Upcoming Change of Leadership at SCR

Dear Readers and Friends,

I am writing to give advance notice to all our SCR friends and readers that, later in 2011, I will be stepping down as Executive Director of SCR.

In 2005 I came back to New York to set up SCR. Now in 2011, after six years, SCR is well established and respected. We have filled a niche and proved that there is a real and increasing demand for consistent, balanced, high-quality information about the activities of the UN Security Council and for the work that we do to assist Council members and other stakeholders. The organisation has grown steadily in response to growing demands from our stakeholders. We are now a geographically diverse team of 13 people. We have just moved into a larger office space. The range of financial donors to SCR is expanding.

Many ambassadors and diplomats, two Secretaries-Generals and many Secretariat staff, NGOs and academics have provided valuable encouragement for this experiment to create a new kind of organisation at the UN. The set-up phase is now over, so I think it is time for me to move on to other challenges and new projects. Also one goal is to spend more time with a growing and active group of grandchildren now spread between Uganda and New Zealand.

We will keep you informed about progress in appointing a new Executive Director. At this stage, the Board of SCR has established a search committee under the leadership of Ambassador John McNee, Permanent Representative of Canada. I know John would be delighted to hear from people who would like to take on the challenge of leading SCR for the next phase. Amanda Roberts at SCR a.roberts@securitycouncilreport.org will be supporting the Search Committee and can be contacted for further information.

Colin Keating

OVERVIEW FOR FEBRUARY

Brazil will have the Council’s presidency in February.

There will be an open debate, most likely on 11 February, on the linkages between development and peace and security. It is likely to be chaired by the country’s Foreign Minister, Antônio Patriota.

A “horizon scanning” briefing in informal consultations by the Department of Political Affairs on issues of concern for the next period is a possibility.

Also possible is a discussion, in consultations, to review the overall programme of the Council’s protection work.

The Council may also meet with Karin Landgren, the incoming Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the UN Office in Burundi (BNUB). The Council, in its 2006 Note from the President (S/2006/507) on working methods stressed its desire to hold dialogues with new Special Representatives of the Secretary-General before they assume their duties, but in practice such meetings up till now have been very sporadic.

The Council will also likely hold another in its series of quarterly consultations on peacekeeping with the heads of the peacekeeping and field support departments.

The Council is due to renew the mandate of the UN integrated mission in Timor-Leste, UNMIT. A briefing by the head of mission, Ameerah Haq, and a debate with the participation of the Prime Minister of...
Timor-Leste Xanana Gusmão, are expected, followed by a formal session to adopt the resolution.

Several other briefings are expected on:

- MONUSCO, the operation in the DRC, by its head Roger Meece, followed by consultations;
- the activities of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) by its chairperson-in-office, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Audronius Azubalis;
- Kosovo, by the head of UNMIK, Lamberto Zannier, likely to be followed by a debate;
- the work of the integrated peacebuilding office in Guinea-Bissau, UNIOGBIS, by its head Joseph Mutaboba;
- EU-UN cooperation from the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton;
- the referendum in Sudan, following the official announcement of results, by the head of UNMIS, Haile Menkerios, via videolink; and
- the DPRK in consultations, by the chair of the DPRK Sanctions Committee, Portugal’s Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral.

Aide-Memoire

Important matters pending include:

- In October 2009 the Council renewed the mandate of the panel of experts of the Security Council Sudan Sanctions Committee in resolution 1891 and requested the panel to submit a final report on its findings and recommendations no later than November 2010. The panel submitted its report to the Sanctions Committee in October 2010. The Committee conveyed the report to the Security Council in December 2010 but the Council has yet to decide to publish the report.
- The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire, requested in a May 2004 presidential statement (S/PRST/2004/17), was never made public. Also on Côte d’Ivoire, the December 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not been published.
- The position of Special Envoy for Myanmar has not been filled since Ibrahim Gambari left the post in January 2009. At the time Vijay Nambiar, the Special Advisor to the Secretary-General, took on the position of Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Myanmar in what was expected to be temporary role.
- On 11 November 2009 in resolution 1894 on protection of civilians, the Council requested the Secretary-General to develop guidance for UN operations and other relevant missions on reporting for enhancing the Council’s monitoring and oversight. There has been no report back to the Council on this.
- On 28 May 2010 in resolution 1925 on the protection of civilians in accordance with resolutions 1894 and 1891, requested in a May 2009 presidential statement (S/PRST/2009/23), the Council requested the Secretary-General to elaborate the concept of operation and rules of engagement of MONUSCO, in line with the resolution, and to report back to the Council on the protection of civilians in accordance with resolutions 1894 and 1891. The Secretary-General has not yet reported back to the Council on this issue.
- Resolution 1904 in December 2009 indicated that the expert groups assisting the three counterterrorism committees (the 1267 Committee on Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions, the 1373 Committee on CTC, and the 1540 Committee on weapons of mass destruction) should be co-located and asked the Secretary-General to elaborate the concept of operation and rules of engagement of MONUSCO, in line with the resolution, and to report back to the Council and the TCCs. The Secretary-General has yet to report back to the Council and the TCCs on this issue.
- The Secretary-General’s reports to the Council on country-specific situations include the protection of children is not yet implemented. In 2009 protection of civilian elements had been incorporated into only half of the relevant country-specific reports.
- Two sets of consultations on Sudan are expected. Consultations are also expected on the ongoing situation in Côte d’Ivoire, and on the previously scheduled review of the sanctions regime. Should the Secretary-General request the extension of the authorisation of the temporary deployment to Côte d’Ivoire of some troops from the operation in Liberia (UNMIL), the Council is likely to hold consultations and would need to meet in a formal session to adopt a resolution.
- The Secretary-General has not yet reenergised his Advisory Committee on the Prevention of Genocide (it has not met since 2008).
- A biennial report by the Secretary-General on small arms requested on 29 June 2007 in a presidential statement is yet to be produced for 2010. The last report on small arms was published in April 2008.
- The mandate to the Secretary-General to assist with the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially Sheb’a Farms, in accordance with resolutions 1701, continues to await completion.
- The Council has yet to address the Secretary-General’s summary of the report of the UN Board of Inquiry into incidents involving UN facilities and personnel in Gaza between 27 December 2008 and 19 January 2009, submitted to it on 4 May 2009.
- The Council requested the Secretariat on 21 November 2006 (S/2006/928) to update the index to Council notes and statements on working methods. This has not been published.
**Security Council Report**

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### Status Update since our January Forecast

**Nepal:** On 5 January Secretary-General’s Representative in Nepal Karin Landgren gave her final briefing (S/PV/6465) to the Council as the head of UNMIN. She said that although the peace process was still incomplete, UNMIN had performed its mandated tasks and contributed significantly to peace. She also noted that the peace process continued to be deadlocked with little progress on the critical issues. The Council also had before it the Secretary-General’s report on UNMIN (S/2010/658). On 14 January, on the eve of UNMIN’s mandate expiry, the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2011/2) reaffirming its support for the peace process in Nepal and saying it would continue to be supportive of the peace process and the people of Nepal following UNMIN’s departure from Nepal.

**Conflict Prevention: Horizon Scanning:** On 10 January Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe briefed Council members in consultations on issues of possible concern. The briefing was in line with similar “horizon scanning” consultations held in November 2010 during the UK presidency. Discussion apparently focused on potential issues arising from some of the many upcoming elections in Africa this year, with Council members emphasising that prospective complications would likely only arise in a few particular instances.

**UNRCCA:** On 13 January Council members were briefed by Special Representative of the Secretary-General Miroslav Jenča, on the work of the UNRCCA. A press statement (SC/10151) following the briefing expressed appreciation for the efforts of the Centre as a mechanism for preventive diplomacy, particularly in Kyrgyzstan, and encouraged further cooperation and coordination between the governments of the region, the Regional Centre, and relevant regional organisations in this regard.

**Somalia:** On 14 January, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, briefed the Council (S/PV.6467) on new developments since the Secretary-General’s 30 December 2010 report on the situation in the country (S/2010/675). Mahiga focused on the remaining transitional tasks before the end of the transitional period in August, as well as the UN strategy, the difficult humanitarian situation and the need for a comprehensive anti-piracy approach. He appealed for enhanced support—both financial and material—to AMISOM. Following informal consultations, Council members, in a press statement (SC/10154), called on the Somali government to “redouble its efforts” to complete the remaining transitional tasks, expressed their intention to monitor the situation closely and called on the international community to provide additional resources and support to AMISOM. They also condemned attacks against civilians and called on all parties to abide by their obligations under international humanitarian law.

On 25 January, the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Legal Issues related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, Jack Lang, briefed the Council on his recommendations to the Secretary-General (S/PV.6473) as contained in his report transmitted to Council members on 19 January (S/2011/30). Lang described the situation with regard to piracy as serious and even worsening and said it had to be addressed with “extreme urgency”. He called for a strengthening of existing measures as well as implementation of new initiatives, including the establishment of specialised domestic courts in Somaliland and Puntland, as well as an extraterritorial Somali specialised court to be established somewhere in the region, possibly in Arusha.

**Haiti:** On 20 January, the Council was briefed (S/PV.6471) on the situation in Haiti by Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and Valerie Amos, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator. Le Roy noted while the overall security situation remained calm despite some sporadic violence, the risk of further unrest remains a concern. He said the international community should work with Haiti to help ensure a credible election result so the country's government can remain focused on earthquake recovery efforts. He voiced commitment to shedding further light on the origins of the cholera epidemic, noting the Secretary-General announced on 6 January the creation of an independent panel to investigate the cause of the outbreak. Amos said much had been accomplished in the last year in providing shelter, drinking water, sanitation and education to the people of Haiti. While the fatality rate from the cholera outbreak had been reduced from nine to two percent, she noted that stability in the country was required to continue combating the disease.

**Post-Conflict Peacebuilding:** The Council held an open debate on institution-building in post-conflict countries on 21 January. The Secretary-General opened the debate. Other speakers included Vice Prime Minister of Timor-Leste José Luis Gutieres and German Ambassador Peter Wittig, who spoke both in his national capacity and as chair of the PBC. In its presidential statement (S/PRST/2011/2) following the debate the Council stressed that institution-building was a critical component of peacebuilding, emphasising the importance of national ownership. The Council also stressed its willingness to make greater use of the advisory role of the PBC and the importance of well-defined partnerships among the key stakeholders. It also committed itself to improving its consideration of peacebuilding tasks related to institution-building in mandates and composition of peacekeeping operations, special political missions and integrated peacebuilding offices.
The Council also requested a review of measures, including targeted sanctions against those who obstruct the work of UNOCI.

On 19 January Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the prevention of genocide, Francis Deng, and the responsibility to protect, Edward Luck, expressed concern about “the possibility of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing in Côte d’Ivoire.” They expressed the belief that urgent steps should be taken in line with the responsibility to protect, to avert the risk of genocide and ensure the protection of all those at risk of mass atrocities.

On 19 January Switzerland froze all assets held in that country by Gbagbo.

On 21 January UN spokesman Martin Nesirky said that proposals by the Ivorian defence and security forces loyal to Laurent Gbagbo to stop and search UN vehicles “are a serious violation of the Status of Forces Agreement and Security Council resolution 1962 and therefore unacceptable.”

On 22 January, Gbagbo’s administration announced that it had cancelled the accreditation of France’s ambassador to Côte d’Ivoire, following an earlier notification from Paris indicating that France had accredited Ali Coulibaly, Ouattara’s choice as Côte d’Ivoire’s envoy to France. On 22 January heads of state of member states of the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) forced the resignation of the head of the bank, who was seen to be a key ally of Gbagbo and had ensured the latter’s cash supply, despite a previous decision by the bank to cut off access by Gbagbo to Côte d’Ivoire’s funds and recognise Ouattara as the legitimate president. The leaders subsequently requested that Ouattara name a new governor of the bank. On 23 January Ouattara called for a month-long international ban on cocoa exports from Côte d’Ivoire, as a further measure to increasing pressure on Gbagbo. (Côte d’Ivoire is the world’s leading producer of cocoa which is its number one source of revenue.) On 24 January the US said it supported Ouattara’s call for a ban on Ivorian cocoa exports.

On 24 January Nigerian Foreign Minister Odein Ajumogobia wrote an editorial in his country’s local press stating that “ECOWAS requires unequivocal international support through an appropriate United Nations Security Council resolution to sanction the use of force...to legitimise the use of external force to effectively contain the increasingly volatile internal situation and ensure an enduring peace in Côte d’Ivoire and the West African subregion.”

On 25 January AU chairperson Bingu wa Mutharika travelled to the Ivory Coast to hold talks with Ouattara and Gbagbo, in the lead up to the the AU Summit scheduled for 30 to 31 January.

On 26 January Gbagbo ordered the seizure of all local branches of BCEAO. Ouattara condemned the move stating that “this illegitimate and illegal decision to requisition is null and void” and indicated that anyone who participated in its implementation “will be subject to sanctions and criminal prosecution.”

On 26 January a delegation of West African leaders met with US officials in Washington DC to discuss the Ivorian crisis.
Key Issues
A key issue for the Council, in light of its previous commitments to and resolutions on Côte d’Ivoire, is balancing its own role and the roles of the regional and subregional organisations to best effect so as to avoid the possibility of relapse into full-blown violent conflict and bearing in mind the risks associated with the previous history of violence based on ethnic lines.

A second issue is the position of the military reinforcements that have been temporarily deployed from UNMIL and balancing the immediate needs in Côte d’Ivoire versus the medium term needs in Liberia.

On sanctions, in light of recent developments, including reported incitement to attack UN personnel, an issue is whether the Council should use the February sanctions review to initiate action to impose targeted sanctions on individuals and entities found to be stoking political tensions and inciting violence.

Options
Options for the sanctions committee include:
- retention of the sanctions regime, without modifications;
- adding new names to induce compliance with the peace efforts of the mediators; and
- inviting ECOWAS ambassadors to a series of informal interactive dialogues with the Committee so that the Committee and the region can develop a joint strategy.

Options for the Council include:
- renewing the mandate of the temporary deployment of UNMIL troops to UNOCI for a further month or two;
- inviting ECOWAS to make a presentation to the Council—perhaps in a closed Council meeting—on its requests to the Council following the AU summit at the end of January; and
- asking the Secretary-General to establish an intellectual high-level panel to review all the issues associated with the voting and perhaps also to oversee a review of the tallies as a tool to assist the regional mediators.

Council Dynamics
Council members appear ready to proceed with a review of Côte d’Ivoire sanctions as envisaged by resolution 1946. However, the circumstances are the opposite of what had been originally envisaged for the review when the resolution was adopted in October 2010. At that time, it was hoped the review would occur “in light of progress achieved in the electoral process” and implicitly anticipated action toward the lifting of the measures. The optimistic scenario no longer prevails.

Council members seem persuaded that the future presence of the temporary troops deployed from UNMIL to UNOCI should be based on developments on the ground and the Secretary-General’s recommendations.

Despite the Nigerian foreign minister’s recent indication that it was becoming imperative for the Council to authorise formally the use of force to oust Gbagbo as threatened by ECOWAS, some Council members remain uncomfortable with this strategy at this time. Some note the risks involved and the inevitable setback it would cause to the larger issue of peace consolidation in the country. Others note the inevitable impact on civilians and likely realise flaws. Russia and China have in the past expressed reservations about use of force in essentially internal matters. However, they have not indicated whether they view the situation in Côte d’Ivoire with its potential regional ramifications, especially on the historically restive Mano river area, in such terms.

The US, France and UK have been strong in their opposition to Gbagbo’s refusal to cede power. British Foreign Secretary William Hague has said that UK supports ECOWAS military intervention in principle, provided such action has the prior endorsement of the Council. The US is yet to indicate its position. At the time of going to press neither Nigeria nor ECOWAS had endorsed the Ouagadougou Agreement.

France is the lead country on this issue in the Council.

UN Documents

Selected Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1967 (19 January 2011) authorised an increase of 2,000 troops in the overall strength of UNOCI military personnel and extended the mandate of troops temporarily deployed from the UNMIL to UNOCI.
- S/RES/1962 (20 December 2010)

**Israel/Palestine: Gaza**

**Expected Council Action**

Robert Serry, the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, will likely brief the Council in February.

At press time, a draft resolution S/2011/24 on Israeli settlements and the peace negotiations remained on the table. (For background, please see our [Update Report on Israel/Palestine](#) of 12 January 2011.) A vote prior to the 5 February Quartet meeting in Munich seemed unlikely. Consultations between the Arab Group and the Quartet seemed possible after the Munich meeting.

The final report of the Panel of Inquiry into the 31 May 2010 Gaza flotilla incident, originally expected in February, now seems unlikely to be completed before the spring.

**Background on the Panel of Inquiry**

On 31 May 2010 Israeli naval forces boarded in international waters a six-ship flotilla bound for Gaza. There was a confrontation on the Turkish-registered ship *Mavi Marmara* that resulted in nine civilian deaths, all of whom were Turkish nationals. On 1 June the Council issued a presidential statement calling for an impartial investigation into the incident and stressing that the situation in Gaza was not sustainable.

On 2 August 2010 the Secretary-General announced a Panel of Inquiry which the Council welcomed on 3 August in a press statement. The Panel was tasked with identifying the facts, circumstances and context of the Gaza flotilla incident (not to determine criminal responsibility).

The Panel’s interim report was submitted to the Secretary-General in September 2010. At that time, only Turkey had submitted the results of its National Investigation and Examination Commission to the Panel. The Israeli input to the Panel was not received until 23 January. At press time, Turkey was drafting an addendum to its original report which is expected to be submitted to the Panel in February.

Separately, the Israeli military undertook its own investigation. On 12 July conclusions were released that the operation was necessary and included the use of live fire. Mistakes in planning were admitted. It seems unlikely that the full Israeli military investigation will be shared with the Panel.

Due to the delay in receiving Israel’s submission, the Panel seems unlikely to conclude its work before the spring.

(For further background on the Gaza flotilla incident and subsequent developments, please see Security Council Report’s July, August and September 2010 *Monthly Forecasts*.)

**Key Recent Developments**

On 23 January the Israeli government-appointed Turkel Commission released its first report, which concluded that Israel did not contravene international law and Israeli soldiers acted in self-defence. The report also says that Israel’s blockade is lawful.

A 23 January press release from the Turkish government characterised the Israeli actions on 31 May 2010 and its blockade of Gaza as devoid of legal basis. It also recalled that the facts of the incident were confirmed by the Human Rights Council’s fact-finding mission (Israel did not cooperate with this mission).

On 19 January Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe briefed the Council before its regular open debate. On Gaza, he noted growing tensions evidenced by a significant increase in rockets and mortars being fired from Gaza into Israel and Israeli incursions and airstrikes into Gaza. He said that an outbreak of hostilities would be devastating and urged all parties to cease violence. He also reported that Hamas had publically committed to maintaining calm. On Israel’s Gaza closure policy, Pascoe noted that import and export levels are still significantly below pre-2007 levels.

A [January 2011 Wikileaks](#) of a March 2008 US diplomatic cable indicated that Israeli policy had been to keep the Gaza economy on the “brink of collapse.” The blockade was slightly relaxed in June 2010 under international pressure after the flotilla incident. However, in November 2010, the then head of the UN Relief and Works Agency in Gaza, John Ging, said, “there’s been no material change for the people on the ground” as a result of this shift.

On 13 January, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said the conditions to restore relations with Israel were an apology and compensation for the families of the nine people killed in the flotilla incident. He separately emphasised the importance of lifting the blockade of Gaza.

In early December, media reports indicated that Turkish and Israeli officials had been meeting in Geneva in an effort to repair relations and had made significant progress on
compromises. However, the process seems to have collapsed after the Israeli foreign minister intervened and rejected compromise on the issue.

Key Issues
There is no immediate issue for the Council in February since the final report of the Panel of Inquiry seems likely to be delayed. (Given the content of the two national investigations a final consensus document seems a highly unlikely outcome given that both Israel and Turkey sit on the Panel. Independent Panel members may therefore have to exercise the role envisaged for them in the Panel’s terms of reference.)

Underlying Problems
With respect to Gaza, the issue of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, held captive in Gaza since June 2006, is still unresolved and movement on this issue seems essential if the blockade is to be modified.

With respect to resumptions of negotiations, continued Israeli settlement activity remains the key blockage. At one point it had seemed that a Security Council resolution (using essentially uncontentious language) might be a key to unlocking the blockade. At press time, it seemed very unclear what alternatives could emerge that would loosen the deadlock.

Council Dynamics
Regarding the flotilla incident, there was concern among many of the 2010 elected Council members that the Panel’s interim report was not shared with the Council. It seems that there is currently an expectation by many members that the spirit of the June 2010 presidential statement requires the final report to be promptly transmitted to the Council.

Most members are conscious that as the anniversary of the incident approaches in May there will be many pressures, especially if Israeli-Turkish relations remain strained.

On the settlements resolution it seems that the cosponsors certainly have the nine votes for it to pass and probably have 14 votes in the Council. The US position seemed more related to timing and process rather than substance. Almost everything in the resolution has been accepted by the US in past resolutions.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolution
- S/RES/1860 (8 January 2009) called for an immediate, durable and fully respected ceasefire, leading to the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and unimpeded humanitarian assistance.

Security Council Presidential Statement
- S/PRST/2010/9 (1 June 2010) called for an impartial investigation into the Gaza flotilla incident and stressed that the situation in Gaza was not sustainable.

Security Council Press Statement
- SC/10001 (3 August 2010) welcomed the establishment by the Secretary-General of his Panel of Inquiry into the Gaza flotilla incident.

Security Council Letters
- S/2011/24 (18 January 2011) is the draft resolution on settlements.
- S/2010/414 (2 August 2010) was on the establishment of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry into the Gaza flotilla incident.

Security Council Meeting Records
- S/PV.6470 and resumption 1 (19 January 2011) was the most recent open debate on the Middle East.
- S/PV.6325 (31 May 2010) and S/PV.6326 (1 June 2010) was the Security Council meeting on the Gaza flotilla incident.

Security Council Resolution

Human Rights Council
- A/HRC/RES/15/1 (29 September 2010) regretted non-cooperation by Israel with the fact-finding mission, endorsed the conclusions in the mission’s report and decided to follow-up at its 16th session (28 February-25 March 2011).
- A/HRC/15/21 (22 September 2010) was the report of the fact-finding mission, which found that the conduct of the Israeli military was disproportionate and excessive.
- A/HRC/RES/14/1 (2 June 2010) condemned the Gaza flotilla incident and called for a fact-finding mission.

Useful Additional Resources
- Press Release from Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 29, 23 January 2011

Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN operation in Timor-Leste, UNMIT, for a further 12 months prior to its 26 February expiry. Prime Minister of Timor-Leste Xanana Gusmão will address an open debate of the Council and Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Timor-Leste Ameerah Haq will brief the Council. The Secretary-General’s report on UNMIT will be published the first week of February.

The Council will convene a meeting with member states contributing police to UNMIT prior to the expiration of its current mandate.

Key Recent Developments
The Council last held an open debate on Timor-Leste on 19 October 2010. The head of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), Ameerah Haq, told the Council that Timor-Leste was entering a “crucial period” that would determine whether the country had overcome the political and institutional weaknesses that contributed to the violent events of 2006. Several members of the core group on Timor-Leste, including Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Portugal, also participated. (The core group, established in 1999, is made up of Australia, Brazil, France, Japan, New Zealand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, the UK and the US.)

On 12 October 2010 UN Police Adviser Ann-Marie Orler visited Timor-Leste to assess the handover of primary responsibility for police operations from UN police to the national police of Timor-Leste (polícia nacional de Timor-Leste—PNTL) in ten out of the country’s 13 districts. During her visit, Orler met President José Ramos-Horta and discussed progress and the remaining operational challenges facing PNTL in assuming primary policing responsibilities in the final three districts (Dili and the border districts of Bobonaro and Cova Lima). Haq’s briefing to the
Council had highlighted that PNTL officers who failed certification in other districts had been transferred primarily to Dili to allow for the resumption of PNTL responsibility in those districts.

On 8 November 2010, the 2010 Human Development Report ranked Timor-Leste 120 out of 169 countries, marking an improvement of twenty places since 2005. This places Timor-Leste in the “medium” human development category, which UN Resident Coordinator in Timor-Leste Finn Reske-Nielsen said was a “real achievement” for the country.

On 10 November, Timor-Leste was elected for two-years to the executive board of UN Women. This followed the successful election of a Timorese expert, Maria Pires, to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women in June 2010.

On 18 November, Haq briefed the Timorese Council of Ministers on planning for the eventual withdrawal of UNMIT from Timor-Leste, taking into account the transition of remaining responsibilities from the UN to Timorese authorities and the conduct of presidential and parliamentary elections in 2012. The Council of Ministers asked that any withdrawal be conducted in a “structured way” to mitigate possible effects over the next two years and decided to form a high-level committee on transition with representatives from UNMIT and the government to “plan and develop the transition.”

A proposed Council visit to Timor-Leste in December 2010 was cancelled at the request of the Japanese Mission in New York due to developments that required the presence in New York of the Japanese permanent representative who was to lead the mission. There are no plans for a resumed visit at this stage.

On 20 August 2010, President Ramos-Horta commuted the sentences of 23 persons incarcerated in the 11 February 2008 attacks on himself and the prime minister. On the same day, the president commuted the sentences of three F-FDTL members convicted of homicide and attempted homicide in the shooting deaths of eight PNTL officers, who were shot whilst under unarmed UN police escort in May 2006. All were released.

Key Issues
A key issue is whether the relative stability of the last two years is evidence of successful institution building or simply reflects a lull at the mid-term of the current five-year election cycle. A related question is whether a resurgence of unrest could accompany political activity in the lead up to the 2012 elections.

A second key issue is whether the Council will consider incorporating possible longer-term roles for the UN, either with regard to the elections or peacebuilding, into the current mandate and the related question of a transition from UNMIT at this debate or postpone such matters until a later stage.

A practical issue is how to balance the authorised level of UN police taking into account both the ongoing reconstitution of the PNTL (and the corresponding reduced role for UN police) with the need for a stable security environment in the lead-up to the mid-2012 elections.

A separate issue for the Council is the ongoing question of addressing issues of justice and impunity arising from the violence in 1999 and the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry into the violence of 2006.

Options
In renewing the mandate of UNMIT, the Council could:

- request the government and UNMIT to continue addressing the obstacles to handing back all remaining districts to the PNTL seriously and without undue haste;
- underscore the ongoing importance of addressing questions of justice and impunity;
- emphasise the importance of UNMIT’s coordinating closely with bilateral and regional partners in institution-building (bearing in mind the presidential statement adopted on this topic in January);
- request a more regular reporting cycle on transition planning and the work of the high-level committee on transition, including with regard to peacebuilding; and
- in view of the UN police drawdown schedule outlined in most recent Secretary-General’s reports, reconsider the current authorised levels in a way that would allow flexibility in the event of unanticipated problems.

Council Dynamics
Brazil has taken over as lead country in the Council and seems to be emphasising that consideration of UNMIT’s mandate be in close consultation with the Government of Timor-Leste. Brazil, supported by Portugal, also seems to favour a cautious approach to the eventual drawdown of UNMIT. There is some concern that Council members that are significant contributors to the UN peacekeeping budget might be drawn to support opportunities to rapidly reduce UNMIT’s force size.

Six members of the core group are currently on the Council—Brazil, Portugal, the US, the UK, France and South Africa. The Council’s consideration of UNMIT should therefore be informed by a good understanding of the situation on the ground and the perspective of key development partners. (It is usual practice that the core group prepares an initial draft for the Council.)

Questions around justice and impunity were to be a focus of the Council’s mission to Dili in December 2010. Despite a different Council composition, several members of the Council could be expected to push this issue, such as the US, the UK, France and Germany. South Africa has a close association with Timor-Leste on issues of truth and reconciliation (Timor-Leste modelled its truth and reconciliation commission on South Africa’s example).

UN Documents

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<th>Selected Security Council Resolutions</th>
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<td>• S/RES/1704 (25 August 2006) established UNMIT.</td>
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<td>• S/PV.6405 (19 October 2010) was a Council debate on Timor-Leste.</td>
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<th>Latest Secretary-General’s reports</th>
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<td>• S/2011/32 (25 January 2011) covers the period 21 September 2010 to 7 January 2011.</td>
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Council Decisions in 2010
In 2010 the total number of Council decisions (resolutions and presidential statements) increased by 7 percent from 2009 (from 83 to 89). (The 2009 total represented the lowest level in almost two decades.) Overall, the Council decisions in 2010 are still largely in line with the 2009 level and recent trends.

However, when one breaks down the 2010 figures, a more interesting picture emerges. In 2010, the number of resolutions actually increased quite significantly from 48 to 59 (22 percent). Over half of the increase in resolutions can be accounted for by an increase in the number of resolutions on Côte d’Ivoire (seven as opposed to three in 2009) and Iraq (four as opposed to two in 2009).

By contrast, presidential statements dropped from 35 to thirty. Most of this change can be attributed to a reduction in the number of presidential statements condemning specific terrorist incidents (none in 2010, down from four in 2009. It seems that this reflects a new practice to issue press statements on specific terrorist incidents rather than adopting formal decisions.)

Council Activity
The modest increase in Council decisions is matched by a slight increase in the number of formal Council meetings. The number of meetings grew by 8 percent, from 194 to 210. While the level of change of formal meetings is minor, some notable variations in specific cases can be seen in the numbers of meetings on:

- Iraq (up from seven to 12);
- Cote d’Ivoire (up from 11 to 15); and
- Georgia (down from four to none).

Council decisions on thematic issues remained nearly constant. The number of thematic resolutions increased by one from 10 to 11, and the number of presidential statements on thematic issues remained at 11.

The number of resolutions on counter-terrorism was unchanged. As was the case in 2009, in 2010 only one resolution was adopted. (The 2010 resolution renewed the mandate of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate.) Also, a presidential statement was adopted at the conclusion of the thematic debate on terrorism held under Turkey’s Council presidency in September.

Six resolutions were passed relating to the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as opposed to four in 2009.

Use of the veto can potentially negatively impact the number of Council resolutions adopted. However, this has not been the case in the last several years. (No vetoes...
In terms of Council activity at the informal level, the number of press statements significantly increased by 47 percent, from 36 to 53. Over half of the increase can be accounted for by eight statements on Côte d’Ivoire (as opposed to none in 2009) and two statements dealing with the January earthquake in Haiti.

There were nine press statements responding to specific terrorist incidents in 2010, down from 10 in 2009.

**Appearances of Media Stakeout**

Appearances of the Council President and other Council members at the media stakeout also offer some insights into the level and focus of informal work of the Council members. Also, as we noted in our September 2010 brief on *Security Council Statistics*, questions have arisen regarding transparency and the ongoing level of information via the media stakeout sharing since the relocation of the Council in April 2010 to new temporary premises.

In a September brief we identified a notable reduction in Council media stakeout appearances for the months April-July 2010. This trend seems to have continued through the end of 2010. Stakeout appearances by the president in August-December 2010 declined by 16 percent (from 48 to 40) when compared with the average number of stakeout appearances for those same months in 2006-2009.

The reduction in stakeout appearances by other Council members is even more pronounced, with a 76 percent drop (from 89 to 21) for the months of August-December. This decline can be partially explained by limitations imposed by the move to temporary facilities. However, there is a risk that, since these temporary arrangements will be in place for several years, the decline in information sharing may become institutionalised.

**Analysis**

When considering possible factors that might have contributed to the present level of Council activity, it is important to note that quantitative benchmarks do not provide a real picture of the Council’s activity, productivity and effectiveness.

It is unclear if the slight increase seen over the past year is only temporary with further statistical decline yet to come. It may be that the two periods of most intense activity following the end of the Cold War, from 1992 to 1995 and 2005 to 2006, were unusual periods with aberrant levels of activity. However, at this time it is impossible to judge this with certainty.

It is also important to note that heightened activity does not necessarily equal increased achievement, and the adoption of a lower number of presidential statements does not necessarily indicate reduced effort on the part of the Council or less positive outcomes. Some proponents of Council reform have advocated a reduction in the number of formal decisions, or at least the time involved in negotiating and adopting them, in order to increase effectiveness in the areas such as conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Anecdotal comments made by Council members over the past year indicate that members do not consider their workloads to be significantly less than in years past. Indeed, some feel the Council is busier than ever and that there are many key issues that the Council should be involved in but is not even discussing.

Another factor that needs to be borne in mind is that currently Council members now invest much time and energy in meetings at the expert level and in working groups. These activities are less easily tracked than formal meetings. In addition, sometimes a great deal of effort is expended on the negotiation of a single decision. (An excellent example is resolution 1966 on a new residual mechanism to replace the ICTY and ICTR. The report of the chair of the Informal Working Group on International Tribunals [S/2010/684] detailed the long and arduous series of meetings which led up to the final decision.)

There is growing concern that the Council is too reactive to events, rather than engaging proactively with emerging concerns. Some feel this has led at times in the past to the “hyperactive” adoption of decisions that focus more on short-term symptoms than...
underlying causes and sometimes add little value. It may be that this sentiment has to some extent influenced Council decision making in the last two years. New processes to help address international threats more proactively began in 2010, with the Council participating in a “horizon scanning” briefing in November under the UK presidency and another in January 2011 under the Bosnia and Herzegovina presidency.

As to the underlying level of “demand” for Council activity, it is interesting to note the conclusions of the 2010 Human Security Report. It concludes that the number of armed conflicts has not been decreasing and in fact has been growing. However, most of the increase is in smaller conflicts that result in relatively few deaths than in earlier times.

Other Possible Contributing Factors
A number of possible contributing factors to the downward trend were identified in our 2009 report on Council statistics. One was the impact of the global financial crisis, which had led governments to necessarily expend much energy on economic and financial issues, perhaps at the expense of security initiatives in the Council. This has probably had an impact throughout 2010 as well. Moreover, most foreign ministries have continued to be under great pressure to reduce costs. This has almost certainly also continued to dampen initiatives.

Overall, the atmosphere in the Council seems to have been constructive during 2010. Dynamics between the members were basically very positive and are unlikely to have negatively affected statistics. Some contention was apparent around the negotiation of the sanctions resolution on Iran. However, it did not have an obvious impact on the Council’s ability to advance work on other issues.

Background
Readers will be aware, from our series of Crosscutting Reports, of the detailed background to the three major themes on protection that the Council has developed:


Typically the Council receives substantial reports from the Secretary-General at 12-18 months intervals on each of these subjects. The Council has often held up to six thematic debates a year. For protection of civilians there is a more or less settled practice to hold two debates a year. But overall there has been uncertainty in the Council work programme in these areas. This has often been due to delays in reporting by the Secretariat (complicated by competing interests in the Secretariat and agencies) and also by members of the Council taking unilateral and late decisions on the focus of their presidency.

The timing for the thematic debates is as follows:

- Protection of Civilians—mid-year and late in the year
- Children and Armed Conflict—variable depending on dates of interested presidencies and timing of the Secretariat reports
- Women, Peace and Security—variable depending on dates of interested presidencies and timing of the Secretariat reports

Underlying Issues
In general, P5 members are sceptical about thematic debates, but the protection area produces a quite marked differentiation between them. France, the UK and the US are often strongly supportive (although with differences of emphasis). China and Russia have been cautious about normative development resulting from Council decisions in thematic resolutions. Russia has been more resistant about the growth of thematic work on gender issues and China has been more hesitant about protection generally. (China has refrained from participating in the informal Council expert group on protection.)

Non-Aligned Movement and G77 members have also tended to be cautious in principle about normative development by the Security Council. But at times in practice the protection agenda has had strong appeal to them because of situations in their own regions. South Africa, for instance, was a strong supporter of the women, peace and security agenda during its previous term on the Council. Violence in the Middle East has often led others to take a strong interest in protection of civilians. And even the most sceptical Council members have been reluctant to be seen to oppose the call to address issues relating to children.

It seems, looking back over the last decade or so, that perhaps Council members’ interest in thematic protection debates has tended to grow when Council members have found themselves embarrassed at their inability to apply protection principles in specific situations of armed conflict.

For many Council members, thematic debates on protection offer a valuable opportunity to profile their country during their Council presidency. For that reason over the years the interest in such debates has often been driven by capitals at high political levels. This has led many members to see some advantages in the current amorphous approach.

Issues for 2011
A key issue will be whether protection sceptics try to use the opportunity of a general review of activity on protection to roll back the number of Council events on protection and thereby reduce the number of pressure points for new decisions—or even amalgamate some or all of the topics.

A related issue will be whether the proponents of protection discussions are amenable to a new approach to scheduling the work programme for these debates.

A third issue is whether the Secretariat can bring a “whole of organisation” approach to the discussion of this issue, including the perspectives of key components based in Geneva such as the High Commissioner for Human Rights and hold out to the Council members a prospect of a better organised schedule of reports.
Sudan

Expected Council Action

The official results of the Southern Sudan referendum are expected on 14 February or possibly earlier if there are no appeals lodged. The Council is expected to meet after the announcement of the official results and issue a statement.

Key Recent Developments

The Southern Sudan referendum was conducted from 9 to 15 January. Preliminary results from voting centres indicate that there was a very high voter turnout in the south and at overseas voting centres, with a lower turnout in the north. Preliminary results based upon 80 percent of the ballots released by the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC) indicate close to 99 percent voted for secession.

The Secretary-General’s panel on the referendum in Sudan reported on 16 January that “it was satisfied that the process allowed the people of Southern Sudan to express their will freely.” The Carter Center said the process was “broadly consistent with international standards for democratic elections and represents the genuine expression of the will of the electorate.” Preliminary statements from the EU, AU, Arab League and East African observer missions likewise assessed the vote as largely credible.

President of Sudan Omar Al-Bashir visited Juba on 4 January and said that he would recognise the result of the referendum. Bashir also called upon leaders in the south to deal with the presence of Darfur rebels in Southern Sudan.

On 6 January the head of UN peacekeeping, Alain Le Roy, briefed the Council in closed consultations on preparations for the referendum and on the security situation in Darfur. The Council issued a press statement:

- welcoming the Sudanese parties’ commitment to respect the outcome of the referendum and appreciating the statement made by Bashir on 4 January;
- welcoming progress made toward holding the Southern Sudan referendum;
- noting with deep concern the absence of an agreement on Abyei; and
- expressing deep concern over the increase in violence and insecurity in Darfur during December 2010.

From 7 to 9 January there were violent clashes in Abyei between Southern Sudanese police and armed Misseriya tribesmen that resulted in the death of twenty to thirty police. Some Misseriya have said the violence was intended to disrupt rumoured plans that the population of Abyei intended to hold an unofficial referendum on 9 January or to unilaterally declare Abyei as part of the south. The Misseriya leadership said that they saw the movement of 300 additional police into Abyei as a provocation.

Tensions were already high in Abyei due to the delayed referendum for Abyei and the increased numbers of people moving south to vote in the Southern Sudan referendum along the same routes as the annual migration of Misseriya cattle herds. Also, the Dinka and Misseriya tribes had yet to reach agreement on the terms of the Misseriya migration (usually agreed to in November or December, but delayed due to issues around planning for the referendum).

On 10 January, Misseriya detained a convoy of around 1,000 southerners travelling in Southern Kordofan towards Aweil in Northern Bahr el Ghazal state. The convoy was looted, with reports of abuse. Separately, a convoy of returnees was attacked in Southern Kordofan state, resulting in at least ten dead and 18 wounded.

On 17 January the special representative of the Secretary-General in Sudan, Haile Menkerios, mediated an agreement on security arrangements in Abyei between the interior ministers of the Government of Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan. Parties agreed to:

- remove the 300 police and replace them with two battalions of joint integrated military units;
- disarm the Dinka and Misseriya;
- allow returnees free movement, including securing road access to Abyei through southern Kordofan; and
- grant freedom of movement and grazing for Misseriya moving through the Abyei area and southwards.

On 18 January, Menkerios and the head of the Secretary-General’s panel on the referendum in Sudan, Benjamin Mkapa, briefed the Council on the conduct of the Southern Sudan referendum. In a subsequent press statement, the Council:

- welcomed the conclusion of a largely peaceful and orderly voting period;
- commended the work of the SSRC and congratulated the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) for the support it provided; and
- deplored the violence that occurred in Abyei and reiterated deep concern over the absence of an agreement on the status of Abyei.

On 26 January the head of the AU/UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), Ibrahim Gambari, and senior peacekeeping official, Atul Khare, briefed the Council on the latest quarterly UNAMID and UNMIS reports respectively, including detail on UNAMID’s new strategy for protection of civilians. The strategy recognises the “mission must be more forceful in ensuring access”.

On 5 January hostage-takers released unharmed the UNAMID civilian staff member who had been kidnapped in October 2010. On 13 January armed men abducted three helicopter crewmembers contracted by the UN to fly humanitarian missions at a landing strip in Um-Shalaya, West Darfur state.

In Darfur on 23 January the Sudanese government raided the Zamzam internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in the outskirts of El Fasher in Northern Darfur state, reportedly to search for and arrest criminal elements. Authorities informed UNAMID three hours after the beginning of the operation. UNAMID has said this action did not abide by an agreement between UNAMID and the government requiring notice and consultations prior to any actions regarding IDP camps. The operation resulted in the arrest of 37 persons and one death.

On 26 January Sudan Armed Forces soldiers surrounded the UNAMID site in Shangil Tobaya and the adjacent temporary IDP camp and threatened to burn down the camp and UNAMID team site if the peacekeepers continued to interfere with efforts to move the IDPs to other camps.

Promoting the Darfur peace process, the Qatari state minister for foreign affairs and the joint chief mediator of the Doha peace process toured Addis Ababa, New York and
Cairo over the week of 17 January. On 30 December 2010 the mediators had suggested a range of compromise proposals to move negotiations forward, including creation of a regional authority in Darfur and a vice-president from the region. However, on 31 December the Sudanese delegation in Doha rejected the proposals and walked out of the negotiations.

On 30 December the Security Council Sudan Sanctions Committee released a report on its activities over the period 1 January to 31 December 2010 noting that its panel of experts had listed many ongoing problems, including:
- continued violations of the arms embargo and of international humanitarian law and human rights, perpetrated by various belligerents in Darfur;
- widespread sexual and gender-based violence;
- military overflights and bombardments of Darfur; and
- no concrete action by the Government of Sudan to implement the targeted travel and financial sanctions.

The Council has yet to publish the final report of the panel of experts.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is the timing of any statement on the result of the referendum.

Another key issue is how to maintain pressure on both parties to maintain momentum on post-referendum negotiations on key outstanding matters, including the status of Abyei, borders, citizenship and asset sharing.

Underlying Issues
The recent violence in Abyei highlighted the difficulty of enforcing on the ground any political agreement reached between the north and south.

The ruling party in Khartoum is factionalised. Statements made by one element have in the past been contradicted by other elements.

Tensions may rise in Southern Sudan if the official results announced after any appeals differ too markedly from the preliminary unofficial results being reported.

Tensions may also rise once the reality of the hard issues in the post-referendum negotiations become apparent.

Options
The Council could:
- wait for regional groups such as the AU to comment on the result before issuing a statement;
- adopt a statement tasking the Secretariat to prepare recommendations for the post-UNMIS UN role;
- request a briefing in early March on post-referendum negotiations, including on the situation in Abyei; or
- consider a more active Council conflict prevention role in connection with the Doha peace process.

Council Dynamics
Council members seem likely to wait until both parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) have responded to the official result before making any statement. Some members seem to prefer for the Council to wait until regional actors, such as the AU and the other observer missions, have commented on the result and the credibility of the counting process. All Council members appear to want to avoid the Council being seen to play any sort of validation role.

Council members seem impressed by the successful conduct of the referendum (some had thought this impossible only a few months earlier). But all are aware of the major hurdles in the post-referendum negotiations and the risks to the stability of both north and south Sudan. The Council seems united on the importance of maintaining close attention on the on-going post-referendum negotiations, in particular in relation to the situation in Abyei.

Council members are watching with interest what name a newly independent state in Southern Sudan might choose. Some are conscious of the problems that have arisen with names of new states in the past.

There appears to be significant concern among Council members on the deterioration in the security situation in Darfur and the possibility that the Doha process may be losing credibility.

The UK is the lead country on Darfur, and the US is the lead country on CPA issues.

UN Documents
Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1935 (30 July 2010) renewed UNAMID.

S/RES/1919 (29 April 2010) renewed UNMIS.
S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.

Latest Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2011/22 (18 January 2011) was on UNAMID.
- S/2010/681 (31 December 2010) was on UNMIS.

Selected Security Council Meeting Records
- S/PV.6474 (26 January 2011) was a briefing by the head of UNAMID and a senior peacekeeping official on the quarterly Secretary-General reports on UNAMID and UNMIS.
- S/PV.6466 (18 January 2011) was briefings by the head of UNMIS and the head of the Secretary-General’s panel on the referenda in the Sudan.

Other
- S/2010/679 (30 December 2010) was the report of the Sudan Sanctions Committee covering the period 1 January to 31 December 2010.

Other Relevant Facts
UNAMID: Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur
Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria)

UNAMID: Force Commander
Lt. Gen. Patrick Nyamvumba (Rwanda)

UNAMID: Size, Composition, Cost and Duration
- Maximum authorised strength: up to 19,555 military personnel, 3,772 police and 19 formed police units (total police 6,432)
- Main troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt and Ethiopia
- Military strength as of 28 December 2010: 17,468 military personnel
- Police Strength as of 28 December 2010: 4,979 police personnel
- Annual Budget: $1.81 billion
- Duration: 31 July 2007 to present; mandate expires 31 July 2011
Following requests for a more focused discussion, Council members were asked to provide questions to Le Roy and Malcorra ahead of the next briefing on 27 May 2010 under the Lebanese presidency. The questions covered areas ranging from the extension of peacekeeping missions to capabilities and gaps in peacekeeping.

In August during the Russian presidency, Council members held a debate and a briefing in which they were briefed by Le Roy and the force commanders of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the UN Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the UN Mission in Sudan (UNISIM) and the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), as well as the chief of staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO).

The final 2010 peacekeeping consultations took place on 24 November under the UK presidency. Council members were again briefed by Le Roy and Malcorra and discussed the overlap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as well as how to write better mandates, the need for balance between mandates and resources and how to include peacebuilding tasks in mandates.

In addition on 11 November, Council members convened an informal meeting with troop and police-contributing countries (TCC/PCCs) of UNMIS. The head of UNMIS, Haile Menkerios, and the UNMIS force commander informed TCCs (via video-link) that the UN was seeking agreement from Khartoum to add 2,000 troops to UNMIS and asked TCCs to consider increasing their current troop numbers. TCC/PCCs also had a discussion with Council members about the situation in Sudan leading up to and beyond the January referendum.

Furthermore, on 20 December during the briefing by chairs of Council subsidiary bodies, Japan—chair of the Working Group on Peacekeeping in 2009 and 2010—said that the focus of the working group in those two years had been on how to fill the gaps between Council mandates and actual implementation on the ground. Also highlighted was the important role of the working group in bringing together Council members, TCC/PCCs and the secretariat. The report of the chair of the Working Group on Peacekeeping published in December 2010 contained three suggestions to move this issue forward:

- encourage inclusive dialogue among relevant stakeholders, especially when establishing, renewing or modifying peacekeeping mandates;
- facilitate regular reporting on critical gaps affecting mandate implementation and find ways of addressing them; and
- build common ground on early peacebuilding tasks in a peacekeeping context in order to prepare for transitions and exits.

The Working Group on Peacekeeping is currently reviewing its work programme under its new chair, Nigeria.

The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34) will convene its 2011 session from 22 February to 18 March. Issues of interest are likely to be the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus, the global field support strategy and protection of civilians in peacekeeping.

Key Issues
A key issue is how these general discussions, often without any results or outcome, can be applied in specific cases.

A second key issue is how to use these regular consultations to translate into practice some of the issues that have emerged over the last year related to the Council’s oversight of peacekeeping. A related issue is whether to use these peacekeeping briefings in part to build on conclusions from the Council’s separate work on the links between peacekeeping, peacebuilding and conflict prevention.

On the issue of national consent, a key question is how to establish national consent at the outset of a mission for a period which approximates the expected timeframe for achieving the goal of the mission rather than just for the initial mandate period.

A second related question is whether there might be value in tasking the Working Group on Peacekeeping and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa to follow up the decisions in consultations.

Also an issue, given that the peacekeeping briefing is being held in the same month as the start of the C34 session, is whether, bearing in mind the Council’s commitment in S/PRST/2010/2 to strengthen its partnership with the C3, there is scope during the month to give effect to a better partnership between the Council and the C34.
Options
One option is simply undertaking the discussion with the secretariat without any formal action.

Other options that could be considered by Council members in informal consultations are:
- requesting the Working Group on Peacekeeping to take up some of the ideas emerging from this discussion as part of its work programme for 2011;
- having the Working Group on Peacekeeping and Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention in Africa work together on the inter-linked areas of conflict prevention and peacekeeping; and
- discussing ways the Working Group on Peacekeeping can help provide material for the quarterly peacekeeping consultations as well as follow-up on the conclusions.

Council Dynamics
With these consultations still evolving in both substance and format, the interest of the country that is Council president during the month of the briefing can play a key role. If the quarterly meetings are held on schedule in 2011, the countries that will be president during the months of the briefings will be France (May), India (August) and Portugal (November).

While the two countries, France and the UK, which initiated the Council’s focus on its oversight of peacekeeping in early 2009, continue to be actively interested in this issue, there is likely to be a new dynamic in the Council with its current composition. Having a number of major TCC/PCCs like Nigeria, India, Brazil, and South Africa on the Council in 2011 could lead to a greater focus on issues related to TCC/PCCs.

Many of these members also appear to have a keen interest in peacebuilding issues and may want to pursue the discussion on the inter-linkages between peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

A stronger Non-Aligned Members caucus in the Council may also lead to greater interest in raising issues such as conflict prevention that are also of interest to the General Assembly and the C34.

Guinea-Bissau
Expected Council Action
In February the Council is expected to consider a report on Guinea-Bissau, and the head of the UN office, Joseph Mutaboba, will likely brief the Council. The mandate of UNIOGBIS expires on 31 December.

Key Recent Developments
Guinea-Bissau has continued to experience serious problems. Little progress has been made in the political process on security sector reform (SSR).

On 17 December 2010 the then-interior minister of Guinea-Bissau, Adjá Satu Camara Pinto, wrote to Prime Minister Carlos Gomes to inform him of her decision to resign, to help “in the resolution of the crisis.” (In October 2010, Gomes had suspended Pinto from her duties for having appointed deputy directors at her ministry without his authorisation, but she initially refused to accept her suspension and continued to work as a minister of state. She has been associated with the inner circle of Guinea-Bissau President Malam Bacai Sanhá, who has been involved in a power struggle with Gomes over the control of the ruling party—the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde.)

On 20 December 2010 the EU initiated action that could result in cuts in aid to Guinea-Bissau, stating that the step was a signal about the need for democratic principles, including bringing an end to illegal detention and impunity. (The EU has allocated 120 million euros to Guinea-Bissau up to 2013.)

On 23 December 2010 the Government of Guinea-Bissau released the former head of the armed forces, Rear Admiral Jose Zamora Induta, and six other officers from prison, citing humanitarian reasons. Induta had been held in detention since the military mutiny of 1 April 2010.

On 18 January the government announced that it will increase surveillance of airstrips believed to be used by drug traffickers and also threatened to shoot down any aircraft that flew illegally over its air space. Guinea-Bissau has a total of 24 airfields, some of which have in the past reportedly been used by South American drug cartels, as transit points for trafficking illicit drugs to Europe.

On 5 November 2010, the Council was last briefed by Mutaboba on developments in the country and on the work of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS). He said that various bilateral and multilateral partners (includ-
The Council also:

- welcomed the ECOWAS-CPLP partnership, anticipated the final endorsement by ECOWAS of its road map (developed by its Chiefs of Defence Staffs, among other things, provide training and protection to Guinea-Bissau state institutions within the framework of SSR and as part of the stabilisation of the country’s political and security environment) and requested the Secretary-General, through his special representative, to present it with comprehensive information detailing the proposed modalities, timing and resources relating to the implementation of the ECOWAS road map;
- requested the Secretary-General to engage with ECOWAS and CPLP with a view to undertaking a joint assessment of the requirements to support the rapid implementation of the road map once it is endorsed by ECOWAS;
- requested the Secretary-General to develop a strategic work plan with appropriate benchmarks to measure and track progress on the implementation of the UNIOGBIS mandate; and
- requested the Secretary-General to report on progress made in implementing the mandate of UNIOGBIS and include in his first report details of progress made in undertaking the joint assessment and the implementation of the road map, once it is endorsed by ECOWAS.

On 22 November the Guinea-Bissau PBC configuration met to consider how international partners could best re-engage with the country regarding peace consolidation, especially SSR. Discussions also touched on the details of the release of the next tranche of funds for the country from the Peacebuilding Fund.

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council will be whether to respond to developments in Guinea-Bissau in the absence of progress by ECOWAS on the road map. A closely related issue from the Secretary-General’s report is how to respond to the need for a joint assessment of the requirements to support the rapid implementation of the ECOWAS road map. It is unclear whether this assessment will have been undertaken by the time of its meeting on Guinea-Bissau in February.

Another key issue is how far the Council will go in terms of reinforcing the PBC, especially keeping the SSR process on track.

An important global issue is the emerging problem of the drug trafficking and organised crime in Guinea-Bissau.

Underlying Problems

Perennially weak state institutions have greatly undermined good governance in Guinea-Bissau.

Options

Options for the Council include:

- deciding to interact much more closely with the PBC on issues relating to Guinea-Bissau;
- issuing a statement to signal its continued concern that the peace consolidation process must remain on track; or
- adopting a wait-and-see stance and following closely developments on the ground.

Council Dynamics

Council members await the Secretary-General’s report to inform its role going forward. Some members are concerned about the absence on response to the matters that the Council raised in its November resolution. Most remain cautious about reports of some progress on the ground, including the recent release of military officials which the Council has been calling for in its recent decisions. Real progress has yet to be shown on core issues affecting stability in Guinea-Bissau. Many have reservations about the fact that the leader of the 1 April military insurrection, General Antonio Indjai, continues to serve as the head of the country’s armed forces (Indjai, who had previously been the deputy armed forces chief, had assumed de facto charge of the army following the mutiny and was subsequently formally appointed armed forces chief by Sanha). Most members seem open, however, to lending their support to any feasible initiative to strengthen peace consolidation.

Nigeria is the lead country on this issue in the Council.
The experts also provided the sanctions committee with a confidential file containing information on three people implicated in the Walikale mass rapes in July and August 2010.

The report recommended new due-diligence standards for importers, processors and consumers of minerals from the eastern part of the DRC. The first set provides guidance on how to mitigate the risk of providing support to illegal armed groups subject to targeted sanctions. The second set advises on how to mitigate the additional risks of providing support to criminal networks and perpetrators of serious human rights violations within the FARDC.

On 29 November 2010, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1952, renewing the sanctions regime until 30 November 2011. (A sixth expert, on natural resources will be appointed soon.) The Council requested the experts to concentrate their activities in areas affected by illegal armed groups and on regional and international networks providing support for such groups and to focus on criminal networks and perpetrators of serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses, including those within the FARDC, in the eastern part of the country.

On 1 December 2010, the DRC sanctions committee added four people to the list of individuals and entities subject to the assets freeze and travel ban imposed by paragraphs 13 and 15 of resolution 1596, as renewed by resolution 1952. Three of the individuals listed are members of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), while the fourth, Innocent Zimurinda, a lieutenant colonel in the FARDC, was listed for several human rights violations. The sanctions list currently consists of thirty individuals and entities. Also in December, a proposal to designate a member of another armed group active in the DRC was put on hold by two permanent members to allow them to process the designation domestically and may be approved later.

Callixte Mbarushimana, the Executive Secretary of the FDLR arrested in France in October 2010, was transferred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) on 25 January. Mbarushimana is charged with 11 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in the DRC.

The trial of Jean-Pierre Bemba, former vice president of the DRC, began on 22 November 2010 at the ICC. Bemba, leader of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), is charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity relating to atrocities allegedly committed in Central African Republic from October 2002 to March 2003. In the 2006 presidential election Bemba won 42 percent of the votes.

On 16 January, the Congolese parliament approved constitutional amendments that will allow the president to be elected by a simple majority in the 27 November election, thus eliminating second round voting. President Joseph Kabila has supported this revision. The opposition claims that the true goal of the amendments is to increase Kabila’s chances of re-election.

On 31 December 2010, FARDC soldiers allegedly committed at least 32 acts of rape in the village of Bushani, in North Kivu. On New Year’s Day, members of the FARDC reportedly committed acts of sexual violence involving at least fifty women in the town of Fizi, in South Kivu. Lieutenant colonel Kibibi Mutware, the officer in charge of the soldiers believed to be responsible for the Fizi attacks, three additional officers and 11 soldiers have been detained.

The Secretary-General’s second report on the implementation of resolution 1925 included a short preliminary update on the joint DRC-MONUSCO security assessment process, stating that both sides to the process are in agreement that no reconfiguration of MONUSCO is called for at this time. However, the report states that no substantial progress has been made on security sector reform in the DRC and notes that the level of violence in the eastern provinces persists. It also stressed the need for additional helicopters in order to protect civilians, in particular attack helicopters. As for the elections, the report indicates that MONUSCO is assisting the DRC with voter registration, which is low at the moment. It also states that the DRC intends to fund approximately 60 percent of election costs, while relying on donors for the remaining costs.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Expected Council Action
In February, the Council will hear a briefing on the Secretary-General’s latest report on the peacekeeping operation in the DRC, MONUSCO, by Special Representative of the Secretary-General Roger Meece. The briefing will be followed by consultations.

The mandate of MONUSCO expires on 30 June.

Key Recent Developments
On 29 November, the Council received a report from its group of experts on sanctions (S/2010/596). The report discussed the illegal exploitation of natural resources by armed groups and elements within the Congolese National Army (FARDC).
On 16 December 2010, the Council adopted resolution 1960, requesting the Secretary-General to establish a monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangement on conflict-related sexual violence. The resolution reiterated the Council’s intention, when adopting or renewing targeted sanctions, to consider including, where relevant, criteria for sanctioning individuals for acts of sexual violence.

Options for the Council include:

- adopting a press statement that addresses the Secretary-General’s report and expressly deplors the latest atrocities in South Kivu;
- requesting the sanctions committee to accelerate its work in light of resolution 1960 and for the Secretary-General to provide recommendations for the implementation of the resolution 1952 guidelines;
- requesting the sanctions committee to produce implementation assistance notices, similar to those produced by other sanctions committees, in order to assist the domestic application of the guidelines;
- requesting MONUSCO, in light of the electoral process in the DRC, to more closely monitor the evolving situation; or
- taking no action at this time.

Council Dynamics

Council members in general want to raise awareness of and implement the standards laid out in due-diligence guidelines. The chair of the sanctions committee, Brazil, is currently circulating notes verbale to UN members and letters to the countries in the region on the adoption and content of the guidelines.

Council members seem pleased with the group of experts’ level of reporting. Some Council members are hoping that this will ease the process of approving the candidates for the experts group for this term. (The Secretariat is expected to circulate an initial list containing the candidates’ names in the next few weeks. Some of the current experts are expected to stay for another term.)

Few Council members seem to have clear ideas on how resolution 1960 should be implemented by the sanctions committee with respect to sanctioning perpetrators of sexual violence. Some believe that the next step is enhanced cooperation with Wallström’s office and worry that the sanctions committee and group of experts will run on parallel tracks with Wallström’s office, rather than collaborate and exchange information effectively.

There seems to be growing support for sanctioning the alleged perpetrators of the atrocities in Walikale. Nevertheless, certain Council members feel hesitant about sanctioning a member of the FARDC unless the DRC government consents to the designation.

Finally, Council members are in agreement that the election process in the DRC must be monitored closely. At the moment, MONUSCO’s assistance to the election is of a logistical nature, and the Council is of the view that the nature of any future involvement will depend on the wishes of the DRC government.
Kosovo

Expected Council Action
In February, the head of UNMIK, Lamberto Zannier, is expected to brief the Council. A debate is likely. No formal action is expected.

Key Recent Developments
Kosovo’s first general elections since independence, held on 12 December 2010, were marred by allegations of fraud and voter intimidation. Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi’s Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) claimed victory in the elections, but the country’s Central Election Commission called for an election rerun in five municipalities that experienced voting irregularities. The PDK reportedly received approximately 20,000 fewer votes when election reruns were held, but final results issued on 24 January confirmed that the PDK had still won the election. A state prosecutor’s investigation into the election fraud is being conducted and should be concluded by the end of January.

Because of the political uncertainty Kosovo is still in the process of forming a government and this appears likely to delay EU-sponsored negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade. While there have been no recent major violent incidents, interethnic tensions remain, and the security situation remains fragile.

A 12 December 2010 report by the rapporteur for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe alleged that Prime Minister Thaçi had been involved in organised crime, including drug trafficking and the illegal trafficking of human organs, during his time as a Kosovo Liberation Army leader. Kosovo authorities dismissed the allegations as “baseless and defamatory.” The report is based on a two-year investigation by Council of Europe Special Rapporteur Dick Marty. The EU’s foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, said in a 20 January interview that the European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) should investigate the organ-trafficking allegations brought against Thaçi.

Following the Marty report, another report from the Council of Europe by Rapporteur Jean-Charles Gardetto was released in January that said Kosovo has no adequate witness protection programme and those who testify in sensitive cases face the danger of their identities being revealed.

On 19 January the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly in favour of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), which opened up trade relations between Serbia and the EU with an eye to Serbia’s eventual EU accession. The text of the SAA urged Belgrade to begin talks with Pristina without delay. The parliament also urged Serbia to dismantle parallel political structures in Kosovo.

On 29 October 2010, Maj. Gen. Erhard Bühler, commander of NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR), announced a restructuring of KFOR. He said that the calm military situation in Kosovo and the performance of EULEX had made it possible for KFOR to reduce its current force of approximately 10,000 to a force of just over 5,000. On 21 January, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen confirmed that the decrease in troop levels would not negatively affect security.

On 12 November 2010, Lamberto Zannier, the head of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), briefed the Council on the situation in Kosovo. He urged the authorities and communities in Kosovo and Serbia to cooperate and continue to need monitoring, particularly in light of the reduced KFOR troop levels.

Key Issues
A key issue is whether Council members want to use the opportunity in February to help move the negotiating process forward.

A related issue is the security situation in northern Kosovo. The situation may continue to need monitoring, particularly in light of the reduced KFOR troop levels.

A continuing practical issue is whether the cycle of quarterly UNMIK reports and briefings by the Secretary-General’s special representative is still appropriate.

Options
One option is for the Council to simply receive the briefing and for the members to discuss the key issues in informal consultations.

A likely option, following recent practice, would be a public Council debate with representatives of Kosovo and Serbia participating.

An additional option would be a statement expressing support for the prompt commencement of negotiations and shifting to a reporting cycle of three reports per year.

Council Dynamics
The ICJ advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence seems not to have affected Council dynamics. The Council remains divided between those who formally recognise Kosovo as an independent state and those who do not.

France, the UK and the US recognise Kosovo, as do new Council members Colombia, Germany and Portugal.
Many other Council members continue to remain neutral.

All Council members seem keen to see the start of EU-sponsored negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade and are supportive of this process.

Russia continues to support Serbia’s position and says it would favour any negotiated agreement between the parties that is supported by Belgrade. Russia remains in favour of the UN playing a key role in the negotiation process.

The US is also supportive of the upcoming settlement talks but, like Kosovo, opposes a return to “status negotiations.”

Useful Additional Source

Inhuman treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo, Dick Marty, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 12 December 2010

Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Expected Council Action

In February the OSCE chairperson-in-office, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Audronius Ažubalis, is expected to brief the Council on the activities of the OSCE. He will provide an overview of priorities and plans for its 2011 chairmanship of the organisation. No Council decision is expected.

Key Recent Developments

On 1 January, Lithuania became the 21st state to chair the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) since the establishment of the position of chairperson-in-office in 1991.

Current priorities include:

- the settlement of prolonged territorial disputes in the OSCE area, particularly in Transdniestria and South Caucasus, as well as the situation in Georgia;
- combating transnational threats, such as cyber security and human and drug trafficking;
- promoting human rights as an integral part of ensuring peace and security;
- safeguarding freedom of the media and ensuring journalists’ safety;
- promoting tolerance through education;
- increasing energy security in Europe; and
- enhancing cooperation with other regional organisations, such as the EU and NATO.

Background

The OSCE is the largest and most diverse regional arrangement recognised under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, with 56 participating states from Europe, Central Asia and North America. It has its origins in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, created in 1975 as a forum for dialogue between Cold War rivals. A transformation of the conference to an organisation with a conflict prevention mandate began in the early 1990s and officially took effect on 1 January 1995.

The OSCE is engaged in early-warning activities, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation and operates along three dimensions of security: the human, politico-military and the economic and environmental. Activities focus on arms control, confidence-building measures, protection of human rights and national minorities, democratisation, policing strategies, border management, counterterrorism and economic and environmental measures.

The organisation currently has 17 missions or field-operations in South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Two of these are in areas currently on the Security Council’s agenda; there is an OSCE mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and one in Kosovo.

The mandate for the OSCE mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was established under the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995 and focuses on peacebuilding and developing inclusive political processes and democratic institutions that respect the rule of law. The OSCE has also appointed a personal representative of the chairperson-in-office based in Vienna to assist the parties to the Dayton Accords in the implementation of an agreement on subregional arms control.

The OSCE mission in Kosovo—established in 1999 and currently the largest OSCE field presence—with some 650 international and local staff—works closely with the UN Mission in Kosovo. It is engaged in support of democratic institutions and good governance, promotion of human and community rights and improvement of security and public safety.

The OSCE also has field missions in five Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In Kyrgyzstan the OSCE is involved in six core strategic areas—border management and security, rule of law, governance, legislation, environmental and economic priorities and regional cooperation. The OSCE is also involved in Afghanistan, which has been an OSCE partner for co-operation since 2003.

Since 2005 the OSCE chairperson-in-office has been invited to brief the Council annually under rule 39 of its Provisional Rules of Procedure, which allows the Council to
invite a person to provide it with information; in 2001 there was a briefing in informal consultations.

Key Issues
An issue for the Council is whether there are options for increased interaction with the OSCE when it considers issues of mutual concern, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Central Asia.

Options
One option is for the Council to simply receive the briefing.

Another option could be to issue a statement following the briefing welcoming the OSCE contributions to the promotion of peace and security. This could note particularly the organisation’s efforts in Central Asia. (This would reinforce the Council’s January press statement [SC/10151] which encouraged further cooperation and coordination between governments in Central Asia, the UN Regional Centre and relevant regional organisations.)

A third option might be to open discussion among experts on possibilities for engaging OSCE input more directly when considering specific issues of mutual concern.

Council Dynamics
Council members seem to find the annual briefing to be useful, particularly given the Council’s wider discussions on enhancing cooperation with regional organisations. The briefing is also useful for keeping Council members abreast of security developments in the OSCE area that would not otherwise be formally discussed in the Council.

Key Recent Developments
In mid-November, US scientist and former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Siegfried Hecker reported that he had been shown construction work in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on a new light-water nuclear reactor and a uranium enrichment facility.

On 23 November 2010 the DPRK shelling of Yeonpyeong, a ROK island near a disputed maritime border, elevated tensions. The DPRK shelling came after the ROK fired artillery into the disputed area during a military drill. DPRK actions were condemned by the US and eight other Council members and on 13 December 2010 Russia criticised the DPRK’s shelling and expressed concern over recently disclosed uranium enrichment activities.

On Sunday 19 December 2010 at the request of Russia the Council held emergency consultations and a closed Council meeting. The DPRK and the ROK attended the closed meeting. Although lengthy discussions on a draft press statement took place, Council members were unable to find consensus.

US Governor Bill Richardson travelled to the DPRK from 16 to 20 December 2010. DPRK officials reportedly told him they were prepared to allow inspectors access to the country’s nuclear facilities and were willing to discuss exporting some plutonium fuel to another country.

In a joint statement released on 19 January during a state visit to Washington, DC by Chinese President Hu Jintao, China and the US expressed concern over heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula triggered by recent developments, including with regard to the DPRK’s uranium enrichment program.

On 20 January the ROK agreed to a DPRK offer to hold military talks as a precursor to a possible resumption of six-party talks. The military talks will apparently discuss the 26 March 2010 sinking of the Cheonan, as well as the shelling of Yeonpyeong island.

The final report of the sanctions committee panel of experts’ first year of operation was published on 5 November 2010. The report had been held by the committee since its submission on 12 May 2010, reportedly due to China’s reluctance. (Sanctions committee operate by consensus.)

The report noted that while sanctions measures seem to be having an impact, the DPRK has used shell companies and falsified manifests in order to continue exporting prohibited items. Indications were found of continuing DPRK involvement in nuclear and ballistic missile-related activities in certain countries, including Iran, Myanmar and Syria. The panel recommended:

- the chair of the committee send a note verbale to member states that have not yet provided national implementation reports;
- engagement with countries to gather additional information on implementation and possibly an optional checklist template for states;
- more detailed guidelines concerning the definition of luxury goods;
- additional names of entities and individuals believed to be engaged in proscribed activities; and
- a more user-friendly consolidated list for each category of proscribed items, as well as guidance to states as to what is included in the small arms and light weapons designation.

Key Issues
A key issue is whether the sanctions regime is proving effective, and how to implement the panel’s report. The related issue is the new uranium enrichment plant. A second likely issue is maintaining support among all Council members for the sanctions currently in place.

A key issue for the committee is the possible addition of names of new persons subject to the sanctions regime.

Underlying Problems
Key underlying problems are the continued refusal of the DPRK to abide by Council resolutions, a lack of transparency about its nuclear programme and a continuing lack of trust between the DPRK, the ROK and others.

Options
Options include:
- refraining from any decision at this time while more time is given for reengagement in the six-party talks format;
a press or presidential statement that confirms the Council’s support at present for ongoing bilateral negotiations or a return to six-party talks; 
- designating, or encouraging the committee to designate, additional entities or individuals subject to the sanctions currently in place; and
- considering additional measures against the DPRK in response to the recent revelation about uranium enrichment activity.

Council and Wider Dynamics

It does not seem that Council members expect any new revelations at the upcoming briefing. Some Committee members hope to soon come to agreement on implementing the recommendations contained in the Panel’s report, particularly measures related to providing states with more guidance on national implementation reports and the designation of luxury goods subject to the sanctions.

It seems many Council members are concerned by the DPRK uranium enrichment programme that recently came to light and look forward to receiving the Panel’s input on the matter.

A number of Council members are still concerned over the delay in circulating the panel of experts’ 12 May 2010 report to the Council, as well as the fact that the Council could not reach agreement on a statement during the 19 December emergency consultations on tensions on the Korean peninsula. However, maintaining Council unity seems still to be the focus at present for many members. Members are waiting to see whether recent overtures by the DPRK to address the ROK’s concerns as a prelude to returning to six-party talks will result in substantive progress in the near future.

UN Documents

Selected Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1928 (7 June 2010) extended the mandate of the panel of experts until 12 June 2011.
- S/RES/1887 (24 September 2009) reaffirmed that the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery are threats to international peace and security.
- S/RES/1874 (12 June 2009) condemned the DPRK’s 25 May 2009 underground nuclear test, expanded the existing arms embargo and authorised inspection of cargoes to and from the DPRK, as well as vessels on the high seas, and provided for the creation of a panel of experts to assist the committee.
- S/RES/1718 (14 October 2006) expressed grave concern over the DPRK’s nuclear test, imposed sanctions and set up a sanctions committee.
- S/RES/1695 (15 July 2006) condemned the DPRK’s launch of ballistic missiles.
- S/RES/825 (11 May 1993) called on the DPRK to reconsiderr withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to honour its non-proliferation obligations under the NPT.

Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2010/13 (9 July 2010) condemned the 26 March attack that led to the sinking of the ROK naval ship Cheonan and encouraged the settlement of outstanding issues on the Korean peninsula by peaceful means and resuming direct dialogue and negotiation as early as possible.

Latest Sanctions Committee Annual Report

- S/2010/28 (14 January 2010)

Selected Letters

- S/2010/571 (5 November 2010) was a note transmitting the final report of the panel’s first year’s work.

Other Relevant Facts

Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

Ambassador José Filipe Moraes Cabral (Portugal)

Useful Additional Source

North Korea: The Risks of War in the Yellow Sea, Asia Report No. 198, International Crisis Group, 23 December 2010

Liberia

Expected Council Action

A report of the Secretary-General on Liberia is due in mid-February. The head of UNMIL, Ellen Margrethe Løj, usually briefs the Council. In normal circumstances the Liberia report would be considered in March. However, in light of the situation in neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire and the risks of potential cross-border issues, Council members seem likely to be keen to absorb quickly any relevant observations in the Liberia report.

Key Recent Developments

On 15 September 2010, the Security Council adopted resolution 1938, extending the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) until 30 September 2011. The resolution authorises UNMIL to provide logistical support for the general presidential and legislative elections expected in October 2011.

Events in neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire have had a considerable impact on Liberia. On 24 November 2010, the Council authorised the Secretary-General to temporarily redeploy from UNMIL to the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) a maximum of three infantry companies and an aviation unit of two military utility helicopters. At press time the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has estimated that over 30,000 Ivorian refugees had fled to Liberia, with estimates of 600 people arriving daily. Liberian authorities have indicated they are bracing for 100,000 refugees to arrive over the next weeks and months. Early flows of refugees were predominantly women and children and purported to be supporters of both Gbagbo and Ouattara.

There have also been concerns about cross border movement in the opposite direction. On 8 December 2010, Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf urged Liberians not to cross into Côte d’Ivoire as mercenaries, following indications that such movements were likely. On 26 December, she said, “We have information that some Liberians are joining the war in Ivory Coast as soldiers of fortune. We have called upon all those involved to desist.” She warned that Liberians involved in acts of violence in Côte d’Ivoire could be prosecuted under Liberian law.

Particular attention has focused on former combatants of the disbanded Liberian rebel group the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). During the last civil war, MODEL operated from Côte d’Ivoire against forces in Liberia loyal to Charles Taylor and was believed to have the support of Ivorian president Laurent Gbagbo.

On 11 and 12 January, violent clashes occurred in Abidjan, resulting in the death of four civilians and five policemen. Witnesses identified the likely presence of Liberian mercenaries because they spoke English to each other rather than French.
On 20 December the Council extended the temporary redeployment of troops and helicopters from UNMIL to UNOCI for a further four weeks and again on 19 January 2011 (in resolution 1967). Resolution 1967 also authorised the transfer, on a temporary basis, of an additional three armed helicopters and crew for a period of four weeks.

**Key Issues**

The key immediate issue for the Council is ensuring the situation in Côte d’Ivoire does not destabilise the fragile post-conflict security and political situation in Liberia.

A key issue for the security of both countries is determining how to prevent, or at least monitor, the movement of mercenaries from Liberia across the porous border to Côte d’Ivoire. And a related concern is that the redeployment of UN troops from UNMIL to UNOCI diminishes UN capacity in Liberia possibly leaving it vulnerable.

An urgent issue is ensuring sufficient support is offered to UNHCR and to Liberia to provide adequate conditions in western Liberia to accommodate the flow of refugees from Côte d’Ivoire.

**Options**

The Council could:
- request the publication of the report from the Secretary-General on UNMIL to be accelerated;
- request the briefing by the head of UNMIL to be brought forward from March to February; or
- request a briefing from the head of the UN office in West Africa, Said Djinnit, on his assessment of the regional impact of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire.

**Council Dynamics**

The pace and nature of events in Côte d’Ivoire are occupying the full attention of Council experts who cover West Africa, including Liberia. Given the focus on Côte d’Ivoire, it seems difficult for many Council members to broaden their attention in February to the wider issues in Liberia. That said, many on the Council recognise the importance of taking a holistic, more integrated approach to the security situation in the region.

All Council members recognise that UNMIL must have sufficient resources to fulfil its mandate and have underscored that the transfer of troops and helicopters from UNMIL to UNOCI is temporary.

The US is the lead country on Liberia in the Council.

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**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1967 (19 January 2011) extended the temporary redeployment of troops and two utility helicopters and redeployed three armed helicopters from UNMIL to UNOCI for a further four weeks.
- S/RES/1962 (20 December 2010) extended the temporary redeployment of troops and helicopters from UNMIL to UNOCI by four weeks.
- S/RES/1961 (17 December 2010) renewed the sanctions regime in Liberia for a further 12 months and extended the mandate of the panel of experts until 16 December 2011.
- S/RES/1951 (24 November 2010) authorised the Secretary-General to temporarily redeploy troops and two utility helicopters from UNMIL to UNOCI for four weeks.
- S/RES/1938 (15 September 2010) renewed UNMIL’s mandate for 12 months.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General**

Ellen Margrethe Løj (Denmark)

**UNMIL Force Commander**

Maj. Gen. Muhammad Khalid (Pakistan)

**Size, Composition, Cost and Duration**

**Strength as of 30 November 2010:** 9,387 personnel, including 7,937 troops, 1,319 police and 131 military observers

**Key contributing countries:** Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh and Ghana

**Cost** (1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011): $524.1 million

**Duration:** September 2003 to present; mandate expires 30 September 2011

**Chairman of the Liberia Sanctions Committee**

Nawaf Salam (Lebanon)

**Panel of Experts on Liberia**

To be announced
## Notable Dates for February

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**Mandate Expiry in February 2011**

| 26 February | Timor-Leste (UNMIT)        | S/RES/1912 |

**February 2011 Other Important Dates**

| 5 February | A meeting of the Quartet on the Middle East is expected to be held in Munich. |
| by 14 February | Official results of the Southern Sudan referendum are expected |
| 20 February | Legislative elections are expected in Chad. |

Also likely in February:
- Regular monthly consultations on the Middle East.
- The Côte d'Ivoire sanctions regime review.
- Timor-Leste’s Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão will address the Council.
- Quarterly consultations on peacekeeping, with briefings from DPKO and DFS.

Briefings are expected by:
- Chair of the DPRK Sanctions Committee
- Special Representative of the Secretary-General Roger Meece on the DRC
- Head of UNMIK Lamberto Zannier on Kosovo
- Representative of the Secretary-General in Guinea-Bissau Joseph Mutaboba
- UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Robert Serry
- Special Representative of the Secretary-General Ameerah Haq on Timor-Leste
- OSCE chairperson-in-office, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Audronius Ažubalis
- Chair of the DPRK Sanctions Committee

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**Security Council Report**

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