OVERVIEW FOR MARCH

Gabon will hold the presidency of the Council in March.

Gabon is planning a thematic open debate on the impact of small arms in the Central African region; scheduled at press time to be held on 19 March (we will publish a detailed Update Report prior to that date).

Debates are likely on Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and Chad and the Central African Republic.

Several other briefings are expected:
- A periodic briefing by the Chair of the Iran Sanctions Committee (the 1737 Committee);
- A briefing on Côte d’Ivoire (followed by consultations);
- A briefing on the Secretary-General’s first report on the Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (followed by consultations); and
- The monthly briefing on the Middle East (followed by consultations).

The Council will likely be briefed in consultations on
- Chad and the Central African Republic by the peacekeeping head, Alain le Roy, on his visit to the country at the end of February to discuss issues relating to the MINURCAT mandate;
- the Secretary-General’s report on Liberia, by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Ellen Margrethe Løj;
- the Secretary-General’s report on the Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (followed by consultations); and
- the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide (it has not met since 2008).
- The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire, requested in a May 2004 presidential statement (S/PRST/2004/17), has still not been made public. Also on Côte d’Ivoire, the December 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not been published.
- The Secretary-General has failed to reenergise his Advisory Committee on the Prevention of Genocide (it has not met since 2008).
- In a presidential statement on Darfur in July 2008 (S/PRST/2008/27) the Council noted the UN investigation underway into the 8 July 2008 attack against UNAMID peacekeepers. The Council has not followed up this investigation.
- The Council has yet to address the Secretary-General’s summary of the report of the UN Board of Inquiry into incidents involving UN facilities and personnel in Gaza between 27 December and 19 January, submitted to it on 4 May 2009 (S/2009/250).
- UNAMI reports on human rights in Iraq, in the past produced every two to three months, have decreased in their frequency and regularity. The last report, released in December 2009, covered the period from 1 January to 30 June 2009.
- In December 2008 and January 2009, in resolutions 1850 and 1860, the Council called for renewed and urgent efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace in the Middle East (and welcomed plans for a high-level international meeting in 2009). The Council voice has now been quiet for over a year.

CONTENT OF THIS ISSUE
Status Update since our February Forecast........................................2
Chad/CAR........................................3
Côte d’Ivoire....................................4
Afghanistan........................................6
Democratic Republic of the Congo...................................................9
Sudan..................................................10
Iran....................................................13
Somalia.............................................15
Liberia.................................................17
Sierra Leone.......................................18
Guinea-Bissau.....................................20
Lebanon.............................................21
Notable Dates for March.............................................24
Important Dates over the Horizon...24

Aide-Memoire

Important matters pending include:
- A quarterly report on ISAF in Afghanistan was circulated on 19 January 2010. This report covered the period 1 August to 31 October 2009. The previous report had been released in June 2009, covering August 2008 to January 2009. However, there does not appear to be any report covering the period from February through July 2009.
- Reports from the Kosovo Force (KFOR) have disappeared. The last one available covers the period from 1 to 31 July 2008.
- The Secretary-General is yet to report to the Council on Kenya as requested in a February 2008 presidential statement (S/PRST/2008/4).
- The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire, requested in a May 2004 presidential statement (S/PRST/2004/17), has still not been made public. Also on Côte d’Ivoire, the December 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not been published.
- The Secretary-General has failed to reenergise his Advisory Committee on the Prevention of Genocide (it has not met since 2008).
- In a presidential statement on Darfur in July 2008 (S/PRST/2008/27) the Council noted the UN investigation underway into the 8 July 2008 attack against UNAMID peacekeepers. The Council has not followed up this investigation.
- The Council has yet to address the Secretary-General’s summary of the report of the UN Board of Inquiry into incidents involving UN facilities and personnel in Gaza between 27 December and 19 January, submitted to it on 4 May 2009 (S/2009/250).
- UNAMI reports on human rights in Iraq, in the past produced every two to three months, have decreased in their frequency and regularity. The last report, released in December 2009, covered the period from 1 January to 30 June 2009.
- In December 2008 and January 2009, in resolutions 1850 and 1860, the Council called for renewed and urgent efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace in the Middle East (and welcomed plans for a high-level international meeting in 2009). The Council voice has now been quiet for over a year.
Overview for March (continued)

- developments in the DRC and MONUC, also by the head of the UN Peacekeeping Department, Alain Le Roy;
- the Secretary-General’s report on Lebanon (resolution 1701) by the Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Michael Williams; and
- the work of the Sudan and Somalia Sanctions Committees.

Consultations are also expected on the electoral process in Sudan and possibly, depending on developments, on Iran and Guinea.

Formal sessions to adopt resolutions are expected on:
- the renewal of the mandate of UNAMA in Afghanistan;
- the renewal of the mandate of the Somalia Sanctions Monitoring Group; and
- the future of MINURCAT.

Aide-Memoire (continued)

- The Council requested the Secretariat on 21 November 2006 (S/2006/928) to update the index to Council notes and statements on working methods. This has not been published.
- The Secretary-General continues to delay responding to the mandate to assist with the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially Sheba Farms, in accordance with resolution 1701.
- The 2005 World Summit requested that the Security Council consider reforms for the Military Staff Committee. This has yet to be addressed.

Status Update since our February Forecast

- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE): On 5 February the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Kanat Saudabayev, briefed the Council in an open meeting (S/PV.6268 and SC/9857). (The acting OSCE chairperson has been invited to brief the Council on a regular basis since 2005.)
- North Korea: On 11 February Council members were briefed in informal consultations by the chair of the DPRK Sanctions Committee.
- Peacekeeping: On 12 February the Council held a debate on transition and exit strategies for UN peacekeeping operations (S/PV.6270 and resumption 1 and SC/9860). Ahead of the debate France had circulated a concept paper (S/2010/67). The Council adopted a presidential statement committing itself to improving its practice in ensuring successful transitions by developing clear, credible mandates which would be matched by appropriate resources. On 17 February, Council members met in informal consultations with Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy and Under-Secretary-General for Field Support Susana Malcorra.
- Iraq: On 16 February the Council was briefed (S/PV.6271) by the Special Representative for Iraq, Ad Melkert, who advised the Council that preparations for the 7 March general elections were nearly complete. The Council met in informal consultations after the briefing and issued a press release (SC/9862). On 26 February after receiving a letter from Iraq confirming its support for the international non-proliferation regime and compliance with disarmament treaties the Council adopted a presidential statement expressing its readiness to review lifting sanctions imposed in 1991 (S/PRST/2010/5).
- Peace Consolidation in West Africa (Guinea): On 16 February the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2010/3) welcoming positive developments in Guinea while expressing concern about the situation. It expressed its intention to “remain seized of the situation and to react as appropriate to any threat or action against the transition” process towards democratic civilian rule (S/PV.6272 and SC/9863).
- Middle East: On 18 February Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, B. Lynn Pascoe, briefed the Council expressing concern regarding stalled negotiations and urged Israel and the Palestinian Authority to accept US Special Envoy George Mitchell’s proposal for proximity talks (S/PV.6273 and SC/9864). The briefing was followed by informal consultations.
- Western Sahara: The Council held informal consultations on 18 February. On 10-11 February, the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross coordinated informal talks in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1871 between Morocco and the Polisario Front. Delegations from Algeria and Mauritania were also present at the opening and closing sessions of the talks and were consulted separately during discussions.
- Haiti: On 19 February the Emergency Relief Coordinator, John Holmes, and the head of the Peacekeeping Department, Alain Le Roy, briefed the Council on the humanitarian situation in Haiti and the work of MINUSTAH (S/PV.6274 and SC/9865). Holmes urged the international community and the UN to come together and to align their “long-term plans with a national vision for reconstruction”.
- Timor-Leste: On 23 February the Council held an open debate (SPV.6276) where it was briefed by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Timor-Leste, Ameerah Haq, on the latest UNMIT report (S/2010/85), and the Deputy Prime Minister of Timor-Leste, José Luis Gutierrez. Haq told the Council that Timor-Leste had made remarkable progress since 2006 but that the country was still fragile and faced serious socioeconomic challenges. On 26 February the Council adopted resolution 1912 renewing UNMIT’s mandate till 26 February 2011.
- Threats to International Peace and Security (UNODC): On 24 February the Council was briefed by the head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (S/PV.6277 and
Chad/CAR

Expected Council Action

Complex discussions of MINURCAT are expected in March in light of the request on the part of Chad not to renew the operation’s mandate when it expires on 15 March.

The head of UN peacekeeping, Alain Le Roy, at the Council’s request, visited the country and met with President Idriss Deby in the last week of February. Le Roy is expected to brief the Council in early March, before any decisions will be taken mid-month.

Key Recent Developments

On 17 February, members of Security Council were briefed by UN Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes and Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Le Roy on all aspects of the mission, including humanitarian developments. Holmes told the Council that MINURCAT plays a critical role because of ongoing concerns for the protection of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Human Rights Watch wrote to the Council expressing concern that withdrawing MINURCAT would have a negative impact on civilians at risk.

In January, the Secretariat sent a technical assessment mission to Chad, where its members met with local officials, IDPs, refugees and NGOs in the eastern part of the country. All of them confirmed that MINURCAT contributed positively to security in the area. However, senior Chadian government officials who met with the assessment team called for MINURCAT’s focus to be changed and for only the civilian component of the UN mission to stay.

In January and February, Sudan and Chad, in an effort to improve their relations, took a step forward by agreeing to deploy a joint force to patrol the border. President Deby’s visit with Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in Khartoum led to agreement on normalising relations and some common approaches to security concerns. From 2006 to 2008, several past agreements quickly collapsed as the two countries went back to openly supporting each other’s rebel insurgencies. The 2010 agreements seem so far to be holding and seem to have contributed to a greater sense of confidence on the part of Deby.

MINURCAT was established by Security Council resolutions 1861 (2009), 1834 (2008) and 1778 (2007). Resolution 1861 authorised the deployment of a military component as part of MINURCAT to take the place of EU peacekeeping force (EUFOR) in eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic established in 2007 and whose mandate ended in 2009. According to resolution 1861, the mission was focused on three main areas:

- Security and protection of civilians, including supporting, training and advising elements of the Détachement intégré de sécurité of the Chadian police force to maintain law and order in refugee camps and areas where IDPs are concentrated.
- Human rights and the rule of law, with particular attention on reducing sexual and gender-based violence and on urging the authorities to take action in fighting impunity.
- Bolstering regional peace efforts, by working with the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur to assist the governments of Chad, Sudan and the Central African Republic in improving their relations.

The Secretary-General’s October 2009 report noted the lack of a comprehensive solution to the conflict with armed groups in the east and lack of progress on broader governance reforms. The Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of IDPs, Walter Kälin, visited Chad from 3 to 9 February 2009. Kälin stated that, because of the lack of security, protection continues to be a concern. He said that as long as there is no progress in the domestic political negotiations between the government, political opposition and armed opposition groups, the situation in eastern Chad could continue to deteriorate, leading to displacement of more civilians. He urged that the UN continue to provide support, assistance and protection services for IDPs.

Key Issues

A key issue is whether the mission can continue at all if the military component is withdrawn.

A second key issue is whether there are any other options for the protection of IDPs and refugees and humanitarian workers, who are currently dependent on the mission for protection.

A third key issue is the time frame for responsible and efficient withdrawal of the mission, if in the end consent from the government of Chad is withdrawn.

A fourth issue is the impact on the Central African Republic.

Underlying Problems

Between EUFOR and MINURCAT the international community has been providing security for IDPs and refugees and for the humanitarian operations in the area for two and a half years. All of the independent information suggests that the risks continue and the government of Chad is not yet capable of providing security in the east.

Recent history suggests that weak security in the east is not just a function of the violence in Darfur but is also influenced by serious domestic political problems including lack of the rule of law and poor governance. This is an issue that MINURCAT has not been permitted to address.
A potential underlying problem is maintaining sufficient essential assets for the operation.

Options
One option for the Council is a rollover resolution for several months to allow for further discussion with the Chad government.

A second option, if the government escalates its position, is to decide to phase down the operations to zero but instruct the Secretary-General to undertake withdrawal in a cautious and responsible manner with a view to ensuring the least cost to the UN or diminution of UN assets and protection of civilians for the longest possible time and to review the situation no later than June.

Another option is to hold an Arria-style meeting to discuss ways to address the humanitarian situation with key humanitarian actors in the country and countries in the region.

Council Dynamics
France has the lead on the issue in the Council. On the one hand it seems to have ongoing concerns about the potential negative impact on civilians. On the other hand, however, by contrast to its energetic activism in the Council on the Chad item in the past, it now seems very restrained in the Council.

African members of the Council and China feel that the Chadian government position must be supported. Others, including most of the P5, believe there might still be compromise possible to solve the issue if some additional time can be achieved.

Most Council members were always sceptical about assuming the financial burden of a mission like MINURCAT from EUFOR in the absence of a mandate which enabled the underlying political reconciliation aspect to be addressed. They agreed to the mission as a result of strong lobbying by the French and because of concern about leaving the civilians protected by EUFOR exposed. But having taken on the task few are comfortable agreeing to Chad’s demands for an abrupt withdrawal. Most are worried about the precedent this will set for future peacekeeping missions.

It is also clear that some Council members are worried about the impact withdrawal would have on the regional situation. Most members welcome the rapprochement between Chad and Sudan, but are concerned that it is too early to assume it will have a significant impact on the security of the region and allow sustained return of IDPs and refugees.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1861 (14 January 2009) renewed MINURCAT’s mandate until 15 March 2010 and authorised the deployment of a military component to replace EUFOR.
- S/RES/1778 (25 September 2007) established MINURCAT and authorised EUFOR.

Selected Presidential Statement
- S/PRST/2009/13 (8 May 2009) condemned renewed military incursions in eastern Chad by “Chadian armed groups, coming from outside”.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report
- S/2009/535 (14 October 2009)

Other
- S/PV.6204 (22 October 2009) was the verbatim record of the latest meeting of the Council on the situation in Chad and Central African Republic and the subregion.
- SG/SM/12373 (20 July 2009) was the statement of the Secretary-General condemning violence in West Darfur, Chad and the Sudan border.

Other Relevant Facts

MINURCAT: Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Victor da Silva Angelo (Portugal)

MINURCAT: Size, Composition and Cost
- Authorised strength as of 14 January 2009: 300 police, 25 military liaison officers, 5,200 military personnel and an appropriate number of civilian personnel.
- Strength as of 31 December 2009: 2,777 total uniformed personnel, including 2,489 troops, 24 military observers, and 264 police officers.

Côte d’Ivoire

Expected Council Action
In March the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations will brief the Council on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire. While no Council decision is envisaged, many Council members are concerned about recent developments and will be watching the security situation closely. They are likely to be guided by the recommendations from the field. The mandate of UNOCI expires 31 May.

Key Recent Developments
On 21 January the head of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), Choi Young-jin, briefed the Council on the latest report of the Secretary-General and on progress towards achieving key benchmarks of the Ouagadougou Agreement and its additional protocols. Choi told the Council that the publication in November of the provisional Ivorian voters list was a significant gain. But he also cited a number of issues that remained to be resolved before polls could be held.

On 28 January the Council, worried about the situation, extended the mandate of UNOCI only until 31 May 2010. (The Council extension was for four months contrary to the recommendation by the Secretary-General to extend it by six months.)

The Council expressed its intention to raise UNOCI’s current troop level of 7,450 by up to 500 additional personnel for a limited period of time when the final voters list is made public. (On 19 December, President Laurent Gbagbo and the Facilitator of
the Ouagadougou Agreement, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, sent a letter to the Secretary-General jointly proposing the deployment, for a period of three months, of a military unit of up to 500 troops from Burkina Faso to Côte d’Ivoire as part of UNOCI in order to reinforce security arrangements for the Ivorian presidential elections that were expected to be held by March 2010.

The Council expressed its intention to review the mandate and troop level of UNOCI by 31 May “with the view to possible significant modifications … in light of the elections and the implementation of the key steps of the peace process.” The Council also requested that the Secretary-General provide an update by mid-March 2010 and a full report by the end of April, including detailed recommendations and options for the future of UNOCI.

On 12 February Gbagbo dissolved both the government and the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), accusing the head of the Commission, Robert Mambé, of adding names to the electoral register to boost the opposition vote. The opposition described Gbagbo’s action as illegal and part of a strategy to cling to power by further delaying elections, which have now been postponed six times since they were first scheduled to take place in 2005. The opposition demanded the reinstatement of the Commission.

Demonstrations stemming from public anger over Gbagbo’s decision subsequently erupted daily across Côte d’Ivoire. On 19 February, security forces in the southwestern town of Gagnoa opened fire on opposition demonstrators, killing five.

On 12 February the UN, the Economic Community of West African States, France and the US urged the country to resolve the impasse and resume efforts to hold the polls as quickly as possible.

On 20 February Gbagbo announced that he had temporarily reinstated Defense Minister Michel N’Guessan Amani, Interior Minister Désiré Tagro and Finance Minister Charles Diby Koffi to run the government while the prime minister formed a new government.

On 23 February Prime Minister Guillaume Soro (and leader of the former rebel Forces nouvelles) announced a new government of 27 members, including opposition members. (The announcement had been held up as Soro and Compaoré sought to resolve the stand-off between the opposition and the president, following the 12 February announcement about resolving the government and the IEC.) Soro named 16 members of the new cabinet who were drawn from Forces nouvelles and President Gbagbo’s party. At press time the names of ministers for the remaining 11 posts designated for the opposition parties had not been announced, but the opposition has agreed to participate in the new government.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is to determine how best to encourage the current peace process. A related question is whether it needs to signal the Council’s concern and its resolve for elections to be held without further delay.

Underlying Problems
The ongoing inability of Côte d’Ivoire to return to legitimate governance through presidential elections threatens to undermine the peace consolidation process. The related problems of delayed restoration of state authority across the country and the stalled disarmament process further increase the risks of a relapse into violent conflict in the country.

Options
Options for the Council include:

- continuing to leave the leadership to bilateral initiatives;
- reiterating the unacceptability of repeated delays in registering voters and pushing the Ivorian parties to make more progress in order to conduct elections in spring;
- setting some timelines for ongoing Council monitoring;
- a visit to Côte d’Ivoire by a small Council mission; and
- increasing deterrents against individuals obstructing the peace process by imposing additional targeted sanctions.

Council Dynamics
Many Council members seem now to have become quite distrustful about the commitment of leading Ivorian political actors—both Gbagbo and, to a certain extent, the former rebels—in efforts to hold national elections.

The Council’s decision to extend the mandate of UNOCI for four months (instead of the six months recommended by the Secretary-General) and the expression of its intention to review UNOCI’s mandate and troop level by 31 May “with the view to possible significant modifications…in light of the elections and the implementation of the key steps of the peace process,” was seen as a discreet hint about the need for keeping the electoral process on track. It was meant as a signal to key actors in Côte d’Ivoire that the very expensive international peacekeeping presence in the country could not be taken for granted, especially in light of the lack of commitment by key actors to the peace consolidation process.

While the Council had on 8 December 2009 indicated in a statement that it would “react as appropriate…towards those who would block the progress of the electoral process,” and re-echoed this position in its 28 January resolution, some Council members still seem wary about the effectiveness of targeting additional important political figures. However, others are conscious that the fruits of a still productive economy are being engaged by a number of leaders on both sides and, as a result, the status quo has certain attractions.

France, the lead country on this issue in the Council, seems very concerned to get the peace process back on track but, unlike in
the past, is not pushing any immediate initiatives for Council leadership in helping to achieve this outcome, except to anticipate the Council’s deliberations on the issue during the mid-March briefing which is in turn expected to feed into the upcoming Secretary-General’s report on the future role of UNOCI due in late April.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selected Council Resolutions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1893 (28 October 2009) renewed the Côte d’Ivoire sanctions regime until 31 October 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selected Presidential Statements</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/PRST/2009/33 (8 December 2009) noted with concern the postponement of the first round of the presidential election, scheduled for 29 November 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/PRST/2009/25 (29 September 2009) expressed concern about the delay in the publication of the Ivorian electoral list and expressing the Council’s intention to review the situation by 15 October 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/PRST/2008/42 (7 November 2008) expressed the Council’s determination to fully support the electoral process on the understanding that elections would be organised before the end of spring 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Latest Secretary-General’s Report</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/2010/15 (7 January 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selected Letters</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/2009/446 (4 September 2009) was on the preparation of the provisional electoral list for the Ivorian presidential election.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- S/2009/5 (5 January 2009) and S/2008/793 (16 December 2008) were from the Secretary-General, appointing experts to the Côte d’Ivoire Sanction Committee’s Group of Experts.
- S/2008/834 (30 December 2008) contained the fourth supplementary agreement to the Ouagadougou Agreement.
- S/PRST/2009/33 (8 December 2009) contained the press statement of the sixth meeting of the Permanent Consultative Framework (Cadre permanent de concertation, or CPC) of the Ouagadougou Agreement.
- S/2007/144 (13 March 2007) contained the Ouagadougou Agreement.

**Other Relevant Facts**

- **Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission**
  - Choi Young-jin (Republic of Korea)
- **Force Commander**
  - Major-General Fernand Marcel Amoussou (Benin)
- **Police Commissioner**
  - Major-General Gerardo Cristian Chaumont (Argentina)
- **Chair of the Sanctions Committee**
  - Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti (Brazil)

**Size and Composition of UNOCI**

- **Strength as of 31 December 2009:** 8,536 total uniformed personnel, including 7,202 troops, 189 military observers, 1,145 police; supported by 400 international civilian personnel, 682 local staff and 304 UN Volunteers

**Approved Budget**

- 1 July 2009-30 June 2010: $491.77 million

**Afghanistan**

**Expected Council Action**

In March the Council is expected to renew the UNAMA mandate ahead of its 23 March expiry and to receive a briefing from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations followed by a debate. Members are currently discussing possible adjustments to UNAMA’s mandate, taking into account the conclusions of the London Conference on Afghanistan. The Secretary-General’s latest report, expected on 12 March, is likely to contain recommendations for refocusing UNAMA’s mandate.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 28 January, Afghan president Hamid Karzai, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, co-hosted in London an international conference on Afghanistan. Sixty-six countries participated. The Conference stressed the need for greater Afghan ownership of the peace and development process. One notable feature of the outcome document was that it demonstrated a model of an integrated peacemaking/peacekeeping/peacebuilding strategy which could be utilised as a framework by the Council in other cases. (The Council has recently recognised in a February presidential statement on peacekeeping the importance of simultaneously supporting political, security, rule of law and peacebuilding activities (S/PRST/2010/2).)

The London Conference highlighted:
- a plan to transfer security responsibility from international to Afghan control, possibly by late 2010 or early 2011;
- targets for a major increase in Afghan national security force numbers and an increase in international forces to support the training of Afghan forces;
- commitments to better-coordinated development assistance, to be increasingly channelled through the Afghan government;
- support for the Afghan government’s national reconciliation programme, including financial support for a peace and reintegration trust fund; and
- support for increased regional cooperation.

Participants also noted that until the Afghan government was ready to take over, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) would continue to be the primary international organisation for coordinating international support.

In a 5 February press statement the Council voiced support for the priorities agreed to at the London Conference. It also underlined the leading role of UNAMA in coordinating international civilian efforts in Afghanistan.

On 26 February the Taliban claimed responsibility for a suicide and car bomb attack close to a shopping area, hotel and guesthouses. The attacks which appeared targeted at foreigners killed at least 18 people including French, Italian and Indian nationals. The Secretary-General and UNAMA strongly condemned the attacks. This was the second coordinated attack by the Taliban in Kabul since the start of the year. On 18 January they attacked government buildings, a shopping center and the presidential palace.

On 25 January the Security Council Al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee removed five ex-Taliban officials from its sanctions list, established by resolution 1267.

On 24 January Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission announced it would delay Afghanistan’s parliamentary election from 22 May to 18 September. It cited a lack of funds, logistical challenges and continued insecurity as reasons for the delay. The UN welcomed the decision as it allows for more preparation time.

A legislative decree which came into effect on 13 February gives Karzai the right to choose the five members of the Electoral Complaint Commission (ECC), which oversees voting irregularities. Before this change three of the seats were held by foreigners appointed by the UN. The move has been criticised by Afghan opposition parties.

On 13 February NATO and Afghan forces began Operation Moshtarak, focused on southern Afghanistan. It is the largest military operation by pro-government forces since 2001.

In Pakistan, intensified action against Afghan Taliban resulted in the capture of several, including on 8 February Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a senior Taliban leader.

On 26 January the Secretary-General announced the appointment of Staffan de Mistura as his new Special Representative for Afghanistan and Head of UNAMA as of 1 March 2010. He replaces Kai Eide, who served in the position for two years.

The Secretary-General and Eide briefed the Council on 6 January. The Secretary-General said Afghanistan was at a critical juncture. Eide identified the negative trends in Afghanistan but outlined a political strategy prioritising civilian institution-building.

The fourth trilateral summit between Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan took place on 25 January in Istanbul. These summits are aimed at strengthening cooperation mechanisms between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

On 26 January a Regional Summit on Afghanistan organised by Turkey was held also in Istanbul with Afghanistan, China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Turkmenistan participating.

UNAMA’s 2009 report on protection of civilians in armed conflict in Afghanistan, published in January, reported a 14 percent rise in civilian deaths in 2009. Deaths caused by anti-government elements increased by 41 percent while those attributed to pro-government forces fell by 28 percent.

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime report, based on farmer’s planting intentions, issued in February said that Afghanistan’s opium cultivation is unlikely to change dramatically this year. It also projected a decrease in opium production due to bad weather.

The Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict visited Afghanistan from 20 February to 26 February to assess the situation and to follow-up on commitments made during her July 2008 visit and the July 2009 conclusions from the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict.

Key Issues
Issues related to UNAMA’s mandate include:
• adjusting UNAMA’s mandate so that it fully reflects the recent decisions on Afghanistan in London including the progressive assumption of leadership by Kabul;
• ensuring that UNAMA’s aid coordinating role is clearly emphasised;
• invigorating better coordination and delivery of civilian aid and the extent to which overall civilian coordination should come under UNAMA’s umbrella; and
• whether UNAMA should be involved in the reconciliation and reintegration process with the Taliban.

Underlying Problems
Key underlying problems clearly include better coordination of the security situation in Afghanistan. Safety and security of UN staff may become a pressing issue.

Similarly, although there is now very wide recognition of the need for a political process and reconciliation the role the UN could play in such a process remains fluid.

UN support for the parliamentary elections is also controversial. Some members feel
that it is premature and that a specific request and details of proposed electoral reform from the Afghan government are needed before making any decisions. Related to this is the role of the ECC. Karzai’s decree giving him total control over this body is likely to complicate the issue.

A very practical underlying problem is the high vacancy rate in UNAMA. This is a result largely of generic recruiting practices within the UN system and the lack of security in Afghanistan. A related issue is whether countries will be allowed to second personnel to UNAMA temporarily to help alleviate this problem.

Options
Renewal of UNAMA’s mandate prior to 23 March seems a given but there are a range of options relating to strengthening and clarifying its tasks, particularly:
- UNAMA’s lead role in aid coordination;
- reconciliation and reintegration; and
- UNAMA’s role in the parliamentary elections (in respect of the electoral assistance role there are a number of sub-options including a commitment in principle but with precise details to be resolved by a defined date).

Other options for the resolution include:
- requesting the Secretary-General to refine the benchmarks and indicators of progress produced in September 2009;
- requesting the Secretary-General to provide a report on lessons learnt from the 2009 presidential election to improve the electoral process for the parliamentary and district council elections and specific recommendations by May for an electoral assistance programme for the September parliamentary voting;
- encouraging the Secretary-General to reorganise UNAMA to reflect new priorities and, in his efforts, to find solutions to UNAMA’s staffing problems;
- exhorting member states to assist the Secretariat to move swiftly to help fill positions in UNAMA;
- inviting de Mistura and the EU and NATO civilian coordinators to an informal meeting to discuss how to make civilian aid coordination more effective; and
- confirming an early Council visit to Afghanistan.

Council Dynamics
Most members agree that while fundamental changes to UNAMA’s mandate are unnecessary, it needs to be refocused to reflect current priorities.

There appears to be some consensus on strengthening UNAMA’s coordination role, but in other areas members have not formed definite positions. There are, however, some areas of interest members are likely to want to see highlighted in UNAMA’s new mandate. The UK is expected to want the themes from the London Conference included in the resolution. Japan, having contributed to the reintegration fund, may be interested in language on reintegration and reconciliation. Other members, such as Austria, are keen to have the importance of the rule of law reflected. Bosnia and Herzegovina, drawing on its past, is concerned about internally displaced persons and the importance of institution building.

One of the more controversial areas for members is that of reconciliation and UNAMA’s possible role. Agreement may be difficult on this issue, particularly given Russia’s strong views and the mixed signals from the US. Although Russia allowed five Taliban to be removed from the 1267 list in January, it seems that its position on dialogue with leaders of the Taliban has not changed fundamentally.

Some members may raise the issue of protection of civilians, following the recent incident in southern Afghanistan and the ongoing offensive.

Another area that is likely to see lively discussion is whether the September date will allow enough time for credible elections. This will also play into discussion of UNAMA’s role in the forthcoming parliamentary elections, particularly in light of the recent decree relating to the ECC.

Turkey is the lead country on Afghanistan. It is planning a number of different initiatives, among them a Council visit to Afghanistan later this year and a retreat of Council members in late June, possibly in Turkey, which will feature Afghanistan as one of the topics discussed.

UN Documents
Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1868 (23 March 2009) extended UNAMA’s mandate until 23 March 2010 and asked for reports with benchmarks every three months.
- S/RES/1401 (28 March 2002) created UNAMA.

Selected Secretary-General’s Report
- S/2009/674 (28 December 2009)

Other
- S/PRST/2010/2 (12 February 2010) was the presidential statement on peacekeeping.
- SC/9858 (5 February 2010) was the press statement on the London Conference.
- S/2010/70 (3 February 2010) was the Istanbul Statement.
- S/2010/65 (2 February 2010) was the communiqué from the London Conference.
- S/2010/47 (26 January 2010) and S/2010/48 (27 January 2010) were letters regarding the appointment of Staffan de Mistura as new Special Representative for Afghanistan.
- S/2010/35 (19 January 2010) was the ISAF report covering August to October 2009.
- S/PV.6255 (6 January 2010) was the Council debate on Afghanistan.
- S/AC.51/2009/1 (13 July 2009) was the conclusions on children and armed conflict in Afghanistan.

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAMA’s Head of Mission
Staffan de Mistura (Sweden)

UNAMA: Size, Composition and Duration
- Strength (as of 31 December 2009): 339 international civilians, 1,298 local civilians, 17 military observers, three civilian police, 53 UN volunteers
- Duration: 28 March 2002 to present; mandate expires on 23 March 2010

ISAF Military Commander
Army General Stanley McChrystal (US)
Key Recent Developments

Instability continues in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The Rwandan opposition group Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR) seems to be the primary problem. However, other armed groups and the limited scope of national authority are contributing factors. Sexual assaults, theft, destruction of civilian property and abductions continued to be committed by all belligerents. Approximately ninety percent of human rights abuses in North and South Kivu provinces are reportedly perpetrated by the FDLR or by government forces. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs an estimated 1.36 million persons are displaced in the Kivus. Armed fighting and rampant banditry restrict humanitarian operations. Poor roads further hamper assistance.

Deadly attacks against civilians by the Ugandan rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Orientale province also continue. There are currently approximately 467,000 internally displaced persons there, including 298,000 in the two LRA-affected districts of Haut-Uele and Bas-Uele. An estimated 195,000 of these were displaced during 2009.

On 2 February, the Secretary-General announced the appointment of European Commission Vice-President Margot Wallström as his Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict. Wallström said the DRC would be one of the first places she would visit in her new role. The UN Population Fund reported an estimated 8,300 women were raped in the Kivus in 2009. Armed groups, including the Congolese army (FARDC), committed the majority of the rapes.

On 16 February, UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) officials in Kinshasa briefed Council experts in a closed meeting via video-conference on the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) and on MONUC’s protection strategy. The ISF, once finalised, will guide the UN system (MONUC and UN Country Team) in the coming three years towards meeting its overall strategic objective of ensuring that the DRC is capable of sustaining essential sovereign functions to uphold national unity and peace. The four key elements of the ISF include: addressing conflict; stabilising conflict-affected areas; consolidating peace; and initiating a viable development process. On each of these elements, tasks critical to achieving success have been identified along with the commitments made by the government and the necessary configuration of the UN system to support the ISF. On the protection strategy, Council members were briefed on its key objectives, which included improving information databases, improving coordination to better identify current and future risks, improving access to justice and promoting the rule of law. Also on 16 February, the MONUC Force Commander, Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye, briefed Troop-Contributing Countries (TCCs).

On 18 February Council experts were briefed by the Director of the Africa II Division in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Raisedon Zenenga, ahead of the technical assessment mission to the DRC. The briefing also included options currently under consideration for the future configuration of MONUC. TCCs were briefed on 18 February.

On 19 February, President Joseph Kabila reshuffled his cabinet, changing twenty posts. It seems no posts were allocated to former rebel groups whose units have been integrated into the national army. Former Congrès national pour la défense du peuple rebels reportedly expected roles as part of the peace agreement that ended fighting in eastern Congo in March 2009. The cabinet was also reduced to 43 posts from 54 posts.

Human Rights-Related Developments

In a joint report issued on 21 December 2009, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and MONUC detailed a number of atrocities committed against civilians by the LRA. The report notes that in some cases the terror inflicted by the LRA in various parts of Orientale province was compounded by troops belonging to FARDC. The report urged the Congolese government and its foreign military allies to “conduct a realistic assessment of their capacities to defend and protect civilian populations” and, with assistance from the international community, to implement “a military operation that takes into account the duty to protect civilians.”

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Expected Council Action

Council members are expecting a briefing in March following Secretariat visits to the DRC. No Council action is expected at this time. But Council members are likely to use this opportunity to further develop their thinking for the negotiations on the future configuration of MONUC over the following weeks. The anticipated trip of the Council to the region (covering the DRC, Uganda and Rwanda) in mid April is also expected to play a role in the process. The MONUC mandate expires on 31 May 2010.

Useful Additional Sources

- Operation Enduring Freedom: Size, Composition and Duration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISAF: Size, Composition and Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Total strength: about 85,795 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Contributors of military personnel:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 NATO and non-NATO countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Current top contributors: US, UK,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, France, Italy and Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Duration: 20 December 2001 to present; mandate expires on 13 October 2010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation Enduring Freedom: Size, Composition and Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Current strength: 13,500 (this is an estimate as the troop numbers shift continuously)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Top contributor: US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Duration: 7 October 2001 to present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Key Issues
An unresolved issue is how to respond sensitively to Kinshasa’s proposals for a MONUC withdrawal but responsibly given the ongoing acute security and stability issues. An important issue for the Council is getting clarity on what role the DRC would like to see MONUC playing in the future and how this dovetails with the UN’s ISF in the DRC. A related question is what level of support the government envisages from MONUC for the forthcoming elections.

Underlying Issues
Stability and security in eastern DRC remain critical problems. Fundamental to this is the ongoing presence of the FDLR, the need to properly reintegrate former combatants, security sector reform and the need for effective control over military forces. A key question is the role the UN can play in all of this.

Continuing UN support for the FARDC (particularly elements responsible for human rights violations), seems likely to continue to be a serious problem for the UN and Kinshasa.

Looking ahead, related regional issues include the risk of deterioration in the security and political situations in neighbouring Burundi, Central African Republic and Sudan in the lead up to elections in 2010 and 2011.

Options
No Council decisions are expected in March. However, the expected interaction between Secretariat officials and Council members will further the discussion on the future configuration of MONUC.

For options in this regard, please see our February 2010 Monthly Forecast.

Council Dynamics
Council members seem to be adopting a wait-and-see approach at this stage. Most members seem keen to maintain security sector reform as a high priority for MONUC.

Despite the government’s request for a withdrawal timeframe, there seems to be some comfort amongst Council members that this will not lead to a hasty withdrawal.

France is the lead country on the DRC in the Council.

UN Documents
Selected Security Council Resolution
- S/RES/1843 (20 November 2008) authorised the temporary deployment of an additional 3,085 troops to reinforce MONUC’s capacity.
- S/RES/1807 (31 March 2008) lifted the arms embargo for government forces and strengthened measures related to aviation and customs.

Latest Presidential Statements
- S/PRST/2009/24 (5 August 2009) was on UN peacekeeping operations.
- S/PRST/2008/48 (22 December 2008) welcomed regional efforts to address the security threat posed by the LRA.

Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2009/472 (18 September 2009)

Other
- S/PV.6244 (16 December 2009) was the verbatim record briefing by the Secretary-General’s Representative, Alan Doss.
- S/2009/603 (23 November 2009) was the latest report of the Group of Experts on the DRC.
- SC/9791 (17 November 2009) was the Council’s press statement on the LRA.
- S/PV.6215 (9 November 2009) was the verbatim record briefing by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on the Great Lakes, Olusegun Obasanjo.
- S/2009/105 (19 February 2009) was the letter from the Secretary-General on the revised concept of operations and rules of engagement for MONUC.

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission
Alan Doss (UK)
MONUC Force Commander
Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye (Senegal)

Size, Composition and Cost of Mission
- Strength as of 31 December 2009: 18,646 troops, 705 military observers, 1,158 police, 1,005 international civilian personnel and 2,613 local civilian staff, 648 UN volunteers
- Approved budget (1 July 2009-30 June 2010): $1,350 million

Duration
30 November 1999 to present; mandate expires on 31 May 2010

Sudan
Expected Council Action
In March, the Council is expecting a briefing by the Sudan Sanctions Committee chairman and also the mid-term report from its Panel of Experts. Consultations are also expected and members seem likely to discuss recent developments and the upcoming April elections.

No formal Council action is expected but developments, including those resulting from the February signing of a framework agreement by the government and the Darfur rebel group, JEM, could prompt the Council to react.

The mandates of UNMIS and UNAMID expire on 30 April and 31 July, respectively. The mandate of the Sanctions Panel of Experts expires 15 October 2010.

Key Recent Developments
On 25 February, the President of the Council, Ambassador Géraud Araud of France made a statement to the media on behalf of the Council welcoming the Framework Agreement signed between the Government of Sudan and JEM and urging the parties to fully implement it. This statement followed one by the Secretary-General on 23 February, which welcomed the agreement and said it is “an important step
towards an inclusive and comprehensive peace agreement.” He also urged all parties to fully engage in the peace process, while agreeing on a settlement of the Darfur crisis. But also on 25 February, there were reports that government forces had conducted aerial bombings in Darfur.

On 23 February, Sudan and JEM signed the peace Framework Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in Darfur. The agreement is a framework for further negotiations, due by 15 March. President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan and the presidents of Chad, Eritrea and the Emir of Qatar participated in the signing ceremony. However, the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Abdel Wahid Al-Nur (SLM-AW) still refuses to negotiate with the government, insisting on the disarming of government-backed militia and on improved security on the ground in Darfur prior to participating in any talks.

On 22 February, the National Congress Party and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement agreed to increase parliamentary seats for southern Sudan in the national parliament, although the actual numbers have not been agreed to yet. The agreement might ease the two parties’ disagreement over the census results, conducted last year.

On 11 February, the Assistant Secretary-General for Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Dmitry Titov, presented the January Secretary-General’s report on Darfur to the Council, which noted the security situation in some areas of Darfur was impacted by military operations between the Sudanese Armed Forces and rebel movements.

On 16 February, seven Pakistani peacekeepers were attacked by an unknown armed group in an area outside Nyala, South Darfur. Both the Secretary-General and AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) condemned the attack and urged the Government of Sudan to investigate the incident.

On 16 February, the head of UNAMID called on the parties to show restraint following fighting between SLM-AW and Sudanese government forces, which led to the displacement of 1,500 people from their homes in Jebel Marra region in West Darfur.

Chadian President Idriss Déby visited Khartoum on 8 February, and met with President Omar al-Bashir to discuss strengthening their relations. Both governments agreed to direct talks and to support peace and regional stability in the future between the two countries.

The latest Secretary-General’s report on Darfur noted that the only rebel group to have reconciled with Khartoum, SLM/Minnawi, had attempted to register as a political party but was not able to do so because the military wing of the party has not been integrated into the national security institutions. In addition, the report expressed concern on the continued retention of emergency laws in Darfur, which restrict freedom of expression, association and assembly, and are crucial aspects of any free, fair and transparent electoral process.

The Secretary-General’s UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) report in January noted the challenges faced by political parties across Sudan, which have complained about lack of political rights in the electoral process and urged the National Unity government to take the necessary steps to ensure free, fair and credible elections. Titov reinforced these points during his February briefing.

In South Sudan, continued intertribal clashes in January and February threatened communities in the south, including Jonglei, Unity and Warrap states. The Secretary-General’s January report on UNMIS signaled concern over the continued violence and called on the government of southern Sudan to focus its efforts on protecting civilians.

Humanitarian organisations working in the area have also urged UNMIS and government authorities to protect civilians from violence. A report by the British humanitarian group Oxfam in January said that the poorly planned local disarmament process has not been successful in increasing security. The group urged the international community to develop a broader strategy to support security reforms.

On 26 January, the Council held closed consultations, reviewing UNMIS. Members of the Council raised their concern about lack of protection for civilians who are caught in intertribal conflict in the south and urged UNMIS to implement the protection portion of its mandate. Members also requested more information about weapons and ammunition flowing into South Sudan, where they have reportedly fueled intertribal conflict in the area. The US in particular raised concerns about the origin of the influx of arms into South Sudan.

On 2 February, the Secretary-General announced the appointment of Haile Menkerios of South Africa as his Special Representative for the Sudan. Menkerios will succeed Ashraf Jehangir Qazi of Pakistan.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in late 2009 developed guidelines for its missions on the support they should provide to Security Council sanctions panels. The guidelines address and standardise substantive, logistics/administrative and security support to the panels.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

At a press conference in Khartoum on 11 February, the UN Independent Expert on the situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, Mohamed Chande Othman, reported on his first mission to Sudan. He noted that the government had taken steps to implement some of the recommendations of the UN Group of Experts on Darfur, such as the deployment of more police personnel in Darfur, including more women and training the staffs of law enforcement agencies in human rights awareness. Othman expressed concern, however, that eight months after the Independent National Human Rights Commission Act was enacted, the Government of National Unity had still not appointed the Commissioners.

**Key Issues**

A key issue for the Council is whether the signing of the recent Framework Agreement between the Government of Sudan and JEM might lead to concrete improve-
ments in Darfur. A related issue is whether coherence among JEM rebels will continue and this in turn will depend on whether the next round of negotiations can address their grievances in a practical way and improve the prospect for viable elections.

A second issue is what the Council can do at this stage to reinforce the political negotiation process.

A third issue for the Council is the risks surrounding the electoral process in the South. Implementing the remaining benchmarks of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) continues to be problem and violence is increasing. As the CPA enters its final year and Sudan prepares for elections, the parties have yet to address several issues, including natural resources, citizenship, security, national debts and assets.

A fourth issue, specifically on sanctions, will be for the Council to assess whether the DPKO guidelines on support for Council panels sufficiently address concerns that have been raised by panel members with sanctions committees.

Proliferation of armaments amongst militias and increased arms transfers is a related issue that is crucial to improving the security situation in South Sudan and the prospect for the elections. A question therefore is what role UNMIS can play in supporting the Government of Southern Sudan to enhance security measures to protect civilians and the need for contingency planning in this regard.

Options
Options for the Council could include:

- inviting the Panel of Experts to meet with Council experts in an informal interactive event so the panel can share information it has acquired over the years on challenges relevant to maintaining security in South Sudan;
- begin discussions on adjusting the current sanctions resolution in a way that allows its application to the parties to the CPA, with a focus on stemming the flow of arms and allowing for spoilers of the CPA to be added to the targeted sanctions list; and
- reverting to a regular monthly briefing but focusing on the country as a whole, not just Darfur.

Council Dynamics

On Darfur, there is common ground among Council members who appreciate that improved relations between the government and rebel groups will be key for UNAMID and humanitarian actors to carry on their operations. This could impact positively on any future voluntary return of the estimated two million internally displaced persons.

On the North/South issue, as the renewal of the UNMIS mandate approaches, Council members are becoming increasingly concerned by the prospect of violence in South Sudan being fueled by the arms transfers. Some support the expansion of the mandate of the Panel of Experts into the South, which could then provide more information on those who are impeding the peace process.

The UK is the lead country on Darfur in the Council.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1881 (30 July 2009) renewed UNAMID.
- S/RES/1870 (30 April 2008) renewed UNMIS.
- S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.

Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2009/13 (8 May 2009) called on Chad and Sudan to respect and fully implement their mutual commitments.

Latest Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2010/50 (29 January 2010) was on UNAMID.
- S/2010/31 (19 January 2010) was on UNMIS.
- S/2009/391 (28 July 2009) was on possible UN support to upcoming elections in Sudan.

Selected Security Council Meeting Records

- S/PV.6251 (21 December 2009) was a briefing by former South African President Thabo Mbeki and AU Commission Chair Jean Ping on the recommendations of the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur.
- S/PV.6227 (30 November 2009) was a briefing by Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet to the Council regarding the Secretary-General’s report in November on UNAMID.

Selected Letters

- S/2010/57 (29 January 2010) was from the Secretary-General informing the Council about the appointment of experts to serve on the Panel of Experts.

Other

- SC/9805 (7 December 2009) was Security Council press statement condemning attacks on UNAMID peacekeepers.

Other Relevant Facts

UNAMID: Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur

Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria)

Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator

Djibril Yipènè Bassolé (Burkina Faso)

UNAMID: Force Commander

Lieutenant General Patrick Nyamvumba (Rwanda)

UNAMID: Size, Composition and Cost

- Maximum authorised strength: up to 19,555 military personnel, 6,432 police personnel.
- Main troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt and Ethiopia
- Military Strength as of 21 January
(NPT) Safeguards Agreement and relevant Council resolutions on 18 February. The report says that Iran has still not supplied the IAEA with information and access necessary to resolve questions about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. Going further than previous reports it points out that information available to the IAEA, obtained from a variety of generally consistent and credible sources, “raises concerns about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile”.

On 8 February the IAEA received a letter noting Iran’s announcement that it would begin producing enriched fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), and revising the design information for its Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz to include the production of enriched uranium up to 20 percent. On the same day, a second letter notified the Agency that Iran would transfer some low enriched uranium (LEU) to the PFEP the next day. Iran transferred about ten kilograms of LEU on 9 February to prepare a centrifuge cascade for further enrichment to the 20 percent level. A further 1,950 kilograms was transferred on 14 February. (This represents almost all of Iran’s stock of LEU. An IAEA inventory established that a total of 1,808 kilograms of LEU had been produced as of 22 November 2009. It seems that an additional 257 kilograms were produced by 29 January, bringing the total LEU produced to 2,065 kilograms.)

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Russia was alarmed by these developments and found Iran’s noncooperation with the IAEA unacceptable. US Ambassador Susan Rice said on 19 February that the process of considering specific measures was beginning, but that it was necessary to be realistic about the speed with which discussions would progress.

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu of Turkey stated on 18 February that Turkey had presented multiple proposals to Iran, and that diplomacy should continue to be pursued. Davutoğlu visited Iran for talks on 16 February. Discussions likely covered the IAEA proposal made last October that Iran would send its LEU abroad in return for 20 percent enriched fuel rods to be used specifically in the TRR for medical purposes. The E3+3 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US) support that proposal. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated on 16 February that such a swap remained a possibility, but also said that Iran planned to proceed to establish its own capacity for enriching uranium to the 20 percent level.

On 13 February US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton travelled to Qatar and Saudi Arabia to consult about the Iran situation. Other high-level US diplomats visited the Middle East the same week for similar discussions.

France, Russia and the US wrote to the IAEA on 12 February saying the proposed uranium swap for the TRR remained the most effective way forward. They said that Iran’s intention to itself enrich uranium to 20 percent was unjustified and contrary to multiple Council resolutions.

On 11 February French Ambassador Gerard Araud stated that it was essential to secure China’s support for new sanctions on Iran, even if additional time was required to do so. The same day, Ahmadinejad said that while Iran is nearly able to produce weapons-grade uranium, it is not constructing a bomb. The statement was made at a rally marking the 1979 Iranian revolution, during which security forces were used to disperse opposition protests.

The US expanded its domestic rules imposing sanctions on Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps companies and individuals on 10 February.

China’s Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, stated on 5 February that a uranium swap for the TRR was still possible. He added that the nuclear issue was best solved diplomatically and that discussion should continue among the E3+3. The E3+3
On 31 January the US disclosed that it was sending defensive missile batteries to several Gulf states and maintaining a ship-based anti-missile capability in the region.

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

The Universal Periodic Review of Iran took place on 15 February in the Human Rights Council’s Working Group. Members of the Group registered concerns about religious freedom, freedom of expression, the right to demonstrate peacefully and protection of minorities. Iran subsequently accepted 123 recommendations made by the Group, rejecting 45 others, including recommendations to end the death penalty and to make torture an offence under its laws.

**Key Issues**

A key issue for the Council as a whole is its continued position on the sidelines of the E3+3 discussion, waiting either for the diplomatic track to yield results or to start discussions on additional measures against Iran.

A further issue, if the P5 agree on submitting a new draft sanctions resolution, is what kinds of additional measures should be imposed.

A related issue is whether the Council should address reported violations of the weapons export ban on Iran as a distinct issue.

**Underlying Problems**

A key underlying issue for the Council is whether or not Iran may still be willing to negotiate in good faith on the proposal to exchange its LEU stockpile for fuel rods to be used in the TRR.

A related problem is the growing distrust between Iran and members of the E3+3. Past attempts by Iran to conceal its nuclear activities and its openly declared disregard for Council resolutions have hindered meaningful communication between the parties. A continuing lack of cooperation with the IAEA in terms of reporting and monitoring further complicates the situation.

**Options**

As has been the case in the past, it seems that the Council as a whole will have few options on Iran other than those that may be agreed by the P5. At this time options may include:

- continuing to wait on the sidelines in the hope that progress on the Iran nuclear issue may still occur in the context of the E3+3 negotiations;
- taking action on any P5 draft resolution imposing new sanctions on Iran which could include additional measures against the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, a comprehensive arms embargo including all imports, or measures targeting the country's refined oil and gas sector or financial institutions;
- establishing a sanctions monitoring group in response to incidents indicating violations of existing sanctions; and
- pressing the P5 for a more inclusive process which could include an orientation discussion in informal consultations.

**Council and Broader Dynamics**

The findings of the latest IAEA report are viewed as a significant development by most if not all Council members. This could generate more discussion than the sanctions briefing itself. But some differences remain among Council members as to whether additional sanctions measures will actually be useful in changing Iran’s behaviour. Some fear that any measures of this sort will actually play out in favour of the regime and be counterproductive. Others feel that additional sanctions are the necessary and logical next step in attempting to deal with Iran. (It seems that elements of possible new sanctions have recently begun to be shared in some capitals of Council members, but it seems unlikely that these will be discussed in detail in New York in the short term.)

France, the UK and the US remain in favour of a new round of sanctions, though the UK stresses that the aim is to persuade rather than punish Iran. Russia appears to have become more willing to support multilateral action. It seems that maintaining a unified P5 approach continues to be important for all P5 members.

Several elected members, including Brazil, Lebanon and Turkey, are not persuaded about the utility of imposing additional sanctions and seem to see value in the short term of continuing diplomatic efforts as the best chance of persuading Iran to abide by the Council’s decisions. It is less clear if they would oppose a draft which had the full support of the P5.

Iran’s consistent refusal to abide by previous Council resolutions and the instances currently before the Sanctions Committee of arms shipments violating of the sanctions regime are important considerations for members.

**Selected UN Documents**

**Selected Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1887 (24 September 2009) reaffirmed previous resolutions related to Iran’s nuclear activities.
- S/RES/1835 (27 September 2008) reaffirmed commitment to a negotiated solution within the E3+3 dual-track framework, and called upon Iran to comply with previous Council resolutions.
- S/RES/1803 (3 March 2008) reiterated existing measures against Iran and imposed additional ones.
- S/RES/1747 (24 March 2007) established a ban on Iran’s arms exports and added names to the list of people and entities subject to assets freeze.
- S/RES/1737 (23 December 2006) banned trade with Iran of certain items related to nuclear activities and weapon delivery systems, imposed an asset freeze on certain persons and entities and established a sanctions committee.
- S/RES/1696 (31 July 2006) demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA.

**Selected Meeting Record**

- S/PV.6235 (10 December 2009) was the last briefing by the chair of the 1737 Committee.
On 23 December 2009 the Council adopted resolution 1907, imposing an arms embargo on Eritrea. The resolution also established targeted sanctions (travel ban and assets freeze) on individuals or entities that violate the arms embargo, provide support from Eritrea to armed groups seeking to destabilise the region or obstruct implementation of resolution 1862 concerning Djibouti. It called on states to inspect, in their territory, suspicious cargo to and from Somalia and Eritrea. (This type of Council request is rare.) Instead of creating a separate sanctions committee for Eritrea, the resolution expanded the mandates of the existing Committee and Monitoring Group for Somalia. (It is the first time that one committee has been put in charge of two separate sanctions regimes.) China abstained and Libya voted against the resolution despite the AU’s leading role in supporting the resolution.

Eritrea wrote a letter to the Council on the day of the adoption calling the resolution “shameful” and maintaining that accusations concerning its involvement in Somalia had never been “substantiated or verified”. In February Eritreans held protests in Australia, Switzerland and the US demanding an end to the sanctions.

On 14 January the Council heard a briefing on the Secretary-General’s latest report by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. Ould-Abdallah outlined two main challenges for the international community in Somalia: the absence of “concrete commitment and determined international policy” towards Somalia and the lack of material assistance despite pledges made and apparent strong international support for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). To overcome these challenges, he called for better international coordination, including cooperation with subregional organisations, enhanced “moral, diplomatic and financial” assistance for the government, vigorous action against spoilers and a more integrated UN presence, as well as early relocation to Mogadishu by the international community. Somali Ambassador Elmi Ahmed Duale, who also spoke at the meeting, said the current UN strategy was “inadequate” and called for a “much heavier UN footprint.”

On 28 January the Council adopted resolution 1910, renewing the authorisation of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) until 31 January 2011. (The AU Peace and Security Council renewed AMISOM’s mandate for another 12 months on 8 January.)

Violence in Somalia escalated sharply in January according to a 2 February statement by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Two hundred and fifty-eight civilians were killed and 253 were wounded in January, making it the deadliest month since August 2009. UNHCR also estimated that 80,000 Somalis had been displaced since the beginning of the year.

On 28 February Al Shabaab ordered the World Food Programme (WFP) to halt all operations in Somalia and leave the country. It accused the WFP of handing out expired food and also said its food distribution had negatively impacted local farmers.

While the standoff between the TFG and the insurgent groups Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam continued with daily clashes, TFG representatives repeatedly said a government offensive was imminent. According to media reports the insurgents responded by sending additional troops to Mogadishu while residents fled in anticipation of a major confrontation. There were also reports of renewed fighting between Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam in the south.

In a 29 January statement Al-Shabaab confirmed officially for the first time that it had joined Al Qaida’s “international jihad”.

In February there were reports that representatives of the TFG and Ahlu Suna Wal Jamma (ASWJ), a pro-government Islamist group that controls parts of central Somalia, were holding talks in Addis Ababa to further strengthen cooperation, possibly through inclusion of ASWJ in the Somali government.
Human Rights-Related Developments

Following his fourth monitoring mission to the Horn of Africa, the UN Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, Dr. Shamsul Bari, issued a strong warning on the security, human rights and humanitarian situation in the country. In a statement on 28 January, Dr. Bari said civilians in South and Central Somalia continued to bear the brunt of the fighting between TFG forces and insurgents. He urged the international community and the UN to strengthen international engagement and support to Somalia, including to Puntland and Somaliland. “This increased support is required”, he said, “particularly for the implementation of the three pillars of the Djibouti process—political, security and recovery—which all include crosscutting human rights issues”.

Key Issues

A technical issue for the Council in March is renewal of the Monitoring Group’s mandate. A related issue is merging the two mandates currently defined by resolutions 1853 and 1907 on Somalia and Eritrea respectively.

A second issue is whether additional experts are needed as a result of the Monitoring Group’s added responsibilities and whether it should be based elsewhere than Nairobi in light of recent threats received there by its members.

Another issue is the need to update the guidelines of the Sanctions Committee as requested by resolution 1907.

A wider issue is moving to effective implementation of the targeted sanctions in resolutions 1844 and 1907. The Sanctions Committee has yet to make any designations under resolution 1844 well over a year after its adoption. Related issues are the impact any designations may have on the government’s reconciliation efforts and whether the Council will take action against those obstructing humanitarian access. (This sanctions criterion, which is found only in the Somalia and Democratic Republic of the Congo sanctions regimes, has never been applied.)

A final issue is whether the Council should now focus on the situation in Somalia also in the context of the 1267 sanctions regime against Al Qaida/Taliban which authorises targeted measures against groups or individuals associated with Al Qaida. (So far only a few designations of individuals relating to the Horn of Africa have been made under this regime.)

Options

Options for the Council include:

- requesting the Secretary-General to reestablish the Monitoring Group for another 12 months within a specified time frame (in order to avoid any delay in its reestablishment, as was the case after the last mandate renewal) with an expanded mandate and adding further experts;
- requesting the Committee to highlight focus on monitoring and implementation;
- sending a small mission to the region led by the chair of the Sanctions Committee, to signal its support to the work of the Monitoring Group (such a mission was originally planned to take place last November, but was postponed);
- designating, in the Sanctions Committee, individuals and entities for targeted sanctions, or if the Committee fails to progress on designations, bringing the issue to the Council for a decision; and
- increasing its focus on the Horn of Africa through the 1267 Committee.

Council Dynamics

It seems that Council members are having difficulties with designations of individuals and entities for targeted measures. Some members supporting implementation of the regime often explain the delay as resulting from the lengthy domestic procedures involved in producing designation proposals.

There appears to be general support among Council members for designations if there is sufficient evidence. However, positions are likely to remain vague until there are concrete proposals on the table.

It seems that attempts to designate Eritrean nationals could be controversial. Libya, which voted against resolution 1907, has left the Council, but several other members only reluctantly supported the targeted measures against Eritrea and China abstained. New members like Brazil and Lebanon seem to be generally cautious on sanctions and prefer a more balanced approach.

On the wider issues related to Somalia, most Council members appear to believe the Council is already doing as much as it can and that the main challenge now lies in implementation of what is already in place.

The UK is the lead country on Somalia in the Council.

Selected UN Documents

Selected Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1907 (23 December 2009) imposed an arms embargo and targeted sanctions against Eritrea.
- S/RES/1862 (14 January 2009) demanded that Eritrea withdraw its forces within five weeks to the positions of the status quo ante in its border dispute with Djibouti and engage in dialogue to resolve the dispute.
- S/RES/1853 (19 December 2008) extended the mandate of the Somalia Monitoring Group and requested the Secretary-General to reestablish it for a period of 12 months. (It was re-established in March 2009.)

Latest Secretary-General’s Report


Selected Meeting Records

- S/PV.6259 (14 January 2010) was the last briefing by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative.
- S/PV.6254 (23 December 2009) was the adoption of the Eritrea sanctions resolution with explanations of vote.

Other

- S/2010/69 (4 February 2010) was a letter from Eritrea denouncing a 1 February communiqué from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development welcoming resolution 1907.
• S/2010/59 (28 January 2010) was a letter from Eritrea criticising US policy in the Horn of Africa region.
• S/2010/14 (7 January 2010) was a letter from the chairman of the Somalia Sanctions Committee transmitting its 2009 report to the Council President.
• S/2009/666 (23 December 2009) was a letter from Eritrea protesting the Council’s decision to impose sanctions on it.
• S/2008/769 (10 December 2008) was the last report of the Somalia Monitoring Group.

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania)

Chairman of the Somalia Sanctions Committee
Claude Heller (Mexico)

Additional Useful Sources
• Communiqué of the AU Peace and Security Council renewing AMISOM’s mandate.
• Somalia: International Military and Policing Assistance should be reviewed, Amnesty International, January 2010.

Liberia

Expected Council Action
In March the Council will discuss the Secretary-General’s report on UNMIL. Ellen Margrethe Loj, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Liberia will brief. Developments over the last five months and progress in meeting key benchmarks are likely to be discussed. Most members appear content with the progress being made. No new decisions are expected at this point.

Under resolution 1885 UNMIL’s mandate continues until 30 September 2010.

Key Recent Developments
On 26 February four people were killed and 25 wounded in the northern Liberian region of Lofa County and churches and mosques were damaged in inter-communal clashes. The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) sent a formed police unit and military personnel to assist the national police. A curfew was imposed on the area and an investigation is expected into the incident.

On 17 December 2009 the Council adopted resolution 1903, renewing for 12 months targeted sanctions on persons seen as a threat to Liberia. The Council also adjusted the arms embargo so that it would not apply to arms and related materiel used by the UNMIL for training Liberian authorities. The Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts monitoring the implementation of the sanctions until 20 December 2010.

In December the Sanctions Committee on Liberia removed Ali Kleiłat, a businessman involved in arms delivery to Charles Taylor, from the list.

On 17 February the Secretary-General’s latest report was circulated to the Council. It said that although Liberia continues to make progress towards peace and stability, significant challenges remained in the development of security and legal institutions. It also identified adequate financial resources as crucial to continued progress in Liberia.

Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf announced on 25 January that she would be a candidate in the 2011 elections.

A by-election for a senate seat in Monteserrado County was held on 10 November 2009, with a run-off on 24 November. The by-election revealed some of the weaknesses of the National Elections Commission particularly in logistics and dissemination of information. However, many of the problems were addressed in the subsequent run-off election.

On 1 January the Liberian government took over full responsibility for the development of the army although ongoing training and development requirements make it unlikely that the Armed Forces of Liberia will be independently operational before 2012.

UNMIL is in the middle of the third phase of its drawdown and expects to repatriate 2,029 military personnel from its current 9,150 by May 2010.

A working group on transition planning, made up of the UN Country Team and UNMIL, was created following the adoption of resolution 1885 in September 2009. It is working on developing a comprehensive plan for the future UN role in Liberia with a focus on effective transition during UNMIL’s drawdown.

On 22 February, George Boley, former leader of the Liberian Peace Council, an insurgent group implicated in numerous abuses during the 14 years of civil war, was arrested in the US.

Human Rights-Related Developments
The final edited report of Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission was released on 1 December 2009. The report makes over 140 recommendations intended to redress Liberia’s legacy of conflict and human rights violations. The Commission found that all warring factions were responsible for gross human rights violations in Liberia, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. The report recommends more than 120 individuals by name for prosecution, including persons associated with all the major warring factions. Human Rights Watch has called for the legislature to back prosecutions for serious crimes in accordance with international standards and for key international partners to provide relevant support, including technical and financial assistance. Liberia’s legislature is expected to consider the Commission’s recommendations early in 2010.

Key Issues
A key issue is the type of oversight role that the Council needs to play as UNMIL moves towards an exit. Given the Council’s recent interest in the integration of peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development, an issue is how to give effect to this in practice as UNMIL begins its transition.

A related issue is ensuring that UNMIL continues to perform its key functions effectively during the drawdown phase.
Another issue is identifying lessons learnt from the November 2009 senatorial by-election that could help the National Elections Commission prepare for the 2011 presidential elections. A significant issue is the potential destabilising effect from the political situations in neighbouring Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire.

A further issue is what the Council can do to encourage greater progress in building security and rule-of-law institutions, given that these areas are closely tied to UNMIL’s exit strategy.

With the challenging financial environment, obtaining sustained funding from donors is increasingly an issue.

Underlying Problems
A potential looming problem is possible backlash from the Liberian people as the government begins to implement the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s recommendations. There appear to be deep divisions over the main issues in the report.

Another problem is the reaction to Sirleaf’s candidacy in the 2011 elections given that the Commission recommended that she face a thirty-year sanction from holding public office for her early support of Charles Taylor (in his initial rebellion against former President Samuel Doe).

There continue to be security problems stemming from a lack of public confidence in the justice system, tensions between the Armed Forces of Liberia and other security agencies, and ex-combatants who easily resort to violence. Illegal cross-border activities have been kept under control partly because of UNMIL’s presence but could become a larger problem as the mission draws down.

Options
The most likely option for the Council is to listen to the Secretary-General’s briefing and to have a discussion on developments in Liberia and UNMIL’s progress in meeting its core benchmarks.

Council Dynamics
Most members do not feel the need for any decisions to be taken at this point. Although some members have indicated in the past that they would like to see UNMIL move more expeditiously towards a transition and exit strategy, there appears to be awareness that no further downsizing should occur until the 2011 elections are over. The African members and the US are particularly keen to ensure that UNMIL does not make a premature exit from Liberia.

Some members see UNMIL as a good case study of how peacekeeping and peacebuilding functions can overlap in a mission that is moving towards exit and may wish to discuss this aspect further, taking into account the debate on transition and exit strategies in peacekeeping held on 12 February. There may be interest in having more information on the comprehensive plan being developed by the working group on transition planning.

The US is the lead country on this issue in the Council.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1903 (17 December 2009) renewed the sanctions regime for Liberia for a further 12 months and extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 20 December 2010.
- S/RES/1885 (15 September 2009) renewed UNMIL’s mandate for 12 months.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2010/88 (17 February 2010) was the report on UNMIL.
- S/2007/479 (8 August 2007) was the initial drawdown plan for UNMIL.

Other

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Ellen Margrethe Loj (Denmark)
UNMIL Force Commander
Lieutenant-General A.T.M Zahirul Alam (Bangladesh)

UNMIL: Size, Composition and Cost
- Strength as of 1 February 2010: 9,380 personnel, including 9150 troops, 126 military observers and 84 staff officers
- Key contributing countries: Bangladesh, Nigeria and Pakistan

Sierra Leone

Expected Council Action
In March the Council is expected to hold a debate on the Secretary-General’s next report on the work of UNIPSIL. The Council will be briefed by its Head, Michael von der Schulenburg. The mandate of UNIPSIL expires on 30 September.

Key Recent Developments
On 15 September 2009 the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1886 extending the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) until 30 September 2010. The resolution also:
- emphasised the importance for UNIPSIL of achieving jointly with the UN country team the objectives of the Joint Vision for Sierra Leone within their respective mandates;
- called “upon the Secretary-General to develop a set of benchmarks for the transition of UNIPSIL into a UN Country Team presence, taking into account those already agreed upon by the government and the UN in the Joint Vision for Sierra Leone, and the particular challenges involved in preparing for the 2012 elections, to keep these under active review, and regularly report on progress to the Security Council;” and
- requested that the Secretary-General keep the Council informed every six months of progress made in the implementation of the mandate of UNIPSIL and this resolution.
In October 2009 the UN-mandated Special Court for Sierra Leone held its final hearing in Freetown, with judges upholding the convictions of three former rebel Revolutionary United Front leaders. In November 2009 the eight people convicted by the court were transferred to Rwanda to be housed in a facility constructed to hold people convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda because prison facilities in Sierra Leone do not meet international standards for housing people convicted by international tribunals. The only remaining case for the court is the trial of former Liberian President Charles Taylor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which continues in the defence phase at The Hague.

On 27 January Sierra Leonean President Ernest Bai Koroma condemned the corrupt conduct in virtually all the ministries and state institutions in charge of law enforcement in the country at a special emergency meeting. Speaking to the related ministers and heads of agencies (e.g. justice, internal affairs, mineral resources, marine resources, standards bureau, births and deaths, immigration, national revenue authority, etc.), he pointed out malpractices undermining national development, challenged them to take responsibility of ensuring due diligence in their various offices and warned that those found wanting would be sacked, and possibly subjected to legal prosecution.

Key Issues
A key issue, given the relatively quiet period Sierra Leone has been experiencing in terms of political and military risks, is whether the Council is adding value to the sustainable consolidation of peace in Sierra Leone and whether the Council should move to a more technical oversight role leaving the PBC to take the lead on substantive matters.

Underlying Problems
It seems that the real problems in Sierra Leone now are socioeconomic coupled with weaknesses in state institutions relating to democracy and the rule of law, youth unemployment of more than 70 percent and illicit drug trafficking.

Options
Taking no formal action is the most likely option at the moment. But one possible option is to issue a statement signalling the Council’s intention to take a lower key role in the absence of adverse developments involving threats to peace and security.

Council Dynamics
The Council’s request for only two progress reports in 2010 (down from the quarterly reports of 2009) is indicative of the prevailing view among its members that the security situation in Sierra Leone has improved. Some Council members seem interested in highlighting the current peacebuilding focus. Others remain interested in monitoring progress in the security sector reform efforts and cite the prompt and innovative response by both national and international peacebuilding partners to violent clashes in March 2009 between supporters of Sierra Leone’s two major political parties as confirmation of the importance of the Council continuing to take an ongoing interest. (Please see our June 2009 Monthly Forecast for further details.) It seems the Council is more comfortable with a lighter approach to following developments in the country compared to other conflict theatres but it remains to be seen what this will mean in practice.

Thus the presence of the new members of the Council—Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Gabon, Lebanon and Nigeria—is not expected to significantly alter the existing dynamics of the Council regarding the situation in Sierra Leone.

The UK is the lead country on this issue in the Council.

UN Documents
Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1886 (15 September 2009) extended the mandate of UNIPSIL until 30 September 2010.
- S/RES/1829 (4 August 2008) authorised the creation of UNIPSIL to replace UNIOSIL for one year commencing 1 October.

Other
- S/PV.6187 (14 September 2009) was the verbatim record of the open debate by the Council to consider the first report of the Secretary-General on UNIPSIL.
- A/HRC/10/52 (4 March 2009) was the annual report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on Sierra Leone.
- S/PV.6080 (9 February 2009) was the open debate by the Council to consider the completion strategy for UNIOSIL.
- S/2008/63 (31 January 2008) was the letter from the Secretary-General conveying the completion strategy for UNIOSIL.

PBC
- PBC/3/SLE/6 (10 June 2009) was the outcome of the PBC High-level Special Session on Sierra Leone.
- PBC/3/SLE/L.2 (10 June 2009) was the PBC’s latest conclusions and
recommendations on Sierra Leone.
- **PBC/3/SLE/4** (6 April 2009) was the PBC statement welcoming the joint communiqué between the two leading political parties in Sierra Leone.
- **PBC/2/SLE/1** (3 December 2007) was the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework.
- **PBC/OC/1/2** (21 June 2006) was a letter from the Council president to the Secretary-General referring Sierra Leone to the PBC.

### Other Relevant Facts

**UNISIL Executive Representative of the Secretary-General**
- Michael von der Schulenburg (Germany)

**Size and Composition of Mission**
- **Staff strength (as of 31 December 2009)**: 29 international civilians and 29 local civilians.
- **Duration**: 1 October 2008 to present; mandate expires 30 September 2010

### Guinea-Bissau

#### Expected Council Action

In March the Council is expected to consider the first report of the Secretary-General on the new Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau known as UNOGBIS. Joseph Mutaboba is expected to introduce the report to the Council. The mandate of the office expires on 31 December.

#### Key Recent Developments

On 5 November 2009 the then Representative of the Secretary-General to Guinea-Bissau and Head of the previous UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau briefed the Council. He highlighted the weakness of the justice system which had eroded confidence of the citizenry, especially against the backdrop of unresolved politically motivated violence. Mutaboba said that the opportunity for change required commitment and results on the part of the government and adequate international support to address the country’s short-term challenges and the long-term goals, including strengthening state institutions.

The Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Antonio Maria Costa, also briefed the Council on the problem of drug trafficking. He noted that over the preceding 18 months, drug seizures had dropped significantly in the region. But that trend had to be interpreted cautiously, he added, especially since demand for cocaine persisted.

The Council adopted a presidential statement reiterating the importance of consolidating democracy, security, the rule of law and national reconciliation to ensure sustainable peace in Guinea-Bissau.

On 28 December 2009 former navy Rear Admiral José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto, who had been in exile in Gambia since a failed coup attempt in August 2008 against Guinea-Bissau President Joao Bernardo Vieira, entered UN premises in Bissau and sought asylum. The UN facilitated talks with the government leading to his Tchuto’s voluntary surrender on 8 January, under guarantee of his legal rights.

#### Developments in the Peacebuilding Commission

On 8 February the chair of the PBC Guinea-Bissau configuration, Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti of Brazil, briefed on the visit to Guinea-Bissau from 16 to 21 January to assess implementation of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding.

The PBC adopted its conclusions and recommendations on the first review of the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau, which acknowledged that progress was being made and established a focus for peacebuilding priorities for the near future.

#### Human Rights-Related Developments

The Universal Periodic Review of Guinea-Bissau by the Human Rights Council is scheduled for 7 May. Amnesty International has lodged a submission that Guinea-Bissau should ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, its two Optional Protocols, and the Convention against Torture.

#### Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is whether the recent positive trends are consolidating into a sustainable peace. A related issue in the minds of many Council members will be whether, since transitioning from UNOGBIS, the mission is indeed playing a real role in harmonising the work of all UN presence in the country and resulting in greater efficiency and effectiveness.

A second issue is whether there are areas where ongoing Council attention is needed to sustain progress in peace consolidation.

#### Underlying Problems

Many of the serious socioeconomic challenges that have been factors in the instability in the country remain. These include widespread poverty, youth unemployment, weak justice institutions and inadequate resources to effectively combat drug trafficking and organised crime, which are beginning to affect most of the West African subregion. Also, while a degree of normalcy has been achieved in the country since the political assassinations in 2009, political tensions and divisions are still close to the surface.

#### Options

One main option the Council may consider is whether to signal ongoing active interest in developments in the country (and if so, whether to issue a formal statement) or whether to begin the process of shifting to a less active mode. (The second report of UNOGBIS is due in June.)

#### Council Dynamics

It remains to be seen how the presence of Brazil and Nigeria, which joined the Council in January, will affect the Council’s approach. Both countries seem to be

---

**Human Rights-Related Developments**

**The Universal Periodic Review of Guinea-Bissau by the Human Rights Council is scheduled for 7 May. Amnesty International has lodged a submission that Guinea-Bissau should ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, its two Optional Protocols, and the Convention against Torture.**
strongly interested in consolidating peace in Guinea-Bissau through peacebuilding as well as continuing to show an active and supportive interest in the Security Council. This could lead to more sustained attention to the country. Brazil is the lead on this issue in the Council and has historically played a leading role as a member of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries and also the chair of the PBC country-specific configuration for Guinea-Bissau. Nigeria is a major player in the West African subregion.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**
- S/RES/1876 (26 June 2009) renewed the mandate of UNOGBIS until 31 December 2009 and requested the Secretary-General to establish UNOGBIS beginning on 1 January 2010 for an initial period of 12 months.
- S/RES/1233 (6 April 1999) supported the Secretary-General’s decision to establish UNOGBIS.

**Selected Presidential Statements**
- S/PRES/2009/29 (5 November 2009) welcomed the planning for the transition of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) to an Integrated Peacebuilding Office (UNOGBIS).
- S/PRES/2009/2 (3 March 2009) condemned the assassination of President Vieira and the chief of the armed forces of Guinea-Bissau, and urged continued adherence to stability, constitutional order, the rule of law and the democratic process.
- S/PRES/2009/7 (24 October 2007) called on the Guinean-Bissau government and the UN system to take further action on drug trafficking and organised crime.

**Selected Letters**
- S/2009/56 (30 January 2009) and S/2009/55 (27 January 2009) was the exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the president of the Council on the appointment of Joseph Mutaboba as the Secretary-General’s Representative in Guinea-Bissau and head of UNOGBIS.
- S/2008/778 (22 December 2008) and S/2008/777 (10 December 2008) was the exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the president of the Council that revised and extended the UNOGBIS mandate to 30 June 2009 and requested recommendations on establishment of an integrated UN Office in Guinea-Bissau by 15 June 2009.
- S/2008/208 (25 March 2008) was a letter from the chairperson of the PBC’s configuration on Guinea-Bissau.
- S/1999/232 (3 March 1999) welcomed the Secretary-General’s proposal to establish UNOGBIS.

**Selected Report on UNOGBIS**
- S/2009/552 (22 October 2009)

**PBC Documents**
- PBC/4/GNB/1 (16 December 2009) was the progress report on the implementation of the Peacebuilding Strategic Framework for Guinea-Bissau.
- PBC/3/GNB/5 (4 March 2009) was the statement by the chair of the PBC’s configuration on Guinea-Bissau concerning the assassination of President João Bernardo Vieira and army chief Tagme Na Waie.

**Other**
- S/PV.6212 (5 November 2009) was the briefing by the Representative of the Secretary-General and the head of UNOGBIS.
- S/2008/87 (28 December 2007) was the letter from the chair of the PBC informing the president of the Council about the placement of Guinea-Bissau on the PBC’s agenda.

**Lebanon**

**Expected Council Action**
Council members are expecting the Secretary-General’s report on resolution 1701 in March which may set the scene for discussion of the Secretariat’s recently completed comprehensive review of UNIFIL. However, the mandate continues until 31 August and it is possible that discussion in the Council will be delayed. The UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Michael Williams, is expected to brief.

No formal action is expected in March.

**Key Recent Developments**
The fifth anniversary of the Hariri assassination was 14 February. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, authorised by resolution 1757 to investigate the killing, is due to submit its first annual report in March 2010 (there have been no indictments to date). Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri met with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in December to discuss strengthening cooperation between the two countries. This was his first meeting with Assad since the assassination of his father, former premier Rafiq Hariri, in 2005.

On 14 February the Lebanese army fired on, but did not hit, Israeli aircraft violating Lebanon’s airspace (similar incidents occurred in late 2009). On 10 February Hariri characterised continued Israeli overflights and heightened Israeli rhetoric toward Lebanon and between Israel and Syria as a dangerous escalation.
On 12 February the Secretary-General submitted the conclusions of the Joint DPKO-UNIFIL Technical Review to the Council. The review assessed the operational capacity of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in light of the fact that it has been over three years since the end of the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. It did not call for any changes to UNIFIL’s mandate, authorised strength or rules of engagement. However, the Secretary-General emphasised that the current size of UNIFIL could not be sustained indefinitely and that progress must be made toward achieving a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution. The review reached several key conclusions, including:

- strengthening UNIFIL’s liaison and coordination function with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), in particular the establishment of a liaison office in Tel Aviv;
- creating a more mobile and flexible force trained and equipped to quickly respond to incidents;
- establishing a task force to accelerate the demarcation of the Blue Line;
- formalising a mechanism to facilitate the LAF’s gradual assumption of security responsibility from UNIFIL; and
- maintaining the Maritime Task Force as an essential component of UNIFIL.

On 31 January 2010 a Lebanese citizen was detained by the IDF and released to UNIFIL the next day.

On 26 December 2009 UNIFIL discovered a cache of explosives outside Khiam in southern Lebanon near the border with Israel. UNIFIL, in cooperation with the LAF, is investigating.

On 18 December 2009 residents of Ghajar, a village that extends north of the Blue Line, protested following media reports that Israel was close to reaching an understanding with UNIFIL regarding an IDF withdrawal. Many residents of Ghajar became citizens of Israel after its annexation of the Golan Heights in 1981. On 21 January Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon said that no final decision had been made.

On 10 November 2009 a government was formed in Lebanon, five months after the 7 June elections: 15 ministers were appointed from Hariri’s majority coalition, five were appointed by Lebanese President Michel Sleiman and ten from the opposition, including two from Hezbollah. The new cabinet adopted a decision which allows Hezbollah to remain armed, citing its resistance role, while assuring the government’s commitment to resolution 1701.

On 4 November 2009 Israel intercepted the ship Francop (sailing under the flag of Antigua and Barbuda), alleging that the weapons found on board were bound from Iran to Hezbollah via Syria, in violation of resolutions 1701 and 1747 (Iran sanctions). Syria, Iran and Hezbollah denied any link to the weapons.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is whether UNIFIL’s reorganisation and focus on capacity-building and confidence-building measures will, by itself, provide any new incentives for Lebanon and Israel to move from the status quo—cessation of hostilities—toward a ceasefire and permanent solution.

A related issue is whether progress on Ghajar and the Blue Line may be possible and, if so, whether it may signal scope for more active mediation on other issues, such as Sheb’a Farms and the related question of disarmament.

A further issue is how to respond to the annual report of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which is expected to be forwarded to the Council by the Secretary-General (the Tribunal’s reporting requirement is to the Secretary-General and the Government of Lebanon).

Underlying Problems
Israeli overflights of Lebanese air space continue in violation of resolution 1701. Hezbollah maintains significant military capacity in violation of resolutions 1559 and 1701, but justified by Lebanon in light of the ongoing Israeli occupation of portions of Lebanese territory—particularly the Sheba Farms.

Options
In light of recent heightened rhetoric in the region and the numerous incidents in southern Lebanon, one option for Council members is to send a positive signal to help maintain calm. A press or presidential statement could:

- welcome the recommendations of the UNIFIL comprehensive review and their potential for assisting the parties to move closer to agreement; and
- reinforce the importance, as this next phase unfolds, of all parties fully meeting their obligations on outstanding elements of resolution 1701.

Council Dynamics
Council members see UNIFIL’s value in maintaining stability but also share the Secretary-General’s observation that the peacekeeping operation’s post-2006 size and structure cannot be maintained indefinitely. However, they are wary of any sudden shifts in size or mandate of UNIFIL given the fragile calm. Most Council members would like to see real momentum towards a ceasefire.

Lebanon, an elected Council member, is supportive of the review’s recommendations. In addition, it would also see value in a more active focus by the Council on the political questions regarding a ceasefire and border issues.

Most Council members agree that progress on issues related to arms smuggling and disarmament is essential but seem to accept that this is only likely to happen in the context of an inter-Lebanese dialogue and improvement on the Israel-Syria track. (Regarding the Francop interception, Council members seem to agree that it is an issue for the Iran Sanctions Committee and is not a 1701 issue.)

France is the lead country on Lebanon in the Council.

UN Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Council Resolutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/1757 (30 May 2007) established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**UN Documents**

**Selected Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1757 (30 May 2007) established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel.
- S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004)
urged withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, disarmament of all militias, and extension of the Lebanese government’s control over all Lebanese territory.

**Selected Secretary-General’s Reports**

- S/2009/566 (2 November 2009) was the latest report on resolution 1701.
- S/2009/542 (21 October 2009) was the latest report on resolution 1559.

**Selected Letters**

- S/2010/86 (12 February 2010) was from the Secretary-General transmitting the conclusions of the Joint DPKO-UNIFIL Technical Review to the Council.
- S/2010/74 (2 February 2010) and S/2010/61 (1 February 2010) were regarded the detention and return of a Lebanese citizen by the IDF.
- S/2010/11 (7 January 2010) was from Israel regarding the 26 December discovery of an explosives cache in southern Lebanon.
- S/2009/574 (5 November 2009) was from Israel regarding the *Francop* interception.
- S/2009/544 (19 October 2009) was a position paper from Lebanon in preparation for the Secretary-General’s comprehensive review of UNIFIL.
- S/2009/407 (6 August 2009) was from the Secretary-General to the Council on the UNIFIL mandate renewal including the plan for a comprehensive review of UNIFIL.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Coordinator for Lebanon**

Michael Williams (UK)

**Special Envoy for the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559**

Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway)

**UNIFIL Force Commander**

Major-General Alberto Asarta Cuevas (Spain)

**Size and Composition of UNIFIL as of 31 December 2009**

- **Authorised**: 15,000 troops
- **Current**: 11,862 military personnel
- **Troop Contributors**: Belgium, Brunei, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, El Salvador, France, FYR of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, Nepal, Niger, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Tanzania and Turkey

**Duration**

March 1978 to present; mandate expires 31 August 2010

**Cost**

1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010: $589.80 million (A/C.5/63/25)
The Council is expected to undertake a visiting mission to DRC, Uganda and Rwanda in mid April.

Elections in Sudan are expected in April.

Elections are expected for April in Northern Cyprus.

The Human Rights Council is expected to conduct its Universal Periodic Review of Guinea-Bissau and Kenya in May.

National elections are expected in the Central African Republic before the end of April.

The promulgation of Nepal’s new constitution is expected by 28 May.

The ICJ advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence is expected sometime during the first half of 2010.

Presidential elections are expected in Guinea on 27 June.

The Palestinian Authority has scheduled local elections for 17 July.

Presidential and legislative elections are expected in Burundi on 28 June and in late July.

Parliamentary elections in Afghanistan are expected on 18 September.

Legislative elections in Chad are expected for November.

General elections in Myanmar are expected later in 2010.

Legislative elections in the DRC are expected in July 2011 and presidential elections are expected in October 2011.

Legislative and presidential elections in Liberia are expected in October 2011.