolutions.
- S/RES/1916 (19 March 2010) extended the mandate of the Monitoring Group for another 12 months with the addition of three new members, decided that the assets-freeze provisions of resolution 1844 would not apply to funds "necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia" and requested the UN humanitarian aid coordinator for Somalia to report to the Council every 120 days.
- S/RES/1844 (20 November 2008) imposed targeted sanctions relating to the situation in Somalia.

Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2010/16 (25 August 2010) was on piracy off the coast of Somalia.

Latest Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2010/675 (30 December 2010) was the latest regular report on Somalia.
- S/2010/556 (27 October 2010) was on piracy off the coast of Somalia.
- S/2010/394 (26 July 2010) provided options for addressing Somali piracy.

Selected Meeting Records

- S/PV.6473 (25 January 2011) was a briefing by the Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Legal Issues related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia Jack Lang.
- S/PV.6467 (14 January 2011) was the most recent briefing by the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Somalia.

Selected Letters

- S/2011/30 (24 January 2011) was from the Secretary-General transmitting Jack Lang's report on piracy.
- S/2010/580 (23 November 2010) was from the chair of the Sanctions Committee transmitting the latest 120-day report of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia in accordance with resolution 1916.

Selected Council Press Statements

- SC/10154 (14 January 2011) was a press statement on Somalia.
- SC/10097 (29 November 2010) was on the most recent review of resolution 1916.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Augustine Mahiga (Tanzania)

AMISOM

Maximum authorised strength as of

January 2011: 12,000 troops, plus maritime and air components

Strength as of February 2011: about 8,000 Ugandan and Burundian troops

Duration: February 2007 to present: Council authorisation expires on 30 September 2011; AU mandate expires on 17 January 2012.

Useful Additional Resources

- *Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support*, International Crisis Group, 21 February 2011

Afghanistan

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to extend the mandate of UNAMA, for a further 12 months ahead of the expiry of its mandate on 23 March.

The head of UNAMA, Staffan de Mistura, is likely to brief before an open debate at the Council. The Secretary-General's report on the activities of UNAMA over the past three months is expected on 11 March.

The Council's informal expert group on protection of civilians is also scheduled to meet in March to discuss input to the UNAMA resolution.

Key Recent Developments

On 26 January, President Hamid Karzai presided over the inauguration of the lower house of the Afghan parliament, the Wolesi Jirga. Karzai had earlier sought to delay the inauguration of parliament to allow time for a five-judge tribunal, set up by the Supreme Court and appointed by Karzai, to investigate alleged election fraud. The tribunal claimed it had authority to order recounts and potentially nullify the entire election if appropriate. The tribunal intended to pursue cases against 59 winning candidates and numerous election officials. Many Afghan legal scholars, election officials and international observers have questioned the constitutional or legal basis of the special tribunal.

The special tribunal continues to review cases and has ordered recounts in several provinces. On 14 February the special tribunal ordered a raid on the Independent Elections Commission (IEC) headquarters in Kabul. Officials from the IEC have said they will allow the special tribunal access to ballot boxes but will not provide logistics assistance to any recounts. On 20 February the attorney general called for the suspension of the IEC chief electoral officer and the IEC commissioner.

On 12 February the Wolesi Jirga passed a resolution calling for the president to dissolve the special tribunal. At press time the Wolesi Jirga was locked in a stalemate over election of its speaker.

A number of Council members and other states with strong involvement in Afghanistan seem concerned that the tribunal

breaches the separation of powers between the executive, legislature and judiciary. UNAMA issued a press statement on 21 January in which it expressed its deep concern and surprise at the call to delay the inauguration of parliament and, along with the EU, the US and Canada, called for a reasonable, enduring and peaceful resolution of the issue, with full respect for the Afghan constitution.

The security situation throughout Afghanistan remains difficult. There have been two suicide bomber attacks on high-profile targets in Kabul in the last month, plus numerous attacks outside the capital. An attack on 28 January on a supermarket in the diplomatic district of Kabul killed eight Afghans. Two suspects were arrested in connection with this attack on 10 February. An attack on 14 February just inside a shopping complex killed two security guards. On 12 February a Taliban raid on the police headquarters in Kandahar killed 19 people (including 15 police). On 18 February a suicide car bomb at a police checkpoint in Khost killed at least 11 people, including nine civilians. On 20 February the Taliban attacked police officers collecting their salaries at a bank in Jalabad. At least thirty people died after a suicide bomber targeted a government census office in Kunduz province on 21 February.

On 6 February, Karzai addressed the Munich Security Conference. In his statement he said that building an effective state with a sound economy required a shift away from reliance on parallel organisations and mechanisms that bypass the state and "undermine the capacity of the state rather than build it." He said by parallel structures he meant private security firms, PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams), direct delivery of money and support to provincial officers and contractual mechanisms and spending of resources through channels other than the Afghan government.

On 24 December 2010, Turkey hosted the Fifth Trilateral Summit of Afghanistan-Pakistan-Turkey in Istanbul. The presidents

of the three nations adopted a joint statement in which Pakistan and Turkey expressed their full support for President Karzai's roadmap for the "Kabul process" of transition to full Afghan leadership and responsibility and agreed to a range of initiatives to improve regional dialogue and cooperation. On 20 to 21 January Karzai held talks with the president of the Russian Federation in Moscow on current bilateral cooperation and ways of addressing regional challenges including illicit drug trafficking, terrorism and organised crime.

On 20 January the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) released its 2010 Afghanistan opium survey. The UNODC report warned that rising opium prices might encourage Afghan farmers to plant more opium poppy. In 2010, the average price of dry opium at harvest time was \$169 per kilogram, an increase of 164 percent compared to 2009, when the price was \$64 per kilogram. The price jump is largely due to expected shortages caused by an opium blight that halved production in 2010. UNODC Executive Director Yury Fedotov said, "If this cash bonanza lasts, it could effectively reverse the hard won gains of recent years."

In January the Afghan Council of Ministers ordered the operators of women's shelters to transfer control to the Women's Affairs Ministry within 45 days. Almost all current shelters are operated by NGOs or the UN. Under the new regulation, which has yet to be finalised, victims of domestic abuse would be subjected to compulsory forensic examination, barred from leaving without ministry approval and be registered with the police. Conservative elements in the Afghan government have accused the shelters of encouraging immorality, prostitution and drug abuse, as the women are away from their families and under the influence of Western organisations. The Afghan minister for women's affairs said the government had found numerous "violations" in the management of the shelters and suggested they were grossly over-funded. Many human rights organisations are concerned that this will threaten the health and safety of Afghan women and will unravel some of the modest gains achieved for women's rights in Afghanistan. NGOs note that conservative elements in Afghan society object

to the shelters as they give Afghan women autonomy from abusive husbands and family members.

There have been a number of developments related to children and armed conflict in Afghanistan. The Secretary-General's special representative for children and armed conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy, and Afghan Foreign Minister Zalmay Rasoul signed an agreement at the start of February to prevent underage recruitment into the Afghan National Security Forces, as well as other violations involving children during conflict. This action plan also commits the Afghan government to prosecuting those who recruit children.

The Secretary-General's third report on children and armed conflict in Afghanistan covering the period from 1 September 2008 to 30 August 2010 was released on 3 February. The report noted that although progress had been made since the last report in 2008, grave violations involving children have increased during the reporting period, with higher numbers of children being killed or injured because of conflict-related violence.

The Afghanistan Compact—the key outcome of the 2006 London Conference and the main set of benchmarks for development achievements in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2010—expired at the start of February 2011. The key enduring outcome of the compact is the creation of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. The compact has effectively been replaced by the Kabul process.

De Mistura last briefed the Council on 22 December 2010. He focused on the role of the UN in the transition process related to the drawdown of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) agreed upon at the NATO Lisbon Conference in November 2010; the process of ensuring better coordination of international aid with Afghan priorities and through Afghan government budgets; assisting women's participation in politics and elections and a read-out of the parliamentary (Wolesi Jirga) election.

The Council issued a press statement after the debate focused on the parliamentary elections.

Human Rights-Related Developments

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights' annual report on Afghanistan will be presented at the March session of the Human Rights Council. The report acknowledges that efforts to promote and protect human rights and build the rule of law in Afghanistan were seriously challenged throughout 2010, although the proportion of civilian casualties inflicted by pro-government forces continued to decline. Despite some gains in education, employment opportunities and health, women continued to face discriminatory laws, policies, attitudes and practices that violate their basic human rights. The report also expresses serious concern about the culture of impunity that is seen as deeply entrenched in Afghan power structures and systems of governance. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) reported on 4 February that it was concerned about the low implementation of legislation enacted in the field of child rights due mainly to weak enforcement, widespread corruption and the application by courts of customary or Sharia law, which infringed principles and rights contained in the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The CRC commended Afghanistan, however, for the recent "remarkable" expansion of the education system in terms of the number of schools, trained teachers and enrolled children, including a notable increase in girls' enrolment.

Key Issues

A key issue, given UNAMA's past mandates and role in elections, is the ongoing and intensifying controversy over the Wolesi Jirga elections. A related issue is what the Council could say on the subject and what mandate to give UNAMA regarding support for resolution of the current issues and future electoral reform.

A second key issue is whether there is a need to further define UNAMA's role in the transition process to Afghan leadership given the expectation of an increase in civilian-led processes following the recent decision on the timeline of ISAF's withdrawal.

A related issue is whether to further define UNAMA's role in support of political processes that may involve the Afghan government and the Taliban.

An ongoing issue is balancing public expectations of UNAMA, particularly operating outside Kabul, with the realities of the difficult security situation facing the UN in Afghanistan.

Options

In renewing UNAMA's mandate the Council could:

- recognise the potential significance and vulnerability associated with the ongoing electoral controversy and include language in the resolution designed to reassure all parties that the Council understands the problem and wants a balanced and reasonable solution;
- conclude that the existing mandate, supplemented by what Council members say in the open debate and in consultations, are sufficient guidance for UNAMA to respond to all of the key issues;
- decide, without changing the mandate in substance, to include new language emphasising the importance of UNAMA's coordinating the activity of all UN agencies in Afghanistan under the concept of the UN "delivering as one";
- note the violations highlighted in the latest Secretary-General's report on children and armed conflict and the need to address these; or
- note the relevance, in terms of its thematic work on children and women in conflict, of the issue regarding women's shelters and the need, consistent with the longer term good of Afghan-led institutions, of a longer transition period combined with appropriate safeguards and benchmarks.

Council Dynamics

Afghanistan is a key foreign policy priority for many members of the current Council, not least those contributing troops to ISAF. The Kabul process seems likely to result in the Afghan mission to the UN seeking to work more closely with Council members on the mandate renewal than in the past.

There seems to be agreement amongst Council members that there is little need to change UNAMA's mandate at present. Most members believe that as UNAMA's mandate was refocused in March 2010 with emphasis on four key priorities—promote what has become known as the Kabul process of coordinating international assistance toward Afghan priorities and through Afghan institutions, strengthen cooperation with ISAF to improve civil-military coordination,

support Afghan-led reconciliation and reintegration programmes, and support the parliamentary elections and possible electoral reform—more time is needed to consolidate UNAMA's activities involving those priorities before making further adjustments.

Nevertheless, some members see value in emphasising some key issues to send a political message, for example highlighting the need to support electoral reform and the need to better monitor human rights, especially involving children and women.

There seems little appetite to try to reduce the length of the resolution (resolution 1917 has 41 operative paragraphs), as the length of the resolution reflects the range of priorities of member states. The largest area of common ground amongst Council members' priorities seems to be on the importance of UNAMA ensuring that international assistance is well coordinated and aligned closely with Afghan priorities and the importance of UNAMA supporting an eventual political process—both of which are already covered in the existing mandate. That said, there seem to be some disparities within the Council on what is meant by political processes or reconciliation with the Taliban. Council members seem highly wary of a political process that does not reduce the threat of terrorism, including outside Afghanistan.

There seems to be a spectrum of views on the level of specificity needed in guiding UNAMA on how to fulfil its mandate. Most members seem comfortable with the current latitude being exercised by the UNAMA leadership and believe that some issues can be covered in the consultations with de Mistura rather than be reflected in the text of the mandate resolution.

Germany is the lead country in the Council on Afghanistan.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/2010/1943 (13 October 2010) extended ISAF's mandate until 13 October 2011.
- S/RES/1917 (22 March 2010) extended UNAMA's mandate until 23 March 2011.
- S/RES/1401 (28 March 2002) created UNAMA.



Selected Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2011/55 (3 February 2011) was the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Afghanistan.
- S/2010/630 (10 December 2010) was the latest quarterly report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security.

Other

- SC/10143 (22 December 2010) was the press statement following the Council debate.
- S/PV.6464 (22 December 2010) was the December open debate.
- S/2010/657 (16 December 2010) was the quarterly ISAF report from 1 August 2010 to 31 October 2010.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAMA's Head of Mission

Staffan de Mistura (Sweden)

UNAMA: Size, Composition and Duration

Strength (as of 31 December 2010): 370 international civilians, 1,603 local civilians, 12 military observers, 4 police, 56 UN volunteers

Duration: 28 March 2002 to present; mandate expires on 23 March 2011

ISAF Military Commander

General David Petraeus (US)

Senior Civilian Representative

Ambassador Mark Sedwill (UK)

ISAF: Size, Composition and Duration

Total strength (as of 14 December 2010): about 131,730 troops

Contributors of military personnel: 48 NATO and non-NATO countries
Current top contributors: US, UK, Germany, France, Italy and Canada

Duration: 20 December 2001 to present; mandate expires on 13 October 2011.

Useful Additional Resource

- "Afghanistan's Elections Stalemate", International Crisis Group Asia Briefing No117, 23 February 2011

Expected Council Action

In March the situation in Côte d'Ivoire will continue to be a focus for Council members. The proposals from the AU's high-level panel for the resolution of the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire are due by 28 March, and a report from the Secretary-General on the work of UNOCI is due by 31 March. Recent reports of military clashes between the Ivorian government forces and Forces Nouvelles was engaging the Council's attention at press time and it seemed that Council meetings might take place if the situation continued to escalate. The mandate of UNOCI expires on 30 June.

Key Recent Developments

On 28 January the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) decided to set up a high-level panel for the resolution of the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire "in conditions that preserve democracy and peace" and requested the panel to submit its findings within a month. The PSC decided that the panel should:

- be supported by a team of experts and work, when necessary, in close cooperation with partners of the AU, particularly the UN;
- "evaluate the situation and formulate, on the basis of the relevant decisions of the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), an overall political solution"; and
- conclude its work within a period not exceeding one month, with its conclusions, to be endorsed by the PSC, and then be binding on all the Ivorian parties.

On 31 January the PSC announced that the panel would be composed of the heads of state of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, South Africa and Tanzania, as well as the chairperson of the AU Commission and the president of the ECOWAS Commission.

On 29 January, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon welcomed the decision by the PSC to set up the panel. He said that solutions being sought needed to be based in principle and promote shared values and not foil the democratically expressed will of the Ivorian people. Ban highlighted five principles that should guide the UN and the AU's efforts, including that of the AU high-level panel:

- the imperative to focus on the future, not on the past, without reopening the results

of the election, which Ban said would be a grave injustice and set an unfortunate precedent;

- the peaceful and honourable exit of Laurent Gbagbo (who is refusing to cede the presidency) and the formation of a national unity government by Alassane Ouattara (the UN-certified winner of the 28 November Ivorian presidential polls);
- concrete action to lift the siege on the Golf Hotel (where Ouattara is being blockaded by the forces loyal to Gbagbo) and other obstructions to the work of the UN on the ground;
- full support for the legitimate government to effectively address social and economic challenges, promote reconciliation and uphold human rights and justice; and
- in view of the UN's unique role in Côte d'Ivoire, the AU high-level panel should work in close coordination with the UN, which was prepared to provide a senior official to work with the team of experts that will support the panel.

Ban expressed concern about the deteriorating human rights and humanitarian situation, as well as misrepresentations about the work of the UN in the country. (In addition to the loss of many lives, more than 30,000 Ivorians had fled to neighbouring countries, and more than 17,000 had been displaced internally. There were reports of mass graves in some places, and UN human rights staff had been blocked from obtaining access to those areas. The state broadcasting service was being used to disseminate hate messages and incite violence.)

On 4 February the Council was briefed in consultations by Choi Young-jin, the head of the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI). He updated the Council on developments relating to the obstruction of the work of UNOCI, human rights violations and the blockade of the Golf Hotel. Speaking to the press after the meeting, Choi said several countries were prepared to provide additional troops for UNOCI following the Council's 19 January authorisation of 2,000 additional troops for UNOCI, but he declined to name them.

In a subsequent statement to the press, the president of the Council indicated that in the meeting with Choi, members:

- underscored their strong desire that the crisis be resolved speedily and rapidly,

and in conditions that represent the will of the Ivorian people;

- "welcomed the ongoing efforts by ECOWAS, the African Union and the United Nations" and in this context "acknowledged the relevant decisions of the AU Peace and Security Council of 28 January on Côte d'Ivoire and encouraged all parties to extend their full cooperation to the African Union High-Level Panel;" and
- remained deeply concerned about the continued violence and human rights violations in Côte d'Ivoire and urged all parties to exert maximum restraint and to refrain from violence.

On 8 February the president of the ECOWAS Commission, James Victor Gbeho, criticised South Africa for sending a warship to the subregion, stating that the presence of the vessel could "only complicate the matter further." However, a South African defence ministry spokesperson said the warship was not providing military support for Gbagbo or Ouattara but was in international waters off the coast of West Africa for routine training.

On 10 February the Gbagbo government announced on state television that frequencies assigned to UN Radio broadcasts had been withdrawn. However, it was subsequently reported in the international media that UN Radio, whose frequency had been jammed since the crisis began, could still be heard on an unofficial FM frequency. (Gbagbo's camp retains control of the Ivorian state television — Ivorian Radio Television or RTI — while Ouattara's camp recently set up a TV station called TV Côte d'Ivoire, which can be viewed in Abidjan.)

Since the week of 13 February, a number of banks in Côte d'Ivoire, including Citibank and Standard Chartered, have suspended their local operations because of a growing financial crisis due to uncertainty brought about by the political stalemate and consequent sanctions. On 17 February the Gbagbo government announced that it had taken control of foreign banks that had suspended operations in the country.

On 16 February the Council extended for up to three months the temporary redeployment from the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to UNOCI of three infantry companies and one aviation unit, composed of two military utility helicopters and three armed helicopters with crews.

On 21 February members of the AU high-level panel, with the exception of Burkinabe leader Blaise Campaore who has been accused by the Gbagbo camp of being supportive of Ouatarra, met with the Gbagbo in Abidjan. It subsequently met with Ouatarra on 22 February. At press time no clear outcome had resulted from the meetings.

On 24 February a spokesperson for UNOCI told the BBC that a position of the former rebel Forces Nouvelles along the buffer zone between the southern and northern parts of the country, close to the border with Liberia, was attacked by government forces in western Côte d'Ivoire, in effect violating the six-year ceasefire between the two forces. On 25 February the Forces Nouvelles responded and attacked and took control of the northern town of Zouan-Hounien, with press reports of the unrest spreading to the capital Yamoussoukro.

Key Issues

A major issue for the Council remains that of balancing its own role and the roles of the regional and subregional organisations to best effect so as to prevent a relapse into full-blown violent conflict.

Another key issue is that of sanctions, in light of recent developments, including reported incitement to attack UN personnel, and whether the Council should initiate action to impose targeted sanctions on individuals and entities found to be causing political tensions and inciting violence.

Underlying Problems

Deep-seated ethnic tensions emanating from the different ethnic and religious affiliations of the opposing parties have proven obstructive to resolving the current situation. These factors could also become catalysts for acts of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. This is particularly troubling in light of the fact that former combatants in the rebel Forces Nouvelles (aligned with Ouatarra) and the militias (mainly aligned with the Gbagbo camp) remain well armed.

Options

Options for the Council include:

- reiterating its position about the unacceptability of the on-going stalemate;
- awaiting the finalisation of the AU high-level panel's work to inform subsequent action; and

- adopting interim deterrents against spoilers by imposing additional sanctions against individuals blocking the peace process.

Council Dynamics

Council members seem to be mainly in a wait-and-see mode, awaiting the outcome of the work of the AU panel, and are conscious that they have no direct role in the work of the panel or the eventual validation of its recommendations. Most Council members, however, remain mindful of their responsibility to act when necessary based on developments on the ground.

Differences of opinion emerged among Council members on how to respond to the AU initiative to set up the panel. Some members (e.g. South Africa, Russia and China) were in favour of explicitly welcoming the AU's decision to form the panel. Others such as France, Germany, the UK and the US were reluctant to do so, citing their difficulty in giving the Council's unreserved support for what they viewed as the ambiguity regarding the AU panel's mandate to work toward "formulating ... an overall political solution." The compromise was to welcome related efforts by ECOWAS and the AU, acknowledge "relevant decisions" by the AU PSC and encourage all parties to fully cooperate with the AU panel.

Many Council members appear open to considering possible additional sanctions but would prefer to base them on properly verified cases of misconduct by actors on the ground.

France is the lead country on this issue in the Council.

UN Documents

Selected Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1968 (16 February 2011) extended the mandate of troops temporarily deployed from UNMIL to UNOCI for another three months.
- S/RES/1967 (19 January 2011) authorised an increase of 2,000 troops in the overall strength of UNOCI military personnel and extended the mandate of troops temporarily deployed from UNMIL to UNOCI.
- S/RES/1962 (20 December 2010) renewed the mandate of UNOCI until 30 June, authorised the temporary redeployment for up to four weeks of



troops from UNMIL to UNOCI, as well as the extension until 31 March of the temporary deployment of up to 500 additional military personnel to UNOCI, which was approved by resolution 1942.

- S/RES/1951 (24 November 2010) authorised the temporary deployment of troops from UNMIL to UNOCI.
- S/RES/1946 (15 October 2010) renewed the sanctions and the mandate of the group of experts until 30 April.
- S/RES/1942 (29 September 2010) authorised the deployment of 500 additional troops to UNOCI to help with security during the election period.
- S/RES/1528 (27 February 2004) established UNOCI.

Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2007/8 (28 March 2007) endorsed the Ouagadougou Agreement.

Latest Secretary-General's Report

- S/2010/600 (23 November 2010)

Selected Letters

- S/2011/5 (7 January 2011) was the recommendation by the Secretary-General to the Council for additional military capacity to be authorised for UNOCI.
- S/2011/3 (5 January 2011) was the Secretary-General's letter informing the Council about his appointment of the group of experts monitoring the Côte d'Ivoire sanctions.
- S/2010/601 (22 November 2010) was the request by the Secretary-General to the Council for approval of the redeployment of troops and aviation assets from UNMIL to UNOCI.
- S/2010/493 (23 September 2010) was from the Secretary-General informing the Council about the head of UNOCI's certification of the Ivorian electoral process.
- S/2010/486 (17 September 2010) and S/2010/485 (14 September 2010) was

the exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Council on raising the level of authorised UNOCI military and police personnel leading up to the presidential election.

- S/2008/834 (30 December 2008) contained the fourth supplementary agreement to the Ouagadougou Agreement.
- S/2007/144 (13 March 2007) contained the Ouagadougou Agreement.

Other

- SC/10149 (10 January 2011) was the latest press statement by the Council on the situation in Côte d'Ivoire.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission

Choi Young-jin (Republic of Korea)

UNOCI Force Commander

Maj.Gen. Abdul Hafiz (Bangladesh)

Chair of the Sanctions Committee

Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti (Brazil)

UNOCI Police Commissioner

Maj. Gen. Jean Marie Bourry (France)

Size and Composition of UNOCI

Strength (as of 31 December 2010):

7,569 troops, 186 military observers, 1,316 police personnel, 380 international civilian personnel, 737 local staff and 267 UN volunteers

Approved Budget

1 July 2010-30 June 2011: \$485.1 million

Cyprus

Expected Council Action

In March, the Secretary-General's special adviser on Cyprus, Alexander Downer, will brief Council members in informal consultations on the Secretary-General's good-offices report expected by the end of February. It is unclear whether the Council will take any action following the consultations.

The mandate of the UNFICYP expires on 15 June.

Key Recent Developments

On 8 December 2010, Lisa Buttenheim, the Secretary-General's special representative and head of UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), briefed Council

members in informal consultations. The Secretary-General's report canvassed UNFICYP's role in maintaining stability and its support of humanitarian functions throughout the reporting period. It noted the good cooperation between the peace-keeping force and both opposing parties and a decrease in military violations by the latter. The report also detailed continuing day-to-day challenges for civilians created by the reality on the ground, along with the progress achieved in demining activities in the buffer zone and in the work of the bicomunal committee on missing persons. Additionally, it mentioned the Secretary-General's intent to conduct a broader assessment of the UN's presence in Cyprus and make recommendations for further adjustments in light of developments in the talks.

On 14 December, the Council extended UNFICYP's mandate for another six months in resolution 1953. The resolution took note of the recommendations of the Secretary-General in his latest good-offices report. The Council expressed its concern over the slow pace of negotiations and strongly urged the leaders of the two sides to "intensify the momentum in the negotiations" and develop "a practical plan for overcoming the major remaining points of disagreement" in time for their upcoming meeting with the Secretary-General in January.

Turkey voted against the resolution (as it did when the three previous UNFICYP extensions came up for a vote since it joined the Council in January 2009), reiterating in an explanation of the vote its objection to the text's reference to the Government of Cyprus as the sole government of the island. It also asserted that the resolution fell short of reflecting the Secretary-General's view in his report on the good-offices mission that the talks "cannot be an open-ended process" and his fear that "a critical window of opportunity is rapidly closing."

On 26 January, Turkish Cypriot leader Dervic Eroclu and Greek Cypriot president Demetris Christofias met with the Secretary-General in Geneva. Following the meeting, the Secretary-General told reporters that both sides have agreed to intensify talks.

On 9 February, the two leaders met in Nicosia and agreed to meet on a weekly basis, while their representatives will meet twice a week. On 17 February, the two leaders met

again and affirmed the progress made in the two previous representatives' meetings on the issues of economy and EU matters.

On 8 February, the Secretary-General briefed Council members on his recent travels, including his Geneva meeting. He said that little progress had been made with respect to the substantive differences between the opposing sides, in particular on the property issue. In his remarks to the press following the briefing, the Secretary-General mentioned the positive atmosphere between the two leaders and his intention to meet with both in the near future.

On 6 December, the Council held a closed meeting with troop and police-contributing countries for UNFICYP (S/PV.6435).

On 20 January, in an event commemorating six years of UN demining activities in Cyprus, Buttenheim stated that demining activities in the areas agreed upon by the opposing parties will conclude in February. Since November 2004, the UN mine-action programme has cleared over 27,000 mines in 74 mine fields throughout the buffer zone, in an area extending more than 9.7 square kilometres. Buttenheim added that, currently, there is no agreement between the two sides to extend demining operations to other areas.

Human Rights-Related Developments

The annual report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on Cyprus will be presented at the March session of the Human Rights Council. The report notes some positive developments, including the opening on 14 October of a seventh crossing point through the buffer zone in the northwest of the island, facilitating access to Nicosia. The opening of this crossing point is seen as an important confidence-building measure for the ongoing negotiations. However, the persisting division of Cyprus continues to have human rights consequences, affecting freedom of movement, missing persons, discrimination, freedom of religion and economic, social and cultural rights. The report will express the hope that the current efforts by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders to negotiate and achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem will lead to improvements in the human rights situation on the island.

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is whether to be proactive in encouraging further progress in the reunification talks and in implementing confidence-building measures. A related issue is what procedural steps the Council could take to push the parties towards speedier and more substantive progress.

A related issue is how the status of the talks should impact the reconfiguration of, and an eventual exit strategy for, UNFICYP.

Options

Options for the Council include:

- taking no action at this time;
- adopting a statement that picks up the key element of the Secretary-General's new report and encourages the parties to reach a settlement, emphasising that the process cannot be indefinite;
- encouraging Downer to play a more assertive role in the talks between the opposing sides in an attempt to bolster their momentum; or
- adopting a statement focusing more on possible confidence-building measures.

Council Dynamics

At press time, Council members had yet to receive the latest report on the good-offices mission. While media coverage and statements by UN officials point to encouraging signs in the rhetoric of the parties toward the talks and in the environment surrounding the negotiations, many members are concerned that there is no real substantive progress on the unresolved core issues, such as property, territory, security arrangements and international guarantees. Some Council members seem to hope that Downer will be explicit about what he believes the next steps should be in the negotiation process and what incentives might be given to the two sides in order to advance the negotiations.

Though there seems to be a consensus on the need for the Council to support a final settlement of the Cyprus issue, Council members continue to hold divergent views on the way to achieve such a solution. These differences lead some Council members to believe that attempting to negotiate an agreed public response following the consultations may be difficult.

Russia is inclined to the Greek Cypriot position, which opposes setting timelines it deems as "arbitrary" for reaching a solution to the Cyprus situation. It also opposes exerting pressure on the parties—for example by endorsing the Turkish initiative to convene a four-party conference comprising the two sides, Turkey and Greece. China similarly believes that the Council should continue to support the bilateral talks, pretty much as it has done so far. The US seems open to any format that the opposing sides think may help the process. The UK seems less patient about continued UN involvement in Cyprus, and would like to see how this involvement is facilitating a successful culmination of the talks.

Council members are aware that the 22 May parliamentary elections in Cyprus and 12 June general elections in Turkey may further hinder reaching a settlement in the near future. While some Council members take the view that these elections should encourage the sides to make haste in their talks, others suggest that the Council should accept that the talks will continue at the pace the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots see fit.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1953 (14 December 2010) renewed UNFICYP's mandate until 15 June, urged the leaders of the two sides to "intensify the momentum in the negotiations" and develop "a practical plan for overcoming the major remaining points of disagreement."

Latest Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2010/605 (26 November 2010) was on UNFICYP.
- S/2010/603 (24 November 2010) was on the good-offices mission in Cyprus.

Other

- S/PV. 6445 (14 December 2010) was the meeting record of the Council's adoption of resolution 1953 with Turkey's explanation of vote.
- S/2010/570 (2 November 2010) was a letter from Turkey responding to Christofias' statement in the General Assembly on 24 September.



Other Relevant Facts

UNFICYP: Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission

Lisa M. Bittenheim (USA)

UNFICYP: Force Commander

Maj. Gen. Chao Liu (China)

UNFICYP: Size, Composition, Cost and Duration

Strength (as of 31 December 2010): 922 military personnel, 68 police, 37 international civilian personnel and 113 local civilian staff

Troop contributors: Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Hungary, Paraguay, Peru, Serbia, Slovakia and the UK

Annual Budget: \$58 million

Duration: 4 March 1964 to present; mandate expires 15 June

Useful Additional Resource

- International Crisis Group, Policy Briefing, titled "Cyprus: Six Steps toward a Settlement" (22 February 2011)

Liberia

Expected Council Action

The head of the UNMIL, Ellen Margrethe Løj, and the chair of the Liberia configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Permanent Representative of Jordan, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Husseini, are expected to brief on the situation in Liberia.

It is also possible that some decision formalising the withdrawal of UNMIL's military guard force from the Special Court of Sierra Leone's premises in Freetown, Sierra Leone will be considered.

The mandate of UNMIL expires 30 September.

Key Recent Developments

On 7 December 2010, Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf reconstituted her

cabinet. She reappointed 14 of the 22 ministers—appointing new ministers for foreign affairs; lands, mines and energy; posts and telecommunications; and transport.

On 24 January, Johnson-Sirleaf delivered her annual message to the nation under the theme “our nation is heading in the right direction.” She said the elections of 2011 would be a crucial test of democracy and, referring to the standoff in Côte d’Ivoire said, “We are at a crossroads in our country’s history; we only have to look across the border to know we could go backwards as easily as we could go forward.” (For more details about the implication for Liberia of the crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, please see our February *Monthly Forecast*.)

Voter registration for the October elections was conducted from 10 January to 6 February. The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) provided support, including transport of registration materials to remote areas.

On 10 February the foreign minister of Liberia, Togo McIntosh, said in an interview in Washington DC that the worsening situation in Côte d’Ivoire threatened Liberian security, particularly given the upcoming elections. He said holding a second successful election was “a critical test” that should not be impeded by “trouble in the neighbourhood.”

McIntosh commended Liberians who had opened their homes to Ivorian refugees, but said the problem of refugee flows from Côte d’Ivoire was growing beyond Liberia’s capacity to respond. McIntosh said he had sought assistance from the UN to transport aid to the camps because roads to the eastern counties were in poor condition. The UN refugee agency (UNHCR) has agreed to repair, possibly by April, a 78-kilometre stretch of a dilapidated major road in north-eastern Liberia, which is a crucial transportation route to get people and goods into the area. Since December 2010, UNHCR has airlifted 108 tonnes of emergency relief supplies (blankets, plastic mats, jerrycans, kitchen sets and tarpaulins) to the border area. McIntosh said that Liberia also needed assistance with security in the camps and along the border. UNICEF has predicted the number of Ivorian refugees will reach 50,000 in February and could reach 100,000 across the region by April.

On 4 and 7 February, a joint meeting in New York of the executive boards of the UN

Development Programme, UN Population Fund, UNICEF, UN-Women and the World Food Programme discussed “efficiency of emergency response and the transition to recovery and long-term development: lessons learned,” looking at the case of Liberia. The boards discussed joint programmes between the UN agencies and UNMIL and the concept of UN integration in Liberia under the concept of “delivering as one.” Liberia was the first country with a peace-keeping mission to implement the concept.

On 11 February the Secretary-General informed the president of the Security Council that the withdrawal of the UNMIL guard force at the premises of the Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) in Freetown, Sierra Leone, would be completed by early March. This followed advice from the registrar of the special court on 13 October 2010 that following relocation of sensitive archives to The Hague and reduction in international staff, the UNMIL guard force would no longer be required in Freetown.

On 16 February the Council extended the redeployment of troops, two utility helicopters and three armed helicopters from UNMIL to the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) for a further three months.

Developments in the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)

The chair of the PBC Liberia configuration, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan, conducted the first official visit of the PBC configuration to Liberia from 7 to 15 November 2010. Prince Zeid informally briefed Council members on this visit in an “interactive dialogue”, in which Løj and a representative of Liberia also participated. The goals of the visit were to familiarise the chair with the situation in the country, to meet key national stakeholders and to introduce the work of the PBC. A key outcome was endorsement by the president of Liberia of a statement of mutual commitments that articulates the peacebuilding priorities identified by the government: strengthening the rule of law; supporting security sector reform; and promoting national reconciliation. Prince Zeid made a further visit to Liberia from 18 to 22 February, during which he also visited UNHCR camps in Nimba county, north-east Liberia.

Key Issues

The key immediate issue for the Council remains ensuring the situation in Côte d’Ivoire does not destabilise the fragile post-conflict security and political situation in Liberia. A related concern is that the redeployment of UN troops from UNMIL to UNOCI does not permanently diminish UN capacity in Liberia, possibly leaving it vulnerable.

An urgent issue remains ensuring sufficient support is offered to UNHCR and to Liberia to provide adequate conditions in western Liberia to accommodate the flow of refugees from Côte d’Ivoire.

A key issue for Liberia is strengthening the security sector, in particular the national police, to gradually reduce reliance on the uniformed elements of UNMIL for security and stability. A related issue is developing mechanisms to extend state authority throughout the country.

A further issue is ensuring that Liberian authorities have sufficient technical support to conduct the referendum to change the electoral laws in August, particularly as these will coincide with the rainy season, and the national elections in November.

Given the key emerging role of the PBC in coordinating donor support for security sector reform and other key priorities, a key issue for the Council will be maintaining appropriate formats along the lines of the November “Interactive Dialogue” to ensure continuing close involvement of the chair of the Liberia configuration with Council members.

Underlying Problems

Three civil wars in West Africa in the past decades with major cross-border dimensions have left a very complicated legacy, particularly with regard to the movement of different ethnic groups between Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. Pressure from the situation in Côte d’Ivoire could stoke ethnic tensions in Liberia.

Youth unemployment in Liberia is 25 percent.

A 2008 survey by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission identified land and property disputes as one of the main threats to peace, which is exacerbated by a weak judicial system.

Options

The ending of the UNMIL guard force from the SCSL in Sierra Leone gives the Council a possible peg on which to express some useful messages at this time:

- at one end of the spectrum it could adopt a very concise technical resolution formalising the withdrawal of UNMIL guard forces from Sierra Leone or accomplish the same in either a brief statement or letter to the Secretary-General; or
- alternatively it could use such a resolution or statement to also highlight key aspects of the situation in Liberia, including the current subregional situation and the risks for Liberia, the refugee situation and the need for support for UNHCR and the importance of peacebuilding efforts.

In discussions with special representative Løj, the Council could:

- seek her views on the impact of the situation in Côte d'Ivoire on the situation in Liberia;
- seek her views on the impact of the continued lending of UNMIL capacities to UNOCI; and
- discuss UNMIL assistance to the August referendum and October elections.

Council Dynamics

Council members are in general agreement that Liberia continues to make significant progress, due in great part to the willingness of the government to work with the UN and other international efforts.

As for a future drawdown of UNMIL, many Council members feel that at this point in time the progress made in Liberia could be compromised unless there is a gradual and carefully executed exit strategy based on Liberia's needs rather than a set timeline.

Some members have expressed concern that Liberia could become overly dependent on UNMIL and bilateral assistance from a too narrow donor base. Others would like to see greater emphasis on the eventual transfer of ownership to the government, particularly with respect to security sector reform.

The involvement of the PBC, particularly under the high-profile leadership of Prince Zeid of Jordan, has been seen as a positive development with regard to planning for an eventual withdrawal given the emphasis on

assistance to security sector reform in the statement of mutual commitments.

The US is the lead country on Liberia in the Council.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1968 (16 February 2011) extended the temporary redeployment of troops and helicopters from UNMIL to UNOCI for a further three months.
- S/RES/1967 (19 January 2011) extended the temporary redeployment of troops and two utility helicopters and redeployed three armed helicopters from UNMIL to UNOCI for a further four weeks.
- S/RES/1962 (20 December 2010) extended the temporary redeployment of troops and helicopters from UNMIL to UNOCI by four weeks.
- S/RES/1961 (17 December 2010) renewed the sanctions regime in Liberia for a further 12 months and extended the mandate of the panel of experts until 16 December 2011.
- S/RES/1951 (24 November 2010) authorised the Secretary-General to temporarily redeploy troops and two utility helicopters from UNMIL to UNOCI for four weeks.
- S/RES/1938 (15 September 2010) renewed UNMIL's mandate for 12 months.

Selected Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2011/72 (14 February 2011) was the latest report on UNMIL, including an annex with revised transition benchmarks to guide the eventual withdrawal of UNMIL.
- S/2007/479 (8 August 2007) was the initial drawdown plan for UNMIL.

Other

- S/2011/78 (17 February 2011) was a letter from the Secretary-General informing the Council of the appointment of the new panel of experts of the Liberia sanctions committee.
- S/2011/74 (11 February 2011) was a letter from the Secretary-General recommending the withdrawal of UNMIL guard forces from the SCSL premises in Sierra Leone.



Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Ellen Margrethe Løj (Denmark)

UNMIL Force Commander

Maj. Gen. Muhammad Khalid (Pakistan)

Size, Composition, Cost and Duration

Maximum Authorised strength: up to 15,000 troops, up to 1,115 police
Strength as of 31 December 2010: 7,938 troops, 1,323 police and 131 military observers

Key contributing countries: Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh and Ghana

Cost (1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011): \$524.1 million

Duration: September 2003 to present; mandate expires 30 September 2011

Chairman of the Liberia Sanctions Committee

Nawaf Salam (Lebanon)

Panel of Experts on Liberia

Wynet V. Smith (Canada), natural resources and coordinator of panel
Christian Dietrich (US), finance
Augusta Muchai (Kenya), arms

Sudan

Expected Council Action

In March the Council is scheduled to receive a report from the new chair of the Sudan Sanctions Committee, Colombia's Ambassador, Néstor Osorio, and the Sudan Sanctions Committee expects to receive a report from its panel of experts by 31 March.

But Council members are expected to also be paying close attention to developments in Darfur and Southern Sudan. However, no formal action was foreseen at press time.

Key Recent developments

On 14 October 2010 the Council renewed the mandate of the panel of experts of the 1591 (Sudan) Sanctions Committee until

19 October 2011. The Council requested the panel to provide to the Committee an interim report no later than ninety days after the adoption of the resolution (i.e. mid-January 2011) and a midterm briefing on its work by no later than 31 March. The Secretary-General informed the Council on 19 January that he had appointed three of the five experts, with the two additional experts to be “appointed shortly.” The experts appointed cover aviation, international humanitarian law and finance. On 7 February the Secretary-General announced a fourth appointment, covering regional issues. At press time an expert on arms had yet to be appointed, although it seems a candidate has been identified. As the full panel has yet to be appointed, the Council has revised its reporting timeline. The interim report is now due 31 March. The midterm briefing is now due 30 June. The Sudan Sanctions Committee met members of the panel for the first time on 23 February.

In resolution 1891—which established the previous panel of experts of the Sudan Sanctions Committee—the Council had requested the panel to provide the Council a final report with its findings and recommendations no later than thirty days prior to the end of its mandate. The panel submitted this report to the Sudan Sanctions Committee ahead of the Council’s consideration of renewing the sanctions regime in October 2010. The sanctions regime was extended until October 2011. However, China abstained on the decision explaining it had serious concerns over the panel’s annual report and the manner in which the panel had undertaken its work. The sanctions committee conveyed the report to the Council in late November. At press time the Council had yet to decide to publish the report.

On 7 February the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission confirmed the official results that 98.83 percent of voters had voted for independence. On the same day, Sudanese President Omer Al Bashir signed a decree confirming his government’s acceptance of the result. On 13 February officials from the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in southern Sudan confirmed that the name of the new state will be South Sudan.

The Security Council met on 9 February and recognised the historic nature of the referendum results in a presidential statement. The Council heard briefings from the head of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), Haile Menkerios, and the chair of the Secretary-General’s panel on the referenda in the Sudan, Benjamin Mkapa. It also heard a statement from the chair of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel on the Sudan, Thabo Mbeki, and the minister of regional cooperation of the Government of Southern Sudan, Deng Alor Kuol. The permanent representative of Sudan to the UN asked the Council to reconsider its position toward Bashir and reward the Sudanese president for implementing such a key part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)—which seems to have been interpreted as a request for the Council to consider applying Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and suspending the arrest warrants against Bashir.

Regarding the future UN role following the end of the UNMIS mandate in July, Menkerios informed the Council that the Government of Southern Sudan has indicated it would welcome continued UN engagement in support of peace consolidation, institutional capacity-building and border management. Regarding the north, Menkerios said he was currently discussing with authorities the areas in which they may seek UN cooperation. Menkerios also highlighted possible UN engagement relating to unresolved issues and the implementation of post-referendum arrangements—perhaps related to Abyei or border demarcation—that was part of the agenda of the current talks between the parties to the CPA.

On 31 January, at the meeting of heads of state and government of the AU, the AU leaders issued a declaration in which they congratulated Sudan on the successful conduct of the referendum, hailed the courage of the leaders of northern and southern Sudan, called upon Sudan’s external creditors to relieve its debt and called upon the UN Security Council to invoke Article 16 of the Rome Statute and suspend the ICC’s actions against Bashir.

There have been two significant violent incidents since the referendum results were announced. On 3 to 5 February, the airport

in Malakal, Upper Nile State was closed due to fighting within the Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) made up of northern and southern Sudanese soldiers of the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). Fifty-four soldiers were killed and 85 were wounded. A national staff member of the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) was killed in crossfire. The fighting seemed to stem from the hasty dissolution of the JIU, which led northern troops to try to relocate JIU equipment, including tanks and other materiel, back to northern Sudan. Southern troops objected to the relocation, and violence ensued. Forces of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) were not involved. Rather, they have deployed to Malakal to restore calm, along with UNMIS troops.

On 9 February forces loyal to former SPLA commander George Athor blew up two SPLA trucks with landmines near the town of Fangak in Jonglei State. Fresh fighting broke out on 10 February between Athor’s troops and the SPLA. On 15 February an official from the Government of Southern Sudan who visited Jonglei said that over 200 people had died, including 154 civilians—mainly women and children—who were “massacred” when they were chased into a river by Athor’s troops. Officials from the area have estimated that over 1,000 people are unaccounted for and up to 20,000 had been displaced by the violence. Athor split from SPLM leadership and took up arms following the elections in April 2010, alleging fraud after he lost the election for Governor of Jonglei. Athor signed a ceasefire agreement in early January 2011.

On 9 February the southern Sudanese minister for cooperatives and rural development, Jimmy Lemi Milla, was killed by a former employee inside his office. The murder does not seem to have been politically motivated.

On 10 February the Government of Sudan announced its negotiating team would return to Doha to resume negotiations with Darfur rebel groups, more than one month after its withdrawal from negotiations.

Key Issues

An issue on sanctions for Council members is determining when to release the final report of the previous panel of experts.

A key issue for Council members relating to the situation in Southern Sudan and the

CPA is implementation of the remaining aspects of the CPA, in particular regarding the situation in Abyei, border demarcation and meaningful popular consultations in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States. A further issue is keeping abreast of developments regarding the negotiations related to the establishment of the new state of South Sudan, including wealth sharing, debt, currency and national symbols.

Options

The Council could:

- seek briefings from the Secretariat in March on progress on post-referendum negotiations, particularly regarding the situation in Abyei;
- begin discussions at the expert level on the actions which will be required in April in light of the expiration of the UNMIS mandate; and
- initiate planning at the expert level in consultation with DPKO and DPA on a UN presence in an independent South Sudan.

Council Dynamics

Compared to the previous six months, Council members hope that March will be a quiet month regarding their work on Sudan. Members are conscious, however, that the expiration of the UNMIS mandate in April is looming and some informal discussion of the necessary Council actions may be desirable.

Many Council members seem to want to pay close attention to the ongoing negotiations between the UN and Sudanese authorities on a future role for the UN in north and south Sudan.

On sanctions, the delay in release of the final report of the panel of experts seems to be due to the objections of China. There is a strongly held view amongst most Council members of the importance of releasing the final report to maintain Council transparency and follow accepted Council practices.

Despite the AU request that the Council consider applying Article 16 of the Rome Statute and suspend the ICC arrest warrants for Bashir, there seems to be little appetite in the Council to discuss this issue in the near future.

The US is the lead country in the Council on north-south issues. The UK is the lead country in the Council on Darfur.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1945 (14 October 2010) renewed the mandate of the Darfur Sanctions Panel of Experts.
- S/RES/1935 (30 July 2010) renewed UNAMID.
- S/RES/1919 (29 April 2010) renewed UNMIS.
- S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.
- S/RES/1591 (29 March 2005) and S/RES/1556 (30 July 2004) imposed sanctions.

Latest Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2011/22 (18 January 2011) was on UNAMID.
- S/2010/681 (31 December 2010) was on UNMIS.

Selected Meeting Records

- S/PV.6478 (9 February 2011) were briefings to the Council on the occasion of the formal announcement of the results of the Southern Sudan referendum.

Other

- S/PRST/2011/3 (9 February 2011) was the statement issued by the Council on the occasion of the announcement of the formal results of the Southern Sudan referendum.
- S/2011/60 (7 February 2011) was a letter from the Secretary-General informing the Security Council of the appointment of one member of the panel of experts.
- S/2011/27 (19 January 2011) was a letter from the Secretary-General informing the Security Council of the appointment of three members of the panel of experts.
- S/2010/679 (30 December 2010) was the report of the Sudan Sanctions Committee covering the period 1 January to 31 December 2010.

Other Relevant Facts

UNAMID: Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur

Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria)

UNAMID: Force Commander

Lt. Gen. Patrick Nyamvumba (Rwanda)



UNAMID: Size, Composition, Cost and Duration

Maximum authorised strength: up to 19,555 military personnel, 3,772 police and 19 formed police units (total police 6,432)

Main troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt and Ethiopia

Military strength as of 31 December 2010: 17,467 military personnel

Police Strength as of 31 December 2010: 4,977 police personnel

Annual Budget: \$1.81 billion

Duration: 31 July 2007 to present; mandate expires 31 July 2011.

Annual Budget: \$1.81 billion

Duration: 31 July 2007 to present; mandate expires 31 July 2011.

UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission

Haile Menkerios (South Africa)

UNMIS: Force Commander

Maj. Gen. Moses Bisong Obi (Nigeria)

UNMIS: Size, Composition, Cost and Duration

Maximum authorised strength: up to 10,000 military and 715 police personnel

Main troop contributors: India, Bangladesh, Egypt and Pakistan

Military strength as of 31 December 2010: 9,780 military personnel

Police Strength as of 31 December 2010: 636 police personnel

Annual Budget: \$938 million

Duration: 24 March 2005 to present; mandate expires 30 April 2011.

Annual Budget: \$938 million

Duration: 24 March 2005 to present; mandate expires 30 April 2011.

Sanctions Committee Chairman

Néstor Osorio (Colombia)

Panel of Experts

Rajiva Sinha (India), finance and coordinator of the panel

Michael Lewis (UK), aviation

Hesham Nasr (Egypt), international humanitarian law

Jérôme Tubiana (France), regional

Vacant, arms

Vacant, arms

Vacant, arms

Vacant, arms

Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator

Djibril Yipènè Bassolé (Burkina Faso)

Sierra Leone

Expected Council Action

The head of the UNIPSIL, Michael von der Schulenburg, is expected to brief the Council in March on UNIPSIL's work over the past six months. The report of the Secretary-General will be published in mid-March. The briefing is likely to be followed by closed consultations. The chair of the country-specific configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), John McNee of Canada, is also expected to brief the Council.

The mandate of UNIPSIL expires 15 September.

Key Recent Developments

The political situation in Sierra Leone remains tense. On 13 November 2010 there were a series of disturbing incidents in which the offices of the main opposition party—the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP)—in Koidu City, Kono District and the residence of an SLPP youth leader were splashed with human excrement. The Political Parties Registration Commission (PPRC) dispatched staff to monitor the rising political tensions, ascertain the facts and determine if there was a political dimension to the incidents. SLPP staff accused the ruling party—the All People's Congress (APC)—of being behind the incidents.

On 15 November 2010 the houses of two leaders of the APC in Kono and a school run by a relative of an APC politician were also splashed with human excrement. The series of incidents have contributed a new level of unease to an increasingly poisonous political environment, with national elections still 18 months away. The PPRC issued a report in which it concluded that there was no evidence that the incidents were prompted by the leadership of either party. There is a history of violence between the two major parties. (In March 2009 SLPP headquarters were set on fire, with allegations the attackers sexually assaulted SLPP staff.)

On 12 November 2010 in The Hague, the defence phase of the trial of Charles Taylor concluded after calling twenty witnesses, including Taylor. The trial chamber was expected to conclude the case on 11 February and adjourn to make the final judgement. However, Taylor and his defence lawyer, Courtenay Griffiths, walked

out of the court on 8 February over the judges' refusal to accept a written brief twenty days after the court deadline. The court directed Griffiths to attend court on 11 February to apologise. The prosecution delivered its closing oral argument on 8 February without Griffiths or Taylor present. On 11 February the court granted the defence leave to appeal the rejection of the late trial brief. A trial judgement is expected in mid-2011.

Schulenburg last briefed the Council on developments in Sierra Leone on 28 September 2010.

Also on 28 September, the Sierra Leone configuration of the PBC reviewed the outcome of the high-level special session of the PBC on Sierra Leone that was held 10 June 2009. The PBC reiterated its decision to focus its engagement in Sierra Leone on good governance and the rule of law, illicit drug trafficking and youth employment, as well as greater subregional cooperation and the promotion of gender equality and human rights.

On 29 September the Council lifted the sanctions that it had imposed on Sierra Leone in response to the civil war in the 1990's and extended the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) for another year.

On 2 to 3 December, UNIPSIL hosted a seminar in Freetown on "strategies and lessons learned on sustainable reintegration and job creation: what works best in West Africa?" The seminar brought together UN representatives and government representatives from Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as officials from UN headquarters and other interested states. The seminar recognised that the issue of unemployment, particularly among youths, was a common threat to the stability of countries in the region and that there was value discussing the problem and different solutions sub-regionally.

On 23 December the General Assembly decided to fund the remaining costs of the Special Court for Sierra Leone out of regular UN-assessed contributions, following a request by the Secretary-General.

Key PBC Developments

On 3 December 2010 the Guinea Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone configurations of

the PBC held a joint meeting in Freetown following the UNIPSIL seminar on employment, with participants briefing the PBC configurations on the findings of the seminar and on the way forward. The joint meeting represents an innovation that the PBC is keen on exploring further when tackling threats to peacebuilding that are common to more than one country and that require a regional perspective (very much in line with the recommendations emerging from the 2010 review of the PBC). The most natural candidate for future joint discussions within the PBC is transnational crime and drug trafficking, which is presently posing a threat to peace in several West African countries.

Human Rights-Related Developments

Sierra Leone's human rights record will be scrutinised on 5 May under the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process of the Human Rights Council. Relevant inputs to the UPR will be the report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) on Sierra Leone for 2010, which noted a number of positive developments. The National Human Rights Commission carried out its mandate to investigate and report on abuses and generally operated without government interference. Progress was observed in addressing endemic corruption and improving access to justice and key economic rights, notably health care and education. And the efforts of the UN-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone made further steps towards achieving accountability for war crimes committed during the armed conflict. However, persistent weaknesses in the performance of the police and judiciary and increased political tension in advance of the 2012 elections slowed the consolidation of the rule of law. HRW also criticised the lack of implementation of the report of the Constitutional Review Committee, submitted in 2008.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is gauging the progress of UNIPSIL's work in order to decide on the eventual transition from UNIPSIL to a UN country team.

A related issue is the stability of Sierra Leone in the context of preparations for the 2012 elections, given the increasingly volatile political environment. The two major

parties have distinct geographic constituencies, but tend not to be divided along ethnic lines.

Another key issue is the impact of the large natural resources contracts entered into by the Government of Sierra Leone and management of the resulting revenues, given the role that natural resources played in Sierra Leone's war.

A procedural issue continues to be the appropriate format for involving Chairs of the PBC configurations.

Underlying Issues

There is significant youth unemployment, which is exacerbated by a large "lost generation" who received no education or opportunities during the war.

There are concerns over the high level of corruption in Sierra Leone and the particular risks for this in the resource sector.

Options

- In discussions the Council members could:
- seek briefings on the helpful role that could be played on natural resources issues (especially given the language on this in its recent presidential statement on the interdependence between security and development);
 - agree on elements for the press about the need to dampen down political violence;
 - ask for updates on cross-regional emerging issues, such as drug trafficking;
 - indicate current views on progress toward an eventual handover of UNIPSIL to a UN country team; and
 - decide to include the PBC configuration chair in discussions in an appropriate format.

Council Dynamics

Council members seem to consider Sierra Leone as a success story, given it has maintained stability whilst graduating from a large peacekeeping operation to a peacebuilding support mission. Most Council members seem to recognise that UNIPSIL is a small mission and its withdrawal should be related to the needs on the ground rather than budgetary pressures.

As UNIPSIL is a peacebuilding support mission, many on the Council attach strong weight to the advisory role of the PBC with regard to the conduct and outcomes of UNIPSIL.

By lifting the sanctions regime in September 2010, the Council was consciously recognising that the threats to Sierra Leone's security from the conflicts in the 1990s had passed. Most Council members recognise that the current risks to stability—such as tensions around the 2012 elections and the impact of the management of extractive industries—are unrelated to the former conflict.

The UK is the lead country in the Council on Sierra Leone.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1941 (29 September 2010) extended the mandate of UNIPSIL until 15 September 2011.
- S/RES/1940 (29 September 2010) lifted the sanctions on Sierra Leone.
- S/RES/1829 (4 August 2008) authorised the creation of UNIPSIL to replace UNIOSIL.
- S/RES/1688 (16 June 2006) requested the Secretary-General to assist in the transfer of former Liberian President Charles Taylor to the Special Court's special outpost in the Netherlands.

Latest Secretary-General's Report

- S/2010/471 (17 September 2010) covers the period 1 March 2010 to 31 August 2010.

Selected Letters

- S/2010/560 (29 October 2010) was a letter from the Secretary-General to the Council on the budget of the SCSL and recommending the remaining costs be covered by assessed contributions.
- S/2008/63 (31 January 2008) was from the Secretary-General conveying the completion strategy for UNIOSIL.

Other

- S/PRST/2011/4 (11 February 2011) was a presidential statement on the interdependence between security and development that highlighted the value of helping governments in post-conflict situations effectively manage their natural resources.
- S/PV.6391 (28 September 2010) was the open meeting by the Council on UNIPSIL.

Peacebuilding Commission

- PBC/4/SLE/3 (1 October 2010) was



the review of the outcome of the high-level special session of the PBC on Sierra Leone.

- PBC/3/SLE/6 (12 June 2009) was the outcome of the PBC high-level special session on Sierra Leone.
- PBC/3/SLE/4 (6 April 2009) was the PBC statement welcoming the joint communiqué between the two leading political parties in Sierra Leone.
- PBC/2/SLE/1 (3 December 2007) was the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework.
- PBC/OC/1/2 (21 June 2006) was a letter from the Council president to the Secretary-General referring Sierra Leone to the PBC.

Other Relevant Facts

UNIPSIL Executive Representative of the Secretary-General

Michael von der Schulenburg (Germany)

Size and Composition of Mission

Staff strength (as of 31 December 2010): 33 international civilians, 33 local civilians and six UN volunteers

Duration

1 October 2008 to present; mandate expires 15 September 2011

Chair of the Sierra Leone Configuration of the PBC

John McNee (Canada)

Lebanon

Expected Council Action

In March Council members are expected to hold consultations on the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of resolution 1701, which in August 2006 called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel. UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams is expected to brief.

The situation in southern Lebanon has been relatively quiet. However, Council members will have in mind the tense

political backdrop in the country, issues relating to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the potential effects for the implementation of resolution 1701.

No formal action is expected. The UNIFIL mandate expires on 31 August.

Key Recent Developments

At press time, the next Secretary-General's report was expected on 28 February. The area of operation of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been calm relative to previous reporting periods, and the report is expected to track ongoing issues such as Ghajar, demarcation of the Blue Line, Israeli overflights and the current political deadlock over the formation of a new cabinet after the government led by Saad Hariri collapsed on 12 January over the issue of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

On 22 February, Williams met with Najib Mikati, Lebanon's prime minister-designate, to reiterate the UN expectation that Lebanon continue to abide by resolution 1701 and all other international obligations.

On 16 February, Mikati assured EU foreign policy head Catherine Ashton that the future Lebanese government would respect international obligations, including resolution 1701. Ashton was in Beirut to reiterate the EU's position on the implementation of all Security Council resolutions and respect for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

Regarding the Tribunal, Mikati's statements have consistently signalled that the the issue would require a national consensus. (Some analysts have observed that referring the Tribunal issue to the Lebanese national dialogue process could have the practical effect of putting the issue on the back burner rather than at the centre of political confrontation.)

On 12 January, 11 Hezbollah-aligned ministers withdrew from the thirty-member cabinet, toppling the Lebanese government led by Prime Minister Saad Hariri. The ministers withdrew in the midst of a Saudi-Syrian effort to reach a compromise on the issue of the Tribunal. Hariri was named as the caretaker prime minister and began positioning himself to resume as premier and form a new government.

The regional mediation efforts, which had reportedly hinged on Lebanon's distancing

itself from the Tribunal in return for guarantees regarding Hezbollah's arms, were abandoned on 20 January.

The political landscape shifted further when on 21 January Druze leader Walid Jumblatt's parliamentary block aligned with Hezbollah.

On 25 January, Hezbollah-backed Mikati was appointed prime minister-designate. At press time, he had yet to form a cabinet but it seemed highly unlikely that Hariri's block would participate in a unity government.

On 16 February the Special Tribunal for Lebanon concluded the procedure to clarify definitions of terrorism and conspiracy and to determine applicable law. This ruling will form the basis for the Tribunal's pre-trial judge to continue his review of the sealed indictments submitted by the prosecutor on 17 January. (Confirmation of the indictments could come as early as April, but any trial activity is unlikely until much later in the year. Hezbollah has said it expects the indictments to implicate its members in the 2005 assassination of Rafik Hariri.)

Also on 16 February, Hezbollah head Hassan Nasrallah urged fighters to be prepared "if a new war is imposed on Lebanon." His comments came a day after Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak's military tour of the northern border, where he told troops "you may be called to enter [Lebanon] again." (Israeli troops had been put on alert in the north after the collapse of the Lebanese government.)

On 11 February, Barak met with Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and confirmed that preparations continued for an Israeli military withdrawal from northern Ghajar to redeploy south of the Blue Line. (Israel had agreed to this plan in November 2010. However, confusion arose after media reports indicated that Israel had frozen its plans after the Lebanese government collapsed.)

On 8 February the Russian ambassador to the UN proposed a Security Council visiting mission to the Middle East, which might include Lebanon in a possible itinerary.

On 26 January, Lebanon sent a position paper to the Secretary-General and the Council reiterating its commitment to implement resolution 1701 and noted

strengthened cooperation between the Lebanese army and UNIFIL. The letter detailed Lebanon's tally of Israeli air, sea and land violations and Israeli espionage activity in Lebanon, including the discovery of electronic surveillance systems in December 2010. It also reiterated Lebanon's position that Israeli withdrawal from northern Ghajar, Sheb'a Farms and Kafr Shuba hills is an obligation and not a concession.

On 12 January a Lebanese citizen was detained by the Israeli army and released to UNIFIL the next day.

In a 4 January letter, Lebanon's foreign minister asked the Secretary-General for the UN to assist in maritime delimitation with Israel. This request has implications for the recent discovery of underwater natural gas reserves. (There is no internationally recognised maritime boundary between Israel and Lebanon. Israel unilaterally installed a buoy line, which Lebanon does not recognise.)

On 5 November 2010, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs Patricia O'Brien briefed Council members in consultations on the 27 October attack against three staff members of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in Beirut.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 18 January the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights drew attention to Lebanon's draft national strategy on human rights. The national strategy is expected to be presented to the Lebanese parliament in 2011 and would help strengthen its implementation of human rights obligations following the 10 November 2010 Universal Periodic Review conducted by the Human Rights Council. The High Commissioner's office also commended the efforts of Lebanese human rights activists, in particular groups pressuring the government to allow women to pass on their nationality to their children and families.

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council remains how to get Israel and Lebanon to move from the status quo — a fragile cessation of hostilities — toward a ceasefire and permanent solution.

Related issues include regular Israeli overflights and its occupation of Ghajar in violation of resolution 1701 and the fact that Hezbollah maintains significant military capacity in violation of resolutions 1559 and 1701.

The issue of Sheb'a Farms also remains frozen.

Regarding the Tribunal, there are no immediate issues for the Council. However, the publication of the names of the Tribunal's Lebanese judges in the Lebanese newspaper *As-Safir* in late January signals a heightened level of political pressure on those judges to resign. This could lead the Council to take up the issue of the Tribunal.

Underlying Issues

At press time, the major underlying issue was the absence of a Lebanese government. Mikati has been attempting to reach agreement on a cabinet and the distribution of ministerial portfolios since his appointment on 25 January. It seemed he may still be trying to secure the participation of Hariri's block.

Options

One option is to take no action, as has been the practice since April 2008, which was the last time the Council issued a presidential statement on resolution 1701.

However, keeping in mind the complex situation in the country, another option may be a statement calling for full implementation of resolution 1701 and in particular, demonstrated progress in the next reporting period on certain 1701 obligations such as:

- demarcation of the Blue Line; and
- progress on the Israeli withdrawal from Ghajar.

The Council could encourage the Secretary-General to include in his reporting issues associated with the maritime border.

Council Dynamics

Council members agree that UNIFIL is an important stabilising factor between Israel and Lebanon—specifically in light of recent heightened political rhetoric between Hezbollah and Israel and more broadly in light of the current upheavals in the region.

Most Council members agree that arms smuggling and disarmament remain key concerns but seem to accept that progress

is only likely in the context of an inter-Lebanese dialogue and improvement on the Israel-Syria track, neither of which seems likely to gain traction soon.

Council members seem to believe that progress on the issue of Ghajar would be an important step toward the implementation of resolution 1701.

On the issue of the formation of a new Lebanese government, Council members clearly attach value to the Lebanese constitutional process being followed. Once a government is formed, Council members will likely be anticipating an explicit statement from Lebanon that it remains committed to its international commitments, including Council resolutions. On resolution 1701, Lebanon—an elected member of the Council—reiterated its commitment in its 26 January letter.

Council members seem to anticipate continued tension in Lebanon as indictments from the Tribunal wind their way through the judicial process. A majority of Council members expressed support for the Tribunal during the January open debate on the Middle East. Some members also noted its importance as a step toward ending impunity in Lebanon and expressed concern with attempts to undermine the Tribunal.

Council members generally underscore the importance of the Tribunal's independence and foresee no Council role in its activities.

France is the lead country on Lebanon in the Council.

UN Documents

Selected Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1937 (30 August 2010) renewed UNIFIL until 31 August 2011.
- S/RES/1757 (30 May 2007) established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel.
- S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) urged withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, disarmament of all militias, and extension of the Lebanese government's control over all Lebanese territory.



Selected Security Council Meeting Record

- S/PV.6470 and res. 1 (19 January 2011) was the latest open debate on the Middle East.
- S/PV.6375 (30 August 2010) was the UNIFIL renewal.

Latest Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2010/565 (1 November 2010) was on resolution 1701.
- S/2010/538 (18 October 2010) was on resolution 1559.

Selected Letter

- S/2011/47 (26 January 2011) was Lebanon's position paper on the Secretary-General's forthcoming 1701 report.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Coordinator for Lebanon

Michael Williams (UK)

Special Envoy for the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559

Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway)

UNIFIL Force Commander

Maj. Gen. Alberto Asarta Cuevas (Spain)

Size and Composition of UNIFIL as of 31 December 2010

Authorised: 15,000 troops

Current: 11,961 military personnel

Troop Contributors: Bangladesh, Belgium, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, El Salvador, France, FYR of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, Nepal, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Turkey

Duration

March 1978 to present; mandate expires 31 August 2011

Cost

1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011: \$518.71 million (A/C.5/64/19)

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to receive a briefing from the chair of the 1737 Sanctions Committee on Iran in March. (The chair typically briefs the Council every ninety days; this will be the first briefing by the current chair, Ambassador Néstor Osorio of Colombia.) An IAEA report on Iran's compliance with Council resolutions is also expected before the briefing.

Key Recent Developments

The IAEA last reported on Iran's implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement and relevant Council resolutions on 23 November 2010. The report said that 3,183 kilograms of low enriched uranium was produced through October 2010, while 32.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20 percent had been produced since the process began in February 2010. The report concludes that, contrary to IAEA board and Council resolutions, Iran has still not suspended its enrichment-related activities. The IAEA "remains concerned about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear-related activities involving military-related organisations."

On 10 December 2010, Ambassador Tsuneo Nishida (Japan), then chair of the 1737 sanctions committee, briefed the Council. He said that during the previous ninety days the committee had received reports from two UN member states regarding two possible sanctions violations (it was clear from the Council's discussion that they were Nigeria and Italy). Nishida said that "it is a matter of grave concern that the apparent pattern of sanctions violations involving prohibited arms transfers from Iran, first highlighted publicly by the committee a year ago, is continuing." Noting that Japan's chairmanship of the committee was coming to an end, he stressed the need for the panel of experts and committee to work together in a coordinated fashion, the importance for the committee and the panel to ensure transparency and share information with member states and the importance of member states to submit mandated reports on national implementation required by the sanctions resolutions.

The five permanent members of the Council each took the floor following the briefing.

All expressed support for continued discussion and diplomatic negotiations in order to resolve concern over Iran's nuclear programme. France, the UK and the US each stressed the importance of the work of the panel of experts, the need for full reporting by member states on national implementation of sanctions measures and expressed concern over the latest IAEA report. China and Russia placed special emphasis on achieving progress through diplomatic negotiations. China also expressed concern over the imposition of additional sanctions by countries beyond those measures contained in relevant Council resolutions.

On 13 December 2010, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad dismissed foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki and named Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran's nuclear organisation, as interim foreign minister. The same day, Iran wrote to the Secretary-General and president of the Council on the matter of two physicists who were attacked in Tehran on 29 November 2010. Iran asserted that the attacks, which killed one of the scientists, were carried out on behalf of powers opposed to the continuation of Iran's nuclear programme and urged the attacks be condemned by the Council.

On 15 December 2010 a suicide bombing at a mosque in Chabahar, Iran, reportedly killed dozens of people. The Secretary-General and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton both condemned the attack and offered condolences.

The work of the sanctions committee's panel of experts, meant to assist the committee in carrying out its work, has continued. In late January the panel provided to the Council an interim report on its work. (The panel consists of eight members from China, France, Germany, Japan, Nigeria, Russia, the UK and the US. The interim report was called for in resolution 1929, which established the panel for one year and imposed further sanctions on Iran. The report was due by 5 February, ninety days after the Secretary-General's appointment of the panel.)

On 15 January, Iran state media reported that representatives of five countries (Cuba, Egypt, Oman, Syria and Venezuela) were arriving in the country, at the invitation of Iran, to tour some of its nuclear facilities. China,

the EU and Russia, who had also been invited, declined to take part in the tour.

On 21 and 22 January, discussions were held between the E3+3 (Germany, France and the UK, and China, Russia and the US) and Iran in Istanbul, Turkey. The meeting followed talks between the parties that were held on 6 and 7 December 2010 in Geneva, Switzerland. It seems that the E3+3 came prepared to discuss a modified fuel swap proposal, by which Iran would transfer most of its enriched uranium out of the country in exchange for fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. (Similar plans were offered by the group in October 2009 and negotiated with Turkey and Brazil in 2010 just before the Council imposed additional sanctions.) However, the talks achieved little progress. Iran reportedly took the position that before discussing Iran's nuclear programme and any possible revival of a fuel swap proposal, it would require international recognition of its right to enrich uranium and the lifting of sanctions. (The position of the E3+3 has been that sanctions would be lifted after Iran demonstrates compliance with relevant Council and IAEA decisions, and it appears the group maintained a unified approach in the latest talks.)

After the meeting, EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton expressed disappointment with the talks and stressed that it was incumbent on Iran to demonstrate the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. She said further talks had not been scheduled. An aide to Iranian nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, said Iran expected talks would continue in the future, though the venue and date had not been set.

On 5 February, Russian media reported Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov as saying that a step-by-step plan involving incentives was needed in order to make progress on the issue. He said that the Istanbul talks made clear that a more detailed plan was needed for successful negotiations over Iran's nuclear programme. A US State department official said the same day that talks meant to delay progress rather than addressing the nuclear issue were not satisfactory.

On 15 February, Lavrov said at a press conference that Russia could not support any sanctions further than those included in resolution 1929, as additional measures would harm the population of the country.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 2 February UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay expressed alarm at the dramatic increase in executions in Iran since the beginning of the year. Pillay expressed particular concern over the cases in which political activists were executed. Pointing out that Iran is party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees the right to free expression and to free association, the high commissioner said that it is “absolutely unacceptable for individuals to be imprisoned for association with opposition groups, let alone be executed for their political views or affiliations.” Pillay added that “the international community as a whole is moving towards abolition of the death penalty in law or in practice” and called on Iran to establish a moratorium on executions with a view to abolishing the death penalty.

Key Issues

A key issue is maintaining support among Council members for the existing sanctions regime. Another issue is the lack of progress coming out of the latest E3+3 talks in Istanbul, with the position taken by Iran seemingly at serious odds with that of the other negotiating partners.

Underlying Problems

A key underlying problem is the lack of trust between Iran and many members of the international community. Iran’s refusal to implement existing Council resolutions is a prime factor.

Options

Options for the Council include:

- taking no action at present while allowing more time for the sanctions measures to have an effect;
- expressing concern over the lack of progress in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue; or
- reiterating the importance of all member states that have not yet reported to the committee on national implementation of resolution 1929 to do so.

Council and Broader Dynamics

Council members remain concerned about the continued development of Iran’s nuclear programme. Many look to Iran to engage in more substantive discussions

and to take some concrete measures aimed at confidence building, noting that resolution 1929 affirmed that sanctions measures would be suspended if Iran complies with existing resolutions. The E3+3 Council members appear disappointed with the lack of outcome from the latest round of talks with Iran in Istanbul.

Also, while all members support the implementation of existing Council resolutions as a matter of principle, some remain concerned that the sanctions that have been imposed do not seem to have yet prompted Iran to engage in substantive negotiations. Others, including the E3, accept that sanctions can require some time to take effect and bring about changes in behaviour. Most members seem to agree that the sanctions are having some effect on Iran’s government, though gauging that effect is difficult. The imposition of additional sanctions does not seem to be viewed as likely in the near term.

Most committee members seem to view the work of the panel of experts favourably. Some recall the concerted efforts required for passage of the latest sanctions resolution in 2010 and emphasise the importance now of ensuring its effective implementation with the assistance of the panel.

UN Documents

Selected Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1929 (9 June 2010) imposed a fourth round of sanctions on Iran. The resolution reaffirmed past Council decisions, imposed new measures on Iran and requested the Secretary-General to establish a panel of experts for a period of one year to assist the Iran Sanctions Committee in carrying out its work.
- S/RES/1887 (24 September 2009) reaffirmed previous resolutions related to Iran’s nuclear activities.
- S/RES/1835 (27 September 2008) reaffirmed commitment to a negotiated solution within the E3+3 dual-track framework, and called upon Iran to comply with previous Council resolutions.
- S/RES/1803 (3 March 2008) reiterated existing measures against Iran and imposed additional ones.
- S/RES/1747 (24 March 2007) established a ban on Iran’s arms exports

and added names to the list of people and entities subject to assets freeze.

- S/RES/1737 (23 December 2006) banned trade with Iran of certain items related to nuclear activities and weapon-delivery systems, imposed an asset freeze on certain persons and entities and established a sanctions committee.
- S/RES/1696 (31 July 2006) demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA.

Selected Meeting Record

- S/PV.6442 (10 December 2010) was the most recent briefing by the chair of the 1737 Committee.

Selected Letter

- S/2010/634 (13 December 2010) was the letter from Iran to the Secretary-General and Council regarding the killing of an Iranian physicist.

Latest IAEA Report

- GOV/2010/62 (23 November 2010)

Other Relevant Facts

Sanctions Committee Chairman

- Ambassador Néstor Osorio (Colombia)

Notable Dates for March

Report Due	Reports for Consideration in March	Requesting Document
15 February	<i>SG report on Liberia (UNMIL)</i>	S/RES/1938
28 February	<i>SG report on 1701 (Lebanon)</i>	S/RES/1937
11 March	<i>SG report on Afghanistan (UNAMA)</i>	S/RES/1917
mid-March	<i>SG report on Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL)</i>	S/RES/1941
31 March	<i>SG report on Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)</i>	S/RES/1962
by end of March	<i>Reports of the Sudan Sanctions Committee and the Panel of Experts</i>	S/RES/1945

Mandate Expiry in March 2011	Relevant Document
23 March	<i>Afghanistan (UNAMA)</i> S/RES/1917

March 2011 Other Important Dates

early March	<i>An envoy-level meeting of the Middle East Quartet (EU, Russia, the UN and the US) is expected in Brussels. A ministerial-level Quartet meeting is possible later in the month.</i>
21 March	<i>The International Contact Group on piracy off the Coast of Somalia is scheduled to meet in New York.</i>
26-27 March	<i>A ministerial-level meeting of the G8 is expected in Paris.</i>
28 March	<i>Proposals from the AU's high-level panel for the resolution of the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire are due.</i>
29 March	<i>Authorisation of meeting of the Arab League is expected in Baghdad.</i>

Also likely in March:

- Regular monthly consultations on the Middle East
- Decision formalising the withdrawal of UNMIL's military guard force from the Special Court of Sierra Leone's premises in Freetown, Sierra Leone
- Open debate on Somalia with the participation of the Secretary-General
- Report of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia to the Sanctions Committee on the impact of the exemption to the assets freeze provisions of the Somalia sanctions regime
- Meeting of the International Contact Group on Somalia in Kampala
- Report of the IAEA on Iran

Briefings are expected by the:

- Chair of the 1737 Sanctions Committee on Iran, Ambassador Néstor Osorio
- Chair of the Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee, Indian ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri,
- Chair of the country-specific configuration of the PBC, Ambassador John McNee, on Sierra Leone
- Head of UNIPSIL Michael von der Schulenburg on Sierra Leone
- Head of UNAMA Staffan de Mistura on Afghanistan
- Head of the UNMIL Ellen Margrethe Løj and the chair of the Liberia configuration of the Peace-building Commission (PBC), the Permanent Representative of Jordan, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein, on Liberia
- UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams
- Special adviser on Cyprus Alexander Downer

Important Dates over the Horizon

- First-round presidential elections are expected on 8 May in Chad.
- Parliamentary elections are scheduled for 22 May in Cyprus.
- New state of South Sudan set to declare independence on 9 July.
- The "transitional" period in Somalia expires in August.
- The Liberian constitutional referendum is scheduled for August.
- Elections to the Palestinian National Authority to be held before October 2011 have been announced.
- Legislative and presidential elections in Liberia are expected in October.
- Parliamentary elections and first round of presidential elections are scheduled for 27 November in the DRC.

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Security Council Report is published with the support of the Governments of Canada, Germany, Liechtenstein, Norway, Singapore and Switzerland, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. It is incorporated as a not for profit Organisation and operates in affiliation with the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University in New York.

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