The UK will hold the presidency of the Council in November. With several days taken up by the holidays (Eid and Thanksgiving), a retreat and a mission to Timor Leste, the calendar will be very full. The annual retreat with incoming members, organised by Finland, is planned for 18-19 November and the incoming members of the Council—Colombia, Germany, India, Portugal and South Africa—will be invited to Council consultations from 15 November.

There will be a ministerial-level meeting on Sudan. There will also be debates on Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Two open debates are planned on:

- protection of civilians in armed conflict, most likely with the participation of the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Director General of the International Committee of the Red Cross; and
- counterterrorism, following the briefing by the chairs of the Council’s three counter-terrorism committees.

There will be several briefings in November on:

- Somalia piracy, the Council expects to be briefed by B. Lynn Pascoe (followed by consultations);
- the Development Fund for Iraq, a briefing is expected from the UN Controller (followed by a private meeting);
- Guinea-Bissau, by the head of UNIOGBIS, Joseph Mutaboba (followed by consultations);
- the Middle East (a monthly briefing by Secretariat, followed by consultations); and
- by the chairs of the three counterterrorism committees (CTC, 1267 and 1540).

A new development is that some of the briefings will include input by:

- the 1373 Committee or CTC and the 1267 Committee on Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions,
- the 1540 Committee on weapons of mass destruction and terrorism should be co-located and asked the Secretary-General make the necessary arrangements as soon as possible."

This request, reiterated in September (S/PRST/2010/19), is still outstanding.

- UNAMI reports on human rights in Iraq, in the past were produced every two to three months. They have decreased in their frequency and regularity. The last report, released in July, covered the period from 1 July to 31 December 2009.

- The request in resolution 1460 (2003) on Children and Armed Conflict that all the Secretary-General’s reports to the Council on country-specific situations include the protection of children is not yet implemented. In 2009 protection of children had
The Secretary-General has not yet re-energised his Advisory Committee on the Prevention of Genocide (it has not met since 2008).

A biennial report by the Secretary-General on small arms requested on 29 June 2007 in a presidential statement (S/PRST/2007/24) is yet to be produced for 2010. The last report on small arms was published in April 2008.

The Council has yet to address the Secretary-General’s summary of the report of the UN Board of Inquiry into incidents involving UN facilities and personnel in Gaza between 27 December 2008 and 19 January 2009, submitted to it on 4 May 2009 (S/2009/250).


The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire, requested in a May 2004 presidential statement (S/PRST/2004/17), has still not been made public. Also on Côte d’Ivoire, the December 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not been published.

The Council requested the Secretariat on 21 November 2006 (S/2006/928) to update the index to Council notes and statements on working methods. This has not been published.

The mandate to the Secretary-General to assist with the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially Sheb’a Farms, in accordance with resolution 1701, continues to await completion.

The 2005 World Summit requested that the Security Council consider reforms for the Military Staff Committee. This has yet to be addressed.

The report of the DRC sanctions panel of experts.

The briefing by the chair of the DPRK Sanctions Committee.

The briefing by the chair of the Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee.

Formal Council sessions will be held to adopt resolutions on:

- Somalia piracy;
- the authorisation for the European force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOR;
- the renewal of the mandate of the office in Guinea-Bissau, UNIOGBIS; and
- the DRC sanctions as well as the mandate of the DRC sanctions committee’s panel of experts.

On 11 November the Council president is scheduled to present the Council’s annual report to the General Assembly.

**Aide-Memoire (continued)**

**Status Update since our October Forecast**

- **Terrorism:** On 25 October the members of the Council condemned the 23 October terrorist attack on a UN office in Herat, Afghanistan and reiterated their serious concern over the threats posed by the Taliban, Al-Qaida and other extremist groups (SC/10070). On 4 October the members of the Council condemned the 1 October terrorist bombings that occurred in Abuja, Nigeria which killed a dozen people (SC/10048).

- **Security Council Elections:** On 12 October the General Assembly elected Colombia, Germany, India, Portugal and South Africa to two-year terms on the Security Council. The five new members will take up their seats on 1 January and will serve on the Security Council for the period 2011-2012. The new members will fill vacancies left by Austria, Japan, Mexico, Turkey and Uganda, whose two-year terms end on 31 December.

- **Afghanistan:** On 13 October the Council extended the authorisation of ISAF in Afghanistan for one year (S/PV.6395). Resolution 1943 highlighted commitments by the Afghan government from the London and Kabul Conferences to strengthen measures to fight corruption and recognised the international community’s support for a phased transition to full Afghan responsibility for security.

- **Peacebuilding:** On 13 October the Council
Status Update since our October Forecast (continued)

held a debate to consider the progress report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of the Secretary-General on women’s participation in peacebuilding (S/2010/466). The Council adopted a statement reiterating its request to the Secretary-General to move forward with efforts to further clarify roles and responsibilities in core peacebuilding areas, to strengthen capacities and ensure greater accountability in the delivery of assistance. It reiterated the importance of national ownership and early and predictable funding for those efforts. The Council took note of the Secretary-General’s report on the need for heightened attention to conflict prevention and anticipated the report’s consideration by all parts of the UN system, including the new Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (S/PRST/2010/20).

At press time the Council was expected to adopt a resolution formalising the outcome of the peacebuilding review in a parallel action with the General Assembly on 29 October.  

■ Haiti: On 14 October, the Council adopted resolution 1944, renewing the mandate of the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) for a period of 12 months. The resolution maintains MINUSTAH’s current force level and calls on the Secretary-General to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the security environment following the 28 November elections and transfer of power to a new government in 2011. It also stresses that these elections must be free, fair, inclusive and transparent for stabilization in the country.

■ Nepal: On 14 October the Council was briefed (S/PV.6398) by B. Lynn Pascoe, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, following his visit to Nepal on 6 and 7 October (SC/10053). He told Council members that the political impasse in Nepal remained and that no breakthrough had been achieved. He also said that he had made it clear that UNMIN would cease after 15 January 2011 as decided in resolution 1939. On 20 October the Council issued a press statement (SC/10062) reiterating support for Nepal’s peace process and underlined the importance of the implementation of a clear work plan for the supervision, integration and rehabilitation of former combatants.

■ Chad/CAR: On 20 October Special Representative and head of MINURCAT, Youssef Mahmoud, briefed the Council on the situation in Chad, CAR and the subregion (S/PV.6406). He expressed appreciation to the Government of Chad for helping ensure an orderly and secure withdrawal. He noted that the security situation in eastern Chad remained calm, but the humanitarian situation was of concern. He described the security situation in northeastern CAR as volatile and worrisome and said that everything must be done to help the government deploy additional forces in Birao ahead of MINURCAT’s withdrawal. He also presented the Secretary-General’s most recent report (S/2010/529) on progress in the mission’s withdrawal.

■ AU Peacekeeping: On 22 October the Council held a debate to consider the Secretary-General’s report on assistance to AU peacekeeping operations authorised by the UN (S/2010/514). The Council adopted a presidential statement reaffirming its commitment to strengthening its partnership with the AU Peace and Security Council and expressed its determination to continue working towards a more predictable solution to funding challenges confronting the AU’s peacekeeping operations. The Council called on the AU to work towards implementation of a long-term and comprehensive capacity-building strategic framework in consultation with the UN and other international partners (S/PRST/2010/21).

■ Women, Peace and Security: On 26 October the First Deputy Prime Minister of Uganda, Erriya Katagaya, presided over an open debate (S/PV.6411) to commemorate the 10th anniversary of resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. The Council was briefed by the Secretary-General (via a pre-recorded message), the head of UN Women, Michelle Bachelet, the head of UN peacekeeping, Alain Le Roy, the President of the Economic and Social Council, Hamidoun Ali and a member of the Civil Society Advisory Group on Women, Peace and Security, Thelma Awori. Austria, Japan and the US were represented by cabinet ministers. Seventy UN member states and international organisations addressed the Council.

The Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2010/22), welcoming the report of the Secretary-General on women, peace and security (S/2010/488) and supporting taking forward the indicators contained in the annex of the report as an initial framework for the UN system and member states to track implementation of resolution 1325. The Council requested the Secretary-General to propose in his next annual report a strategic framework to guide the UN’s implementation of resolution 1325 over the next decade and expressed its intention to convene a high-level review in five years. There was no mention of any adjustments to the Council’s working methods with regard to considering women, peace and security across the Council’s agenda.

The debate was preceded on 19 October by an Arria formula meeting between the Council and civil society, chaired by Austria, Mexico and the UK.

■ International Court of Justice (ICJ): On 27 October the president of the ICJ, Hisashi Owada of Japan, briefed the Council in a private meeting (S/PV.6412). Owada’s briefing coincided with his presentation to the General Assembly of the Court’s annual report (A/65/4).

Conflict Prevention: Horizon Scanning

Expected Council Action

Some procedural innovations aimed at promoting more proactive approaches to peace and security and more interactive and informal consultations seem likely during the month.

The UK is planning to invite Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe to consultations early in the month for a “horizon scanning session”. This could stimulate an overview discussion focusing on issues of concern in November including ones that may not be on the Council agenda for the month.

This session could help ensure that the Council is better primed for conflict-prevention action by offering a proactive and non-crisis-mode assessment of some
possible threats, both new and existing, to international peace and security. It reinforces wider efforts by the African Council members and others, including Brazil and Turkey, to move the Council toward more conflict prevention rather than its current heavy focus on conflict management.

This interactive session will also be part of an effort that has been championed by several presidencies over the course of the year to encourage greater dialogue in and a more unscripted nature of Council consultations. Pascoe will be expected to highlight his greatest current concerns and engage members in a discussion.

This development is not a new procedure. It represents a potential return to procedures which were routine in the Council in the 1990s (please see section 2 of our 30 March Special Research Report Security Council Working Methods—A Work in Progress?).

Council Dynamics

At press time there were no clearly articulated objections by Council members to the initiative, and the cited rationale of getting the Council to be proactive in addressing latent threats to international peace and security seemed to be a compelling argument. It is not certain, however, where all Council members stand on this in the long-term. It remains to be seen whether members will remain committed to this during their presidencies of the Council and make it an established Council practice.

Expected Council Action

A ministerial-level meeting is expected on 16 November where the Council will be briefed on preparations for the referenda in Sudan, the situation in Darfur and progress of the Doha peace talks. The Secretary-General is expected to brief along with the head of the AU High-Level Implementation Monitoring Panel, Thabo Mbeki, the head of UNMIS, Haile Menkerios, and the head of UNAMID, Ibrahim Gambari. Some may brief by video teleconference.

A presidential statement is expected.

Key Recent Developments

Rhetoric from both parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) escalated during October regarding actions that will be taken by the north against southern Sudanese in the north if the south votes for secession—including stripping southerners of property and Sudanese citizenship. Authorities in the south are reiterating their commitment to move all southerners in the north who want to move to the south ahead of the referendum. Uncertainty over referenda processes, including who is eligible to vote and the process for southerners in the north to vote, are leading to high levels of anxiety and fear among the population.

Registration for the southern Sudan referendum will commence on 14 November and run until 1 December, with 13 to 30 December set aside for appeals.

The Council visited Sudan from 6 to 10 October, visiting South Sudan (Juba), Darfur (El Fasher) and Khartoum. Uganda, the US and the UK briefed the Council on 14 October, saying the visit helped reinforce the message that the referenda should be held on time and maintain pressure on both parties to work through the remaining procedural and political obstacles. The briefing also highlighted the dire situation in Darfur and the importance of all parties’ participation in the Doha talks. Closed consultations followed, where it is understood members held an unusually free-flowing discussion on their perspectives of progress in Sudan and what they had learned from the visit.

During the visit, the President of southern Sudan, Salva Kiir, requested the Council to authorise the deployment of additional troops to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to form buffer zones along the prospective north-south border. The Government of Sudan rejected the proposal and stated that both parties to the CPA need to agree to any UNMIS troop increase. The head of UNMIS, Haile Menkerios, stated the UN has adjusted the deployment of some existing UNMIS troops in the ceasefire zone to defuse tensions, consistent with its mandate and with the full knowledge of both parties.

On 14 October the Council adopted resolution 1945 renewing the mandate of the Darfur sanctions monitoring panel of experts. China abstained, explaining it had serious concerns over the panel’s annual report and the manner in which the panel had undertaken its work. The resolution contains several new elements that refine the existing sanctions regime outlined in resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1591 (2005), including:

- a requirement that the Government of Sudan notify the Darfur Sanctions Committee in advance of moving arms into Darfur when using the existing exemption related to the CPA;
- a requirement that states exporting weapons to Sudan ensure they obtain appropriate end-user certificates to ascertain that the weapons will not be transferred to Darfur; and
- stronger language on the role of the private sector.

On 25 October the head of peacekeeping, Alain Le Roy, briefed the Council on the southern Sudan referenda preparations and Darfur. Council members raised with Le Roy in subsequent closed consultations reports of harassment and arrests of some internally displaced persons (IDPs) whom the Council had spoken to during its visit to Darfur.

The UN panel to monitor the referenda made its first visit to Sudan from 10 to 14 October. The panel met with both parties to the CPA and a range of other stakeholders. It seems the panel has serious concerns over the work that remains to be accomplished for the referenda to be held.

An AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) civilian staff member was kidnapped in El Fasher on 7 October. The UN is in contact with his abductors and is working with Sudanese authorities to secure his release. At press time, he was still being held.

Intensified fighting has been reported in eastern Jebel Marra in Darfur and the UN is concerned about limitations on humanitarian access. The UN has reports that at least six villages in Jebel Marra had been attacked but has faced difficulties confirming information because of limited access to the area.

Human Rights-Related Developments

In her statement at the opening of latest session of the Human Rights Council (HRC), High Commissioner Navi Pillay, observed that “in Sudan the general climate of repression and intimidation of
Key Issues
The key issue for the Council remains that the CPA be implemented and the referenda conducted in a credible and peaceful manner. A related issue is how to maintain pressure on all parties to ensure the timetable for the referenda is met.

A second key question is whether UNMIS has sufficient troops to support the referenda. A separate issue continues to be ongoing violence in Darfur and the persistent unwillingness of all key stakeholders to join negotiations to consider a credible political strategy to resolve the conflict. Related is the growing instability in IDP camps and tension between supporters and opponents of the Doha peace talks. The instability may deteriorate further and spread throughout Darfur. Security of UNAMID staff also remains a key issue.

A possible issue is the process for formation of the new panel of experts to monitor the Darfur sanctions, given China’s concerns over the former panel’s final report.

Underlying Issues
The Southern Sudan Referendum Commission (based in Khartoum) and Referendum Bureau (based in Juba) are severely underfunded. Key rules and regulations have yet to be decided, including the definition of who is eligible to register or vote. Locations of registration points, in the north and south, have yet to be determined. The referenda question has yet to be finalised—either in words or pictographically.

Options
A presidential statement could:
- reiterate the international community’s commitment to referenda being held on 9 January 2011;
- insist that the parties to the CPA are responsible for the referenda preparations and urge them to negotiate quickly all outstanding matters in good faith and a timely manner;
- signal the use of sanctions to press those rebel groups in Darfur not participating in the Doha talks to join the process; and
- authorise, as a contingency, an increase in troop numbers for UNMIS to give the Secretary-General flexibility to respond to events that may arise in its efforts to support the CPA.

Another option is for the Council to hold an informal interactive dialogue with UNMIS troop-contributing countries to discuss the Council’s and the contributing country’s expectations regarding the role of UNMIS in the coming months.

Council Dynamics
The Council visit brought unity to its resolve that the CPA must be fully implemented and that pressure be maintained on both parties to ensure the referenda are held in a credible and timely manner. But that sense of cohesion is fragile and could easily be tested by future issues in reaction to events on the ground.

The visit reinforced some existing divisions within the Council over its approach to the situation in Darfur, but seems to have convinced some members previously reluctant to pressure rebel groups currently outside the talks in Doha to change this policy. Some Council members were concerned that no prior consultations were held on the content of the 14 October briefing, despite the statements purporting to represent all members of the visit.

Most members were pleased with resolution 1945, particularly the strengthening of the sections on notification, end-user documentation and references to the relationship between UNAMID and the panel. Some others were concerned that language reintroduced from earlier panel renewals was unnecessarily strong. China has strong reservations about the report of the panel monitoring sanctions regimes in Sudan (submitted to the Council in early October), which alleged that Chinese ammunition had been found at the site of attacks against UNAMID peacekeepers in Darfur.

The UK is the lead country on Darfur in the Council. The US is the lead country on north-south issues.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1935 (30 July 2010) renewed UNAMID.
- S/RES/1919 (29 April 2010) renewed UNMIS.
- S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.

Latest Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2010/528 (14 October 2010) was on UNMIS.
- S/2010/543 (18 October 2010) was on UNAMID.

Selected Security Council Meeting Records
- S/PV.6410 (25 October 2010) was a briefing by UNMIS.
- S/PV.6401 (14 October 2010) was the adoption of the resolution to renew the mandate of the Darfur Sanctions Panel of Experts.
- S/PV.6397 (14 October 2010) was a briefing by Uganda, the US and the UK on the Council’s visit to Sudan.

Other
Timor-Leste

The Council is considering a visit to Timor-Leste at the end of November. Japan, as the lead country on Timor-Leste, has pushed for this visit. The number of Council members going on the mission was uncertain at press time. While no members have objected to the visit, it appears that a number of countries will not be represented at ambassador level and some members may decide not to participate at all. A decision also had not been made on whether the Council delegation should confine the visit to Dili or consider a field trip outside the capital. The last Council visit to Timor-Leste was in November 2007.

Japan will lead the mission. It has argued that it is time to review the UN Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) prior to mandate renewal on 26 February 2011. Japan appears keen to have the visit take place before it leaves the Council at the end of 2010. It may also want to discuss the format of the UN presence post-UNMIT, but others feel that this would be premature.

Based on the views expressed in the 19 October debate other Council members are likely to be interested in exchanging views with the Timorese authorities on the security situation, the resumption of Timorese responsibility in the final three districts and justice and accountability issues. A number of members, including the US, the UK and Austria, seem to be looking forward to an exchange on justice and impunity.

The Council was briefed on 19 October by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Timor-Leste, Ameerah Haq. She noted that progress had been made but that the focus now needed to be on longer-term challenges, such as systemic, institutional and political fragilities. Members of the Core Group on Timor-Leste, including Portugal (which will be on the Council next year), also participated in the debate.

Among the key issues for Council members are:

- how to manage the reservations from the host country about the timing of the mission;
- what sort of information from the ground will be most useful to Council members in thinking about UNMIT’s mandate; and
- the fact that justice and accountability issues are becoming a source of friction between the Council and the Timor-Leste government is in part because of a lack of sustained dialogue and the discussion in the Council being so public.
Key Recent Developments
On 21 October, the Council heard a briefing by the Secretary-General and Somali Foreign Minister Yusuf Hasan Ibrahim. AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Ramtane Lamamra presented the AU requests to the Council adopted at the AU Peace and Security Council meeting of 15 October. He urged the Council to endorse an increase in the authorised troop strength of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) from 8,000 to 20,000, as well as an expansion of its funding from UN-assessed contributions. He also urged the Council to impose a naval blockade and no-fly zone over Somalia and to consider requesting the naval operations off the coast of Somalia to provide “more direct and tangible operational support to AMISOM”. Finally, he reiterated the need to approach the piracy issue “in a holistic manner, with a view to effectively addressing the underlying causes.” Following a private meeting with Lamamra and others, the Council, in a press statement, took note of the AU’s requests regarding AMISOM. (For more background please refer to our 15 October Update Report on Somalia.)

The Council last considered Somali piracy on 25 August. It held an open debate featuring briefings by the Secretary-General and by Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs Patricia O’Brien. At the end of the meeting, the Council adopted a presidential statement which:
- encouraged the International Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia to continue discussions on possible further steps to ensure that those responsible for acts of piracy be held accountable;
- emphasised the need for a regular review of progress achieved in prosecuting and imprisoning pirates; and
- requested the Secretary-General to include in his next report on Somali piracy observations possible ways to enhance ongoing international cooperation.

On 26 August, the Secretary-General appointed Jack Lang, a former French politician and professor of public law, as his Special Adviser on legal issues related to piracy off the coast of Somalia.

On 28 September, the International Contact Group on Somalia met in Madrid under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Somalia, Augustine Mahiga. Addressing the issue of piracy, Mahiga emphasised that all counter-piracy activities “must be conducted under the overall strategy of the Djibouti agreement” and that international efforts “must be delivered as part of, and not independent from, a package of balanced measures that contribute to the political stability of Somalia.” In a communiqué the contact group stressed the need to address piracy’s root causes.

On 1 October Kenya ended an agreement with the EU to prosecute suspected Somali pirates. Kenya has accused the international community of failing to deliver promised financial support to cover the costs involved.

Also in October, Lang travelled to the region and held consultations with regional and international actors. Lang said in response to Kenya’s announcement that the UN was assessing ways for the trials to resume and was discussing the problem with Kenyan authorities.

On 18 October, the International Maritime Bureau reported that Somali pirates were responsible for 44 percent of all piracy attacks globally in 2010 and had extended their reach as far as the southern Red Sea. Overall, piracy activity off the coast of Somalia had declined compared with 2009, but the number of hijackings remained at the same level.

According to EU anti-piracy naval operation EU NAVFOR, the detention period for crews captured by pirates and ransom demands have increased significantly.

On land, humanitarian access continues to be of grave concern. On 15 September the Islamist insurgent group Al-Shabaab announced that it had banned another three aid agencies from Mogadishu. (This followed its 9 August ban on three Christian aid organisations.) On 8 October, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said that Al-Shabaab’s expulsion of international aid organisations affected more than 1 million people. There were reports, however, of divisions within Al-Shabaab’s leadership over whether to allow international aid groups to work in areas controlled by it.

Human Rights-Related Developments
The situation in Somalia was the subject of two debates during the latest session of the Human Rights Council (HRC). On 29 September the HRC held a stand-alone interactive dialogue on assistance to Somalia in the field of human rights in which the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, and Shamsul Bari, the UN’s independent expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, participated. Pillay said that this was the first occasion in the HRC’s history that human rights in Somalia would be addressed by all agencies working in this field in Somalia. Bari called for a more concerted international effort to deal with the situation in Somalia, characterising the atrocities that had been committed there over a long period of time as a blot on the conscience of humanity. On 1 October, in a resolution on assisting Somalia in the field of human rights (adopted without a vote) the HRC expressed serious concern over the growing negative impact of the ongoing instability in Somalia on neighbouring nations and urged all parties in that country to reject and stop acts of violence. The resolution also extended for one year the mandate of the independent expert on human rights in Somalia.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is whether to extend the anti-piracy provisions of resolution 1897 and if so, whether the Council’s current approach to the piracy problem needs to be revised to better address its root causes (taking into account the concerns expressed by Lamamra on behalf of the AU and as recognised by the international contact group). Related issues are better coordination with the overall UN strategy for Somalia as called for by Mahiga and others and the AU’s request for the naval operations in the region to also provide more “direct and tangible support.”
to AMISOM and for the Council to impose a naval blockade on Somalia.

The prosecution and imprisonment of suspected pirates has also become an acute issue and the Council has before it the different options presented by the Secretary-General in his 26 July report.

Another key issue is the AU request for increased support for AMISOM from assessed contributions. A related question is the timing of any Council decision on this with respect to further consideration by the General Assembly’s Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and by the Fifth Committee.

A further issue is the increasingly difficult situation with regard to humanitarian access in Somalia and the impact on civilians. A related issue in terms of protection of civilians is whether the provision in resolution 1916 regarding the assets-freeze exemption should remain in place.

An additional issue related to the humanitarian situation is the Secretary-General’s recent proposal for integration of UN activities in Somalia (which is now likely to be taken up by the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee in November). This has met with strong resistance from humanitarian actors in Somalia who fear such an approach would undermine their perceived independence. The Secretary-General said in his September Somalia report that the integration proposal would be submitted to the Council.

Options
Main options for the Council include:

- a simple extension of the anti-piracy provisions of resolution 1897, authorising states and regional organisations to enter Somali territorial waters and take action on land in Somalia to combat piracy;
- responding to concerns about prosecution and imprisonment of pirates and deciding to take collective responsibility for this aspect by establishing an international tribunal as proposed by Russia;
- requesting the Secretary-General to develop a comprehensive strategy to address the root causes of piracy, including for land-based projects to develop alternative livelihoods;
- emphasising the need for greater coordination between the international naval operations at sea and international efforts on land in Somalia and encouraging these operations to provide support to AMISOM;
- imposing a naval blockade and no-fly zone over Somalia;
- deciding that the assets-freeze exemption should remain in place and expressing concern for the humanitarian situation and calling for unimpeded access;
- deciding whether to support the Secretary-General’s plans for an integrated UN presence in Somalia; and
- requesting the Secretary-General to expand the support package for AMISOM from UN assessed contributions.

Council Dynamics
There seems to be wide agreement that the existing anti-piracy provisions should be extended. But there is no consensus yet on the Secretary-General’s options for prosecution of pirates. The international piracy contact group will continue to work on this and Lang is due to present his advice to the Secretary-General soon based on his consultations with key countries in the region and Council members.

Council members also remain divided over how or whether to expand the financial support for AMISOM. But discussions are at an early stage.

The review of the humanitarian assets-freeze exemption is expected to be uncontroversial.

Most members appear supportive of the Secretary-General’s proposal for better UN integration.

The UK is the lead country on Somalia in the Council.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1918 (27 April 2010) requested a report on options to ensure prosecution and imprisonment of persons responsible for piracy off the coast of Somalia.
- S/RES/1897 (30 November 2009) renewed for a period of 12 months the anti-piracy measures of resolutions 1846 and 1851.


Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2010/16 (25 August 2010) was on piracy off the coast of Somalia.

Latest Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2010/447 (9 September 2010) was the latest regular report on Somalia.

Selected Meeting Records

- S/PV.6408 (21 October 2010) was the communiqué from a private meeting with the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security.
- S/PV.6407 (21 October 2010) was the meeting with the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security.
- S/PV.6386 (16 September 2010) was the most recent briefing by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia.
- S/PV.6374 (25 August 2010) was a debate on Somali piracy.

Selected Letters

- S/2010/452 (26 August 2010) and S/2010/451 (25 August 2010) was on the appointment of Jack Lang as the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on legal issues related to piracy off the coast of Somalia.
- S/2010/372 (12 July 2010) was from the chair of the Sanctions Committee transmitting the report of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia on the implementation of paragraphs 4 and 5 of resolution 1916 and on impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia.


Selected Council Press Statements

- SC/10065 (21 October 2010) was on Somalia taking note of the decisions on Somalia at the 15 October meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council.
- SC/9988 (20 July 2010) was on the last review of paragraph 5 of resolution 1916.

Other

- A/HRC/15/48 (16 September 2010) was a report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, Shamsul Bari.
potential indictments from the Tribunal. (It is in Lebanon related to speculation about rhetoric and challenges to state institutions that there had been a sharp increase in debate on the Middle East. Taranco said Secretary-General for Political Affairs the location and attacked the staff.) On 18 when a large group of people arrived at office meeting as part of the investigation gathered facts about the incident. On 27 October the Tribunal condemned an attack made that day on three of its staff members in Beirut and pledged the attack would not deter its investigation while it gathered facts about the incident. (Apparently the staff were attending an office meeting as part of the investigation when a large group of people arrived at the location and attacked the staff.) On 27 October the Tribunal condemned an attack made that day on three of its staff members in Beirut and pledged the attack would not deter its investigation while it gathered facts about the incident. (Apparently the staff were attending an office meeting as part of the investigation when a large group of people arrived at the location and attacked the staff.) On 18 October the Council was briefed by Assistant-Secretary-General for Political Affairs Oscar Fernandez-Taranco prior to an open debate on the Middle East. Taranco said that there had been a sharp increase in rhetoric and challenges to state institutions in Lebanon related to speculation about potential indictments from the Tribunal. (It is generally expected that at least one indictment will be handed down by year’s end.) Taranco reiterated the Secretary-General’s 6 October statement that the Tribunal is independent, with a clear mandate from the Security Council to uncover the truth and end impunity. The Secretary-General said that the outcome should not be prejudged, nor should there be interference with the Tribunal’s work.

On 17 October Syrian President Bashar al-Assad met with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in Riyadh. The two leaders discussed the Tribunal and the 33 arrest warrants issued by Syria on 4 October for Lebanese and international officials in relation to the “false witnesses” case of the former head of Lebanese security, Jamil al-Sayyed. Sayyed says he was detained on unfounded allegations related to the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese premier Rafiq Hariri. (Sayyed has also requested access to his criminal file from the Tribunal.)

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Lebanon on 13-14 October. Ahmadinejad said that he supported Lebanon’s unity and that Iran stood ready to help Lebanon face Israeli aggression. (On 24 August Hezbollah head Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech calling upon the Lebanese government to seek military assistance from Iran.)

On 1 October Lebanon informed the Council that Israeli forces had fired rounds toward Lebanese forces in Lebanese territory on 20 September.

On 3 September there was an explosion in Shehabiyeh in southern Lebanon. UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) launched an investigation. Israel alleges it was an explosion of a Hezbollah weapons cache.

On 2 September UNIFIL’s preliminary findings into the 3 August Lebanon-Israel border incident were shared with the parties at a tripartite meeting. (On 3 August there was an exchange of fire along the Blue Line separating Israel and Lebanon resulting in the death of three Lebanese soldiers, one Israeli officer and one Lebanese journalist.) The investigation established that the area where the Israeli Defense Force was performing maintenance was south of the Blue Line on the Israeli side. However, at issue is who opened direct fire first. It is unclear whether the upcoming 1701 report will offer further clarity beyond what was already detailed in the Secretary-General’s 11 August letter to the Council.

On 30 August the Security Council renewed the UNIFIL mandate for a further year. In past renewals, both Lebanon and Israel made statements to the Council as interested parties. However, because Lebanon is currently a member of the Council, it was afforded the right of reply after Israel’s statement. Lebanon’s initial statement reiterated its commitment to full implementation of resolution 1701. Israel’s statement also voiced its commitment to 1701; expressed concern at Hezbollah’s rearmament in violation of the arms embargo; alleged that Hezbollah impeded UNIFIL’s freedom of movement; and regarding the 3 August incident, demanded that the Lebanese Armed Forces differentiate itself from radical elements. Lebanon in reply emphasised continued violations of Lebanese sovereignty, including incidents involving Israeli cluster munitions in southern Lebanon; daily Israeli overflights; Israeli occupation of northern Ghajar, Sheba Farms and Kafr Shuba hills; and an alleged Israeli spy network in Lebanon. Regarding the 3 August incident Lebanon called for the Blue Line to be marked and respected.

On 9 July the Security Council issued a press statement calling for respect of UNIFIL’s freedom of movement and the safety of UNIFIL and UN personnel. The statement was precipitated by an early July incident in which a French peacekeeping patrol was disarmed in a clash with civilians.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

Lebanon will undergo its Universal Periodic Review in the Human Rights Council on 10 November. Submissions for the review have focussed on legislation regarded as discriminatory. Examples include the inability of Lebanese women to pass on their security. #
Council Dynamics
In light of the current political environment, Council members agree that UNIFIL’s role in maintaining stability and helping avoid tension between Israel and Lebanon is especially important.

After the 3 August incident the Council had agreed in principal to meet again on the issue using the informal interactive dialogue format to allow for Israel’s participation. However, it is now unlikely such a meeting will take place since both sides were able to publicly air their views during the UNIFIL renewal.

Most Council members agree that arms smuggling and disarmament remain key issues but seem to accept that this is only likely to happen in the context of an inter-Lebanese dialogue and improvement on the Israel-Syria track, which is unlikely to gain any immediate traction due to strained Israeli-Turkish relations.

Council members seem to anticipate increasing tension in Lebanon as indictments from the Tribunal approach and are watching developments closely. During the October open debate, several Council members also referred to the Tribunal expressing support for the Secretary-General’s statement and concern for Lebanese political stability. Although at time of writing information was still being gathered about the 27 October incident involving Tribunal staff, a Council press statement seemed to be a possible response.

France is the lead country on Lebanon in the Council.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is how to get Israel and Lebanon to move from the status quo—a fragile cessation of hostilities—toward a ceasefire and permanent solution. In this regard the Secretary-General’s 11 August letter cited the 3 August incident as an example of how the relatively calm environment in southern Lebanon can quickly change.

Related issues include regular Israeli overflights and its occupation of Ghajar in violation of resolution 1701 and the fact that Hezbollah maintains significant military capacity in violation of resolutions 1559 and 1701.

Peacekeeper’s freedom of movement so that UNIFIL may fulfil its mandate is a major issue, especially in light of the early July incident and the impact a Tribunal indictment might have in southern Lebanon.

The issue of Shebab’a Farms remains frozen.

Options
The most likely option is to take no action, as has been the practice since April 2008, which was the last time the Council issued a presidential statement on resolution 1701.

However, keeping in mind that the 3 August incident was the most serious confrontation since 2006, a statement may be an option, calling for:
- full implementation of resolution 1701; and
- strengthened respect for the Blue Line.

In particular, the Council could call for confidence-building measures such as:
- expedited progress on demarcation of the Blue Line; and
- Israeli withdrawal from Ghajar.

Selected Security Council Meeting Records
- S/PV.6404 and res. 1 (18 October 2010) was the latest open debate on the Middle East.
- S/PV.6375 (30 August 2010) was the UNIFIL renewal.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2010/538 (18 October 2010) was the latest report on resolution 1559.
- S/2010/352 (1 July 2010) was the latest report on resolution 1701.

Selected Letters
- S/2010/506 (1 October 2010) was from Lebanon regarding the IDF firing toward the LAF on 20 September.
- S/2010/468 (7 September 2010) was from Israel regarding the 3 September explosion in Shehabiyeh in southern Lebanon.
- S/2010/460 (1 September 2010) was from Lebanon alleging an Israeli spying network in Lebanon.
- S/2010/430 (11 August 2010) was from the Secretary-General following up his July 2010 report on resolution 1701.
- S/2010/415 and S/2010/418 (3 August 2010) were letters, respectively from Israel and Lebanon, regarding the 3 August exchange of fire on the Blue Line.

Selected Press Statement
- SC/9976 (9 July 2010) called on all parties to respect UNIFIL’s freedom of movement.

Other Relevant Facts
Special Coordinator for Lebanon
Michael Williams (UK)
Special Envoy for the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559
Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway)
UNIFIL Force Commander
Maj.-Gen. Alberto Asarta Cuevas (Spain)

Size and Composition of UNIFIL as of 30 August 2010
- Authorised: 15,000 troops
- Current: 11,449 military personnel
- Troop Contributors: Bangladesh, Belgium, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, El Salvador, France, FYR of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece,
Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Tanzania and Turkey

**Duration**
March 1978 to present; mandate expires 31 August 2011

**Cost**
1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011: $518.71 million (A/C.5/64/19)

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**Democratic Republic of the Congo**

**Expected Council Action**
In November the Council will consider the renewal of the DRC sanctions regime and the mandate of the group of experts, which expire on 30 November. The DRC Sanctions Committee is scheduled to meet in mid-November to discuss the final report of the group of experts.

It is also possible that experts will be discussing new listing requests for the sanctions committee, for possible approval in December.

The Council is unlikely to address the “mapping” report released by the UNHCHR.

The mandate of the peacekeeping operation in the DRC, MONUSCO, expires on 30 June 2011.

**Key Recent Developments**
On 14 October the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallström, briefed the Council. Wallström expressed concern over recent reports on the involvement of soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) in rapes and looting. She urged the sanctions committee to list “Colonel” Serafim of the rebel Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). Serafim is a counterpart of the recently apprehended “Lieutenant Colonel” Mayele, both allegedly responsible for the recent mass rapes in Walikale (please see our 3 September Update Report for more details). Wallström added that further analysis is needed to examine the nexus between the illicit exploitation of natural resources by armed groups and sexual violence. Wallström urged the Council to provide the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) with the proper resources to carry out the mandate to protect civilians.

Finally, she called on member states to enact laws requiring companies to disclose whether their products contain minerals originating from the DRC.

During the meeting, Wallström was asked if she was able to obtain information about Bosco Ntaganda, de facto military head of the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP). He has been listed by the sanctions committee and the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued a warrant for his arrest. Wallström replied that she has been given assurances by the DRC government that they are not cooperating with Ntaganda, and she could not obtain any further information.

On 15 October, Roger Meece, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of MONUSCO, briefed the Council. Meece said that the recent events in Walikale had compelled MONUSCO to conduct a major internal review of the protection programs carried out by the force. The increased military presence of MONUSCO in the eastern regions, improved radio and cell phone communications and use of more interpreters will be measures that can be taken to increase security in the region and communication with local population.

Meece further stressed that building the capacity of the country’s military, justice system and police force is needed in order to preserve the progress noted in the report. Meece said that MONUSCO and the FARDC have not been cooperating with Ntaganda, despite the latter’s statements.

The Secretary-General’s 8 October report said that the security situation in the eastern regions remains a serious concern. Repeated attacks by armed groups against civilians continue. (In a related development, on 11 October, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that the security situation in North and South Kivu provinces continues to deteriorate, with daily reports of assassination, rape and extortion.) The report also noted the recent withdrawal of nine helicopters provided to MONUSCO by India, and the expected withdrawal of an additional four attack helicopters by March 2011. These helicopters account for a large part of MONUSCO’s air capability. The report also said that MONUSCO’s efforts were hampered by the lack of Security Council authorization to equip newly formed police battalions, an issue raised by Meece before the Council.

The report briefly addresses the joint DRC-MONUSCO security assessment process outlined in resolution 1925. Since its adoption 1,494 troops have been repatriated from the DRC. A joint consolidated report is expected shortly, the conclusions of which will be reflected in the next Secretary-General’s report. In his briefing, Meece added that no significant adjustment in MONUSCO’s deployment would be indicated in the report.

Finally, according to the report, the Independent Electoral Commission has announced that the first round presidential and national legislative elections are set to take place on 27 November 2011. Provincial legislative, senatorial and gubernatorial elections are all scheduled for 2012 and local elections for 2013. MONUSCO has begun assisting the electoral authorities with voter registration and will need to continue to provide logistical and technical support to the process.

The group of experts on sanctions was supposed to submit its final report on October 20. At press time the report had been circulated to Council members but not yet released publicly. It is reported to include due diligence guidelines for private entities conducting business in the DRC, in light of the sanctions regime.

On 1 October, a report resulting from a “mapping” exercise by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) was released, documenting serious violations of international human rights during the period from 1993 to 2003.

Several developments regarding criminal prosecutions occurred in October. In addition to the 6 October arrest of “Colonel”...
Mayele on 8 October, the Appeals Chamber of the ICC decided to resume the trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, founder and leader of the Union of Congolese Patriots in the Ituri region. On 11 October, Callixte Mbarushimana, a Rwandan rebel leader, was arrested in France on an ICC arrest warrant on suspicion of war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed in the eastern DRC last year. On 19 October, the Appeals Chamber confirmed the proceedings against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, a former senior official of the DRC charged with war crimes allegedly committed in the neighbouring Central African Republic.

Violence has also continued in other parts of the DRC. On 15 October, the UN Refugee Agency reported increased attacks and population displacement in central Africa, including the DRC, caused by the Lord’s Resistance Army.

On 23 October, some fifty men attacked a UN peacekeeping base in North Kivu province. Eight of the perpetrators were killed in the incident, while two others were injured. A joint MONUSCO-DRC investigation is underway to establish the identities and motives of the attackers who, according to early indications, appear to be part of the Mai-Mai milita group.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

A UNHCHR report mapping the most serious human rights violations in the DRC from 1993 to 2003 has caused controversy because of allegations of genocide during the Congo Civil war. The objective of the mapping exercise was to formulate options to assist the Government of the DRC in identifying appropriate transitional justice mechanisms to deal with the legacy of these violations. The publication of the report was delayed until 1 October 2010. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon met with officials in Rwanda on 7 and 8 September to discuss their concerns.

**Key Issues**

A key issue for the Council in November is the role of sanctions in addressing problems facing the DRC, such as overall insecurity in large parts of the country and endemic sexual violence, and the related issue of how to enhance this tool’s effectiveness amidst growing calls to deter perpetrators of such violence.

A related issue, highlighted by recent events, is the way in which the tools the Council have created have become trapped in bureaucratic silos (such as peacekeeping operation mandates, expert panels and targeted sanctions), their ability to coherently address the situation on the ground, and the Council’s capacity for practical oversight to ensure these tools are used.

It remains to be seen whether the issues regarding the renewal of the mandate of the Sudan panel of experts (for details please see the Sudan brief in this Forecast), will be a factor in achieving agreement in the Council for the renewal of the DRC sanctions regime without compromising the independence of the group of experts.

**Options**

Options for the Council include:
- renewing the sanctions regime and the mandate of the group of experts;
- modifying the sanctions regime and/or the mandate of the group of experts; or
- not renewing the mandate of the group of experts (a less likely option at this time).

**Council Dynamics**

At press time it was unclear whether the Chinese abstention on the renewal of the mandate of the Sudan panel of experts will affect Council dynamics regarding the DRC sanctions. Council members may try to find a balance between ensuring that the content of the final report is supported by all Council members while not compromising the independence of the group of experts.

There have also been some continuing differences between members, such as China and Brazil, and others about the balance between MONUSCO’s role in capacity-building and reform activities, as opposed to a focus on peacekeeping advocated by others.

On the response to the recent events in Walikale and other acts of violence, some Council members believe that the response should be based, first and foremost, on the initiative of the DRC government and its suggested course of action. They believe that initiatives coming out of Kinshasa have a higher probability of gaining traction. Others remain profoundly sceptical that Kinshasa is yet in a position to grapple effectively with these issues.

With respect to the issue of police equipment, some members were uneasy about the language used in the Secretary-General’s report and by his special representative regarding the Council’s role in obtaining such equipment and would like MONUSCO to make more of an effort to mobilise donors.

The lead country is France.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1896 (30 November 2009) extended the DRC sanctions and the mandate of the group of experts to 30 November 2010.
- S/RES/1925 (28 May 2010) extended the mandate of MONUC until 30 June 2010 and decided that from 1 July 2010, MONUC shall bear the title of MONUSCO and shall be deployed until 30 June 2011.

**Latest Presidential Statement**

- S/PRST/2010/17 (17 September 2010) urged the DRC government to prosecute the perpetrators of the mass rapes that occurred in eastern DRC in late July and August.

**Latest Secretary-General’s Report**

- S/2010/512 (8 October 2010) Selected Meeting Records
  S/PV.6403 (15 October 2010) was the briefing by Roger Meece.
  S/PV.6400 (14 October 2010) was the briefing by Margot Wallström.

**Selected Security Council Press Statements**

- SC/10016 (26 August 2010) expressed the Council’s outrage at the mass rapes in eastern DRC.
- SC/10010 (18 August 2010) condemned the attacks on peacekeepers in Kirumba.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission**

Roger Meece (US)

**MONUSCO Force Commander**

Lt.-Gen. Chander Prakash (India)
expected council action
in november, the council is expecting a report from the secretary-general and is scheduled to hold its biannual open debate on protection of civilians in armed conflict. the debate is expected to feature a briefing by the new under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs, valerie amos and possibly also by the un high commissioner for human rights navanethem pillay as well as the director-general of the international committee of the red cross, yves daccord. a presidential statement is also expected.

(For a more detailed analysis of the council’s recent work on protection of civilians both thematically and in country-specific situations, please see our upcoming third cross-cutting report on protection of civilians in armed conflict.)

Key Recent Developments
The council’s previous debate on protection of civilians, in july 2010, featured briefings by the secretary-general, then-under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs john holmes and pillay.

The secretary-general emphasised the importance of sustained political support by the council to ensure implementation of peacekeeping mandates. he also stressed the need for a stronger common understanding of what protection of civilians entails in practice. with reference to chad and the democratic republic of the congo, the secretary-general warned against the premature termination of peacekeeping missions and said benchmarks on protection of civilians should be achieved before the withdrawal of peacekeepers. he also highlighted accountability as a key challenge, specifically mentioning sri lanka and guinea.

holmes expressed concern that little had improved on the ground, highlighting in particular the situation for internally displaced persons. he reiterated his call for the council to respect and promote engagement with non-state armed groups to improve their compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law. other issues he addressed included protection mandates in peacekeeping operations, humanitarian access and the effects of explosive weapons on civilians. he said more research was needed on these effects and urged the council to begin a dialogue “on ways to tackle this emerging issue.” finally, holmes urged the council to take a “robust approach” to accountability issues and also floated the idea of establishing a permanent mechanism in the un system to conduct inquiries into serious allegations of violations of international humanitarian and human rights law more or less automatically to prevent issues from being politicised.

pillay also emphasised accountability as a key issue for protecting civilians. she argued that the establishment of commissions of inquiry was “amongst the most significant actions taken by the council for the protection of civilians” and called for more frequent use of such mechanisms.

also relevant to the protection of civilians agenda was a council debate on 29 june on promoting and strengthening the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security. in a presidential statement emphasising its commitment to mediation and the peaceful settlement of disputes, the council recognised respect for international humanitarian law as an essential component of the rule of law in conflict situations and reaffirmed that the protection of civilians should be included in any conflict resolution strategy. it also called for all parties to armed conflict to respect international law applicable to civilians, stressed the importance of fighting impunity and expressed its willingness to act in this regard.

on 26 october the council held an open debate on women, peace and security. it adopted a presidential statement in which i.a. it strongly condemned all violations of applicable international law committed against women and girls and expressed its intention to uphold accountability for such crimes. it also supported “taking forward, including by relevant un entities”, the set of indicators proposed by the secretary-general to track implementation of resolution 1325.

the council’s informal expert group on protection of civilians has met three times since the july debate. it discussed the mandate renewals for the au/un hybrid operation in darfur and the un assistance mission in iraq in july and the international security assistance force in afghanistan in september.

on 1 august 2010 the convention on cluster munitions entered into force. as of 26 october, 43 countries had ratified the convention.

on 19 august 2010, the 2005 optional protocol to the convention on the safety of un and associated personnel entered into force.

Key Issues
At this stage, a key issue for the council is whether there has been satisfactory progress in implementing the operative requests of resolution 1894, such as:
■ development of an operational concept on protection of civilians for peacekeeping missions;
■ mission-wide planning, pre-deployment training and senior leadership training on protection in un operations with protection mandates and training by troop and police-contributing countries;
■ incorporation of protection strategies into the overall mission implementation plans for all peacekeeping operations with protection mandates;
■ inclusion of protection indicators in benchmarks to measure and review progress in the implementation of peacekeeping mandates;
■ systematic monitoring and analysis by the secretary-general of constraints on
humanitarian access;
- more comprehensive and detailed information relating to protection of civilians, including on protection-related incidents and actions taken by parties, in the Secretary-General’s country-specific reports; and
- development of guidance for UN operations and other relevant missions on protection reporting with a view to streamlining such reporting and enhancing the Council’s monitoring and oversight.

Another key question is the new issues raised by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and others, such as the impact on civilians of explosive weapons or compensation to civilian victims of conflict and the Secretary-General’s earlier proposal to consider issues related to compliance with international humanitarian law by non-state armed groups.

A further issue is the Council’s own working methods and tools at its disposal, such as the informal expert group on protection, and whether these can be improved.

Underlying Issues
How to translate thematic principles into actions on the ground remains an underlying issue for all of the Council’s work on protection of civilians. The five key challenges identified in the Secretary-General’s last protection report (enhancing compliance with international humanitarian law, including by non-state armed groups, making more effective use of peacekeeping, improving humanitarian access and strengthening accountability for violators of international humanitarian law) remain key underlying issues also for the Council.

Options
Immediate options for the Council include:
- adopting a presidential statement welcoming the Secretary-General’s report and addressing initially in principle some of the issues raised by the Secretary-General, Pillay, Holmes and others;
- updating the aide-mémoire on protection of civilians first adopted by the Council in 2002 and last revised in January 2009 (at press time, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs was aiming to have an update ready for the debate); and
- holding consultations on the work of the informal expert group with a view to identifying ways to make it more useful for Council members.

Council and Wider Dynamics
At press time Council members expected that a presidential statement would be adopted at the debate in November, but no draft had yet been circulated.

Council dynamics have not changed. Differences still remain on the general approach to protection issues. These tend to be more pronounced at the country-specific than at the thematic level. China and Russia emphasise, in particular, respect for national sovereignty and are reluctant to authorise accountability measures. China still does not participate in the informal expert group on protection. Its main concern seems to be that its participation would open the way for attempts to formalise the group along the lines of the Council’s working group on children and armed conflict.

Council members seem generally satisfied with progress on implementation of resolution 1894.

The UK is the lead country in the Council on protection of civilians and chairs the informal expert group.

UN Documents

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<th>Selected Security Council Resolutions</th>
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<td>S/RES/1894 (11 November 2009)</td>
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<td>reaffirmed the Council’s commitment</td>
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<td>S/RES/1889 (5 October 2009)</td>
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<th>Selected Presidential Statements</th>
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<td>S/PRST/2010/22 (26 October 2010)</td>
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<td>was on women, peace and security.</td>
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<td>S/PRST/2010/11 (29 June 2010)</td>
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<td>was on justice and the rule of law</td>
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<td>and asked the Secretary-General to</td>
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<td>provide a follow-up report within 12</td>
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<td>2004 Secretary-General’s report.</td>
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<td>S/PRST/2009/1 (14 January 2009)</td>
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<td>reaffirmed previous decisions on</td>
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<td>protection of civilians and contained</td>
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Selected Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2010/498 (28 September 2010) was a report on women, peace and security, including a revised set of indicators to track implementation of resolution 1325.
- S/2009/277 (29 May 2009) was the seventh (and latest) report on protection of civilians.

Latest Council Meeting Record

- S/PV.6354 and resumption 1 (7 July 2010)

Cote d'Ivoire

Expected Council Action
In early November the Council will be briefed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire and the work of UNOCI, and in particular the elections (which at press time remained on track to take place on the 31 October). The mandate of UNOCI expires on 31 December.

Key Recent Developments
On 15 October the Council adopted a resolution renewing the sanctions regime (on arms and diamonds, along with a targeted asset freeze and travel ban on certain individuals) and the mandate of the Group of Experts monitoring the effectiveness of the sanctions regime until 30 April 2011 (S/RES/1946).

On 18 October the Secretary-General’s mid-term report on the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was issued (S/2010/537). The Secretary-General recounted the process leading to the establishment of the final voters list and its certification by the head of UNOCI, Choi Young-jin. While noting that the establishment of the list is a major breakthrough in the Ivorian peace process, the report expressed concern about reports that “militia groups and elements” were threatening to disrupt the electoral process.
The Secretary-General further observed that while it was “both difficult and undesirable to foreshadow the outcome” the UN and international partners “must be prepared to deal with possible challenges arising after the first round, as also for the need of a second round of voting”. He indicated that his report in November will give a detailed assessment of the first round of the presidential elections and issues relating to the next steps in Côte d’Ivoire “including arrangements for determining the future direction of UNOCI”.

On 28 October Choi announced that an additional 500 peacekeepers (authorised by the Security Council on 17 September) had arrived to assist in addressing security concerns ahead of the 31 October presidential elections.

Key Issues and Council Dynamics

Council members welcome the improved situation on the ground where there seem to be no obvious political obstacles to the electoral calendar, making the elections in Côte d’Ivoire feasible on 31 October. At press time members remained cautiously optimistic but cognisant of the logistical constraints and potential for problems, and the possible impact on the security dynamics of the country.

There remains wide agreement among Council members on the need to monitor the electoral situation closely and proactively, including through briefings by the Secretariat.

Choi is not expected to brief the Council because of the need for him to be on the ground in early November to monitor developments relating to the electoral and security situation.

France is the lead country on this issue in the Council.

Guinea-Bissau

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to consider Guinea-Bissau in November. There will be a report of the Secretary-General on UNIOGBIS, and the head of the UN office, Joseph Mutaboba, may brief the Council. The mandate of UNIOGBIS expires on 31 December. It seems likely that the Council will take action to renew UNIOGBIS in November (ahead of schedule) in order to alleviate the Council’s heavy December workload.

Key Recent Developments

The Government of Guinea-Bissau’s external relations became further strained in June when President Malam Bacai Sanha appointed the leader of the 1 April military insurrection, General Antonio Indjai, as the head of the country’s armed forces. (Indjai, who had previously been the deputy armed forces chief, had assumed de facto charge of the army following the insurrection and before being formally appointed armed forces chief.)

On 2 July the heads of states in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) expressed concern about the appointment of Indjai as head of Guinea-Bissau’s armed forces. They urged Guinea-Bissau’s authorities to create the necessary environment to enable ECOWAS to resume its efforts at mobilising bilateral and multilateral partners to support the effective takeoff of the security sector reform (SSR) programme in the country.

The US on 15 July called for global sanctions against former navy chief Bubo Tchuto and the current Air Force Chief of Staff, Ibaima Papa Camara, for alleged involvement in drug trafficking. (On 9 April the US, acting under its Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, accused the two men of similar allegations, froze their US assets and proscribed US citizens’ engagement in business with the two.)

On 15 July, Mutaboba briefed the Council on developments. He indicated that while his previous report had envisaged progress in 2010, based on positive economic developments and perceived commitment to reform in the country, the events of 1 April had highlighted the extreme fragility of the peacebuilding process and its vulnerability to reversals.

The minister for foreign affairs of Guinea-Bissau, Adelino Mano Queta, also participated in the meeting and said the briefings illustrated the complexity and seriousness of the problems facing his country. He assured the Council of Guineans’ commitment to placing the country on the path to durable peace and stability and urged continued engagement in the process by international partners.

The Ambassador of Brazil, Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, in her capacity as the chair of the Guinea-Bissau Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) configuration, stated that while the PBC remained committed to peace consolidation in the country its engagement was based on the principle of mutual accountability. Consolidating democratic institutions was critical to ensuring durable peace and stability.

On 22 July the Council adopted a presidential statement expressing concern about the prevailing security situation and threats to constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau. It called on the government to release immediately all those detained in the events of 1 April or prosecute them with full respect for due process.

The EU indicated on 2 August that it will end its SSR mission, launched in June 2008, by November because of the deterioration in the rule of law in the country. It indicated, however, that the mission could resume under certain circumstances, including the release or prosecution of those detained in the events of 1 April. (The detainees include the former armed forces chief of staff, Zamora Induta, and about a dozen of his perceived, mostly military, allies.)

On 17 August the National Assembly held a session to discuss a possible national dialogue to include political parties, the military, unions and civil society organisations. During the meeting, President Sanha said that the citizenry was not proud of being perceived as incapable of solving their national problems. The Assembly’s meeting anticipated the convening of a national reconciliation conference in January 2011.

On 19 September an ECOWAS summit meeting was held in Abuja to consider the political situation in Guinea-Bissau. The meeting called for the resumption of international support for reforming the country’s security sector by the EU and the US.

On 4 October, President Sanha formally wrote to ECOWAS requesting support and
assistance to re-launch the reform of his country’s defence and security sectors.

Human Rights-Related Developments

On 1 October, the Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted the outcomes of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of Guinea-Bissau. The government confirmed that of the 108 recommendations made, 103 had been accepted and were being implemented. Five were rejected. Guinea-Bissau accepted the need to humanise prisons and improve the education system. It also indicated its preparedness to criminalize practices linked to female genital mutilation once it had conducted a campaign to illustrate the harmful effects of these practices, something that it believed had to be dealt with gradually. In the HRC’s discussion on Guinea-Bissau, speakers welcomed the commitment to improving the human rights situation through the UPR. Guinea-Bissau was urged to work with regional and other international partners to reform the security sector and to ensure primacy of the civilian government and the rule of law.

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council will be assessing the UN integrated mission’s role in Guinea-Bissau over the past ten months in light of recent developments on the ground.

A related issue is deciding on how best to assist in achieving sustainable peace consolidation in Guinea-Bissau, given the pattern of destabilising military interventions in the country’s contemporary history.

Another issue is that of how best to ensure primacy of the civilian government and the rule of law.

Underlying Problems

Institutional weakness remains uncorrected resulting in military insubordination to civilian leadership and critical socioeconomic challenges reflected in dire development gaps. Illicit drug trafficking and cross-border organized crime have continued to threaten effective peace consolidation in the country.

Options

Options for the Council include: renewing the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), without modifications; modifying the mandate of UNIOGBIS by authorising the mission to engage more proactively in preventive diplomacy activities, in improving the local current political context and the process of consolidating peace; conveying resolve to address more directly some of the major underlying issues, and to this end deciding to include clear language in the new mandate and to send a small Council follow-up mission to Guinea-Bissau; and, approving the Secretary-General’s recommendation in his 29 September 2008 report to “take strong action and... consider establishing a panel of experts to investigate the identity and activities of those involved in drug trafficking and organised crime in Guinea-Bissau, with the possibility of taking measures, including punitive, targeted sanctions that would help reverse the current disturbing growth in the drug trafficking crisis in the country.”

Council Dynamics

Council members continue to be frustrated with the repeated setbacks to consolidating peace and ensuring sustainable democracy in Guinea-Bissau. Most members seem likely to favour a renewal of and retention of the main elements of UNIOGBIS’s mandate, but remain open to examining further options for better-tuning it to the current needs of the situation. Members are comfortable with an early adoption as a Council workload management measure.

Nigeria is the lead country on this issue in the Council.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1876 (26 June 2009) renewed the mandate of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea Bissau (UNIOGBIS) until 31 December 2009 and requested the Secretary-General to establish UNIOGBIS beginning on 1 January 2010 for an initial period of 12 months.

Selected Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2010/15 (22 July 2010) expressed concern at the prevailing security situation in Guinea-Bissau and stressed the need for genuine security sector reform in the country.
- S/PRST/2009/29 (5 November 2009) welcomed the planning for the transition of UNOGIIS to UNIOGBIS.

Selected Letters

- S/2008/208 (25 March 2008) was from the chairperson of the PBC to the president of the Security Council providing advice on peacebuilding priorities for Guinea-Bissau.
- S/2008/87 (28 December 2007) was from the chair of the PBC informing the president of the Council about the placement of Guinea-Bissau on the PBC’s agenda.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2010/335 (24 June 2010) was the latest report of the Secretary-General.
- S/2008/628 (29 September 2008) contained the Secretary-General’s proposal that a panel of experts be set up to investigate the identity and activities of those involved in drug trafficking and organized crime in Guinea-Bissau with the possibility of taking measures, including sanctions, to curb those activities.

Other

- S/PV.6359 (15 July 2010) was the Council briefing by the head of UNIOGBIS.
- SC/9900 (1 April 2010) was a press statement issued by the Council expressing concern about the military developments in Guinea-Bissau.
noted that since parties lacked the political
to enter into “genuine negotiations,”
“priority attention” should be given to
“confidence-building measures.” Ross said
that progress on these measures—such as
the resumption of special flights for family
visits in accordance with the action plan
of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR)—will build momentum and
serve as a “clear signal” that the parties
can work together.

It seems that the Group of Friends may be
asked to assist with high-level approaches
to Morocco, the Polisario Front and Algeria,
urging them to consider that:
■ the status quo in the long-term is unac-
ceptable, especially because of the risk
of a drift toward extremist or criminal
activities among Sahrawi youth and
because the absence of a settlement
prevents regional integration, development
and comprehensive security cooperation;
■ confidence-building measures, such as
family visits as proposed by UNHCR and
the personal envoy, should receive
urgent attention;
■ human-rights violations and the protec-
tion of refugees must be addressed; and
■ creating a conducive atmosphere for
meetings is needed.

Cyprus

Expected Council Action
In November, the Secretary-General’s
Special Adviser on Cyprus, Alexander
Downer, is expected to brief Council
members in informal consultations on the
ongoing UN-facilitated reunification talks
between the Greek Cypriot president
Demetris Christofias and the Turkish
Cypriot leader Derviş Eroğlu.

The Secretary-General has invited the
two leaders to a tripartite meeting in New
York. If they accept his invitation, this
meeting is likely to take place before
Downer’s briefing.

The Secretary-General’s next report on the
UN operation in Cyprus (whose mandate
expires on 15 December) is due on
1 December.

Key Recent Developments
When the Council last renewed the
mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force
in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in resolution 1930 of
15 June, it welcomed progress made in
the negotiations, urged the parties to
“intensify the momentum of negotiations”
and looked forward to decisive progress
“consistent with the hope expressed by the
two sides on 21 December 2009 that, if
possible, 2010 would be the year of solution.”

Following the election last April of Derviş
Eroğlu as the new Turkish Cypriot leader,
the Cyprus reunification talks resumed
at the end of May. The property issue,
which aims at resolving numerous complex
claims between the two sides on property
seized decades ago and is considered one
of the most difficult of the seven items
addressed in the talks, has remained the
focus of the resumed talks. (The other
issues are governance and power sharing;
EU matters; the economy; division of
territory; security arrangements and
guarantees; and citizenship, immigration
and asylum issues.)

The Secretary-General on 21 October
noted that progress had been slow recently.
He said he had been in contact with the two
leaders, urging them to “achieve concrete
advances” and maintain the momentum.

On 14 October the Limnitis/Yesilirmak
crossing point between the two sides of the
island was opened. (It is the seventh such
crossing point.) An agreement to open it
was reached in June 2009 and was seen as
an important confidence-building measure
but had been difficult to implement.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1930 (15 June 2010)
  renewed UNFICYP’s mandate until
  15 December, welcomed progress in
  the negotiations, strongly urged the
  parties to increase the momentum
  in the negotiations and requested a
  report from the Secretary-General
  by 1 December 2010.
- S/RES/186 (4 March 1964)
  established UNFICYP.

Western Sahara

Expected Council Action
In November, the Personal Envoy of the
Secretary-General for Western Sahara,
Christopher Ross, is expected to brief
Council members in informal consultations
after an informal meeting between Morocco
and the Polisario Front to be held early in
November.

No Council decision is expected but
members are likely to signal both their
support for the personal envoy’s mandate
and concerns about progress.

Key Recent Developments
In October Ross conducted his fourth
regional tour in preparation for the informal
meeting, which he will facilitate in accor-
dance with resolution 1920. (Adopted on 30
April 2010, the resolution calls on the
parties to continue negotiations under the
auspices of the Secretary-General without
parties to continue negotiations under the
auspices of the Secretary-General without

The Group of Friends of Western Sahara
attachment to mutually exclusive posi-

June 2010 memo leaked to the media, Ross
nudge the process forward. Based on an 18
focused on finding additional options to
informal meeting in February, Ross appears
since the deadlock following the second

Joseph Mutaboba (Rwanda)

1 January 2010 to present; mandate expires on 31 December 2010.
Fatmir Sejdiu, after the constitutional court ruled that he had acted in violation of the constitution by simultaneously holding office and the leadership of the LDK.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Pristina on 13 October, pledging to work for broader international recognition of Kosovo and to support Kosovo’s pursuit of EU and NATO membership. Clinton then travelled to Brussels, where she met with EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton. Clinton told Ashton that she believed Serbia’s application for EU membership ought to be forwarded to the European Commission, a crucial step in the accession process, as a reward for its recent constructive stance on Kosovo. Serbia’s application was forwarded to the Commission on 25 October.

In his previous briefing to the Council, Zannier reported that the situation in the north remains of major concern. He cited insufficient progress towards reconciliation between the communities and slow economic development as culprits behind the ongoing instability.

The security situation in northern Kosovo still remains tense. On 4 October, following a string of violent incidents, the heads of the NATO-led force (KFOR), the EU Rule of Law Mission Police and Kosovo police announced a plan to increase patrols to prevent unrest and establish law and order.

Clashes between ethnic Serbs and Albanians erupted in Mitrovica on 12 September following Serbia’s loss in a world championship basketball match in Istanbul. Three international peacekeepers and six locals were wounded.

In September the Czech defence minister announced that his country will withdraw 300 peacekeepers from Kosovo, which would leave only ninety Czech troops in Kosovo. Slovakia is currently also drawing down forces, as its commitment to KFOR expires in November. NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on 16 September urged alliance members to reconsider the pace of their troop reductions, warning that while all KFOR partners were considering a reduced military presence, the announced reductions seemed too large and that KFOR must continue to have a sufficient presence to ensure stability and peace.

On 11 September, Serbia indicted nine former paramilitary members for the killing of 43 ethnic Albanians in May 1999 during the Kosovo conflict. The nine were also implicated in rapes, beatings and the burning of homes and property. Serbia’s prosecution of such atrocities committed during the Balkan wars is a key condition of advancing Serbia’s bid for EU accession.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia on 10 September denied a request by former Kosovo prime minister Ramush Haradinaj to be provisionally freed before he is retried, stating his release would encourage his supporters to intimidate witnesses. Haradinaj had been acquitted of war crimes in April 2008, but the acquittal was overturned in July 2010 because of claims of witness intimidation in the original trial. He is being retried for war crimes including murder and torture.

On 3 August, Zannier, briefed the Council on Kosovo following the issuance of the ICJ opinion affirming the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. Zannier recalled that the ICJ had reaffirmed that Kosovo remained subject to the interim administration of the UN and resolution 1244 (1999) and that the UN Mission in Kosovo’s (UNMIK) Constitutional Framework continued to apply.

In a 27 July letter to the Secretary-General, Serbia outlined its position concerning the ICJ opinion. The letter asserted that the ICJ findings did not endorse Pristina’s claim to statehood nor did it conclude that Kosovo’s declaration of independence is a unique case. It maintained that the status of Kosovo is yet to be resolved.

Kosovo

Expected Council Action

In November head of UNMIK, Lamberto Zannier, is expected to brief the Council. Discussion is likely to focus on the upcoming EU-brokered talks between Serbia and Kosovo. It seems unlikely that the Council will take any formal action.

Key Recent Developments

On 16 October the coalition government of Prime Minister Hashim Thaci collapsed when the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) announced it was leaving the government. Among those resigning was Foreign Minister Skender Hyseni. According to Kosovo’s constitution, elections must be held within 45 days of the withdrawal, which would mean early December. The withdrawal occurred just days after acting president, Jakup Krasniqi, announced that general elections would be held on 13 February. At press time the election timetable remained unclear. These developments follow the 27 September resignation of Kosovo’s first president,
Human Rights-Related Developments

In a report on 28 September, the mission of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Kosovo expressed concern over ineffective legal representation observed in criminal and civil proceedings in Kosovo. The OSCE regards the legal representation by defence counsel for criminal matters as often substandard and ineffective, having serious repercussions for a defendant’s right to a fair trial and thus for his or her human rights. As explained by European Court of Human Rights case law, a fair trial is intended to be a right that is “practical and effective,” not “theoretical or illusory.” While some defence counsels do provide effective legal representation, the OSCE has observed instances where both court-appointed and privately hired defence counsel fail to exercise their professional advocacy duties. The report notes that authorities have a duty to ensure that legal assistance is effective, particularly when appointed by the court.

Key Issues

A key issue is whether and how a Council debate can help to move the negotiating process forward.

A related issue is the security situation in northern Kosovo. (The situation will continue to need close monitoring during the negotiation process, particularly in light of the reduced KFOR troop levels.)

A continuing practical issue is whether there is still a need for quarterly UNMIK reports and briefings by the Secretary-General’s special representative.

Options

One option is for the Council to simply receive the briefing and for the members to discuss the key issues in informal consultations.

Another option, following recent practice, would be a public Council debate with invitations to Kosovo and Serbia to participate.

A third option would be a statement reflecting support for EU-mediated dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina and addressing the security situation in the north.

Council Dynamics

The Council remains divided between those members who have formally recognised Kosovo’s independence (Austria, France, Japan, Turkey, the UK and the US) and those who have not.

Council members who had previously taken low key positions on Kosovo’s status continue to remain neutral after the issuance of the ICJ advisory opinion (which seems not to have affected Council dynamics).

Of the incoming 2011 Council members Colombia, Germany and Portugal have recognised Kosovo.

Russia continues to support Serbia’s position and says it would favour any negotiated agreement between the parties that is supported by Belgrade. Russia is in favour of the UN playing a role in the negotiation process. The US is also supportive of the upcoming settlement talks but, like Kosovo, opposes a return to “status negotiations”.

In light of the recent move toward dialogue, Council members are likely to approach the issue with a more positive and encouraging tone than in recent past.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) authorised NATO to secure and enforce the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and established UNMIK.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report

- S/2010/401 (29 July 2010)

Other

- A/64/L.65/Rev.1 (8 September 2010) was the General Assembly resolution welcoming EU-mediated talks between Serbia and Kosovo.
- S/PV.6367 (3 August 2010) was the most recent debate on Kosovo.
- A/64/876 (27 July 2010) was the letter from Serbia to the Secretary-General outlining Serbia’s position concerning the ICJ advisory opinion.
- A/64/881 (26 July 2010) was the ICJ Advisory opinion on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Lamberto Zannier (Italy)

UNMIK

- Size of mission: 510
- Cost: $47.87 million (1 July 2010-30 June 2011 budget)

KFOR (NATO force)

- Force commander: Lt. Gen. Erhard Büler (Germany)
- Size of mission: 9,923 Troops (as of 26 February 2010)

Useful Additional Source

Kosovo and Serbia after the ICJ Opinion, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Number 206, 26 Aug 2010

Expected Council Action

The Council is expecting to discuss the Development Fund for Iraq in November. The UN Controller appears likely to brief the Council in an open meeting and Iraqi representatives may also address the Council. A follow-on closed meeting is also possible. No Council action is expected at time of writing.

Key Recent Developments

Iraq has continued to be unable to form a new government following its 7 March elections. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki visited a number of countries in the region in mid-October, reportedly to discuss aspects of government formation in Iraq, including the possible inclusion of the Iraqiya coalition led by Iyad Allawi. Maliki travelled to Iran on 18 October, where Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reportedly urged politicians in Iraq to reach agreement on forming a new government as soon as possible. (Before travelling to Iran, Maliki went to Syria and Jordan and went on to visit Egypt and Turkey.)
The visits followed a 1 October agreement to nominate Nouri al-Maliki for prime minister by the State of Law coalition led by Maliki, supporters of Moktada al-Sadr and some smaller factions. However, those groups remain short of a majority in the Iraqi parliament, and gathering additional support from Kurdish groups or the Iraqiya coalition is needed. On 8 October hundreds of Sadr’s followers rallied in Baghdad and other parts of the country to show support for the decision to nominate Maliki for a second term as prime minister.

Violence in the country has continued. The US ended combat operations in August and reduced its troops to 50,000. On 19 October a UN convoy transporting Special Representative for Iraq Ad Melkert was attacked with a roadside bomb in Najaf after a meeting between Melkert and Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. While Melkert and UN staff were not injured, one member of the Iraqi security forces was killed. The Secretary-General said the attack would not deter the UN’s activities in Iraq.

In survey results presented on 19 October, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees reported that a majority of Iraqis who have moved back to Baghdad regret their decision to return, due to violence, harassment and kidnapping. (While hard to confirm, there have been recent media reports that significant numbers of former Sunni Awakening Council members have joined or rejoined Al-Qaida in Mesopotamia because of frustration with the Shiite-led government. It is unclear to what degree renewed support for Al-Qaida may be contributing to ongoing violence.)

### Human Rights-Related Developments

The representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Walter Kaelin, visited Iraq in late September. Kaelin stated that he was encouraged by the cooperation between the Iraqi authorities and the international community to address the humanitarian and human rights situation of displaced persons in Iraq and by the development of a national policy on displacement. However, he expressed concern over dire living conditions in settlements of displaced persons and urged that efforts be strengthened to find alternative housing and long-term solutions, including allocation of land plots. Kaelin observed that durable solutions for displaced persons were “a political imperative, a development challenge and a vital part of the national reconciliation and peace-building process.” He added that, at the same time, “immediate humanitarian needs and human rights must be addressed for all displacement-affected communities, including equitable access to basic services, registration as internally displaced persons, and provision of personal documentation for those who may have lost it.”

### Key Issues

#### A key issue for the Council in November

A key issue for the Council in November is assessing progress made by Iraq to establish a successor mechanism to the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) which should happen by 31 December 2010, as called for in resolution 1905. (The DFI holds the proceeds of petroleum export sales from Iraq as well as remaining balances from the Oil-for-Food program and other frozen Iraqi funds. The International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) is its audit oversight body.) An ongoing constraint in this regard is the delay in forming a government. A related issue is that ongoing delays also undermine Iraq’s ability to take the steps necessary for the lifting of restrictions imposed in Saddam-era resolutions.

#### Underlying Problems

A major underlying problem is the fact that as a relatively new democracy, Iraq is still developing the political institutions and social infrastructure required for long-term stability. This hinders the country’s ability to overcome significant sectarian and political divisions.

#### Options

Options for the Council include:

- adopting a press statement that encourages Iraq’s continuing efforts toward establishing a DFI successor mechanism;
- choosing to take a decision on removing one or more measures imposed on Iraq in historical resolutions related to the regime of Saddam Hussein (a less likely option at this time); or
- refraining from action at present.

### Council and Wider Dynamics

Council members seem increasingly concerned over the delay in forming a new government and the complications for assessment of Iraq’s work on a DFI successor mechanism with some questioning whether a credible mechanism can be installed by 31 December. Many appear to remain sceptical about extending immunities associated with the DFI past the end of this year.

With regard to resolving other outstanding Chapter VII issues, many Council members seem to view progress as likely only after the formation of a new Iraqi government and with Iraq/Kuwait issues remaining more problematic.

The US is the lead country on Iraq issues in general, and the UK is the lead on Iraq/Kuwait issues.

### UN Documents

#### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- **S/RES/1936 (5 August 2010)** extended UNAMI’s mandate through 31 July 2011.
- **S/RES/1905 (21 December 2009)** extended the arrangements for the DFI and the IAMB until 31 December 2010, called on Iraq to develop an action plan and timeline for a post-DFI mechanism in 2010 and requested the Secretary-General to report on strengthening oversight of the DFI, legal issues and options for a post-DFI mechanism, and Iraq’s progress in preparing for such a mechanism.
- **S/RES/1859 (22 December 2008)** requested the Secretary-General to report on all Council resolutions concerning Iraq since 1990; a letter from Iraq requesting the lifting of Saddam-era resolutions is included as an annex to the resolution.
- **S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003)** established sanctions against the previous Iraqi government, created the DFI, provided immunity to Iraqi petroleum products and envisaged the termination of the oil-for-food programme.
Counterterrorism

Expected Council Action

The chairs of the three counterterrorism committees—the 1267 Committee, the CTC and the 1540 Committee—are due to brief the Council in November. (They usually provide a joint briefing of the Council twice each year.) No formal outcome is anticipated, but an open debate is expected to follow the briefing.

Key Recent Developments

1267 Committee

(AI-Qaida and Taliban sanctions)

The review of the list of individuals and entities subject to sanctions, which was mandated by resolution 1822 (2008), was concluded at the end of July. The committee’s monitoring team has produced a report on the outcome of the review noting that 488 names had been reviewed, with the committee finding that the listing remained appropriate for 380. Of the remaining 108 names, 45 had been removed from the list, including eight of deceased individuals. (Thirty-five of the names had been associated with AI-Qaida and ten with the Taliban.)

The committee delayed a final decision on the remaining 63 names pending further information. Under resolution 1904, delisting requests are to be decided within six months unless extraordinary circumstances require additional time, and this should apply to the 63 delisting requests still under consideration by the committee. Also, resolution 1904 urged the committee to resolve by 31 December 2010 all issues pending at the time of its adoption, including fifteen delisting requests.

The monitoring team made a number of recommendations with regard to the ongoing review processes mandated in resolution 1904, including that the committee take a flexible approach when deciding what documentation to accept as confirmation of an individual’s death. The committee is currently considering the report. (In the past, the committee has transmitted its position to the Council on recommendations contained in reports of the monitoring team, and this seems likely to happen with regard to the most recent report.)

CTC (or the 1373 Committee)

The stocktaking exercise, which is meant to assess progress by member states in implementing the provisions of resolution 1373, continues. The committee has also continued to facilitate technical assistance, conduct visits to member states and maintain dialogue and cooperation with regional organisations. In this context, CTC is organising a seminar for prosecutors expected to take place in December.

The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) has continued to be involved with a series of technical briefings for the committee and the broader UN membership, which have been part of the focus of the committee in the current year. However members are conscious that Resolution 1805 (2008), which extended the mandate of CTED, expires on 31 December 2010. Discussion of mandate renewal will therefore be a feature in December. CTED has undertaken a comprehensive analysis of its work to aid the committee in advising the Council whether and under what terms the CTED mandate should be renewed. The committee is now considering this and plans to submit a report to the Council.

1540 Committee (weapons of mass destruction and terrorism)

Work on a report on compliance with the 1540 regime is due to be presented to the Council before the committee mandate expires on 25 April 2011. The committee appears to have carried on its practice of holding more frequent monthly meetings throughout the year. The committee has also undertaken outreach activities, including seminars meant to facilitate regional experience-sharing, as recommended in its January comprehensive review. Work among the committee’s four working groups (on assistance, cooperation, outreach and implementation) has also continued, though the groups meet less frequently.

Counterterrorist Network

• 2010/359 (6 July 2010) was the most recent report on UNAMI.
• 2010/403 (28 July 2010) was from Iraq to the Council outlining additional steps taken to comply with disarmament and nonproliferation obligations.
• 2010/359 (6 July 2010) was the most recent report on the DFI and the IAMB.
• 2010/153 (18 March 2010) included an IAEA assessment of Iraq’s cooperation with its safeguards activities.
• 2010/300 (9 June 2010) was the most recent report on the IAMB.
• 2010/385 (27 July 2009) was the report on the review of Iraq resolutions.

Selected Secretary-Generals’s Reports

• 2010/406 (29 July 2010) was the most recent report on UNAMI.
• 2010/359 (6 July 2010) was the most recent report on the DFI and the IAMB.
• 2010/300 (9 June 2010) was the most recent report on Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property.
• 2009/385 (27 July 2009) was the report on the review of Iraq resolutions.

Selected Presidential Statement

• 2010/5 (26 February 2010) underlined the importance of Iraq’s ratifying the Additional Protocol and expressed the Council’s willingness to review disarmament-related restrictions on Iraq.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Iraq

• Ad Melkert (Netherlands)

Secretary-General’s High-Level Coordinator for Iraq/Kuwait Missing Persons and Property

• Gennady Tarasov (Russia)

Selected Meeting Records

• 2010/6356 and 2010/6357 (12 July 2010) was the latest briefing on UNAMI.

Selected Letters

• 2010/406 (29 July 2010) was the latest briefing on UNAMI.
• 2010/403 (28 July 2010) was from Iraq to the Council outlining additional steps taken to comply with disarmament and nonproliferation obligations.
• 2010/150 (22 March 2010) included an IAEA assessment of Iraq’s cooperation with its safeguards activities.

Other Recent Developments

• S/2010/300 (9 June 2010) was the most recent report on UNAMI.
• S/2010/406 (4 August 2010) was the latest briefing on UNAMI.
• S/2010/359 (6 July 2010) was the most recent report on the DFI and the IAMB.
• S/2010/406 (29 July 2010) was the latest briefing on the DFI and the IAMB.
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• 2009/385 (27 July 2009) was the report on the review of Iraq resolutions.
Key Issues
There are no issues for the Council to decide in November. However, given the upcoming discussion in December of renewal of CTED, some Council members and others may use the debate to send signals of their concerns and whether and how the mandate might be altered. Another issue which may be highlighted especially with regard to the 1267 Committee is the extent of progress made in addressing due process and human rights concerns.

Options
Possible options include:
- approving a press statement encouraging the committees to enhance their ongoing cooperation and reiterating its past request that arrangements be made as soon as possible for the co-location of the committees’ expert groups, as expressed in the Council’s 27 September presidential statement on terrorism; or
- refraining from action at this time.

Council and Wider Dynamics
The biannual joint briefings are seen by some non-Council members as an opportunity to offer feedback on the work of the committees. However, some Council members view them as somewhat too formulaic. The UK, as president of the Council in November, seems to be hoping for the chairs to give some reflection on their experiences and perhaps advice with regard to the future of the committees. (Such a focus for this joint briefing may be particularly apt, considering that all three chairs will leave the Council at the end of December.) Some other members also want a more lively and forward-looking discussion. However, others believe the chairpersons should limit themselves in their remarks to texts previously agreed by consensus at committee level.

Despite the recent 27 September presidential statement which encouraged the CTC and CTED to continue their work, in close cooperation with the General Assembly Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, some Council members are cautious about the manner in which to proceed, and how quickly to do so. The status of the CTC as a subsidiary body of the Council rather than the General Assembly seems to be the driving factor.

With regard to the 1267 Committee, some members are concerned that even with the committee’s ombudsperson in place and with improved due process provisions included in resolution 1904, additional legal challenges to the regime are possible. Some members have noted the 25 October briefing to the 1267 Committee by Martin Scheinin, the Human Rights Council’s special rapporteur on the protection of human rights while countering terrorism, and Scheinin’s recent report to the General Assembly presented on 26 October which concluded that resolutions 1267, 1373 and 1624 do not have a proper legal basis under Chapter 7 of the Charter, and recommended that they be replaced by a single resolution that is not adopted under Chapter 7. (At time of writing Scheinin was also expected to brief the CTC in late October.)

UN Documents

Selected Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1904 (17 December 2009) renewed the mandate of the 1267 Committee Monitoring Team for 18 months. The resolution also included significant changes to the administration of the 1267 regime, including the creation for an initial period of 18 months of an Office of the Ombudsperson, which is intended to serve as a point of contact for individuals and entities requesting that they be delisted.
- S/RES/1822 (30 June 2008) directed the 1267 Committee to conduct a review of its consolidated list.
- S/RES/1810 (25 April 2008) extended the mandate of the 1540 Committee and expert body until 25 April 2011.
- S/RES/1624 (14 September 2005) called on states to adopt measures to prohibit the incitement of terrorism.
- S/RES/1540 (28 April 2004) established the 1540 Committee and its mandate.
- S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001) established the CTC and its mandate.
- S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999) established the Al-Qaeda and Taliban Committee and its mandate.

Useful Additional Source
**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

**Expected Council Action**

In November, the Council expects a report from the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Valentin Inzko of Austria, on implementation of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. A debate, with a briefing by Inzko, is expected and the Council seems likely to reauthorise the EU force in the country for another 12 months.

The Council debate may be used by a number of members to send firm messages about the need, post 3 October general elections, for the parties to move to a more conciliatory phase.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 12 October, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Bosnia and Herzegovina with the message that it must catch up with its neighbours and integrate with Europe.

On 3 October, Bosnia and Herzegovina held its sixth national election. Campaign rhetoric was largely along ethnic lines and included calls for secession. Bakir Izetbegović (Bosniak), Željko Komšić (Croat) and Nebojša Radmanović (Serb) were elected members of the three-person national presidency. With the election of reputed moderates Izetbegović and Komšić, observers expressed hope that some space can be created for further dialogue and a climate of lowered rhetoric. However, while the moderate Bosniak and Croat parties that favour unity appear to have performed well at the national presidency level, power at the state level seems to be further consolidated in the hands of those with an opposing agenda—Croats calling for their own autonomous entity and Serbs seeking secession. Milorad Dodik, the Republika Srpska (RS) prime minister and his nationalist party, in particular, further consolidated power by winning the presidency of the RS. These developments seem to indicate that political obstacles and the risk of deadlock may be in store for the incoming government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (It seems that the government is unlikely to be formed before February 2011.)

Earlier, speaking on behalf of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the 23 September Council summit, then Chair of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency, Haris Silajdžić, accused the Bosnian Serbs of genocide in Srebrenica. He also said that “one part of Bosnia and Herzegovina” was destabilising the Dayton Agreement with “open calls for secession.” He went on to claim that the Serb action to turn territories where they committed “atrocities, ethnic cleansing and genocide” into a “fiefdom” was a “threat” to the peace and security of the international community.

The last Council meeting on Bosnia and Herzegovina was held on 24 May. In his briefing, Inzko noted that there was progress in the following areas:
- addressing the membership action plan to join NATO;
- EU visa liberalisation; and
- positive attempts at regional reconciliation.

However, he noted that continued divisions within Bosnia and Herzegovina have resulted in its inability to address key governance and budgetary issues. There continues to be concern over growing anti-Dayton rhetoric and challenges to the authority of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and Peace Implementation Council (PIC) by the RS. Inzko said that no progress has been made on the 5+2 agenda. (The five objectives are: the resolution of state property; resolution of defence property; completion of the Brcko final award; fiscal sustainability of the state; and entrenchment of the rule of law. The two conditions are to sign the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU and to obtain a positive assessment of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the PIC.) Inzko also noted that constitutional reform efforts have stalled, with high-level political discussions initiated by the EU and US—the so-called “Butmir process”—ending without a breakthrough in November 2009.

The political directors of the PIC met in Sarajevo on 29 and 30 June. (The PIC’s steering board members are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, the US, the EU presidency, the European Commission and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, represented by Turkey.) In a communiqué, PIC welcomed the recent initiatives to promote reconciliation and improve regional cooperation and efforts at addressing the “painful issues of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s past”. They continued to encourage progress to be made on resolving all outstanding 5+2 agenda items, such as inmovable defence properties, as a step toward NATO membership and closing the OHR. As for the October general elections, the PIC urged all political parties to campaign in a “forward-looking, constructive, and responsible manner.”

On 25 July, Dodik claimed that the opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence shows that secession is a possibility for the republic. He said that this issue would be further discussed after the 3 October elections.

On 29 September, appearing on the election campaign trail together with Serbia’s President Boris Tadic, Dodik, he remained defiant with his secessionist rhetoric. He said that his political platform remained clear: “Republika Srpska forever, Bosnia only for as long as it has to exist.”

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

On 11 June, the Human Rights Council adopted the outcome of the Universal Periodic Review of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of the 125 recommendations received, Bosnia and Herzegovina accepted 26, partially accepted 58 and rejected 46. Among those accepted were recommendations to more effectively suppress racial discrimination and capacity building of human rights institutions.

On 4 October, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe observer mission from the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights noted that while the 3 October general elections were conducted “generally” in-line with international standards, the ethnic limitations to the highest political office continues to violate the European Convention of Human Rights.
Key Issues
A key issue is whether the Council should respond to the continued uncertainty in the political climate after the general elections. The pressing concern is how Bosnia and Herzegovina will be able to form a more functional government that can start taking important steps towards European integration.

A related issue is what could be sent to try to dampen the strong secessionist rhetoric in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Another such issue is the continuing challenges to the authority of the High Representative and the Dayton Agreement.

Options
A main option is to adopt a resolution to renew the mandate of the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR). (Substantive changes to the mandate are not likely.)

A further option is to include in the resolution language that expresses strong concern over divisive rhetoric calling for secession and the continuing challenges to the Dayton Agreement.

A third option is to highlight the urgent need for unity and functionality of the government, after the 3 October general elections.

Council Dynamics
There seems to be a growing sense among Council members that if the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina collectively and genuinely want integration with the EU that will be an important milestone in reducing tension. But Council members also see this as a key incentive for Bosnia and Herzegovina to undertake the necessary political reforms to ensure that the state is functional. Some Council members are increasingly concerned that Bosnia and Herzegovina will be left further behind in the process of qualifying for EU membership while other Balkan states make strides towards closer European integration.

While concerns remain over secessionist rhetoric, none seem to see any real risk that Dodik would carry out his threat to declare independence for Bosnian Serbs.

Russia appears to remain sensitive about initiatives for constitutional reform, especially if they are seen as new conditions for closing the High Representative’s office. Russia also believes that the High Representative, as a priority, should pro-actively focus on finding compromise solutions to solve the property issue in order for the office to be closed.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1869 (25 March 2009) welcomed and agreed to the designation of Valentin Inzko as High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina by the PIC Steering Board.
- S/RES/1575 (22 November 2004) established EUFOR.

Selected Council Meeting Record
- S/PV.6319 (24 May 2010) was the latest briefing of the High Representative to the Council.

Selected Letters
- S/2010/510 (4 October 2010) was from the Secretary-General conveying the latest report on the activities of EUFOR from 1 December 2009 to 31 May 2010.
- S/2010/235 (17 May 2010) was from the Secretary-General transmitting the most recent report of the High Representative on the implementation of the Peace Agreement.
- S/2010/113 (23 February 2010) was from the Secretary-General conveying the latest report on the activities of EUFOR from 1 September to 30 November 2009.
- S/2010/51 (28 January 2010) was from Turkey transmitting “Conclusions on developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina” of the second meeting of the Political Directors of the South-East European Cooperation Process.

Other
- S/1995/999 and annexes (21 November 1995) was the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Annexes, signed in Dayton.

Peacekeeping

Expected Council Action
In late November members of the Council are expected to hold consultations on peacekeeping, including briefings from the DPKO and DFS. Following the August 2009 presidential statement on peacekeeping, which encouraged regular discussions on peacekeeping with the field support and peacekeeping departments, the Council has held quarterly meetings on peacekeeping. The November discussion is likely to focus on overlap between peacebuilding and peacekeeping.

The Working Group on Peacekeeping may also take up this issue. A report from NYU’s Center on International Cooperation analysing peacebuilding tasks that have been undertaken by peacekeeping missions over XX years is expected to help inform its discussions.

Also likely in November is a closed meeting with troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to discuss UNMIS. It will be an important working methods development and could involve a briefing from DPKO and the UNMIS Force and Police Commanders by video-link. This is expected to be an interactive session conducted in a question and answer format, giving TCCs a chance to meet independently from mandate renewal schedule and bring up issues related to the current situation as well as the upcoming referenda.

Neither meeting is expected to result in a formal outcome from the Council.

Key Recent Developments
On 23 September the Council held a summit meeting on the maintenance of international peace and security initiated by Turkey. The meeting was attended by nine heads of state and government and six cabinet members. At the end of the meeting, a presidential statement reaffirmed the need for a more comprehensive and coherent approach toward international peace and security. Members also pledged to adapt preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding to changing circumstances, acknowledging that the relationship between these tools was not always sequential and that it was necessary to use them in a comprehensive, integrated
and flexible manner. Other areas that were stressed included the importance of addressing the root causes of conflict and strengthening strategic partnerships with regional and subregional organisations and other relevant players.

On 6 August, under the Russian presidency, the Council met with Alain Le Roy, the Under-Secretary-General for peace-keeping and the force commanders from the UN Mission in Liberia, the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti and the head of mission and chief of staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation. This was part of the quarterly series of peacekeeping discussions initiated following the August 2009 presidential statement. Bangladesh, Canada, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea also participated in the debate. Le Roy spoke about how peacekeeping had reached a plateau and said that the focus was now on consolidation and accelerating reform. The force commanders provided information on developments in their missions, details about deployment, the challenges faced and the resources needed to carry out their mandates. Force commanders from other missions were available to answer questions.

The first progress report by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) on the New Horizon initiative was published in October. It covered the consultation process and activities undertaken by DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS) over the last year, as well as progress on the peacekeeping reform agenda set out by the Secretary-General in his report to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34). The report noted that following a surge in peacekeeping, which peaked with a historically high level of deployments in 2010, UN peacekeeping may be headed toward a period of consolidation. Areas of focus now include transition towards exit, the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus, and capability challenges.

Also in October, DPKO and DFS circulated an informal paper entitled “Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Clarifying the Nexus.” The aim of the paper was to clarify the priorities and sequencing of early peacebuilding tasks in the post-conflict peacekeeping context. The paper identified three primary roles of peacekeepers as early peacebuilders: articulating peacebuilding priorities; enabling the implementation of peacebuilding; and implementing early peacebuilding tasks.

The Working Group on Peacekeeping was briefed by Ameerah Haq, the Secretary-General’s Representative in Timor-Leste on 22 October. Among the areas discussed were capability gaps and transition strategies related to the UN Mission in Timor-Leste.

**Key Issues**

An issue for the Council is how to carry forward the September high-level consensus into mutual lessons for formulating early peacebuilding tasks during the peacekeeping phase.

A related issue is how to go beyond the discussion of the overlapping roles of peacekeeping and peacebuilding to understanding how this translates into reality on the ground.

Also an issue is to tackle the connected issue of Council working methods relating to peacebuilding. The recent report on the review of the peacebuilding architecture recommended various changes in Council working methods relevant to the PBC when peacekeeping mandates are being established, reviewed or approaching a drawdown.

An issue for discussions with the TCCs will be whether the November TCC format promotes substantive interactive discussions.

**Options**

The most likely option for both peacekeeping meetings is holding an interactive discussion without any formal action.

Other options which could be considered by Council members in informal consultations are:

- whether the Working Group on Peacekeeping should take up the issue of inter-linked areas of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding;
- the Council’s response to the peacebuilding commission architecture review including the proposal to allow for consultations with bodies such as the PBC ahead of mandate renewal and establishment of new mandates.

- regular informal interactive meetings with TCCs ahead of major events that could affect a mission’s mandate; and
- addressing the difficulty of getting more information about actual needs on the ground well ahead of mandate renewals, including through the use of video links.

**Council Dynamics**

Overall, members have shown increased interest in 2009 and 2010 in discussing peacekeeping issues. There have been four peacekeeping debates, three on peacebuilding and one summit covering these areas. All the permanent members have initiated discussions on peacekeeping in some form, as have a number of elected members.

Most members have found the regular peacekeeping consultations useful and are open to having a discussion with the Secretariat in November. There is also some agreement that providing the Secretariat with questions on areas of interest has led to more productive discussions.

However, there are differences among Council members over specific issues like the financing of peacekeeping, filling the capacity gaps and the use of benchmarking. Some members, feeling the strain of the global financial crisis, are reluctant to take on greater financial commitments while others, such as the African countries, would like to see greater financial commitments from the UN toward regional and subregional actors.

Elected members—including Japan, Turkey and Uganda, which all leave the Council at the end of 2010—have played an active role in shaping the Council’s peacekeeping agenda over the last two years. Others, such as Austria, have brought the issue of protection of civilians within peacekeeping to the forefront of peacekeeping issues. The combination of important TCCs such as India, Brazil, South Africa and Nigeria on the Council in 2011 may result in a greater focus on TCC issues.
DPRK (North Korea)

Expected Council Action
In November the chair of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee is expected to brief the Council and the committee’s panel of experts is expected to provide a midterm report on its work, which is due by 12 November. No new Council decision is expected.

Key Recent Developments
Recent media reports have suggested that the US and Japan had rejected a recent Chinese proposal to resume six-party talks (involving the DPRK, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia and the US). The US State Department spokesman said on 25 October he could not speak about any proposals made by other countries, but that the US would continue high-level consultations with the six-party partners. On 12 October a DPRK representative to six-party talks met with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi. Following the meeting, a Chinese foreign ministry representative said that the US had rejected the DPRK’s proposal to restart negotiations on the country’s nuclear programme. Another Chinese official asserted the DPRK was committed to returning to the talks.

On 21 October media reports suggested that satellite imagery had detected increased activity at a DPRK nuclear testing site, citing a ROK government source. On 18 October the DPRK state news media criticised the ROK and the US for holding recent joint military exercises, saying they were provocative and risked war.

However, some positive moves have occurred. On 25 October the ROK sent a large shipment of rice to the DPRK. Such humanitarian food shipments had been suspended for over two years. On 18 October the DPRK and the ROK conducted a test call on a re-established hot line between their main international airports (the hot line had been severed in May in the wake of the sinking of an ROK navy ship). And on 1 October the ROK and the DPRK agreed to allow a series of reunions to take place for families separated by the Korean War.

In mid-October 2010 the Panel of Experts completed a country visit to the United Arab Emirates in connection with a shipment seized there in August 2009. (The shipment in question, carried by the ANL-Australia, allegedly originated in the DPRK and was bound for Iran with arms.)

On 28 September, Kim Jong Un, the youngest son of DPRK leader Kim Jong Il, was appointed to key positions during a rare conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea. The conference, which is thought to have been called to put in place succession plans, had been delayed by two weeks, which prompted speculation about the health of Kim Jong Il. Kim Jong Un was named a vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, which oversees the country’s forces. He was also appointed to the Workers’ Party Central Committee, which functions as a policymaking mechanism in the country. The appointments apparently came just a day after he was promoted to a four-star general in the military.

In addressing the General Assembly on 29 September, DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister Pak Kil Yon said the sovereignty of his country continued to be threatened by the ROK and the US. On 25 September, ROK Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Shin Kak-soo told the General Assembly that no sustainable peace could be achieved on the Korean Peninsula without the DPRK giving up its nuclear weapons programme.

Selected Security Council resolutions
- S/RES/1645 (20 December 2005) created the PBC and the Peacebuilding Fund.
- S/RES/1327 (13 November 2000) adopted the decisions and recommendations of the report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations.
- S/RES/1318 (7 September 2000) contained the Millennium Summit Declaration on maintaining peace and security, especially in Africa.
- S/RES/1353 (13 June 2001) contained the Millennium Summit Declaration on maintaining peace and security, especially in Africa.
- S/RES/1327 (13 November 2000) created the PBC and the Peacebuilding Fund.
- S/RES/1645 (20 December 2005) created the PBC and the Peacebuilding Fund.
- S/PRST/2001/5 (20 February 2001) reiterated the value of including peacebuilding elements in mandates of peacekeeping operations.

Additional useful sources
- DPKO and DFS: Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Clarifying the Nexus, October 2010

Selected Presidential Statements
- S/PRST/2010/18 (23 September 2010) reaffirmed the Council’s primary responsibility to the maintenance of international peace and security and the need for a more comprehensive and concerted approach.
- S/PRST/2010/2 (12 February 2010) focused on peacekeeping exit and transition strategies.
- S/PRST/2010/7 (22 July 2009) emphasised the vital role of the UN in post-conflict peacebuilding.
- S/PRST/2001/5 (20 February 2001) reiterated the value of including peacebuilding elements in mandates of peacekeeping operations.

Selected Meeting Records
- S/PV.6389 (23 September 2010) was the summit meeting on peace and security.
- S/PV.6370 (6 August 2010) was the meeting with Force Commanders.
- S/PV.6270 and resolution 1 (12 February 2010) was on transition and exit strategies.
- S/PV.6178 and resolution 1 (5 August 2009) assessed the peacekeeping review.
- S/PV.6153 and resolution 1 (29 June 2009) was the debate on the relationship with TCC/PCCs.
- S/PV.6075 (23 January 2009) was on UN peacekeeping.

A/64/573 (22 December 2009) was the Secretary-General’s report on implementation of the recommendations of the C34.
Human Rights-Related Developments

In a report of 30 September, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) publication Refworld, which provides information necessary for taking quality decisions on refugee status and is issued by the Division of International Protection Services of UNHCR, published a report on the DPRK stating that North Korea remained the most repressive media environment in the world in 2009. The government owned all media, sought to regulate all communication, and limited the ability of North Koreans to have access to information. Refworld notes that although the constitution theoretically guarantees freedom of speech, other constitutional provisions calling for adherence to a “collective spirit” are invoked to limit all reporting that is not sanctioned by the government.

Key Issues

A key issue is whether the sanctions regime is effective. A related issue is maintaining support among Council members for the continued implementation of sanctions currently in place. Another issue is whether the sanctions should be modified.

Underlying Problems

A persistent underlying problem is the lack of trust regarding the DPRK and particularly with regard to a lack of transparency about its intentions for its nuclear weapons programme.

Options

Options include:
- refraining from public action at this time;
- a press statement that confirms the unity of the Council in its approach to the issue of the DPRK’s nuclear programme; or
- designating additional entities, individuals and goods that are subject to the sanctions imposed in resolutions 1718 and 1874.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Council members expect the upcoming quarterly briefing by the chair of the DPRK committee to be rather technical and to focus on the activities of the committee over the preceding three months. It appears likely that the Panel of Experts’ midterm report will feature in the briefing. It seems that no new sanctions violations were reported in the current period.

Most Council members seem to remain supportive of the established approach to the DPRK involving broad support in the Council for the implementation of the sanctions regime at its existing level. Most do not appear to favour expanding the scope of the existing sanctions regime at the present time. Some stress that it remains the DPRK’s responsibility to change its behaviour and the sanctions already in place are sufficient, especially if accompanied by a consistent message from the Council.

Although it remains unclear when or if the DPRK will return to six-party negotiations on its nuclear disarmament in a substantive way, Council members seem to recognise that developments or a lack of progress on this front may be a determining factor when considering future Council action related to the nuclear programme.

UN Documents

Selected Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1928 (7 June 2010) extended the mandate of the panel of experts that assists the DPRK Sanctions Committee until 12 June 2011.
- S/RES/1887 (24 September 2009) reaffirmed that the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery are threats to international peace and security, and reaffirmed earlier resolutions related to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and missile programmes.
- S/RES/1874 (12 June 2009) condemned the DPRK’s 25 May underground nuclear test, expanded the existing arms embargo and authorised inspection of cargoes to and from the DPRK as well as vessels on the high seas, and provided for the creation of a panel of experts to assist the committee.
- S/RES/1718 (14 October 2006) expressed grave concern over the DPRK’s nuclear test, imposed sanctions and set up a sanctions committee.
- S/RES/1695 (15 July 2006) condemned the DPRK’s launch of ballistic missiles.

Other Relevant Facts

Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006)

Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan (Turkey)

Useful Additional Source

David Albright and Paul Brannan, Taking Stock: North Korea’s Uranium Enrichment Program, Institute for Science and International Security, 8 October 2010
Also expected in November:

- The Council is likely to renew UNIOGBIS ahead of its December expiry.
- A briefing on the report of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia is expected in the Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee.
- Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe on Somalia piracy
- Head of UNMIL, Thabo Mbeki, Head of UNMIS Haile Menkerios and Head of UNAMID Ibrahim Gambari
- Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Cyprus, Alexander Downer
- Personal envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross
- Department of Peacekeeping Operations on Côte d’Ivoire
- Head of the UN office in Guinea-Bissau, Joseph Mutaboba
- Secretary-General on Sudan with Head of the AU High-Level Implementation Monitoring Panel Thabo Mbeki, Head of UNMIS Haile Menkerios and Head of UNAMID Ibrahim Gambari
- UN Controller for the Development Fund for Iraq
- UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Michael Williams
- Chair of the DPRK Sanctions Committee
- Under-Secretary-General for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay and Director-General of the International Committee of the Red Cross
- Yves Daccord on protection of civilians
- The DPKO and DFS on peacekeeping issues
- Special Representative for the Secretary-General, Jean-Pierre Besuddy on Côte d’Ivoire
- Chair of the Eritrea Sanctions Committee, Mexican Ambassador Claude Heller

The transitional period as defined by the Transitional Federal Charter of Somalia expires in August 2011. Legislative and presidential elections in Liberia are expected in October 2011. Parliamentary elections and first round of presidential elections are scheduled for 27 November 2011 in the DRC.

Important Dates over the Horizon

- Referenda for southern Sudan and Abyei are to be held pursuant to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by 9 January 2011.
- Parliamentary and first round presidential elections are scheduled for 23 January 2011 in CAR.
- Legislative elections are expected on 20 February 2011 and local elections on 27 March 2011 in Chad.
- First-round presidential elections are expected on 8 May 2011 in Chad.
- Legislative elections in Liberia are expected in October 2011.
- Parliamentary elections and first round of presidential elections are scheduled for 27 November 2011 in Côte d’Ivoire.

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