OVERVIEW FOR OCTOBER

Uganda will hold the presidency of the Security Council in October. The month’s programme is likely to be very tightly packed, especially since it seems the Council will undertake a mission to Sudan (Juba, Khartoum and Darfur and perhaps also including Kampala, Uganda) during the week of 4 October. The elections in the General Assembly for five new Security Council members on 12 October will also be a focus.

Several debates are planned. In the first half of the month, the Council is set to hold a debate on post-conflict peacebuilding. Later in the month there is likely to be a debate on peace and security in Africa with a focus on AU peacekeeping and will be presided over by Uganda’s Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa. On 29 October a ministerial-level open debate on women, and peace and security is planned to mark the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1325. An open debate on the Middle East and a debate on Timor Leste are also expected.

Several briefings are expected on:
- the DRC, by MONUSCO’s head, Roger Meece, to be followed by consultations;
- the 28 September to 6 October visit to the DRC by Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict Margot Wallström;
- MONUSCO’s strategy for the protection of civilians and its implementation challenges from the Secretariat;
- the operation in Chad and Central African Republic, most likely by MINURCAT’s head, Youssef Mahmoud, also to be followed by consultations;
- Lebanon in the context of resolution 1559, by Special Envoy Terje Red-Larsen (in consultations);
- UNMIN, by Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe, following his visit to Nepal;

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Aide-Memoire

- In resolution 1888 (2009) on sexual violence as a tactic of war, the Council requested the Secretary-General to devise urgently (preferably by the end of 2009) specific proposals on ways to ensure more efficient monitoring and reporting within the existing UN system on the protection of women and children from rape and other sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations, in order to provide timely, objective, accurate and reliable information on gaps in the UN response, for consideration in taking appropriate action. The Secretary-General has yet to release such proposals.
- The quarterly reports on ISAF in Afghanistan are running about five months late. (The latest was circulated on 19 August covering the period from 1 February 2010 to 30 April 2010.)
- UNAMI reports on human rights in Iraq, in the past produced every two to three months, have decreased in their frequency and regularity. The last report, released in July, covered the period from 1 July to 31 December 2009.
- Two matters related to Children and Armed Conflict remain to be addressed. The August 2009 request in resolution 1882 to the Secretary-General to provide administrative and substantive support for the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict has yet to be complied with. The Council’s 16 June presidential statement (S/PRST/2010/10) reiterated this request. And the request in resolution 1460 (2003) that all the Secretary-General’s reports to the Council on country-specific situations include the protection of children is not fully implemented. Protection of children has been incorporated into only half of the relevant country-specific reports.
- The Secretary-General has not yet re-energised his Advisory Committee on the
The operation in Sudan, UNMIS and preparations for the referenda (also in consultations);
- the operation in Darfur, UNAMID, to be followed by consultations;
- Somalia, to be followed by a private meeting;
- the Council visiting mission to Sudan; and also
- by the President of the International

Court of Justice, Hisashi Owada (in a private meeting).

Consultations are also expected on Côte d’Ivoire and the operation there, UNOCI.

A number of adoptions are due and will occur in formal sessions of the Council:
- the renewal of the peacekeeping operation in Haiti, MINUSTAH;
- the authorisation of the international forces in Afghanistan, ISAF;
- the renewal of the mandate of the Sudan sanctions panel of experts; and
- the renewal of Côte d’Ivoire sanctions and the panel of experts.

The Council will also likely approve in October its annual report to the General Assembly.

Aide-Mémoire (continued)

Prevention of Genocide (it has not met since 2008).

The Council has yet to address the Secretary-General’s summary of the report of the UN Board of Inquiry into incidents involving UN facilities and personnel in Gaza between 27 December 2008 and 19 January 2009, submitted to it on 4 May 2009 (S/2009/250).

The latest report of the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team, issued on 25 August 2008, still awaits Council consideration (S/2008/582). The mandate to the Secretary-General to assist with the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially Sheba Farms, in accordance with resolution 1701, continues to await completion.

A biennial report by the Secretary-General on small arms requested on 29 June 2007 in a presidential statement (S/PRST/2007/24) is yet to be produced for 2010. The last report on small arms was published in April 2008.

The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire, requested in a May 2004 presidential statement (S/PRST/2004/17), has still not been made public. Also on Côte d’Ivoire, the December 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not been published.

The Council requested the Secretariat on 21 November 2006 (S/2006/928) to update the index to Council notes and statements on working methods. This has not been published.

The 2006 presidential note on working methods (S/2006/507) indicated the Council’s interest in having the Secretary-General arrange a dialogue with the new Special Representatives of the Secretary-General before assuming their duties. Two new Special Representatives (for the DRC and for Somalia) were in town in July, yet no dialogues with the Council were arranged during that pre-deployment period.

The 2005 World Summit requested that the Security Council consider reforms for the Military Staff Committee. This has yet to be addressed. However on 23 September 2010 the Council reaffirmed (S/PRST/2010/18) its intention to “look into the role of the Military Staff Committee”.

Status Update since our September Forecast

Somalia: In a press statement on 31 August (SC/10019) the Council condemned the attack on the presidential palace in Mogadishu on 30 August, which resulted in the death of four peacekeepers of AMISOM. On 16 September the Secretary-General’s new Special Representative for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, gave his first briefing to the Council (S/PV.6386). Mahiga emphasised the need for unity and cohesion among Somali leaders to address the insurgency and advance the peace process and, noting that only 11 months remained until the end of the transitional period, called on both the Somali government and the international community to strengthen their efforts. In regards to AMISOM Mahiga said the AU Peace and Security Council would soon submit to the Council a request for authorisation of increased troop levels. The Secretary-General’s latest report on Somalia (S/2010/447) was issued on 9 September.

Liberia: On 8 September the Council was briefed on developments in Liberia by Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the Head of UNMIL. On 15 September the Council extended the mandate of UNMIL for another year (S/RES/1938).

International Court of Justice: On 9 September the Council elected Joan E. Donoghue (US) to replace Judge Thomas Buergenthal, for the remainder of his term until 5 February 2015 (S/PV.6381). Buergenthal resigned from the ICJ on 6 September 2010. (The General Assembly also independently elected Donoghue in accordance with the ICJ statute.)

Terrorism: On 10 September the Council issued a press statement (SC/10025) condemning the terrorist bombing that took place in Vladikavkaz, Russian Federation the previous day. The bombing killed over a dozen people.

Iran: On 15 September the chair of the 1737 Committee on Iran sanctions, Ambassador Tsuneo Nishida of Japan, informed the Council in a briefing that he expected that the panel of experts established by resolution 1929 would be appointed in the near future (S/PV.6384). He also expressed regret that the Committee had so far received only 36 reports from member states on their implementation of resolution 1929. (The resolution called on states to report to the Committee within sixty days on the steps they had taken to implement its provisions.) In statements following the briefing, France, the UK and the US emphasised Iran’s continued noncompliance with Council resolutions. China and Russia stressed the importance of dialogue and negotiation in resolving questions related to the country’s nuclear programme.

Middle East: On 17 September Robert Serry, the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, briefed the Council on the direct Israeli-Palestinian talks that
Status Update since our September Forecast (continued)

resumed in Washington DC on 2 September and reaffirmed the UN position that Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories is illegal under international law (S/PV.6388). A 21 September Quartet statement strongly supported direct talks and commended the Israeli settlement moratorium and urged its continuation (SG/2162). On 26 September the moratorium had expired and building in settlements had restarted. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, who has previously said he would quit talks if settlement activity was renewed, is expected to consult with the Arab League on 6 October.

- **West Africa (Guinea):** On 17 September Council members were briefed during informal consultations by Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, on the situation in Guinea. The Council subsequently issued a press statement expressing concern about the violent political clashes that occurred on 11 and 12 September in that country. The Council expressed regret about the postponement of the second round of presidential elections and urged the Guinean government to ensure a calm and peaceful electoral environment (SC/10035).

- **Summit Meeting:** On 23 September the Council held a summit meeting on the maintenance of international peace and security (S/PV.6389). Turkey, which holds the presidency of the Council for September, initiated this meeting and circulated a concept paper beforehand (S/2010/461). It was attended by nine heads of state and government and six ministers. At the end of the meeting Council members adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2010/18) where they reaffirmed that international peace and security required a more comprehensive and coherent approach. They also pledged to continue to adapt and strengthen preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding to changing circumstances. Other areas that were stressed include the importance of addressing the root causes of conflict and strengthening strategic partnerships with regional and subregional organisations and other relevant players.

- **Counter-Terrorism:** On 27 September, at the initiative of Council president Turkey, the Council held a thematic meeting (S/PV.6390) on counterterrorism and adopted a presidential statement on the matter (S/PRST/2010/19). The statement underlined the need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, recognising that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. The statement also stressed the importance of assisting victims of terrorism. The Council expressed concern at the increase in incidences of kidnapping with the aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions, called on states to improve cooperation to prevent the movement of terrorist groups to and from their territories and encouraged the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) and its Executive Directorate (CTED) to continue facilitating technical assistance to states, in particular in close cooperation within the Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). The statement reiterated the need to enhance cooperation among the Council’s counter-terrorism committees (the 1267 Committee on Al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctions, the 1373 Committee or CTC and the 1540 Committee on weapons of mass destruction and terrorism) and recalled the Council’s request that the Secretary-General make the necessary arrangements for the committees’ expert groups to be co-located as soon as possible. The Council also reiterated its support for the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the institutionalisation of CTITF and encouraged member states to conclude negotiations of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism.

- **Sierra Leone:** On 28 September the Council was briefed on developments in Sierra Leone by Michael von der Schulenburg, the head of UNIPSIL. The Secretary-General’s report on UNIPSIL was issued on 17 September (S/2010/471). On 29 September the Council lifted the sanctions that it had imposed on Sierra Leone in response to the civil war in the 1990’s (S/RES/1940) and extended the mandate of UNIPSIL for another year (S/RES/1941).

### Women, Peace and Security

**Expected Council Action**

The Council is scheduled to hold a ministerial-level open debate on 29 October on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. The foreign minister of Uganda, Sam Kutesa, is expected to preside. The newly appointed head of UN Women, Michelle Bachelet, is expected to be invited to brief the Council. A representative of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and a single representative of civil society are also likely to speak. The Council is expected to adopt either a presidential statement or resolution following the debate, taking action to invigorate implementation of resolution 1325, including a set of revised indicators to track implementation at the global level.

For detailed analysis of the Council’s dynamics and approach to this issue from 2000 to 2010, please see our *Cross-Cutting Report on Women, Peace and Security* published in October.

The debate is expected to be preceded on 28 October by an Arria formula meeting with civil society co-hosted by Austria and Mexico and possibly other members of the Council.

At press time Council members had yet to decide whether to take up the Secretary-General’s separate report on women and peacebuilding (prepared by the Peacebuilding Support Office) during this debate or during a specific debate devoted to the Peacebuilding Commission (see our brief on the Peacebuilding Commission in this month’s *Monthly Forecast*).

**Key Recent Developments**

On 27 April the Council held a debate on the Secretary-General’s report that recommended a set of 26 indicators for use at the global level to track implementation of resolution 1325, which could serve as a common basis for reporting by relevant UN entities, other international and regional organisations and member states. At the time, the Council was split between members who wanted to endorse the set of indicators immediately and members who thought the initial set of indicators needed more work. China and Russia felt that if the indicators were to be used by all UN member states to track their implementation of 1325, then it
was important there be wider input into development of the indicators. There were some concerns with specific indicators: in particular, “proxy” indicators that indirectly measured the implementation of 1325 (such as using maternal mortality rates to measure women’s access to health services during conflict).

The Council issued a presidential statement following the debate in April noting that the indicators would need further technical and conceptual development before they could become operational and requested the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Council and the broader UN membership. The Council sought these revised indicators by October, along with an allocation of responsibilities for the indicators within the UN system and a timeframe to render the indicators operational.

The special adviser for gender equality and the advancement of women, Rachel Mayanja, undertook consultations—meeting with all geographic groups—in May and June. It is understood that these led to several modifications to the original indicators, which will be included in the Secretary-General’s report on the UN system’s implementation of resolution 1325, which was due in mid-September, but is now expected in early to mid-October.

In resolution 1889, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report on addressing women’s participation and inclusion in peacebuilding and planning in the aftermath of conflict, taking into consideration the views of the Peacebuilding Commission. This report is expected in early October 2010. The Peacebuilding Support Office undertook extensive consultations with the UN membership, peacebuilding practitioners within the UN system in New York and Geneva and civil society when drafting this report. The final report is expected to contain a seven-point action plan for gender-responsive peacebuilding, including recommendations on minimum funding levels for gender programming in post-conflict recovery and possibly a recommendation that quota systems for women’s participation in post-conflict legislatures be encouraged.

The General Assembly decided on 2 July to create a new UN gender entity—UN Women—combining the existing four women’s entities into one. The Secretary-General announced on 14 September that former Chilean President Michelle Bachelet would lead UN Women.

A range of activities are planned to mark the 10th anniversary of resolution 1325. UN peacekeeping, peacebuilding and political missions held a series of “Open Days” throughout June to facilitate their contact with women’s civil society. In more than twenty post-conflict countries, special representatives of the Secretary-General and other high-level officials met with women’s advocates to hear their concerns and discuss how to increase women’s participation in sustainable conflict resolution, peace-making and peacebuilding. The Open Days were organised by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the UN Development Programme. UNIFEM has indicated efforts were being made to make this an annual event.

The Secretary-General and cabinet ministers from Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, Liberia, Namibia, Sierra Leone and the UK hosted a ministerial-level event on 25 September in New York to mark the 10th anniversary of resolution 1325, as a platform to encourage member states to make time-bound and measurable commitments toward the implementation of resolution 1325 in their interventions at the Council’s open debate in October.

**Key Issues**

A key issue for the Council in October is to reach agreement on its specific role with regard to the set of indicators to track countries’ implementation of resolution 1325.

A further issue is whether and how the Council will adapt its working methods to enable it to track systematically—and across the full Council agenda—the increased information that will become available and issues that will arise when countries report their progress against the indicators.

**Underlying Problems**

Some question whether the “global” indicators can be truly global. Many of the indicators are only relevant to conflict or post-conflict countries.

There are practical questions as to how the information which will be used to track the indicators will be gathered and how it will be processed for Council members and others. Much information is likely to be voluntarily supplied by UN member states and drawn from existing information held by UN entities. Some support and additional analysis is expected from the UN system, but some members question how the information will be processed so as to be comparable between different country situations. Many on the Council are looking to UN Women to take the lead on coordinating the indicator process and managing the resultant information. However, UN Women will only come into effect on 1 January 2011 and its structure and resourcing will inevitably take time to emerge.

**Options**

One option is a Council decision on 29 October to address two elements—indicators and framework—as well as general language acknowledging the 10th anniversary of resolution 1325. The Council could:

- endorse all the revised indicators in the Secretary-General’s report;
- endorse a modified list that it negotiates;
- set up a framework within which it uses the indicators (or set up a date by which to determine it); or
- not endorse any of the indicators.

If the Council also takes up the Secretary-General’s report on women and peacebuilding during this debate one option is to consider and approve the seven-point action plan for gender-responsive peacebuilding in one thematic decision on women, peace and security on 29 October.

The alternative is for the Council to address the seven-point action plan in the debate on peacebuilding, which would ensure the recommendations of the report are dealt with in a more cross-cutting way.

**Council Dynamics**

There seems to be a growing consensus among Council members that if the indicators have been revised to take into account member state consultations then it is appropriate for the Council to endorse them.

Differences may emerge, however, over the process the Council might establish to address the indicators and the information that it wants to come to the Council. Most P5 members are leaning toward a longer-term approach to establishing such a framework that takes into account both the consolidation of UN Women and the timeline to render the indicators operational.
Elected members, especially Austria, Mexico and Japan, seem to prefer to establish a framework in October, which may also formalise to some degree the Council’s process for consideration of the thematic issue of women, peace and security.

With regard to the eventual information flows when member states report progress against the indicators, some members place weight on the value this will add when the Council is considering countries already on the Council agenda. Other members, by contrast, want to look at all countries’ performance against the indicators as a guide to early warning and conflict prevention, even when a country is not on the Council agenda.

Most P5 members consider a presidential statement a sufficient outcome for October. Other members prefer a resolution to formalise new Council working methods and the set of indicators.

**UN Support for Regional Peacekeeping**

**Expected Council Action**

In October the Council will consider a report by the Secretary-General on UN assistance to the AU to improve effectiveness in deploying and managing peacekeeping operations. The foreign minister of Uganda, Sam Kutesa, will preside over the debate. This issue has proved highly controversial in previous years. However a presidential statement is a likely outcome.

**Background and Key Recent Developments**

On 16 April 2008, under the South African presidency, the Council held a debate on strengthening relationships between the UN and regional organisations and adopted resolution 1809 welcoming the establishment of a joint AU-UN panel to consider options for supporting AU peacekeeping operations. After its chair, former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi, it became known as the “Prodi Panel”.

The Prodi Panel’s report was transmitted to the Council in December 2008. It addressed capacity building for conflict prevention in Africa and offered several recommendations involving UN funding from assessed contributions, funding to support AU peacekeeping operations and to develop AU logistics capacity.

In March 2009 the Council held a high-level debate on the Prodi report which revealed considerable reservations among members about the panel’s recommendations. The Council adopted a presidential statement requesting the Secretary-General to submit a report on practical ways to provide effective support for the AU, including “a detailed assessment of the recommendations”, particularly those on financing and establishing a joint AU-UN team.

In September 2009, the Secretary-General proposed a number of alternate ways for the UN to help the AU improve effectiveness in deploying and managing peacekeeping operations. He made several suggestions for strengthening the partnership between the UN and the AU.

In a presidential statement of 26 October 2009, the Council welcomed the intentions of the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission to establish a joint task force on peace and security. The Council requested the Secretary-General to update it by 26 April and submit a progress report no later than 26 October 2010.

In May Under-Secretary-General Susana Malcorra, the head of the Department of Field Support, briefed Council members during informal consultations on UN cooperation with the AU. Members were reportedly encouraged by the efforts being made by the joint task force of the UN and AU secretariats but urged the task force to establish priorities and develop further strategic thinking on the role of regional organisations in peacekeeping.

On 1 July 2010 the General Assembly formally established a UN presence for co-operation with the AU. The new office integrates various UN peace and security presences in Addis Ababa:
- the UN Liaison Office;
- the UN’s AU Peace and Support Team;
- the UN Planning Team for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); and
- the administrative functions of the Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism of the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur.

Through an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Council on 6 and 13 August, Zachary Muburi-Muita (Kenya) was appointed as the Head of the UN Office to the AU at the level of Assistant Secretary-General.

On 9 July members of the Council held a consultative meeting at UN headquarters with the AU Peace and Security Council and top AU Commission officials. Topics discussed included enhancing cooperation...
between the two Councils and modalities for organising future consultations between them. Participants also focused on two specific conflict situations where the AU and the UN are partners—Sudan and Somalia. They also discussed the border dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea. A joint communiqué issued at the end of the meeting said that participants recognised the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing the AU’s peace and security capability and agreed on modalities for future meetings between the two Councils, to be conducted annually. (The theme of peacekeeping has been a recurring one since the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council began holding annual meetings in 2007, alternating between Addis Ababa and New York.)

On 25 September the UN and the AU launched a joint task force on peace and security, as part of efforts between the two organisations to enhance conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding on the African continent. The task force will meet twice a year at the senior level with the objective of reviewing immediate and long-term strategic issues and its programme of work will be mapped out in coordination with the UN Office to the AU and the AU’s Permanent Observer Mission to the UN.

Key Issues
A key issue is whether the Council is ready to move forward with decisions regarding more predictable resources for AU peacekeeping efforts.

A second issue may be whether to determine more clearly the role of the new UN Office to the AU and its relationship with the Council and Council expectations.

A related issue may be whether to articulate a clear Council position on the UN’s and the AU’s comparative advantages in addressing peacekeeping and contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Council Dynamics
Most Council members welcomed the efforts being made by the UN and AU secretariats in enhancing the state of cooperation with the AU in the area of peacekeeping operations during informal consultations on the issue in May. However, real differences remain regarding the issue of UN financial support for AU regional peacekeeping missions authorised by the UN. African countries on the Council have argued that UN financial support should be provided for AU missions, citing the primary responsibility of the UN for ensuring global peace and security and the consequent need to collaborate in a substantial way with regional peacekeeping.

The P5 and Japan have consistently expressed reservations about any generic or thematic decision related to using funds from the assessed contributions of the UN peacekeeping budget to support peacekeeping operations by regional organisations. They prefer to address this issue on a case-by-case basis such as in Darfur and Somalia. (In January 2009 the Council requested the Secretary-General to establish a trust fund to provide financial support to AMISOM, which is dependent on donor funding.)

The African Council members tried unsuccessfully to get an explicit commitment from the Council in its 18 March 2009 presidential statement to explore the use of assessed UN contributions for supporting AU peacekeeping endeavours, to be determined on a case-by-case basis. The issue is important to Uganda given the pivotal role it plays in AMISOM as a major troop-contributing country. It emphasises the need to press further the need for more predictable and sustainable funding for such missions.

Some other Council members are sympathetic because of circumstances which have driven much of the AU peacekeeping activities of the AU’s peacekeeping activities—operations which should ideally have been under the UN. But they are also cognisant of the fact that there is no established precedent for the UN giving financial support on a regular basis from its assessed contributions to support peacekeeping operations that are led by regional organisations. Many Council members are also conscious in that regard of the prerogative of the General Assembly on financial issues. This nuanced appreciation of the resourcing of AU peacekeeping missions has led to some elected members advocating an incremental approach to resolving the issue of finding predictable and sustainable sources of funding for UN mandated AU peacekeeping missions, which may suggest that while some movement may be possible in October a major breakthrough is unlikely.

UN Documents

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1863 (16 January 2009) requested the Secretary-General to establish a trust fund to provide financial support to AMISOM.
- S/RES/1809 (16 April 2008) welcomed the Secretary-General’s proposal to set up an AU-UN panel to consider the modalities of how to support AU peacekeeping operations established under a UN mandate.
- S/RES/1769 (31 July 2007) established UNAMID.
- S/RES/1706 (31 August 2006) was the resolution on the situation in Sudan mandating UN assistance to AMIS.
- S/RES/1631 (17 October 2005) was the first resolution adopted by the Council on regional organisations.
- S/RES/1625 (14 September 2005) was a declaration on the effectiveness of the Council’s role in conflict prevention, calling for the strengthening of cooperation and communication between the UN and regional and subregional organisations in accordance with Chapter VIII (on regional arrangements).
- S/RES/1497 (1 August 2003) recognised the role Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) played in implementing the June 2003 ceasefire in Liberia and cited Chapter VIII.
- S/RES/1464 (4 February 2003) welcomed the actions of ECOWAS in response to the violence in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002 with reference to Chapter VII and Chapter VIII.
- S/RES/1318 (7 September 2000) was the adoption of the Millennium Summit declaration on maintaining peace and security, especially in Africa.
- S/RES/1197 (18 September 1998) was on the need for the UN to provide support to regional and subregional organisations and to strengthen coordination between the UN and those organisations.

**Selected Presidential Statements**

- S/PRST/2009/26 (26 October 2009) welcomed the intention of the UN Secretariat and AU Commission to establish a joint task force on peace and security and requested an update by 26 April 2010 and a progress report by 26 October.
• S/PRST/2009/3 (18 March 2009) welcomed of the AU-UN Panel on modalities for support to AU peacekeeping operations established under a UN mandate and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report by 18 September 2009, on practical ways to provide effective support for the AU when it undertakes such peacekeeping operations.

• S/PRST/2007/42 (6 November 2007) was a presidential statement on the role of regional and subregional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security.

• S/PRST/2007/31 (28 August 2007) requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on the options for further implementation of resolution 1625.

• S/PRST/2007/7 (28 March 2007) was a presidential statement on relations between the UN and regional organisations, particularly the AU.

• S/PRST/2006/55 (19 December 2006) called for the immediate deployment of light and heavy support packages to AMIS and endorsed the phased approach towards a hybrid AU-UN force agreed by the AU Peace and Security Council.

• S/PRST/2006/39 (20 September 2006) welcomed the progress made in realising the goals of resolution 1631 and urged contributions to the capacity building of regional organisations and subregional organisations, particularly of the AU and African subregional organisations.

• S/PRST/2004/44 (19 November 2004) recognised the importance of strengthening cooperation with the AU in order to help build its capacity to deal with collective security challenges.

• S/PRST/2004/27 (20 July 2004) was the statement after the Council’s debate on cooperation between the UN and regional organisations in stabilisation processes.

• S/PRST/1998/35 (30 November 1998) reaffirmed the increasingly important role of regional arrangements in maintaining peace and security.

• S/PRST/1998/28 (16 September 1998) focused on enhancing Africa’s peacekeeping capacity and highlighted the problem of children and armed conflict.

• S/PRST/1997/46 (25 September 1997) noted that addressing the challenges of conflict in Africa required a comprehensive approach and called on the Secretary-General to produce a report to address the issue.

• S/PRST/1994/22 (3 May 1994) said that regional and subregional organisations should be taken into account when setting up new peacekeeping operations.

Selected Reports

- S/2009/470-A/64/359 (18 September 2009) was the Secretary-General’s report on support to AU peacekeeping operations authorised by the UN.

- S/2008/813 (31 December 2008) was the report of the AU-UN Panel on modalities for support to AU peacekeeping operations established under a UN mandate.

- S/2008/186 (7 April 2008) was the Secretary-General’s report on enhancing cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, in particular the AU.

- S/2006/590 (28 July 2006) was the report A regional-global security partnership: challenges and opportunities.


- A/59/565 (2 December 2004) and Corr. 1 (6 December 2004) was the report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.

- S/2000/809 (21 August 2000) was the Brahimi report on peacekeeping.

Selected General Assembly Resolutions

- A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005) was the World Summit Outcome Document.

- A/RES/49/57 (17 February 1995) was the Declaration on Enhancement of Cooperation between the UN and Regional Arrangements or Agencies in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security.

Other

- S/2010/433 (6 August 2010) and S/2010/434 (13 August 2010) was the exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the president of the Council appointing Zachary Mubiri-Muita (Kenya) as the Head of the UN Office to the AU.

- S/2010/392 (20 July 2010) was the letter transmitting the joint communiqué issued at the end of the fourth meeting between the UN Security Council and the AUPSC.

- S/PV.6206 (26 October 2009) was the record of the open debate on the Secretary-General’s report on support to AU peacekeeping operations authorised by the UN.

- S/PV.6092 and resumption 1 (18 March 2009) was the high-level debate on the AU-UN panel report on options for supporting UN mandated AU peacekeeping operations.

- S/PV.5868 and resumption 1 (16 April 2008) was the debate combining the thematic issues of UN cooperation with regional organisations and conflict prevention and resolution, in particular in Africa.

- S/PV.3819 (25 September 1997) was the first ministerial-level debate on the situation in Africa.

Other Relevant Facts

Head of the UN Office to AU

Zachary Mubiri-Muita (Kenya)

Expected Council Action

On 13 October, the Council is expected to hold a debate covering two issues related to peacebuilding:

- the report of the three co-facilitators of the 2010 UN peacebuilding architecture review process; and

- a report from the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict.

The Council might also consider a third report at the same meeting. A report, on women and peacebuilding is expected from the Secretary-General in early October. But at press time the Council had yet to decide whether to take up that issue in the context of the peacebuilding debate or whether to address it during the tenth anniversary debate on Women, Peace and Security planned for 29 October.
The Council is likely to adopt a resolution formalising the outcome of the peacebuilding review, in a parallel action with the General Assembly.

A presidential statement on the wider issue of post-conflict peacebuilding is also possible.

**Background**

On 16 July, the Secretary-General submitted a progress report on post-conflict peacebuilding. It gave a mixed picture of progress. It noted:

* "The project of strengthening civilian capacities" and the establishment of "UN system-wide standards for strategy and planning in mission settings that will, with continued effort, produce more coherent approaches to peacebuilding at the field level"; but

* the UN still fell "short of an effective and predictable response, including in areas fundamental to sustainable peacebuilding like close collaboration with the World Bank, predictable and norms-based delivery in core areas such as rule of law and security sector reform, and supporting national capacity development through significantly improved operational approaches."

(For further background, please see our August 2010 Monthly Forecast, our 17 July 2009 Update Report on Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and our 9 May 2008 Update Report on Building Sustainable Peace: Post-Conflict Stabilisation.)

On women in peacebuilding, the expected report responds to a request by the Council on 5 October 2009 in resolution 1889. It asked the Secretary-General for ideas on addressing women’s participation and inclusion in peacebuilding and planning in the aftermath of conflict, taking into consideration the views of the PBC. The Peacebuilding Support Office subsequently undertook extensive consultations with the UN membership, peacebuilding practitioners within the UN system in New York and Geneva, and civil society when drafting this report. The final report, due in early October, is expected to contain a seven-point action plan for gender-responsive peacebuilding, including recommendations on minimum funding levels for gender programming in post-conflict recovery and possibly a recommendation that quota systems for women’s participation in post-conflict legislatures be encouraged.

**Key Issues**

One key issue for the Council is the implications in terms of working methods of the recommendations of the co-facilitators on the peacebuilding architecture review.

Another closely related issue will be whether to adopt the recommendations of the peacebuilding review with specific implementation expectations or instead agree to a more general formula of in principle approval.

A third issue is how to bring value out of the Secretary-General’s report on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, bearing in mind that many of the issues have been overtaken by the debate held in the Council on 23 September and the lessons in the statement (S/PRST/2010/18).

**Options**

Options regarding the issue of the peacebuilding architecture review include:

* adopting a general resolution in parallel with the General Assembly to acknowledge the outcome of the peacebuilding review;

* establishing by way of separate decision a follow up process or mechanism to implement the recommendations of the peacebuilding review, as it relates specifically to the Council.

An option for the issue of post-conflict peacebuilding will be for the Council to adopt a statement simply noting the key observations of the Secretary-General’s July report and highlighting the need to enhance effective and predictable responses. (At press time, discussions were in their nascent stages regarding a possible Council presidential statement.)

If the Council considers the Secretary-General’s report on women and peacebuilding during its peacebuilding debate, one option is to endorse the seven-point action plan for gender-responsive peacebuilding in the one thematic decision on women, peace and security.

**Council Dynamics**

It seems that Council members are comfortable with a general principle approval of the PBC review by way of parallel resolutions in the Council and the General Assembly. At press time, there was reportedly controversy about the exact operative wording. The P5 seem to prefer more ambiguous language and to defer any commitment on exactly what needs to be done respectively by the Council and General Assembly to implement the recommendations of the co-facilitators.

For the Council specifically, the issue is that the recommendations of the co-facilitators really relate to Council working methods (e.g. seeking the advice of the PBC when peacekeeping mandates are being established, reviewed or are approaching a drawdown). P5 members traditionally prefer that the General Assembly not use language on such matters. Russia has argued that this needs to be worked out in detail separately, not in the anticipated resolution. Others, including Uganda (which holds the presidency in October), seem keen to have the Council act more quickly and move the process forward in October.

Preliminary discussions on the question of the most appropriate forum in which to con-
consider the Secretary-General’s report on women and peacebuilding has reportedly seen some Council members, including Austria, France, Mexico, the UK, Turkey and Japan, pushing for the issue to be taken up on 13 October. They argue for including the report in the debate on peacebuilding instead of during the tenth anniversary debate on women, and peace and security later in October to ensure that peacebuilding experts deal with the report, rather than the gender experts, in order that the recommendations of the report are dealt with in a more cross-cutting way. Other members, including Uganda, China and Russia, appear to question the idea, citing the need to consider the matter within the specific thematic context of the tenth anniversary debate on women, and peace and security.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1889 (5 October 2009) was on the issue of women, peace and security and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on women and peacebuilding.
- S/RES/1645-A/RES/60/180 (20 December 2005) created the PBC and the Peacebuilding Fund.
- S/RES/1327 (13 November 2000) and S/RES/1318 (7 September 2000) contained annexes discussing measures to strengthen peacekeeping operations.

Selected Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2010/18 (23 September 2010) was on the maintenance of international peace and security.
- S/PRST/2010/7 (16 April 2010) stressed the need for a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy to prevent the recurrence of conflict.
- S/PRST/2008/16 (20 May 2008) invited the Secretary-General to provide advice on how to support sustainable peace in post-conflict situations.
- S/PRST/2007/3 (21 February 2007) requested the PBC to include consideration of security sector reform programmes in integrated peacebuilding strategies.
- S/PRST/2007/1 (8 January 2007) underlined the importance of close interaction between the Council and the PBC.

- S/PRST/2006/42 (8 November 2006) welcomed the role the PBC can play in mainstreaming gender perspectives into the peace consolidation process.
- S/PRST/2006/39 (20 September 2006) welcomed the intent of regional organisations to be closely associated with the work of the PBC and expressed the Council’s commitment to facilitate their participation in the PBC’s country-specific activities.
- S/PRST/2006/38 (9 August 2006) was on peace consolidation in West Africa, underscoring the importance and role of the PBC in assisting countries emerging from conflict to achieve sustainable peace and security.
- S/PRST/2001/31 (31 October 2001) emphasised the importance of gender perspectives in policies and programmes addressing armed conflict, especially peacekeeping operations.
- S/PRST/2001/5 (20 February 2001) reiterated the value of including peacebuilding elements in mandates of peacekeeping operations.
- S/PRST/2000/10 (23 March 2000) was on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.

Selected General Assembly Resolutions

- A/RES/60/287 (21 September 2006) was on the Peacebuilding Fund.
- A/RES/60/1 (16 September 2005) was the 2005 World Summit Outcome.

Selected Letters


Expected Action

The General Assembly is expected to hold elections on 12 October for five members of the Security Council. The five new members will take up their seats on 1 January and will serve on the Security Council for the period 2011-2012.
Colombia is the only candidate for the GRULAC seat: India received endorsement from the South African seat was endorsed by the AU in Colombia for the GRULAC seat. (at press time it has not yet

canvass the uncontested seats are South Africa for the African seat: India for the Asian seat and Colombia for the GRULAC seat: South Africa was endorsed by the AU in February 2010 as the candidate for the African seat. (South Africa has had one term on the Council, in 2007-2008, and was a founding member of the UN); India received endorsement from the Asian Group in February 2010 (India is one of the founding members of the UN and has served six terms on the Council, most recently in 1991-1992); and Colombia is the only candidate for the GRULAC seat (at press time it has not yet received regional endorsement from the group). Colombia is one of the founding members of the UN and has had six terms on the Council, most recently in 2001-2002.

By contrast the two WEOG seats are contested by three candidates:
- Canada (one of the founding members of the UN, which has served on the Council every decade since, most recently in 1999-2000);
- Germany, which served on the Council most recently in 2003-2004 (both the Federal Republic of Germany [or West Germany] and the German Democratic Republic [or East Germany] were admitted to the UN on 18 September 1973 and united to form one sovereign state effective 3 October 1990; if East Germany’s one term on the Council in 1980-1981 is included, Germany has served five terms on the Council); and
- Portugal, which has served two terms on the Council, in 1979-1980 and 1997-1998 (Portugal was admitted to the UN on 14 December 1955).

It appears that only the WEOG seats will be contested, with three candidates for two seats: Canada, Germany and Portugal.

The uncontested seats are South Africa for the African seat, India for the Asian seat and Colombia for the GRULAC seat:

- South Africa was endorsed by the AU in February 2010 as the candidate for the African seat. (South Africa has had one term on the Council, in 2007-2008, and was a founding member of the UN);
- India received endorsement from the Asian Group in February 2010 (India is one of the founding members of the UN and has served six terms on the Council, most recently in 1991-1992); and
- Colombia is the only candidate for the GRULAC seat (at press time it has not yet received regional endorsement from the group). Colombia is one of the founding members of the UN and has had six terms on the Council, most recently in 2001-2002.

The composition of the Council in 2011 is expected to be highly interesting. Brazil, India, Nigeria and South Africa will be on the Council concurrently. All four are major emerging countries and key stakeholders in both regional and global institutions. In addition, if Canada and Germany were to join them this would put ten members of the G20 in the Council concurrently.

The table below indicates the number of available seats by region, the declared candidates and their previous experience on the Council.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Available Seats in the 2010 Election</th>
<th>States Running</th>
<th>Years Served Previously on the Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>One term of two years (2007-2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Two terms comprising four years (1979-1980, 1997-1998)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, five UN members who have asserted bids for permanent Council membership could be on the Council in 2011.

2011 could see the strongest group of global stakeholders ever assembled on the Council. This could create a unique positive dynamic. But it is difficult to predict whether it will foster a more proactive and effective Security Council.

**Correction**

Special Research Report No. 3 on Security Council Elections 2010 published on 17 September contained an error. Guatemala is currently expected to be the sole GRULAC candidate for the 2012-2013 term, rather than Ecuador as mistakenly stated.

**Afghanistan**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council will consider extending the authorisation for the international force in Afghanistan ahead of its expiry on 13 October. Informal discussions on a resolution renewing ISAF’s mandate followed by a formal meeting to adopt the resolution are expected.

At press time no wider discussion was expected due to the fact that the Council had met on 29 September to discuss developments in Afghanistan.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 18 September parliamentary elections were held in Afghanistan. Over 4 million people turned out to vote. More than 5,000 polling stations were open for voting. About 1,000 had to remain shut for security reasons.

On 19 September the Secretary-General praised the Afghan voters for showing courage and determination in exercising their right to vote. He also acknowledged the leadership of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) and called on all parties to use the appropriate legal channels to file complaints.

The Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Afghanistan, Staffan de Mistura, on 21 September commended Afghanistan’s electoral authorities on the conduct of the parliamentary polls and said that there had been significant improvements in the organisation of the elections. He stressed that the post-election period was also crucial and that time was needed to check for irregulari-
ties and verify votes. At press time provisional results are expected on 8 October.

By the 21 September deadline for submission of complaints the ECC had received over 3,000 formal complaints of fraud and irregularities before and during the election. These included allegations of multiple voting, using fake identities and stealing ballot boxes. On 27 September the IEC ordered a partial recount of votes from seven of the 34 provinces.

The security situation has continued to deteriorate. The death toll for ISAF rose on 21 September to 529, exceeding the 521 deaths in 2009. Incidents involving improvised explosive devices have increased, as have complex suicide attacks.

During the election campaign period, there was an escalation of violence with at least 19 election-related deaths, including four candidates. The Taliban threatened widespread violence on election day and urged people to stay home. There were rocket and bomb attacks on polling day, with at least 22 people killed.

The Netherlands began withdrawing its ISAF contingent in early August. It is the first NATO country to withdraw its entire military contingent. Canada has announced that it will withdraw in 2011. Poland plans to withdraw its troops in 2012.

On 29 September the Council was briefed by de Mistura on developments. He said that events over the year like the London Conference, the peace jirga, the Kabul conference and the recent elections were stepping stones leading towards full Afghan exercise of sovereign authority. He noted that the elections marked an important step towards strengthening democratic institutions but that it was too early to pronounce success. The foreign minister of Afghanistan also participated in the debate.

Key Issues
An issue for the Council is how to tailor the ISAF resolution to reflect the new policy directions agreed upon at the London and Kabul conferences this year, and link this with the revised priorities for the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) adopted in March.

A closely related issue is how the deterioration in security affects the Afghan population’s confidence in the international security forces and the Afghan government’s ability to uphold the rule of law.

A further possible issue is civilian casualties. A recent report from UNAMA on civilian casualties has shown that the number of civilian casualties caused by ISAF dropped by 30 percent in the first half of 2009 compared to the same period last year. However, due to Taliban action overall numbers have increased.

A future issue is whether the goal of having Afghan troops ready to lead in security matters by 2014 is realistic.

Options
One option is a simple resolution renewing the ISAF authorisation similar to resolution 1890 adopted last October.

Another option is a resolution that reflects the changing priorities, particularly the focus on shifting to Afghan-led security.

A further option is to include language on protection of civilians reflecting the recent UNAMA findings.

Language on the outcome of the parliamentary elections is also an option in the resolution if the final results are out by the time the Council meets, or perhaps separately in a subsequent statement.

An option for improving the Council’s monitoring of ISAF developments is to request that the ISAF reports be synchronised with the Secretary-General’s quarterly reports on UNAMA. (The last report received on 19 August covers the period 1 February to 30 April 2010, whereas the latest Secretary-General’s report covers developments from June to September.)

Another option in line with better understanding of the political-military aspects of NATO’s work in Afghanistan is to ask the NATO senior civilian coordinator, Mark Sedwill, to brief the Council.

Council Dynamics
At press time Council members were largely focused on the September UNAMA debate and had not begun to focus on the ISAF’s reauthorisation. However, no major problems were foreseen regarding the substantive issue of renewal.

In the past there has sometimes been debate over the issue of civilian casualties. Last year, two elected members, no longer on the Council, pushed for more language on protection of civilians to be included in this resolution. This was met with resistance from some members who felt that they could not accept any language that put ISAF and the Taliban on the same level.

Given the recent reports on the number of casualties this year, there may be some members who may wish to open up discussion about stronger language on the need to protect civilians.

A key issue this year appears to be counter-narcotics. Some members are keen for stronger language on countering illicit production and trafficking of drugs in the ISAF resolution.

Most members seem open to including language relating to the London and Kabul conferences but have yet to formulate appropriate language and positions.

Turkey is the lead country on Afghanistan till the end of 2010.

Human Rights-Related Developments
On 21 May the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted its concluding observations on Afghanistan’s implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Committee acknowledged that Afghanistan is a country in transition and that the destruction of institutions and infrastructure seriously impedes the implementation of the rights enshrined in the covenant. Nonetheless, the Committee expressed concern that the covenant had not been fully incorporated into domestic law. It was also concerned that Afghanistan had not yet developed effective measures to tackle widespread corruption and impunity. The committee recommended that the government adopt a legal framework to combat corruption and impunity in conformity with international standards, educate lawmakers, civil servants and law enforcement officers on the economic and social costs of corruption and take measures to prosecute cases of alleged corruption.

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UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1890 (8 October 2009) extended the ISAF mandate until 13 October 2010.
- S/RES/1401 (28 March 2002) created UNAMA.

Selected Secretary-General’s Report

- S/2010/463 (14 September 2010)

Other

- S/PV.6394 (29 September 2010) was the Council September debate on Afghanistan.
- SC/9992 (23 July 2010) was the Council press statement on the Kabul Conference.
- S/2010/353 (21 June 2010) was the quarterly ISAF report from 1 February 2010 to 30 April 2010.

Other Relevant Facts

Staffan de Mistura (Sweden)

UNAMA: Size, Composition and Duration

- **Strength (as of 31 May 2010):** 338 international civilians, 1,380 local civilians, 16 military observers, 48 UN volunteers
- **Duration:** 28 March 2002 to present; mandate expires on 23 March 2011.

ISAF Military Commander

General David Petraeus (US)

Senior Civilian Representative

Ambassador Mark Sedwill (GBR)

ISAF: Size, Composition and Duration

- **Total strength (as of 30 September 2010):** about 119,819 troops
- **Contributors of military personnel:** 47 NATO and non-NATO countries
- **Current top contributors:** US, UK, Germany, France, Italy and Canada
- **Duration:** 20 December 2001 to present; mandate expires on 13 October 2010.

Operation Enduring Freedom: Size, Composition and Duration

- **Current strength:** 13,500 (this is an estimate as the troop numbers shift continually)
- **Lead contributor:** US
- **Duration:** 7 October 2001 to present

Useful Additional Sources


Kabul Conference Communiqué, 20 July 2010.


Chad/CAR

Expected Council Action

In October the Council is expecting the Secretary-General’s report on MINURCAT ahead of the second phase of drawing down forces in Chad and CAR. Special Representative and Head of MINURCAT Youssef Mahmoud is expected to brief the Council.

MINURCAT’s mandate expires on 31 December 2010.

Key Recent Developments

The UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) is preparing to withdraw further troops. (An initial withdrawal of over 1,200 troops has been completed.)

Since 27 May, when the Chadian government assumed responsibility for security and the protection of civilians, including refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), there have been no reports of the deliberate targeting of civilians or new trends of internal displacement. However, the situation is fragile and banditry continues to threaten security in eastern Chad.

Chad’s national electoral commission announced on 25 September that it would delay parliamentary and local elections due to difficulties with preparations. Legislative elections, previously set for late November, will be held on 20 February 2011 and local elections on 27 March 2011. First-round presidential elections, originally set for April, are now slated for 8 May 2011.

In the Central African Republic (CAR), the security situation in the northeast remains precarious. The government continues to struggle to establish an effective presence due to a lack of logistical and other resources. Inter-ethnic conflict and movement of armed groups continues to pose security threats.

The presence of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) also continues to compromise security in CAR. On 6 and 7 September the LRA twice attacked the town of Ouandda Djalle in northern CAR, leaving 16 dead, including two civilians. On 2 September attacks by the LRA were reported in Davaq, a remote area of South Darfur. The attackers were said to have come from across the nearby CAR border. According to a recent Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, the LRA also continues abduction campaigns in southeastern CAR along the Congolese border. Tens of thousands have fled the area since large-scale abductions began in July 2009. HRW also reported that in the past few months the government of CAR has deployed troops to protect civilians in the area, but that the number is “too few to provide adequate protection.”

CAR has set 23 January 2011 as the date for parliamentary and first round presidential elections (initially scheduled for October). Second round elections are proposed for 20 March 2011. Government and opposition parties and former rebels signed an agreement on 11 August establishing the election timetable. An electoral census is currently underway.

On 20 September the Peacebuilding Commission’s (PBC) country-specific configuration for CAR and the World Bank organised a high-level event to draw international attention to the peacebuilding and development challenges in CAR.

In a 7 September letter to the Council, the Chadian government outlined its plan for sustaining its forces, the Détachement intégré de sécurité (DIS), after the departure of MINURCAT. The plan, which outlines security strategies, as well as financial and logistical plans, was requested in resolution 1923.

On 10 August Special Representative to the Secretary-General and Head of MINURCAT Youssef Mahmoud gave his first briefing to the Council on the situation in Chad and CAR since the adoption of resolution 1923, which authorised MINURCAT’s drawdown. Closed consultations followed the briefing.
On Chad, Mahmoud reported on the Government’s assumption of responsibility for security and protection of civilians and humanitarian workers and noted that “the Government had spared no effort to rise to the challenge”. He also reported that there have been encouraging reports of returns of some IDPs.

Concerning CAR, the Secretary-General’s report had outlined two options for mitigating the impact of MINURCAT’s withdrawal. The first was to establish a UN peacekeeping force that would remain in the area until the CAR government develops sufficient capacity to ensure security. The second option was to provide international assistance to train and equip the Central African Armed Forces and strengthen capacity for ensuring security and rule of law in the northeast in conjunction with longer-term security sector reform and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration efforts. During a 22 July meeting with the Secretary-General, CAR President François Bozizé expressed his preference for a capacity building option over the establishment of a peacekeeping mission.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is the impact of the ongoing reduction of the military component of MINURCAT on the two countries.

A related issue for the Council is the sustainability of the DIS efforts to assume protection responsibility in the time remaining before withdrawal. (The reports of the joint Chad/UN high-level working group on the security situation and Chad’s performance vis-à-vis the benchmarks on the voluntary return and resettlement of IDPs, the demilitarisation of refugee and IDP camps and the improvement in the capacity of authorities in eastern Chad outlined by resolution 1861 will be particularly helpful in assessing the mission’s progress in this regard.)

A further issue is the Council’s response to the options on the table for filling the security vacuum in CAR that will result from MINURCAT’s departure from the northeastern region.

A related issue is whether there are realistic possibilities for bilateral and multilateral organisations to meet the needs under the capacity building option.

Options
At this stage in MINURCAT’s drawdown, one option is for the Council to take no formal action in October. The Council could simply receive the report and briefing and initiate informal discussions on the progress being made and the possible security arrangements for future.

Another option would be for the Council to issue a statement concerning the situation in Chad and CAR. Elements of the statement could include:

■ welcoming Chad’s efforts in providing security to civilians and humanitarian workers;
■ expressing concern about the ongoing security situation in northeastern CAR and noting the Secretary-General’s options for addressing the security situation following MINURCAT’s departure; and
■ calling on the PBC to engage urgently with regional, bilateral and multilateral partners to determine realistic capacity to provide assistance in post-drawdown security arrangements and provide advice to the Council on the matter.

Council Dynamics
There are no longer any pronounced divisions among Council members on MINURCAT, but there does appear to be a strong interest in conducting MINURCAT’s withdrawal in a manner conducive to establishing long-term stability in both countries. Council members are particularly interested in how the Government of Chad will perform in its protection of civilians responsibilities. And members are concerned that MINURCAT’s departure will leave a security void in northeastern CAR.

France is the lead country on this issue.

UN Documents
Selected Security Council resolutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/1923</td>
<td>25 May 2010</td>
<td>renewed MINURCAT’s mandate until 31 December 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/1922</td>
<td>12 May 2010</td>
<td>rolled over MINURCAT’s mandate to 26 May 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/1913</td>
<td>12 March 2010</td>
<td>rolled over MINURCAT’s mandate to 15 May 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/1861</td>
<td>14 January 2009</td>
<td>renewed MINURCAT’s mandate until 31 December 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Useful Additional Sources

Côte d’Ivoire

Expected Council Action

In October the Council will be waiting for the Secretary-General’s report on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire and the peacekeeping operation there, UNOCI. The presidential elections are currently scheduled to be held in Côte d’Ivoire on 31 October and developments in this context could also influence Council action.

The Council is also expected to renew the sanctions regime (on arms and diamonds, along with a targeted asset freeze and travel ban on certain individuals) and the mandate of the Group of Experts monitoring the effectiveness of the sanctions regime. Both expire on 31 October.

The mandate of UNOCI expires on 31 December.

Key Recent Developments

On 30 June, following a one-month technical rollover, the Council extended and modified the mandate of the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) until 31 December. The Council:

- requested the Secretary-General to inform it of the publication of the final voter list and to provide a mid-term report no later than 22 October on the situation on the ground;
- expressed its intention to consider raising, for a limited time before and after the Ivorian presidential elections, the level of authorised UNOCI military and police forces by up to 500 additional personnel;
- expressed its concern at the continuing delays in the electoral process and the absence of an electoral timeframe and urged the relevant Ivorian stakeholders to ensure the publication of the final voters list without further delay;
- reiterated that the Secretary-General’s Special Representative would certify that all stages of the electoral process provided all the necessary guarantees for credible presidential and legislative elections; and
- stressed that the Council would base its assessment of the electoral process on the certification to be prepared by the Special Representative under the five-criteria framework referred to in the Secretary-General’s April 2008 report on UNOCI and after inclusive contacts with all stakeholders in Côte d’Ivoire.

The situation in Côte d’Ivoire remains tense, though progress has been made during the last several months towards holding the presidential election, (postponed seven times over the past five years).

On 15 July the country’s Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) published a provisional voter list, replacing all previous versions. The list had been expanded to include 490,000 voters who had been under age during the 2000 elections.

On 4 August the IEC proposed 31 October as the date for holding presidential elections. On 5 August the Ivorian government confirmed that date. (The presidential elections are to be followed by legislative elections 45 days after the announcement of the results of the presidential elections.)

On 6 September, Prime Minister Guillaume Soro—in a joint appearance with President Laurent Gbagbo and key electoral rivals, former prime minister Alassane Ouattara (leader of the Rally of the Republicans or RDR) and Henrie Konan Bédié (leader of the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire-African Democratic Rally or PDCI-RDA)—announced that all the presidential aspirants had reached agreement on the final voter list and the “holding of presidential elections as planned.” On 9 September President Gbagbo issued a decree validating the list.

On 17 September 2010 the Council, through an exchange of letters with the Secretary-General, took note of the Secretary-General’s recommendation (S/2010/485) on raising the level of authorised UNOCI military and police personnel to assist in addressing security concerns relating to the holding of the Ivorian elections.

On 21 September the Permanent Consultative Framework (Cadre permanent de concertation, or CPC) of the Ouagadougou Agreement endorsed the final voter list. (The CPC was established in 2007 following the Ouagadougou Agreement and includes Ivorian President Gbagbo, former rebel Forces nouvelles leader Prime Minister Soro and the leaders of the main opposition parties, as well as President Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso, who is the facilitator of the Agreement). The head of UNOCI, Choi Young-jin, verified the list and on 24 September certified it to be valid. The Secretary-General, in a statement that same day congratulated the Ivorian leaders and the facilitator on this achievement and called on the Ivorian actors to build on this consensus in order to maintain a peaceful environment before, during and after the elections.

On 28 September Choi briefed the Council on the Ivorian electoral process. In a subsequent statement to the press that day, the Council indicated that any attempt to undo the achievements of the electoral process, or add preconditions to holding the elections that could delay them, would be inconsistent with the commitments taken by the parties. It further stressed the need for the parties to ensure calm prior to, during and after the vote and agreed to deploy up to 500 additional uniformed personnel to UNOCI for a limited period of no more than six months, to assist with related security arrangements. On 29 September the Council adopted a resolution formally authorising the deployment of 500 additional troops to UNOCI to help with security during the election period.

An AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) team visited Côte d’Ivoire from 27 September to 1 October, where it met with members of the Ivorian government, civil society and representative of the international community in the country. The visit was in fulfilment of an AUPSC decision to send a delegation to Côte d’Ivoire and the neighbouring region to assess the situation in that country and identify measures to further contribute to a way out of the crisis.

Human Rights-Related Developments

A UNOCI report issued on 26 August disclosed serious human rights violations that were committed during the demonstrations held in Côte d’Ivoire in February following the dissolution of the government and the national electoral authority. (The demonstrations resulted in 13 deaths.) Among the violations, UNOCI recorded extrajudicial executions, physical violence, cruel and degrading treatment of people arrested, and illegal arrests and detentions committed by agents of the Defence and Security Forces of Côte d’Ivoire. The report invites the UN to examine requests for a waiver of the arms embargo on Côte d’Ivoire to help the country import anti-riot materials, noting that the lack of these materials had led the law enforcement forces to resort to firearms.
Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is whether the positive momentum generated by the recent progress in the Ivorian electoral process can be maintained and the presidential elections can be held successfully on 31 October.

A related issue is whether the Council can do any more at this stage to facilitate the electoral process.

Other issues involve disarmament and the reunification of the country (including establishing a truly centralised national treasury), in line with the fourth supplementary-agreement to the Ouagadougou Agreement. (President Gbagbo’s party had earlier in the year insisted that those preconditions be met before elections are held and, although tensions in that regard have subsided, they remain a latent source of trouble for the electoral process.)

A further issue is the sanctions regime on Côte d’Ivoire and the renewal of the mandate of the Group of Experts. A closely related issue is whether the Council should use the September sanctions renewal resolution to act on the Secretary-General’s recommendation in May that it should impose targeted sanctions against media institutions found to be stoking political tensions and inciting violence.

Underlying Problems
The continued inability of Côte d’Ivoire to return to legitimate governance through presidential elections has prolonged instability. The possibility of relapse into conflict is a particular risk given the previous history of violence based on ethnic lines.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- deciding on a simple renewal of the sanctions regime, as well as the mandate of the Group of Experts without modifications;
- modifying the sanctions regime and adding new names to induce compliance with the peace process; and
- signalling an intention to renew the scope of application of the sanctions to recognise progress already made (this is perhaps more likely after a successful election).

Council Dynamics
Council members are cautiously optimistic about the recent progress made in the electoral process. There is a consensus about UNOCI’s ongoing role in assisting in consolidating peace in the country.

There is wide agreement on the need to monitor the electoral situation closely and proactively. No modifications in UNOCI’s mandate are anticipated, as the recent resolution is seen by members to be adequate.

Several Council members are concerned that the calendar of activities leading to the presidential election on 31 October may not be viable in view of the formidable logistical challenges that must be addressed to meet the deadline, as well as potential distractions that could be caused by political and security action (e.g. disarmament and reunification) by key parties in the country.

Council members seem ready to renew the mandate of the Group of Experts and to maintain the current sanctions regime. Many seem to prefer a wait-and-see approach that would defer any substantial changes until after the elections. Most are mindful that previous resolutions (including the June resolution 1893) made provision for reconsidering the sanctions three months after the holding of elections.

France remains the lead country in the Council on this issue, but the Ivorian government has voiced its preference that another country assumes that role.

UN Documents

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Selected Council Resolutions</th>
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<tr>
<td>S/RES/1942 (29 September 2010) authorised the deployment of 500 additional troops to UNOCI to help with security during the election period.</td>
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<th>Selected Presidential Statements</th>
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endorsed the Ouagadougou Agreement.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2010/245 (20 May 2010)
- S/2008/250 (15 April 2008) contained the five-criteria framework Special Representative for certifying all stages of the Ivorian electoral process

Latest Group of Experts’ Report
- S/2010/179 (9 April 2010)

Selected Letters
- S/2010/493 (24 September 2010) was from the Secretary-General informing the Council about the head of UNOCI’s certification of the Ivorian electoral process.
- S/2010/486 and S/2010/485 (17 September 2010) was the exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Council on raising the level of authorised of UNOCI military and police personnel in relation to the holding of the Ivorian presidential elections
- S/2010/221 (29 April 2010) was from the president of the Security Council to the Secretary-General requesting his report by 21 May.
- S/2010/220 (26 April 2010) was from the Secretary-General to the president of the Security Council proposing a one-month technical rollover of UNOCI’s mandate until 30 June 2010 and notifying the Council that his report would be delayed until 31 May.
- S/2007/144 (13 March 2007) contained the Ouagadougou Agreement.

Other
- SC/10043 (28 September 2010) was the latest statement by the Council on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire.
- PSC/PR/BR (CCXVIII) (5 March 2010) was an AU Peace and Security Council press statement on Côte d’Ivoire.
- S/PV.6284 (17 March 2010) was the verbatim record of the latest briefing to the Council on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire
UN presence in the DRC and authorised the withdrawal of up to 2,000 troops by 30 June 2010. The resolution also allowed for future reconfigurations of MONUSCO based on the situation on the ground.

The wave of rapes in North Kivu’s Walikale territory between 30 July and 2 August triggered various events in September. On 7 September, the Assistant Secretary-General in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Atul Khare, and the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallström, provided a detailed briefing to the Council on the rape of at least 303 people. (Please see our 3 September Update Report for more details.) Khare said the UN’s action in response to the rapes was not adequate. He said MONUSCO would develop better mechanisms of gathering information from communities and conduct more patrols. It would also develop guidance for its peacekeepers to investigate reports of armed group movements in high threat areas and the appropriate response. He recommended targeted sanctions on the leaders of the armed groups responsible for the rapes. He also said the illegal exploitation of resources was driving violence in the region and needed to be combated. (On 8 September, President Joseph Kabila ordered the indefinite suspension of mining in North and South Kivu and Maniema Provinces in eastern DRC.) Wallström pledged to prioritise the establishment of systems for obtaining real-time, actionable information. She also urged the imposition of targeted sanctions. Following the briefing and closed consultations, the Council President delivered remarks to the press in which he reiterated the Council’s strong condemnation of the events. The Council urged the DRC government to immediately launch an inquiry and to arrest and prosecute the perpetrators. It also urged the UN to take all necessary measures to improve its efficiency to help prevent and respond to such attacks and to better coordinate its actions.

On 8 September members of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict agreed on press elements on the mass rapes in the DRC. Members expressed strong condemnation of the events and highlighted the fact that there had been 32 cases of rape against children. This was the first time the Working Group had publicly responded to a crisis through remarks to the press.

On 14 September the DPKO produced a non-paper for Council members containing recommendations on enhancing protection of civilians in the DRC. The paper reportedly provides recommendations for the UN on improving relations and radio communications with communities, enhancing dialogue with state and non-state actors on sexual violence, fully staffing MONUSCO’s sexual violence unit, increasing interpreters and assisting the government to bring the perpetrators to justice. It also recommends the Council reconsider authorising the provision of basic equipment to the Congolese police that MONUSCO is training. After meeting on 16 September the Council issued a presidential statement on 17 September urging the government to swiftly prosecute the perpetrators of the rapes and expressing the Council’s readiness to consider all appropriate actions, including targeted measures against the perpetrators.

During his 7 September briefing to the Council, Khare also reported ten women were raped by elements of the Congolese military (FARDC) on 17 August in Fizi territory, South Kivu. He said many rapes also occurred in Shabunda and Mwenga territories in South Kivu in July and August. At least 214 cases of sexual violence have been recorded in Shabunda and 74 in and around Miki, Mwenga territory. At least 38,000 people have also been displaced since early July in Shabunda as a result of attacks perpetrated by the Rwandan Hutu rebel group the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR).

An estimated 90,000 people were displaced in Beni territory in North Kivu following the commencement on 30 June of a FARDC military operations against the Ugandan rebel group the Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU). The return of residents to their villages reportedly stalled in mid-September following the launch of the second phase of military operations against the ADF-NALU.

On 11 August, Human Rights Watch reported the Ugandan rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) had abducted more than 697 adults and children in the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Bas Uele district of northern DRC over the past 18 months. Nearly one-third of those abducted were children. MONUSCO reported that a dozen people were abducted on 10 August 2010.
near Duru in Haut-Uele district. On 18 September, Uganda’s defence minister and the DRC’s defence and veteran’s minister met to discuss joint operations against the LRA and the ongoing operations against the ADF-NALU.

On 18 August up to sixty unidentified men attacked the MONUSCO operating base in Kirumba, North Kivu, killing three Indian peacekeepers. In a press statement, the Council condemned the attacks and encouraged the government to ensure that the perpetrators of such attacks be swiftly brought to justice.

On 25 July a delegation from the electoral assistance division of the UN Department of Political Affairs visited the DRC to evaluate the role, modalities and scope of possible electoral assistance. The Congolese government has formally requested UN support for general and local elections. The first round of presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled for 27 November 2011. If required, a runoff will be held on 26 February 2012, to coincide with provincial-level elections.

On 21 May the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy, briefed the DRC Sanctions Committee. Coomaraswamy provided information to the committee to support the listings of six individuals. The group of experts also presented their interim report to the committee. On 6 August the Committee adopted guidelines for the conduct of its work.

On 19 May the team leader for the Great Lakes Integrated Operational Team, Kevin Kennedy, briefed Council experts on the outcome of the DPKO-led mission to the DRC from 1 to 10 May to assess MONUC’s conditionality policy (as per resolution 1906). Kennedy reportedly said it was difficult to assess whether the policy had reduced the number of violations committed by the FARDC. He said MONUC was supporting fewer FARDC units as a result of the screening process. Paradoxically this meant MONUC’s ability to influence the FARDC had diminished.

**Key Issues**

A continuing issue for the Council, which is highlighted by events in the DRC, is mismatch between the tools the Council has created (such as peacekeeping operation mandates, special advisors, panel of experts and targeted sanctions) and its capacity for practical oversight to ensure that the tools are in fact utilised to prevent abuses of the kind that recently occurred in the Kivus.

A key issue for the Council is not only improving MONUSCO’s response in civilian protection situations but also the more general implications.

A related issue is improving communications in the field and between the field and UN headquarters.

A further issue is ensuring that the assessments on which the Council will base possible reconfigurations of MONUSCO reflect the true situation on the ground and are not masked by political filtering.

A possible future issue is the impact of the publication of the human rights mapping report.

The November renewal of the mandate of the group of experts could become an issue for the Council, as it seems unclear at this stage whether the DRC government supports their renewal.

**Options**

There is a possibility that the assessment requested by the Council in OP20 of resolution 1925 to guide future possible reconfigurations of MONUSCO will not be available before the next regular report of the Secretary-General. An option for the Council is to request a supplemental briefing as soon as the assessment is ready.

An option for the Council, once this assessment is available, is adopting a presidential statement.

In addition, the Council could follow up on Khare’s recommendations for targeted sanctions and also utilise the information provided by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for children and armed conflict to expand the sanctions list.

**Council Dynamics**

Some countries, including Austria, France, Mexico, the UK and the US, see value in sanctioning leaders responsible for rapes in the DRC. Other members question the effectiveness of such measures.

There is concern among some Council members that the blocking of candidates for sanctions groups of experts is becoming a growing trend. The establishment of the DRC group of experts following the adoption of resolution 1896 was delayed five months, partially as a result of the DRC government, supported by China, objecting to a proposed candidate.

During the May MONUC renewal negotiations all Council members found the demands from the government for a fixed withdrawal timetable for MONUC unacceptable. As to the mandate, China wanted MONUSCO’s top priority to include not only protection of civilians but also stabilisation and peace consolidation. It also wanted to reorder the priorities within the protection of civilians’ subset. Although China eventually supported the order of prioritisation within MONUSCO’s mandate, it was unhappy that protection of civilians was designated as the “highest” priority (in OP11 of resolution 1925). The US (with the support of the UK, Austria and Mexico) favoured the retention of “highest,” but language on MONUSCO’s support for the regional military organisations against the LRA was used in a compromise. Uganda and the US both strongly advocated and were successful in gaining inclusion of a MONUSCO role in supporting the Ugandan military in fighting the LRA.
Some members, including China, Brazil, and the African members of the Council, wanted MONUSCO to be mandated to support peacebuilding activities. Others argued this was the domain of the UN Country Team.

The lead country is France.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1925 (28 May 2010) extended the mandate of MONUC until 30 June 2010 and decided that from 1 July 2010, MONUC shall bear the title of MONUSCO and shall be deployed until 30 June 2011.

**Latest Presidential Statement**

- S/PRST/2010/17 (17 September 2010) urged the DRC government to prosecute the perpetrators of the mass rapes that occurred in eastern DRC in late July and August.

**Latest Secretary-General's Report**

- S/2010/164 (30 March 2010)

**Selected Security Council Press Statements**

- SC/10016 (26 August 2010) was a press statement expressing the Council's outrage at the mass rape in eastern DRC.
- SC/10010 (18 August 2010) was a press statement condemning the attacks on peacekeepers in Kirumba.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission**

Roger Meece (US)

**MONUSCO Force Commander**

Lt.-Gen. Chander Prakash (India)

**Size, Composition and Cost of Mission**

- **Strength as of 31 July 2010:** 17,745 troops, 716 military observers, 1,224 police, 982 international civilian personnel, 2,787 local civilian staff and 589 UN volunteers
- **Approved budget** (1 July 2010-30 June 2011): $1,369 million

**Duration**

30 November 1999 to present; mandate expires on 30 June 2011

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**Haiti**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the peacekeeping mission in Haiti for another 12 months. The mandate expires on 15 October.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 13 September Edmond Mulet, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), briefed the Council on the latest developments. Mulet said much progress has been made since the January earthquake in addressing the immediate humanitarian needs of the population. MINUSTAH has shifted its focus to three main areas: ensuring a secure and stable environment; natural-disaster response; and supporting the authorities in preparation for the anticipated presidential and legislative elections of 28 November.

The Secretary-General’s report states that 1,723 additional military personnel out of the 2,000 additional troops authorised by the Council have been deployed as of 17 August. Likewise, as of 15 August, 3,019 police personnel out of the 4,391 authorised by the Council have been deployed. According to the report, the surge of personnel has permitted the building of the capacity of the Haitian National Police and expansion of police and military presence to help ensure the physical security of an estimated 1.3 million displaced persons.

The report also notes MINUSTAH’s capacity-building efforts in the form of logistical support and technical assistance given to several government ministries.

Haiti is assessed as calm but fragile, with a potential for social unrest and instability, especially during the elections period. MINUSTAH has been conducting consultations with a wide range of local actors in order to build trust in the political process and address concerns raised by some political opposition and civil society groups about the impartiality of the Provisional Electoral Council, the body charged with holding the elections.

The report recommends maintaining the current troop and police levels until after the November elections. Upon the establishment of a new government, a fresh assessment of the security situation in the country may allow a draw-down plan for the mission to be developed.

During the 13 September debate, Council members and members of the Group of Friends (composed of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, France, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and the US) expressed their appreciation for the achievements of MINUSTAH and their support for the renewal of its mandate. Haitian Ambassador Leo Méroès stressed the interrelations between the legitimacy of the November elections and the elected government’s ability to carry out effective reconstruction efforts. He also called on the international community to release the funds pledged to Haiti at the Donors Conference on 31 March.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

In his report on MINUSTAH published on 1 September, the Secretary-General noted that “Haiti is now entering a period of change which will be critical to its future stability. The most immediate challenge, besides reconstruction, is the organization of presidential and legislative elections.” Earlier, on 26 August, Haiti’s president and the secretary general of the Organization of American States (OAS) met in Port-au-Prince to review the progress of an OAS project to establish a system to update the electoral census for the November elections. The immediate goal of the project is to improve the digital civil-registry system to overcome the loss of citizens’ identity cards in the earthquake. The OAS has deployed mobile units to help with voter registration as the first stage of this project.

**Key Issue**

A key issue for the Council in renewing the MINUSTAH mandate is whether the level of military and police personnel, as recently increased by resolutions 1908 and 1927, remains appropriate in light of the anticipated elections and ongoing security needs.

**Underlying Problems**

Contributing to the fragile environment in Haiti are the political uncertainty related to the forthcoming elections and the continuing large number of displaced people living in 1,300 camps, where they are exposed to physical insecurity and, increasingly, forced eviction.

Another underlying problem is the slow donor assistance disbursement rates. The various sources of funding need improved coordination, and the Interim Haiti Recovery
Commission (co-chaired by Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive and UN Special Representative Bill Clinton) has yet to demonstrate that it is on top of the issue.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- renewing the mandate of MINUSTAH as it currently stands, as recommended by the Secretary-General;
- renewing the mandate of MINUSTAH with a provision for reassessing the mission following the elections; or
- altering the composition or mandate of MINUSTAH in a more substantive way (a less likely option at this time).

Council and Wider Dynamics
There seems to be widespread support among Council members for maintaining the current mandate, as recommended by the Secretary-General.

Some Council members would like to anticipate a comprehensive reassessment of the security situation after the elections. Other members, in particular members of the Group of Friends, remain cautious about any timetable or plan for reducing MINUSTAH’s overall composition at this stage.

Some permanent members continue to emphasise that MINUSTAH should focus just on the maintenance of a secure environment and avoid involvement in reconstruction efforts. They envisage the peacekeeping operation shifting to a mainly civilian effort as soon as possible.

As in the past, the Group of Friends continues to play a key role in discussions regarding Haiti. A draft circulated by the Group will likely form the basis for negotiations in the Council regarding the renewal of the mandate.

UN Documents

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<th>Selected Security Council Resolutions</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1927 (4 June 2010) expressed concern over new challenges and threats resulting from the 12 January earthquake in Haiti, authorised the deployment of 680 additional officers for the police component of MINUSTAH as a temporary surge with a particular focus on building the capacity of the Haitian National Police and encouraged the mission, within available means, to provide temporary logistical and technical support to the Government of Haiti that will be phased out as Haiti’s national capacity grows.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1908 (19 January 2010) bolstered the troop and police personnel for MINUSTAH by 1,500 additional police and 2,000 additional military personnel.</td>
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<td>• S/RES/1892 (13 October 2009) renewed the mandate of MINUSTAH until 15 October 2010.</td>
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Latest Secretary-General’s Report

- S/2010/446 (1 September 2010)

Selected Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2010/7 (16 April 2010) was adopted during an open debate on peacebuilding.
- S/PRST/2010/2 (12 February 2010) was on UN peacekeeping operations’ transition and exit strategies.
- S/PRST/2009/24 (6 August 2009) was on integration of peacebuilding in peacekeeping missions.
- S/PRST/2009/23 (22 July 2009) was on post-conflict peacebuilding.

Selected Letter

- S/2010/27 (18 January 2010) was from Mexico to the Council arguing for a realignment of MINUSTAH’s mandate.

Other

- E/2010/102 (14 July 2010) was an ECOSOC report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MINUSTAH
Edmond Mulet (Guatemala)

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Kevin Kennedy (US)

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Ad Interim) and UN Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator (Ad Interim)
Nigel Fisher (Canada)
**Lebanon**

**Expected Council Action**
Council members are expecting a briefing from Special Envoy Terje Rød-Larsen on developments in implementation of resolution 1559. This resolution, adopted in 2004, urged the disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and the extension of government control over all Lebanese territory.

Discussion is likely to focus on the ongoing disarmament challenge and related border security issues, including developments in bilateral relations between Lebanon and Syria. At press time, it seemed unlikely that the Council would take any formal action.

Council members will also have in mind developments relating to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

**Key Recent Developments**

US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton met with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mualem on 27 September and Lebanese President Michel Sleiman on 24 September in New York on the sidelines of the General Assembly. Both meetings reportedly focused on a comprehensive approach to the Middle East. Previously, US Special Envoy George Mitchell met with Sleiman in Beirut on 17 September following talks with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. Mitchell was reportedly holding preliminary consultations on a comprehensive regional peace, covering the Lebanese and Syrian tracks.

On 23 September Lebanese President Sleiman addressed the Security Council during its high-level meeting saying the Council should take greater responsibility for Middle East issues—in particular, holding Israel accountable for its actions.

Also on 23 September, UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams commended Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s 21 September cabinet statement that all political parties should resort to dialogue and protect state institutions. The cabinet meeting was called by Hariri to cool tensions related to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and recent armed clashes. (Saad Hariri is the son of slain former premier Rafiq Hariri.)

Regarding the Tribunal, tensions were heightened by accusations from the former head of Lebanese security, Jamil al-Sayyed, that he had been detained on unfounded allegations in relation to the 2005 Hariri assassination. Also at issue was the 2011 budget, which includes Lebanon’s contribution to the Tribunal.

Sayyed was one of the four generals held for four years in connection with the Hariri assassination and released in April 2009. Subsequently, Sayyed requested access to the evidence leading to his detention. Whether Sayyed will be allowed access to his criminal file held by the Tribunal will be determined after 1 October, the deadline set by the Tribunal to receive further information on whether granting such access would compromise the ongoing investigation.

In a 16 September meeting of a parliamentary budget committee Hezbollah members blocked progress on Lebanon’s contribution toward the Tribunal. (Lebanon is obligated to provide 49 percent of the Tribunal’s expenses, and with indictments expected by year’s end, the 2011 budget has increased.)

In a 6 September interview with the Saudi-owned newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat Hariri said, “We made mistakes and accused Syria of assassinating the martyred premier. This was a political accusation.” He also said that “false witnesses” misled the investigation into his father’s assassination, harming Lebanese-Syrian relations. Observers note, however, that Hariri remains supportive of the Tribunal’s independence.

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has made several speeches regarding the Tribunal in recent months. On 24 August Nasrallah said that it was Lebanon’s right to know the identity of “false witnesses.” On 9 August he claimed Israel was implicated in the Hariri assassination. Subsequently the Tribunal requested that any evidence of Israeli involvement be provided to it. On 22 July Nasrallah said he expected that the Tribunal would indicted some Hezbollah members in relation to the assassination. He denied any involvement by Hezbollah and charged that the Tribunal had been politicised.

On 17 September, Russia confirmed the sale of cruise missiles to Syria. Israel has alleged that Syria had smuggled scud missiles to Hezbollah, which Lebanese and Syrian officials denied. In early May, UNIFIL said that it had not seen any scud missiles in its area of operations.

**Key Issues**

A key issue is that Hezbollah has rearmed since the end of the 2006 war with Israel. The numerous reports of the presence of weapons outside governmental control will be on Council members’ minds. These incidents highlight a lack of progress on meeting resolution 1559’s requirements on disarmament and raise questions regarding arms smuggling.

Another issue is whether the Council might revisit resolution 1559. Some of its outstanding elements are also covered in Lebanon. Media reports indicate the building might have been used by Hezbollah to store weapons. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is investigating, in cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces.

On 30 August the Security Council renewed UNIFIL’s mandate for a further year. Resolution 1937 included strengthened references to the Blue Line, UNIFIL’s freedom of movement, Ghajar and the arms embargo.

On 24 August there were clashes in Beirut between Hezbollah and Al-Ahbash (a pro-Syrian Sunni Islamist group) that resulted in three deaths. Both parties issued statements that the clashes were not politically motivated but rather the result of a personal dispute.

On 18 July, Lebanon and Syria signed 17 new bilateral agreements on a range of security and economic issues. However, no agreement was reached on border delineation.

On 7 July, Israel alleged it had found further evidence of Hezbollah weapons caches in the village of Khiam. On 14 July Williams said that UNIFIL had no evidence of Hezbollah weaponry in the south.

In April, Israel alleged that Syria had smuggled scud missiles to Hezbollah, which Lebanon and Syria denied. In early May, UNIFIL said that it had not seen any scud missiles in its area of operations.
resolution 1701. Syria maintains that it met its 1559 obligations when it withdrew from Lebanon in 2005. However, some Council members take a wider view of resolution 1559—a key dimension is sufficient progress on Lebanese/Syrian border security.

**Underlying Problems**

Hezbollah maintains significant military capacity in violation of resolutions 1559 and 1701. Some justify this in light of the ongoing Israeli occupation of portions of Lebanese territory—particularly the Sheb’a Farms. (In December 2009 Lebanon issued a ministerial declaration, article 6 of which effectively allows Hezbollah to remain armed, citing its resistance role.)

Another problematic area is in the delineation of the Lebanon/Syria border, on which progress has been very slow.

**Options**

One option is for the Council to wait and see, as has been the practice since June 2007, the last time the Council took action on a 1559 report.

Other options include:

- reemphasising that resolution 1559 remains to be fully implemented;
- encouraging further cooperation between Lebanon and Syria on other areas relevant to implementation of 1559, in particular border control and delineation;
- encouraging the Secretary-General to reenergise his good offices to continue assisting with border delineation, in particular Sheb’a Farms; and
- reinforcing the positive trend associated with the national dialogue and urging a reduction in inflammatory rhetoric.

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon is independent. Council members will want to respect that and monitor the impact on Lebanon’s political environment as the indictment phase approaches. (There is provision for a Council role in the case of non-cooperation with the Tribunal.)

**Council Dynamics**

Most Council members seem to agree that there is still a need for movement on two major outstanding 1559 issues—disarmament and borders—but recognise that the Lebanese political dialogue is the key to progress. In that regard, the ongoing national dialogue is seen as a positive trend—albeit one that has yet to produce tangible results.

Most Council members anticipate increased tension in Lebanon as indictments from the Tribunal approach and are watching developments closely.

Council members are concerned by escalated rhetoric in Lebanon but are encouraged by the efforts of both Lebanese and regional leaders in maintaining a stable political climate in the country.

France is the lead country on Lebanon in the Council.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1757 (30 May 2007) established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to investigate the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others.
- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel.
- S/RES/1680 (17 May 2006) strongly encouraged Syria to delineate its common border with Lebanon.
- S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) urged the disarmament of all militias and extension of the Lebanese government’s control over all Lebanese territory.

**Selected Security Council Meeting Record**

- S/PV.6389 (23 September 2010) was the high-level meeting on the Council’s role in maintaining international peace and security effectively, including remarks by Lebanese President Sleiman.

**Selected Secretary-General’s Reports**

- S/2010/352 (1 July 2010) was the latest report on resolution 1701.
- S/2010/193 (19 April 2010) was the latest report on resolution 1559.

**Selected Letters**

- S/2010/468 (7 September 2010) was from Israel regarding the 3 September explosion in Shehabiyeh in southern Lebanon.
- S/2010/364 (7 July 2010) and S/2010/212 (27 April 2010) were letters from Syria to the Council regarding, respectively, the most recent 1701 and 1559 reports.

**Useful Additional Source**

Special Tribunal for Lebanon www.stl-tsl.org

**Nepal**

**Expected Council Action**

Council members are expecting in October a briefing in closed consultations from Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe following his visit to Nepal as called for in resolution 1939 in September. (The visit is expected to take place in the first half of October to focus on the implementation of the agreement reached by parties to complete the final tasks of the peace process by 14 January 2011.)

At press time it was unclear if there would be a written report or simply an oral briefing.

UNMIN’s mandate expires on 15 January 2011.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 15 September the Council adopted resolution 1939 deciding to extend the mandate of the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) until 15 January 2011, after which the mandate would be terminated. Resolution 1939 also called on the Nepalese protagonists to implement both the agreement reached on 13 September, as well as an action plan with a timetable and clear benchmarks for the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army personnel.

On 13 September the Nepalese government and the Maoists agreed to:

- implement documents prepared by the Special Committee for taking forward the peace process (the Special Committee was formed to supervise the integration and rehabilitation of former Maoist combatants);
- bring the Maoists combatants under the Special Committee without delay;
- take up the remaining tasks of the peace process from 17 September and complete them by 14 January 2011; and
- request an extension of UNMIN’S term for the last time for four months under the current mandate.
There had been some confusion in the days leading up to the mandate extension. The Council had received two letters with different requests on UNMIN’s mandate renewal. One from the Nepalese government side came during a briefing from the Secretary-General’s representative in Nepal, Karin Landgren, on 7 September. It requested a four-month extension of UNMIN’s mandate and asked UNMIN to focus on “the monitoring of management of the Maoist combatants and their arms until the Special Committee takes responsibility of this task.” The letter made no mention of whether the Nepalese army should be under UNMIN monitoring.

On 9 September the United Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-Maoist) sent a letter asking for a six-month extension of UNMIN and for UNMIN to continue monitoring both the Maoist ex-combatants and the Nepalese army.

Following talks between the Nepalese parties the Council received new letters on 14 September from both sides requesting a four-month extension. However, some differences remained. One specified that this would be the final extension of UNMIN’s mandate. The UCPN-Maoist letter was more nuanced and stated that it hoped that it would be possible to bring the “ongoing peace process of Nepal to a fruitful conclusion within that period.”

(No please our 14 September Update Report for more detailed information about the developments leading up to UNMIN’s mandate renewal.)

On 23 September the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights called for the establishment of a police complaints commission or another independent mechanism, following findings that security forces were possibly involved in the extrajudicial killings of dozens of people between January 2008 and June 2010.

There have been allegations of Maoist army personnel involvement in two recent incidents. One on 16 September involved a clash with villagers in Thotri village and the second was a robbery on 24 August in Gwagha village.

On 19 September the Nepalese parliament failed at its eighth attempt to elect a new prime minister since July. Maoist leader Puspa Kamal Dahal (Prachandra) had withdrawn from the race in early September leaving Ramchandra Poudel from the Congress Party as the only candidate. However, Poudel failed to secure an overall majority of the votes. The next vote is expected to be held on 30 September.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is whether the two sides will be able to keep their commitment to complete the remaining tasks of the peace process by the end of UNMIN’s mandate on 14 January 2011.

A related issue is what action the Council should take if the Secretary-General’s report indicates that there has been little progress made since the Nepalese government and the Maoists signed their agreement on 13 September.

Also an issue is what needs to be done to ensure an orderly drawdown and withdrawal of UNMIN by 15 January 2011.

Another issue is what type of arrangements will be put in place for the monitoring of arms if UNMIN is to leave by mid-January 2011.

Another issue is whether it would be wise to have UNMIN withdraw from Nepal if the security situation deteriorates.

Options
The most likely option for the Council is to listen to the briefing but take no action.

A possible option is a statement or remarks to the press from the President reflecting the Council’s reactions to the Secretariat’s progress report on the implementation of the final tasks of the peace process.

Also an option is to schedule another meeting on Nepal in November to monitor developments ahead of the mandate expiry in mid-January.

Council Dynamics
At the time of UNMIN’s mandate renewal in September, Council members were divided over a one-month roll-over or a four-month extension. The UK, which is the lead country on Nepal, and a number of European countries, advocated a one-month roll-over as they felt it would give the Council time to look at options and make a better informed decision.

However, once the parties agreed on a four-month extension, countries such as China and Russia, as well as a number of elected members, felt that a four-month extension would be more appropriate.

Many members are frustrated with yet another last-minute request by Nepal. There appears to be a growing acceptance that it is time for UNMIN to leave Nepal, particularly given the increasingly adversarial policy to the UN being employed by the Nepali Congress party. The US and France in particular appeared to want to make it clear that this would be the last extension for UNMIN. However, some others seem more concerned that if UNMIN left prematurely without alternative monitoring arrangements already in place, this could undermine peace and security in Nepal.

UN Documents
Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1740 (23 January 2007) established UNMIN.

Secretary-General’s Report
- S/2010/2453 (2 September 2010) concerned the implementation of UNMIN’s mandate.

Other
- S/PV.6385 (15 September 2010) was the meeting record of the extension of UNMIN’s mandate to 15 January 2011.
- S/2010/474 (14 September 2010) contained the two letters from the Nepalese government and the Maoists asking for a four-month extension of UNMIN.
- S/2010/473 (9 September 2010) was the letter from the UCPN-Maoist party asking for a six-month extension of UNMIN.
- S/2010/472 (7 September 2010) was the letter from the Nepalese government requesting an extension of UNMIN and a change of mandate.
- S/PV.6377 (7 September 2010) was the briefing by the Secretary-General’s Representative, Karin Landgren.
Other Relevant Facts

Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission
Karin Landgren (Sweden)

UNMIN: Size and Composition
248, including about 72 arms monitors as of August 2010

Duration
23 January 2007 to 15 January 2011

Useful Additional Source
International Crisis Group, Nepal’s Rites of Passage, Asia Report, No. 194, 29 September 2010

Sudan

**Expected Council Action**

The high-level meeting on Sudan held at UN Headquarters on 24 September has focused attention on the risks over the coming months and seems likely to ensure ongoing attention in the Council as well. At press time there were indicators that the Council would visit Sudan in the first week of October.

On 15 October the mandate of the sanctions panel of experts expires and is likely to be renewed. Prior to this, the Sudan Sanctions Committee is expected to meet to discuss the panel’s final report, which was submitted in late September. Reports on both peacekeeping missions, UNMIS and UNAMID fall due in October.

**Key Recent Developments**

Preparations for the January 2011 referendum continue to be problematic. The Secretary-General of the referendum commission, Mohamed Osman al-Nujoomi, assumed his duties on 7 September after the composition of the commission was settled in late June. Voter registration has yet to commence. Under the referendum law the final list of voters should be drawn up by 9 October. Border demarcation between the north and south remains incomplete and stalled despite the provision in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that the task be completed within six months. Additional unresolved issues include citizenship (the status of northerners in the south and vice versa in the event of a vote for separation) and wealth sharing. The UN estimates that there are 1.5 million to 2 million southerners in the north. The Abyei referendum commission has yet to be formed despite the fact that the Abyei referendum is also scheduled for 9 January 2011.

On 15 September Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy briefed Council members. Le Roy reportedly said referenda preparations remain slow and, in the case of Abyei, there was no progress to report. On post-referendum arrangements, parties were still talking about matters of procedure rather than substance. In a press statement following the consultations, Council members called for the parties to the CPA to take urgent action to facilitate peaceful and on time referenda that reflect the will of the Sudanese people, to respect their results and to resolve key remaining post-referenda issues. They also welcomed the Secretary-General’s intent to create a referenda-monitoring panel. (On September it was announced that former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa would lead the panel. The other panelists are former Portuguese foreign affairs minister (and former High Representative for the Côte d’Ivoire elections) Antonio Monteiro and the former chairman of the Nepalese election commission, Bhojraj Pokharel.)

On 24 September the Secretary-General convened a high-level meeting on Sudan in order to mobilise international support for the full and timely implementation of the CPA and for the peace processes for Darfur and eastern Sudan. The meeting was attended by more than thirty nations and international organisations and Sudanese First Vice President and South Sudan President Salva Kiir and Second Vice President Ali Osman Taha. In the communiqué adopted at the close of the meeting the CPA parties committed to overcoming the remaining political and technical challenges and to ensure the referenda are held on 9 January 2011. Participants noted delays in the referenda processes and expressed a willingness to assist the joint efforts by the parties to expedite them. Participants agreed that international funding was necessary to alleviate the suffering of the affected populations in southern Sudan. They also highlighted the urgent need to assist southern Sudan in developing its governance capacities. Participants expressed concern at the security situation in Darfur. Progress on the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement was noted.

On 1 September the UN announced it had opened its first field office in Western Equatoria as part of its plan to expand its presence in southern Sudan for the January referendum. Offices are to be opened in the region’s 79 counties.

Darfur peace negotiations between the government and the rebel Liberation and Justice Movement were expected to resume on 29 September in Doha. A draft peace document that is expected to serve as the basis for a comprehensive peace agreement was to be considered.

On 2 September at least 37 people were killed and some fifty wounded when militiamen loyal to the Sudanese government attacked Tabarath village in northern Jebel Marra, North Darfur. On 7 September, the Assistant Secretary-General in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Atul Khare, briefed on the attacks in closed consultations.

Between 50,000 and 60,000 IDPs remain in Kalma Camp following the late July eruption of violence between political rivals over attendance at the Doha peace talks. The governor of South Darfur state has announced his intent to close Kalma Camp and move IDPs to alternative sites. On 5 September six people were reportedly killed and dozens injured in Al-Hamidiya camp, near Zalingei in West Darfur in similar violence regarding participation in the Doha peace talks.

On 23 August the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator at the time, John Holmes, told Council members in closed consultations the level of restrictions imposed on humanitarian operations and harassment, threats and violence directed at humanitarian personnel in Darfur are once again becoming unacceptable.

On 17 September the chairman of the Sudan Sanctions Committee, Austria’s Thomas Mayr-Harting, presented his regular ninety-day report to the Council.
On 27 August the pre-trial chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued two decisions, informing the Security Council and the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute about Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir’s visits to Chad and Kenya. The pre-trial chamber noted both countries had a clear obligation to enforce the outstanding arrest warrants for Al-Bashir issued by the ICC both under the Rome Statute (Chad and Kenya are state parties) and as UN member states. Kenya also held the vice-presidency of the Assembly of States Parties. The AU defended Kenya and Chad, saying they were acting in accordance with the July 2009 AU decision that AU members shall not cooperate in the arrest and surrender of Al-Bashir.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

On 17 September the Human Rights Council (HRC) held an interactive debate with its Independent Expert on Sudan, Mohamed Chande Othman. In his two reports on human rights in Sudan (covering the period June 2009-August 2010), Othman found that South Sudan continues to be plagued by increasing tribal violence. Common causes of the violence are tensions between ethnic groups, competition over resources, resistance to disarmament and occasional acts of indiscriminate violence by armed state agencies. Since the elections in April, the human rights situation in Sudan has deteriorated. Violence and widespread human rights abuses during the post election period in southern Sudan were particularly troubling. Othman reported that the security situation in Darfur had significantly deteriorated in recent months. The conflict was characterised by banditry, criminal activities, fighting between government troops and armed movements and inter-communal violence. The persistent climate of impunity in the region remains the central driver of many acts of violence and criminality. Sudan is calling for the termination of the Independent Expert’s mandate, which expires at the end of the HRC’s current session on 1 October.

**Key Issues**

The key issue for the Council is that the referenda be conducted on time and in a credible, peaceful way. A related issue is whether there is now enough time to prepare for such referenda.

Another key issue continues to be the perilous security situation in Darfur and the persistent unwillingness of all key stakeholders to come to the negotiating table to consider a credible political strategy to resolve the conflict. A related issue is the growing instability in IDP camps and the tension between supporters and opponents of the Doha peace talks. A concern is that the instability may deteriorate further and spread throughout Darfur.

A related issue is how to address the continued violations of the Council-imposed arms embargo, as attacks and counter-attacks between the Government of Sudan and armed movements impede the peace process and target civilians. How these questions are reflected in the expected resolution renewing the mandate of the Sanctions Panel of Experts will be a key issue in October.

Another issue, relevant to the possible Council mission to Sudan, is accountability, and in particular the risks of engaging with ICC indictees.

**Underlying Issues**

UNAMID continues to operate in an environment where there is no durable peace to monitor and where parties to the conflict (including the host government) continue to engage in active conflict. Despite being nearly fully deployed, UNAMID troop-and police-contributing countries continue to lack the resources to execute their mandate.

Capacity weakness in South Sudanese institutions has emerged as a major issue, regardless of the outcome of the referendum. Communal conflicts persist in the south in the face of weak security institutions and further contribute to instability in South Sudan. The transformation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement from a guerrilla movement to a ruling party remains incomplete.

**Options**

The most likely action by the Council in October is to renew the mandate of the sanctions panel of experts. Other options for the Council are to use the renewal resolution to send some firm signals of concern, or even more concretely to introduce new measures, and bolster sanctions to strengthen implementation of the arms embargo. Areas which could be considered within the mandate include:

- engaging the private sector, such as companies identified by the Panel of Experts that have significant economic relationships with actors involved in the Darfur crisis, to discuss compliance with UN;
- establishing guidance for the private sector on how to address the role of dual-use products; and
- extending the mandate of the panel to 14 months given it historically takes months every year to appoint a new panel reducing the time for the panel to complete its work.

But other wider options are also likely, in particular finding ways to continue high-level engagement on Sudan in the lead up to the referendum.

Another possibility is for the Council to hold an informal interactive dialogue involving the AU High-Level Implementation Panel headed by Thabo Mbeki and a briefing from the Secretary-General’s referenda monitoring panel.

**Council Dynamics**

The Council seems united in its concern regarding the status of preparations for the upcoming referenda and the associated risks.

Any attempt to strengthen or expand the current sanctions regime is likely to be controversial. Tougher language in the draft resolution will also mean a tough negotiation met with resistance by some members of the Council.

There were for some time considerable divisions within the Council over the possible trip to Sudan and contact with ICC indictees. It seems that some members, including the US, UK and France insisted that their ambassadors are unable to meet any ICC indictee. The UK and the US are leading on negotiations for the visit.

The UK is the lead country on Darfur in the Council. The US is the lead country on north-south issues.
**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1935 (30 July 2010) renewed UNAMID.
- S/RES/1919 (29 April 2010) renewed UNMIS.
- S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.

**Latest Secretary-General’s Reports**

- S/2010/388 (19 July 2010) was on UNMIS.
- S/2010/382 (14 July 2010) was on UNAMID.

**Selected Security Council Meeting Records**

- S/PV.6365 (27 July 2010) was the briefing by Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur Ibrahim Gambari.
- S/PV.6338 (14 June 2010) was the briefing by former South African President Thabo Mbeki, Haile Menkerios, Ibrahim Gambari and Djibril Bassolé.
- S/PV.6336 (11 June 2010) was the briefing by ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo.

**Other**

- SG/2165 (24 September 2010) was the Communiqué on the Sudan High-Level Meeting.
- SC/10031 (15 September 2010) was a press statement calling for parties to the CPA to take urgent action to facilitate peaceful and on-time referenda.

**UN Documents**

**Main troop contributors:**

- Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt and Ethiopia
- Military Strength as of 30 August 2010: 22,007 military personnel
- Police Strength as of 30 June 2010: 4,795 police personnel
- Cost: 1 July 2010 - 30 June 2011: $1.81 billion

**UNAMID: Duration**

- 31 July 2007 to present; mandate expires 31 July 2011

**UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission**

- Haile Menkerios (South Africa)

**UNAMID: Force Commander**

- Maj.-Gen. Moses Bisong Obi (Nigeria)

**UNMIS: Size, Composition and Cost**

- **Maximum authorised strength:** up to 10,000 military and 715 police personnel
- **Main troop contributors:** India, Pakistan and Bangladesh
- **Military Strength as of 30 June 2010:** 9,441 military personnel
- **Police Strength as of 30 June 2010:** 676 police personnel
- **Cost:** 1 July 2010 - 30 June 2011: $938 million

**UNMIS: Duration**

- 24 March 2005 to present; mandate expires 30 April 2011

**Sanctions Committee Chairman**

- Thomas Mayr-Harting (Austria)

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**Other Relevant Facts**

**UNAMID: Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur**

- Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria)

**Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator**

- Djibril Yipènè Bassolé (Burkina Faso)

**UNAMID: Force Commander**

- Lt.-Gen. Patrick Nyamvumba (Rwanda)

**UNAMID: Size, Composition and Cost**

- **Maximum authorised strength:** up to 19,555 military personnel, 3,772 police and 19 formed police units (total 6,432)

**Key Recent Developments**

In September the Timorese national police force (PNTL) resumed primary policing responsibilities in four districts—Aleu, Ermera, Liquica and Manufahi. In April the PNTL resumed responsibilities for Ainaro and Baucau districts. There are 13 districts that are to be handed over and by the end of September resumption of primary policing responsibilities by the PNTL had taken place in ten districts since the transfer of security functions began in May 2009. In September the PNTL also assumed responsibility for the administration and management of the Immigration Department, Border Patrol Unit and Interpol Office. The Police Training Centre, the Maritime Police Unit and the Police Intelligence Service had been handed over to the PNTL earlier. Delays are expected with the final three districts as some of the more difficult personnel cases from other districts had been moved into these three districts.

On 23 February the Council held an open debate on Timor-Leste, during which it was briefed by Haq and Deputy Prime Minister of Timor-Leste José Luís Gutieres. Haq told Council members that although Timor-Leste had made remarkable progress since 2006, the country was still fragile and there were many socioeconomic challenges. Gutieres spoke about Timor-Leste’s growth rate and the country’s strategic plan, as well as challenges, such as high unemployment, that would need international cooperation. Several members of the Core Group, including Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Portugal also participated in the debate. (The Core Group on Timor-Leste was established in 1999 and is made up of Australia, Brazil, France, Japan, New Zealand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, the UK and the US.)
On 26 February the Council adopted resolution 1912 extending the UN Mission in Timor-Leste’s (UNMIT) mandate for a year at current levels while endorsing the Secretary-General’s intention to reconfigure its police component in line with the phased resumption of policing responsibilities by the national police.

In line with the request in resolution 1912 for regular updating of the concept of operations and rules of engagement, on 4 June Council members held a private meeting with countries that contribute police and military liaisons to UNMIT. Atul Khare, the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping (and the former Special Representative for the Secretary-General in Timor-Leste) and Ata Yenigun, the Mission Management Coordinator in the Civilian Police Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, briefed the meeting.

The UN Secretariat has plans to send a technical assessment mission to Timor-Leste at the end of the year or in early 2011 to review the draw-down of the police component.

The Timor-Leste parliament has before it legislation to create an institution to implement some of the recommendations from the Commission of Truth, Reception and Reconciliation report.

On 20 August, President of Timor-Leste José Ramos-Horta pardoned and commuted the sentences of 26 convicted persons who had been found guilty of the 2006 violence, as well as the attack on the Timor-Leste president and prime minister in February 2008. Some NGOs are concerned about how the pardons could affect the functioning and credibility of the legal system.

On 6 September Deputy Prime Minister Mário Carrascalão resigned following a public disagreement with Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão whom he had accused of embezzling public funds.

Legislative reforms to harmonise national legislation with the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) include adoption of land laws giving both women and men equal rights to use and own land obtained through marriage and inheritance and changes to the criminal code to categorise domestic violence as a public crime. A candidate from Timor-Leste, Maria Pires, was also elected to the CEDAW Committee in June, marking the first victory for a nominated candidate from Timor-Leste in a UN election.

Human Rights-Related Developments

UNMIT reported on 23 August on a training course run by the UN Development Programme to educate members of the human rights investigations team in Timor-Leste in the basics of forensics for investigation of human rights abuses. Staff from the national human rights institute, the Provedoria of Human Rights and Justice (PDHJ), participated in the training session. Since 2005 the PDHJ had received over 250 complaints of human-rights violations. The objective of the course was to provide an awareness of different forensic science techniques for application in evidence gathering and analysis and to thus help PDHJ perform its role as Timor-Leste’s independent national human rights organisation.

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is the sustainability of the handover of responsibility to the local police. Haq suggested in February that the end of 2010 was a strong possibility for full transfer. This is now likely to be revised as three districts are unlikely to be ready for handover till 2011 at the earliest.

A connected issue is the presence in those districts of police personnel with dubious records and the implications of this for the certification process of the three remaining districts. A key issue for the institutional development of the PNTL is how to speed up the recruitment of UN police who can train and advise the local police. Although resolution 1912 endorsed reconfiguring UNMIT to more accurately reflect current skill requirements, recruitment notices for officers with the relevant skills only went out in September.

An issue related to UNMIT’s mandate renewal in February 2011 is whether a Council mission to Timor-Leste may help Council members obtain quality information so that the Council can make an accurate assessment of UNMIT’s future.

Also an issue is the delay in dealing with justice and impunity issues and the impact of this on the development of an independent and trusted judiciary.

A related issue is whether Timorese law sufficiently guarantees that there will be no impunity for serious crimes. (Human rights organisations such as Amnesty International have expressed concern about some aspects of the 2009 Penal Code.)

Also an issue of concern for the Council is how to contribute to building trust between the security forces and the people of Timor-Leste.

Options

The most likely option is a debate in the Council focused on recent developments in the handing over of police responsibility to the PNTL and reconfiguration of UNMIT’s police component.

Other options include:

- an initial discussion on UNMIT’s longer-term role including ways of incorporating peacebuilding tasks and addressing justice and impunity questions;
- agreement that a technical assessment team should visit Timor-Leste later this year and report to the Council at least a month before UNMIT’s 26 February 2011 expiry date;
- an analysis of the process of UNMIT police reconfiguration has been so slow following Council approval in February; and
- agreement on a possible Council mission in late 2010 (perhaps by 4-5 Council members if there is resistance to a full Council visit).

Underlying Problems

A key underlying problem is the need for more progress in socioeconomic development efforts, particularly in the rural areas. A related problem is high youth unemployment, which is a problem for both economic development and a possible security risk.

Council Dynamics

Members are not expecting any new decisions on UNMIT in October. In February there was unanimous agreement to renew UNMIT’s mandate with no major changes. There was also a general sense of cautiousness towards the drawdown of UNMIT police and agreement that the resumption of policing should not be rushed. Most Council members are now waiting for an update from the Secretary-General before formulating their positions on UNMIT’s future.

During the February debate, a number of members, including Lebanon, Mexico and...
the US, voiced concern about the need to address impunity, build the justice sector and strengthen the rule of law and security sectors. Several members also showed awareness of the importance of addressing socioeconomic issues.

While countries such as Japan, the lead country for Timor-Leste in the Council, and Brazil are supportive of a Council visit to Timor-Leste this year, some others feel that there have been too many Council visits this year and appear less keen.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**
- S/RES/1704 (25 August 2006) established UNMIT.

**Selected Meeting Records**
- S/PV.6278 (26 February 2010) was on the adoption of resolution 1912.
- S/PV.6276 (23 February 2010) was the last Council debate on Timor-Leste.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission**
Ameerah Haq (Bangladesh)

**Size, Composition and Cost**
- **Maximum authorised strength:** up to 1,608 police and 34 military officers
- **Size as of 30 August 2010:** 1,480 police and 33 military liaison officers
- **Civilian staff as of 30 August 2010:** 352 international and 898 local, 173 UN Volunteers
- **Key police contributors:** Malaysia, Portugal, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Philippines
- **Approved budget** (1 July 2010 – 30 June 2011): $206.31 million

**Duration**
25 August 2006 to present; mandate expires 26 February 2011.

**International Stabilisation Force**
- **Size as of 2 December 2009:** approximately 800 troops
- **Contributors:** Australia (650 troops) and New Zealand (150 troops)

**Useful Additional Source**

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**International Court of Justice**

**Expected Council Action**
In October the president of the ICJ, Hisashi Owada of Japan, is expected to brief the Council in a private meeting. This briefing, which has been held annually since the practice was first established in 2000, normally coincides with the president’s presentation of the Court’s annual report to the General Assembly. (The president is invited to brief the Council under rule 39 of the Council’s Provisional Rules of Procedure, which allows the Council to invite a person to provide it with information.)

Judge Owada is likely to give a presentation on the overall activities of the ICJ and discuss the relationship between the Council and the Court. No Council decision is expected.

At press time the ICJ annual report covering the period from August 2009 through July 2010 had yet to be released.

**Background on the ICJ**
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is one of the UN’s six principal organs. All UN member states are parties to the ICJ Statute, which is an annex to the UN Charter. The ICJ is the only international court of a universal character with general jurisdiction. The Court is composed of 15 judges, elected for terms of office of nine years in separate but simultaneous elections by the General Assembly and the Council. (Two such elections were held in 2010; for more details on the elections, please refer to our June and September 2010 Monthly Forecasts.)

Of the 192 states parties to the ICJ Statute, 66 have submitted a declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction. States that have not done so may also consent to take a dispute between them to the ICJ through special agreement. In addition, some 300 bilateral and multilateral treaties provide for ICJ jurisdiction in resolving disputes arising out of the treaties’ application.

The ICJ and the Council have an important nexus established by the Charter. In the event that a state fails to abide by an ICJ decision, the other party may have recourse to the Council. Under the Charter, the Council may then make recommendations or decide upon measures to give effect to the ICJ’s decision.

The ICJ also exercises advisory jurisdiction through a procedure allowing intergovernmental organisations to request advisory opinions. The Council or the General Assembly and some specialised agencies may request the ICJ to give an advisory opinion on any legal issue.

The most recent advisory case was the General Assembly’s request in a resolution adopted in October 2008 for an advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence of 17 February 2008. In its opinion issued on 22 July, the Court ruled that the declaration “did not violate general international law.” Subsequently, on 9 September the General Assembly adopted a resolution acknowledging the advisory opinion.

**UN Documents**

**Selected General Assembly Documents**
- A/64/PV.120 (9 September 2010) was the meeting record of the General Assembly’s adoption of the resolution acknowledging the ICJ’s advisory opinion on Kosovo.
- A/64/4 was the annual report of the ICJ to the General Assembly covering the period 1 August 2008-31 July 2009.
- A/64/PV.30 (29 October 2009) was the meeting record from the 2009 presentation of the ICJ’s report to the General Assembly.

**Selected General Assembly Resolutions**
- A/RES/64/298 (9 September 2010) acknowledged the ICJ’s advisory opinion on Kosovo.
- A/RES/63/3 (8 October 2008) referred Kosovo’s declaration of independence to the ICJ for an advisory opinion.
Notable Dates for October

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<td>early October Women and Peacebuilding report S/RES/1889</td>
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<td>11 October SG report on DRC (MONUSCO) and sanctions S/RES/1925</td>
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<td>15 October SG report on Timor-Leste (UNMIT) S/RES/1912</td>
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<td>mid-October SG report on women, peace and security S/RES/1899</td>
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<td>mid-October SG report on the implementation of resolution 1559 (Lebanon) S/PRST/2004/36</td>
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<td>mid-October SG report on Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and sanctions S/RES/1933</td>
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<td>late October SG report on support for AU Peacekeeping S/PRST/2009/26</td>
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Mandate Expiry in October 2010

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<td>13 October Afghanistan (ISAF) S/RES/1890</td>
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October 2010 Other Important Dates

3 October Presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

6 October A meeting of the Arab League is expected regarding the current Israeli-Palestinian direct talks.

8 October Provisional results of the 18 September election in Afghanistan are expected.

12 October Security Council elections are scheduled.

mid-October The Secretary-General will report to the Council on Nepal (UNMIN) as requested in resolution 1939 and a briefing from Under-Secretary-General B. Lynn Pascoe is expected following his visit.

19 October The next session of the Lebanese national dialogue is expected to be held.

29 October The Council is scheduled to hold a ministerial-level open debate on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of resolution 1325 on women, peace and security.

31 October Presidential elections are scheduled in Côte d’Ivoire.

Also expected in October:

- Security Council mission to Sudan and Uganda during week of 4 October
- a debate on support for AU peacekeeping, presided over by Ugandan Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa
- an open debate on the Middle East
- The Council is expected to be briefed by the:
  - President of the ICJ Hisashi Owada
  - Head of UN Women Michelle Bachelet
  - Head of MONUSCO Roger Meece
  - Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict Margot Wallström
  - Special Representative and head of MINURCAT Yousef Mahmoud
  - Special Representative for Timor-Leste Amearah Haq
  - Special Envoy Terje Red-Larsen on Lebanon

Important Dates over the Horizon

- Presidential and legislative elections in Haiti are expected on 28 November.
- General elections in Myanmar are expected in November.
- Referenda for southern Sudan and Abyei are to be held pursuant to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by 9 January 2011.
- Parliamentary and first round presidential elections are scheduled for 23 January 2011 in CAR.
- Legislative elections are expected on 20 February 2011 and local elections on 27 March 2011 in Chad.
- First-round presidential elections are expected on 8 May 2011 in Chad.
- Legislative and presidential elections in Liberia are expected in October 2011.
- Parliamentary elections and first round of presidential elections are scheduled for 27 November 2011 in the DRC.

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