Japan will have the presidency of the Council in April. It will be a busy month, with several important events planned.

Three open debates were expected at press time: on post conflict peacebuilding; on Council working methods; and on the Middle East (on the occasion of the monthly briefing). The open debate on peacebuilding will be chaired by Japan’s Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada. Other member states’ foreign ministers have been invited to participate. A debate on Haiti also seemed likely.

Also in April, in the week of 19 April, the Council will be travelling to Africa with a primary focus on the DRC. The itinerary will include the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda.

The Council is due to receive in April Secretary-General’s reports on small arms and on Kosovo, and the report of the Commission of Inquiry on the assassination of former Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto. At press time it was unclear whether the reports would be taken up in the course of the month.

There are likely to be several briefings on:
- the Development Fund for Iraq, most likely by the UN controller;
- the Secretary-General’s report on MONUC, probably by the Special Representative for the Secretary-General, Alan Doss;
- women, and peace and security by the Special Adviser on Gender Issues, Rachel Mayanja;
- sexual violence in conflict by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Margot Wallström; and
- the Council trip to Africa by Permanent Representatives leading on the different parts of the trip.

Some briefings are expected in consultations on:
- UN support for AU peacekeeping;
- the developments related to the request by the Government of Chad to withdraw the operation there, MINURCAT;
- Côte d’Ivoire, by the chairperson of the Sanctions Committee; and
- Lebanon, by Special Envoy for the implementation of resolution 1559 Terje Rød-Larsen.

Consultations are also likely to be held on:
- Sudan, prior to the renewal of the peacekeeping operation there, UNMIS;
- Western Sahara, before the renewal of MINURSO; and
- the Development Fund for Iraq.

Formal sessions to adopt resolutions are expected on:
- the renewal of the mandate of UNMIS in Sudan; and
- the mandate renewal for MINURSO in Western Sahara.

**Aide-Memoire**

Important matters pending include:
- A quarterly report on ISAF in Afghanistan was circulated on 19 January 2010. This report covered the period 1 August to 31 October 2009. The previous report had been released in June 2009, covering August 2008 to January 2009. However, there does not appear to be any report covering the period from February through July 2009.
- Reports from the Kosovo Force (KFOR) have disappeared. The last one available covers the period from 1 to 31 July 2008.
- The Secretary-General is yet to report to the Council on Kenya as requested in a February 2008 presidential statement (S/PRST/2008/4).
- The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire, requested in a May 2004 presidential statement (S/PRST/2004/17), has still not been made public. Also on Côte d’Ivoire, the December 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not been published.
- The Secretary-General has failed to re-energise his Advisory Committee on the
Aide-Memoire (continued)

Prevention of Genocide (it has not met since 2008).

- In a presidential statement on Darfur in July 2008 (S/PRST/2008/27) the Council noted the UN investigation underway into the 8 July 2008 attack against UNAMID peacekeepers. The Council has not followed up this investigation.

- The Council has yet to address the Secretary-General’s summary of the report of the UN Board of Inquiry into incidents involving UN facilities and personnel in Gaza between 27 December and 19 January, submitted to it on 4 May 2009 (S/2009/250).

- UNAMI reports on human rights in Iraq, in the past produced every two to three months, have decreased in their frequency and regularity. The last report, released in December 2009, covered the period from 1 January to 30 June 2009.

- The Council requested the Secretariat on 21 November 2006 (S/2006/928) to update the index to Council notes and statements on working methods. This has not been published.


- The Secretary-General continues to delay responding to the mandate to assist with the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially Sheb’a Farms, in accordance with resolution 1701.

- The 2005 World Summit requested that the Security Council consider reforms for the Military Staff Committee. This has yet to be addressed.

Status Update since our March Forecast

- Iran: On 4 March the chair of the 1737 Committee on Iran sanctions, Ambassador Yukio Takasu of Japan, informed the Council that from 11 December 2009 to 4 March, the Committee had received a response from one of the two states requested to provide additional information on previous reported violations of the sanctions regime. The Committee approved an additional notice urging states to be especially alert for additional violations. (S/PV.6280 and SC/9873).

- Guinea-Bissau: On 5 March the Head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, Joseph Mutaboba, introduced the Secretary-General’s report (S/2010/106) on Guinea-Bissau (S/PV.6281). The Council subsequently issued a press statement (SC/9875) welcoming the progress being made in peace consolidation in the country and reaffirming the critical importance of security sector reforms in the country.

- Middle East: Speaking to the press on 5 March the president of the Security Council expressed Council “concern at the current tense situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including East Jerusalem”. He also said “they urged all sides to show restraint and avoid provocative acts; they stressed that peaceful dialogue was the only way forward and looked forward to an early resumption of negotiations.” On 24 March the Secretary-General briefed the Council on the 19 March meeting of the Quartet in Moscow, his own visit to the region and his intention to attend the Arab League Summit in Libya in late March (S/PV.6292). The Quartet welcomed proximity talks towards resuming direct negotiations leading to a negotiated settlement within two years; reaffirmed that unilateral action would not be recognised by the international community; underscored that Jerusalem is a permanent status issue and the Quartet’s intent to monitor developments and consider additional steps as may be required; and expressed concern regarding Gaza.

- Liberia: On 10 March the Council was briefed in private consultations by the Head of the UN Mission in Liberia, Ellen Margrethe Løj, on the Secretary-General’s latest report on the country (S/2010/88).

- Somalia: On 10 March the Somalia Monitoring Group briefed the Somalia/Eritrea Sanctions Committee on its report (S/2010/91). Subsequently, Council members met in closed consultations on 16 March to hear a briefing by the Committee’s chairman, Mexican Ambassador Claude Heller. Heller said in a statement to the press following the consultations that there was general consensus among Council members in support of the idea to establish an independent investigation of the Monitoring Group’s allegations regarding diversion of World Food Programme (WFP) aid to insurgents. On 19 March the Council adopted resolution 1916 extending the mandate of the Monitoring Group for another 12 months with the addition of three new members. It also decided that the assets freeze provisions of resolution 1844 would not apply to funds “necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia” and requested the UN humanitarian aid coordinator for Somalia to report to the Council every 120 days.

- The Council met (S/PV.6290) on 22 March and renewed the mandate for the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) for one year to 23 March 2011 (S/RES/1917). The mandate was expanded to provide technical assistance for the parliametary elections expected in September. The resolution also stated that UNAMA and its special representative would continue to head international civilian efforts in Afghanistan. This includes promoting, as co-chair of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring
### Expected Council Action

A Council mission to the DRC is planned for 17-20 April before the Council takes decisions on the future of MONUC. The MONUC mandate expires on 31 May. The mission will also visit Rwanda and Uganda.) The Secretary-General’s report and recommendations are due 1 April and MONUC’s head, Alan Doss, will brief the Council on 13 April. Consultations on key messages to be delivered during the mission are expected following the briefing. The Council mission comes at a particularly difficult time in terms of the future of DRC and the role of the UN. Many Council members seem determined to push back against premature downsizing of the mission.

The Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallström, is expected to visit the DRC at the same time as the Council.

### Key Recent Developments

MONUC and the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) launched joint operations on 26 February under Operation Amani Leo to protect civilians and to eliminate the threat of the Rwanda Hutu rebel Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and other armed groups in North and South Kivu provinces. On 11 March the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) General Amuli Bahigwa reported 271 FDLR members had been killed or captured. A further 135 dependents had been passed to the MONUC disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and integration (DDRRR) programme and 189 weapons recovered.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees identified 444 protection incidents—including extortion, forced labour, arbitrary arrests and looting—in South Kivu in February, representing a 246 percent increase over January. The main perpetrators were government security forces.

Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels reportedly killed at least 11 civilians and eight troops during attacks in Orientale Province between 11 and 14 March. This followed a reduction in LRA violence in February, with seven attacks recorded versus 26 attacks in January. Rudia II, the FARDC-led operation against the LRA in cooperation with the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces and with logistical support from MONUC, continues.

On 5 and 18 March, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy briefed the Council in closed sessions on the outcome of his 2-3 March visit to the DRC and discussions with President Joseph Kabila about the future of MONUC. (The government had proposed MONUC’s immediate drawdown and exit by August 2011.) The Council was told that one option was to draw down MONUC forces in the west of the DRC and to focus on the east of the country where the violence is ongoing.

A first batch of up to 2,000 troops could withdraw from the west by 30 June 2010. Le Roy said it was premature to contemplate withdrawal from the east. He stressed that there is a commitment between the UN and DRC which needed to be honoured. More time was needed for critical tasks to be completed in the east. He suggested that after June, MONUC troops should concentrate on North and South Kivu, Orientale and Maniema provinces. Discussions are ongoing between the government and MONUC on the withdrawal issue.

On 17 February the Director of the Africa II Division in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Raisedon Zenenga briefed Council experts in a closed session on the outcomes of the DPKO-led technical assessment mission to the DRC. Council members were reportedly told that DRC was proposing an initial troop withdrawal by end of June and thereafter MONUC and the government would consider the next phase of withdrawals in September 2010 and March 2011. For its part the UN wanted MONUC’s withdrawal to be benchmarked against critical tasks rather than a fixed timeline. The government and the UN had reportedly made some progress on three of these critical tasks: completion of military operations in the east; the raising of a force to replace MONUC in the east; and restoration of state authority in the east. It seems the government is not seeking MONUC’s support to train FARDC troops, looking instead to partner with bilateral donors. It also seems that the future role of...
the UN in security sector reform is unclear with the government reluctant for MONUC to play a coordinating role.

On 23 March an Arria-formula meeting, titled “Support to institutional capacity building in the DRC: challenges of consolidating rule of law and security sector reform,” was held at the expert level. The EU Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region, Ambassador Roland Van de Geer, and three NGOs active in the DRC made presentations to Council members. All presenters agreed to a more coordinated and collaborative plan for security sector reform involving the DRC, UN and its international partners was urgently needed. Van de Geer said the DRC was not ready for MONUC to leave by 2011 and a humanitarian disaster was likely if withdrawal occurred in this timeframe.

**Human Rights Related Developments**

The situation in the DRC was considered repeatedly during the Human Rights Council (HRC) March session. Four reports were submitted and on 26 March the HRC adopted a resolution on the situation of human rights in the DRC and the strengthening of technical cooperation and consultative services. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Margaret Sekaggya, reported on her visit to the DRC from 21 May to 3 June 2009. She recommended that the UN Joint Human Rights Office in the DRC publicly condemn the killing of human rights defenders, as well as all other serious human rights violations against them, and increase its staffing and financial capacity to ensure the continued existence of the protection unit. On 18 March the HRC adopted the outcome of the Universal Periodic Review on the DRC. The DRC’s Minister of Justice and Human Rights, Luzolo Bambi Lessa, told the HRC his government had adopted 124 recommendations made during the Review. Eleven recommendations were, however, unacceptable. These involved mainly calls to cooperate with the International Criminal Court to investigate and prosecute soldiers of the FARDC suspected of serious human rights abuses or crimes and to establish an independent mechanism to take measures against security force members responsible for serious human rights violations. The High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay, in her report stated that human rights improvements in the DRC have been limited and human rights violations continued to be perpetrated by the FARDC, the Congolese National Police and armed groups. In addition, the DRC government had made very little progress in implementing previous recommendations, and implementation of many of these recommendations remains beyond the capacity of the DRC government. Pillay suggested an interactive process between the government and her office to address the more than 1,000 recommendations yet to be implemented. The second joint report on the DRC by the seven thematic rapporteurs appointed by the HRC was also presented. Key concerns remain impunity and the presence of perpetrators of serious violations in the security forces. Reform efforts have been undermined by the lack of will on behalf of the government to implement the “zero tolerance” policy, the report concluded.

**Key Issues**

A key issue is how to respond responsibly but sensitively to Kinshasha’s call for an August 2011 MONUC withdrawal, given the acute security, human rights and stability issues. A related issue is whether to accept a withdrawal plan based on a fixed timeline or one in response to realities on the ground and MONUC’s ability to fulfill its protection of civilians role as it downsizes.

A second issue is how to manage the tension which has arisen because of domestic political sensitivities in the DRC between host country consent for the UN role in DRC, and the underlying compact which always exists between host countries and the Council.

A third issue for the Council is better understanding the role the DRC would like to see the UN playing in the future given the government’s dislike of MONUC’s proposed Integrated Strategic Framework for engagement in the DRC over the next three years.

A fourth and related issue is whether the absence of a clearly articulated peacebuilding limb for the UN presence in DRC has become part of the problem and whether there is now a need to give higher priority to a common peacebuilding strategy led by the UN to coordinate among international partners and the DRC government on big picture peacebuilding issues, including security sector reform.

**Underlying Issues**

There seems to be broad consensus that the DRC government will not be capable by 2011 of ensuring security in the east. The ongoing presence of the FDLR in the east and the support generated by their overseas networks remain problems.

Continuing human rights violations committed by elements of the FARDC, the culture of impunity, the maintenance of command and control structures by former rebels absorbed into the FARDC and the involvement of the FARDC in resource extraction and distribution networks continue to be impediments to effective security sector reform.

The activities of the LRA in eastern DRC remain a problem.

**Options**

One option is for Council members to use their visit to the DRC to underline their view that a withdrawal based on the achievement of critical tasks is essential rather than a fixed timetable. (The outcome of these discussions would then have a direct impact on the options available for reconfiguring MONUC.)

A second and additional option might be to insist that, in return for a firm commitment by DRC that withdrawal would be based on realistic criteria, some sort of immediate reduction in MONUC’s troop level could occur in June as a public response to the government’s request.

A third linked option is to intensify MONUC’s peacekeeping mandate on operations in the east and perhaps to recast the mandate into two parts so that there is one part focusing on the UN mission delivery of integrated peacebuilding tasks in the country as a whole and a second part dealing with the military dimension but limited solely to the east of the country.

A fourth option is to reinforce this new kind of profile with a new name for the Mission (and perhaps new leadership).
Council Dynamics
Most Council members agree that a responsible withdrawal of MONUC should be on the basis of the mandate being achieved and not based on a fixed deadline. Members seem confident a compromise can be found with the government on a more flexible timeline for withdrawal. China seems reluctant to oppose the DRC government’s position.

Some members insist that the Council has not yet agreed to any downsizing withdrawal of 2,000 troops by 30 June and would not support that option unless there is a reasonable compromise on the larger issue of long-term withdrawal.

Members do not yet have a good sense of what the government hopes the UN might be able to deliver in terms of its wider role in the country. Members are therefore waiting for the outcome of their discussions with the government in April before committing to elements of MONUC’s new configuration and mandate. Some members are also pursuing bilateral discussions with the government.

France is the lead country.

UN Documents
Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1843 (20 November 2008) authorised the temporary deployment of an additional 3,085 troops to reinforce MONUC’s capacity.

Latest Presidential Statements
- S/PRST/2009/24 (5 August 2009) was on UN peacekeeping operations.
- S/PRST/2008/48 (22 December 2008) welcomed regional efforts to address the security threat posed by the LRA.

Selected Secretary-General’s Report

Other
- A/HRC/13/L.23 (26 March 2010) was a resolution on the situation of human rights in the DRC and the strengthening of technical cooperation and consultative services.
- A/HRC/13/63 (8 March 2010) was the second joint report of seven UN experts on the situation in the DRC.
- A/HRC/13/64 (28 January 2010) was the report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the DRC.
- S/2009/603 (23 November 2009) was the latest report of the Group of Experts on the DRC.
- SC/9791 (17 November 2009) was the Council’s press statement on the LRA.

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission
Alan Doss (UK)

MONUC Force Commander
Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye (Senegal)

Size, Composition and Cost of Mission
- **Strength as of 28 February 2010:**
  - 18,645 troops,
  - 712 military observers,
  - 1,216 police,
  - 1,001 international civilian personnel,
  - 2,690 local civilian staff,
  - 648 UN volunteers
- **Approved budget** (1 July 2009–30 June 2010): $1,350 million

Duration
- 30 November 1999 to present; mandate expires on 31 May 2010

Useful Additional Source
- Trail of Death: LRA Atrocities in northeastern Congo, Human Rights Watch, 28 March 2010

Chad/CAR
Expected Council Action
In April, Council members will again take up the serious situation that has arisen over the future of MINURCAT. A briefing by the head of UN peacekeeping, Alain Le Roy is expected after the return of a UN delegation led by Youssef Mahmoud.

The mandate of MINURCAT was rolled over until 15 May to allow time for negotiations over Chad’s announcement in January that it did not want the mission to continue.

Key Recent Developments
On 22 March, Council members held an informal interactive dialogue with Chad’s permanent representative. Council members expressed their continued concern about protection of civilians in the eastern Chad/CAR part of the country and reiterated their position in favour of the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) continuing its operations.

The Chadian ambassador said that the operation had not yet fully deployed and was not able to protect civilians effectively as insecurity continues in the eastern part of the country. He argued that the Chadian government is ready to provide security in the east, which will be helped by the improved relations with Sudan.

On 12 March, the Council adopted resolution 1913, extending MINURCAT until 15 May. It noted a 19 January note verbale and 3 March letter from the Government of Chad and the Secretary-General’s response of 11 March, indicating the discussions on the future of MINURCAT in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Chad should continue.

The resolution recognises that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security.

Key Issues
Ensuring security for the internally displaced persons and civilians in the east continues to be key issue for the Council.

A little discussed issue to date is the impact on MINURCAT’s role in CAR.

The overall future role of the UN in Chad is a complex issue for the Council involving the question of consent and the duration of understandings reached when missions are initially established. It also involves important technical aspects since the withdrawal is almost impossible to conduct given the approaching rainy season and the associated logistics challenges.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- continuing with the mission as originally planned;
- reducing the number of MINURCAT’s military but deciding that the reductions should take place in a way that responsibly responds to the logistic challenges of the rainy season; and
- agreeing to full withdrawal as soon as possible.
Council Dynamics
Most Council members welcomed the recent interactive dialogue with the permanent representatives of Chad and CAR as it allowed them to state their views on MINURCAT and their concern about the requested withdrawal directly.

Most Council members seem open to some compromise that would respond to the concerns expressed by the host country, but not at the expense of abandoning the mission and its military contingent altogether.

Sudan
Expected Council Action
In April the Council attention will be focused on Sudan and the renewal of the mandate of UNMIS. Elections are due on 11 April and a report from the Secretary-General is due. The head of UN peacekeeping, Alain Le Roy is expected to brief. (The UNMIS mandate expires on 30 April. The mandate of UNAMID expires on 31 July.)

Key Recent Developments
On 18 March, there was further progress on Darfur when the Sudanese government and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) signed a Framework Agreement in Doha similar to the one signed on 23 February between Khartoum and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The agreement establishes steps towards a ceasefire between the two sides in Darfur, which could improve the security on the ground, while also allowing UNAMID to monitor those violating the ceasefire process.

On 11 March, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy briefed the Council on the preparations for the 11 April elections in Sudan and the agreement on Darfur signed by the Government of Sudan and rebel parties.

On 9 March, delegations from the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) met in Nairobi, Kenya, at a special regional summit of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and adopted a resolution urging the two parties to resolve the remaining disputes in the peace agreement, including finalising North-South border demarcation and creating an official referendum commission.

On 9 March, the Secretary-General sent a message to the parties during the IGAD meeting urging them to resolve key outstanding issues for the referendum on self-determination in Southern Sudan and to address wealth and power-sharing. He encouraged IGAD to continue to support improved relations between the two parties.

In February, election campaigns began in Sudan, with 12 candidates running for president of the republic, two for Southern Sudan presidency and more than 4,000 for the National Assembly. On 21 February, the Presidency reached an agreement on the contested census results that provides for an additional forty seats in the National Assembly for the south, to be filled by appointment following the national election. In return, the south agreed to drop its objections to the national census results. In addition, Southern Kordofan and Abyei would be allocated four and two seats, respectively, in the new National Assembly.

In February, the National Elections Commission (NEC) also released the final voter registration figures. Nationally, 79 percent of the population registered, including 72 percent in the north, 67 percent in Darfur and 111 percent in the south. (The reason for this last figure is unclear as SPLM previously complained that the southerners were undercounted during the census.) The total registration was 16,441,852 voters.

On 29 January Secretary-General reported on the AU-UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and noted that it is critical that the national elections provide an opportunity for all Darfurians, particularly internally displaced persons (IDPs), to participate fully. He also urged the Government of Sudan to address significant unresolved technical and political challenges that could compromise the electoral process in Darfur.

Access has been difficult for UNAMID. The Secretary-General’s January report on UNAMID noted the ongoing restrictions on UNAMID in particular as it conducts its patrols in the aftermath of reported fighting.

On 19 January the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) noted that better relations between the NCP and the SPLM are key to the north/south peace process and the implementation of the remaining provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), including:

- increasing the NEC’s public information campaign to ensure that the voting public is well informed about the electoral process;
- providing security during elections so voters have a fair opportunity to participate in the elections;
- appointing a referendum commission and negotiating post-referendum agreements;
- bringing all legislation in line with the values upheld by the Interim National Constitution;
- focusing the efforts of the Government of Southern Sudan on protecting civilians and breaking the cycle of violence;
- making progress on border demarcation between the north and south, a key concern with implications for both the elections and the referendums;
- making a political decision on Abyei and the future governance of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile state;
- supporting peaceful migration for people within Sudan; and
- linking the formal migration, demobilisation and reintegration process with effective community initiatives to reduce violence.

Following the 23 February signing of a Framework Agreement between the Sudanese government and JEM, UNAMID announced that it plans to set up mobile monitoring teams to increase its capacity to monitor the security situation and investigate reports of violence. The teams will establish liaisons with the parties to the ceasefire.

Human Rights-Related Developments
In her annual report to the Human Rights Council on 4 March, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay, said that she had met with representatives of Sudan throughout 2009 and had expressed deep concern over death sentences and executions imposed and carried out there. She acknowledged, however, the presidential pardon of all alleged combatants of the JEM. She noted the positive step that had been taken in February in the peace process in Sudan through the Framework Agreement between the Government of Sudan and JEM, reached with the help of Qatar and Chad. But, she added, “all parties should make the protection of civilians their utmost priority.”
Key Issues
A key issue is how the Council can play a more effective role in ensuring that the CPA is implemented. An immediate test is the outcome of the elections and whether Sudanese people have been able to freely participate and whether the results will be accepted by the population.

The UNMIS renewal in April brings to the fore several further issues:
- monitoring the post-election situation in preparation for the referendum;
- preparing UNMIS for managing its mandate for the protection of civilians in the south; and
- fostering implementation of the remaining CPA provisions, including border demarcation.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- a simple renewal of the UNMIS mandate for another year;
- adopting the current mandate to reflect UNMIS’s changed focus after the elections, intensifying tasks relating to the implementation of the CPA and the increase of protection of civilians activities in South Sudan; and
- organising an informal interactive dialogue (or perhaps a series of such meetings) with key stakeholders after the elections to discuss the future issues for Sudan taking into account the results of the elections and the challenges ahead presented by the referendum.

Council Dynamics
Most Council members seem to expect that the outcome of the elections will simply reinforce the current trend towards the referendum in South Sudan, and that this means that the international community needs to plan on how to assist the parties to bring this about peacefully. Some members including Russia and China are cautious and feel that the Council should wait and see whether the parties might still reach an agreement on the way forward.

Many Council members are expecting the Secretary-General to provide more concrete information on protection of civilians in his next report. The impact of continuing violence on civilians in South Sudan is seen as a problem and it is likely that in the discussion of the renewal of the UNMIS mandate in April, some will urge that UNMIS should prioritise its protection-related activities.

On Darfur, some Council members are anxious that the coming elections will exclude many Darfurians, including IDPs. While most Council members are cautiously welcoming the recent agreements signed between the Government of Sudan and the rebels in Darfur, there is ongoing concern that insecurity continues in parts of Darfur. Some point to the lack of implementation of previous agreements.

Council of his intention to appoint Haile Menkerios as his Special Representative for the Sudan.
- S/2009/639 (14 December 2009) was from the Secretary-General informing the Council of the appointment of experts to serve on the Panel of Experts.

Other
- SC/9805 (7 December 2009) was a Security Council press statement condemning attacks on UNAMID peacekeepers.

UNAMID: Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur
- Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria)
- Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator
- Djibril Yipène Bassolé (Burkina Faso)
- UNAMID: Force Commander
- Lieutenant General Patrick Nyamvumba (Rwanda)

UNAMID: Size, Composition and Cost
- Maximum authorised strength: up to 19,555 military personnel and 6,432 police personnel
- Main troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt and Ethiopia
- Military Strength as of 28 February 2010: 16,852
- Police Strength as of 28 February 2010: 4,675
- Cost: 1 July 2009 - 30 June 2010: $1,598.94 million

UNAMID: Duration
- 31 July 2007 to present; mandate expires 31 July 2010

UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission
- Haile Menkerios (South Africa)

UNMIS: Force Commander
- Major-General Paban Jung Thapa (Nepal)

UNMIS: Size, Composition and Cost
- Maximum authorised strength: up to 10,000 military personnel and 715
Police personnel
- Main troop contributors: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh
- Military Strength as of 28 February 2010r: 9,390 military personnel
- Police Strength as of 28 February: 674 police personnel
- Cost: 1 July 2009 - 30 June 2010: $958.35 million

UNMIS: Duration
24 March 2005 to present; mandate expires 30 April 2010

Sanctions Committee Chairman
Ambassador Thomas Mayr-Harting (Austria)

Côte d’Ivoire

Key Recent Developments
On 17 March, Choi Young-jin, the head of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), briefed the Council. Choi stated that UNOCI would prepare detailed plans and possible options for UNOCI for the Council’s next consultations on the country expected in May.

Ambassador Ilahiri Djédjé of Côte d’Ivoire told the Council that the political crisis of late January and February had been caused by irregularities in the electoral list in favour of the opposition. He repeated claims that the previous chairman of the IEC (an opposition member) had fraudulently registered more than 429,000 people in the electoral list. Djédjé argued for:
- removal of the 429,000 names from the electoral list;
- “a full audit of the provisional list...to remove those who have no right to be on it and to validate...the inclusion of those who do have that right” (Djédjé indicated that these first two processes would take one to two months, after which the final voters list will be established for the elections); and
- progress in the disarmament and reunification of the country.

At press time, talks were yet to get under way among the major political parties in Côte d’Ivoire on the most contentious issues, in particular the government’s demands for criteria beyond those contained in previous understandings to be met (e.g. auditing of the provisional electoral list) and the opposition’s preference for the process to be expedited to avoid further delays.

Human Rights-Related Developments
The report of the Working Group of the Human Rights Council (HRC) that conducted the Universal Periodic Review of Côte d’Ivoire was tabled during the March session of the HRC. The Ivorian government supported over two-thirds of the recommendations of the HRC’s Working Group. The remaining recommendations were to be further examined by the government. (The recommendations dealt largely with ratifying the statute of the International Criminal Court and protocols to various human rights instruments including those on torture and the rights of the child.)

Key Issues
The key issue for the Sanctions Committee in April is compliance with the sanctions regime and certain challenges posed to the work of the Group of Experts. (The Group recommended in its October 2009 report that the Ivorian government ensure unrestricted access for the Group and UNOCI to all sites and military installations, including areas designated “presidential perimeters.” It also said that the leadership of the former rebel Forces nouvelles should ensure similar access to all arms and related materiel, “including materiel that zone commanders retain in their private residential compounds.”)

Underlying Issues
The risk that the general security situation in Côte d’Ivoire could unravel, given the repeated delays in holding the presidential elections, is an underlying problem for the Council.

A related issue for the Council is how to restore momentum to the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire after the recent setbacks, which have led to uncertainty about when elections would be held. Continued tensions and lawlessness in many parts of the country pose additional challenges.

The reported restrictions by the Ivorian government and the former rebel Forces nouvelles to the arms inspections by UNOCI raise concerns about the commitment of the parties to the disarmament process and the latent threat that political opponents could resort to armed violence.

Delays in the restoration of state authority across the country and the stalled disarmament process enhance the risk of a relapse into violent conflict.

Options
Options for the Sanctions Committee include:
- maintaining the current sanctions regime without any significant changes;
- moving to impose targeted sanctions on additional persons who are obstructing the peace process; and
- considering a possibility of secondary sanctions on persons or entities violating the current sanctions regime.

Options for the Council include:
- taking up the wider issues on Côte d’Ivoire again in April and issuing a statement highlighting the possibility of sanctions on those who obstruct the
Peace process or the electoral process;
- arranging a visit to Côte d’Ivoire by a small Council mission (the Council last visited the country in June 2007); and
- encouraging the Secretary-General to send his Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide to the country individually or as a part of a high-level team, in view of the fact that the issue of national identity lies at the core of unrest in Côte d’Ivoire.

Council Dynamics
Some Council members remain unenthusiastic about imposing further sanctions. But they have signalled in recent decisions that it is a possibility. The recommendations by the Group of Experts are therefore likely to be influential. However, no significant changes are expected to be made to the sanctions regime as a whole during the upcoming midterm review.

Council members have grown increasingly frustrated with the repeated delays since 2005 in holding elections. The recent demands by the government have proved worrisome to the Council since they portend an unwelcome longer term delay of the elections till autumn, due to the practical logistical constraints that the onset of the rainy season will present.

Overall, the dynamics within the Council remain largely unchanged, characterised by a low key Council approach and a preference to follow developments on the ground and await the Secretary-General’s recommendations. His next report is due at the end of April (for more details, please see our March 2010 Monthly Forecast).

France is the lead country in the Council on this issue.

UN Documents

Selected Council Resolutions

Selected Presidential Statements
- S/PRST/2009/33 (8 December 2009) noted with concern the postponement of the first round of the presidential election, scheduled for 29 November 2009.
- S/PRST/2009/25 (29 September 2009) expressed concern about the delay in the publication of the Ivorian electoral list and the Council’s intention to review the situation by 15 October 2009.
- S/PRST/2008/42 (7 November 2008) expressed the Council’s determination to fully support the electoral process on the understanding that elections would be organised before the end of spring 2009.
- S/PRST/2008/11 (29 April 2008) welcomed the approval by the Ivorian authorities of the IEC’s proposal to postpone the presidential elections to 30 November 2008.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report
- S/2010/15 (7 January 2010)

Latest Group of Experts’ Report
- S/2009/521 (7 October 2009)

Selected Letters
- S/2009/446 (4 September 2009) was on the preparation of the provisional electoral list for the Ivorian presidential election.
- S/2009/5 (5 January 2009) and S/2008/793 (16 December 2008) were from the Secretary-General, appointing experts to the Côte d’Ivoire Sanction Committee’s Group of Experts.
- S/2008/834 (30 December 2008) contained the fourth supplementary agreement to the Ouagadougou Agreement.

Expected Council Action
The Council expects to receive in April the Secretary-General’s suggested indicators for tracking implementation of resolution 1325 on women and peace and security. The Special Adviser on Gender Issues Rachel Mayanja will brief on the report as part of the same meeting, the new Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallström, will also brief the Council. She will outline proposals for monitoring and reporting on the protection of women and children from rape in armed conflict and post-conflict situations, as requested by resolution 1888.

At press time, it was not clear whether Council members would be ready to formally respond with decisions at this stage or would wait until the major event planned for October to mark the tenth anniversary of resolution 1325.
Key Recent Developments
In March, in New York, the Commission on the Status of Women conducted the 15-year review of the Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action.

On 5 March, the Secretary-General appointed a civil society expert group to assess the impact of resolution 1325 on women in the context of armed conflict over the past decade. The group is co-chaired by the former Irish president and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, and the Executive Director of Femmes Africa Solidarité, Bineta Diop. It will feed into the work of a UN High-Level Steering Committee (referred to in resolution 1889 and meant to strengthen preparation within the UN system for the tenth anniversary of resolution 1325).

On 2 February the Secretary-General appointed Margot Wallström of Sweden as his Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict.

Resolution 1889, adopted on 5 October 2009, was the Council’s most recent set of decisions on those issues and in preparation for the 1325 anniversary asked the Secretary-General to:
- develop a strategy to increase the number of women appointed as Special Representatives and Special Envoys and take measures to increase women’s participation in UN political, peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions;
- ensure that country reports to the Security Council provide information on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls and their needs in post-conflict situations;
- ensure that relevant UN bodies, in cooperation with member states and civil society, collect data to assess specific needs of women and girls in post-conflict situations in an effort to improve system-wide response to those needs; and
- appoint, as appropriate, gender advisors or women-protection advisors to UN missions in cooperation with UN country teams, to provide technical assistance on recovery needs of women and girls in post-conflict situations.

The resolution also expresses the intention to include provisions on the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women in post-conflict situations when establishing and renewing the mandates of UN missions. In addition, the resolution urges member states to mainstream gender in all post-conflict peacebuilding efforts to improve women’s participation in political and economic decision-making at the earliest stages of the peacebuilding process. This responded to the assertion in the Secretary-General’s September report that so far most attention has been focused on women as victims, but there is a need to incorporate gender perspective into the emerging peace process. The report also noted that tools and indicators are needed to monitor and reverse current trends, including the disregard for international law and international humanitarian law by parties to armed conflict.

During the debate on the adoption of resolution 1889, Mayanja, the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, said women and girls continue to be victims of gender-based violence during an armed conflict and its aftermath. Countries emerging from conflict in particular need support to strengthen their judiciary and security institutions. Also, the Council needs to be informed of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls in the country-specific reports to the Council.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is how to integrate the provisions of resolutions 1325, 1886 and 1889 into its situation-specific work in order to ensure real impact on the ground. Related to this, in April, in the context of the upcoming renewals of the mandate of the operations in Western Sahara and Sudan there are issues as to whether these mandates should ensure the protection and respect for women and girls.

A second issue is whether to seek to respond now to the new material from the Secretary General or whether to seek to integrate this material into more in depth decisions in October in the context of the tenth anniversary of resolution 1325.

Options
Options for the Council may include adopting a presidential or press statement with all or some of the following:
- welcoming of the Secretary-General’s proposals;
- noting the proposed indicators; and
- deciding to incorporate Council responses to the proposed resolution in October; and
- welcoming Margot Wallström in her new role.

Council Dynamics
Most Council members support intensified action to implement resolution 1325 and assert text better responding to the needs of women and girls in post-conflict situations needs to be addressed concentrating in individual cases. But there are differences as to whether any specific action should be taken at this time. Some members favour endorsing the indicators in April, while others feel they need more time and may prefer to wait until October.

Some members favour specific action incorporating women’s empowerment into post-conflict development efforts, but others see this as better managed in peace-building context.

The UK is the lead country on the issue of Women and Peace and Security in the Council.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1325 (31 October 2000) was welcomed Margot Wallström in her new role.
- S/RES/1325 (31 October 2000) was the resolution on women, peace and security, in particular expressing the Council’s willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping missions, calling on all parties to protect civilians from all forms of sexual violence and to put an end to impunity for such crimes.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2009/465 (16 September 2009) was on resolution 1325.
Key Recent Developments

Preparations continued for the 31 March International Donors’ Conference, Towards a New Future for Haiti to be held at the UN in New York. Sponsors of the conference include the UN and the US in cooperation with the Haitian government. Brazil, Canada, the EU, France and Spain will also play leading roles. The Government of Haiti is likely to present a vision for the country’s ongoing recovery and development. The Conference will not only seek to mobilise sustained donor contributions for Haiti, but also to establish common positions on Haiti’s long-term recovery and development needs and how to coordinate international support for them. A fund for reconstruction in Haiti is likely to be discussed.

On 23 March a stakeholders meeting organised by Brazil and Haiti was held in New York in advance of the 31 March conference. It sought to take stock of the current situation on the ground and to discuss the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) role in the ongoing aid effort in the country. The discussion of MINUSTAH’s role was essentially confined to the limits of its current mandate and participants emphasised that the stakeholders meeting should not prejudge if and when the Council might revise the mission’s mandate. Possible enhancements to MINUSTAH’s role, without a formal change to the mission’s mandate, were identified in the areas of:
- ensuring a secure and stable environment;
- providing support to the earthquake relief effort;
- physical reconstruction;
- capacity-building;
- coordination and ownership;
- political dialogue; and
- accountability and transparency.

Former US presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush made a joint visit to Haiti on 22 March to assess the nation’s earthquake recovery needs. The two men are heading up private US fundraising for the country. Clinton also serves as UN Special Envoy for Haiti and has played a leadership role in coordinating the international relief effort at the request of the Secretary-General.

Also on 22 March the EU committed to support a long-term development plan for Haiti over the next decade, stated its support for the Haitian government’s leadership with regard to recovery and reconstruction efforts and said it intended to prepare a planning document for aid after the conference.

In preparation for the 31 March conference, the Dominican Republic, with the support of the World Bank and Canada, hosted an international technical conference on 16 and 17 March to evaluate the economic consequences of the 12 January earthquake. (A preliminary study by the Inter-American Development Bank in February estimated that the cost of the earthquake could be nearly $14 billion. A more detailed post-disaster needs assessment will be completed in the coming weeks.) At the conclusion of the conference in the Dominican Republic, participants issued a statement announcing $3.8 billion over 18 months to support relief and reconstruction efforts in Haiti. Participants proposed the creation of a trust fund to be administered by the Government of Haiti and donors and supervised by the World Bank.

The Secretary-General travelled to Haiti on 14 March. He noted that the UN’s revised flash appeal for the country is nearly half funded. (On 18 February the UN had launched a $1.44 billion appeal for Haiti.)

On 9 March, the UN held a memorial service to honour its 101 employees—civilians, military and police personnel from 29 countries—who were killed in the 12 January earthquake.

Human Rights-Related Developments

UN Commissioner for Human Rights Navanethem Pillay noted on 4 March in her Annual Report to the Human Rights Council that her office was actively engaged in ensuring that human rights are put at the centre of all humanitarian and reconstruction activities in Haiti. The Representative of the Secretary General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Walter Kalin, echoed these remarks several days later. “The human rights of Haiti’s displaced population should serve as benchmarks for all recovery efforts,” Kalin told a panel of experts at the UN in Geneva who are engaged in developing a roadmap for lasting solutions for the 1.9 million persons displaced by January’s earthquake.

Haiti

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to take up the situation in Haiti in April with a view to adjusting the tasks for the UN mission in Haiti. On 31 March the UN will host an international conference on Haiti to discuss reconstruction in the aftermath of the January earthquake. Many Security Council members will play a leading role and it seems likely that the conference outcome will be a key element in the Council’s discussions.
Key Issues
The key issue facing the Council is whether and how the pre-earthquake mandate of MINUSTAH should be adjusted in light of the results of the 31 March conference.

Underlying Problems
Extreme poverty and inequality, a history of poor governance and recurrent political instability and the continuing risk of crime and insecurity emerging on a larger scale underlie the situation in Haiti and enormously complicate the post-earthquake scenario.

A second underlying problem is the strategic coordination of international assistance and how this will be led and managed. The risks of multiple bodies trying to do this are apparent, both at the operational level and in terms of member state oversight.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- no alteration of MINUSTAH’s mandate for the time being;
- asking MINUSTAH—as it has recently done with the UN mission in Afghanistan—to assume full responsibility for all operational coordination of assistance;
- requesting the Secretary-General to produce recommendations for best integrating oversight of the assistance coordination mandate of MINUSTAH, bearing in mind the role of the Security Council and other institutions;
- approving a press or presidential statement highlighting the current needs in Haiti and the ongoing role of MINUSTAH in addressing them.

Council Dynamics
Many Council members seem to welcome the enhancements to MINUSTAH’s role suggested at the 23 March stakeholders meeting. Members appear to agree that Council action is desirable due to the drastically changed situation in Haiti. Council members are also aware that not only does the UN need to plan for the medium term but also that some short term elements of the relief effort are pressing. Recent heavy rains highlighted shortfalls in the provision of shelter, which will be exacerbated with the start of the rainy season followed by the hurricane season.

There does not yet appear to be consensus, however, on how to alter the role of the mission. Most members look forward to input from the 31 March conference, the Secretary-General’s report and perhaps some additional assessments by the Secretariat.

UN Documents

Selected Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1908 (19 January 2010) bolstered the troop and police personnel for MINUSTAH by 1,500 additional police and 2,000 additional military personnel.
- S/RES/1892 (13 October 2009) renewed the mandate of MINUSTAH until 15 October 2010.

Selected Secretary-General’s Report
- S/2009/439 on (1 September 2009)

Selected Presidential Statements

Selected Press Statement
- SC/9665 (19 February 2010) conveyed the Council’s appreciation for MINUSTAH’s work and pledged its continuing support to the nation and people of Haiti.

Other Relevant Facts
Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MINUSTAH
Edmond Mulet (Guatemala)

Acting Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Anthony Banbury (US)

UN Special Envoy to Haiti
Bill Clinton (US)

Force Commander
Major-General Luiz Guilherme Paul Cruz (Brazil)

Police Commissioner
Geraldo Chaumont (Argentina)

Useful Additional Source

Iraq
Expected Council Action
The Council is expecting a report on the Development Fund for Iraq in early April. It is likely that the UN Controller will brief the Council on the fund and an Iraqi representative will report progress on plans for the establishment of a successor mechanism. No Council action was expected at time of writing.

Key Recent Developments
On 21 December 2009 the Council adopted resolution 1905 calling on the government of Iraq to develop an action plan and timeline by 1 April for the effective transition to a post-Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) mechanism by 31 December 2010.

On 16 February, Ad Melkert, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Iraq, briefed the Council on a range of issues relating to Iraq. He said that public acceptance of national election results would be vital, and that the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) had assisted the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) to develop a mechanism to adjudicate complaints in a timely manner. He noted that final election results could take considerable time, with the Federal Supreme Court certifying the tally once all appeals have been resolved. Melkert stated that considering the scheduled draw-down in US military forces, a continued UN presence in Iraq would require a higher level of funding. He also commented on the process of excluding many candidates before the election because of links with the outlawed Baath Party. He said this had lacked transparency. However, the decision was entirely an Iraqi responsibility and should be assessed in the context of the overall electoral process.

On 26 February in a presidential statement, the Council welcomed a confirmation from Iraq on 18 January regarding its commitment to compliance with non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. The Council also welcomed that Iraq would provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pending ratification by Iraq’s parliament. The Council requested the IAEA to inform the Council regarding Iraq’s cooperation
with the Agency and underlined its willingness to review Saddam-era restrictions placed on Iraq related to weapons of mass destruction and civil nuclear activities.

On 8 March, the Council issued a press statement expressing appreciation to the government of Iraq and UNAMI for assisting with the elections in Iraq on 7 March. (The IHEC estimated 62 percent of voters turned out for the election, despite attacks that killed 38 people in Baghdad.)

On 26 March, final preliminary results were released indicating that the Iraqiya list of candidates led by Ayad Allawi had secured 91 seats in parliament, with the State of Law list led by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki close behind with 89 seats. However, the final results could take weeks to be certified by the Federal Supreme Court. In addition, reports emerged of a possible merger between the State of Law and Iraqi National Alliance blocs, which would work to sideline Allawi. (The final preliminary results show the Iraqi National Alliance list of candidates, which includes followers of Moktada al-Sadr, in third place with 70 seats.)

The Working Group of the Human Rights Council (HRC), which conducted the Universal Periodic Review of the Iraq on 16 February, made a large number of recommendations. Iraq has already indicated that it supports many of those recommendations and will respond to 14 additional recommendations in time for their inclusion in the outcome report to be adopted by the HRC at its fourteenth session in June. The government did not support a number of other recommendations, almost all of which related to abolition of the death penalty and concerns about persecutions motivated by gender or sexual orientation.

The outcome of Iraq’s national elections is a related issue. Whether the final results of the elections will be widely accepted in the country after being certified is a key question. Protracted political conflict over the results could seriously affect not only the security situation in Iraq but also its legislative capacity to create new institutions needed if the Saddam-era restrictions are to be removed.

Underlying Problems
A major underlying problem is the fact that because Iraq is a new and relatively fragile democracy, its ability to deal effectively with disagreements about the legitimacy of election results may result in an extended period of uncertainty.

Options
Options include:
- adopting a press statement that expresses the Council’s assessment of Iraq’s efforts toward establishing a DFI successor mechanism, and encouraging Iraq to continue its efforts toward full compliance with all historical Council resolutions related to the country; or
- refraining from further action until the overall situation is clearer.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Council members are looking forward to Iraq’s first report on its plan and timetable for transitioning to a post-DFI mechanism. Members are aware that the deadline for transitioning to a DFI successor is not until the end of the year, and as a result do not see any urgent need to take action at the present time. However it is possible that some may support a press statement encouraging Iraq.

Council members are mindful that DFI is only one of a number of interrelated and complex historical resolutions related to Iraq. With regard to resolutions related to disarmament and WMD, members appear to agree that in order to further consider lifting restrictions the IAEA must first give the Council a positive report on Iraq’s cooperation with the agency and Iraq’s parliament must ratify the Additional Protocol.

In terms of other issues related to historical Council resolutions, Council members are aware that the close results of the election will likely have implications for the formation of a new government regardless of the final certified result. Given this uncertainty and that some Council members continue to believe that more effort is required on the part of the Iraqi government to resolve outstanding issues regarding Kuwait, members are cautious about whether quick action is possible on any of the various historical resolutions related to Iraq.

The US is the lead country on Iraq issues in general, and the UK is the lead on Iraq/Kuwait issues.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1905 (21 December 2009) extended the arrangements and related immunities for the DFI and the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) and called on Iraq to develop an action plan and timeline for a post-DFI mechanism in 2010.
- S/RES/1859 (22 December 2008) requested the Secretary-General to report on all Council resolutions concerning Iraq since 1990; a letter from Iraq requesting the lifting of Saddam-era resolutions is included as an annex to the resolution.
- S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003) established sanctions against the previous Iraqi government, created the DFI, provided immunity to Iraqi petroleum products and envisaged the termination of the oil-for-food programme.

Selected Presidential Statement
- S/PRST/2010/5 (26 February 2010) underlined the importance of Iraq’s ratifying the Additional Protocol and expressed the Council’s willingness to review disarmament-related restrictions on Iraq.

Selected Meeting Record
- S/PV.6271 (16 February 2010) was the latest briefing on UNAMI.

Selected Press Statement
- SC/9876 (8 March 2010) expressed appreciation to the government of Iraq and UNAMI for preparing and conducting the 7 March election.
Key Recent Developments
At the initiative of Gabon, the Council held a debate on 19 March on the impact of illicit small arms and light weapons on peace and security in the Central African region. Twenty-seven member states made statements during the debate. In a presidential statement adopted at the conclusion of the debate, the Council:
- reiterated that small arms pose a threat to peace and fuel armed conflict and that states should effectively implement existing arms embargoes;
- recognised the importance of the forthcoming UN Fourth Biennial Meeting of States (BMS) in June 2010 to consider the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects; and
- requested the Secretary-General to take the content of the presidential statement into account in his upcoming biennial report.

Key Issues
Key issues for the Council in the future include:
- the relative roles of the Council and the General Assembly in addressing the issue of small arms and light weapons, and
- how best to take supportive action on the small arms issue in the way it has recently taken up several times the question of drugs and transnational criminal threats.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- deferring consideration of the report until late in the year; or
- adopting a press or presidential statement that will encourage the BMS process by responding to particular recommendations in the Secretary-General’s report.

Council and Broader Dynamics
Council members are in general agreement on the importance of continuing to address the issue of small arms. However, it does not appear the Council as a whole is prepared to take further action in April given the focus on the issue in March.

Several Council members are sensitive to the fact that an arms trade treaty is currently under discussion in the General Assembly and appear to favour holding off on any further action until after the BMS in June.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Presidential Statements
- S/PRST/2010/6 (24 March 2010) was adopted at the conclusion of the thematic debate on small arms and light weapons and the Central African region.

Selected Report of the Secretary-General
- S/2008/258 (17 April 2008) was the last report on small arms.

Selected Security Council Debate on Small Arms
- S/PV.6288 and resolution 1 (19 March 2010) was the thematic debate on small arms and light weapons and the Central African region.

Lebanon

Expected Council Action
In April Council members are expecting a briefing from Special Envoy Terje Rød-Larsen in informal consultations on the Secretary-General’s report on resolution 1559. The discussion is likely to focus on disarmament and border issues. But at press time it seemed unlikely that the Council would take any formal action.

Key Recent Developments
At press time it seemed likely that Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri would hold a second meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus in April to discuss strengthening cooperation on a number of issues, including borders.

On 16 March, Robert Ford, US Ambassador-Designate to Syria, said that both the US and Syria agree that Lebanon should exercise sovereign authority over all its territory but remained far apart on how best to achieve this goal. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, on 24 February said that the US position remained that Syria should “end interference in Lebanon and the transport or provision of weapons to Hezbollah…and generally, to begin to move away from the relationship with Iran”.

On 25 February, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad hosted a public dinner with Iranian
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.

On 12 March UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams briefed the Council on Lebanon. Williams welcomed Lebanon’s efforts toward developing a comprehensive border strategy and hoped that improved Lebanese-Syrian relations would contribute to effective border management. Williams expressed the UN position that disarmament should be addressed by a Lebanese-led political process.

On 9 March Lebanon resumed its national dialogue which is expected to continue on 15 April with a focus on defence issues. (A February 2010 poll by the Beirut Center for Research and Information found that 84 percent of Lebanese believe Hezbollah is a deterrent to Israeli attacks.)

In December 2009 Lebanon issued a ministerial declaration, article 6 of which effectively allows Hezbollah to remain armed, citing its resistance role.

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, authorised by resolution 1757 to investigate the Hariri assassination, released its first annual report on 6 March. There have been no indictments but the report noted “significant progress towards building a case which will bring perpetrators to justice”.

On 5 March a letter from Syria to the Council said “that the real obstacle to border delineation is continued Israeli occupation of the occupied Syrian Golan and the Sheb’a Farms”.

Key Issues
A key issue is that Hezbollah has rearmed since the end of the 2006 war with Israel. Related issues include border control and arms smuggling in violation of the arms embargo. In this context the resumption of Lebanon’s national dialogue will be on Council members’ minds along with the issue of what role if any the Council it can play supporting it.

Another issue is whether and when the Council should consider revisiting resolution 1559. A related question is that in December 2009 according to media reports Syria asked Lebanon to seek the revision of the 1559 mandate. A key dimension of this issue is whether Council members yet feel confident that sufficient progress on border security is being made.

A third issue is whether there are still obligations under resolution 1559 to be implemented. Syria maintains that it met its obligations when it withdrew from Lebanon in 2005. Many Council members take a wider view of resolution 1559.

Options
One option is simply wait and see, as has been the practice since June 2007, the last time the Council took action on a 1559 report. Other options include:

- welcoming the Secretary-General’s report and reemphasising that resolution 1559 remains to be fully implemented;
- acknowledging areas where there has been progress in implementing resolution 1559 including Lebanon’s relaunch of the national dialogue;
- encouraging further cooperation between Lebanon and Syria on other areas relevant to implementation of 1559, in particular regarding border control and delineation; and
- encouraging the Secretary-General to reenergise his good offices to continue assisting with border delineation, in particular Sheb’a Farms.

Council Dynamics
Most Council members seem to agree that there is still a need for movement on two major outstanding 1559 issues—disarmament and borders—but recognise that progress is only likely in the context of a Lebanese domestic political dialogue. In that regard, they view the resumption of the national dialogue as a positive development.

Most Council members including Lebanon see value in the 1559 process continuing.

The Council decided to bring forward consideration of the 1559 report to April from May to avoid the possible perception of a conflict of interest since Lebanon has the presidency of the Council in May.

This will be the second time Lebanon is expected to again renew the mandate. The Council is expected to again renew the mandate.

Key Recent Developments
On 11-12 February, Morocco and the Polisario Front held an informal meeting, facilitated by Ross, in accordance with resolution 1871. (Resolution 1871 urged the parties to continue a dialogue without preconditions to achieve “a just, lasting and
mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara." During the talks, held in Westchester near New York City, the parties discussed:

- Morocco’s proposal that Western Sahara be an autonomous region within Morocco; and
- Polisario Front’s position that the territory’s final status can only be decided in a referendum that includes independence as an option.

Representatives from neighbouring countries, including Algeria and Mauritania, were also present at the opening and closing sessions and were consulted separately during the discussions.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Ross said that neither side accepted the other’s proposal as the sole basis of future negotiations, and on 18 February he briefed the Council in Informal Consultations. He said that the parties had reiterated their commitment to continue negotiations. He also outlined his plan to consult further with the parties and other stakeholders during a visit to the region in March.

Ross arrived in Morocco on 17 March and planned to visit Mauritania and Algeria before briefing the Council in April.

The Secretary General’s report of April 2009 noted that the UN seeks to uphold human rights standards in all its operations, including in Western Sahara. But the report said the UN does not have capacity to conduct human rights monitoring in the Western Sahara or in the refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria, since the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) does not have a specific human rights mandate and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has no presence in the territory or in the refugee camps near Tindouf.

In a letter on 19 June 2009 to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Watch urged the UN to establish a programme to monitor human rights in Western Sahara and the Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria. The letter also urged the parties to take measures to ensure that all human rights are protected fully both in Western Sahara and in the refugee camps.

On 7 March, the EU held a summit with Morocco in Granada, Spain. EU President Herman Van Rompuy emphasised that the EU supported UN efforts on Western Sahara.

The upcoming Secretary-General’s report will discuss the latest developments in Western Sahara, including Ross’s efforts to bring the parties together. The report will also likely discuss:

- efforts to clear mines in the region, which has an impact on civilians travelling from the Territory to Tindouf;
- freedom of movement for MINURSO military observers; and
- human rights issues.

### Human Rights-Related Developments

The Human Rights Council’s Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances made its annual report to the Council in March. The Group commended Algeria for beginning a process of dialogue and cooperation with the Working Group. The Working Group visited Morocco last June to take stock of progress by the Moroccan Equality and Reconciliation Commission. The Group acknowledged several encouraging developments but recommended that Morocco take further measures to put an end to impunity as a fundamental step towards ensuring that acts of enforced disappearance are not repeated.

### Key issues

A key issue for the Council is how best to support Ross in his efforts to bring the parties together and break the stalemate. A related question is whether the Council can be more helpful by trying to nudge the parties on the substance of the issues or to remain at arm’s length.

A second issue is whether to be more active in addressing the human rights situation. The parties continue to accuse each other of human rights violations. Several Council members expressed concern about the human rights situation at the time of the adoption of the resolution in April 2009.

Another issue is whether to be more active on confidence building measures. The Secretary-General raised this in his 2009 report.

A further issue is whether the Council should be more active in pressing other countries in the region, including Algeria and Mauritania, to be more active in supporting Ross’s mediation.

### Underlying problems

The two parties’ insistence on their mutually exclusive positions has been a key reason for the stalemate. A particular concern for many AU members (and others in the UN as well) has been the failure to implement UN decolonisation principles which require a referendum on self determination including independence.

The conflict and ongoing stalemate have high human costs, especially for the Sahrawi population, and has impacted negatively the security and economic situation of the Maghreb region.

### Options

Options for the Council include:

- a simple extension of MINURSO’s mandate for another year;
- a more extensive resolution with language welcoming the parties’ re-engagement in the peace process;
- specifically addressing the role of countries in the region in supporting negotiations;
- encouraging the UN Refugee Agency and MINURSO efforts to expand the family visits programme between the territory and the refugee camps in Tindouf; and
- calling on the parties to ensure respect for human rights.

### Council and Wider Dynamics

Council members and the parties seem comfortable with the recent efforts of the personal envoy.

Positions among the P5 seem unchanged. France has traditionally supported autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. Russia sympathises with the Polisario position on a referendum that includes independence as an option. The US has alternated between a neutral and a pro Moroccan position depending on developments. The UK and China seem to have even handed positions.

Most Council members would like to see regional countries playing greater role in supporting the parties to commit to the negotiation. This is also supported by the US. Many believe that improved relations between Algeria and Morocco might help address some of the wider challenges facing North Africa but recognise that one of the keys to this is a solution to the Western Sahara issue.
The Group of Friends of Western Sahara (France, Russia, Spain, the UK, and the US) usually takes the lead on resolution drafting. This has at times been quite controversial in the Council. At press time, however, no positions appeared to have been forthcoming.

Costa Rica, which is no longer on the Council, had led the discussion on the need for better respect for human rights. It remains to be seen if other members will take up this role.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1871 (30 April 2009) called on the parties to continue dialogue and negotiations through UN-sponsored talks.
- S/RES/1813 (30 April 2008) endorsed the Secretary-General’s recommendation that realism and a spirit of compromise are essential for the negotiations to move forward, called upon the parties to continue negotiations without preconditions and in good faith and extended MINURSO’s mandate for 12 months.
- S/RES/690 (29 April 1991) established MINURSO.

Secretary-General’s Latest Reports

- S/2009/200 (13 April 2009)
- S/2008/251 (14 April 2008)

Latest Press Statement

- SC/9241 (4 February 2008)

Other

- SG/SM/12734 (2 February 2010) was the Secretary-General’s statement welcoming the parties’ agreement to the UN proposal regarding the upcoming meeting in February 2010.
- SG/SM/12677 (18 December 2009) was the Secretary-General’s statement welcoming the end to Western Sahara human rights activist’s hunger strike.
- S/2009/526 (6 October 2009) was the letter from the Secretary-General to the Council expressing his intention to appoint Hany Abdel-Aziz as his Special Representative for Western Sahara and Head of MINURSO.
- S/PV.6117 (30 April 2009) was the Council meeting extending MINURSO’s mandate.
- A/63/871-S/2009/198 (9 April 2009) was a letter from a representative of the Polisario Front addressed to the President of Security Council.
- S/2009/19 (6 January 2009) was the letter from the Secretary-General to the Council expressing his intention to appoint Christopher Ross as his new personal envoy for Western Sahara.
- S/2008/348 (27 May 2008) was a letter from Morocco protesting political demonstrations held by the Polisario Front, as well as the presence of troops in the Tifariti zone east of the berm separating areas under Moroccan and Polisario Front control.
- S/PV.5884 (30 April 2008) was the Council meeting extending MINURSO’s mandate.
- A communiqué (18 March 2008) was issued by Van Walsum with the agreement of the parties after the fourth round of talks.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Hany Abdel-Aziz (Egypt)

Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy

Christopher Ross (USA)

MINURSO Force Commander

Major General Zhao Jingmin (China)

Size and Composition of Mission

- Authorised strength: 231 military personnel and six police officers
- Strength (as of 28 February 2010): 224 total uniformed personnel, including twenty troops, five police officers and 199 military observers; supported by 97 international civilian personnel, 160 local civilian staff and 19 UN volunteers

Cost

1 July 2009-30 June 2010: $53.53 million (A/C.5/64/15)

Pakistan

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to receive the report of the Commission of Inquiry on the assassination of former Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto in April. At press time there was no indication whether and when Council members planned to discuss the report’s findings.

Background

On 27 December 2007, Benazir Bhutto, who had twice served as Pakistan’s prime minister, was assassinated following a political rally in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, ahead of parliamentary elections. The assassination involved a suicide bombing in which more than twenty people were killed.

Following the assassination, the Security Council issued a presidential statement condemning “in the strongest terms the terrorist suicide attack by extremists” and urging all Pakistanis to exercise restraint and maintain stability in the country.

Conflicting information reports emerged concerning the details of the assassination and possible culpability for the attack. Some suggested that the attack bore trademark of al-Qaida or Taliban militants in Pakistan. However, eyewitnesses reportedly described a sniper firing from a nearby building. It was unclear whether Bhutto had been shot before the suicide bomb was detonated. Questions were raised about how well the government had sought to protect her. The day after the assassination, the Interior Ministry announced that her death was caused not by gunshots or shrapnel but by a skull fracture sustained when the force of the blast caused her head to hit a lever on her car’s sunroof. At the request of her husband, now-President Asif Ali Zardari, no autopsy was conducted. London’s Scotland Yard, asked to assist by Pakistani authorities, concluded that a lone attacker fired shots at Ms. Bhutto before the explosives were detonated, but bullets were not the cause of death.

The government said al-Qaida-linked militant leader Baitullah Mehsud had ordered the attack. The US Central Intelligence Agency is also reported to have concluded that Bhutto’s killers were allied with Mehsud. Mehsud, who denied the allegations and was killed in a US drone strike in South Waziristan in August 2009.

Some of Bhutto’s aides expressed dissatisfaction with the investigations and have speculated that the attack may have been
carried out by allies of then-President Pervez Musharraf.

In a 2 February 2009 letter to the Council, in response to a request from the Government of Pakistan, the Secretary-General announced the establishment of an international Commission of Inquiry. The Commission was charged with determining "the facts and circumstances of the assassination". He said the three-member Commission would be of a limited duration and would not conduct a criminal investigation. That was for the Pakistani authorities, he added. The Government of Pakistan guaranteed the Commission the "privileges, immunities and facilities necessary for the independent conduct of the inquiry".

In June 2009 Chilean Ambassador to the UN Heraldo Muñoz was appointed head of the Commission. Marzuki Darusman, a former attorney general of Indonesia, and Peter Fitzgerald, a retired senior official of Ireland's police force and a former UN official, were named as the other two members.

The Commission began work on 1 July 2009 and made its first visit to Pakistan later that month, followed by trips in September, November and a final trip in February 2010. During the visits the Commission met with President Zardari, former President Musharraf, Interior Minister Rehman Malik, and other Interior Ministry and police officials. During the July trip, Ambassador Muñoz downplayed expectations when he told journalists the report would not include "smoking guns in terms of names" of culprits. Also in July, a spokesman for Zardari said the independent investigation had been requested in order to avoid allegations of partiality.

Key Recent Developments

In a 30 December 2009 letter to the Council, the Secretary-General granted the Commission a three-month mandate extension, requested by Muñoz, from 31 December 2009 to 31 March 2010, “to enable the Commission to complete its inquiry and prepare the report”.

The Commission conducted a final visit to Pakistan in February. It met again with President Zardari and with Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani. Muñoz also met with General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, chief of the Pakistani army and Ahmed Shuja Pasha, Director-General of Inter Services Intelligence. The Commission also heard from civil society members. Initially the Commission request to interview General Kayani and other top serving military generals was rejected, even though the terms of reference guaranteed the Commission “freedom to interview representatives of governmental, as well as other institutions and, in principle, any individual whose testimony is considered necessary for the fulfilment of its mandate”. Eventually the interview with Kayani was approved.

Pakistani officials continued to conduct their own investigations. In March 2010 Interior Ministry officials revealed that four retired military personnel were under investigation in connection with the assassination. The four, who disappeared just before the December 2007 attack, are among a group of eight thought to be connected to Ibad Ur Rehman, a main suspect in Pakistan’s investigation. This was the first time military personnel were implicated in the investigations.

Options

The most likely option for the Council at this stage is to simply receive the report of the Commission from the Secretary-General.

A possible option for the Council is to request a briefing from Muñoz.

Council Dynamics

At press time it appeared that Council members preferred to wait and see what the report has to say before considering whether to pursue any discussion on the Commission’s report.

UN Documents

Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2007/50 (27 December 2007) condemned “in the strongest terms the terrorist suicide attack by extremists” which killed Bhutto.

Selected Secretary-General’s Letters


UN Support for AU Peacekeeping

Expected Council Action

Council members are expecting a briefing in April in informal consultations on support for AU peacekeeping, as requested in the October 2009 presidential statement on Peace and Security in Africa. No action is expected at this stage as the Council is expecting a progress report by 26 October 2010.

Background

On 16 April 2008 the Council held a debate on strengthening relationships between the UN and regional organisations and adopted resolution 1809 welcoming the establishment of a joint AU-UN panel to consider options for supporting AU peacekeeping operations. After its chair, former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi, it became known as the “Prodi Panel”.

The Prodi Panel’s report was transmitted to the Council in December 2008. It addressed capacity building for conflict prevention in Africa and offered several recommendations involving UN funding from assessed contributions, funding to support AU peacekeeping operations and develop AU logistics capacity.

On 18 March 2009 the Council held a high-level debate on the Prodi report which revealed considerable reservations about the recommendations. The Council adopted a presidential statement requesting the Secretary-General to update “a detailed assessment of the recommendations” particularly those on financing and establishing a joint AU-UN team.

In September 2009, the Secretary-General proposed a number of alternate ways for the UN to help the AU improve effectiveness in deploying and managing peacekeeping operations. He made several suggestions for strengthening the partnership between the UN and AU. (For more details on the Prodi report and the Secretary-General’s assessment see Security Council Report’s March 2009 Monthly Forecast and 22 October 2009 Update Report.)

The Council held an open debate on the Secretary-General’s report on 26 October 2009 and issued a presidential statement welcoming the intentions of the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission to establish a joint taskforce on peace and security and asked the Secretary-General provide an update by 26 April 2010. The upcoming briefing will provide this update.
Council Dynamics
Most Council members are supportive of strengthening the partnership between the AU and UN. However, there are some significant differences among members over any thematic approval for using assessed contributions for financing AU peacekeeping operations. It is significant to note, however, that the Council has been willing to approve funding on an exceptional basis. In August 2006 the Council approved the use of UN support for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMISOM) and again in January 2009 for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Kosovo

Expected Council Action
The Secretary-General’s quarterly report on Kosovo is due on 31 March. A briefing on the report by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), Lamberto Zannier, is expected. But it was unclear at press time whether this will be in April or will be postponed until May.

Key Recent Developments
The situation has not significantly changed since the Council last discussed Kosovo on 22 January.

In January the International Civilian Representative and EU Special Representative, Pieter Feith, proposed a strategy for the integration of northern Kosovo which would have the effect of strengthening Priština’s authority in this area.

The Serbian government and Kosovo Serb officials have opposed the integration strategy. For them it is too close to the 2007 Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement prepared by Martti Ahtisaari, then the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy. Serbian President Boris Tadić told the Council in January that the plan would “blatantly violate resolution 1244” and warned against its implementation.

Disagreement on Kosovo’s status in international law led to tensions in March over a regional conference organised by Croatia and Slovenia entitled “Together for the EU: Contribution of the Western Balkans to the European Future”. It was supposed to be the first meeting of all the region’s leaders in 18 years. Serbia refused to participate, however, when it became clear that Kosovo would attend as a state.

Key Issues
An important issue is the slow progress on the six-point dialogue (proposed by the Secretary-General in 2008, covering the areas of police, justice, customs, transportation and infrastructure, boundary management and protection of Serbian patrimony) which remains a key element of the international approach in Kosovo.

Another key issue is whether continued pushing of the integration strategy for northern Kosovo will have a destabilising effect.

UN Documents

Resolutions
• S/RES/1863 (16 January 2009) requested the Secretary-General to establish a trust fund to provide financial support to AMISOM.
• S/RES/1809 (16 April 2008) welcomed the proposal to establish the joint AU-UN panel on modalities for support to AU peacekeeping operations.
• S/RES/1706 (31 August 2006) requested strengthening the partnership between the AU and UN. However, there are some significant differences among members over any thematic approval for using assessed contributions for financing AU peacekeeping operations. It is significant to note, however, that the Council has been willing to approve funding on an exceptional basis. In August 2006 the Council approved the use of UN support for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMISOM) and again in January 2009 for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Presidental Statements
• S/PRST/2009/26 (26 October 2009) welcomed the intention of the UN Secretariat and AU Commission to establish a joint task force on peace and security and requested an update by 26 April 2010.
• S/PRST/2009/3 (18 March 2009) followed the meeting on the AU-UN Panel’s report.

Security Council Debates
• S/PV.6206 (26 October 2009) was the debate on the Secretary-General’s assessment of the Prodi report.
• S/PV.6092 (18 March 2009) was the debate on the Prodi report.
• S/PV.5868 (16 April 2008) was the debate on strengthening the relationship between the UN and regional organisations.

Other
• S/2009/470 (18 September 2009) assessed the Prodi report’s recommendations.
• S/2008/813 (24 December 2008) was the letter transmitting the Prodi report.
The Council is expected to be briefed by:

- Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross
- Special Representative for the Secretary-General and Head of MONUC, Alan Doss
- Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallström
- Special Adviser on Gender Issues, Rachel Mayanja
- Head of UN peacekeeping, Alain Le Roy, on Sudan and MINURCAT
- UN Controller for the Development Fund for Iraq
- Head of UN peacekeeping, Alain Le Roy, on Sudan and MINURCAT
- Special Adviser on Gender Issues, Rachel Mayanja
- Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallström
- Special Representative for the Secretary-General and Head of MONUC, Alan Doss
- Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross
- Permanent Representatives leading different parts of the Council trip to the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda

Also expected in April:

- The Council is expected to receive the report of the Commission of Inquiry on the assassination of former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto.
- The Council will hold debates on post conflict peacebuilding, Council working methods, the Middle East and Haiti.
- Elections are expected in Northern Cyprus.
- Council members are expected to be briefed on support for AU peacekeeping.
- National elections are expected in the Central African Republic.
- A Secretary-General’s report on small arms is expected.

The Council is expected to be briefed by:

- Chairman of the Sanctions Committee on Côte d’Ivoire
- Special Envoy for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559, Terje Rød-Larsen
- UN Controller for the Development Fund for Iraq
- Head of UN peacekeeping, Alain Le Roy, on Sudan and MINURCAT
- Special Adviser on Gender Issues, Rachel Mayanja
- Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallström
- Special Representative for the Secretary-General and Head of MONUC, Alan Doss
- Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross
- Permanent Representatives leading different parts of the Council trip to the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda

Important Dates over the Horizon

- An Afghan-led peace jirga will take place in early May.
- The NPT Review Conference will be held in New York from 3 to 28 May.
- Organisation of the Islamic Conference Summit will be held from 18 to 20 May in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.
- The promulgation of Nepal’s new constitution is expected by 28 May.
- The Human Rights Council is expected to conduct its Universal Periodic Review of Guinea-Bissau and Kenya in May.
- The ICC Rome Statue Review will be held from 31 May to 11 June in Kampala, Uganda.
- Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit will be held in June.
- The IJC advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence is expected sometime during the first half of 2010.
- The UN Fourth Biennial Meeting of States (BMS) regarding small arms is to be held in June.
- Presidential elections are expected in Guinea on 27 June.
- The Palestinian Authority has scheduled local elections for 17 July.
- Presidential and legislative elections are expected in Burundi on 28 June and in late July.
- The General Assembly’s annual general debate will start on 14 September.
- Parliamentary elections in Afghanistan are expected on 18 September.
- The IAEA Summit will be held from 20 to 24 September in Vienna, Austria.
- Legislative elections in Chad are expected for November.
- General elections in Myanmar are expected later in 2010.
- Legislative elections in the DRC are expected in July 2011 and presidential elections are expected in October 2011.
- Legislative and presidential elections in Liberia are expected in October 2011.