OVERVIEW FOR JULY

Uganda will have the Council presidency in July.

A thematic open debate on post-conflict peacebuilding, currently scheduled for 22 July, is expected to be chaired by Uganda’s Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa and is likely to have several other ministerial-level participants. This debate follows up a 2008 debate on this subject and a report from the Secretary-General is expected. (SCR will publish an Update Report close to the time of the debate.)

Due to growing concerns about the situation in Somalia, a debate is likely.

An open debate on the occasion of the monthly Middle East briefing is expected on 27 July.

At press time it was unclear whether an open debate on sexual violence in conflict will be held in July or at a later time.

Three mandates expire in July:

- UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) expires on 23 July and at press time the Nepal government had not yet formally asked for an extension although there are indications that it is likely to do so. The Council will hold consultations and, if the mission is to be extended, a formal session.
- UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) expires on 31 July and the Council is expected to renew it by resolution. It will likely be briefed on the latest Secretary-General’s reports and will hold a formal session to adopt a resolution.
- The Council is also expected to renew the mandate of the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) which expires on 31 July. A briefing on recent developments and a formal session are expected.

A briefing by Joaquim Chissano, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas, whose mandate was suspended as of 30 June due to a standstill in the peace process, is expected mid-month.

Aide-Memoire

Important matters pending for the Council include:

- In a presidential statement on Darfur in July 2008 (S/PRST/2008/27) the Council welcomed the UN investigation into the 8 July attack against UNAMID peacekeepers. The results are still awaited.
- The Security Council’s request, in resolution 1820 (2008) on sexual violence, that the Secretary-General systematically include in his written reports on conflict situations his observations concerning the protection of women and girls and recommendations in this regard, has yet to be fully implemented.
- The Council has yet to address the Secretary-General’s summary of the report of the UN Board of Inquiry into incidents involving UN facilities and personnel in Gaza between 27 December and 19 January, submitted to it on 4 May (S/2009/250).
- The monthly reports from the Kosovo Force (KFOR) appear to have stopped. The last one available covers the period 1-31 July 2008.
- In resolution 1327 on the report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report, S/2000/809), the Council decided to review periodically the implementation of the provisions contained in the resolution’s annex. No such reviews have occurred in the past four years. However, in January the Council embarked on an initiative to look at ways of improving the Council’s handling of peacekeeping issues. An outcome is expected in August.
- The quarterly reports of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan are now always outdated when released. (The last report, released in June, covered the period from August 2008 to January 2009.)
- UNAMI reports on human rights in Iraq, in the past produced every two to three months, are now always very delayed and...
A briefing is also likely on the annual report of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, by the Group’s current (Mexico) and past (France) chairs.

On Children and Armed Conflict, the Council is also expected, by the end of July, to take up the issue of expanding the criteria for including parties to armed conflict in the annexes to the Secretary-General’s report on children and armed conflict, as requested in the 29 April presidential statement.

The Council may hold consultations on the situation between Djibouti and Eritrea, following up on its June 2008 presidential statement and resolution 1862 of last January that aimed at restoring normalcy in the border area.

The Council is also likely to hold consultations on:
- the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 1701 (which in 2006 put an end to the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon);
- the occasion of a briefing by the chair of the Somalia Sanctions Committee; and
- the report of the DPRK Sanctions Committee on the adjustment of the measures through the designation of additional entities, goods, and individuals, as required by resolution 1874.

The Council is also likely to receive in July the Secretary-General’s report, initially expected in June, on Iraq mandate review and discuss it (see our June Forecast for details).

Uganda will be drafting the Council’s annual report to the General Assembly covering 1 August 2008 through 31 July 2009 and the Council may begin its first discussions of the text in July.

**Aide-Memoire (continued)**

thus outdated when published. The last report, released in late April, covered the period from 1 July to 31 December 2008.

- The Secretary-General’s recommendations to the Council regarding specific action on sexual violence as put forward in his 2007 report on protection of civilians in armed conflict (S/2007/643) have yet to be implemented in country-specific situations.
- The Council requested the Secretariat on 21 November 2006 (S/2006/928) to update the index to Council notes and statements on working methods. This has not been published.
- The Secretary-General has yet to put forward proposals for the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in the Sheba Farms area, in accordance with resolution 1701, and respond to the cartographic, legal and political implications of the alternative path suggested by the government of Lebanon in its seven-point plan.
- The Council has yet to address the latest report of the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team, which was issued on 25 August 2008 (S/2008/582).
- The 2005 World Summit requested that the Security Council consider reforms for the Military Staff Committee. This has yet to be addressed.
- The Secretary-General is yet to report to the Council on Kenya as requested in a February 2008 presidential statement (S/PRST/2008/4).

**Status Update since our June Forecast**

- **DPRK**: On 25 May the DPRK conducted an underground nuclear test, followed by the launch of a short-range missile. After three weeks of negotiations held in strict confidentiality, first among the P5 plus Japan and South Korea, and then among all Council members, the Council on 12 June adopted resolution 1874 condemning the nuclear test, expanding the existing arms embargo, authorising inspection of cargoes to and from the DPRK, as well as vessels on the high seas, prohibiting financial services and transfers to the DPRK that could be linked to weapons related activities and authorising asset freezes in this regard, and calling upon states and international institutions not to provide new financial assistance or trade support to the DPRK, except for humanitarian or development assistance. The Council also decided that the 1718 Sanctions Committee would adjust its measures within thirty days, through the designation of additional entities, goods, and individuals. The Committee is due to submit a report to the Council by 15 July. Finally, it requested the Secretary-General to establish a panel of experts to monitor and verify implementation of the sanctions measures.
- **Northern Uganda and LRA-Affected Areas**: On 26 May the Secretary-General wrote to the Security Council about suspending the assignment of his Special Envoy for LRA-affected areas Joaquim Chissano as of 30 June 2009 (S/2009/281). (Chissano’s office had originally been authorised through December 2009.) In a letter dated 29 May the Security Council thanked Chissano for his contribution to the northern Uganda peace process (S/2009/282).
- **Iraq**: On 2 June the Council received the latest Secretary-General’s report on UNAMI (S/2009/284). In it, the Secretary-General emphasised that national reconciliation remained the main priority, in particular for the sharing of natural resources and disputed internal boundaries. Also, attacks against civilians were continuing and tensions were rising in the north. He highlighted that important electoral processes were ongoing. The Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Iraq, Staffan de Mistura, briefed the Council on 18 June. This was followed by a debate with the participation of Iraq (S/PV.6145). The Council then adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2009/17) reaffirming its support to the Iraqi government and to UNAMI, in particular for helping the return of refugees, promoting dialogue and providing electoral assistance.
- **Counter-Terrorism**: On 4 June the Council received a report on Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate activities as part of the interim review requested in resolution 1805 of 2008 (S/2009/289). The Council held consultations on it on
11 June and heard a briefing by France, the acting chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee.

**Tribunals:** On 4 June the Council held a debate on the International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY/ICTR) where they were briefed by prosecutors for each court on their respective completion strategies (S/2009/252 and S/2009/247). It released a press statement the same day (SC/9670).

**Sri Lanka:** On 5 June the Secretary-General held an informal interactive dialogue with the Council and Sri Lankan representatives on his 23 May visit to Sri Lanka (please see our 4 June Update Report on Sri Lanka). No action was taken.

**Iran:** On 5 June the latest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on implementation of Council resolutions in Iran was published (GOV/2009/35). It found that the number of centrifuges enriching uranium had increased and that Iran has continued to produce low enriched uranium at a slightly higher rate. It also noted that Iran had continued to deny IAEA inspectors access to certain nuclear sites including Arak.

On 15 June, the Chairman of the 1737 Sanctions Committee, Japanese Ambassador Yukio Takasu, briefed the Council on the Committee’s recent activities. He said that two states had still not provided additional information on the recent violation of the arms export ban to Iran despite the Committee’s request. Concerns over the findings of the IAEA report were expressed by the US, the UK, France, and Mexico. Those members, in addition to China and Russia, also reiterated the need for engagement with Iran (S/PV.6142).

**Sierra Leone:** On 8 June the Council was briefed in an open meeting (S/PV.6137) by the executive representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), Michael von der Schulenburg, on the latest report of the Secretary-General on UNIPSIL (S/2009/267). The chair of the Peacebuilding Commission’s (PBC) country configuration on Sierra Leone, Ambassador John McNeel of Canada, highlighted the findings of his recent visit to the country and the preparations for the PBC’s 10 June high-level special session on Sierra Leone. Also participating in the meeting was the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sierra Leone, Zainab Hawa Bangura, who told the Council of the peace consolidation efforts of the Sierra Leonean government.

**Burundi:** On 9 June the Council was briefed in an open meeting (S/PV.6138) by the head of the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), Youssef Mahmoud, on the fifth report of the Secretary-General on BINUB (S/2009/270).

**Georgia:** On 15 June the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) ended when a draft resolution failed by a vote of 10 in favour to 1 against (Russia), with four abstentions (China, Libya, Uganda and Vietnam) (S/PV.6143). The vetoed resolution (S/2009/310) had asked for a two-week extension of UNOMIG’s mandate to allow more time for negotiations on a new security regime in the region. The Secretary-General’s report (S/2009/254) of 18 May had presented recommendations for a new security regime.

**Kosovo:** On 17 June the Council held a debate on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) (S/PV.6144). The Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Kosovo presented the latest Secretary-General’s report and briefed on UNMIK’s work and status of its restructuring. He told the Council that the three-phased reconfiguration was winding up and that UNMIK was shifting its focus towards a more diplomatic and political role. The Council released a press statement following the briefing (SC/9683).

**Golan Heights:** Following the latest Secretary-General’s report on the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) (S/2009/295), the Council on 19 June held a private meeting with UNDOF troop contributors, and then consultations. On 23 June the Council adopted a resolution renewing the UNDOF mandate until 31 December (S/RES/1875), although it appears that some members proposed a one year extension. According to its practice on this issue, the Council also adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2009/18) noting the Secretary-General’s observations that the situation in the Middle East would remain tense until a comprehensive settlement on all aspects of the Middle East can be reached.

**Central African Republic:** The Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, B. Lynn Pascoe, on 22 June presented the latest report (S/2009/309) of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR) and on the activities of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office (BONUCA) to the Council, during an open meeting (S/PV.6147). Ambassador Jan Grauls of Belgium, Chair of the CAR configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) also briefed the Council on related activities by the Commission.

**Guinea-Bissau:** On 26 June in resolution 1876 the Council extended the mandate of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) until 31 December and requested the Secretary-General to establish a UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) to succeed UNOGBIS for an initial period of 12 months after that. On 23 June UNOGBIS head, Joseph Mumbaba, presented the Secretary-General’s report (S/2009/302) on Guinea-Bissau and UNOGBIS (S/PV.6149). The Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission, Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti of Brazil, updated the Council on the Commission’s activities. On 28 June presidential elections were held in Guinea-Bissau. Results were unavailable at press time.

**Middle East:** On 23 June the Council heard its monthly briefing on the situation in the Middle East. Robert Serry, Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, summarised the latest developments in the region. He said that although there had been a notable decrease in violence, living conditions in Gaza remained of grave concern. He also mentioned that Israel had not been cooperative with the Human Rights Council fact-finding mission in Gaza. And he added that Israel had failed to implement a freeze on all settlements activity, that Hamas must reevaluate its stance on a two-state solution and the resort to violence against civilians, and that Fatah needs to face the challenge of internal reform (S/PV.6150).

**Liberia:** On 25 June the Council met in closed consultations to hear a briefing by Alain Le Roy, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations,
on the Secretary-General’s special report on the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) issued on 10 June (S/2009/299). It also heard a briefing by the Chairman of the Liberia Sanctions Committee on the mid-term report of the Liberia Panel of Experts (S/2009/290). Discussions reportedly focused mainly on the Secretary-General’s proposed drawdown plan for UNMIL and revealed that divisions remain, mainly between the US and France, on whether to aim for more ambitious reductions in the third drawdown stage. Most members were supportive of the Secretary-General’s recommendations.

Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict:
On 26 June the Council held an open debate on protection of civilians. John Holmes, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, gave a briefing on the Secretary-General’s most recent report on the issue (S/2009/277), which provides an assessment of the first ten years of Council action on protection as a thematic issue and identifies key challenges. Holmes noted that much greater effort was needed to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law, as well as accountability for violations. He stated that the Council should consistently condemn violations and demand compliance and also apply targeted sanctions in cases of non-compliance, request reports on violations and mandate commissions of inquiry. He also said that the Council should seek compliance with international humanitarian law by non-state actors. In regards to UN peacekeeping operations, he stressed the importance of providing clear and practical guidance to heads of missions and force commanders on implementing protection mandates, developing mission-specific protection strategies and spreading best practice innovations. Ensuring adequate resources was also important. Finally, Holmes focused on the need to improve humanitarian access, referring to the annex on access included in the Secretary-General’s report and calling for Council action. (S/PV.6151 and res. 1)

Peacekeeping: At the time of writing the Council was expected to hold a public debate on UN peacekeeping on 29 June on the relationship with troop contributing countries and police contributing countries. Major troop and financial contributors are expected to participate. The Council is also expected to be briefed by Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy and Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Field Support Susana Malcorra. (Please see our 25 June Update Report on Peacekeeping.)

Afghanistan: At the time of writing the Council was expected to hold a debate on the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) on 30 June. It follows the Secretary-General’s first report (S/2009/323) on UNAMA since the 23 March adoption of resolution 1868 requesting more frequent reports.

Sudan

Expected Council Action
The mandate of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) expires on 31 July and the Council is expected to renew. The Council will consider the two most recent Secretary-General’s reports on UNAMID (one covering April and May and one likely to be received in mid-July covering June) and will be briefed by the joint AU-UN Special Representative, Rodolphe Adada. The Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, Susana Malcorra, may brief on developments regarding UNAMID’s deployment.

Also in July, the Council is likely to hold consultations on the quarterly report from the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), whose mandate expires on 30 April 2010. The UNMIS report is likely to include findings from the May needs-assessment mission in preparation for the Sudanese elections planned for 2010 Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy may brief. If additional resources are requested, a decision from the Council will be required.

The Sudan Sanctions Committee is expecting a report from its Panel of Experts and may start discussing the possibility of adding new names to its list of targets.

Key Recent Developments
In a briefing on 11 June, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes noted that the Sudanese government has allowed some new registrations for international aid organisations and was signaling that assistance from international NGOs is both welcome and valued. But he also said that the gaps left after the March expulsions of the humanitarian organisations were particularly serious in areas such as education, reproductive health and livelihood assistance and the overall humanitarian situation will be further exacerbated by the onset of the rainy season.

Holmes highlighted ongoing concerns about the impact of the NGO ejections on the Three Protocol Areas (Abeyi, Blue Nile State, and Southern Kordofan State) and eastern Sudan. He also conveyed serious concerns about the high humanitarian toll of the tribal violence in Jonglei state and the renewed presence in Sudan of the Ugandan rebel group, Lord’s Resistance Army.

The Sudan Sanctions Committee is expected to receive a thematic issue and identifies key challenges. Holmes noted that much greater effort was needed to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law, as well as accountability for violations. He stated that the Council should consistently condemn violations and demand compliance and also apply targeted sanctions in cases of non-compliance, request reports on violations and mandate commissions of inquiry. He also said that the Council should seek compliance with international humanitarian law by non-state actors. In regards to UN peacekeeping operations, he stressed the importance of providing clear and practical guidance to heads of missions and force commanders on implementing protection mandates, developing mission-specific protection strategies and spreading best practice innovations. Ensuring adequate resources was also important. Finally, Holmes focused on the need to improve humanitarian access, referring to the annex on access included in the Secretary-General’s report and calling for Council action. (S/PV.6151 and res. 1)

Chad/Sudan relations remain tense. Recent reports suggested that Sudan was pushing the rebels back across the border. A Chadian website reported that Sudanese forces had bombed the towns of Bahai and Karyare in Chad on 30 May.

On 28 May, Sudanese army forces working with Sudanese Liberation Army forces loyal to Minni Minnawi retook the town of Kornoy, in Darfur near the Chadian border, from Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebels who had taken the town in mid-May and from there attacked nearby Umm Barru, forcing some 350 civilians to seek refuge with UNAMID.

A JEM spokesperson claimed Sudan bombed wells in the area of Furawiya settlement, Darfur, on 1 June, killing two and injuring 15.

Peace negotiations in Doha between JEM and the Sudanese government appeared to show some promise in late May and in June. On 28 May, JEM agreed to release sixty Sudanese army soldiers taken as prisoners of war. On 19 June the Doha talks were suspended. On 9 June, a court in Khartoum sentenced 12 more JEM rebels to death (bringing the total sentenced to
death to 103), for their role in attacks on the capital in May 2008. Prisoners remain the key point of contention for JEM. On 23 June AU/UN Joint Chief Mediator Djibril Yipènè Bassolé announced that both sides agreed to exchange prisoners in the near future, with Sudan willing to release twenty members of JEM and JEM promising to free sixty soldiers.

On 29 May, also in Doha, special envoys of the permanent members of the Security Council met with the EU envoy and Bassolé to discuss the Darfur peace process. Most of them met again, along with representatives from about thirty other countries, on 23 June in Washington at a US-organised forum focused on the north-south process.

In South Sudan, tribal violence increased significantly. In late May in Southern Kordofan, some 250 were killed. On 3 June, 14 were killed and seven wounded in the vicinity of Akobo. In the same region, on 12 June, members of the Jikany-Nuer tribe ambushed a convoy of 27 boats carrying emergency food rations for the World Food Programme to an area controlled by the Lou-Nuer tribe. Forty people were killed, including several Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) soldiers, escorting the convoy. On 15 June Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) accused the government of distributing the weapons used in the attack. Khartoum denied the accusations on 16 June.

On 5 June, the prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno-Ocampo, briefed the Council. He said he had no plans to open a new investigation in the next six months but would continue to follow new information on ongoing crimes. Subsequently, Sudanese Ambassador Abdalmahmood Abdulhalim Mohamed, denounced the prosecutor, his report and the warrant against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir.

Two African nations indicated they will enforce the ICC’s arrest warrant for Bashir. In May, South Africa warned Bashir against attending President Jacob Zuma’s inauguration in Pretoria, and Botswana on 9 June announced that it would arrest Bashir should he visit.

In South Sudan, the internal political landscape has seen some recent changes. President Salva Kiir on 31 May reshuffled his cabinet amid allegations of ministerial corruption and mismanagement. He relieved ten ministers of their posts and appointed nine replacements.

On 6 June, former Sudanese Foreign Minister Lam Akol announced the founding of a new political party to challenge the SPLM: the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement—Democratic Change (SPLM-DC). Akol accused the SPLM of mismanagement and failing the people of South Sudan while in power. The SPLM, in turn, has accused Akol of being a pawn of the North. On 8 June, SPLM leadership indicated they would take legal action against Akol’s use of the SPLM name.

### Developments in the Human Rights Council

On 16 June the UN Special Rapporteur for Sudan, Sima Samar, submitted her report (covering August 2008 to May 2009) to the Human Rights Council. She cited many human rights violations, including arbitrary arrests, detentions and the torture of humanitarian workers by the National Intelligence and Security Services. In light of upcoming elections, Samar also noted increasing censorship and restrictions on the media in Sudan. In South Sudan, according to Samar, grave human rights problems developed as a result of ethnic tribal clashes. Sudanese representatives urged the council to end the mandate of the Special Rapporteur.

On 18 June, the Council adopted a resolution establishing the mandate for a new Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Sudan, to replace the Special Rapporteur, whose mandate lapses at the end of June. The new expert takes over the mandate of the Special Rapporteur (as outlined in Human Rights Council resolutions 6/34, 6/35, 7/16 and 9/17). The Independent Expert is mandated to work with the AU, UNAMID and UNMIS and to report at the Council’s session in June 2010.

### Key Issues

A key issue is the delays in full deployment of the authorised strength of UNAMID (69 percent of troops and 79 percent of the police have been deployed—it is hoped that by year’s end 90 percent of deployment will be achieved).

The hybrid operation is novel and has proven to be an imperfect model. However, it is likely to be renewed without significant change. Some members have been critical of it, but no major changes to the core mandate are likely to be proposed. Achieving consensus on UNAMID historically has been very difficult.

An important issue has been the difficulty of conducting peacekeeping without a peace accord and the related need for a political settlement representative of all the Darfuri population, including rebels and the civilian population, to avoid the pitfalls of the previous peace agreement.

An issue for Darfur—and for Sudan as a whole—are the growing concerns about the north-south relationship and the recent upsurge in tribal violence. Important in this context will be whether both sides accept the ruling, expected in July, of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague on Abeyel.

### Options

The Council has an opportunity to address several pressing issues by including in the resolution some of the following options:

- calling for credible and timely elections representative of the entire Sudanese population with particular attention paid to the displaced population of Darfur;
- requesting regular reports on the humanitarian situation and the fulfilment of commitments made by the government in the aftermath of the humanitarian organisations’ expulsions;
- emphasising the importance of protection of civilians in UNAMID’s mandate and the need for this to translate into robust action on the ground;
- enhancing support for quick-impact projects in health, education and infrastructure, which would also bring local communities and the UN closer together;
- emphasising the need for strengthened support for displaced persons who might want to return home; and
- asking UNAMID to strengthen its cooperation with the Sanctions Committee’s Panel of Experts.
On sanctions, should a new list of targets be suggested with no consensus in the Committee to approve it, an unlikely option is to take the matter to the Council for a vote.

Council Dynamics

The dynamics on UNAMID are affected by history. Reaching agreement on the original mandate in 2007 was exceptionally difficult because of significant differences among permanent members. Its first renewal in 2008 was clouded by the ICC announcement on President Bashir, and AU members’ call for a Council preemptive request to the Court to suspend ICC action. (A mention of this request in the 2008 resolution prompted the US to abstain.) At present, members seem agreed about the need for UNAMID’s renewal. They are likely to focus on areas of consensus to ensure that the operation achieves full deployment and fulfils its protection mandate to the best extent possible.

The Doha meeting on Darfur in May and the Washington forum on the north-south process on 23 June, both with the participation of the P5 special envoys for Sudan, possibly signal an emerging degree of political cooperation among the permanent members and recognition of the need for sustained focus on and support to the political process. It remains to be seen whether this will translate into effective and inclusive collective action in New York.

On the possibility of additional names for targeted sanctions, members are divided. Some (such as Libya) are interested in adding rebel leaders, and others (like France) are willing to move forward only if additions would also include spoilers on the government side. Sanctions committees operate by consensus and this may mean a continuing standstill on the sanctions list issue.

The UK is the lead nation on Sudan.

Underlying Problems

Access to Darfur has been a problem for UN bodies and humanitarian organisations ever since the situation entered the international security agenda. For Darfurians, freedom of movement (and association) has been an ongoing problem as well. On the international side, in addition to the expulsions of international aid workers, the Sudan sanctions Panel of Experts faced weeks of paralysing visa denials. On the domestic side, there appears to be an increasing pattern of attempts to isolate civil society groups and individuals. A conference organised by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, scheduled for 12-16 May in Ethiopia to bring together 345 members of Darfuri civil society was cancelled after the Sudanese government refused to issue exit visas for the participants. And on 12 May, Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Service stopped a workshop organised by UNAMID at the University of Zalingei in western Darfur. The workshop was focused on the role of local administration in peace, conflict resolution and reconciliation, and was properly registered with local authorities.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1870 (30 April 2009) renewed UNMIS.
- S/RES/1828 (31 July 2008) renewed UNAMID.
- S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.

Selected Presidential Statement
- S/PRST/2009/13 (8 May 2009) called on Chad and Sudan to respect and fully implement their mutual commitments.

Latest Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2009/297 (9 June 2009) was a report on UNAMID.
- S/2009/211 (17 April 2009) was a report on UNMIS.

Selected Security Council Meeting Records
- S/PV.6139 (11 June 2009) was the briefing of Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes to the Council
- S/PV.6135 (5 June 2009) was the briefing of ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to the Council.
- S/PV.6131 (28 May 2009) was the briefing on the Council Mission to Africa, 14 to 21 May 2009.
- S/PV.6112 (27 April 2009) was the latest UNAMID briefing.
- S/PV.6079 (5 February 2009) was the latest UNMIS open briefing.

Selected Letters

- S/2009/255 (16 May 2009) was a letter from Sudan detailing complaints against Chad.
- S/2009/249 (15 May 2009) was the letter containing the 3 May 2009 Doha agreement between Chad and Sudan.
- S/2009/144 (6 March 2009) was the AU Peace and Security Council communiqué on the ICC arrest warrant for President Al-Bashir.
- S/2009/100 (18 February 2009) was the Agreement of Goodwill and Confidence-Building for the Settlement of the Problem in Darfur.

Other Relevant Facts

UNAMID: Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur
- Rodolphe Adada (Republic of Congo)
- Djibrill Yipènè Bassolé (Burkina Faso)
- UNAMID: Size, Composition and Cost
  - Maximum authorised strength: up to 19,555 military personnel, 3,772 police and 19 formed police units (total police 6432)
  - Main troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt and Ethiopia
  - Strength as of 23 June 2009: 13,455 military personnel (including 12,814 troops, 378 staff officers, 179 military observers and 84 liaison officers) and 2,975 police personnel (including 1,997 police advisers and 7 formed units composed of 975 personnel)
On 9 June Somali media suspended broadcasting to protest the killing, and NUSJ called on the international community to take action.

The situation for civilians, particularly in Mogadishu, remained “extremely alarming” according to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Also, the International Committee of the Red Cross, Médécins sans Frontières (MSF), and Oxfam International expressed grave concern. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees said on 9 June that the situation for civilians was unacceptable and that the fighting was conducted in clear violation of international humanitarian and human rights law. It estimated on 26 June that more than 250 civilians had been killed, 900 wounded and 160,000 people displaced since fighting erupted at the beginning of May.

On 20 June the Somali speaker of parliament, Sheikh Aden Mohamed Nur, asked neighbouring countries (including Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen) to intervene militarily in Somalia to support the government. On 22 June Somali President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed declared a state of emergency. Al-Shabaab immediately warned against any intervention and said it would fight any foreign troops.

Reuters had reported earlier in June that Ethiopian soldiers were once again observed by residents as far as 30 kilometers inside Somalia. While Ethiopia had admitted at the end of May to carrying out reconnaissance missions on Somali territory, it denied the presence of soldiers, saying it had no intention of going back into Somalia and claimed the reports were fabricated by Islamist rebels to gain support for their fight against the TFG.

There were several attacks targeting journalists. On 2 June Ibrahim Mohamed Ali, the director of Universal TV, a Somali TV station based in London, was abducted on his way from Afgoye to Mogadishu. On 7 June two armed men shot and killed the director of the Somali radio station Radio Shabelle, Mukhtar Mohammed Hirabe. According to the National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSJ), Hirabe was the fifth journalist killed in Somalia this year. On 9 June Somali media suspended broadcasting to protest the killing, and NUSJ called on the international community to take action.

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for the period 1 July to 31 December in the amount of approximately $138.8 million.

A closely related issue is whether the current UN strategy for Somalia is sufficient or whether additional measures are needed as requested by the Somali government in its appeal for foreign intervention. It seems likely that new initiatives will emerge for greater UN action in the sanctions area. Revisiting the UN peacekeeping idea seems less of an issue.

As to regional military action, Ethiopian Information Minister Bereket Simon said, according to the BBC, that any further Ethiopian action would be based on a decision by the international community. However, it is widely thought that any Ethiopian military involvement would be counterproductive.

Another key issue is the role of foreign fighters and outside interference, notably from Eritrea, and the impact on regional stability. Concern appears to be growing that the current situation is attracting foreigners with links to Al-Qaeda and others wanting to wage holy war in Somalia, thus strengthening the insurgency. There are also concerns about regional implications of an escalation of the conflict. Kenya in particular has said that a further deterioration in Somalia would be a threat to regional stability and should not be allowed.

A related question is what role Eritrea is playing in supporting the insurgents. In June an IGAD delegation visited New York to ask Council members to support its request for sanctions on the government of Eritrea. (There was less focus on IGAD’s call for a no-fly zone and a blockade of seaports in Somalia.) The Council asked the Sanctions Monitoring Group in a statement in May to investigate reports that Eritrea had supplied arms to insurgent groups. It is unlikely to take any action until it has received credible evidence, but a Council initiative in this area is another possible issue.

A major underlying issue is the suffering of the civilian population and the continuing deterioration in the humanitarian situation. In previous decisions on Somalia, the Council has repeatedly called for respect for international humanitarian law but has never substantively addressed the issue of accountability for those responsible for violations. Implementing the current sanctions regime for Somalia which allows for targeted individual measures against those who obstruct humanitarian assistance is a further issue.

Options
At press time, discussions were underway among Council members about possible action in July. Main options for the Council include:

- reinforcing previous messages and calling in particular for immediate international support for the TFG both bilaterally and through mechanisms already in place;
- exploring additional measures if requested by IGAD or the AU; and
- expediting work in the Somalia Sanctions Committee to establish the list of individuals and entities subject to targeted sanctions.

In addition the Council could:

- provide much more precise steering on international involvement in political reconciliation efforts, in particular as regards the Special Representative’s role (this issue may be addressed in the Secretary-General’s July report which is expected to include recommendations on ways to strengthen the Djibouti peace process);
- condemn the recent attacks against Somali journalists, recalling its resolution 1738, which specifically calls for protection in armed conflict for journalists and media professionals; and
- express support for the establishment, at the appropriate time, of an independent commission of inquiry to investigate serious crimes committed in Somalia and request the Secretary-General to develop recommendations in that regard.

Council Dynamics
The Council is united in its concern for the current situation in Somalia, but most members do not seem ready to launch any new initiative for immediate action. Some are waiting to see what decisions will emerge from the AU summit scheduled in Libya from 24 June to 3 July.

African members of the Council are divided on the IGAD request for sanctions on Eritrea. While Uganda seems supportive, Libya and Burkina Faso are seen as reluctant. Other Council members are concerned about the Eritrean role, but seem to think that any initiative to coerce Eritrea must have full support from African members.

On the broader sanctions issues, divisions are expected as well. Also, because of procedural issues the establishment of a list of individuals and entities to be subject to targeted sanctions is likely to take time. It remains to be seen, however, whether the Monitoring Group’s expected draft sanctions list may create some momentum.

UK is the lead country on this issue in the Council.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1872 (26 May 2009) renewed authorisation of AMISOM until 31 January 2010, approved its funding from assessed UN contributions and requested the Secretary-General to implement the phased approach recommended in his 16 April report.
- S/RES/1863 (16 January 2009) renewed authorisation of AMISOM for up to six months, approved using UN resources to strengthen AMISOM and expressed the Council’s intention to establish a UN peacekeeping operation by 1 June 2009.
- S/RES/1853 (19 December 2008) renewed the mandate of the Monitoring Group for 12 months.
- S/RES/1851 (16 December 2008) expanded the antipiracy authorisation to include action on land in Somalia and called for enhanced coordination.
- S/RES/1738 (23 December 2006) condemned intentional attacks against journalists, media professionals and associated personnel, and requested that the Secretary-General include as a sub-item in his next reports on the protection of civilians in armed conflict the issue of the safety and security of journalists, media professionals and associated personnel.

Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2009/15 (15 May 2009) condemned the renewed fighting by Al-Shabaab and other extremists,
demanded an immediate end to the violence, and called on the Sanctions Monitoring Group to investigate reports that Eritrea had supplied arms to insurgent groups.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2009/210 (16 April 2009) was the report requested by resolution 1863 on a possible UN peacekeeping deployment in Somalia.
- S/2009/146 (16 March 2009) was the report on piracy submitted pursuant to resolution 1846.
- S/2009/132 (9 March 2009) was the most recent regular report.
- S/2009/256 (19 May 2009) was a letter from Eritrea reaffirming its rejection of accusations that it had supplied arms to any party in Somalia.

Latest Monitoring Group’s Report

- S/2008/769 (10 December 2008)

Other

- SC/9685 (19 June 2009) was a Council press statement condemning the suicide bombing that killed the Somali Minister for National Security.
- S/2009/312 (16 June 2009) was a letter from the Secretary-General informing the Council of the appointment of the fifth expert to the Monitoring Group.
- S/2009/172 (31 March 2009) was a letter from the Secretary-General informing the Council of the appointment of four experts to the Monitoring Group.

Women, Peace and Security

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to hold a debate in July on implementation of resolution 1820 on sexual violence in conflict. (The Secretary-General’s report is due on 30 June). At press time it was unclear whether the report would be received on time and if the Council would consider it in July or August.

Key Recent Developments

Sexual violence against women has continued in many places including Burundi, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti, Liberia, Myanmar, Somalia, Nepal and Timor-Leste, and has increased in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic since the adoption of resolution 1820 in June 2008, according to the relevant Secretary-General’s country-specific reports.

Implementation of resolution 1820 has been weak. Parties to armed conflict have often failed to protect civilians from sexual violence, and only in a few countries were steps taken to allow better victim access to justice and to create police women protection units. Despite commitments to combat sexual violence in peace agreements (such as in the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire), these have not been fully implemented. Assistance to victims and reparations continue to be insufficient.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania)

UNPOS

- **Cost:** approx. $16 million (revised 2009 budget)
- **Duration:** 15 April 1995 to present; mandate expires on 31 December 2009

Information on sexual violence in relevant Secretary-General’s country-specific reports has been superficial, with no analysis of trends. Specific paragraphs were included only in reports on the DRC and Somalia. Sexual violence against girls has been better addressed in country reports on children and armed conflict.

Between 20 June 2008 and 15 June 2009 the Council adopted 16 resolutions (on Haiti, Liberia, Chad, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Burundi, the DRC, Somalia, Timor-Leste and Côte d’Ivoire) including a reference to the goals of resolution 1820 or a condemnation of violence against women.

On 14 January the Council adopted a revised aide-memoire facilitating its consideration of issues related to the protection of civilians. It inserted a section on women affected by armed conflict.

The Council last held an open debate on women, peace and security on 29 October 2008. It adopted a presidential statement urging states and international and regional organisations to increase women’s participation in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding. It called upon the Secretary-General to appoint more women to pursue good offices and requested a report on resolution 1325 (the 2000 resolution on women, peace and security) including information on obstacles to women’s participation.

UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict—a group of 12 UN entities aimed at improving coordination and accountability, supporting national efforts to prevent sexual violence and responding to the needs of survivors—has developed an Analytical Inventory of Responses by Peacekeeping Personnel to War-Related Violence Against Women, which catalogues existing protection tactics used by peacekeepers. This will be available to troop contributors. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has been tasked to develop gender guidelines for peacekeeping personnel to facilitate resolutions 1325 and 1820, to be completed in 2009.
From 22 to 24 June the UN organised a colloquium in New York entitled “Addressing sexual violence in conflict: implementing resolution 1820”. It brought together technical experts on ceasefires, protection of civilians, justice, disarmament and social protection and mediators. It developed guidance to bring up sexual violence in pre-ceasefire agreements; to list sexual violence as a prohibited act under a ceasefire agreement; to ensure that disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration as well as security sector reform processes prevent sexual violence and provide protection; to cover sexual violence in justice processes; and to provide reparations. The colloquium was followed by an Arria formula meeting.

DRC
Most of the attention has focused on implementation of resolution 1820 in the DRC.

UN Action and the UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) have developed a comprehensive strategy on combating sexual violence, creating a common framework for action in the DRC by all UN agencies. It identifies key issues such as weak political will by the DRC government and from some UN agencies, the need for a centralised funding mechanism, and the lack of data and analysis on sexual violence.

On 3 March the Council’s DRC Sanctions Committee imposed an assets freeze and travel ban on three individuals identified in 2008 by the Expert Group report as responsible for sexual violence.

During its May visit to the DRC, Council members met victims and gave the government the names of five army officers who should be arrested for sexual violence (although the list did not include Bosco Ntaganda currently indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) on charges of war crimes). No arrest warrants have so far been issued. To date only four soldiers have been convicted for failing to assist persons in danger. The absence of a credible vetting process for the Congolese army and lack of willingness from the DRC government to seriously address impunity at the highest level of Congolese armed forces continues to be a problem. This was emphasised by former force commander for the eastern DRC Patrick Cammaert during a press conference at the UN on 24 June. A positive development, however, was the sentencing on 5 June by a DRC military court of five militia fighters guilty of sexual crimes to thirty years in prison and ordered them to pay damages to over 135 victims.

Options
With the view to strengthening resolution 1820 implementation, the Council could:

- request an assessment of current efforts across the UN system to implement resolution 1820 and recommendations for improvement;
- establish an 1820 reporting cycle, perhaps with a specific annex with global analysis of prevalence of sexual violence;
- recommend appointing a Secretary-General special representative or personal envoy on sexual violence in conflict;
- request the Secretary-General to personally take up with all Special Representatives their responsibility to engage forcefully on the issue of sexual violence with relevant parties to conflict;
- request analysis of sexual violence issues in all reports to the Council and emphasise the need for more systematic data collection;
- encourage development of UN strategies to combat sexual violence in all affected areas, using the precedent of the strategy developed in the DRC;
- request the Department of Political Affairs to ensure that sexual violence dimensions are considered in all mediation processes with which the UN is involved; and
- call on troop contributors to strengthen pre-deployment training on ways to address sexual violence and request the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to include this in training advice to troops contributing countries.

The Council could also review the 1820 agenda and:

- establish a working group on sexual violence against women or decide to incorporate sexual violence issues in the work of the Council expert group on protection of civilians;
- request relevant UN agencies to ensure that more assistance be provided to victims;
- establish a commission of inquiry into sexual violence in one or more situations—it could also do this in the context of the Secretary-General’s broader recommendation in his latest report on protection of civilians to establish commissions of inquiry to examine violations of international humanitarian law;
- where impunity prevails or local justice mechanisms are overwhelmed, authorise or support ad hoc judicial arrangements to address sexual violence;
- warn that it will, if necessary, refer situations of sexual violence to the ICC; and
- request that sexual violence issues become part of the mandate of gender advisers, in the context of a broader mainstreaming of sexual violence issues into all UN agencies.

Key Issues
The Council is likely to review resolution 1820 implementation efforts. Key issues are:

1. Collection of Information on Sexual Violence: Prevention, protection, or prosecution cannot occur without information and analysis. But data is lacking. A problem seems to be the lack of confidentiality, witness protection and assistance to victims in the context of data collection. Related issues seem to be weak coordination among UN agencies, the absence of standardised definitions and methodologies, restricted access to sensitive areas and general funding deficits.

2. Leadership among UN Agencies: Resolution 1820 implementation by the entire UN system is a multi-sectoral issue. A question is whether a personal envoy or special representative on sexual violence tasked to strengthen UN coordination, provide political impetus and act as an in-house advocate should be appointed. Whether UN Action’s activities in the DRC can be replicated in other areas may also be addressed.

3. Security Council Mechanism: Another issue is how the Council can more systematically address sexual violence in country-specific situations on its agenda. A question is whether to establish a new mechanism or use existing ones as avenues for addressing sexual violence. For instance, the Council could decide in July to expand the list of triggers for the Children and Armed Conflict Working Group to include rape and other grave sexual violence against children.

4. Dialogue with Non-State Actors: The latest Secretary-General’s report on protection of civilians recommended...
that states support or at least not impede efforts by humanitarian organisations to engage with armed groups to protect civilians. The report also said that engagement can provide entry points for dialogue on sexual violence.

5. Mediation and Sexual Violence: An issue is how to better incorporate sexual violence issues into peace processes. While supporting greater participation of women as mediators and as parties to negotiations, the Council may also consider encouraging the systematic inclusion of sexual violence provisions in peace agreements.

Council Dynamics

France, the US, the UK, Costa Rica, Austria and some others consider this upcoming 1820 report as a landmark opportunity on which to build implementation. A majority of members seem to favour regular 1820 reports.

There is some debate as to whether 1325 and 1820 should be addressed separately. Some members (Austria, France, and the UK) support the creation of a sexual violence mandate because this issue is a high profile one. They also think that this would provide political leadership, engagement with non-state actors, and better UN coordination. Most of them seem to think that a personal envoy would be a better option for funding reasons. Japan is particularly reluctant about options which would require additional funding for this issue. Others disagree with establishing a focal point on sexual violence and believe that UN efforts should be linked to more toward 1325 implementation. Russia and China in particular favour this approach.

Most Council members are reluctant to create a mechanism similar to the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict for sexual violence. Some believe it would be too burdensome. Russia believes that sexual violence is not a peace and security issue per se as it is difficult to differentiate between a tactic of war and random crime. Russia also considers that sexual violence should not be addressed by the Council independently from other violations against civilians.

A debate also exists between those who believe that a first step should be expanding the list of triggers for consideration by the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict to include sexual violence and those who believe it is an insufficient response as it would leave out all women over 18. Japan, France, the US and the UK in particular seem inclined to use the new aide-memoire and the expert group on protection of civilians.

Council members seem generally to agree on improvement of data collection and analysis. The US, the UK, France, Japan and Austria seem ready to consider the establishment of a commission of inquiry, although Japan and the US have budgetary reservations. Russia seems reluctant if it focuses only on sexual violence and on certain conflicts.

The US has the lead on this issue. At press time it was still determining its strategy for the Council discussions.

UN Documents

**Selected Council Resolutions**
- **S/RES/1820** (19 June 2008) recognised that sexual violence as a tactic of war can exacerbate situations of armed conflict, demanded all parties to protect civilians from all forms of sexual violence and requested a report from the Secretary-General.
- **S/RES/1807** (31 March 2008) imposed sanctions against individuals involved in sexual violence in the DRC.
- **S/RES/1794** (21 December 2007) requested MONUC to pursue a mission-wide strategy to strengthen prevention, protection and response to sexual violence.
- **S/RES/1325** (31 October 2000) was the resolution on women, peace and security.

**Selected Council Presidential Statements**
- **S/PRST/2009/8** (21 April 2009) stressed the need for more women participation in mediators’ teams.
- **S/PRST/2009/1** (14 January 2009) was the latest statement on protection of civilians including the revised aide-memoire.
- **S/PRST/2008/39** (29 October 2008) was a statement on women, peace and security focused on women’s participation

**Selected Secretary-General’s Reports**
- **S/2009/277** (29 May 2009) was the latest report on protection of civilians in armed conflict.
  - **S/2009/160** (27 March 2009) was the latest report on MONUC.
  - **S/2008/693** (10 November 2008) was the latest report on protection of civilians in armed conflict in the DRC.
  - **S/2008/622** (25 September 2008) was the latest report on women, peace and security.
  - **S/2007/643** (28 October 2007) was a report on protection of civilians in armed conflict.

Latest Council Meeting Record
- **S/PV.6005 and res. 1** (29 October 2008) was the latest open debate on women, peace and security.

Useful Additional Sources

- **A framework for a holistic approach to resolutions on protection of civilians, children and armed conflict, and women, peace and security**, Liam Mahony and Roger Nash, 10 November 2008

Children and Armed Conflict

Expected Council Action

In July the Council is expected to consider the annual report on the activities of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009. The Council is likely to be briefed by both France, which was chair of the Working Group until the end of 2008, and Mexico, which took over in January 2009.

By the end of July, the Council is also expected to take up the issue of expanding the criteria for including parties to armed conflict in the annexes to the Secretary-General’s report on children and armed conflict, as foreshadowed in its 29 April presidential statement. Currently, the recruitment of children is the single trigger...
for placing an entity on the Secretary-General’s annexes, but the presidential statement recognised the value of expanding this to include the crimes of killing and maiming, rape and sexual violence against children in the context of an armed conflict.

Since the establishment of the Working Group in 2005 the Council’s practice has been to consider the Working Group’s annual report under “other matters”. However, if the discussion on expanding the criteria for inclusion in the Secretary-General’s annexes results in a formal Council decision, a meeting of the Council to adopt it is likely.

Key Recent Developments

The presidential statement, adopted after a day-long open debate on 29 April, reiterated the Council’s strong condemnation of the continuing recruitment and use of children in armed conflict. Moreover, it also recognised the importance of including killing and maiming and acts of rape and sexual violence that are prohibited under international law as criteria for listing in the annexes to the Secretary-General’s report. The presidential statement asked for the Council to take action on this matter within three months. It also highlighted the obligation of parties to armed conflict to comply with applicable international law, reiterated the Working Group’s request for administrative support, and called on parties once again to prepare and implement time-bound action plans. The presidential statement also emphasised the need to take immediate action against perpetrators of serious violations against children and to bring them to justice. The Working Group was asked to adopt timely conclusions and continue its review of its working methods.

The Working Group when dealing with country-specific issues tends to proceed by adopting sets of conclusions based on its discussion of Secretary-General’s reports.

The Working Group has stalled in 2009 largely due to inability to reach agreement on its conclusions on Afghanistan. The main problem appears to have been differences between Russia and the US over whether the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan has violated international humanitarian law within the context of children and armed conflict. The Secretary-General’s report on children and armed conflict in Afghanistan was published on 10 November 2008. The Council first discussed it in December. Mexico has been working with the US and Russia to try and resolve the issue. It now appears that conclusions might be released on 1 July covering children and armed conflict in both Afghanistan and the DRC (which was also first discussed in December).

The Working Group began discussions on 16 June on expanding the thematic issue of criteria for the Secretary-General’s annexes, as requested in the April presidential statement. This will feed into the upcoming debate. Mexico, as chair of the Working Group, had earlier held bilateral meetings with all Working Group members to determine positions. Mexico is expected to circulate a draft with elements for either a resolution or presidential statement shortly.

There have been three Secretary-General’s reports on children and armed conflict released this year: Central African Republic on 3 February, Sudan on 10 February and Myanmar on 1 June. It appears that the report on Sri Lanka may be released shortly. But no conclusions have been issued since 5 December 2008.

Options

Options for a resolution or a presidential statement include:

- expanding the criteria for inclusion in the annexes of the Secretary-General’s annual report to include killing and maiming and committing acts of rape and other sexual violence against children in situations of armed conflict;
- establishing a systematic channel of communication between the Working Group and relevant sanctions committees. In situations where the Council has not imposed sanctions, one option would be to enable the Working Group to ask the Council to adopt resolutions with targeted sanctions against individuals, and to empower it to serve as a sanctions committee in such situations; and
- reiterating the need for time-bound action plans and possibly asking for a review of factors that have limited the implementation of action plans.

Other possible elements include:

- requesting the Secretary-General to include an assessment of the progress or deterioration of each specific situation in his reports on children and armed conflict;
- deciding to evaluate the work of the monitoring and reporting mechanism and the Working Group at regular intervals; and
- requesting the Working Group to provide other options for applying pressure on persistent violators, apart from targeted sanctions.

Key Issues

A procedural issue for the Council is whether a resolution is needed or whether a presidential statement will suffice for expanding the trigger for parties on the Secretary-General’s annex and other possible elements. If the Council decides to focus only on expanding the criteria to include sexual violence and killing and maiming, a decision recorded in a presidential statement is a possible option. However, setting up a new mechanism specifically tied to sanctions committees suggests that the greater weight of a resolution would be appropriate.

A connected issue is whether having a resolution in July—whatever is decided—could be useful, even if not legally necessary, to signal the importance the Council places on this issue.

An underlying substantive issue is how to increase pressure on persistent violators? One suggestion involving a system of communications between the Working Group and the relevant sanctions committees is on the table. A related issue is how to deal with persistent violators if there are no sanctions in place.

Another issue is ensuring that a new decision strengthens existing mechanisms and does not undermine the operations of the current structures like the monitoring and reporting mechanism on children and armed conflict as well as the Working Group. A better sense of how many new situations would come on to the annexes as a result of these new criteria may be useful in this respect.

An important issue is determining the listing and delisting criteria for the groups committing sexual violence and killing and maiming, within the context of armed conflict.
A continuing issue is how best to engage with non-state actors, how to encourage more groups to agree and how to implement time-bound action plans.

A potential issue is the slowdown in Working Group decision making, bearing in mind that it has not released any conclusions since the end of last year.

Council Dynamics
There is now some agreement that the trigger should be expanded. However, there are differences over the need for a resolution and what other areas should be addressed. Most Council members appear open to either a resolution or presidential statement, but many are waiting to see how the substance develops before deciding. Some, like Austria, have indicated that if a resolution jeopardises having the trigger expanded, then a presidential statement would be preferable. China, which had earlier in the year not been open to expanding the trigger, is now agreeable but would rather it be done through a presidential statement than a resolution.

In the past Russia had wanted all six violations (recruiting child soldiers, killing and maiming, sexual violence, attacks on schools, abduction of children and denial of humanitarian access) considered by the monitoring and reporting mechanism to be used in expanding the trigger. It now appears open to starting with an additional two criteria, as long as one of them is killing and maiming. Russia’s approach to the conclusions on Afghanistan may be related to its approach to killing and maiming and a new interpretation of humanitarian law.

China has been placing emphasis on setting clear priorities and improving the efficiency of the monitoring and reporting mechanism. The other area it has stressed is the need to cooperate fully with governments with groups listed in the Secretary-General’s annexes. It appears to want the Working Group to have greater control over listing and delisting of the groups on the Secretary-General’s lists.

France has worked closely with Mexico in transferring its institutional memory and continues to be an involved player, although less actively than in the past. Many of the elected members are actively involved and most appear supportive of having a substantive outcome in July. For members like Turkey and Vietnam, there are some red lines such as some modes of interactions with non-state actors.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1612 (26 July 2005) requested the Secretary-General implement a monitoring and reporting mechanism and set up a working group on children and armed conflict.

Selected Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2009/9 (29 April 2009) recognised the importance of including in the Secretary-General’s annexes those that commit acts of killing and maiming and sexual violence in situations of armed conflict and asked for the Council to take action within three months.
- S/PRST/2008/28 (17 July 2008) reiterated the need for stronger focus by all parties concerned on the long-term effects of armed conflict on children.
- SPRST/2008/6 (12 February 2008) reaffirmed the Council’s commitment to address the impact of armed conflict on children and expressed its readiness to review past resolutions and build on the resolution 1612.

Selected Reports

- S/2009/278 (1 June 2009) was the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Myanmar.
- S/2009/158 (26 March 2009) was the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict.
- S/2009/84 (10 February 2009) was the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Sudan.
- S/2009/66 (3 February 2009) was the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the Central African Republic.
- S/2008/782 (12 December 2008) was the report of the Council mission to Afghanistan from 21 to 28 November 2008.
- S/2008/693 (10 November 2008) was the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the DRC.

Security Council Debate Records

- S/PV.6114 and res. 1 (29 April 2009)
- S/PV.5936 and res. 1 (17 July 2008)

Nepal

Expected Council Action
In July the Council is expected to consider the future of the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN). Its mandate expires on 23 July. The Secretary-General’s report is likely to contain an analysis of the implications of developments for the future of the peace process and UNMIN’s role.

At the time of writing the Nepal government had not yet formally asked for an extension although it has indicated to UN officials that it is likely to do so.

Key Recent Developments
A series of events led to the resignation on 4 May of Nepalese Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal, a Maoist leader who is known as Prachanda. These events raised constitutional and procedural questions relating...
to the powers of the prime minister, the president and the Nepalese army. On 20 April the army chief, General Rokmangud Katawal, was asked to provide clarification on several issues. These included the recruitment of personnel by the Nepalese army in late 2008, the extension of the terms of eight retiring brigadier generals and the boycott of the national games by Nepalese army participants because Maoist army athletes were taking part.

On 3 May the largest coalition partner, the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (UML) party, withdrew from the government, leaving Prachanda’s party, the Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) in the minority.

On 3 May the Cabinet sacked the army chief Katawal, Prachanda then appointed Chief of General Staff Kul Bahadur Khadka, the second in command of the army, as acting chief. However, on that same day President Ram Baran Yadav wrote to Katawal and instructed him to continue as army chief. Prachanda resigned the next day, pulling his party out of the government.

The Secretary-General’s 24 April report provided an overview of developments and a midterm review. It said that there had been examples of “not insignificant positive measures” such as public consultations on the new constitution, revival of long-dormant government bodies and peaceful by-elections in six constituencies. The tone of the report was guardedly positive although it warned of differences among political parties and an atmosphere of mistrust. (Many of the differences have become more acute in the following months.)

The Secretary-General’s Representative in Nepal, Karin Landgren, briefed the Council on 5 May. The stand-off between the Nepalese Army and the leader of the governing coalition, the UCPN-M, had by that time come to a head, resulting in the resignation of the prime minister. Following the debate, the Council adopted a presidential statement where it expressed its concern over the political crisis in Nepal and underscored the urgent need for the government and all parties to work together. It also reaffirmed its support for UNMIN and recalled the Nepalese government’s commitment to discharge minors from the cantonment sites.

Following the withdrawal of the Maoist UCPN-M party, a new coalition government was formed, led by Madhav Kumar Nepal of UML. These events resulted in street protests and strikes. On 11 June the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Nepal expressed its concern that increased violence by political parties and affiliated groups could jeopardize the peace process. There were also protests following the new coalition government’s reinstatement of Katawal as army chief on 19 June.

The Army Integration Special Committee, set up on 16 January, appears to have stopped its consultations. The Special Committee’s role is to supervise the integration and rehabilitation of former Maoist combatants. It was meant to implement decisions on integration and rehabilitation within six months. The Technical Committee under the Special Committee appears to have continued its meetings.

There had been some movement on the issue of child soldiers before the political crisis in May. The Special Committee had on 11 February requested the government to go ahead with discharging and rehabilitating Maoist army personnel disqualified during the UNMIN verification process, including 2,973 minors. However, all discussions appear to be suspended for now.

A video of Prachanda stating that the number of UCPN-M combatants was inflated during the UNMIN verification led to some Nepali parties questioning the UN’s verification process and asking for re-verification of the UCPN-M soldiers. UNMIN, in a press statement, made it clear that it had been asked to register and verify only according to whether combatants had joined the service before 25 May 2006 or were born before 25 May 1988.

The OHCHR presence was renewed for a three-month period requested by the Nepal government. This appears to be an interim measure while further consideration is given to the request for OHCHR to stay for another two years.

During his visit in June, Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon said India was committed to assisting Nepal in its transition to multiparty democracy and in the peace process. The Nepalese prime minister is expected to visit India in August.

Key Issues
A key issue is how much the political developments in May, the deep political polarisation and lack of trust and confidence among parties will affect the peace process. The development of multiple power centres is a concern.

For the Council, immediate issues include whether to renew the mandate for UNMIN in July and whether to seek to play an active role in persuading the government to establish a high-level coordination committee and other multiparty mechanisms such as a peace and reconciliation commission to encourage political leaders to reengage in multiparty discussions.

Also an issue is the unrest following the pull-out of the UCPN-M and the new government’s decision to reinstate the army chief. There are press reports indicating that Prachanda plans to start another “people’s movement...to establish civilian supremacy”.

An issue of concern is that former combatants, including almost 3,000 minors, have now been in camps for two years and could become increasingly restive if there are no signs of imminent release. A related question is ensuring that integration and rehabilitation does not result in large numbers of former combatants released into Nepalese society without jobs.

Another increasing concern is whether the drafting of the constitution can now be completed by the May 2010 deadline.

Continuing issues which could affect the peace process are:
- lack of progress on return of property;
- the need to keep political youth groups under control;
- stalling on setting up transitional justice mechanisms which could establish accountability for human rights violations;
- meeting the demands of traditionally marginalised parties and groups.

Options
Among the options are:
- choosing not to renew UNMIN (which is possible but unlikely given developments since the January renewal);
- extending UNMIN’s mandate by the period requested by the Nepal government with no mandate change; and
- extending UNMIN’s mandate with
changes to its mandate such as formally including the provision of assistance to the Technical Committee established under the Special Committee.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Given the deterioration in the political situation, most members support the continuation of UNMIN and feel that withdrawing would clearly send the wrong political signal. Nor do they think this is the right time for further downsizing and moving towards an exit strategy. Some feel that, in line with the ongoing UK-France peacekeeping review, possible benchmarks should still be put in place, but perhaps once the implications of the changed political situation are clearer.

There is, however, an underlying wariness about UNMIN staying on in a simple monitoring role for too long. The sense is that the Nepalese government is unlikely to ask for a different mandate, but some members would prefer to see a new mandate better adapted to current realities and clarifying the respective responsibilities of UNMIN and the Nepalese government.

China continues to emphasise the need to complete UNMIN’s role as soon as possible. However, it is likely to go along with a request from the Nepalese government to renew UNMIN’s mandate.

Members including France, Austria and Costa Rica voiced their concern about the delay over the discharge of minors during the May debate and are likely to bring this issue up again.

India, a non-Council member with a keen interest in the issue, believes that it would not be good for UNMIN to get involved in issues such as the separation of forces which are highly political and likely to result in a long-term presence.

United Nations Office for West Africa

Expected Council Action
In July the Council is expected to consider the report of the Secretary-General on the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) due by 30 June. The mandate of UNOWA expires on 31 December 2010.

Key Recent Developments
On 21 January the Council was briefed during an open meeting by the head of UNOWA, Said Djinnit, on the latest report of the Secretary-General on the activities of UNOWA. According to the report, UNOWA’s recent work has focused on regional and cross-border developments such as proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the West African subregion. Djinnit said that in addition to perennial challenges confronting the region (including youth unemployment, irregular migration and rapid or unplanned urbanisation), the root causes of conflict in many countries in the subregion remained to “to be addressed in an effective and durable manner”.

Djinnit highlighted priorities for the region, along with UNOWA’s engagement on those issues, including:
- the challenge of economic insecurity due to rising global food prices and food insecurity, compounded by threats of a global economic recession;
- the spread of cross-border organised crime, especially drug trafficking, because of the increasing use by criminal networks of porous borders and weak state and security institutions in West Africa to transfer narcotics bound for Europe from Latin America;
- major setbacks to the considerable progress in consolidating democratic governance in the region from military coups in Mauritania and Guinea and attempts on the life of the then-President of Guinea-Bissau João Bernardo Vieira from within the country’s armed forces (Vieira was later assassinated, apparently by elements from the armed forces on 2 March);
- opportunities and risks presented by electoral processes;
- the continued fragile political and security situation in the Sahel region; and
- concern about the role and the capacities of security sector institutions in many West African countries.

Djinnit also updated the Council on support provided to the delimitation and demarcation process along the Cameroon-Nigeria boundary, in his capacity as chairman of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission. He said that following the successful completion of the transfer of authority in the Bakassi Peninsula from Nigeria to Cameroon on 14 August 2008, efforts had been centred on expediting the boundary demarcation process and promotion of confidence-building measures between the two countries. (For decades, the oil rich peninsula was the subject of intense and sometimes violent disputes between the two countries until they agreed on 23 January 2007 to 23 July 2009.

Cost
$88.8 million
to a UN-supported resolution process, with the International Court of Justice settling the matter with a ruling in 2002. In 2006 Nigeria recognised Cameroonian sovereignty over the peninsula in the Greentree Agreement, signed under the auspices of former Secretary-General Kofi Annan.)

On 16 June in New York, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and representatives from Nigeria and Cameroon held the first high-level meeting between the three parties since the transfer of the Bakassi Peninsula. The representatives agreed to hasten action on outstanding tasks regarding the court’s ruling, particularly delimitation and demarcation of their common land boundary.

Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Affairs Alain Le Roy made a five-nation tour of West Africa from 10 to 20 June visiting Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali and Nigeria. During the visit he discussed the consolidation of peace and stability in the region and how to enhance UN support-related regional and national efforts with senior government officials. Le Roy also consulted the 15-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the Nigerian capital Abuja, as well a number of UN political missions in the region, including UNOWA, the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office for Sierra Leone and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council at the midpoint of UNOWA’s current three-year mandate will be to assess the extent to which the refinement of the Office’s mandate has been successful in implementation and possible ways to enhance its operation.

Another closely related issue is the kind of support UNOWA could offer to specific regional initiatives to address relatively newer challenges like the growth of organised drug trafficking, including possible support for the ECOWAS Regional Plan of Action in the fight against illicit drug trafficking and organised crime in West Africa.

Options
Options for the Council include:

- issuing a statement highlighting key issues raised in the Secretary-General’s upcoming report and possibly reiterating the Council’s support for the work of UNOWA;
- considering the Secretary-General’s report but delaying action;
- utilising the discussion of the report to exchange views in a regional context on fragile situations not on the Council’s agenda but subsumed under the regional mandate of UNOWA (e.g. Guinea, Mauritania and Niger, in line with the Council’s presidential statement of 5 May about the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of governments in Africa), along with those on the Council’s agenda that are not immediately due for consideration on its programme (e.g. Guinea-Bissau); and
- building on its collaboration with the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) by emphasising the role for UNOWA in working with the PBC on consolidating peace in the West African subregion and including in a possible statement its support for cooperation between the Commission and UNOWA in consolidating peace in the region.

Council Dynamics
The Council has not issued any statement on UNOWA since the renewal of its mandate in December 2007. But the current midterm point could afford the Council members the opportunity to review its work in light of the Secretary-General’s report and possibly highlight emerging priorities, including organised crime and unconstitutional changes of government. (In December 2007, when welcoming the extension of the mandate, the Council requested more frequent reports—semi-annual as opposed to 18-month midterm mandate reports—in order to be more regularly informed and assuage concerns of some countries, including the US, about the continued utility of the Office.)

Burkina Faso is the lead country on this issue in the Council.

UN Documents

Selected Presidential Statement
- PRST/2009/11 (5 May 2009) was the presidential statement expressing concern about the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa.

Selected Letters
- S/2008/128 (26 February 2008) and S/2008/127 (21 February 2008) was an exchange of letters regarding the appointment of Said Djinnit as Special Representative for West Africa and Head of UNOWA.
- S/2007/754 (21 December 2007) and S/2007/753 (28 November 2007) was an exchange of letters regarding the extension UNOWA until 31 December 2010 and more frequent reporting.
- S/2005/16 (14 December 2004) conveyed the Secretary-General’s intended mandate functions and activities of UNOWA from 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2007.
- S/2004/858 (25 October 2004) and S/2004/797 (4 October 2004) was an exchange of letters regarding the extension UNOWA for three years.
- S/2001/1129 (29 November 2001) welcomed the intention of the Secretary-General outlined in S/2001/1128 to establish UNOWA for three years from January 2002 to 31 December 2004, subject to a review after its first year of operation.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2003/149 (26 November 2003) was the last report of the Secretary-General on UNOWA.
- S/2008/426 (30 June 2008) was the first semi-annual report of the Secretary-General on UNOWA.
- S/2007/143 (13 March 2007) was the report on cross-border issues in West Africa.
- S/2004/797 (4 October 2004) was a review of activities and performance of UNOWA spanning the January 2003 to July 2004 period.

Selected UNOWA Studies and Concept Papers

Available at http://www.un.org/unowa/unowa/studies/studies-cp.htm
- Working Document on Sanctions in Africa (June 2007)
- Security Landscape and Peace Consolidation in West Africa (March 2007)
A UNOCI, the work in 2008 had focused on the identification and publication of the provisional voters list; on the verification and publication of the final voters list; and on the registration of voters, a process in which UNOCI had provided technical, logistical and financial support. He expressed concern that momentum towards holding elections was being lost, especially since the timeline for any election seemed to depend on progress in the country’s reunification process.

The Secretary-General’s 13 April report on UNOCI indicated that the overall security situation in the country was stable but fragile, with largely unrestricted freedom of movement of people, goods and services throughout the territory. According to the report, Côte d’Ivoire had reached a stage where the two critical processes of reunification and elections needed to be completed in order to restore normalcy. (It is anticipated that his upcoming report will propose possible adjustments in the role and configuration of UNOCI.)

As part of the preparations for the November elections, a ceremony was held on 26 May in the former rebel stronghold of Bouaké to mark the transfer of authority over the northern part of the country from the Forces nouvelles (under its control since September 2002) to the Ivorian government. Soro, who presided over the event, stressed that it was not merely symbolic but rather an embodiment of the political will of signatories of the Ouagadougou Agreement to achieve reunification.

On 29 May the Council issued a presidential statement welcoming a communiqué adopted on 18 May by the Permanent Consultative Framework of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (CPC). (This was established in 2007 following the Ouagadougou Agreement and involves Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo, Prime Minister Soro, and the leaders of the main opposition parties, Alassane Ouattara and Henri Bédié.) The CPC has proposed a new elaborate electoral timeframe anticipating presidential elections on 29 November. The Council in its statement underlined the need for effective implementation of the five stages leading to the elections:

- publication of the provisional voters list at the end of voter registration;
- publication of the final voters list;
- production of identification and voters cards;
- distribution of identification and voters cards; and
- electoral campaigning.

Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Alain Le Roy visited Côte d’Ivoire from 10 to 12 June to assess developments. He held discussions with all the main national political actors during the visit on preparations for the November poll, and reiterated the support of UNOCI for ensuring secure and peaceful elections.

**Key Issues**

The key issue for the Council is ensuring the successful holding of presidential elections on 29 November, especially in light of repeated postponements.

A related issue is when to amend the mandate and troop level of UNOCI. (In resolution 1865, adopted in January, the Council expressed its “intention to review by 31 July 2009 the mandates of UNOCI and the French forces which support it, the level of troops of UNOCI and the benchmarks... in light of the progress achieved in the electoral process” and requested the Secretary-General “to provide to it a report to this end three weeks before this date.”)

**Options**

Options available to the Council include:

- renewing the mandate of the peacekeeping mission for another six months without any modification until after the election;
- modifying the mandate or troop levels of UNOCI (Council members have been inclined towards considering mandate modification in recent times, in part, to bring pressure to bear on the Ivorian political parties on the ground by signalling that the UN peacekeeping presence cannot be assured permanently and the consequent need for commitments and goals to be met by them in the peace and electoral process. Members are also interested in proactively exploring options for UNOCI and the French Licorne force’s future engagement in the country); and
- reminding the parties that additional sanctions would be likely against those who may obstruct the peace process or the electoral process.

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**Côte d’Ivoire**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) which expires on 31 July. It will consider the Secretary-General’s report, due by 10 July, and is expected to be briefed by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Côte d’Ivoire, Choi Young-jin.

**Key Recent Developments**

The political situation in Côte d’Ivoire has moved from gloom to cautious optimism. In mid-April, supporters of the former rebel Forces nouvelles had accused the national unity government of hindering the processes, reached under the March 2007 Ouagadougou Agreement, leading to the holding of presidential elections. At the same time, they called on their leader, Ivorian Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, to step down from his government post. But the situation shifted on 14 May when Soro announced 29 November as the date for the long-delayed polls.

Choi briefed the Council on 28 April and said UNOCI’s work in 2008 had focused largely on the country’s electoral process, particularly on the identification and registration of voters, a process in which
Council Dynamics
Council members seem relieved that a concrete electoral timetable has finally been set with the endorsement of all the major Ivorian political actors. If progress on the electoral process remains on track most Council members seem ready to extend the mandate of the peacekeeping force till after the November election. There is support for a review to modify the mission after the elections. However, Council members remain cautious in light of the numerous postponements of previously scheduled elections.

France is the lead country on this issue in the Council.

UN Documents

Selected Council Resolutions
• S/RES/1842 (29 October 2008) extended the sanctions regime until 31 October 2009 and decided that any obstruction to the electoral process would be subject to sanctions.
• S/RES/1643 (15 December 2005) renewed until 15 December 2006 the sanctions regime and established a diamonds embargo.
• S/RES/1609 (24 June 2005) increased UNOCI’s contingents and authorised the temporary redeployment of military and civilian police personnel among the UN Mission in Liberia, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone and UNOCI.

Selected Presidential Statements
• S/PRST/2009/16 (29 May 2009) was a presidential statement welcoming the CPC’s 18 May communiqué.
• S/PRST/2008/42 (7 November 2008) expressed deep concern about the postponement of presidential elections, urged the Ivorian parties to complete the identification and registration of voters operations before the end of January 2009 and expressed its determination to fully support the electoral process on the understanding that elections will be organised before the end of spring 2009.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report
S/2009/196 (13 April 2009)

Selected Letters
• S/2009/5 (5 January 2009) and S/2008/793 (16 December 2008) were the letters from the Secretary-General appointing experts to the Côte d’Ivoire Sanction Committee’s Group of Experts.
• S/2008/834 (30 December 2008) was the letter containing the fourth supplementary agreement to the Ouagadougou Agreement.
• S/2008/694 (11 November 2008) was a letter from Burkina Faso transmitting the press statement of the 10 November CPC meeting in Ouagadougou.

Other
• S/PV.6113 (28 April 2009) was a briefing by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Choi Young-jin, on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire.
• S/2007/144 (13 March 2007) contained the Ouagadougou Agreement.

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Choi Young-jin (Republic of Korea)

Force Commander
Major-General Fernand Marcel Amoussou (Benin)

Police Commissioner
Major-General Gerardo Cristian Chaumont (Argentina)

Group of Experts
El Hadi Salah, Algeria (customs and coordinator of the Group of Experts)
Grégoire Bafouatika, Republic of Congo (aviation)
James Bevan, UK (arms)
Joel Hernando Salek, Colombia (finance)
Noora Jamsheer, Bahrain (diamonds)

Size and Composition of UNOCI
• Strength as of 31 May 2009: 9,048 total uniformed personnel, including 7,661 troops, 197 military observers; 1,190 police; supported by 486 international civilian personnel, 645 local staff and 300 UN Volunteers

• Key troop-contributing countries: Bangladesh, Ghana, Jordan, Morocco and Pakistan.

Approved Budget
1 July 2008 - 30 June 2009: $497.46 million

Chad-Central African Republic

Expected Council Action
In July the Council is expected to consider the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), including an update on the development of a strategic work plan with indicative timelines to measure and track progress on the implementation of benchmarks. The current mandate of MINURCAT expires on 15 March 2010.

Key Recent Developments
On 24 April Assistant-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet briefed the Council on the Secretary-General’s first report on the MINURCAT since the transfer of authority from the EU Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (EUFOR) to the UN on 15 March. Mulet said critical shortfalls in equipment had weakened MINURCAT’s operational capability. Its military component, mandated for 5200 troops, stood at about half its strength as of 22 April.

Mulet advised that the UN-trained Chadian force known as the Détachement intégré de sécurité (DIS), which is tasked with providing law and order in refugee camps and other humanitarian sites in eastern Chad, was fully operational with 850 personnel. Challenges for the DIS were ill-discipline and its vulnerability to attack, prompting the Chadian government to propose equipping them with AK-47 submachine guns. He said the UN Secretariat would conduct a midterm review of the concept and performance of the DIS.

The Chad-Sudan border situation deteriorated significantly in May. At talks in Doha from 29 April to 4 May, both countries had agreed to renew diplomatic ties and cease cross-border attacks. However, Chad on 5 May accused Sudan of “sending several armed columns” into its territory and on 6
May requested a meeting of the Council “to discuss the attack perpetrated by the Sudan against ...Chad.”

On 8 May the Council held an open meeting during which it was briefed on the unfolding situation by Assistant-Secretary-General for Rule of Law in Peacekeeping Dmitry Titov. He said MINURCAT lacked the ability to observe and track developing incidents. He urged the Council to join the Secretariat in appealing to potential troop contributors to provide MINURCAT with the missing capacities in order to enable it to carry out its mandate. Titov indicated that, at the time of meeting, the MINURCAT force stood at 2,396 personnel—representing 46 percent of its authorised strength—and lacked 14 of the 18 military utility and reconnaissance helicopters.

Representatives of Chad and Sudan traded accusations, assigning unilateral faults to the other country for the then ongoing Chadian government forces military clashes with the rebels.

Subsequently, the Council adopted a presidential statement condemning renewed military incursions in eastern Chad by “Chadian armed groups, coming from outside”. It expressed concern at the consequent threat posed to the safety of the civilian population and the conduct of humanitarian operations and called on the parties to respect and implement their mutual commitments.

Chad’s armed forces entered Sudanese territory to attack Chadian opposition fighters, while Sudan was also reported to have undertaken military strikes against Sudanese rebel camps in eastern Chad.

On 12 June the Chadian government released 84 child soldiers, from among 236 insurgents captured in clashes with rebel units in eastern Chad in late May, to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF). UNICEF said the children had been coerced into joining rebel ranks.

In the Central African Republic (CAR), while there was marked progress in implementing the recommendations of the December 2008 national dialogue held between the government, opposition, rebel groups and civil society, the security situation in the northern parts of the country remained volatile, with continued reports of insurgent rebel activity. Two major attacks were carried out by insurgents in June on the town of Birao which falls within the mandate of MINURCAT. The last attack took place on 21 June resulting in the death of three civilians and injury of six members of the armed forces, the torching of over 100 homes and a massive displacement of the town’s population. The head of MINURCAT, Victor da Silva Angelo, visited the capital Bangui on 23 June to discuss the deteriorating security situation with national authorities.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is that the progress towards fulfilment of the MINURCAT benchmarks remains elusive in light of the worsening political and military situation.

A related issue is the delayed deployment of the full complement of MINURCAT and the resulting need to ensure that MINURCAT effectively carries out its mandate to contribute to protect vulnerable civilians (including refugees and internally displaced persons) as well as UN and associated personnel, and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Another issue limited to the wider regional context is the need for capacity to credibly monitor the border, to help resolve the security tensions between Chad and Sudan which have been manifested in the apparent proxy wars in which each government has supported rebels in the other country’s territory.

Options
Options available to the Council include:

- issuing a statement based on key issues raised by the Secretary-General, and developments on the ground, including a call for international support to assist MINURCAT meet the full complement of its authorised capacity;
- increasing the size of the DIS based on the Secretary-General’s recommendations (at press time the Secretariat was undertaking an assessment mission to Chad to review the work of the DIS, but it was not yet certain whether the mission’s findings will be incorporated in the Secretary-General’s report or submitted separately);
- taking a fresh look at the possibility of assigning a border-monitoring mandate to AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and MINURCAT, to constrain cross-border rebel activity;
- adding the names of Sudanese and Chadian rebel leaders who receive sanctuary in Chad and Sudan respectively to the Sudan sanctions list.

Council Dynamics
There is consensus among Council members about the need to uphold MINURCAT’s protection of civilians mandate and to contain the spillover of the Darfur conflict into Chad.

Council members remain concerned with the difficulties of force generation and obtaining related military assets.

While members are aware of the high stakes of continued tension between Chad and Sudan, and mindful of the potential benefit should the mission’s mandate be modified to monitor the border, no Council member has emerged to promote this course of action.

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1861 (14 January 2009) renewed MINURCAT’s mandate until 15 March 2010 and authorised the deployment of a military component to replace EUFOR.
- S/RES/1778 (25 September 2007) established MINURCAT and authorised the EUFOR.
Selected Security Council Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2009/13 (8 May 2009) condemned renewed military incursions in eastern Chad by "Chadian armed groups, coming from outside".
- S/PRST/2008/22 (16 June 2008) was a statement on the June rebel offensive in Chad.
- S/PRST/2008/3 (4 February 2008)
- S/PV.6121 (8 May 2009) was the Security Council Report.
- S/PRST/2009/13 (8 May 2009) was the most recent MINURCAT report.
- S/PRST/2008/22 (16 June 2008) was a statement on the June rebel offensive in Chad.
- S/PRST/2008/3 (4 February 2008)
- S/PV.6111 (24 April 2009) was the meeting of the Council to consider the Secretary-General's Report on the MINURCAT.
- S/PRST/2008/22 (16 June 2008) was a statement on the June rebel offensive in Chad.

Latest Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2009/199 (14 April 2009) was the most recent MINURCAT report.
- S/2008/601/Add.1 (15 September 2008) described the financial implications for the establishment of a UN military force.
- S/2008/532 (7 August 2008) was a report on children and armed conflict in Chad.
- S/2009/199 (14 April 2009) was the most recent MINURCAT report.
- S/2008/601/Add.1 (15 September 2008) described the financial implications for the establishment of a UN military force.
- S/2008/532 (7 August 2008) was a report on children and armed conflict in Chad.

Other

- S/PV.6121 (8 May 2009) was the Council meeting to discuss renewed cross-border rebel activity in Chad.
- S/2009/232 (6 May 2009) was a letter from Chad requesting a Council meeting on the situation between Chad and Sudan.
- S/2009/231 (5 May 2009) was the note verbale from the Chadian government accusing Sudan of facilitating the renewed cross-border rebel activity.
- S/PV.6111 (24 April 2009) was the meeting of the Council to consider the Secretary-General's Report on the MINURCAT.
- S/2009/214 (21 April 2009) was the letter from the Secretary-General transmitting two reports on the activities of the EUFOR.
- SC/9614 (17 March 2009) welcomed the successful transfer of authority on 15 March 2009 from EUFOR to MINURCAT.
- S/PV.6029 (3 December 2008) was a briefing by John Holmes, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, on the situation in Chad and the Sudan.

Other Relevant Facts

MINURCAT: Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Victor da Silva Angelo (Portugal)

MINURCAT: Size, Composition and Cost

- Authorised strength as of 14 January 2009: 300 police, 25 military liaison officers, 5,200 military personnel and an appropriate number of civilian personnel
- Strength as of 31 May 2009: 3,043 total uniformed personnel, including 2,770 troops, 32 military observers, and 241 police officers, as well as 364 international civilian personnel, 215 local civilian staff, and 114 UN volunteers
- Main police contributors: Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Benin and France
- Main military contributors: France and Ireland

MINURCAT: Duration

September 2007 to present; mandate expires 15 March 2010

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to consider the Secretary-General’s report on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), due on 30 June. The Council is expected to be briefed by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for the DRC, Alan Doss. The mandate of the UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) expires on 31 December.

Key Recent Developments

On 7 May Congolese parliamentarians adopted a law granting amnesty to militias in the east of the country, as part of the process to bring peace to provinces of North and South Kivu. The amnesty covers acts of war committed since 2003 but not war crimes, including recruiting and using child soldiers, was placed on the sanctions list in November 2005.

On 4 May the Group of Experts submitted its interim report to the Sanctions Committee. It referred to violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Oriental Province as well as North and South Kivu by members of foreign armed groups, namely the Ugandan rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), who are now in the government military forces (FARDC) are operating parallel command structures. This included documentary evidence, and testimonies from senior FARDC officers and sources close to CNDP, that former CNDP warlord Bosco Ntaganda was acting as a de facto FARDC deputy commander for military operations in the Kivus. Ntaganda, who was indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2006 on three counts of war crimes, including recruiting and using child soldiers, was placed on the sanctions list in November 2005.

Council members visited the DRC as part of a mission to Africa from 14 to 21 May. Following the mission, the Council on 28 May held a public meeting at which Ambassador Jean-Maurice Ripert of France reported on the mission’s visit to the DRC, where he led the delegation. He said that the situation in the Great Lakes Region had improved, particularly as a result of the rapprochement between the Congolese and Rwandan governments. However, MONUC still remained indispensable. Sexual violence was widespread and assistance with security sector reform remained crucial. Ripert also said that deployment of 3,000 additional troops, approved by the Council (troops to be provided by Egypt and Jordan) was expected on the ground in June and July.

In late May government forces and MONUC forces began a joint military offensive...
(Kimia II) in North Kivu against the ethnic Hutu Rwandan militia FDLR to stem the latter’s attacks against civilians in the area.

There are also reports of several mutinies by disgruntled Congolese soldiers in North Kivu over non-payment of salaries by army commanders, including an incident on 17 June when a UN base in eastern DRC was fired on by FARDC soldiers.

Units of LRA fighters continued looting, destroying property and kidnapping in northeast DRC, resulting in the displacement of more than 12,000 civilians. Operation Lightning Thunder, which was carried out between December and March by the DRC, Uganda and South Sudan forces, was unsuccessful in eliminating the LRA presence. To support the Congolese army efforts, MONUC forces were also deployed over the weekend of 23 May to a village near the northeastern town of Dungu where LRA elements had allegedly committed atrocities.

On 5 June a Congolese military court handed down thirty-year sentences to five militia fighters, found guilty of rape and other sexual crimes, and ordered them to pay financial damages to more than 135 female victims.

On 15 June the ICC confirmed that the former Congolese Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba would face charges relating to the actions of his former rebel Movement for the Liberation of Congo (Mouvement de Libération du Congo, or MLC) troops in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2002 and 2003. Bemba faces trial on three counts of war crimes and two of crimes against humanity, including criminal responsibility for rapes, murders and pillage. MLC fighters were accused of committing atrocities, when they became involved in the conflict in CAR to support then-embattled CAR President Ange-Félix Patassé. Bemba’s lawyers moved to the have case dismissed, saying the militia was not under his command once they had crossed the DRC border into CAR. Bemba had previously held the post of DRC vice-president in 2003 as part of a peace agreement which he subsequently lost in the national election against President Kabila in 2006. Bemba went into exile in 2007 after being charged with treason following violent clashes between his bodyguards and the Congolese army. Belgium arrested Bemba in May 2008 and transferred him to the ICC in July 2008.

Key Issues

The key issue for Council members at this time is effective implementation of MONUC’s mandate to protect civilians. Supporting the strengthening of democratic institutions and the rule of law and assisting in the establishment of a secure and peaceful environment for the holding of free and transparent local elections are also key tasks at this time.

A related issue is whether the Council will put renewed political support behind UN efforts to generate the additional capacities authorised by the Council in November 2008 to reinforce the rapid reaction capacity of MONUC to protect civilians. At press time, none of the additional troop and aerial capacities approved for the mission in November 2008 had yet been deployed to the country.

Options

Possible options for the Council include:

- taking the opportunity of the Secretary-General’s report and the impressions gleaned from the Council visit in May to issue a comprehensive updated policy statement with guidelines, priorities and benchmarks for MONUC;
- requesting the DRC Sanctions Committee to update its list of individuals and entities deemed to be obstructing the peace process;
- considering the Secretary-General’s report but deferring action, and only scheduling subsequent meetings as appropriate in light of the evolving situation the ground; and
- following up the allegations against Bosco Ntaganda in light of his role in FARDC and the associated responsibility that this puts on the Kabila government.

Council Dynamics

While Council members have been satisfied with the mending of fences between Rwanda and the DRC, and also with the decision to reconfigure MONUC to enable it to better carry out its protection mandate, they are concerned about delays in getting additional capacities on the ground to enable MONUC to deal effectively with the protection of civilians mandate.

France is the lead country on this issue in the Council.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1857 (22 December 2008) renewed the sanctions regime for the DRC and extended the Group of Experts’ mandate until 30 November.
- S/RES/1856 (22 December 2008) renewed MONUC’s mandate and continued authorisation of the additional 3,085 troops for MONUC until 31 December 2009.
- S/RES/1843 (20 November 2008) authorised the temporary deployment of an additional 3,085 troops to reinforce MONUC’s capacity.
- S/RES/1807 (31 March 2008) lifted the arms embargo for government forces, strengthened measures related to aviation and customs.
- S/RES/1698 (31 July 2006), 1649 (21 December 2005) and 1596 (18 April 2005) strengthened sanctions, including provisions in resolution 1698 against actors recruiting and using children in armed conflict in the DRC.

Latest Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2008/48 (22 December 2008) welcomed regional efforts to address the security threat posed by the LRA.
- S/PRST/2008/40 (29 October 2008) condemned the offensive by the rebel CNDP in the eastern region of the DRC and noted the request for reinforcement of MONUC.
- S/PRST/2008/38 (21 October 2008) expressed concern about the resurgence of violence in the eastern parts of the DRC and requested a comprehensive analysis of the situation.

Secretary-General’s Report

- S/2009/160 (27 March 2009) was the latest report on the DRC.

Other

- S/2009/253 (4 May 2009) was the latest report of the Group of Experts on the DRC.
- SC/9633 (9 April 2009) was the latest Council press release on the situation in the DRC.
**Lebanon**

**Expected Council Action**

A Secretary-General’s report on resolution 1701, which in 2006 called for an end to the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, is due at the end of June. Council consultations are expected in early July. The focus of Council attention is likely to be the political situation in Lebanon following the recent parliamentary elections. It is still unclear whether the Council would take action following discussions on the report, but at press time it seemed unlikely.

**Key Recent Developments**

Lebanese legislative elections were held on 7 June. The “March 14 Alliance” led by Saad Hariri, the son of slain Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, won a majority of seats in parliament (71 of 128) against the opposition “March 8 Coalition” led by Hezbollah. Polling was quiet with a high turnout, but there were charges of vote-buying. The opposition quickly conceded. Hezbollah said on 10 June that it was ready to open a new page in its relation with the March 14 alliance; but that it would wait to see what it has to offer before joining the government (Hezbollah’s boycott of the government had previously led to a deep political crisis in Lebanon). On 25 June the Shi’a speaker of parliament, Nabih Berry, was re-elected. On 27 June Hariri was appointed prime minister.

On 8 June Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon congratulated Lebanon on the peaceful conduct of elections and called on all Lebanese to respect the results. He said he looked forward to the full consolidation of Lebanon’s sovereignty, stability, unity and political independence in accordance with Council resolutions.

Another positive development for implementation of resolution 1701 was Israel’s handing over to the UN on 12 May data on cluster munitions fired over southern Lebanon in 2006.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Chairman of the DRC Sanctions Committee**
Ambassador Baki Ilkin (Turkey)

**Group of Experts**
- Christian B. Dietrich, USA (aviation)
- Claudio Gramizi, Italy (arms)
- Dinesh Mahtani, UK (finance expert and coordinator)
- Mouctar Kokouma Diallo, Guinea (customs expert)
- Raymond Debelle, Belgium (regional expert)

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission**
Alan Doss (UK)

**MONUC Interim Force Commander**
Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye (Senegal)

**Size, Composition and Cost of Mission**
- **Strength as of 31 May 2009**: 16,626 troops, 681 military observers, 1,074 police, 969 international civilian personnel and 2,154 local civilian staff, 606 UN volunteers
- **Approved budget** (1 July 2008-30 June 2009): $1,242.73 million

**Duration**
- 30 November 1999 to present; mandate expires on 31 December 2009

On 7 May the Secretary-General’s special envoy for the implementation of resolution 1559, Terje Rød-Larsen, briefed the Council following his latest report. He said that reconciliation efforts among Lebanese factions had created a favourable environment for strengthening sovereignty while relations with Syria were improving. He expressed concern at the continuous porous nature of the Syrian-Lebanese border. Recurrent security incidents highlighted the proliferation of weapons and armed groups in Lebanon. In addition, there had been a growing concern that Hezbollah had engaged in militant activities beyond Lebanese territory.

In May and June the Lebanese authorities arrested 35 Lebanese nationals on charges of spying for Israel. The government sent several letters to the Council complaining that Israeli spy networks inside Lebanon violated resolution 1701.

**Options**

One option is for the Council to remain silent.

Another option is to welcome the 1701 report in a presidential statement and:
- congratulate Lebanon on the elections, express hope that the government will be formed soon and will commit to implementing Council resolutions;
- ask the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT) to undertake a new field visit and report back to the Council, or alternatively reiterate the need for full implementation of its previous recommendations regarding enhanced Syrian-Lebanese border control; and
- urge all parties to make more efforts to implement resolution 1701, in particular for Israel to pull out from Ghajar and stop its overflights; for Lebanese factions to resume national dialogue and address Hezbollah’s weapons; for Syria to make more efforts toward border delineation; and for Syria, Lebanon and Israel to engage in discussions on the status of the Sheb’a Farms.

**Key Issues**

A key issue is whether Lebanese factions will agree on a cabinet composition. The opposition hopes for a national unity government, preserving the current arrangement which provides it with veto power, as enshrined in the Doha Agreement of May 2008. The veto formula seems opposed by the March 14 Alliance, but to avoid political confrontation a further
national unity government is a possible outcome. The issue therefore is whether Hariri would agree to the former veto arrangement or whether a new compromise solution will be explored. It also remains to be seen whether Hezbollah will show flexibility (the Christian party of Michel Aoun, belonging to the opposition, seems to consider veto power a condition for participation in the government). The Council is likely to closely follow these developments because a stalled situation could reinstitute the political crisis witnessed in 2007 and 2008.

More generally, a key question for the Council at this point is whether making pronouncements on the current political process, with or without specific language relating to implementation of resolution 1701, would have any added value.

Council Dynamics
The US and France both seem satisfied with the current state of political process. While they strongly support full implementation of resolutions 1701 and 1559 (which in 2004 urged withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon) they continue to remain cautious about not interfering in Lebanese politics through Council pronouncements.

US policy continues to be based on support for the president and the March 14 Alliance. However, the US seems to prefer at this time to project its support through discreet bilateral channels. US initiatives for major new Council statements seem unlikely.

Overall, Council members continue to believe that many elements of resolution 1701 have now been implemented (exchange of prisoners, renewed Syrian-Lebanese contacts, handing over of cluster munitions maps). Most members see the remaining issues (status of the Sheb’a Farms, Israeli occupation of Ghajar, disarmament of militias, delineation of the Syrian-Lebanese border) as intrinsically linked to progress on the broader regional picture, especially the Syrian-Israeli peace track. There are hopes that progress between Israel and Syria would allow movement on these issues and that the Council can now afford to be more relaxed. Nevertheless, all Council members remain committed to implementation of resolution 1701. All are also conscious of the large and costly UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). It has contributed to increased security (there have been no recent incidents), stabilisation and extension of Lebanese control over the whole territory.

It seems that the UN has had difficulties finding contributors for the maritime task force deployed along the Lebanese coast with the aim of curtailing arms smuggling. Although there are fears that UNIFIL ground forces will also find it difficult to find contributors because of European commitments in other parts of the world, core contributors France, Italy and Spain have so far remained committed to UNIFIL.

UN Documents

Selected Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel.
- S/RES/1680 (17 May 2006) strongly encouraged Syria to delineate its common border with Lebanon.
- S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) urged withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, disarmament of all militias, and extension of the Lebanese government’s control over all Lebanese territory.

Selected Council Presidential Statements
- S/PRST/2008/17 (22 May 2008) welcomed the Doha Agreement.
- S/PRST/2008/8 (15 April 2008) was the latest statement on implementation of resolution 1701.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2009/218 (24 April 2009) was the latest report on resolution 1559.
- S/2009/119 (3 March 2009) was the latest report on resolution 1701.
- S/2008/582 (25 August 2008) was the latest LIBAT report.
- S/2007/382 (26 June 2007) was the first LIBAT report.

Council Official Records
- S/PV.6120 (7 May 2009) was a briefing by Terje Rød-Larsen on his latest 1559 report.

Useful Additional Sources
- The Power Relations in Parliament: An Overview of What Has Changed and What It Means, Maya Khourchid, NOW Lebanon, 19 June 2009
- Analysis and Important Updates on the 7 June 2009 Lebanese General Elections, Deen Sharp

from Lebanon informing the Council that Israel permitted Lebanese citizens suspected of spying for Israel to cross the Blue Line between the two countries, in violation of resolution 1701.
- S/2009/264 (20 May 2009) was a letter from Lebanon saying that Israeli spying networks inside Lebanon were a violation of Lebanese sovereignty.
- S/2009/227 (4 May 2009) was a letter from Syria on resolution 1559.

Other Relevant Facts

Secretary-General’s Special Coordinator for Lebanon
Michael Williams (UK)

Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Implementation of Resolution 1559
Terje Rød-Larsen (Norway)

UNIFIL Force Commander
Major-General Claudio Graziano (Italy)

Size and Composition of UNIFIL as of 31 May 2009
- Authorised: 15,000 troops
- Current: 12,158 military personnel.
- Troop Contributors: Belgium, Brunei, China, Croatia, Cyprus, El Salvador, France, FYR of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, Nepal, Norway, Poland (Poland announced in April that it would withdraw by October), Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Tanzania and Turkey

Cost
An international conference on the middle east peace process is to convene in 2009.

Presidential elections are expected in Afghanistan on 20 August 2009.

Presidential elections are expected in Côte d’Ivoire on 29 November 2009.

Legislative elections in Chad are currently slated for 2009.

Gubernatorial elections in the DRC are currently slated for 2009.

Parliamentary elections for Iraq are provisionally scheduled for end of 2009 or early 2010.

Palestinian presidential and legislative elections are to be held in January 2010.

Elections (presidency and parliament, south Sudanese presidency, state governors, southern parliament and state assemblies) in Sudan are expected in February 2010.

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