Libya will preside over the Council’s work in March. In addition to its regular activities, during this month, the Council will undertake a mission to Haiti (from 11 to 14 March) and will also hold its annual retreat with the Secretary-General.

A public debate to review the report by the joint African Union–United Nations panel on options for UN support to AU peacekeeping operations is planned for 18 March. The meeting is likely to be chaired by Libya’s Minister for African Affairs Ali Treiki. Former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi, who headed the panel, is expected to present the report.

There are also likely to be public debates on:
- Afghanistan;
- Somalia;
- Kosovo; and
- the Middle East.

A briefing on the Council’s trip to Haiti is planned for 19 March.

The Council will hold a meeting in consultations on Liberia and is likely to be briefed by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in charge of UNMIL, Ellen Løj. On Lebanon, the Council will hold consultations on implementation of resolution 1701. A briefing by the Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams is possible.

Consultations on the situation between Eritrea and Djibouti are likely.

On Sudan, a briefing by the chair of the sanctions committee is expected. And, in view of the likely decision by the ICC judges on an arrest warrant against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, some Council discussions are likely.

Important matters pending for the Council include:
- The 2005 World Summit requested that the Security Council consider reforms for the Military Staff Committee. This has yet to be addressed.
- In a presidential statement on Darfur in July 2008 (S/PRST/2008/27) the Council welcomed the UN investigation underway into the 8 July attack against UNAMID peacekeepers. The Council is still awaiting the results of this investigation.
- There was no monthly report from the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in November. The last one available covers the period 1-31 July 2008.
- In resolution 1327 on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report, S/2000/809), the Council decided to review periodically the implementation of the provisions contained in the resolution’s annex. No such reviews have occurred in the past four years. However, in January the Council embarked on an initiative to look at ways of improving the Council’s handling of peacekeeping issues. An outcome is expected in August.
- The quarterly reports of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan are now always outdated when released. (The last report, released in December, covered the period 1 May-31 July 2008.) The next report covering the period 1 August-30 September 2008 is yet to be released.
- UNAMI reports on human rights, in the past produced every two to three months, are now also very delayed. (The last report, released in December, covered the period from 1 January-30 June 2008.)
- The Secretary-General’s recommendations to the Council regarding specific action on sexual violence as put forward in his latest report on protection of civilians in armed conflict (S/2007/643) have yet to be systematically implemented in country-specific situations.
- The Council requested the Secretariat on 21 November 2006 (S/2006/928) to update the index to Council notes and statements on working methods. This has not been published.
- On Western Sahara, in April 2008 the Council in resolution 1813 called upon the parties...
to continue negotiations. But there have been no further talks, nor any briefings to the Council on the situation.

- On the DRC, the Council sanctions committee has not acted on individual sanctions under resolutions 1698 and 1807 against armed groups that recruit children and or commit “serious violations of international law involving the targeting of children or women in situations of armed conflict, including killing and maiming, sexual violence, abduction and forced displacement,” respectively, despite MONUC’s reports about the problems continuing on a serious scale.
- The Secretary-General has yet to put forward proposals for the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in the Sheb’a Farms area, in accordance with resolution 1701, and respond to the cartographic, legal and political implications of the alternative path suggested by the Government of Lebanon in its seven-point plan.
- The Council has yet to address the latest report of the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team, which was issued on 25 August 2008 (S/2008/582).
- The Council is awaiting the Peacebuilding Commission’s response to its May request for advice and recommendations on the situation in the Central African Republic (S/2008/383).
- The Secretariat is yet to report to the Council on Kenya as requested in the 6 February presidential statement (S/PRST/2008/4).

Recent developments on the situations covered in this Forecast are addressed in the relevant briefs. Interesting developments on other issues in the Council during February included:

- **Pakistan**: On 2 February the Secretary-General informed the Council (S/2009/67) he had agreed to the government of Pakistan’s request for an international commission to determine the facts and circumstances of the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. The three-member commission of inquiry will operate for a period of six months. Ambassador Heraldo Muñoz of Chile will head the commission.

- **Iraq**: On 3 February the Security Council released a press statement (SC/9587) welcoming the holding of provincial elections in Iraq on 31 January and congratulating Iraqis. On 20 February the Secretary-General released his quarterly report on Iraq (S/2009/102). The Special Representative for Iraq, Staffan de Mistura, briefed the Council on 26 February in an open meeting.

- **Sudan**: On 3 February the Council was briefed by Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet on the continued fighting between Justice and Equality Movement forces and the Sudanese military in Muhajeriya in southern Darfur. On 5 February the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Ashraf Qazi, briefed the Council (S/PV.6079). On 12 February Council members had a private meeting with an AU and Arab League delegation led by AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ramtane Lamamra, to discuss the ICC proceedings.

On 17 February, Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy briefed the Council in closed consultations on the Secretary-General’s report (S/2009/83) on Darfur and progress regarding the deployment of AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the implications of a possible ICC warrant against Sudanese President Omar al Bashir. On 23 February the ICC announced that its decision on an arrest warrant against Bashir is likely on 4 March.

- **Sierra Leone**: On 9 February, the Council held an open debate (S/PV.6080) to consider the first report of the Secretary-General (S/2009/59) on the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIIL). Michael von der Schulenburg, the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General, briefed the Council. The Council was also briefed by Netherlands’ Ambassador Frank Majoor, Chairman of the Peacebuilding Commission’s Sierra Leone configuration.

On 25 February, the Special Court for Sierra Leone found three leaders of the rebel Revolutionary United Front, Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

- **Middle East**: On 10 February the Secretary-General told the Council in consultations that he had established a UN investigation into incidents involving death and damage at UN premises in Gaza between 27 December and 19 January and that he would report back to the Council when the investigation is completed. On 12 February he announced that the Board of Inquiry, led by Ian Martin and composed of four members, had begun its work. On 13 February the president of the Council, Japanese Ambassador Yukio Takasu, conveyed to the press Council members’ views on the humanitarian situation in Gaza, including their concern for full implementation of resolution 1860 and that there was convergence of views to welcome the establishment of the Board of Inquiry and the Secretary-General’s intention to report its conclusions to the Council.

On 18 February, the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Robert Serry, briefed the Council (S/PV.6084). He emphasised the challenges facing the region, in particular: the repercussions of the Gaza crisis; continued Palestinian divisions and lack of reconciliation; the new political situation in Israel; unmet road map obligations, especially regarding settlements; and the freeze in indirect Israeli-Syrian negotiations. He emphasised the need for a permanent Gaza ceasefire. A return to violence was always possible. He said Israel had not made all crossings into Gaza available for humanitarian convoys.

- **DPRK**: On 12 February, Turkish Ambassador Baki Ilkin, chairman of the 1718 Sanctions Committee on the DPRK briefed the Council.

- **Georgia**: On 13 February, the Council adopted resolution 1866 extending the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) until 15 June. The resolution also called for provisions set out in paragraph 2(a) (relating to armed forces and heavy military equipment in the security zone and restricted weapons zone) of the 1994 Moscow agreement on a ceasefire.
and separation of forces to be respected, and it welcomed the six-point agreement of 12 August 2008 and implementing of measures of 8 September 2008. The resolution asked to report to the Council on the implementation of the resolution and the situation on the ground by 15 May.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): On 17 February the Council was briefed (S/PV.6083) on the humanitarian situation in the DRC by Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes. Subsequently, the president of the Council conveyed to the press the Council’s concerns regarding the humanitarian situation in the eastern parts of the DRC, the priority of the protection of civilians, condemnation of the brutal attacks by the Ugandan rebel group, Lord’s Resistance Army, in North Kivu and called on governments to cooperate with UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) in the planning and execution of joint operations.

On 19 February the Secretary-General wrote to the Council (S/2009/105) to inform it about the recently revised concept of operations and rules of engagement for MONUC.

Timor-Leste: On 19 February, the Council held an open debate (S/PV.6085) of the Secretary-General’s report (S/2009/72). The Secretary-General told the Council that Timor-Leste had made remarkable progress since the attacks on the leaders of Timor-Leste a year ago and that in 2009 it could devote its attention to building the foundations for long-term stability. He said that one of the key priorities should be reforming the security sector and the resumption of policing responsibilities by the national police. The Council is expected to adopt a resolution extending the mandate of UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) on 26 February.

Myanmar: On 20 February, Ibrahim Gambari, the Secretary-General’s Special Advisor on Myanmar, briefed the Council in informal private consultations on his 31 January-3 February visit to Myanmar. Following the briefing, Gambari said that he had told the Council that although there was no tangible outcome from his visit, there was some movement. On 23 February Gambari briefed the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General, in remarks to the press following the meeting, noted the amnesty announced by Myanmar on 20 February, which reportedly includes 23 political prisoners, but reiterated his call for the release of all political prisoners including Aung San Suu Kyi. He also said that he was willing to visit Myanmar again to build on his May 2008 visit. Special Rapporteur on the situation on human rights in Myanmar, Tomás Ojea Quintana, visited Myanmar from 14-19 February, where he met with a number of political prisoners and called for the “progressive release of prisoners of conscience”.

Sri Lanka: At press time, the Council was expected to be briefed on 27 February by John Holmes, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, on the humanitarian situation in Sri Lanka following his visit to that country.

UN Support for Peacekeeping by Regional Organisations

Expected Council Action

On 18 March the Council will consider the report of the joint AU-UN panel set up by the Secretary-General to review options for supporting AU peacekeeping operations. The panel report was circulated on 24 December. The format of the meeting is expected to be a public meeting chaired by the foreign minister of Libya and to have high-level participation by the AU and the chair of the panel, Romano Prodi, former prime minister of Italy. At press time Council members were still at an early stage of discussion about any Council decisions on the report.

Background

On 16 April 2008 in resolution 1809, the Council recognised the problems that some regional organisations were confronting in maintaining peacekeeping operations. The Council concluded that it was desirable to enhance the “predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing regional organizations” operating under a UN mandate. The Secretary-General subsequently established a joint AU-UN panel to consider modalities for supporting such peacekeeping operations, in particular start-up funding, equipment and logistics. (The proposal had originated in the Secretary-General’s report on enhancing cooperation between the UN and regional organisations of 24 March 2008.)

On 24 December the panel’s report was submitted to the Council and the General Assembly. The panel included input from member states, the UN Secretariat, UN agencies involved in peace operations, AU institutions and member countries, the EU, and existing and potential donors. The panel explored how the UN and the AU could enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing of UN mandated peace operations undertaken by the AU. A particular focus was how to achieve expeditious and effective deployment of well equipped troops and effective mission support arrangements.

Significantly, the panel also addressed the related topic of capacity building for conflict prevention. (See SCR’s Update Report on UN Cooperation with Regional and Subregional Organisations and Conflict Prevention of 14 April 2008.)

While acknowledging that its proposals “will not completely address” the challenges to peace in Africa, the Panel put forward the following recommendations:

- approving the use of UN assessed funding to support UN authorised AU peacekeeping operations for up to six months on a case by case basis and only when the mission was to transition to UN management within six months;
- establishment of a voluntarily funded multi donor trust fund to build AU peacekeeping capacity (thus allowing the AU to move away from ad-hoc and disconnected bilateral support arrangements). The fund would consolidate current sources of support for the AU and AU members and secure additional resources from current and new donors building on the current EU funded African Peace Facility;
- extending the voluntary trust fund concept to include capacity building to cover early
warning, conflict prevention, conflict resol-
ution and post-conflict reconstruction;
- developing of the AU’s logistics capacity;
- and
- establishment of a joint UN-AU team to
evaluate how to implement the panel’s
proposals.

Key Issues
The main issue for the Council is how and
when to take up the recommendations. Respon-
sibility for financial issues rests with the
General Assembly not the Security
Council. Current UN financial practice does not
allow assessed UN funding for peace opera-
tions led by other groups, even when
authorised by the Council. There has been
only one exemption to this—when UN sup-
port packages were approved for the AU
Mission in Darfur (AMIS) (S/RES/1706 and

The second issue—setting up a multi donor
trust fund that will be voluntarily financed—
may be less controversial. Such trust funds
involving voluntary financing are within the
general responsibility of the Secretary-Gen-
eral. He often sets up such funds after
consultation with the Council. Early Council
action on this recommendation could there-
fore raise less problems.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- waiting and deciding, in light of views
expressed in the 18 March debate, how
best to progress any follow up Council
action;
- deciding to begin work prior to the 18
March debate on a Council statement or
resolution endorsing some or all of the
Panel’s findings and recommendations;
- drafting for adoption on 18 March a
Council statement welcoming the report
but explicitly deciding not to take action
on the assessed financing issue but
deciding instead to refer it to the General
Assembly for action (article 11(2) of the
Charter contemplates the Security
Council bringing issues before the
General Assembly);
- supportively communicating to the Sec-
retary-General (perhaps in a letter from
the president) that the Council members
welcome and agree with the proposal to
set up a voluntary funded trust fund; and
- deferring all action until the panel’s rec-
ommendations have been addressed in
the General Assembly.

Council Dynamics
Council members appear to generally
agree on the value of the report.

Some are sceptical that agreement on for-
mal approval of the recommendations
could be reached at this stage in the Coun-
cil. These members believe that approving
the panel’s recommendations would risk
possible criticism of encroachment by Gen-
eral Assembly colleagues.

African and NAM countries on the Council
agree that UN financial support should be
provided for regional missions, citing the
primary responsibility of the UN for ensur-
ing global peace and security and the con-
sequent need to collaborate in a sub-
stantial way with regional peacekeeping.

The US, UK and Russia have, in the past,
registered strong reservations about using
funds from the assessed contributions of
the UN peacekeeping budget to support
peacekeeping operations by regional
organisations. The new US administration’s
policy remains unclear.

Although some Council members oppose
UN financial support for peacekeeping
operations undertaken by other organisa-
tions at the generic level, they have shown
an inclination to allow such funding in cer-
tain specific cases. One example was the
2006 “light” and “heavy packages” of sup-
port for AMIS prior to transition to the
AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNA-
MID) (S/RES/1769). Another is the Coun-
cil’s approval in January this year in
resolution 1863 to use UN resources to
strengthen the AU Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM). (This has not yet been
approved by the General Assembly.)

A greater level of agreement among Coun-
cil members may be possible on the panel’s
other key recommendation to set up a vol-
untary funded multi donor trust fund.

At this stage, while Council members gener-
ally expect the panel’s recommendations to
set the tone for further deliberations on
the way ahead, it is unclear how far they would
like the Council to go, bearing in mind the
responsibilities of the General Assembly.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1863 (16 January 2009) renewed
authorisation of AMISOM for
up to six months, approved using UN
resources to strengthen AMISOM, and
expressed the Council’s intention to
establish a UN peacekeeping opera-
tion by 1 June.
- S/RES/1809 (16 April 2008) was the
resolution welcoming the Secretary-
General’s proposal to set up an
AU-UN panel to consider the modal-
ties of how to support AU
peacekeeping operations established
under a UN mandate.
- S/RES/1769 (31 July 2007) estab-
lished UNAMID.
- S/RES/1706 (31 August 2006) was the
resolution on the situation in
Sudan mandating UN assistance
to AMIS.
- S/RES/1631 (17 October 2005) was the
first resolution adopted by the
Council on regional organisations.
- S/RES/1625 (14 September 2005) was a
declaration on the effectiveness of the
Council’s role in conflict preven-
tion, calling for the strengthening of
cooperation and communication
between the UN and regional and
subregional organisations in accor-
dance with Chapter VIII (on regional
arrangements).
- S/RES/1497 (1 August 2003) recogn-
ised the role Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS)
played in implementing the June
2003 ceasefire in Liberia and cited
Chapter VIII.
- S/RES/1464 (4 February 2003) wel-
comed the actions of ECOWAS in
response to the violence in Côte
d’Ivoire in 2002 with reference to
Chapter VII and Chapter VIII.
- S/RES/1318 (7 September 2000) was the
adoption of the Millennium Summit
declaration on maintaining peace and
security, especially in Africa.
- S/RES/1197 (18 September 1998) was on the need for the UN to provide
support to regional and subregional organisations and to strengthen coordination between the UN and those organisations.

**Selected Presidential Statements**

- S/PRST/2007/42 (6 November 2007) was a presidential statement on the role of regional and subregional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security.
- S/PRST/2007/31 (28 August 2007) requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on the options for further implementation of resolution 1625.
- S/PRST/2006/55 (19 December 2006) called for the immediate deployment of light and heavy support packages to AMIS and endorsed the phased approach towards a hybrid AU-UN force agreed by the AU Peace and Security Council.
- S/PRST/2006/39 (20 September 2006) welcomed the progress made in realising the goals of resolution 1631 and urged contributions to the capacity building of regional organisations and subregional organisations, particularly of the AU and African subregional organisations.
- S/PRST/2004/44 (19 November 2004) recognised the importance of strengthening cooperation with the AU in order to help build its capacity to deal with collective security challenges.
- S/PRST/2004/27 (20 July 2004) was the statement after the Council’s debate on cooperation between the UN and regional organisations in stabilisation processes.
- S/PRST/1997/46 (25 September 1997) noted that addressing the challenges of conflict in Africa required a comprehensive approach and called on the Secretary-General to produce a report to address the issue.
- S/PRST/1994/22 (3 May 1994) said that regional and sub-regional organisations should be taken into account when setting up new peacekeeping operations.

**Selected Letters**

- S/2008/813 (24 December 2008) was the letter from the Secretary-General forwarding the AU-UN panel report on how to support AU peacekeeping operations established under UN mandate to the Council president.
- S/2008/229 (8 April 2008) was a letter from the permanent representative of South Africa forwarding the concept paper on the relationship between the UN and regional organisations, particularly the AU, in the maintenance of international peace and security.
- S/2007/640 (29 October 2007) was the letter from the permanent representative of Indonesia forwarding the concept paper on the relationship between the UN and regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security.
- S/2007/148 (14 March 2007) was the letter from the permanent representative of South Africa forwarding the concept paper on the relationship between the UN and regional organisations, in particular the AU, in the maintenance of international peace and security.
- S/2005/567 (29 August 2005) was the conclusions of the sixth high-level meeting between the Secretary-General and regional organisations.

**Selected Secretary-General’s Reports**

- S/2008/186 (24 March 2008) was the Secretary-General’s latest report on enhancing cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, in particular the AU.

**Selected General Assembly Resolutions**

- A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005) was the World Summit Outcome Document.
- A/RES/49/57 (17 February 1995) was the Declaration on Enhancement of Cooperation between the UN and Regional Arrangements or Agencies in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security.

**Other**

- A/59/565 (2 December 2004) and Corr. 1 (6 December 2004) was the report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.
- S/2000/809 (21 August 2000) was the Brahimi report on peacekeeping operations.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**AU-UN Panel on Modalities for Support to AU Peacekeeping Operations**

- Romano Prodi (Italy), Chair
- James Dobbins (USA)
- Jean-Pierre Halbwachs (Mauritius)
- Monica Juma (Kenya)
- Toshiyuki Niwa (Japan)
- Behrooz Sadry (Iran)
Haiti

Expected Council Action
The next Secretary-General’s report on the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is expected by 9 March. It is likely to provide an overview of developments regarding the implementation of indicators of progress in key areas of stabilisation.

From 11 to 14 March the Council will conduct a mission to Haiti, the first since April 2005. Costa Rica is the lead country. The visit was originally envisaged for September 2008 but was postponed because Haiti was recovering from a series of hurricanes.

The main goal for the visit appears to be assessing progress in stabilisation, taking into account last year’s setbacks from the hurricanes and the food crisis and in particular assessing implementation of the mandate of the MINUSTAH.

On 19 March Costa Rican Ambassador Jorge Urbina is expected to brief the Council on the visit.

Key Recent Developments
In late August and early September, hurricanes killed about 800 people in Haiti and led to around $1 billion in damage (according to World Bank estimates). The UN launched an appeal in September seeking nearly $108 million to provide humanitarian help in the next six months, but only 48 percent had been pledged as of December.

On 15 October the UN Humanitarian and Resident Coordinator for Haiti, Joël Boutroue, said some three million Haitians lacked food security. He added that the UN did not have the capacity, without further contributions, to provide water and sanitation in emergency shelters. This was reiterated by UN Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes who said after a visit to Haiti in October that the devastation from the hurricanes had dealt a severe blow to efforts to combat poverty.

Banditry and kidnappings have risen recently, leading MINUSTAH to conduct a special security operation in urban centres. This was followed in December by a large-scale anti-drugs operation in the south of the country.

In November, the Secretary-General commissioned the economist Paul Collier (author of The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and Can Be Done About It) to conduct a study assessing the impact of the 2008 food crisis and hurricanes on Haiti’s economy and proposing a strategy for achieving economic security. Collier visited Haiti from 1 to 5 December and submitted a report in January. His recommendations focus on job creation, provision of basic services to the population, the achievement of food security and environmental sustainability.

Human rights in Haiti have also been addressed. Following a visit from 2 to 5 November, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay highlighted that Haitians face several human rights issues, including lack of access to food and water, prolonged detention without trial and poor prison conditions. Independent UN expert, Michel Forst, visited at the end of November and, while recognising that Haiti had made progress in the area of civil and political rights, urged the government to make further progress, especially improving the penal system. He also stressed the need to tackle corruption and economic exclusion.

On 14 October the Council adopted resolution 1840 renewing the mandate of MINUSTAH for one year and further detailing its mandate. At that time the Council recognised that natural catastrophes and price hikes for food and fuel had adversely affected Haiti’s long-term stability and security. On the political side, it encouraged the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to facilitate dialogue between the Haitian government and relevant political actors to ensure implementation of the National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction. MINUSTAH was also given a greater coordination mandate with the UN country team. The resolution also invited member states to coordinate with MINUSTAH to address the cross-border trafficking of persons, drugs, arms and other illegal activities. It strongly condemned the grave violations against children affected by armed violence including sexual abuse of girls and reaffirmed resolution 1820 on sexual violence against women, as well as MINUSTAH’s human rights mandate.

Finally, the Council recognised the need for a high-level donor conference. (This is scheduled for April in Washington.)

The Council did not take up the 2 October letter from Haitian President René Préval requesting that reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter (action with respect to threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression) be removed from MINUSTAH’s mandate. President Préval argued that this would contribute to creating a favourable climate for foreign investments. Clearly, Council members considered that this proposal was misjudged.

Briefing the Council on 8 October the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Haiti, Hédi Annabi, said the need to respond to natural disasters in September had helped Haitian politicians unblock the five month old political standoff and generate a sense of solidarity. He added, however, that historic tendencies towards political confrontation could easily reemerge in the context of the 19 April elections. He warned that the suffering created by the economic crisis and natural disasters produced a reservoir of discontent that could be manipulated for political reasons. He then highlighted MINUSTAH’s humanitarian role in supporting the response to the hurricane catastrophe and discussed MINUSTAH’s accomplishments and upcoming challenges in terms of meeting indicators of progress elaborated by the Secretary-General in his consolidation plan. Development was not the business of peacekeeping operations, although they had the task to create an environment conducive to economic and social development, he said. He finally pointed out that advancing longer-term planning for implementing the Poverty Reduction Strategy, taking into account the damage created by the hurricanes, was needed.

On 16 February the Haitian Electoral Council announced that it had barred candidates from the Lavalas Family party, the party of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide who lives in exile in South Africa, from running in the Senate elections, due to failure to submit registration on time. Given the popularity of the party in Haiti, this has raised fears that it may lead to political instability.
Developments in the Human Rights Council

On 24 September 2008, the President of the Human Rights Council made a statement welcoming the formation of the new Haitian government, the cooperation between the Haitian National Police and MINUSTAH in curbing violence, and the adoption of new regulations on the judiciary. The statement also expressed deep concern at the deterioration of Haitians’ standard of living, partly as a result of the economic crisis. Finally, he welcomed the appointment of Michel Forst as independent expert and welcomed the Haitian government’s request to extend his mission until September 2010. (PRST/9/1)

Key Issues

The terms of reference for the Council’s mission, drafted by the Group of Friends of Haiti (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and the US) and approved by the Council on 20 February, reflect a number of key issues that the Council will address during its visit.

Reaffirming the Council’s support for Haiti and for current efforts towards stabilisation is a key issue. At the same time, the terms of reference also reflect the importance of Haitian ownership and primary responsibility in the stabilisation process. There seems to be a realisation that the success of international involvement in Haiti will require strong Haitian engagement at all stages of the process. Therefore, a key issue for the Council is to send a message of support while reaffirming basic expectations from the Haitian authorities, particularly regarding deeply needed political dialogue and national reconciliation as well as socioeconomic development. A related key issue, which may be addressed during the visit, is clarifying that the Chapter VII mandate does not contain the negative implications that Haiti’s government seems to fear.

Another issue is assessing progress made in all key areas of stabilisation: political dialogue, extension of state authority, security sector reform, rule of law and human rights, and social and economic development. This assessment will be crucial for future Council discussions on the mandate of MINUSTAH, and the recent human rights assessments are also relevant in that regard.

Evaluating preparations for the upcoming elections is a further issue, especially regarding recent developments. Frequent elections in Haiti are costly and are considered as a potential factor for further destabilisation. Although President Préval has expressed his willingness to reform the electoral system, constitutional reform remains a divisive issue.

A further issue is cooperation among international actors in Haiti for the implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy. This has been a major area of concern for the Council, which in resolution 1840 enhanced MINUSTAH’s mandate to ensure better coordination among all actors. The role of regional actors in Haiti may also be explored.

A related issue is assessing the general humanitarian situation in Haiti. A main goal will also be to grasp the extent of economic and humanitarian setbacks suffered during the past months and their impact on meeting the benchmarks developed by the Secretary-General. A disaster and risk reduction strategy may be important as Haiti has been hit several times by devastating storms.

Finally, the Council will review progress in tackling cross-border illicit trafficking of persons, drugs, arms and other illegal activities.

Council and Wider Dynamics

The draft of terms of reference was not controversial within the Council. There is a general view within the Council that the time is not ripe for placing MINUSTAH under a Chapter VI mandate as the situation continues to be extremely fragile, and the Council needs to continue to send a message of strong engagement. Also, in practice the actual operations of the mission need to remain the same. Activities under a Chapter VI mandate would therefore not differ from activities under Chapter VII. This issue is likely to also be discussed during the visit.

Members of the Group of Friends seem to be less divided than in past over issues of security versus development in MINUSTAH’s mandate. However, some Council members, including Russia and China continue to believe that rehabilitation activities should not be conducted by a peacekeeping mission.

Canada, one of the biggest donors to Haiti, as a member of the Group of Friends, has argued that MINUSTAH should play a stronger role in the political reconciliation process.

For the US, security seems to remain a priority. The US also has a priority that MINUSTAH utilises resources effectively and efficiently. The US suggested including a mention in the terms of reference of how insights on lessons learned from MINUSTAH could inform Council’s consideration of broader peacekeeping issues.

Mexico, a new Council member, recently joined the Group of Friends of Haiti. While Mexico is not a troop contributor, it has recently sent police officers specialised in kidnapping to Haiti.

UN Documents

Latest Security Council Resolution
- S/RES/1840 (14 October 2008) renewed MINUSTAH’s mandate for one year.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report
- S/2008/586 (27 August 2008) presented a consolidation plan with key indicators to measure and track progress.

Report of the Latest Security Council Visit to Haiti
- S/2005/302 (6 May 2005)

Latest Briefing to the Council
- S/PV.5990 (8 October 2008) was a briefing by Hédi Annabi.

Latest Letter
- S/2008/640 (2 September 2008) was a letter from Uruguay enclosing a Joint Communiqué following a meeting of deputy ministers of foreign affairs and deputy ministers of defence of the Latin American “2x9 Mechanism” on Haiti, held in Montevideo on 29 August.
Haiti: Confronting the Gangs of Port-au-Prince, Michael Dziedzic and Robert Perito, Special Report No. 208, United States Institute of Peace, September 2008

### Somalia

#### Expected Council Action

In March, the Council will receive a report from the Secretary-General. Also in March, the General Assembly is expected to take up the funding of the UN logistical-support package to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) endorsed by the Council on 16 January by resolution 1863. A report on piracy off the coast of Somalia is also expected, including advice on a possible UN coordination and leadership role as requested on 2 December by resolution 1846. A briefing by Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, is likely. It is unclear whether there will be any Council action.

#### Key Recent Developments

On 30 January Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed was elected president of Somalia by the newly expanded parliament which now includes 150 new opposition members from the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS). Seventy-five parliamentary seats are being kept vacant and will be allocated to representatives of civil society and opposition groups that have not yet joined the peace process. Ahmed won in the second round of voting after Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein, the other leading candidate, withdrew. The Council welcomed the election of Ahmed in a press statement on 3 February.

Ahmed travelled directly to the AU summit taking place in Addis Ababa and also attended a meeting of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. On 7 February he arrived in Mogadishu to meet senior security officials from the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and representatives from ARS and the next day appointed a commission to oversee the integration of TFG and ARS security forces. He also met clan elders and Islamic Courts Union representatives and reportedly discussed the need to open talks with insurgent groups that have so far refused to join the peace process.

On 13 February Ahmed appointed Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke as the new prime minister. Sharmarke, the son of a former Somali president, belongs to the Darod clan. Ahmed is from the Hawiye clan, thus rectifying clan imbalance which had bedeviled the national leadership previously. His nomination was approved by a large parliamentary majority. Shortly after taking office, Sharmarke reportedly said he wanted to hold talks with Al-Shabaab. On 20 February he announced his new cabinet, naming 36 ministers.

The security situation remained volatile. On 4 February four insurgent groups, including the Eritrea-based faction of ARS but not Al-Shabaab, announced plans to merge into a new group called Hisbi Islâm (Islamic party) to fight the newly elected president and the anticipated unity government. There were reports of new clashes in the central region of Somalia between Al-Shabaab and Ahlu Sunna Waljamarca, a moderate Sunni group supporting the government. There were also reports that Ethiopian troops reentered Somalia on 18 February.

In Mogadishu, insurgent attacks against AMISOM continued. Eleven Burundian peacekeepers were killed in an attack on 22 February for which Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility. On 19 February more than 300 clerics and clan elders gathered in Mogadishu and reportedly called for AMISOM to leave within 120 days.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees announced that for the first time in two years, internally displaced persons had started returning to certain parts of the city. Still, civilians were reportedly fleeing other parts to escape fighting. On 4 February the director of Horn Afrik radio, Said Tahlil Ahmed, was killed in the Bakara market in Mogadishu by unidentified militias. He was the second Somali journalist killed this year.

On 30 January the Secretary-General reported that it would take time before the UN support package approved by the
Council could be delivered. The required budgetary approval by the General Assembly was scheduled for March. The report stressed the immediate need for strong bilateral assistance, both through contributions to the trust fund that will be set up in accordance with resolution 1863, as well as through contributions of personnel, equipment and other resources.

On 12 February the Council was briefed in closed consultations by B. Lynn Pascoe, Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs, and Susana Malcorra, Under Secretary-General for the Department of Field Support. Malcorra did not provide an estimate of the overall cost of the AMISOM support package, noting that it was still in the process of being finalised.

Anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia gathered increasing support. Japan announced on 28 January that it had ordered its navy to prepare for possible deployment to join international forces already in place. There appeared to be a reduction in piracy activity. The International Maritime Organization convened a regional meeting in Djibouti that adopted a new code of conduct on anti-piracy cooperation on 29 January, including provisions on information sharing and arrest and investigation and prosecution of persons suspected of piracy. It is similar to an Asian regional arrangement of 2006.

Key Issues
Sustaining political progress seems to be the immediate key issue. Implementing the UN support package for AMISOM is also a pressing issue. However, the Council role is limited now that the ball is in the General Assembly’s court. In the meantime, encouraging further political progress may finally lead to results on the ground and reduce the need for outside forces.

Piracy remains a problem, but the issue has shifted from the need for stronger measures to implementing resolutions in place. Discussions are likely to be shaped by the upcoming report from the Secretary-General, including on the issue of a possible UN coordinating role. There are already several competing coordination mechanisms in place, including the US-led International Contact Group and the EU’s Maritime Security Centre. While the UN is unlikely to take on any ambitious role in the region, the question is whether some type of secretariat function to coordinate existing mechanisms might add value. Longer-term maritime security is clearly linked to a functioning government and the rule of law.

Options
Options for the Council include:
• welcoming the establishment of a unity government and providing much more precise steering for the Special Representative’s role, including clearer direction on political reconciliation;
• taking up the Secretary-General’s piracy report with a view to determining how the UN can add further value;
• proposing names in the Somalia Sanctions Committee of individuals and entities to be targeted by sanctions; and
• implementing the recommendations of the Somalia Monitoring Group.

Council Dynamics
African Council members seem concerned about the lead time for deployment of the AMISOM support package. They are mindful that the UN budget is the prerogative of the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee, but there are also concerns that bilateral support is not proving adequate. Monitoring progress is therefore seen as important. Other Council members are concerned about cost and ensuring that standard oversight procedures apply. In March, another briefing on the support package is therefore likely.

Several members—including the US, UK, France and Russia—seem hesitant about any significant UN coordinating role on piracy and the Secretariat seems reluctant to take on any major new tasks.

Developments in the Sanctions Committee
The Somalia Sanctions Committee did not hold any meetings in February but is expected to meet in March. It has yet to agree on the list of individuals and entities to be targeted by the expanded sanctions regime adopted by the Council in resolution 1844 of 20 November. The resolution encouraged member states to submit proposals to the Committee for inclusion on the targeted sanctions list. In addition to discussing the sanctions list, the Committee is expected to revise its guidelines. At press time the Secretary-General had yet to reestablish the Monitoring Group.

Security Council Report
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Djibouti/Eritrea

Expected Council Action

The Council is expecting a report from the Secretary-General (due 25 February) on the border dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea. Eritrea did not comply with the Council’s demand in resolution 1862 that it withdraw its forces from the disputed area by 18 February and engage in dialogue. It seems likely that the Council will take up the issue again in March.

Key Recent Developments

On 11 September the Council received the report from the fact-finding mission dispatched to the region in response to Eritrea’s refusal to withdraw its troops as requested by the Council’s presidential statement of 12 June. (For more background information, please see our Update Report on Djibouti/Eritrea of 23 June 2008.) The mission was refused entry into Eritrea and visited only Ethiopia and Djibouti. As a result, it was unable to give a full account of the situation. Eritrea also rejected similar missions proposed by the Arab League and the AU, as well as other proposals for dialogue. The mission reported that Eritrea, unlike Djibouti, had not withdrawn its troops from the contested area. It recommended that the Secretary-General use his good offices to establish a dialogue between the two countries.

On 23 October the Council held an open meeting to hear a statement by Djibouti’s President, Ismail Omar Guelleh, who called on the Council to take urgent and effective action. In response, Eritrea denied taking any land from Djibouti, called the conflict “a manufactured problem”, and pointed instead to Ethiopia’s occupation of Eritrean territories.

Eritrea continued to reject any attempts at solving the conflict and sent several letters to the Council denying the existence of any dispute with Djibouti. On 24 October an Eritrean letter accused the US of orchestrating the Djibouti/Eritrea conflict as a “diversionary scheme”. A 4 November letter appealed to the Council to address Ethiopia’s occupation of Eritrean territories. On 10 November, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki criticised the Council for considering action against Eritrea but declining to take the same steps against Ethiopia. He accused the Council of double standards. Djibouti refuted Eritrea’s version in a letter on 4 December.

On 14 January, resolution 1862 demanded that Eritrea withdraw its forces to the positions of the status quo ante no later than five weeks from the date of the resolution. It called on Eritrea to acknowledge the border dispute and engage in dialogue with Djibouti. The Council also decided to review the situation based on a report by the Secretary-General.

Eritrea immediately rejected the Council’s demand. In a statement from its foreign ministry on 15 January, it called the resolution ill-considered and unbalanced and repeated that it had not occupied any land belonging to Djibouti. President Guelleh on 24 January said in an interview that Djibouti would not be pushed into war with Eritrea and would pursue all legal means to solve the conflict.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is how to persuade Eritrea to withdraw its forces and engage in a dialogue with Djibouti to solve the conflict peacefully. Based on Eritrea’s actions and statements so far, it seems unlikely that it will respond to any ratcheting up of Council demands.

A related issue is whether a change in approach might lead to a more flexible Eritrean attitude. Council members will be reluctant to give the appearance of rewarding intransigence. However, the issue is also to some extent seen as complicated because the former US administration under George W. Bush, was seen as a strong ally of Ethiopia and did not allow the Council to pressure it for its intransigence on border issues with Eritrea.

Another issue is whether to see the problems as compartmentalised or as part of a wider regional dimension. Eritrea seems intent on using the Djibouti crisis as leverage to get the Council to address the unresolved issue of Ethiopian behaviour.
A further issue is how and when to engage regional organisations more effectively on the problem. There were preliminary reports that Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, who on 2 February became chair of the AU, had offered to mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea on the border dispute.

A final issue, if efforts to open a dialogue on reasonable terms prove impossible, is whether stronger measures, such as sanctions, would be considered. A related issue is the Council’s credibility if, as happened in Somalia for over a decade, sanctions were easily circumvented. By contrast, doing nothing also raises the credibility issue.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- requesting the Secretary-General to continue his good offices efforts, thus buying some more time;
- deciding to adopt a more regional approach by signaling willingness to address all other relevant issues and create space for private discussions to explore possible modalities; and
- deciding to adopt targeted sanctions on Eritrea subject to a new deadline if it continues to reject the Council’s demands.

Council Dynamics
There is agreement in the Council that Djibouti is the aggrieved party and that Eritrea must withdraw from the contested area and engage in dialogue. There seems to be little sympathy for Eritrea’s position. Its previous actions that led to withdrawal of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea are raised by some members as examples of related irresponsible behaviour. Many Council members recognise Eritrea’s legitimate concerns over the unresolved Ethiopia/Eritrea border issue, and that a long-term solution may require a comprehensive approach, but are unwilling to be seen to be rewarding aggressive action.

At press time, Council members were waiting to see what the Secretary-General’s report would conclude and also how the policy of the new US administration would unfold. France, as the lead country, may want to propose action in March. Libya is another key player with its new AU chairmanship and it will also have the presidency of the Council in March.

The possibility of sanctions has apparently been raised informally. Most seem to favour a cautious approach that would avoid imposing sanctions at this stage. At the same time there is awareness that the Council needs some strategy in response to Eritrea’s refusal to comply with the demands in resolution 1862 to avoid losing credibility.

UN Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Security Council Resolution</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1862 (14 January 2009) demanded that Eritrea withdraw its forces to the positions of the status quo ante within five weeks and requested a report from the Secretary-General by 25 February.</td>
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<th>Selected Security Council Presidential Statement</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/PRST/2008/20 (12 June 2008) called for a ceasefire between Djibouti and Eritrea.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/2009/28 (12 January 2009) was a letter from Eritrea expressing disappointment at the discussions in the Council to adopt a resolution.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/2008/766 (4 December 2008) was a letter from Djibouti refuting Eritrea’s statements on the crisis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/2008/700 (10 November 2008) was a letter from Eritrea criticising the Council for considering action against Eritrea and, referring to Ethiopia, accusing the Council of double standards.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/2008/690 (4 November 2008) was a letter from Eritrea drawing attention to Ethiopia’s occupation of Eritrean territory and calling on the Council to act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/2008/673 (24 October 2008) was a letter from Eritrea, referring to the circulation of the report from the Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission as a document of the Council on 3 October, accusing the US of orchestrating the Eritrea/Djibouti conflict as a “diversionary scheme”.</td>
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Kosovo

Expected Council Action
In March the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) will be on the table. This will be the first report that will give Council members a sense of how the delicate compromise, which was successfully brokered by the UN in November 2008 and which permitted the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) to be deployed in Kosovo, is working out in practice. The Council will be interested in the Secretary-General’s assessment now that EULEX...
has deployed throughout Kosovo under the UN umbrella. It is also awaiting further details of progress in implementing the Secretary-General’s six-point proposal for administering northern Kosovo, covering the areas of police, judiciary, boundary management, protection of religious facilities, transport and customs.

At press time, the format for the Council meeting had not been decided, but it is possible that it will be similar to that of the 26 November open debate where the foreign ministers of Serbia and Kosovo participated, (under Rules 37 and 39 of the Security Council’s provisional rules of procedure).

The UNMIK report and briefing are not expected to result in any Council action.

**Key Recent Developments**

The Secretary-General’s report of 24 November covered UNMIK’s activities from June to October 2008. It described how UNMIK has begun to adapt its structure and profile within the framework of resolution 1244 (which established the mission in 1999) as outlined in the Secretary-General’s June 2008 special report on Kosovo as well as UNMIK’s evolving relationship with EULEX.

In a presidential statement on 26 November following its discussion of the report, the Council welcomed Belgrade’s and Pristina’s “intentions to cooperate with the international community”, while taking into account their positions. It also welcomed the cooperation between the UN and other international actors within the framework of resolution 1244.

The 26 November presidential statement therefore provided the basis for EULEX to take over police, justice and customs from UNMIK. On 9 December EULEX officially began its mandate in Kosovo and EULEX staff members were deployed throughout Kosovo. EULEX submitted its first report through Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, to the Secretary-General on 13 February.

On 12 December, in a letter to the Secretary-General, Serbia made it clear that while it supported the strictly status-neutral deployment of EULEX, it did not believe that EULEX’s mandate included any portion of the Secretary-General’s former Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari’s, “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement”.

On 21 January the Kosovo Security Force (KFS) was formed. It replaced the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), a quasi military body made up largely of former ethnic Albanian veterans. The day after the KFS was formed, a grenade was thrown at its barracks, damaging the building but causing no injuries. There were also protests by former KPC members who had not been accepted into the KFS. Serbia sent a letter on 21 January to NATO and the UN protesting the formation of the KFS. In the letter, Serbia says it considers the KFS as a paramilitary organisation and a threat to Serbia’s national security. It also points out that the KFS was not created in accordance with resolution 1244 and asks for it to be disbanded.

On 17 February Kosovo marked the first anniversary of its unilateral declaration of independence. Fifty-four UN members have formally recognised Kosovo’s independence. The day before the anniversary, Serbia said that it would never recognise Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence and called for a new round of negotiations on Kosovo’s future status once the International Court of Justice (ICJ) reaches a decision on the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence. (The ICJ is not expected to provide its advisory opinion before 2010.)

In mid-February the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Kosovo, Lamberto Zannier, accepted an invitation to meet Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić and Minister for Kosovo-Metohija Goran Bogdanović. The visit took place on 19 February.

**Options**

One option is for the Council to receive a briefing and hear statements from interested parties and Council members but take no action.
Also an issue (although not one currently for the Council) is the effect of the present level of recognition for Kosovo. For instance, will Kosovo’s applications for membership to the World Bank and IMF be blocked?

A related future issue for the Council is the consequence of Kosovo becoming a frozen conflict situation in the absence of progress towards resolving its status by the international community. A soft partition between the rest of Kosovo and the north may lead to a Cyprus-like scenario, with a solution becoming more difficult as the years go by.

A future issue is how to deal with revenue from customs posts. Serbia is likely to argue that revenue collected in the north should go to northern Kosovo (thus benefiting the Serbian population there) and this is likely to be challenged by the Kosovars.

A longer-term issue is the future of UNMIK. While UNMIK is likely to be reduced to between 100 and 200 personnel, its presence in Kosovo remains an issue that will need to be taken up at some point.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

For two years the Council expended a great deal of energy on this issue. From February 2007 when it was presented with the Ahtisaari plan to the end of 2008 when it adopted a presidential statement that ultimately allowed EULEX to take over many UNMIK functions, it was deeply divided. The November presidential statement was the first substantive decision by the Council on Kosovo since 2005. (A draft resolution put on the table in July 2007 was finally aborted after it was clear that it would be vetoed.)

It is clear that the differences over this issue have not disappeared. However, there is a sense that western members are happy to see it move down the list of Council priorities for now. They appear to have little inclination to see a return to divisive discussions on Kosovo’s status and on the role of resolution 1244.

The Russian position has remained consistent. Russia favours a strict implementation of resolution 1244 and supports the Serbian position that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence was contrary to international law. The successful adoption of the November 2008 presidential statement and a move towards a more cordial US-Russia relationship may result in smoother dynamics over this issue in 2009. Russia’s interests in the similar set of issues in Georgia may also influence its approach, particularly if western countries are taking a less belligerent position on Kosovo.

Serbia continues to take a firm position and has lobbied Council members and the larger UN. It remains to be seen how the Secretary-General and the Council will handle Serbia’s demands, such as the disbanding of the KFS. New Council members are approaching this issue cautiously given its history in the Council. Most members do not yet have strong positions on it and are waiting for the Secretary-General’s report to help shape their thinking on the steps ahead. There are now nine countries in the Council that have recognised Kosovo’s independence and six that have not. (Last year it was eight versus seven.)

**Underlying Problems**

Unemployment, poverty and a crumbling infrastructure are among the immediate problems facing Kosovo today. Lawlessness and corruption are also likely to grow. This is likely to present challenges for both Kosovo’s government and the international community.

**UN Documents**

**Security Council Resolution**

- S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) authorised NATO to secure and enforce the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and established UNMIK.

**Selected Presidential Statement**

- S/PRST/2008/44 (26 November 2008) was the presidential statement welcoming the Secretary-General’s 24 November report and the cooperation between the UN and other international actors within the framework of resolution 1244.

**Selected Letters**

- S/2008/638 (10 October 2008) was the letter on the operations of KFOR from 1-31 July 2008.

**Afghanistan**

**Expected Council Action**

The mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) expires on 23 March and is expected to be renewed.

The Secretary-General’s report on Afghanistan is expected in early March. His Special Representative for Afghanistan, Kai Eide, is likely to brief the Council in mid-March. During his last briefing to the Council on 14 October, Eide outlined key benchmarks which he hoped UNAMA would meet in six months. These included specific criteria to measure aid effectiveness, strengthening the government’s mechanisms for combating corruption, determining the kind of police force required, designing an agricultural reform programme and solidifying the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship.

The mandate for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan expires on 13 October.

**Key Recent Developments**

Afghanistan continues to confront a thriving drug trade, an increasingly violent insurgency, corruption and widespread poverty.
The insurgency’s influence is expanding beyond traditionally volatile areas. On 11 February the Taliban conducted simultaneous attacks against government facilities in Kabul, killing at least twenty people and injuring many others.

### Human Rights

According to the Annual Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human rights situation in Afghanistan released on 16 January, a culture of deeply-entrenched impunity prevails. Despite reform initiatives, the judicial system remains weak, corrupt and dysfunctional. Civilian casualties rose substantially in 2008, along with further erosion of accessibility for humanitarian organisations. The report concludes there was a lack of political will to address problems of lawlessness, the widespread abuse of power, violence against women and their marginalisation and restrictions on freedom of expression.

UNAMA released its report on civilians in armed conflict on 17 February. In 2008 UNAMA recorded 2,118 civilian casualties, an increase of almost 40 percent from the previous year. Forty percent of civilian casualties occurred in the south and 55 percent of the overall death toll (1,160) was attributed to insurgents, with the vast majority killed by suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices. Coalition air strikes were responsible for 522 civilian deaths. In 2008, 38 aid workers were killed, twice as many as in 2007. International security force casualties also reached their highest levels in 2008 since 2001. As of October 2008, between one-third and one-half of the country was inaccessible for most humanitarian organisations.

The new US administration describes Afghanistan as its top military priority and has launched a review of its policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan to be completed before the NATO summit in early April. Ahead of the review, the new US Special Envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan, Richard Holbrooke, met Afghan, Pakistani and Indian leaders during a visit in February. On 17 February, US President Barack Obama authorised a 17,000 troop increase for Afghanistan.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy visited Afghanistan in early February. Ban said the UN strategy for 2009 was to implement the June 2008 Paris Declaration focusing on investment in agriculture, energy and infrastructure and making aid more effective.

UNAMA’s budget was doubled in December by the General Assembly which granted an increase in international staff from approximately 1,500 to 2,000. The increases reflect the need for more resources to enable UNAMA to effectively execute its tasks under resolution 1806 and the Paris Declaration, including strengthening capacity to support electoral assistance, improving governance and institution-building, supporting the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), expanding UNAMA’s presence in the provinces and promoting donor coordination and aid effectiveness.

A decision was taken in October by Eide to establish an Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) presence in Afghanistan separate from the Humanitarian Affairs Unit in UNAMA. The decision was based on perceptions held by the humanitarian community that OCHA’s neutrality was compromised while operating within UNAMA and concerns that assistance would be driven by political objectives rather than needs. OCHA, which reports to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and to the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, is part of the UN country team.

A Council mission visited Afghanistan, including Kabul and Herat, from 21 to 28 November. While meeting the Council delegation, President Hamid Karzai raised issues of terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan, civilian casualties, institutional strengthening and international donor coordination. The delegation noted progress made in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, governance (as evidenced by the October cabinet reshuffle), reducing opium cultivation and the government’s commitment to improve subnational governance.

The Independent Electoral Commission announced presidential elections would be held on 20 August despite the constitutional requirement that they be conducted within thirty to sixty days before the last day of the president’s term (22 May). Insecurity, the harsh winter and lack of funds seem to have prompted the postponement. Controversy has arisen as to whether the Electoral Commission has the authority to change the election date in this way. There are moves to have both houses of parliament endorse the postponement in order to grant legitimacy to an extension of the president’s term. Voter registration commenced in the remaining provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Nimroz and Uruzgan in late January.

The joint Afghanistan Opium Rapid Assessment Survey by the UN Office of Drugs and Crime and the Afghan Ministry of Counter-Narcotics released in February forecasts a decrease in opium poppy cultivation in 2009, including in the south, as a result of stronger efforts by the government, high food prices and low opium prices. Eighteen of the 34 provinces in 2008 are likely to remain poppy free in 2009 according to the Survey. NATO defence ministers agreed in October to authorise troops to engage narcotics facilities and facilitators providing material support for the insurgency. Since the new rules were agreed upon in early February, 11 drug laboratories have been dismantled, $50 million worth of drugs have been seized and a number of traffickers have been arrested.

On 6 January the foreign ministers from Pakistan and Afghanistan signed a joint declaration on bilateral cooperation. The declaration agreed to strengthen communication between government departments, armed forces and security agencies. It also agreed to develop a joint strategy for combating terrorism and to establish closer cooperation to counter militancy and extremism in the region.
Options
The most likely option is for the Council to extend the current mandate of UNAMA for a further 12 months.

An option which would galvanise attention on the multilateral capacity that UNAMA can bring to bear would be for President Obama’s Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan and former US Permanent Representative Richard Holbrooke to brief the Council on some of the findings from his recent assessment mission.

With continued tension over the number of civilian casualties resulting from coalition military operations, stronger language on protection of civilians in a new resolution to extend UNAMA’s mandate is an option. This might mirror language adopted in resolution 1833, extending ISAF’s mandate, which called on international forces to take additional robust efforts to minimise the risk of civilian casualties.

A further option is to modify the language on the coordination of humanitarian assistance to reflect the creation of an OCHA office separate from the UNAMA structure.

The Council could also pursue additional options including:
- stronger language on aid coordination and effectiveness to reflect the Paris Declaration which strengthened the role of UNAMA in leading and coordinating international civilian aid efforts in Afghanistan;
- reminding donors of their earlier commitment to fully align their efforts behind the financing and implementation of the ANDS;
- mandating UNAMA to play an oversight role in the auditing process of programmes financed through the core and external budgets;
- strengthening the language on UNAMA’s support for elections;
- encouraging the work of the Friends of Pakistan Group and requesting a briefing on progress in the Group’s agenda; and
- establishing a contact group to promote greater dialogue and transparency in the region and to work with regional powers to resolve the regional problems that inherently influence the conflict in Afghanistan.

Key Issues
A key issue is whether UNAMA is fully executing its mandate and playing an effective role in leading and coordinating international civilian aid efforts in Afghanistan.

An issue which is closely related is whether the international community is discharging its shared responsibility for aid delivery and coordination with UNAMA and whether donors have honoured their commitments made at the Paris Conference in June to deliver assistance in a more coordinated way and increasingly through the national budget.

A further issue is whether the government is making progress in strengthening government institutions and introducing accountability mechanisms to provide donors with confidence to commit funds to Afghanistan’s central budget.

An underlying issue for UNAMA is the deteriorating security situation. This is impairing reconstruction and humanitarian efforts and increasing the toll on civilians, humanitarian workers and security forces. A related issue is the growing anger and frustration among Afghans with the international community, arising from slow progress in development and civilian casualties caused by coalition military operations (particularly air strikes).

A key political issue is how best to involve all the regional stakeholders in a comprehensive regional strategy. This would need to address militant sanctuaries across the border in Pakistan, tensions between India and Pakistan and Iran’s concerns that Afghanistan could be used as a staging area against it.

Other key issues include:
- the need for a comprehensive strategy on national reconciliation;
- free and fair elections conducted with UNAMA’s support;
- countering narcotics;
- improving governance at all levels in Afghanistan to improve services for and accountability to the Afghan people; and
- the need for the government to continue to address corruption.

Council Dynamics
Council members support the role of UNAMA in Afghanistan.

While Council members support a more comprehensive regional approach to the crisis in Afghanistan, there are differing views about what role the Council can play in achieving this given concerns by India and Pakistan that their respective situation not be on the Council’s direct agenda.

Council members also support the idea of an Afghan-led national reconciliation plan. However, views differ on the breadth of such a strategy. While there is unanimity that negotiations cannot be undertaken with Al-Qaida, some members believe it is important to support reconciliation efforts with parts of the Taliban. Others take a more cautious approach and object in particular to initiatives involving anyone on the Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions list. There are also differences as to whether any reconciliation efforts should be primarily at the local level or whether they need to be more comprehensive.

Civilian casualties are a sensitive issue between members. During the ISAF mandate renewal consultations in September, there was a long debate on the strength of the language regarding protection of civilians.

For 2007-2008, Italy had the lead on Afghanistan. With its departure from the Council, Japan will assume this role initially followed in 2010 by Turkey. Given their history of support for Afghanistan both Japan and Turkey are expected to play strong roles in the Council’s consideration of Afghanistan.
Kai Eide
General and UNAMA’s Chief of Mission
Special Representative of the Secretary-General

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UN Documents
Selected Security Council Resolutions
• S/RES/1817 (11 June 2008) was the resolution restricting the trafficking into Afghanistan of chemical precursors for narcotics production.
• S/RES/1659 (15 February 2006) endorsed the Afghanistan Compact (on international cooperation with Afghanistan) and its annexes.
• S/RES/1401 (28 March 2002) created UNAMA.

Selected Presidential Statement
• S/PRST/2008/26 (11 July 2008) welcomed the outcome of the Paris conference, recalled the strengthened role of UNAMA and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and endorsed the increase of resources of UNAMA to fulfill this role.

Selected Reports
• A/HRC/10/23 (16 January 2009) was the report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan and on achievements in technical assistance in the field of human rights.
• S/2008/782 (12 December 2008) was the report of the Security Council mission to Afghanistan, 21 to 28 November 2008.
• S/2008/695 (10 November 2008) was the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Afghanistan.
• S/2008/617 (24 September 2008) was the latest UNAMA report.
• S/2008/434 (3 July 2008) was the special report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 1806 on UNAMA.

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAMA’s Chief of Mission
Kai Eide

UNAMA: Size, Composition and Duration
• Strength (as of 31 December): 250 international civilians, 1,163 local civilians, 16 military observers, five civilian police, 41 UN volunteers
• Duration: 28 March 2002 to present; mandate expires on 23 March 2009

ISAF Military Commander
General David D. McKiernan (US)

ISAF: Size, Composition and Duration
• Total strength: about 56,000 troops
• Contributors of military personnel: Forty NATO and non-NATO countries
• Top contributor: US, UK, Germany, Canada, and Italy.
• Duration: 20 December 2001 to present

Operation Enduring Freedom: Size, Composition and Duration
• Current strength: 13,500 (this is an estimate as the troop numbers shift continuously)
• Top contributor: US
• Duration: 7 October 2001 to present

Useful Additional Resources

Chad/CAR

Expected Council Action
Council members will be following closely in March the transition from the EU Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (EUFOR), which concludes on 15 March, to a UN military component for the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). A statement recognising the contribution made by EUFOR in improving security in eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic (CAR) is possible.

Council members will also be looking forward to a report in April by the Secretary-General on progress towards the full deployment of MINURCAT and the Dépêche-ment Intégre de Sécurité (DIS), a UN-trained Chadian force responsible for providing security inside refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) camps in eastern Chad.

It was concluded that a report would be of more use once the transfer was complete despite the requirement for a report every three months. Victor da Silva Angelo, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of MINURCAT, may brief the Council.

The mandate of MINURCAT expires on 15 March 2010.

Recent Developments
The humanitarian and security situation in eastern Chad continues to be of concern with ongoing attacks, banditry, the militarisation of refugee camps, recruitment of child soldiers, gender-based violence, lawlessness and impunity. There are concerns rebels may attempt to attack N’Djamena before the rainy season begins in May.

There continues to be approximately 180,000 IDPs, 57,000 refugees from the CAR and 263,000 refugees from Darfur who receive humanitarian assistance in Chad. Given continuing insecurity in Sudan and Chad, refugees are unlikely to return in 2009.

In mid-January UN and international NGO staff were evacuated from the town of Ndélé in northeastern CAR because of approaching rebels. Also in January, more than 10,000 refugees from northeastern CAR fled fighting between the government and rebels into southeastern Chad.

On 14 January the Council authorised deployment of a military component to replace EUFOR in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR on 15 March. Five thousand and two hundred military personnel (including 300 for CAR) were authorised to replace the 3,300 EUFOR troops. MINURCAT’s mandate was also extended until 15 March 2010.

France, which contributes 1,660 of
EUFOR’s 3,300 troops, plans to withdraw at least 1,000 troops by mid-2009. On 13 February the UN and Chadian government signed a memorandum of understanding formalising the transfer of EUFOR infrastructure and assets to the UN.

MINURCAT completed its target of training 850 officers for the DIS in February, and approximately 530 officers are currently deployed. An assessment of the Chadian government’s request to raise the total strength of DIS to 1,700 is expected following the deployment of the first 850 officers. On 28 January the DIS and UN Police conducted their first joint operation, seizing military uniforms, charges and ammunition from Am Nabak refugee camp in northeastern Chad during a search operation.

In December 2008, Chad’s National Assembly (in which President Idriss Déby’s party is in majority) passed draft bills related to the electoral law and the establishment of the National Electoral Commission provided under the EU-sponsored Inter-Chadian Agreement of 13 August 2007 between the government and the political opposition. The main opposition coalition, known as the Coordination of Political Parties for the Defence of the Constitution (CPDC, or Coordination des Partis politiques pour la Défense de la Constitution), questioned the independence of the proposed National Electoral Commission and has threatened to boycott the elections unless the legislation is revised. In 2007, parliamentary elections were postponed until 2009. Key precursors such as the population census and voter registration remain outstanding.

On 19 January Chadian rebel leader Timam Erdimi was appointed as the chief of the Union of Resistance Forces (Union des Forces de résistance, or UFR—a coalition of eight rebel groups formed in late 2008) during a meeting of Chadian rebels in Sudan. The Union’s aim is to remove Déby from power.

Relations between Sudan and Chad have again deteriorated amid renewed accusations of a proxy war on both sides. The Chadian government claims Sudan is supporting the UFR, and the Sudanese government says Chad supports and protects the Darfur rebel group known as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The AU has expressed serious concern at current tensions. An AU mission chaired by former Burundian president, Pierre Buyoya, visited the region in October and November 2008 at the request of the AU Peace and Security Council in June. It has yet to release its recommendations.

On 17 February the Sudanese government and JEM signed an agreement pledging to resolve the Darfur conflict. The host of the peace talks, Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani, reportedly said the peace negotiations should be broadened to involve an agreement between Sudan and Chad.

The AU-sponsored Dakar Agreement Contact Group, formed in March 2008 to follow up implementation of measures to normalise relations between Chad and Sudan, failed to meet in Khartoum in January. Following its last meeting in N’Djamena on 15 November, the Group indicated a peace and security force of Sudanese and Chadian troops would monitor the common border in January. This deployment appears to have been delayed.

In December 2008, the CAR held an inclusive political dialogue involving all parties, including the ruling administration, rebels, the legal opposition and civil society leaders. In line with the dialogue’s recommendation to appoint a government of national unity, President François Bozizé appointed a new government on 20 January. Lawlessness, impunity and the absence of state authority continue to plague many parts of the country.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- taking up the recommendation by the Sudan sanctions Panel of Experts to include monitoring of the arms embargo within MINURCAT’s mandate;
- adding the names of Sudanese rebel leaders who receive sanctuary in Chad (and possibly their Chadian supporters) to the Sudan sanctions consolidated list;
- welcoming the CAR’s inclusive political dialogue and increasing pressure on the Chadian government, rebels and political opposition to take concrete steps towards a similar all-inclusive dialogue; and
- requesting the Secretary-General to report on the action plans of armed forces party to the conflict in Chad to end the recruitment and use of children, as recommended by the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict in September 2007 and December 2008.

Key Issues
A key practical issue for the Council is that between the UN and the EU a sizeable and capable force is maintained in Chad and CAR during the transition period.

A major humanitarian issue is the continuing lawlessness and decreasing humanitarian space in eastern Chad, the politicisation and militarisation of refugee camps and the limited ability of MINURCAT and the government to protect civilians. Related issues are the delayed deployment of MINURCAT, EUFOR’s limitations in dealing with criminality and banditry, delays in training of the DIS, and the Chadian government’s capacity to improve security. A critical factor is the need to strengthen the rule of law in eastern Chad to support the DIS deployment.

An underlying issue is the deteriorating relationship between Chad and Sudan and the continued proxy war in which each government supports rebels in the other’s country. There is a need for credible border monitoring.
Council Dynamics
The focus of the Council remains on how best to protect civilians and contain the spillover of the Darfur conflict into Chad. Council members unanimously supported a follow-on UN military force to succeed EUFOR in eastern Chad. Despite also authorising a 300-strong UN force in northeastern CAR, several Council members were initially more inclined to accept the Secretary-General’s recommendation that the threat assessment in this region did not warrant such a sizable force.

Despite the strong Council support for political resolution to Sudan’s internal conflicts, there seems to be continued reluctance from the Council to ask Chad to take serious steps to address its internal political problems.

Most members appreciate the seriousness and the interconnected nature of the security situations in both Sudan and Chad. However, few Council members seem ready to advocate for stronger Council leadership on the regional dimension of the issue.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1861 (14 January 2009) renewed MINURCAT’s mandate and authorised the deployment of a military component to replace EUFOR.
- S/RES/1778 (25 September 2007) established MINURCAT and authorised EUFOR.

Latest Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2008/760 (4 December 2008)
- S/2008/532 (7 August 2008) was a report on children and armed conflict in Chad.

Latest Briefings

- S/PV.6042 (12 December 2008) was the meeting to discuss the Secretary-General’s latest report.
- S/PV.6029 (3 December 2008) was a briefing by John Holmes, the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, on the situation in Chad and the Sudan.

Other Relevant Facts

MINURCAT: Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Victor da Silva Angelo (Portugal)

MINURCAT: Size, Composition and Cost
- Authorised strength (commencing of 15 March): 300 police, 25 military liaison officers, 5,200 military personnel and an appropriate number of civilian personnel.
- Strength as of 31 December 2008: 235 police and 44 military observers, 316 international civilian personnel, 183 local civilian staff and 98 UN volunteers
- Main police contributors: Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Benin and France

MINURCAT: Duration
September 2007 to present; mandate expires on 15 March 2010

EUFOR: Size, Composition and Cost
- Expected strength: 3,700 troops and 600 on reserve
- Strength in area of operation as of 28 January: 3,306 troops
- Main contributors: France (1,661), Ireland (446), and Poland (394).
- Cost: €119.6 million

EUFOR: Duration
17 March 2008 to present; mandate expires on 15 March 2009

Lebanon

Expected Council Action
A report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 1701 will be before the Council in March.

A briefing by the Special Coordinator for Lebanon, Michael Williams, is expected. At press time, there were no signs that the Council would take any significant action.

On 1 March the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is scheduled to begin functioning.

Key Recent Developments
Overall, the security situation in south Lebanon has been relatively calm in recent months. It appears that no new threats against UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) have been made.

On 8 and 14 January several rockets were fired from southern Lebanon into Israel. (Apparently UNIFIL and the Lebanese army prevented some other attacks.)

Concerns persisted that the conflict between Hamas and Israel in Gaza might trigger a wider conflict, especially given the presence of armed militants in Lebanon, in particular inside Palestinian refugee camps, who have expressed support for Hamas.

On 21 February Israel fired at least six artillery shells toward Lebanon in response to the firing of two rockets towards Israel which had lightly wounded three Israelis.

On 18 February the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Robert Serry, gave his monthly briefing to the Council on the situation in the Middle East. He said that the crisis in Gaza led to increased tensions in Lebanon although divisions between Fatah and Hamas had not translated into open confrontation. He said Lebanon continued to enjoy relative political stability overall with good implementation of the May 2008 Doha agreement among Lebanese factions which ended the political standoff in Lebanon, despite the likelihood of more political hostilities in the run-up to the 7 June parliamentary elections.

On 16 February Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, said that Hezbollah had the right to acquire air-defence weapons and use them against Israeli warplanes that violate Lebanese air space.

On 14 February demonstrations were held in Beirut on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the killing of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Support for the Special Tribunal was reaffirmed by the US at this occasion.

On 10 February parliamentary elections were held in Israel. The centrist Kadima party headed by Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, won 28 seats in the 120-member parliament, and the right-wing opposition Likud party led by Benjamin Netanyahu, won 27 seats. In light of promises of support from minor parties for Netanyahu,
Israeli President Shimon Peres asked Netanyahu to form a new government. By law, he has 42 days to win parliament’s approval.

In an interview for Lebanese television on 26 January, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said the election of US President Barack Obama raised cautious hopes that a peace settlement could be reached in the Middle East. He added, however, that there was no prospect for indirect peace talks between Syria and Israel after its attack on Gaza and that a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights would be a precondition to any peace settlement. He also expressed readiness to engage in a direct dialogue with the US as long as the US imposed no preconditions.

The progressive reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Syria has continued. Syria accepted Lebanon’s first ambassador ever to Damascus on 27 January. Syria has yet to submit the name of its candidate as ambassador to Beirut. On 20 February, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner voiced concern over the delay.

Positive developments in Lebanon also included further meetings among Lebanon’s main political leaders on 22 December and on 26 January in the context of the Lebanese national dialogue. They continued discussions on Lebanon’s national defence strategy. The next meeting is scheduled for 2 March.

The political situation in Lebanon has been more stable since the formation in July of a unity government in which the Shi’a-led opposition holds veto power, a development that followed 18 months of political standoff. However, there are fears that upcoming legislative elections may reignite tensions between the Sunni-led anti-Syrian coalition led by Saad Hariri and the Hezbollah-led alliance supported by Syria and Iran. The electoral contest is expected to be tight. On 16 January the EU pledged $5.1 million towards ensuring Lebanon’s elections proceed democratically.

Options
If the Council decides to respond to the 1701 report, it could:

- reaffirm the need for full implementation of resolution 1701;
- welcome positive developments in Lebanon, in particular the continuation of the Lebanese dialogue, and encourage further efforts;
- encourage ongoing steps towards normalisation of bilateral diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Syria;
- request Israel to put an end to overflights and to provide maps of cluster munitions in southern Lebanon in application of resolution 1701; and
- encourage a smooth electoral process.

Alternatively, the Council might choose to take no action at this stage and wait for political developments in Israel and in Lebanon, as well as for new US engagement in the region.

Key Issues
Issues include progress with implementation of all elements of resolution 1701. These include status of the Sheb’a Farms and Ghajar village, disarmament of militias, arms smuggling, Lebanon-Syria reestablishment of diplomatic relations, Israel’s air violations of Lebanon’s territorial integrity and Israel’s provision of maps for the location of cluster munitions in southern Lebanon.

Israel continues to raise the issue of arms smuggling across the Syrian-Lebanese border. The firing of rockets from southern Lebanon in January and February seems to confirm the arrival of new weapons in the south, in violation of resolution 1701. A key question is whether to take action. A problem is that in the absence of specific evidence of arms embargo violations, action in the Council will prove difficult.

Israeli overflights are linked to arms smuggling and have also continued unabated. Israel also still has to provide maps of location of cluster munitions in southern Lebanon.

Recent UN attempts to bring Lebanon and Israel together, in particular on the issue of the Israeli occupation of the Sheb’a Farms and Ghajar have not been successful. George Mitchell, the recently appointed US Middle East Envoy, is expected to visit Lebanon soon. A key issue, therefore, is whether the Council will want to wait for diplomatic developments or continue to press for implementation of resolution 1701. The uncertain political situation in Israel signals that any progress on the issues of Ghajar and Sheb’a Farms is unlikely at least until a new government is established.

Council Dynamics
Support for implementation of resolution 1701 remains strong, particularly from the US, which reaffirmed its willingness to see more progress on all aspects of the process. There seems to be, however, less momentum for pushing it via the Council at the moment. Some believe that it may be time for the Council to reaffirm resolution 1701 as the only viable option for a long-term solution. But others tend to prefer a wait-and-see strategy as Syria’s relations with both Israel and the US will be the key to implementing resolution 1701.

The US seems concerned by the rocket incidents in January and may emphasise the necessity for UNIFIL and the Lebanese armed forces to further strengthen their patrolling and to address arms smuggling.

Council members are very supportive of a free and fair electoral process as a guarantee of stability. There is general concern about a possible increase of tensions in the lead-up to parliamentary elections in June.

However, because there is also a sense that the overall situation in Lebanon is improving, there seems to be less appetite for Council action.

Dynamics in the Council on Lebanon have not changed significantly as a result of new Council members. Some members are more concerned with arms smuggling and the lack of progress on disarmament, while other members are inclined to emphasise Israel’s obligations to provide maps of cluster munitions’ location and to end overflights.
UN Documents

Selected Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1832 (27 August 2008) extended the UNIFIL mandate until 31 August 2009.
- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel and for a long-term solution, imposed an arms embargo on Lebanon and authorised a reinforcement of UNIFIL.

Latest Council Presidential Statement on 1701

- S/PRST/2008/8 (15 April 2008)

Latest Secretary-General’s report on 1701

- S/2008/715 (18 November 2008)

Latest Monthly Briefing to the Council on the situation in the Middle East

- S/PV.6084 (18 February 2009)

Latest Letters

- S/2009/76 (5 February 2009) was a letter from Lebanon enclosing a statistical table of the violations committed by Israel by air, sea and land in January.
- S/2009/74 (5 February 2009) was a letter from Lebanon complaining that two Israeli gunboats intercepted a Lebanese Brotherhood Vessel carrying humanitarian aid and medicine while it was in international waters trying to reach Gaza.

Other Relevant Facts

Secretary-General’s Special Coordinator for Lebanon

Michael C. Williams (UK)

UNIFIL Force Commander

Major-General Claudio Graziano (Italy)

Size and Composition of UNIFIL

- Authorised: 15,000 troops
- Current (31 December 2008): 12,435 military personnel, supported by some 317 international civilian and 640 local civilian staff.
- Troop Contributors: Belgium, Brunei, China, Croatia, Cyprus, El Salvador, France, FYR of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, Nepal, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Spain, Tanzania and Turkey.

Cost

1 July 2008 - 30 June 2009: $680.93 million (A/C/5/82/30)

Useful Additional Sources

Nurturing Instability: Lebanon’s Palestinian Refugee Camps, International Crisis Group, Middle East Report N°84, 19 February 2009


Liberia

Expected Council Action

In March, the Council is expected to discuss the Secretary-General’s report on Liberia of 10 February and hear a briefing by Ellen Margrethe Løj, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Progress in meeting key security benchmarks and possible adjustments of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) will be considered. Resolution 1836 renewed the UNMIL mandate until September 2009.

Key Recent Developments

On 19 December resolution 1854 renewed the arms embargo and travel ban for a further 12 months and extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts monitoring implementation of the sanctions regime until 20 December.

In December the Liberia Sanctions Committee removed two further individuals from the travel ban list and assets freeze lists: Jenkins Dunbar (former Liberian minister of lands, mines and energy) and Gus Kuenwenhoven (arms dealer and purveyor of funds to the Charles Taylor regime and close associate of Taylor). It also updated information on others.

On 30 January in the trial in the Special Court for Sierra Leone of former Liberian president Charles Taylor, the prosecution concluded testimony, having called 91 witnesses. Defence testimony is expected to start in April. A verdict is expected in early 2010. The UK has offered to imprison Taylor if he is convicted.

On 9 January, Charles “Chuckie” Taylor, Taylor’s son, was sentenced by a US court to 97 years in prison for torture committed when he was head of a notorious anti-terrorist unit in Liberia during his father’s presidency. It was the first application of a US law known as the extraterritorial torture statute, which allows for the prosecution of US citizens who commit torture overseas.

On 30 November the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia (TRC) published a list of 198 individuals suspected of having committed war crimes and other human rights violations between 1979 and 2003 and called on them to appear before the Commission to respond to the allegations.

Public hearings were extended from December to 15 February to allow more witnesses to testify. Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf testified before the Commission on 12 February, apologising for having supported Taylor’s rebellion against President Samuel Doe before she went into exile.

On 19 December the TRC presented the first of several volumes of its final report, containing findings and determinations made to date. It recommended that individuals and groups found by the TRC responsible for serious crimes, including violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, should be prosecuted in a special criminal court. More detailed recommendations on this court would be included in the final consolidated report to be presented to the Liberian government on 22 June.

The overall security situation in Liberia remained stable but fragile. UNMIL was reconfigured into two sectors, following the withdrawal of one infantry battalion and two sector headquarters in accordance with resolution 1836 which approved a reduction of 1,460 UNMIL troops.

Focus continued on justice sector reform. On 3 December UNMIL released its biannual report on the human rights situation in Liberia. It addressed challenges in the
criminal justice system, in particular the lack of key personnel and inadequate funding for essential rule of law institutions including courts, police and the prison system. It expressed concern about the prevalence of gender-based violence and called on the government to make appointments to the Independent National Commission on Human Rights so it could become operational.

Challenges in security sector reform were also reported by the International Crisis Group in January, which highlighted concerns about ineffectiveness and corruption among the police.

The Secretary General’s report of 10 February, which will be before the Council in March, also noted significant challenges in meeting core security and rule of law benchmarks. It recommended that UNMIL’s strength should be maintained for the remainder of the current mandate. However, the report suggested a further military drawdown of 2,000 by the end of 2010 (i.e. phase three of the drawdown plan) subject to a more detailed assessment on the ground. No significant police reduction was envisaged at this stage.

Key Issues

Security sector reform remains a key issue. While there seems to be agreement that UNMIL’s presence remains crucial in maintaining security, particularly for the presidential and legislative elections in 2011, a key question is how large UNMIL needs to be for this purpose.

Regional issues also remain important. Liberia’s security situation could be cross infected from negative developments in neighbouring countries. The further postponement of elections in Côte d’Ivoire and the recent coup in Guinea are worrying issues in this regard. In addition, destabilising factors such as high youth unemployment, drug trafficking and food insecurity are affecting the whole subregion of West Africa.

Options

The Council could push for a faster drawdown of UNMIL to alleviate pressures from elsewhere on limited peacekeeping resources, but this seems less likely now that the Secretary-General has given his clear recommendation to maintain UNMIL’s strength until September.

Another option would be to endorse his recommendation but also signal that it hopes to see a more aggressive approach to phase three of the drawdown than suggested by the Secretary-General.

Council Dynamics

At press time, Council members were still studying the Secretary-General’s report. In-depth discussions on the recommendations had yet to start. It is unclear whether any members will press for an immediate drawdown. In the past, France has argued for a quicker drawdown but has faced resistance, notably from the US.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1854 (19 December 2008) renewed the arms and travel sanctions for a further 12 months and extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts that monitors implementation of the sanctions regime until 20 December.
- S/RES/1836 (29 September 2008) renewed the UNMIL mandate for 12 months and endorsed the Secretary-General’s recommendations for the mission’s drawdown.
- S/RES/1819 (18 June 2008) requested the Secretary-General to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Liberia until 20 December 2008.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2009/86 (10 February 2009) was the latest UNMIL report.
- S/2007/479 (8 August 2007) was the Secretary-General’s drawdown plan for UNMIL.

Other

- S/2009/47 (22 January 2009) was the letter from the Secretary-General appointing two of the members of the Panel of Experts on Liberia.
- S/2008/785 (30 November 2008) was the latest report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Ellen Margrethe Løj (Denmark)

UNMIL: Size, Composition and Cost

- Strength as of February 2009: 10,764 military and 1,226 police
- Key contributing countries: Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Pakistan
- Cost: 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009: $631.69 million

UNMIL: Duration

September 2003 to present; mandate expires 30 September 2009

Chairman of the Liberia Sanctions Committee

Giadalla Azuz Ettalhi (Libya)

Panel of Experts on Liberia

- Thomas R. Creal (US, expert on finance)
- Wynet V. Smith (Canada, expert on natural resources and coordinator of the Panel)
- A third expert is yet to be appointed

Useful Additional Sources


Iran

Expected Council Action

The prospects of change in US policy on Iran and the possibility of a new diplomatic track on the Iranian nuclear issue suggests that Council involvement in March will be of a technical nature only.

A report and briefing from the chairman of the 1737 Sanctions Committee, Japanese Ambassador Yukio Takasu, are due in March. Discussion of additional sanctions against Iran is not being contemplated at the moment.
Key Recent Developments

Representatives from the E3+3 (France, Germany, UK, China, Russia and the US) met in Wiesbaden, Germany on 4 February to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue. They reaffirmed their commitment to the dual-track approach and emphasised the need to pursue diplomacy. The new US administration’s instinct to engage in direct talks with Iran was encouraged.

Just prior to her confirmation as US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton said that the US administration would conduct a review of its approach to Iran’s nuclear issue. However, no option was taken off the table. She also emphasised that there would be consequences if Iran did not comply with Council resolutions. The new US Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, said on 26 January that President Barack Obama would engage in direct diplomacy with Iran but reminded Tehran to comply with Council demands to suspend uranium enrichment.

On 10 February, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Iran was ready to engage in dialogue with the US in an atmosphere of equality and mutual respect. In recent months, diplomatic efforts have been at a standstill. EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana and Iranian nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, have remained in indirect contact. But they have not met formally since 19 July when they met in Geneva with representatives of the E3+3. The E3+3 “freeze for freeze” proposal made in June 2008, therefore, remains on the table. According to this, Iran would agree not to enrich more uranium, and the Council would not adopt new sanctions against Iran for a transition period, which would allow for pre-negotiations. Formal negotiations would then begin with Iran’s suspension of its sensitive nuclear activities and the Council’s suspension of sanctions.

On 16 December, on the margins of a Council meeting on the Middle East, the E3+3 and seven Arab countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) held a meeting to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue. Solana briefed on recent developments in his contacts with Jalili. The E3+3 and the Arab countries agreed to consult regularly on Iran’s nuclear programme.

In September 2008, the E3+3 introduced resolution 1835 which reaffirmed Iran’s obligation to implement Council and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolutions and the Council’s commitment within the dual-track framework to a negotiated solution to the issue.

Recent IAEA reports on Iran’s compliance with Council resolutions noted that Iran was making significant advances in developing and operating its nuclear centrifuges enriching uranium. The latest report, issued on 19 February, revealed that Iran had produced an additional 209 kilograms of low enriched uranium (LEU) since the previous report was issued in November, bringing the total amount of LEU produced by Iran to approximately 700 kilograms. Some experts such as the Institute for Science and International Security estimate that this is sufficient for the production of enough weapon grade uranium for a single nuclear weapon (other scientists estimate that 900 kilograms or 1,000 kilograms is more realistic). However, Iran would still have to further enrich its LEU stockpile, which could occur quickly. Another finding was that Iran has dramatically increased its installation of centrifuges (now numbering more than 5,400) although the number of centrifuges actually enriching uranium is holding steady at just under 4,000. The reports also said Iran continued to resist efforts to substantively address its alleged nuclear weapons related work and refused to allow the IAEA to visit the Arak heavy-water reactor under construction. Finally, the IAEA reported that it had obtained information about the possibility of Iran drawing on foreign expertise in conducting experiments connected with the initiation of a highly explosive charge suitable for a nuclear weapon.

On 3 February, Iran launched its first satellite, underlining progress towards technology that could be employed for ballistic missiles.

In his briefing to the Council in September, the chairman of the 1737 Sanctions Committee pointed out that there had been reports that two unnamed states may have contravened the export ban on arms and related materiel from Iran. One state later provided assurances that it would continue to fully implement the resolutions on Iran. Another regular briefing was held on 10 December.

A major development was a recent confidential communication by Cyprus to the 1737 Sanctions Committee that a ship coming from Iran and bound for Syria had been detained in Cyprus since 29 January and was inspected following suspicions that it was transporting arms in contravention of resolution 1747. The result of the search was transmitted to the Sanctions Committee but has not been made public. It appears that the ship was not allowed to go back to Iran.

On 3 January Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed concern over reports that Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, had been threatened. Ban called on the Iranian authorities to take immediate measures to ensure her safety.

Options

The Iran nuclear issue is unlikely to be taken up in March. However, one option might be for the Council to signal in a presidential statement its support for a renewed diplomatic process.

If the Sanctions Committee reports that Iran and Syria have violated resolution 1747, an option for the Council would be to invite both countries to a closed Council meeting to respond to the report and thereafter hold a public debate.

Key Issues

The principal issue is whether and when the US administration will engage with Iran and the extent to which it seeks to involve the Security Council in a more positive way with the Iranian issue as opposed to the harsher instrumental role employed in recent years. It seems that the US is aiming to complete its policy review by the second half of March. A key question is whether suspension of uranium enrichment will be an absolute precondition for making progress or whether flexibility will be part of the new approach.
Other key issues are whether the Sanctions Committee will report in March that Iran and Syria have contravened to resolution 1747—revealing that the intercepted Iranian cargo contained weapons or weapons-related material, as some press reports suggest—and whether the Council will want to take action given that the diplomatic track with Iran is considered a priority. There seems to be a lack of appetite for using possible violation of resolution 1747 a basis for new sanctions at this stage, but the issue is what other responses can be developed so that the UN does not seem to be ignoring the issue.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

The Council, and in particular the P5, have been in a wait-and-see mode in recent months, because of uncertainty regarding the policy of the new US administration, but also because of internal divisions on the way forward. France, the UK, Germany and the US remain concerned over the findings of the IAEA suggesting that Iran is progressing on the nuclear path. Meanwhile, Russia and China have continued to emphasise that a peaceful solution to the Iran nuclear issue lies in diplomatic negotiations.

Dynamics on this issue in the Council are likely to be influenced by the new Council members. Turkey seems reluctant to contemplate additional sanctions and Japan believes that transparency in nuclear activities is crucial. Mexico and Austria seem to prioritise the diplomatic track over sanctions.

France and the UK have in the past pushed for additional EU sanctions against Iran as a way to counter the stalled UN process. It seems that both have tried to pass new EU regulations that would prevent Iran from obtaining equipment and technology for its oil industry, ban the operation of two Iranian banks on EU territory and add names to the list of Iranian organisations subject to UN sanctions. Italy and to a lesser extent, Germany, supported such measures, but Austria, Sweden, Cyprus, Greece and Spain have been hesitant, emphasising the need for more dialogue with Iran.

**UN Documents**

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<th>Security Council Resolutions</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1835 (27 September 2008) reaffirmed its commitment to an early negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and called upon Iran to comply with its obligations under previous Council and IAEA resolutions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1803 (3 March 2008) established a travel ban on some individuals already subject to sanctions, added new names to the list of individuals and entities subject to assets freeze, expanded the scope of the embargo on proliferation sensitive items by adding dual-use items and authorised states to inspect Iranian cargoes to and from Iran if there are suspicions that they may transport prohibited items.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1747 (24 March 2007) established a ban on Iran’s arms exports and added names to the list of people and entities subject to assets freeze.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1737 (23 December 2006) banned trade with Iran of certain nuclear proliferation-sensitive items, imposed an asset freeze on a list of persons and entities involved in proliferation-sensitive activities and established a Sanctions Committee.</td>
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<td>• S/RES/1696 (31 July 2006) demanded that Iran implement steps required by the IAEA to reestablish confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme and, in this context, suspend uranium enrichment activities.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latest 1737 Sanctions Committee’s Briefings to the Council</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/PV.6036 (10 December 2008)</td>
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<td>• S/PV.5973 (11 September 2008)</td>
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<th>Latest IAEA Board Resolution</th>
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<tr>
<td>• GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006) underlined necessary steps that Iran should take to reestablish international confidence in its nuclear programme and reported the issue to the Council.</td>
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<td>• GOV/2009/9 (19 February 2009)</td>
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<td>• GOV/2008/59 (19 November 2008)</td>
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<td>• GOV/2008/38 (15 September 2008)</td>
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