



# SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT

## MONTHLY FORECAST

### FEB 2010



29 January 2010

This report is available online and can be viewed together with Update Reports on developments during the month at [www.securitycouncilreport.org](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org)

## OVERVIEW FOR FEBRUARY

France will hold the Council presidency in February.

A debate on transition and exit strategies in peacekeeping operations is planned in the second week. It will be preceded by consultations with participation of the heads of the peacekeeping and field support departments who will update Council members on the two departments' respective recent strategic studies.

One mandate will come up for renewal in February, the UN Mission in **Timor-Leste** (UNMIT). A briefing by the head of UNMIT and informal consultations are planned. The resolution will be adopted in a formal meeting.

A public Council meeting will also be held to hear a briefing by the head of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Antonio Maria Costa on transnational threats to international peace and security posed by organised crime.

The Secretary-General is expected to brief the Council in consultations on his recent travel to London, Addis Ababa and Cyprus.

The Council will receive several other briefings in public sessions:

- the monthly briefing on the **Middle East**;
- the annual briefing by the **Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe**

>> page 2

### CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUE

#### Status Update since our January

<b>Forecast</b> .....	<b>2</b>
<b>Democratic Republic of the Congo</b> ....	<b>3</b>
<b>Chad/CAR</b> .....	<b>5</b>
<b>Timor-Leste</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>Peacekeeping</b> .....	<b>9</b>
<b>Iran</b> .....	<b>12</b>
<b>Sudan/Darfur</b> .....	<b>14</b>
<b>Israel/Palestine</b> .....	<b>16</b>
<b>Iraq</b> .....	<b>18</b>
<b>DPRK (North Korea)</b> .....	<b>20</b>
<b>Security Council Statistics for 2009</b> .....	<b>21</b>
<b>Notable Dates for February</b> .....	<b>24</b>
<b>Important Dates over the Horizon</b> ...24	

## Aide-Memoire

Important matters pending include:

- The quarterly reports of the International Security Assistance Force in **Afghanistan** continue to be seriously delayed. (The last report, released in June 2009, covered the period from August 2008 to January 2009.)
- Reports from the **Kosovo** Force (KFOR) have disappeared. The last one available covers the period from 1 to 31 July 2008.
- The Secretary-General continues to delay responding to the mandate to assist with the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially **Sheb'a Farms**, in accordance with resolution 1701.
- The Council has yet to agree on the election of chairs and vice chairs of **subsidiary bodies** for 2010. The election is normally announced in early January in a note by the President of the Council but at press time it had not been out.

- The Council requested the Secretariat on 21 November 2006 (S/2006/928) to **update the index to Council notes and statements on working methods**. This has not been published.
- The latest report of the **Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team**, issued on 25 August 2008, still awaits Council consideration (S/2008/582).
- The 2005 World Summit requested that the Security Council consider reforms for the **Military Staff Committee**. This has yet to be addressed.
- The Secretary-General is yet to report to the Council on **Kenya** as requested in a February 2008 presidential statement (S/PRST/2008/4).
- The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in **Côte**

**d'Ivoire**, requested in a May 2004 presidential statement (S/PRST/2004/17), has still not been made public. Also on Côte d'Ivoire, the December 2005 report by the Secretary-General's Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not been published.

- UNAMI reports on human rights in **Iraq**, in the past produced every two to three months, have decreased in their frequency and regularity. The last report, released in December 2009, covered the period from 1 January to 30 June 2009.
- In a presidential statement on **Darfur** in July 2008 (S/PRST/2008/27) the Council noted the UN investigation underway into the 8 July 2008 attack against UNAMID peacekeepers. The Council has not followed up this investigation.

Chairman-in-Office, Secretary of State and Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan, Kanat Saudabayev;

- a briefing on **Darfur**;
- on **Iraq**, most likely by the head of UNAMI, Ad Melkert;
- on **sexual violence in conflict** (a follow-up to resolution 1888) is possible; and
- also possible is a briefing on **Haiti**

and the aftermath of the 12 January earthquake.

Informal consultations are expected on the **Democratic People's Republic of Korea** (briefing by the chair of the Sanctions Committee) and discussion of a possible presidential statement on **Guinea** is also likely in informal consultations.

On Chad and the Central African Republic, informal consultations are possible. There is also a possibility of consultations on **Haiti** to discuss MINUSTAH's mandate and whether it needs to be modified to perform new, post-earthquake recovery tasks.

On the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, a meeting at the experts level is expected.

## Status Update since our January Forecast

- **Afghanistan:** The Council was briefed by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative for Afghanistan, Kai Eide, on 6 January (S/PV.6255). The Secretary-General told the Council that Afghanistan was at a critical juncture. He also said that better coordination based on strong political willingness of the international community and strong local effort was needed. Eide said he was worried about negative trends in Afghanistan and outlined a political strategy that prioritised a systematic approach to civilian institution-building.
- **West Africa:** On 12 January the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) briefed (S/PV.6256) the Council on the Secretary-General's latest report (S/2009/682) on the situation in West Africa and the activities of UNOWA.
- **Cooperation Between the UN and Regional Organisations:** On 13 January the Council held a debate on cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional organisations in maintaining international peace and security (S/PV.6257). Representatives of the AU, Association of Southeast Asian Nations; Collective Security Treaty Organisation, EU, League of Arab States, NATO, Organization of American States; Organisation of the Islamic Conference; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; Pacific Islands Forum; and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation participated. The Secretary-General, who the day before held a retreat with heads of international organisations, addressed the Council as well. At the end of the debate the Council issued a presidential statement (S/PRST/

2010/1) promising further action to promote better operational cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional organisations. Conflict early warning, prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding were highlighted. The Council commended the Secretariat's efforts to consolidate partnerships including the Secretary-General's retreat and encouraged the Secretariat and regional and subregional organisations to develop information-sharing and to continue to compile best practices, in particular in the field of mediation, good offices and peacekeeping.

- **Central Asia:** On 14 January Council members met in informal consultations to hear a briefing on the activities of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia by the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Central Asia and head of the Centre, Miroslav Jenča. Following the meeting, the Council issued a press statement (SC/9843) encouraging further cooperation between the Centre and governments in the region and expressing continued support for its work.
- **Somalia:** On 14 January the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, briefed (S/PV.6259) the Council on the Secretary-General's latest report on Somalia (S/2009/684). Ould-Abdallah called for a strengthening of international support to the Somali government and enhanced cooperation with regional and subregional organisations. He also said the Council should "address vigorously the role of spoilers". Somali Ambassador to the UN Elmi Ahmed Duale, Permanent Observer for the

League of Arab States to the UN Yahya Mahmassani and the Commissioner for Peace and Security of the AU, Ramtane Lamamra, also spoke. In informal consultations following the briefing Council members expressed continued support for the government and the current UN strategy. On 28 January the Council adopted resolution 1910 renewing the authorisation of the AU Mission in Somalia until 31 January 2011.

- **Nepal:** On 15 January the Council was briefed (S/PV.6260) by the Representative of the Secretary-General, Karin Landgren, who also introduced the Secretary-General's report (S/2010/17). In her briefing Landgren said that although the fragility of the peace process remained real, parties had in the past month shown a "renewed urgency" on core issues. She stressed the importance of following up these developments and resolving the main tasks in the peace process. Nepal's Permanent Representative Gyan Chandra Acharya provided information on what the government hoped to do in the next few months. Following the briefing Council members held informal consultations. On 21 January the Council adopted resolution 1909 renewing UNMIN until 15 May 2010. The resolution also called for UNMIN to make the "necessary arrangements...for its withdrawal, including handing over any residual monitoring responsibilities by 15 May 2010".
- **Haiti:** On 19 January the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1908, increasing the force levels of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in order to support increased requirements in the aftermath of the 12 January earthquake. One thousand and five hundred additional police and

## Status Update since our January Forecast (continued)

2,000 additional military personnel were authorised. The Council had issued a press statement (SC/9846) on 18 January expressing deep sympathy to the people of Haiti, and condolences to the families of all members of MINUSTAH who lost their lives in the earthquake, including Special Representative of the Secretary-General Hedi Annabi, Principal Deputy Special Representative Luiz Carlos da Costa and Acting UN Police Commissioner in Haiti Doug Coates.

- **Côte d'Ivoire:** On 21 January the head of the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), Choi Young-Jin, briefed (S/PV.6263) the Council on the latest report of the Secretary-General (S/2010/15) and on progress

towards achieving key benchmarks of the Ouagadougou Agreement and its additional protocols. On 28 January the Council extended the mandate of UNOCI until 31 May 2010.

- **Kosovo:** On 22 January the Council held a debate on Kosovo (S/PV.6264). The Secretary-General's Special Representative and head of UNMIK Lamberto Zannier gave a briefing on the Secretary-General's latest report (S/2010/5) on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. In addition to Council members, Serbian President Boris Tadić and the Foreign Minister of Kosovo Skënder Hyseni spoke at the meeting.
- **Women, Peace and Security:** The Council

had been expecting in January advice from the Secretary-General regarding his proposals for monitoring and reporting within the existing UN system on the protection of women and children from rape and other sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations, as requested by resolution 1888. Also expected was the appointment of his Special Representative to lead the strengthening of existing UN coordination mechanisms and advocate on the prevention of sexual violence in armed conflict. It seems that some delays have been caused by the urgent demands on a number of senior Secretariat officials in the aftermath of the earthquake in Haiti.

## Democratic Republic of the Congo

### Expected Council Action

A closed oral briefing from the Secretariat at expert level for Council members and MONUC troop and police contributors is expected. Implementation of a protection strategy and the Secretariat's emerging Integrated Strategic Framework will be the focus. This is likely to lead into discussions in coming weeks on the future configuration for MONUC. The February briefing may also include an update on military operations in eastern DRC.

Also in February, a UN Technical Assessment Mission is expected to visit the DRC. A briefing upon its return is possible.

### Key Recent Developments

On 23 December 2009 the Council adopted resolution 1906 extending the deployment of the UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) until 31 May 2010. The short five month renewal represents a broad consensus that a major review of MONUC's role is now essential and is also in part an effort to show sensitivity to the growing concern from Kinshasa about MONUC's presence. President Kabila has called for a plan to withdraw MONUC troops prior to 30 June (the 50th anniversary of the DRC's independence). The resolution prioritises MONUC's

mandate to focus specifically on the protection of civilians. It also prioritises disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of Congolese armed groups and repatriation and resettlement of foreign armed groups and highlights the need for security sector reform (SSR). The resolution requests the Secretary-General to provide recommendations by 1 April on adjustments to MONUC's mandate to enable changes but without risking instability.

The resolution urges the DRC government to implement the "zero-tolerance policy" for human rights violations committed by elements of the DRC army. While requesting MONUC to continue to support army operations against militias in eastern DRC, the resolution also calls upon MONUC to withdraw support from army units linked to serious violations of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.

On 16 December 2009 the Secretary-General's Special Representative and head of MONUC, Alan Doss, briefed the Council. Doss said Kimia II—the joint army/MONUC operation to disrupt and disperse the Rwanda Hutu rebel *Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda* (FDLR) in eastern DRC—had largely met its objectives, though not without serious and tragic humanitarian consequences. The FDLR remained a potent threat, he said. Kimia II ended on 31 December 2009.

In January the joint team of MONUC and the DRC armed forces (FARDC) began Amani Leo, a new operation to protect civilians, hold territory taken from armed groups and help restore state authority in these areas. It is also to conduct targeted operations against remaining elements of the FDLR. MONUC will support FARDC units provided operations are jointly planned with MONUC and are real protection operations conducted in accordance with international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.

On 13 December 2009 a report published by Human Rights Watch (HRW) documented the deliberate killing of 1,400 civilians between January and September 2009 by government and rebel forces in eastern DRC during Kimia II and its predecessor operation. A further 7,500 cases of sexual violence against women and girls were reported across the Kivus during the same period, nearly double that of 2008. HRW said MONUC's support to the DRC military implicated it in these abuses and undermined the mission's primary objective to protect civilians. The report recommended creating and deploying a civilian protection expert group to provide specific recommendations on how to improve civilian protection in eastern DRC.

On 16 December 2009 the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions,

Philip Alston, said that UN peacekeepers should not cooperate with a military operation led by individuals accused of war crimes. Alston named two DRC army commanders who remain in their posts, Innocent Zimurinda and Bosco Ntaganda, who are facing serious accusations of human rights violations. (An arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court (ICC) is outstanding against Ntaganda.) Alston called on MONUC to make public the terms of any conditionality policy which it currently implements and to ensure adequate monitoring guarantees.

In December 2009, the Ugandan rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) reportedly killed 83 civilians in the Haut-Uélé district of Orientale province. A further 160 civilians including 17 children were abducted. In early January four civilians were reportedly killed near Dungu, Orientale province.

In 2009 more than 1,500 FDLR ex-combatants and more than 2,000 dependents were voluntarily repatriated. Nearly 15,000 Rwandan civilians were also repatriated by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

In mid-January, UNHCR reported 107,000 refugees from Equateur province since early November. A further 17,000 had crossed into the Central African Republic (CAR) following interethnic fighting in late October.

On 7 January Thomas Lubanga Dyilo's defence began at the ICC. Lubanga faces two counts of war crimes: enlisting and conscripting child soldiers and using them in hostilities in the DRC. The trial started on 26 January 2009.

### Human Rights-Related Developments

The DRC was considered as part of the Universal Periodic Review by the Human Rights Council (HRC), with an outcome adopted by the Working Group of the HRC on 7 December 2009. The DRC, represented by its Minister for Human Rights, accepted a large majority of the recommendations made by participants in the Working Group, including the need to ratify several

human rights instruments and to improve the legislative basis for implementing human rights obligations. Some other recommendations were not accepted by the DRC, such as pursuing members of the security forces suspected of having committed serious human rights violations. Twenty-eight other recommendations taken under advisement by the DRC will be the subject of a future response. These include ending impunity for crimes of sexual violence, protecting human rights defenders, implementing the ICC Statute and prosecuting those accused of war crimes. The response of the DRC to these recommendations will be included in the outcome report to be adopted by the HRC at its next session (1-26 March).

### Key Issues

An immediate key issue is assessing what is behind the sudden disenchantment with MONUC in Kinshasa and how to respond sensitively but responsibly given the ongoing acute security and stability issues.

Stability and security in eastern DRC remains a critical question. Fundamental to this is the FDLR issue, reintegrating former combatants, security sector reform and effective control over military forces. A recurrent question is how the Council can be seen as playing a more effective role on these issues.

A related issue is whether the prioritisation within resolution 1906 of MONUC's mandate will have any effect on the security situation in eastern DRC, and whether the DRC government in the coming months will be able to demonstrate a commitment to developing sustainable security sector institutions with respect to the rule of law.

A further issue is whether the Integrated Strategic Framework will impact in practice upon the future mandate of MONUC. An important issue for the Council is what role the DRC government would like to see MONUC playing in the future. MONUC's continuing support for FARDC, which includes elements responsible for human rights violations, seems likely to continue to be a

problem both for the UN and for Kinshasa.

Looking ahead, an issue to watch is the risk of deterioration of the security and political situations in neighbouring Burundi, CAR and Sudan in the lead up to elections in 2010 and 2011.

### Options

No Council action is expected in February. However, the interaction between Secretariat officials and Council member experts will begin a drawn out process of discussion of the Integrated Strategic Framework and the options for future reconfiguration of MONUC.

Options in this regard could include:

- accelerating the idea of a Council mission to the DRC—perhaps sending a small team of four to five Ambassadors for an in depth series of meetings;
- an Aria-style meeting focused on the broader challenges facing the DRC and the role the UN could play in addressing these;
- shifting resources away from MONUC's formed military units and putting additional capacity into civilian roles working on SSR, DDR and DDRRR;
- focusing military capacity more on advising and monitoring roles so as to assist government authorities to integrate protection of civilians into the planning of operations, and on monitoring the performance of FARDC battalions; and
- beginning to develop for MONUC, as a whole, activities that reflect the overlapping needs for peacebuilding type processes and outcomes as identified in paragraph nine of S/PRST/2009/24.

### Council Dynamics

Council members ultimately agreed on a five-month mandate despite initial concerns from some that more time was needed to see progress in SSR initiatives and that the security situation in the east warranted 12 months.

Resolution 1906 sets out clear expectations of both MONUC and the government in relation to the protection of civilians, SSR, DDR and DDRRR. During December's consultations on MONUC's mandate, China expressed concern at the priority given in the draft resolution to protection of civilians,

given the primary responsibility for such a task falls with the government. It was also concerned with the amount of detail provided on the conditionality of MONUC's support to the FARDC. However, it seemed comfortable with the final language.

Resolution 1906 is silent on the question of MONUC's support to elections. This seems to be deliberate so as to focus the mission's mandate and respond to critics who claim MONUC's mandate was too extensive for it to be effective.

There seems to be interest in shifting the mission towards a more integrated mission with more peacebuilding characteristics. There is skepticism by some as to whether the security situation in the east would allow immediate drawdown of MONUC's military component.

Most members seem committed to an extensive consultative process based on the Integrated Strategic Framework.

Some members seem keen to add names to the targeted sanctions list in accordance with the Group of Experts recommendations.

France is the lead country on the DRC.

## UN Documents

### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1906 (23 December 2009) extended the mandate of MONUC until 31 May 2010.
- S/RES/1896 (30 November 2009) extended the DRC sanctions and the mandate of the Group of Experts to 30 November 2010.
- S/RES/1843 (20 November 2008) authorised the temporary deployment of an additional 3,085 troops to reinforce MONUC's capacity.
- S/RES/1807 (31 March 2008) lifted the arms embargo for government forces, strengthened measures related to aviation and customs.

### Latest Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2009/24 (5 August 2009) was on UN peacekeeping operations.
- S/PRST/2008/48 (22 December 2008) welcomed regional efforts to address the security threat posed by the LRA.

## Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2009/623 (4 December 2009)
- S/2009/472 (18 September 2009)

## Other

- S/2009/667 (31 December 2009) detailed the activities of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) from 1 January to 31 December 2009.
- S/PV.6244 (16 December 2009) was the verbatim record briefing by the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Alan Doss.
- S/2009/603 (23 November 2009) was the latest report of the Group of Experts on the DRC.
- SC/9791 (17 November 2009) was the Council's press statement on the LRA.
- S/PV.6215 (9 November 2009) was the verbatim record briefing by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on the Great Lakes, Olusegun Obasanjo.
- SC/9703 (10 July 2009) was the Council's press statement on the DRC.
- SC/9608 (3 March 2009) was the press release on the addition of four individuals to the assets freeze and travel ban list by the DRC Sanctions Committee.
- S/2009/105 (19 February 2009) was the letter from the Secretary-General on the revised concept of operations and rules of engagement for MONUC.

## Other Relevant Facts

### Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission

Alan Doss (UK)

### MONUC Interim Force Commander

Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye (Senegal)

### Size, Composition and Cost of Mission

- *Strength as of 30 November 2009:* 18,614 troops, 701 military observers, 940 police, 1,008 international civilian personnel and 2,611 local civilian staff, 630 UN volunteers
- *Approved budget* (1 July 2009-30 June 2010): \$1,350.00 million

### Duration

30 November 1999 to present; mandate expires on 31 May 2010



## Chad/CAR

### Expected Council Action

In February, the Council is expecting a report from the Secretary-General on developments in eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic. The report will come against the backdrop of a recent request by the government of Chad, conveyed to the Secretary-General, not to renew the mandate for the peacekeeping operation MINURCAT, which expires on 15 March. No Council action is expected in February, but intense behind the scenes discussions are likely. A meeting with troop and police contributors to MINURCAT is expected. Input from UN humanitarian agencies and NGOs working in the camps of displaced persons protected by MINURCAT is also likely.

### Key Recent Developments

On 19 January the government of Chad requested that the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) be withdrawn. On 25 January the Secretariat responded by sending a technical assessment mission to the country.

Humanitarian groups present in Chad have expressed alarm at the possibility of MINURCAT's withdrawal, concerned about the security situation for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and their own operations.

The message from the government of Chad that the operation should be withdrawn by the end of April came unexpectedly. MINURCAT's key role had been training and advising the *Détachement intégré de sécurité* (DIS), of the Chadian police force to assume responsibility for security in camps for refugees and IDPs, as well as sites with concentrations of IDPs and key towns in neighbouring areas. MINURCAT also maintains security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and IDPs by facilitating the

provision of humanitarian assistance in eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic (CAR) and by creating favourable conditions for the reconstruction and economic and social development of those areas. MINURCAT has also been charged with a number of Chapter VII tasks in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR, including contributing to protecting civilians in danger, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations, and protecting UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment.

On 22 October 2009, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet briefed the Council and reported progress made in implementing the 13 August 2007 agreement between the government and the political opposition that would prepare Chad for November 2010 parliamentary elections, in particular the release of census data, which was accepted by parties; adoption of key legislation; and the establishment of the Electoral Commission. On CAR, Mulet stated that situation in the northeast has stabilised, but continued to be unpredictable because of sporadic interethnic clashes and weak state institutions. He encouraged the government of CAR to redouble its efforts to facilitate intercommunity dialogue and begin a credible disarmament process in the region.

The October 2009 Secretary-General's report had noted, however, MINURCAT's limited progress on the benchmarks in the strategic workplan, which include strengthened security coordination with DIS and national police, peace consolidation efforts and voluntary return of refugees and IDPs to their areas of origin. The report also said the lack of a comprehensive solution to the conflict with armed groups in eastern Chad and on broader governance reforms impacted any positive political development.

December 2009 saw increased violence (including banditry) in northeastern CAR, areas with a high population of refugees from Darfur. On 23 December MINURCAT increased its presence in areas near a

refugee camp in Sam Ouandja as tensions in the area led to clashes between the rebel group, Union of Democratic Forces for Unity, stationed in the area and Darfurian refugees. Two members of the rebel group were killed.

Tensions between Chad and Sudan remained high, with limited progress made towards implementing previous commitments to refrain from using force against each other and cease providing support to armed opposition groups. The presence of the Sudanese Justice and Equality Movement in border locations in northeast Chad and Chadian armed opposition groups on the Sudanese side of the border has continued, jeopardising security in the region.

On 21 December, the Council issued a presidential statement welcoming the establishment of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) on 1 January. It called on the government to strengthen security sector reform and condemned ongoing attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in CAR.

### Human Rights-Related Developments

**Chad:** The absence of a delegation from Chad during the consideration of its report to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on 5 November 2009 drew adverse comment from the chair of the Committee. The Committee also expressed concern about high levels of illiteracy amongst women in Chad and questioned the degree of independence of Chad's National Human Rights Commission.

**CAR:** The 8 December 2009 Secretary-General's report on the situation in CAR described the human rights situation as "worrisome" especially in northern and northwestern regions of the country. The LRA was seen as responsible for instances of human rights violations, including summary executions, abductions, rape and systematic pillaging in the Haut Mboumou area. Impunity remained a major source of concern all over the country.

### Key Issues

An overarching issue for the Council is whether the request for MINURCAT to leave in April is driven by tactical issues or practical problems that can be resolved.

A key issue is the security and welfare of the refugee and IDP population since aid groups may be unable to do their job if MINURCAT is withdrawn.

In light of Chad's parliamentary elections expected in November, an issue for the Council is whether MINURCAT's departure in April might contribute to creating a situation of electoral instability.

A practical issue for the Council is how to address lack of progress highlighted on key benchmarks that have been elaborated, including demilitarisation of refugee and IDP camps to be evidenced by a decrease in arms, violence and human rights abuses and improvements in the government's capacity to ensure security and protection of civilians, necessary for sustainable voluntary return of refugees and resettlement of IDPs.

A related issue is whether Sudan and Chad will move forward with the implementation of their recent agreement to conduct joint border control and address the fighting between rebels and government forces in Chad, which impacts the security of civilians in eastern Chad. A related issue is management of localised sources of conflict between ethnic groups, which is crucial for the return of IDPs.

### Underlying Problems

The military component of MINURCAT was authorised in 2009 after the previous EU peacekeeping force, EUFOR, decided to withdraw and requested the UN to fill the vacuum. The UN force, though authorised at 300 police and 5,200 military personnel, has so far reached only about 55 percent of its strength. Thus, it has not been capable of fully delivering on its mandate. This in turn has prompted complaints in Chad that civilian elements of the mandate, in particular those aimed at creating favourable conditions for reconstruction and economic and social development in returnee areas, have not been fulfilled.

## Options

Immediate options for the Council include:

- encourage the Secretary-General to engage in direct dialogue with the government of Chad to resolve his concerns;
- engage with the government of Chad at the ambassadorial level in New York and at the central government level through Council members' embassies in N'Djamena;
- agree on specific benchmarks for measuring the transition of MINURCAT's mandate as it is fulfilled (in this context, given the centrality of refugee and IDP security to the mandate, one benchmark could be a determination that DIS is fully operational and fulfilling the requirements necessary for humanitarian protection of vulnerable populations); and
- use the meeting with troop and police contributing countries to MINURCAT to discuss and review complaints by Chad about MINURCAT and consider possible ways to address them.

## Council Dynamics

Council members seem concerned that any sudden termination of the mandate would have adverse implications for security in both Chad and CAR, leaving already vulnerable populations at a yet higher risk. There is therefore little or no support for the Chad position. The overall financial climate may affect the willingness of some members to agree to any costly new measures to appease Chad. However, some practical accommodation may be explored in the coming weeks.

France is the lead country.

## UN Documents

### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1861 (14 January 2009) renewed MINURCAT's mandate until 15 March 2010 and authorised the deployment of a military component to replace EUFOR.
- S/RES/1778 (25 September 2007) established MINURCAT and authorised EUFOR.

### Selected Security Council Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2009/35 (21 December 2009)

welcomed the establishment of BINUCA.

- S/PRST/2009/13 (8 May 2009) condemned renewed military incursions in eastern Chad by "Chadian armed groups, coming from outside".
- S/PRST/2008/22 (16 June 2008) was on the June rebel offensive in Chad.

### Selected Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2009/535 (14 October 2009) on MINURCAT.
- S/2009/359 (14 July 2009) on MINURCAT.
- S/2009/277 (29 May 2009) was a report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.
- S/2009/199 (14 April 2009) on MINURCAT.

### Other

- S/PV.6204 (22 October 2009) was a meeting of the Council on the situation in Chad and Central African Republic and the subregion.
- S/PV.6172 (28 July 2009) was a meeting of the Council on the situation in Chad and Central African Republic.
- SG/SM/12373 (20 July 2009) was the statement of the Secretary-General condemning violence in West Darfur, Chad and Sudan border.
- S/PV.6121 and S/PV.6122 (8 May 2009) were Council meetings to discuss renewed cross-border rebel activity in Chad.
- S/2009/232 (6 May 2009) was a letter from Chad requesting a Council meeting on the situation between Chad and Sudan.
- S/2009/231 (5 May 2009) was the note verbale from the Chadian government accusing Sudan of facilitating the renewed cross-border rebel activity.
- S/2009/214 (23 April 2009) was the letter transmitting the report on the activities of the EU military operation in Chad and CAR.

## Other Relevant Facts

### MINURCAT: Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Victor da Silva Angelo (Portugal)

### MINURCAT: Size, Composition and Cost

- *Authorised strength as of 14 January*



2009: 300 police, 25 military liaison officers, 5,200 military personnel and an appropriate number of civilian personnel

- *Strength as of 30 November 2009:* 3,032 total uniformed personnel, including 2,743 troops, 23 military observers, and 266 police officers, as well as 419 international civilian personnel, 323 local civilian staff, and 137 UN volunteers.
- *Main police contributors:* Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Benin and France
- *Main military contributors:* France and Ireland
- *Cost:* approved budget 1 July 2009–30 June 2010: \$690.75 million

### MINURCAT: Duration

September 2007 to present; mandate expires 15 March 2010

## Timor-Leste

### Expected Council Action

A briefing by the head of the UN Mission in Timor-Leste, Ameerah Haq, and an open debate are expected in February. (The UNMIT mandate expires on 26 February and Council renewal is expected.) Resolution 1867 (which extended UNMIT's mandate in 2009) requires a report by the Secretary-General by 1 February, but at press time it looked unlikely that this deadline would be met. The Secretary-General's report is expected to include recommendations from a recent technical assistance mission. Council members are likely draw on these in their decision. Some reconfiguration of the operation seems likely.

### Key Recent Developments

The technical assessment mission, led by Ian Martin, was in Timor-Leste from 10 to 18 January to assess the future of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) and make recommendations, including

possible adjustments in UNMIT's mandate and strength. Among the likely suggestions are that the UN Police (UNPOL) be downsized and that there be a change of emphasis in UNPOL's role.

The Timor-Leste National Police (PNTL) has been gradually assuming policing responsibilities since 14 May 2009. (The handover process had been suspended following the assassination attempts on Timor-Leste's president and prime minister in 2008.) Earlier in 2009 the PNTL had resumed responsibility of four districts: Lautem, Oecusse, Manatuto and Viqueque and the Police Training Centre. On 14 December 2009 it resumed primary responsibility for the conduct of maritime police operations and on 18 December 2009 for the Police Intelligence Service.

On 28 December 2009 a PNTL officer was involved in a shooting in the Comoro area of Dili; one person was killed and another injured. The police officer under investigation was suspended from duty on 4 January. UNPOL and PNTL are carrying out an internal investigation. A separate inquiry will be conducted by UNMIT's Human Rights and Transitional Justice Unit.

The new Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Timor-Leste, Ameerah Haq, arrived in Timor-Leste on 5 January. On 25 November 2009 the Secretary-General wrote to the Council advising of Haq's appointment from 28 December 2009 in succession to Atul Khare, who had held the post for three years.

On 23 October 2009 the Council was briefed by Khare and by José Luís Guterres, Deputy Prime Minister of Timor-Leste. Khare stressed the need for a steady approach to Timor-Leste and that there should be no exit without a strategy. Most Council members agreed with the Secretary-General's recommendation to maintain the strength and composition of UNMIT but that the technical assessment mission in January 2010 would evaluate possible adjustments in UNMIT's mandate and strength in the future.

## Human Rights-Related Developments

In their latest joint report on human rights developments in Timor-Leste published in September 2009, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and UNMIT focussed on accountability for past and present human rights violations. They noted some progress in strengthening the justice system including a new criminal code, but found gaps in implementing recommendations of the joint Indonesia and Timor-Leste Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) and the Truth Commission for Reception and Reconciliation (CAVR). The report urges the government ensure that the judiciary and prosecution services are allocated sufficient resources and clearly delineate the roles of the military and the police. It urges donors to provide coordinated technical assistance in the areas of security sector reform and justice.

In a related development, the Timor-Leste parliament on 14 December 2009 adopted a resolution agreeing to set up and fund a special institution to implement the recommendations of the reports of the CTF and the CAVR. The resolution asked a parliamentary committee to prepare, within three months, draft legislation for concrete measures to implement the recommendation for the two commissions and for the creation of a new institution for that purpose. The resolution will be debated by the Timor-Leste parliament in April.

## Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is whether changes are needed for the UNMIT mandate and staffing and developing a clear strategy which reflects the reality on the ground.

A related issue is the appropriate resources at this stage including capacity-building and mentoring.

Also a key issue is whether the December 2010 deadline, suggested recently by the Timor-Leste government, for concluding the handover to the national police is realistic. The dangers of setting artificial deadlines are well remembered in the Council.

An issue which may suggest that major reconfiguration is premature is the slow progress on comprehensive security sector reform, the lack of institutional development in the police and uncertainty over whether the Timor-Leste government is able to develop a professional police force at this stage.

A related question is the ongoing review of the Supplementary Policing Agreement (which agreed that UNPOL would be given executive policing authority until the PNTL was reconstituted). A government commission formed in April 2009 to review the agreement has not met the UN since May.

The shooting incident in Dili in December raises issues whether the PNTL is yet receiving the right type of training for community-oriented policing.

A further issue is the impact of the International Stabilisation Force's downsizing. In December Australia announced that it would reduce its troops from 650 to 400 by February.

## Underlying Problems

One of the fundamental problems that led to the violence in 2006 was a fragmented security sector. A recent International Crisis Group report notes that little has been done to clarify the roles of the security and defence forces. Draft legislation provides the legal means for integration of these two forces but there does not seem to be a vision for effective steps to reform the respective roles and reduce the potential for re-emergence of conflict between the army and police.

Internally displaced persons have returned home. However, reintegration continues to be a challenge. Difficulty with accessing employment, services and infrastructure, the lack of a legal framework to address land and property disputes, a weak justice system and slow security sector reform could therefore contribute to possible future unrest.

An Amnesty International report on justice and impunity published in August 2009 underlines an ongoing problem. Despite a number of national and international justice initiatives there is continuing impunity in Timor-Leste for atrocity crimes and this



feeds underlying discontent in some sectors of society.

## Options

One option is to renew UNMIT for a year with some limited downsizing of police and prioritisation of the existing mandate so that greater effort can go into mentoring, governance, security sector reform and other peacebuilding type activities.

A possible option, if members feel the need for a fuller discussion of the underlying issues and development of a Council strategy, is to consider a two to three month rollover.

Further options include:

- requesting the Secretary-General to develop a more structured way of measuring progress against key benchmarks taking into account a possible exit in 2012;
- reiterating the need for greater progress in a comprehensive review of the future role and needs of the security sector;
- highlighting the importance of continuing to focus on accountability and justice and the promotion and protection of human rights;
- deciding on a Council visit to Timor-Leste before the next mandate renewal; and
- deciding on how to involve UNMIT in peacebuilding type activities and processes.

## Council and Wider Dynamics

At this point most members appear comfortable with some limited refocusing of the mandate and some downsizing while retaining the four main pillars of the mandate (i.e. security sector reform, democratic governance, rule of law and socioeconomic development) and working towards a possible 2012 exit. Initial briefings on the technical assessment mission's recommendations appear to have had a good reception.

France, which has initiated a debate on peacekeeping transition and exit strategies in February, may see Timor-Leste as a case study in this context. However, a number of other members are wary of including language in the resolution that could send a signal of early departure. The events of 2006 are still seen by some Council members as a reminder not to act prematurely

on UNMIT's future. There is some concern that the issues that contributed to the 2006 crisis have yet to be fully dealt with.

Brazil has historically been actively involved in the issue and wants to focus on security and socioeconomic development. Japan also has an active interest, but as the lead country seems likely to play the role of facilitator.

Members like Austria, Mexico and Turkey have shown interest in the human rights and justice dimensions of this issue.

Countries outside the Council (Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Philippines, Portugal, and South Africa) continue to be closely engaged and will play a role in developing the first draft of the resolution. Some of these countries are concerned, however, that there may be insufficient time between the release of the Secretary-General's report and the mandate expiry for a satisfactory exploration of the issues in sufficient detail.

## UN Documents

### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1867 (26 February 2009) extended UNMIT until 26 February 2010.
- S/RES/1704 (25 August 2006) established UNMIT.

### Selected Letters

- S/2009/612 (25 November 2009) and S/2009/613 (1 December 2009) was an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Council regarding the appointment of Ameerah Haq as Special Representative.

### Selected Meeting Records

- S/PV.6205 (23 October 2009) was the last Council debate on Timor-Leste.
- S/PV.6086 (26 February 2009) was on the adoption of resolution 1867.

## Other Relevant Facts

### Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission

Ameerah Haq (Bangladesh)

### Size, Composition and Cost

- *Maximum authorised strength:* up to 1,608 police and 34 military officers



- *Size as of 31 December 2009:* 1,517 police and 35 military liaison officers
- *Civilian staff as of 31 December 2009:* 366 international and 895 local, 198 UN Volunteers
- *Key police contributors:* Malaysia, Portugal, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Philippines
- *Approved budget* (1 July 2009–30 June 2010): \$205.94 million

### Duration

25 August 2006 to present; mandate expires 26 February 2010

### International Stabilisation Force

- *Size as of 2 December 2009:* approximately 800 troops
- *Contributors:* Australia (650 troops) and New Zealand (150 troops)

## Useful Additional Resources

- *Handing Back Responsibility to Timor-Leste Police*, International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 180, 3 December 2009
- *'We Cry for Justice', Impunity Persists 10 Years on Timor-Leste*, Amnesty International, August 2009

## Peacekeeping

### Expected Council Action

At the initiative of the French presidency the Council will hold a further debate on peacekeeping.

Informal consultations are also likely involving a discussion with the head of the Peacekeeping Department, Alain Le Roy, and the chief of Field Support, Susana Malcorra. France hopes that this process will result in an outcome document to follow-up the 5 August 2009 presidential statement, and take into account aspects of Secretariat's "New Horizon" non-paper and an upcoming field support strategy report.

France is expected to circulate a concept paper focusing on transition out of peacekeeping ahead of the debate.

The fact that the debate precedes that of the session of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping (which begins on 22 February) seems to be generating some concern among the wider UN membership and interest in participation in the debate may be strong.

This debate may pick up strands of the Council's debate on "no exit without strategy" which took place on 15 November 2000. The Secretary-General responded in April 2001 with analysis and recommendations, but Council consideration seemed to lapse.

## Key Recent Developments

### 1. UK-France Initiative

In 2009 the Council embarked on a review, initiated by France and the UK, of some peacekeeping issues. Three debates were held: the first on 23 January 2009 preceded by a seminar, the second on 29 June focused on the relationship with troop and police contributing countries (TCC/PCCs), and the third on 5 August assessed progress and adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2009/4) which documented some improvements in peacekeeping practices in the first half of 2009. The statement identified areas where further consideration was needed:

- creating clear, credible and achievable mandates matched by appropriate resources;
- improving information sharing particularly on military operational challenges;
- increasing interaction with the Secretariat in the early phase of mandate drafting and throughout mission deployment;
- engaging with TCC/PCCs earlier and more meaningfully before renewal or modification of mandates;
- improving Council awareness of the implications of decisions on resource and field support;
- enhancing Council awareness of the strategic challenges across peacekeeping operations;
- how to implement a robust approach to peacekeeping and implementing protection of civilians' mandates; and
- coherence and integration of peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development (which was first mentioned in a 22 July presidential statement following a debate on post-conflict peacebuilding).

The Council's enhanced attention to its practices and working methods on peacekeeping has resulted in a number of practical developments in 2009 including a much more consistent focus on benchmarks and requests for updating concepts of operation and rules of engagement in relevant peacekeeping missions mandates as they came up for renewal. For example:

- The 15 September 2009 resolution on Liberia called for the Secretary-General to continue to monitor progress on core benchmarks (first presented in the Secretary-General's August 2007 report) as well as developing and submitting to the Council a "strategic integrated plan to coordinate activity towards the achievement of benchmarks". It also recalled the 5 August presidential statement on peacekeeping and requested the Secretary-General, to provide information on progress on achieving a coordinated UN approach in Liberia, particularly on critical gaps in peacebuilding objectives in his next report.
- The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) resolution adopted on 23 December 2009 requested the Secretary-General to conduct a strategic review of the situation and the progress made by the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) toward achieving its mandate, and to further develop existing benchmarks. It also asked for the modalities of a reconfigured mission and the critical tasks that need to be completed before thinking about a drawdown.
- The AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) resolution adopted on 30 July 2009 asked for the Secretary-General to submit a strategic workplan with benchmarks to measure and track progress made by UNAMID in implementing its mandate and to include an assessment of progress made against these benchmarks in his next report.

### 2. Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping

Another piece of evidence of practical change in working methods on peacekeeping emerged not only from the UK-France review process but also from the Working Group, under Japan's leadership. A major improvement has been to address the issue of meetings with TCC/PCCs. A real effort

has been made to bring forward the consultations with TCC/PCCs to at least a week before peacekeeping mandate renewals. In the past, consultations tended to take place just before the Council's adoption of a resolution. There has also been more regular dialogue with the Secretariat and more regular political-military meetings.

The Group's chair produced a summary on 17 December 2009 of discussions of its four meetings in November and December. Key issues identified were:

- improvements in the cooperation mechanism, such as more meaningful consultations between stakeholders;
- improvement in implementing mandates in cooperation with TCC/PCCs; and
- support to TCC/PCCs.

There seems to be agreement on the need to make best use of existing consultation mechanisms and to implement measures set out in resolution 1353 of 2001 (which contains a statement of cooperation and specified categories of consultation with TCCs). But there was also a strong interest by some in developing or adopting mechanisms such as core groups or groups of friends to address the problems. Participants also identified better coordination with the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, or C34, as a key issue.

In 2010 the Working Group plans to look at closing gaps in capabilities, resources and training and key lessons learned from past and current missions about the successful implementation of transitional strategies.

### 3. New Horizon and Comprehensive Field Support Reports

Since the July 2009 publication of the non-paper, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) have held consultations with key stakeholders, including the Non-Aligned Movement, the EU and TCC/PCCs. There have been seven informal briefings to members of the C34 since November 2009. Le Roy and Malcorra also made formal presentations to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly in October 2009.

Four priority areas are being stressed by the Secretariat:

- policy development;
- capability development;
- field support strategy; and
- planning and oversight.

Activities underway include developing policy guidelines on robust peacekeeping, protection of civilians, linkages between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and developing a new field support strategy to expedite and improve support for field missions while achieving efficiencies and economies of scale.

#### 4. *Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34)*

The Secretary-General's 22 December 2009 report for the C34 will be discussed at the session beginning on 22 February. The report addresses the four priority issues for DPKO and DFS identified above.

#### 5. *Protection of Civilians and Peacekeeping Mandates*

On 11 November 2009 the Council held an open debate chaired by Austrian Foreign Minister Michael Spindelegger and adopted resolution 1894, which recognised the need for protection early in the formulation of peacekeeping mandates and requested the Secretary-General to develop an operational concept for the protection of civilians in peacekeeping missions, as well as guidance to missions for reporting on protection. It also reaffirmed the importance of clear, credible and achievable mandates and stressed the importance of including progress on protection of civilians when developing benchmarks measuring the progress of implementation of peacekeeping mandates. The cross-cutting impact of this resolution was reflected in resolution 1906 adopted on 23 December 2009, which gave protection of civilians priority in MONUC's new mandate.

In November 2009 the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and DPKO released an independent study on protection of civilians in peacekeeping operations. The study concluded that pre-mandate planning and assessments do not address well enough the nature of threats to civilians. It also found that the Secretariat and peacekeeping missions often lack clarity from the Council as to its intent regarding mandates for the protection of civilians. It said this ambiguity has created gaps in

policy planning in the Secretariat and inevitably hampered implementation of protection mandates by the missions.

#### 6. *Initiatives by Other Member States*

Continuing its series of peacekeeping panel discussions, Canada held a second discussion on 11 September 2009 which focused on the political dimensions of peacekeeping, and a third on mandates and modalities on 4 December. A fourth on field support strategy is scheduled for 12 February.

Australia and Uruguay organised a workshop on the protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping operations on 19 January where member states discussed the OCHA-DPKO study and looked at next steps for the issue of protection of civilians. This workshop was intended to generate discussion and ideas on an issue of interest to the participants of the 2010 C34 session.

#### **Key Issues**

Key issues which France hopes to address in the debate are:

- overcoming difficulties in setting up exit strategies from the outset of a mission, including conceptualising the end state which is desired;
- finding ways to put in motion a transition strategy during the life of a mission;
- Council practices in drafting mandates; and
- Council oversight function in peacekeeping.

A second issue is securing consensus on a substantive outcome addressing these issues. Positions on exit strategies tend to be highly politicised and some other permanent members of the Council are traditionally opposed to establishing generic fixed rules on such matters, preferring flexibility to deal with crises individually. These issues could make it difficult to agree on a standard approach to be used in drafting future resolutions.

Another key issue is how to build effectively on the improved partnerships that are beginning to develop between key players in UN peacekeeping. It appears that frequency of communication and coordination between the Secretariat, TCC/PCCs and the Council has improved over the last year. But improving the quality of the substantive interaction still seems to be a challenge.



A related issue is how to better integrate information available to TCC/PCCs, military experts and key stakeholders in Council decisions.

A related issue is the growing recognition of the value of improved interaction between the Working Group on Peacekeeping and the C34 and how to achieve that in an efficient and productive way.

Another issue, given how close the Council peacekeeping debate is being held to the start of the C34 session, is framing the Council debate with sensitivity given past reactions from the C34 to perceived Council encroachment.

Also an issue is ensuring that experts on Council delegations have knowledge of the way mandates are being implemented in the field. A related question is how few, if any, of the experts are ever able to visit key peacekeeping missions.

A large issue which the Council only touched on in its August presidential statement is the overlapping role of peacebuilding and peacekeeping. Clearly this is a critical element for transition and exit of formed military contingents but it may require more intensive preparatory discussion before members can firm up their positions.

Similarly, providing clearer priorities and greater clarity to tasks in mandates, particularly regarding protection of civilians and the associated robust peacekeeping, is critical to getting to desired end states for missions. But again much discussion, including in the C34, seems necessary before firm positions can be developed.

#### **Options**

One option is a detailed presidential statement which seeks to resolve the key issues on transition, exit strategies and peacekeeping mandates.

Another option is a more general and incremental presidential statement which would

update and enlarge some of the elements in the August presidential statement.

Other options available to the Council include:

- requesting DPKO to provide a series of informal monthly briefings to the Council as it develops its strategy on critical early peacebuilding tasks undertaken by peacekeeping;
- requesting the Working Group to give priority to its proposed study of past successful transition strategies in peacekeeping; and
- approving the guidelines for scheduling meetings with PCC/TCCs provided in the annex of the Working Group's report and requesting the Secretariat to ensure that there is consistency reflected in future scheduling.

### Council and Wider Dynamics

Although most members appear comfortable with the idea of a debate on transition strategies, there is less agreement over the appropriateness of discussing exit strategies. There is concern that a debate on exit strategies in the current climate will be viewed in terms of wanting to shut down a mission because of financial reasons. Some members would prefer to frame the discussion as connected to objectives fulfilled and linked to the benchmarks set. Most agree that deciding whether benchmarks have been met is not easy and is often politically contentious.

Since the review began, France, the UK and the US have actively pushed for peacekeeping mandates to have benchmarks inserted and monitored. There are some differences among them, however, over the question of when transition and exit strategies need to be included in a resolution.

Elected members like Brazil and Nigeria are active contributors to UN peacekeeping and are expected to draw on their practical experience during the discussions. Brazil believes that sustainable peace should be the end goal of a peacekeeping mission and that exit strategy language is unhelpful to a more holistic approach. Nigeria prefers to talk about achieving objectives and meeting benchmarks rather than talking about an exit. Japan, reflecting its role as chair of the Working Group, seems to prefer to highlight some of the key issues raised in the Working Group.

While there is some agreement that the overlap between peacebuilding and peacekeeping is important in terms of transition most members are not sure about the modalities. Some, like Mexico, Turkey and Brazil, would like to see a natural and effective intersection between peacekeeping and peacebuilding at some point in the life of a mission. Others question whether the Council is ready to grapple with such issues.

### UN Documents

#### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1906 (23 December 2009) renewed MONUC's mandate.
- S/RES/1894 (11 November 2009) was on protection of civilians.
- S/RES/1885 (15 September 2009) renewed UNMIL's mandate.
- S/RES/1881 (30 July 2009) renewed UNAMID's mandate.
- S/RES/1353 (13 June 2001) contained a statement of cooperation and categories of consultation with TCCs.

#### Selected Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2009/24 (5 August 2009) set out future areas for improvement.
- S/PRST/2009/23 (22 July 2009) was on post-conflict peacebuilding.

#### Selected Meeting Records

- S/PV.6216 and resumption 1 (11 November 2009) was the protection of civilians debate.
- S/PV.6178 and resumption 1 (5 August 2009) assessed the peacekeeping review.
- S/PV.6153 and resumption 1 (29 June 2009) was the debate on the relationship with TCC/PCCs.
- S/PV.6075 (23 January 2009) was on UN peacekeeping missions and was part of the UK-France initiative.
- S/PV.4223 and resumption 1 (15 November 2000) was the debate on "no exit without strategy".

#### Other

- A/64/573 (22 December 2009) was the Secretary-General's report for the C34.
- S/2009/659 (17 December 2009) was the Working Group on Peacekeeping's report.
- S/2007/479 (8 August 2007) was the

Secretary-General's report on Liberia including a plan to achieve benchmarks.

- S/2001/394 (20 April 2001) was the Secretary-General's paper following the "no exit without strategy" debate.
- S/2000/1072 (6 November 2000) was the letter from the Dutch ambassador with a paper for the debate "no exit without strategy".

### Useful Additional Source

- *Protection of Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges*, Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor, UN, 2009

### Iran

#### Expected Council Action

It is unclear whether the Council will consider the Iran nuclear issue during February. China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US continue to discuss further steps in response to Iran's non-compliance with IAEA and Council decisions and apparent rejection of the compromise October offer to send its low-enriched uranium to Russia and France for further enrichment, in return for fuel rods to be used in the Tehran Research Reactor for medical purposes. France, the UK and the US seem to be actively pushing for further sanctions.

#### Key Recent Developments

Tensions over Iran's nuclear programme have escalated in recent months. On 27 November 2009 the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted a resolution expressing concern at Iran's continued defiance of IAEA and Council demands and at its failure to notify the IAEA of the planned new enrichment facility at Qom. The resolution urged Iran to comply with all its international legal obligations (including by suspending immediately construction at Qom), and to engage with the IAEA on all outstanding issues (including by clarifying all aspects of the Qom facility). It also called on Iran to comply with its safeguards obligations and implement and ratify the additional protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Twenty-five of the 35 Board members, including China

and Russia, voted in favour of the resolution, the first adopted on Iran since 2006.

On 29 November 2009 Iran said it had approved construction of ten additional uranium enrichment plants. And President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said on 2 December 2009 that Iran would enrich uranium to a higher level itself, apparently rejecting the October IAEA proposal and taking off the table earlier conditional counterproposals.

On 10 December 2009 the chairman of the Iran Sanctions Committee, Japanese Ambassador Yukio Takasu briefed the Council. (The Committee is required to report to the Council every ninety days.) Takasu confirmed that the Committee had received reports from three states of violations by Iran of the provisions of resolution 1747 imposing an export ban on arms and related materials. The violations involved the vessels MV Hansa India and Francop, both chartered by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines. (According to media reports the German owned MV Hansa India was intercepted in October 2009, apparently on its way to Syria. And in a 5 November letter, Israel informed the Committee that it had discovered hundreds of tonnes of arms aboard the Francop, also on its way to Syria.)

On 2 January, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki set a deadline of one month for Iran's international counterparts to accept its position on the October 2009 offer or it would start further enrichment itself. On 20 January there were reports that Iran had sent a formal response to the IAEA, essentially confirming what it had already said publicly.

On 16 January the P5 plus Germany met in New York to discuss next steps. (Their previous meeting was held on 20 November.) The Chinese political director did not attend, but China was represented by a diplomat from its UN mission. The chair of the meeting, EU's political director Robert Cooper, said in an agreed statement that the six countries had concluded that Iran's response was "inadequate". While they remained committed to a dual-track approach involving a negotiated solution, "consideration of appropriate further measures" had begun.

## Human Rights-Related Developments

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay issued a statement on 30 December 2009 expressing shock at violence that had led to deaths and injuries in Iran, and called on the Iranian government to curb excesses by security forces. She also expressed concern about continuing reports of arrests of political activists, journalists, human rights defenders and other civil society actors. Pillay said, "Those who have been arrested, for whatever reason, must be accorded due process that is fully in line with international human rights standards and norms, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." The Universal Periodic Review of Iran's human rights record by the Human Rights Council is scheduled for 15 February.

## Key Issues

A key issue for the Council as a whole is its continued position on the sidelines of the P5+1 discussion, waiting either for the diplomatic track to yield results or to start discussions on additional measures against Iran.

A further issue, if the P5 agree on submitting a new draft sanctions resolution, is what kinds of additional measures should be imposed.

A related issue is whether the Council should address reported violations of the weapons export ban on Iran as a distinct issue.

## Options

As has been the case in the past, it seems that the Council as a whole will have few options on Iran other than those that may be agreed by the P5. At this time options may include:

- continuing to wait on the sidelines in the hope that progress on the Iran nuclear issue may still occur in the context of the P5+1 negotiations;
- taking action on any P5 draft resolution imposing new sanctions on Iran which could include additional measures against the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, a full arms embargo, or measures



targeting the country's petroleum industry or financial sector;

- establishing a sanctions monitoring group in response to the recent incidents indicating violations of existing sanctions; and
- pressing the P5 for a more inclusive process which could include an orientation discussion in informal consultations.

## Council and Wider Dynamics

Within the P5, divisions remain on the best approach on Iran. France, the UK and the US now support prompt action on further sanctions.

China seems to maintain that further dialogue might be productive and that there is still space for further negotiations with Iran. It is therefore not the right moment for sanctions. However, China agreed to the joint statement from the January meeting which began a process to discuss additional measures.

Russia does not seem to rule out additional sanctions. It seems to have been particularly concerned at the revelation of the Qom enrichment facility, as well as Iran's rejection of the IAEA October 2009 proposal which it saw as a fair compromise. In a statement on 22 January, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Russia wanted to see "constructive actions" from Iran.

Some elected Council members seem sceptical about the utility of further sanctions at this stage. There are also concerns about the impact of increased international pressure on the fragile internal situation in Iran.

Brazil and Turkey both abstained when the 27 November 2009 resolution on Iran was adopted in the IAEA and believe there is still room for further negotiations on the basis of the October offer. They have both engaged bilaterally with Iran. Lebanon is also concerned about premature Council action.

Many elected members also seem concerned about the failure of the P5 to consult with them collectively as Council members in the process.

## UN Documents

### Selected Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1835 (27 September 2008) reaffirmed the Council's commitment to an early negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and called upon Iran to comply with its obligations under previous Council resolutions and IAEA requirements.
- S/RES/1803 (3 March 2008) reiterated existing measures against Iran and imposed additional ones.
- S/RES/1747 (24 March 2007) established a ban on Iran's arms exports and added names to the list of people and entities subject to assets freeze.
- S/RES/1737 (23 December 2006) banned trade with Iran of items related to nuclear enrichment, reprocessing, heavy water activities and nuclear weapon delivery systems, imposed an asset freeze on a list of persons and entities involved in proliferation-sensitive activities and established a sanctions committee.
- S/RES/1696 (31 July 2006) demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA.

### Selected Letters

- S/2009/633 (7 December 2009) was from the Secretary-General to the Council conveying the resolution on Iran adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 27 November 2009.
- S/2009/574 (5 November 2009) was from Israel to the Secretary-General and the Council relating to violations of resolution 1747.

### Other

- S/PV.6235 (10 December 2009) was the latest briefing by the chair of the 1737 Committee.
- GOV/2009/74 (16 November 2009) was the latest IAEA report.

## Other Relevant Facts

### Chair of the 1737 Sanctions Committee

Yukio Takasu (Japan)

## Sudan/Darfur

### Expected Council Action

In February, the Council is expected to review a report from the Secretary-General on Darfur. Discussions will likely focus on the strategic elements laid out in July 2009 in resolution 1881 and in particular on efforts to accelerate the Darfur peace process, taking into account the briefing to the Council on 21 December 2009 on the recommendations of the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur.

The mandate of UNAMID expires on 31 July.

### Key Recent Developments

On 25 January, Ibrahim Gambari, the new AU-UN Joint Special Representative arrived in El Fasher, the headquarters of the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Gambari stated that top priority for UNAMID is consolidating the peace process in Darfur.

On 29 December 2009 UNAMID and the Sudanese government signed a framework to increase the safety of UNAMID personnel and assets following recent attacks. Separate attacks by unidentified militias on 4 and 5 December led to the killing of five Rwandan peacekeepers.

On 7 December 2009, the Council urged the Sudan government to ensure that all perpetrators are brought to justice and called on all parties to cooperate fully with UNAMID. The Secretary-General's 16 November 2009 report had warned that until all parties provide unconditional security, challenges will continue for UNAMID.

On 21 December 2009, former South African President Thabo Mbeki and AU Commission Chairperson Jean Ping briefed the Council on the recommendations of the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur. Mbeki stated that peace, reconciliation and justice in Darfur are linked to any comprehensive peace agreement.

On 16 November 2009 the Secretary-General's report highlighted three critical tracks towards a political settlement:

- continuing dialogue between the government and armed groups to agree on sustainable security arrangements;
- addressing the concerns and priorities of representatives of Darfurian civil societies for inclusion in a political settlement; and
- supporting Chad-Sudan reconciliation efforts.

In a letter dated 14 December 2009, the Secretary-General advised the Council that four experts had been appointed to the Sudan sanctions Panel of Experts until 15 October 2010. On 12 October 2009, the experts briefed the Council on their plans in the coming year.

Clashes between the Sudanese army and Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid Faction (SLA/AW) continued in January in North Darfur, with some 18 civilians killed. On 14 January UNAMID appealed to the parties to allow them to conduct an investigation and assess the needs of the population affected by recent clashes.

On 30 November 2009 the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Edmund Mulet, briefed the Council on the unstable security situation and the obstacles faced by UNAMID. The Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur, Djibril Bassolé, briefed the Council that lack of confidence between the parties impacted progress in the peace talks. Mediation efforts had been focused on building consensus among civil society groups, organising negotiations between the movements and the government and assisting Chad and Sudan to improve relations.

In July 2009, in resolution 1881, the Council asked the Secretary-General to submit a strategic workplan containing benchmarks for the implementation of UNAMID's mandate and report on progress against these benchmarks, including the political process, on the humanitarian and security situation and on compliance by all parties with their international obligations.

## Key Issues

The first issue is whether there is anything the Council can do to assist the peace process. A related issue is the implementation of the AU High-level Implementation Panel recommendations, including on power-sharing, wealth-sharing, security and compensation. Another related issue is whether the efforts of mediators alone are sufficient to bring all parties together for a settlement, and whether the Council can be more effective in supporting the mediation efforts.

A second key issue, also a strategic priority in resolution 1881, is reducing the continuing violence in Darfur which limits the freedom of movement of UNAMID and the access of humanitarian personnel as they respond to the needs of populations impacted by the evolving security environment. A related question is whether the 29 December 2009 framework agreement is having any positive impact.

A third key issue highlighted in resolution 1881 is ensuring the rule of law, strengthened governance and human rights protection. A question for the Council is what it should do to respond to the apparent lack of progress in these areas.

Another further key issue is political settlement in Darfur, which would allow the people of Darfur to participate in the approaching elections.

## Options

Options include:

- renewing the Council's demands for the government and rebel movements to fully commit to the peace process;
- emphasising credible participation by Darfurians in the elections as a way to build confidence for a political settlement;
- noting the role of the report of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel and its complementarity with Council objectives for Darfur and the importance of forging a closer partnership between the UN and AU in strengthening and supporting the mediation; and
- deciding to invite members of the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council to form a joint "contact

group" to provide direct member state support for the mediation.

## Council Dynamics

As elections approach, many Council members are increasingly anxious about the north-south Sudan issue and the likely impact for Darfur.

Council members seem agreed on the peace process as the key to achieving a sustainable solution for Darfur. However, most members also emphasise that the security and governance issues also need to be addressed in this process.

Most members are encouraged by Mbeki's briefing on the report of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel. They seem comfortable with many of the recommendations which address peace, justice, accountability and reconciliation in Darfur.

The UK is the lead country on Darfur in the Council.

## UN Documents

### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1881 (6 August 2009) renewed UNAMID.
- S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.
- S/RES/1591 (29 March 2005) and S/RES/1556 (30 July 2004) imposed sanctions.

### Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2009/13 (8 May 2009) called on Chad and Sudan to respect and fully implement their mutual commitments.

### Latest Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2009/592 (16 November 2009) was on UNAMID.
- S/2009/391 (28 July 2009) was on possible UN support for the upcoming elections in Sudan.

### Selected Security Council Meeting Records

- S/PV.6251 (21 December 2009) was the briefing by former South African President Thabo Mbeki and AU Commission Chair Jean Ping on the recommendations of the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur.



- S/PV.6227 (30 November 2009) was the briefing by Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet to the Council regarding the Secretary-General's report in November on UNAMID.
- S/PV.6135 (5 June 2009) was the briefing of ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to the Council.
- S/PV.6131 (28 May 2009) was the briefing on the Council Mission to Africa from 14 to 21 May 2009.

### Selected Letters

- S/2009/639 (14 December 2009) was from the Secretary-General informing the Council about the appointment of people to serve on the Panel of Experts.
- S/2009/599 (17 November 2009) transmitted the report of the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur.
- S/2009/369 (16 July 2009) was from Sudan informing the Council of Chadian bombing incidents in Darfur.
- S/2009/255 (16 May 2009) was from Sudan detailing complaints against Chad.
- S/2009/249 (12 May 2009) contained the 3 May 2009 Doha agreement between Chad and Sudan.
- S/2009/144 (6 March 2009) was the AU Peace and Security Council communiqué on the ICC arrest warrant for President Bashir.
- S/2009/100 (18 February 2009) transmitted the text of the Agreement of Goodwill and Confidence-Building for the Settlement of the Problem in Darfur.

### Other

- SC/9805 (7 December 2009) was the press statement condemning attacks on UNAMID peacekeepers.
- S/2009/562 (27 October 2009) was a report of the Sanctions Panel of Experts.
- AU/Dec.245(XIII) (3 July 2009) was the

decision of the AU Assembly about non-cooperation with the ICC.

- A/HRC/11/L.17 (16 June 2009) was a resolution from the Human Rights Council establishing the mandate for the Independent Expert on human rights in the Sudan.
- A/HRC/11/14 (June 2009) was the report of the Special Rapporteur for Sudan to the Human Rights Council.

### Other Relevant Facts

#### UNAMID: Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur

Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria)

#### Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator

Djibril Yipènè Bassolé (Burkina Faso)

#### UNAMID: Force Commander

Lieutenant General Patrick Nyamvumba (Rwanda)

#### UNAMID: Size, Composition and Cost

- *Maximum authorised strength:* up to 19,555 military personnel, 3,772 police and 19 formed police units (total police 6,432)
- *Main troop contributors:* Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt and Ethiopia
- *Military Strength as of 31 December 2009:* 15,374 military personnel
- *Police Strength as of 31 December 2009:* 4,575 police personnel
- *Cost:* 1 July 2009 - 30 June 2010: \$1,598.94 million

#### UNAMID: Duration

31 July 2007 to present; mandate expires 31 July 2010

#### UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission

Ashraf Jehangir Qazi (Pakistan)

#### UNMIS: Force Commander

Major-General Paban Jung Thapa (Nepal)

#### UNMIS: Size, Composition and Cost

- *Maximum authorised strength:* up to 10,000 military and 715 police personnel
- *Main troop contributors:* India, Pakistan and Bangladesh
- *Military Strength as of 31 December*

2009: 9,569 military personnel

- *Police Strength as of 31 December 2009:* 693 police personnel
- *Cost:* 1 July 2009 - 30 June 2010: \$958.35 million

#### UNMIS: Duration

24 March 2005 to present; mandate expires 30 April 2010

#### Sanctions Committee Chairman

Thomas Mayr-Harting (Austria)

## Israel/Palestine

### Expected Council Action

A briefing on the Middle East is expected. No outcome is expected. However, members will be mindful that the Secretary-General is due to submit a report to the General Assembly on Israeli and Palestinian investigations into violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in Gaza, following the Goldstone Report.

### Key Recent Developments

In January 2009 the Human Rights Council (HRC) approved an investigation into the Gaza conflict between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009. In April 2009 Richard Goldstone was appointed as the head of the investigative team, accepting the role only after revision of the original mandate was amended to include all violations.

The report, released on 15 September 2009, made recommendations to the UN, Israel, Palestinians and the ICC. It recommended that the Security Council monitor investigations by both Israel and Gaza authorities and consider referring the situation to the ICC if there was a lack of credible investigations. (For further details please see our *Update Report* of 12 October 2009.)

On 14 October 2009, during the Security Council's open debate on the Middle East, most Council members said it would be premature to consider the report while it was in the hands of the HRC.

On 16 October 2009 the HRC endorsed the Goldstone Report's recommendations and is expected to take it up again at its next session in March.

On 5 November 2009 the General Assembly endorsed the Goldstone Report in resolution 64/10 and requested the Secretary-General to report on implementation of the resolution "with a view to considering further action...including [by] the Security Council."

In November 2009, the Secretary-General transmitted the Goldstone Report to the Security Council. Both parties were given a late January 2010 deadline to advise the Secretary-General of progress with their investigations.

In December 2009, an Israeli delegation visited New York to brief the Secretariat. The delegation included Brigadier General Avichai Mendelblit, the Chief Military Advocate General for the Israel Defense Forces. The delegation reportedly advised that broad investigations were underway and that information was being drawn from a wide range of sources, including from reports by human rights organisations, including some cited in the Goldstone Report. It seems no details regarding which incidents were being investigated were shared at that time (though media reports indicate it might include an Israeli rebuttal regarding the destruction of the only flour mill in Gaza and a wastewater plant). The delegation also reportedly underscored that the investigations were an Israeli initiative and were not in response to the Goldstone Report's recommendations.

On 25 January Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas announced a committee had been formed to investigate violations. The committee will be led by the Chief Justice of the Palestinian High Court, located in the West Bank. Reportedly, the committee will also include a judge from Gaza. It is possible this initiative is related to the Arab League proposal to appoint an international committee to assist investigations. It is unclear if Hamas has been approached with the Arab League proposal or whether it will cooperate with the committee seated in the West Bank. (In October 2009 Hamas had indicated it would investigate violations. On 27



January, Hamas announced it had established its own committee and would submit its findings to the Gaza office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.)

On 20 January the US Special Envoy for Middle East Peace, George Mitchell, travelled to the region to meet Israelis and Palestinians in a continued effort to get the parties back to the negotiating table. Peace talks were suspended in December 2008 and the issue of settlements has been a key factor in the stalemate. Prior to the 22 September 2009 trilateral meeting between US President Barack Obama, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Abbas, held in New York on the sidelines of the General Assembly, Abbas had reiterated that a complete Israeli settlement freeze would be essential prior to his participation in any renewed talks.

On 25 November 2009 Israel announced a ten-month slow-down in settlement activity. However, it excluded East Jerusalem and also permitted natural growth in existing settlements.

On 21 January the Secretary-General stressed the importance of a settlement freeze.

On 22 January Israel reimbursed for damage to UN facilities during the conflict, resolving the financial aspects arising from a UN Board of Inquiry investigation. (However, Israel did not accept legal responsibility for the incidents.) The Board of Inquiry had recommended that the UN seek formal acknowledgement by Israel, accountability and reparations, and obtain guarantees from Israel against the repetition of such incidents.

On 27 January the Council was briefed by Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Oscar Fernández-Taranco followed by an open debate on the Middle East. (The format of the January meeting became controversial because of Libya's last minute decision to make a presentation to the Council in December 2009, contrary to the previous understanding that any discussion would be in informal consultations.)

### Human Rights-Related Developments

On 23 December 2009 the Human Rights Council's Special Rapporteur for the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Richard Falk, drew attention to the situation in Gaza. Speaking one year after the start of the Israeli military campaign against Gaza, Falk said that "two urgent types of action should be encouraged on this dismal anniversary". Western nations should insist that Israel immediately end its blockade of Gaza, backed up by a credible threat of economic sanctions. In addition, Falk asserted that the Goldstone Report's recommendations, having confirmed the commission of war crimes by Israel and Hamas, should be fully and swiftly implemented.

### Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is how to handle the Goldstone Report. Discussion of the report in the Council could hamper Israel's current willingness to resume talks. On the other hand, it could be an important factor in persuading Israel that airing such issues may be strategically useful, especially if it becomes part of a carrot to get Abbas to reenter negotiations.

A related issue is the Secretary-General's expected report and whether it will be delayed.

Other issues for the Council include implementation of resolutions 1850 and 1860. 1850 declared Council support for the Annapolis process and called on both parties to fulfill their obligations under the Road Map (which includes a settlement freeze). 1860 called for access to deliver humanitarian aid in Gaza, encouraged intra-Palestinian reconciliation and called for renewed efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace as envisaged in resolution 1850.

Another issue is the Secretary-General's Board of Inquiry report and the recent agreement between Israel and the UN. A summary of the report was submitted to the Council in May 2009.

### Underlying Problems

In Gaza, Israel's blockade and the resulting humanitarian situation continue. No significant reconstruction has taken place.



The issue of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, held captive in Gaza since 2006, is still unresolved.

There has been no progress with Hamas-Fatah reconciliation, which will be crucial if elections are to be held in 2010.

### Options

The option of taking up the Goldstone Report in February seems remote, if only because of uncertainty about the Secretary-General's report.

If Mitchell were to secure some breakthrough towards resuming talks an important option would be a Council press release or presidential statement supporting the process.

If the situation continues to deteriorate, with no progress made on renewing talks, Council concern could be signaled by:

- adopting a presidential statement emphasising the need to implement resolutions 1850 and 1860 (as was done in a May 2009 presidential statement) and touching on the importance for both sides of accountability; and
- a debate on the desirable parameters of peace negotiations with a view to a final status agreement.

### Council and Wider Dynamics

Most Council members seem to be in a "wait and see" mode.

Some members think the Secretary-General's report should include an initial assessment of whether the actions taken by the parties meet international standards. Others prefer a simply descriptive report.

Some members believe the HRC is the proper body to take up the Goldstone Report since it mandated the fact-finding mission. They prefer the nexus of the Goldstone Report to shift back to Geneva.

Other members want to keep open the possibility of considering the Goldstone Report but feel it is premature for the Security

Council to consider it at this stage (i.e., before the conclusion of investigations) and see value in delay, pending a resumption of peace talks.

Lebanon, which joined the Council in January, is likely to be open to the views of the Arab Group regarding follow-up to the Goldstone Report. It seems the Arab Group, following the Palestinian lead, currently prefers to wait for the outcome of the Secretary-General's report.

## UN Documents

### Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1860 (8 January 2009) called for an immediate, durable and fully respected ceasefire leading to the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza.
- S/RES/1850 (16 December 2008) declared Council support for the Annapolis process and its commitment to the irreversibility of bilateral negotiations.

### Security Council Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2009/14 (11 May 2009) reiterated the Council's commitment to the irreversibility of bilateral negotiations built upon previous agreements and encouraged steps toward intra-Palestinian reconciliation.

### Security Council Letters

- S/2010/39 (22 January 2010) was the Secretary-General's letter to Council noting the satisfactory resolution of the financial issues related to the incidents investigated by the Board of Inquiry.
- S/2009/586 (10 November 2009) was the Secretary-General's transmission of the Goldstone Report to the Security Council.
- S/2009/538 (7 October 2009) was Libya's transmission of the Goldstone Report to the Security Council.
- S/2009/510 (6 October 2009) was a letter from Libya requesting a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the Goldstone Report.
- S/2009/250 (4 May 2009) was the summary of the Secretary-General's Board of Inquiry report regarding the Gaza conflict.

### Security Council Meeting Records

- S/PV.6265 (27 January 2010) was the

most recent open debate on the Middle East.

- S/PV.6248 (17 December 2009) was a briefing by UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Robert Serry.
- S/PV.6201 and resumption 1 (14 October 2009) was an open debate on the Middle East.

### General Assembly

- A/RES/64/10 (5 November 2009) endorsed the Goldstone Report and requested a report from the Secretary-General with a view to consider further action, including by the Security Council.

### Human Rights Council

- A/HRC/RES/S-12/1 (16 October 2009) was the resolution endorsing the Goldstone Report.
- A/HRC/12/L.12 (25 September 2009) was the deferred draft resolution on the Goldstone Report.
- A/HRC/12/48 (15 September 2009) was the report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, or the Goldstone Report.
- A/HRC/S-9/L.1 (12 January 2009) was the resolution mandating the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict.

## Useful Additional Sources

- Website of the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/FactFindingMission.htm>
- *Palestine: Salvaging Fatah*, International Crisis Group, Middle East Paper Report No. 91, 12 November 2009

## Iraq

### Expected Council Action

The Council is scheduled to receive a briefing on Iraq in February. Some discussion of the expected report from the Secretary-General is likely. However no action is expected. (UNAMI's mandate expires on 6 August.)

### Key Recent Developments

On 23 January US Vice President Joe Biden met with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and discussed a recent decision by Iraq's

Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) which banned many Iraqi Sunni leaders from running in the upcoming national elections on 7 March. On 21 January, the Iraqi Presidency Council requested a court ruling on the legality of the decision.

On 19 January Maliki said that Sunni Muslims were not being targeted. (On 14 January the IHEC had upheld a decision to prohibit more than 500 individuals from running in national elections on 7 March because of their past links to the Ba'ath party of Saddam Hussein.) The IHEC subsequently stated that a roughly equal number of Shi'a and Sunni were included in the ban. Critics contended that officials appointed by Maliki largely control the IHEC and argued they were trying to bolster his position in the elections.

On 18 January the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq, Christine McNab, spoke in New York at a conference on the International Compact with Iraq. McNab stated that the Compact had accomplished much but Iraq was now ready to transition to a longer-term development agenda. The outgoing Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on the Compact, Ibrahim Gambari, also spoke.

On 14 January an Iraqi court sentenced 11 Iraqis to death for the coordinated bombings that took place in Iraq on 19 August 2009.

On 21 December 2009 the Council adopted resolution 1905, extending the arrangements for the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) and the DFI auditing entity, the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB), until 31 December 2010. The resolution calls on Iraq to establish an action plan and timeline for transitioning to a post-DFI mechanism by 1 April, and thereafter for Iraq to report to the Council quarterly through the Committee of Financial Experts on progress made.

On 8 December 2009 coordinated vehicle bombings in Baghdad killed 112 people. The Council issued a press statement condemning the bombings the same day. Maliki said that the attack involved foreign support, and subsequently dismissed the commander overseeing security in the cap-

ital. The attack followed two other large-scale coordinated bombings on 19 August and 25 October 2009.

On 8 December 2009 the Iraqi Presidency Council set 7 March as the date for national elections after amendments to the election law were finalised on 6 December 2009.

### Human Rights-Related Developments

In its latest report published in December 2009 (covering 1 January to 30 June 2009), the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) placed special emphasis on the areas of rule of law, the reimplementation of the death penalty, the situation in prisons and detention centres, and allegations of torture. Concerns included increased violence directed at persons based on their perceived sexual orientation and continued violence against women, especially honour-related homicides in the region of Kurdistan where many crimes went unpunished. During the reporting period 31 death row inmates were executed, including one woman. Noting that UNAMI has continuously stated that security in Iraq may not be sustainable unless significant steps are taken to uphold the rule of law and human rights, the report stressed that “significant progress remains to be achieved to fully restore the rule of law and to systematically address the issue of impunity”.

### Key Issues

The legitimacy of the national elections on 7 March is an issue in light of the IHEC action. Members will want to see elections that are legitimate and credible so as to maintain international acceptance and support.

The issue of historical resolutions adopted during the regime of Saddam Hussein remains a problem but is unlikely to be addressed in February.

### Underlying Problems

An underlying problem is the still fragile cohesion of the Iraqi state, despite some progress made in recent years. The perception of some political actors that they are not equal partners in governance, and continuing violence, are related challenges. Fragile commitment to rule of law reinforces these problems.

### Options

Options include:

- members using the February meeting to set out their concerns and objectives in the lead up to national elections through their individual statements;
- the Council collectively recognising the need for safe, credible and successful elections, and agreeing on the value of emphasising this (and the significance for the UN because of UNAMI’s role) through a presidential or press statement; and
- refraining from any formal discussion until after the national elections on 7 March.

### Council and Wider Dynamics

There is concern among many Council members that the disqualification of so many people from running in national elections may precipitate a new political crisis. (Members are very conscious of what happened in the Afghanistan elections in 2009 and the taint that affected not only the process of governance but also the UN itself.)

Members are not pushing for resolving the historical Council resolutions on Iraq at this stage. Many feel that advancement of this issue is unlikely until after the elections.

Some members now seem to believe that progress on the contentious Iraq/Kuwait issues may be necessary as an integral part of this process to facilitate the lifting of resolutions and that increased efforts are therefore necessary on Kuwait-related issues.

### Selected UN Documents

#### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1905 (21 December 2009) extended the arrangements for the DFI and the IAMB until 31 December 2010.
- S/RES/1883 (7 August 2009) extended the UNAMI mandate for another 12 months.
- S/RES/1859 (22 December 2008) requested the Secretary-General to report on all Council resolutions concerning Iraq since 1990; a letter from Iraq requesting the lifting of Saddam-era resolutions is included as an annex to the resolution.



- S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003) established sanctions against the previous Iraqi government, created the DFI, provided immunity to Iraqi petroleum products and envisaged the termination of the oil-for-food programme.

#### Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2009/30 (16 November 2009) reaffirmed support for UNAMI, welcomed the 8 November Iraqi agreement on amendments to the electoral law (the amendments were later vetoed by Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi), and encouraged the possibility of the Secretary-General facilitating technical assistance to Iraq through the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED).

#### Selected Press Statements

- SC/9810 (9 December 2009) condemned the 8 December coordinated bombings in Baghdad.
- SC/9775 (26 October 2009) condemned the 25 October coordinated bombings in Baghdad.
- SC/9772 (22 October 2009) noted the Council agreed to extend the financing of the mandate of the High-Level Coordinator for Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property for eight months.
- SC/9733 (19 August 2009) condemned the 19 August coordinated bombings in Baghdad.

#### Selected Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2009/585 (11 November 2009) was the latest UNAMI report.
- S/2009/539 (16 October 2009) was the latest report on Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property.
- S/2009/430 (24 August 2009) was the latest DFI/IAMB report.
- S/2009/385 (27 July 2009) was on the review of Iraq resolutions.

## Other Relevant Facts

### Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Iraq

Ad Melkert (Netherlands)

## Useful Additional Resources

- *Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks*, Congressional Research Service, 8 December 2009
- *Iraq's New Reality: The Politics of Governance and Federalism*, The Stimson Center and the Centre for International Governance Innovation, November 2009

## DPRK (North Korea)

### Expected Council Action

The chairman of the DPRK Sanctions Committee is expected to brief the Council in February, but no Council action is likely.

### Key Recent Developments

On 27 January the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) exchanged artillery fire near disputed coastal waters. No casualties were reported.

Wi Sung-lac, the top negotiator from the ROK met with US officials from 20 to 23 January about restarting the six-party talks involving the DPRK, China, Japan, ROK, Russia and the US. (The DPRK withdrew from the talks in April 2009).

On 11 January the DPRK stated its willingness to negotiate on nuclear disarmament. But it also insisted on the lifting of sanctions and a peace treaty. (A peace treaty would formally end the Korean War, which concluded in 1953 with an armistice agreement.) These were the first indications from the DPRK about its possible return to the six-party talks since Stephen Bosworth, the US Special Representative for North Korea Policy, visited the DPRK in December 2009. On 12 January both the ROK and the US said that it was not acceptable to establish preconditions such as a peace treaty or sanctions being lifted prior to the DPRK reengaging in talks.

During a news conference on 5 January, Ambassador Zhang Yesui of China—the January Council president—stressed the importance of all parties taking steps to resume the six-party talks.

On 11 December 2009, Thailand seized an aircraft flying from the DPRK after it landed for refuelling. It was reportedly carrying approximately 35 tons of weapons and related material, appearing to constitute a violation of the sanctions imposed on the DPRK in resolution 1874 (adopted after the DPRK's underground nuclear test in 2009). The final destination of the arms shipment remains unclear.

Bosworth visited the DPRK from 8 to 10 December 2009. He delivered a personal letter from US President Barack Obama to DPRK leader Kim Jong-Il. At the conclusion of his trip, Bosworth stated that the DPRK had not agreed to resume negotiations on its nuclear disarmament, but had offered assurance that it still supported the six-party process. The DPRK stated that while differences with the US had been narrowed, continued cooperation was needed for further progress to occur.

On 19 November 2009 Council members met in informal consultations for a briefing from the DPRK Sanctions Committee (established by resolution 1718 after the DPRK's 2006 nuclear test). In remarks to the press, members confirmed that they had received the Committee's regular ninety-day report, as well as the Panel of Expert's interim report. Members welcomed the commencement of the Panel's work and encouraged current diplomatic efforts, but stressed the need for the DPRK's full compliance with Council resolutions. Japanese Ambassador Yukio Takasu stated that mixed signals from the DPRK continued, with its possible return to six-party talks offset by a continuation of provocative and unhelpful acts, as well as the Panel's assessment that the DPRK was actively attempting to evade sanctions imposed against it.

On 10 November 2009 DPRK and ROK navy ships exchanged fire in disputed waters. The ROK stated that it had suffered no casualties in the incident.

On 3 November 2009 the DPRK announced that it had completed processing 8,000 nuclear fuel rods, producing more plutonium for its nuclear weapons programme. The US stated that this continuing production of plutonium violated Council resolutions.

## Human Rights-Related Developments

The outcome of the Universal Periodic Review of the DPRK was adopted by the Working Group of the Human Rights Council (HRC) on 9 December 2009. The DPRK indicated that fifty of the Working Group's recommendations did not have its support, while the remaining 117 recommendations would be the subject of response after examination. The reply of the DPRK to these recommendations will be included in the outcome report to be adopted by the HRC at its next session (1-26 March). Recommendations made by participants in the Working Group during the review included the need to ratify various human rights instruments and to join the International Labour Organization. A number of recommendations were based on concerns including the need for cooperation with human rights mechanisms, promoting gender equality, ensuring the access to food and ending extrajudicial executions.

In January the HRC Special Rapporteur on DPRK, Vitit Muntarbhorn, expressed concern about the increased severity with which DPRK has punished citizens who have tried to flee the country over the last two years.

### Key Issues

As it remains unclear if or when the DPRK will return to negotiations on its nuclear disarmament in a substantive way, an issue for the Council is whether it can play any role in bridging the gap between the parties.

A second and related issue is whether the Council should limit its role to maintaining the continued implementation of sanctions currently in place.

A third issue is whether sanctions should soon be modified to increase pressure on the DPRK, such as including additional entities or individuals subject to the regime.

### Underlying Problems

A key underlying problem is the lack of trust between the DPRK and other members of the six-party talks and the US. Past attempts to conceal its nuclear weapons

programme are also very real impediments. It is unclear whether others can play any useful role in building the level of trust necessary for meaningful negotiations that might lead to a solution.

### Options

Options include:

- the Council sending a further warning to the DPRK by designating additional entities, individuals and goods that are subject to the sanctions imposed in resolutions 1718 and 1874;
- a statement of policy by the Council confirming to the DPRK its position on preconditions through a presidential or press statement; and
- taking no public action at present.

### Council and Wider Dynamics

It is expected that the Sanctions Committee briefing will lead to discussion of the arms shipment intercepted in Thailand, though the Committee is still in the process of gathering information about the incident. At press time it appeared uncertain whether an initial assessment of state implementation of the sanctions regime, prepared for the Committee by the Panel of Experts, would also be discussed. Though there is some difference of opinion with regard to the procedure by which the Experts undertake country visits, members seem satisfied that this will be resolved.

The consensus in the Council in 2009, which resulted in enhanced sanctions through resolution 1874, is holding. Members remain supportive of the established Council approach to the DPRK.

There seems to be no momentum for expanding the scope of the current sanctions regime at this time. However, some members point to the recent arms shipment intercepted in Thailand as evidence that sanctions are having an effect on the DPRK's ability to generate income from arms sales. The US, China and Japan still seem convinced of the centrality of the six-party process. Most other Council members continue to defer to this view. Accordingly, developments on this front (and the related DPRK-US direct engagement) remain the determining factor in the Council.

## UN Documents

### Selected Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1887 (24 September 2009) reaffirmed that nuclear proliferation is a threat to international peace and security.
- S/RES/1874 (12 June 2009) condemned the DPRK's underground nuclear test, expanded the arms embargo and authorised inspection of cargoes to and from the DPRK as well as vessels on the high seas, and established a panel of experts.
- S/RES/1718 (14 October 2006) expressed grave concern over the DPRK's nuclear test, imposed sanctions and set up a sanctions committee.
- S/RES/1695 (15 July 2006) condemned the DPRK's launch of ballistic missiles.
- S/RES/825 (11 May 1993) called on the DPRK to reconsider withdrawing from the NPT and to honour its non-proliferation obligations under the NPT.

### Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2009/7 (13 April 2009) condemned the 5 April launch of a rocket by the DPRK, saying it was in contravention of resolution 1718.

### Sanctions Committee Annual Reports

- S/2010/28 (14 January 2010)
- S/2008/830 (31 December 2008)
- S/2007/778 (31 December 2007)

### Selected Letters

- S/2009/416 (12 August 2009) was from the Secretary-General informing the Council about the appointment of a panel of experts.
- S/2009/364 (16 July 2009) was from the Sanctions Committee designating additional entities and materials, as well as individuals subject to sanctions.
- S/2009/222 (24 April 2009) was from the Sanctions Committee designating new entities and materials subject to sanctions.
- S/2009/205 (14 April 2009) was from the Sanctions Committee updating items, equipment, goods and technology prohibited from being imported or exported by the DPRK.

### Other Relevant Facts

#### Chair of the 1718 Sanctions Committee

Ertugrul Apakan (Turkey)



### Useful Additional Sources

- *Shades of Red: China's Debate over North Korea*, International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 179, 2 November 2009
- *Visit of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)*, Professor Vítit Muntarbhorn, to the Republic of Korea (ROK): 10-16 January 2010, press release

### Reduced Security Council Decision Making in 2009: A Year of Decline—Or Are the Statistics Misleading?

The year 2009 has seen a dramatic drop in the level of Security Council decisions. Output has reduced to levels not seen since 1991. The chart on the next page demonstrates graphically the overall situation. This report gives a breakdown of the figures. It also analyses some of the underlying factors which may have influenced this situation.

### Council Decisions and Activity


In 2009 the total number of Council decisions (resolutions and presidential statements) decreased by 26 percent from 2008. The number dropped from 113 to 83, the lowest level since 1991. Resolutions dropped from 65 to 48 and presidential statements from 48 to 35.

This significant trend is also mirrored in a matching reduction in formal Council activity. The number of formal Council meetings decreased by 20 percent, from 243 to 194.

The number of press statements, which is one indicator of Council decision making at the informal level, also decreased by 23 percent, from 47 to 36.

Some examples of this reduced Council activity in specific cases can be seen in the numbers of formal meetings on Somalia (down from 16 to 11) and Sudan (down from 22 to 16).

**Annual Statistics on Security Council Resolutions and Presidential Statements (1990-2009)**



There was also a decrease in Council decisions on thematic issues, although the decline was less marked. The number of thematic resolutions dropped by 17 percent compared to 2008 (from 12 to ten) and the number of presidential statements on thematic issues fell from 18 to 11.

On counter-terrorism Council decisions also decreased. In 2009 only one resolution was adopted as opposed to three in 2008. There were four presidential statements condemning terrorist incidents in

2009 down from five in 2008. The number of press statements issued in response to terrorist incidents also declined, from 15 to ten.

Four resolutions were passed relating to the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as opposed to five in 2008.


**Background**

Since the end of the Cold War the Council has had two periods of very intense activity:

1992-1996 and 2004-2008. In these periods the average level of decision making was 134 decisions per year.

In the intervening period, 1997-2003, the average level of decision making was lower—but still averaged at least 100 decisions per year. The change in 2009, down to a level of only 83 decisions, is therefore quite unprecedented in the post-Cold War era. The 2009 level represents a return to levels of activity not seen for almost twenty years.

**Annual Statistics on Security Council Resolutions and Presidential Statements (1990-2009)**



## Analysis

The reasons for this new trend in 2009 cannot be simply explained. 2009 was not a year when the Council was stymied by regular use of the veto. In fact only a single veto occurred in 2009. The overall atmosphere in the Council seems to have been cordial most of the time and generally constructive—at least by contrast to some years in the recent past. The antagonisms between the Council and the General Assembly, which had marked much of the past decade, actually seemed to recede in 2009.

Nor can the overall state of international peace and security during 2009 explain this trend. Globally the number of conflict situations did not decline either in number or seriousness from 2008. To the contrary there was an upsurge in serious violence, in Gaza and Sri Lanka in particular, and a worrying resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government in parts of Africa. It is true that the 2007 *Human Security Brief* reported a significant decline in the number of armed conflicts and combat deaths from the late 1990s up to 2006. However, recent Crisis Group studies suggest that in the past year crisis situations overall have not improved and perhaps have worsened. And the 2010 publication *The Shrinking Costs of War*—released on 20 January from the authors of the *Human Security Report*—indicates in its overview that the positive trends identified earlier in the decade seem to have stalled.

## Progress is not Measured only by Formal Decisions

In looking at the possible factors which might have contributed to the decrease in Council activity in 2009, it is important to begin by acknowledging that metrics do not always show the full picture.

During 2009 Council members actually spent a great deal of time—in negotiation in meetings at the expert level—meetings which are not captured in any available statistics—or in working groups. These processes have produced some milestones that are not reflected by the bare numbers. A few examples include:

- establishment of a new expert group on protection of civilians;

- an intensive (and more transparent) review process for improved decision making on peacekeeping operations;
- new processes for better input from troop contributors;
- a new “working method”—the Informal Interactive Dialogue—which allowed the Council, eventually, to address the Sri Lanka situation;
- taking up nuclear and WMD disarmament (as opposed to simply the non-proliferation dimensions);
- significant new content in its resolution on protection of civilians;
- innovative procedural solutions for taking up cases not formally on the Council agenda (e.g. Guinea);
- an extensive open and transparent process for input to its review of resolution 1540; and
- a major revision of its processes for listing and delisting persons for targeted sanctions, including improvements to address due process criticism.

## More is not Necessarily Better

Some Council members, including China and Russia, have been quietly arguing for a number of years that the Council was overactive, trying to adopt too many decisions that were overly reactive to short term concerns and that, in their view, were not helpful in addressing underlying issues.

Some in the General Assembly have also been very critical of Council activism for wider political reasons and may (or may not) be relieved at this new trend.

And a number of former Council members have hinted in retrospect that a lot of Council action—especially the rushes of presidential statements adopted earlier in the decade—proved to be at best ephemeral and often added little or no value on the ground.

Nevertheless, it is very difficult to see evidence that any of these factors played a significant role in contracting Council decision making in 2009—and certainly not to the extent that would explain a drop in the level of decision making of the order which occurred.



## Other Factors in Play in 2009

It would be naive not to give significant weight to the impact of the financial crisis during 2009. There is no doubt that both the domestic and international dimensions of the crisis have consumed a great deal of time and energy on the part of global leaders. As a result there has not been the traditional level of push for initiatives in the Security Council.

2009 has also been a year in which most if not all governments have faced very significant fiscal problems. Foreign ministries have been under strong pressure to reduce costs. Initiatives in the Security Council usually involve increased effort by nations individually and collectively. And that means increased costs.

In addition, two Council members which historically have been drivers of much Council activity, the UK and France, seemed in late 2008 and throughout 2009 to be somewhat less focused on the Security Council than at times in the past.

The change of administration in the US is also a possible factor. New administrations always need time to get their appointees approved by the Senate and new policies developed, which tends to mean fewer Security Council initiatives in the first year. In 2009, however, the outcome of new policy reviews by Washington in a number of cases relevant to the Security Council was to seek to “engage” with countries concerned. This led to some issues being pursued bilaterally or in forums outside the Council.

Finally, the complexity of many of the issues facing the Council seems to have led a number of players in 2009—both states and NGOs—to a sense of frustration at the apparent intractability of the issues and a lack of ideas about initiatives that would make a difference, especially at a time of seriously constrained financial resources.

## Notable Dates for February

Reports for consideration in February	Document Requesting Report
31 January	<i>Darfur (UNAMID)</i> S/RES/1881
12 February	<i>Timor-Leste (UNMIT)</i> S/RES/1867
mid February	<i>Chad/CAR (MINURCAT)</i> S/RES/1861
mid-February	<i>Iraq (UNAMI)</i> S/RES/1883
February 2010 Mandates Expire	Relevant Document
26 February	<i>Timor-Leste (UNMIT)</i> S/RES/1867
February 2010 Other Important Dates	
2 February	<i>The AU Summit will conclude in Addis Ababa</i>
11-17 February	<i>The Human Rights Council will conduct its Universal Periodic Review of Fiji on the 11th, Iran on the 15th, Iraq on the 16th and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the 17th.</i>
	<i>The Secretary-General is expected to report to the General Assembly on Israeli and Palestinian follow-up to the Goldstone Report.</i>

Also expected in February:

- a debate on transition and exit strategies in peacekeeping operations
- a meeting with troop and police contributors to MINURCAT
- a briefing on Darfur

The Council is expected to be briefed by:

- Ameerah Haq, the Special Representative for Timor-Leste
- Ad Melkert, the Special Representative for Iraq
- The chair of the DPRK Sanctions Committee
- Kanat Saudabayev, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office

## Important Dates over the Horizon

- The trial of former Liberian President Charles Taylor will continue in February.
- Presidential elections are expected in Côte d'Ivoire shortly.
- General elections in Iraq are expected on 7 March.
- An Arab League summit is expected to be held in Tripoli in March.
- Elections in Sudan are expected in April.
- Elections are expected for April in Northern Cyprus.
- The Human Rights Council is expected to conduct its Universal Periodic Review of Guinea-Bissau, Haiti and Kenya in May.
- National elections are expected in the Central African Republic before the end of April.
- The promulgation of Nepal's new constitution is expected by 28 May.
- The ICJ advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence is expected sometime during the first half of 2010.
- Presidential and legislative elections are expected in Burundi on 28 June and in late July.
- Parliamentary elections in Afghanistan are expected for September.
- Legislative elections in Chad are expected for November.
- General elections in Myanmar are expected later for 2010.

### SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT STAFF

**Colin Keating**, Executive Director  
**Joanna Weschler**, Director of Research  
**Amanda Roberts**, Programme Coordinator  
**Robert Afriyie**, Research Analyst  
**Ikram Hussein**, Research Analyst  
**Shamala Kandiah**, Research Analyst  
**Nina Pregellio**, Research Analyst  
**Troy Prince**, Research Analyst  
**Astrid Forberg Ryan**, Research Analyst  
**Tim Caughley**, Research Consultant  
**Brian Lockstone**, Communications Consultant  
**Robbin VanNewkirk**, Publications Coordinator  
**Jamaal A. Young**, Programme Assistant

Security Council Report is published with the support of the Governments of Canada, Denmark, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland, The Rockefeller Foundation, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and the David and Lucile Packard Foundation. It is incorporated as a not for profit Organisation and operates in affiliation with the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University in New York.

The material in this publication is subject to copyright ownership. Material in this publication may be freely used as in the public domain. You are free to copy, distribute, or make derivative works of the work under the following conditions: you must attribute the work to Security Council Report, Inc.; you may not use this work for commercial purposes; if you alter, transform, or build upon this work, you may distribute the resulting work only under a license identical to this one.