**OVERVIEW FOR FEBRUARY**

In February Japan will have the presidency of the Council.

It is unclear whether Japan as president will initiate a special thematic debate. It is perhaps unlikely, but the option is still open.

A session on the Middle East is expected (see our Update Report of 26 January 2009 on Gaza). (Our Special Research Report on the Middle East of 17 December 2007 provides background on the history of Council involvement in the Israeli/Palestine issue.)

Public meetings are also expected on:
- Georgia (to rollover or modify the UNOMIG mandate);
- Timor-Leste (to renew the UNMIT mandate);
- Sudan (in response to Secretariat report);
- Sierra Leone (in response to a Secretariat report); and
- Iraq (in response to Secretariat reports).

In view of recent developments in eastern DRC and Somalia public meetings on these situations are also very likely.

Council discussions are also expected in informal consultations on:
- Middle East (including Gaza) various briefings are possible;
- Myanmar (following a visit to the region by Special Envoy Gambari); and
- Lebanon (relating to the expiry of the UNIFIL mandate).

Ongoing discussions of the review of peacekeeping initiated in January are likely.

Briefings or informal meetings on Zimbabwe may also emerge.

Agreement is also likely on a Council mission to Haiti.

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**Aide-Memoire**

Important matters pending for the Council include:
- The 2005 World Summit requested that the Security Council consider reforms for the Military Staff Committee. This has yet to be addressed.
- In a presidential statement on Darfur in July 2008 (S/PRST/2008/27) the Council welcomed the UN investigation underway into the 8 July attack against UNAMID peacekeepers. The Council is still awaiting the results of this investigation.
- There was no monthly report from the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in November. These reports, which are submitted every month have a significant time-lag. The last one available covers the period 1-31 July 2008.
- In resolution 1327 on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report, S/2000/809), the Council decided to review periodically the implementation of the provisions contained in the resolution’s annex. While no such reviews have occurred in the past four years, in January the Council embarked on an initiative which during the next several months will look at ways of improving Council’s handling of peacekeeping issues.
- The quarterly reports of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan are now routinely outdated when released. (The last report, released in December, covered the period 1 May – 31 July 2008.)
- The next report covering the period 1 August - 30 October 2008 is yet to be released.
- Similarly, UNAMI reports on human rights, which in the past were produced every two to three months, are now usually delayed by several months and are therefore quite outdated. (The last report, released in December, covered the period from 1 January - 30 June 2008.)
- The Council requested the Secretariat on 21 November 2006 (S/2006/928) to update the index to Council notes and statements on working methods. This has not been published.
- On Western Sahara, in April 2008 the Council in resolution 1813 called upon the parties...
to continue negotiations. But there have been no further talks, nor any briefings to the Council on the situation.

- On the DRC, the Council sanctions committee has not acted on individual sanctions under resolutions 1698 and 1807 against armed groups that recruit children and or commit “serious violations of international law involving the targeting of children or women in situations of armed conflict, including killing and maiming, sexual violence, abduction and forced displacement,” respectively, despite MONUC reports about the problems continuing on a serious scale.
- The Secretary-General has yet to put forward proposals for the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in the Sheb’a Farms area, in accordance with resolution 1701, and respond to the cartographic, legal and political implications of the alternative path suggested by the Government of Lebanon in its seven-point plan.
- The Council has yet to address the latest report of the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team, which was issued on 25 August 2008 (S/2008/582).
- The Council is awaiting the Peacebuilding Commission’s response to its May request for advice and recommendations on the situation in the Central African Republic (S/2008/383).
- The Secretariat is yet to report to the Council on Kenya as requested in the 6 February presidential statement (S/PRST/2008/4).

Status Update since our January Forecast

Recent developments on the situations covered in this Forecast are addressed in the relevant briefs. Interesting developments on other issues in the Council during January included:

- **Middle East:** Following Israel’s military intervention in Gaza on 27 December, the Council adopted a press statement on 28 December expressing serious concern at the escalation of the situation and calling for an immediate halt to all violence (SC/9559). On 8 January, the Council adopted resolution 1860 calling for an immediate, durable and fully respected ceasefire leading to the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza. It also condemned violence against civilians and acts of terrorism. On 21 January, following a briefing by the Secretary-General on his recent trip to the region (S/PV.6072), and after a ceasefire was finally secured, the Council adopted another press statement emphasising the need for full implementation of resolution 1860 (SC/9580). For more information, please see our 26 January Update Report on Gaza. On 27 January the Council heard a briefing on the situation in Gaza by Under Secretary-General John Holmes following his visit to the area from 21 to 25 January, and a briefing by UNRWA Commissioner-General Karen Koning Abuzyad (S/PV.6077).

- **Western Sahara:** On 6 January the Secretary-General informed the Council of his intention to appoint Christopher Ross of the United States as his Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, to succeed Peter van Walsum of the Netherlands (S/2009/19).

- **Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict:** On 14 January, the Council held an open debate and heard a briefing by Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes on this issue (S/PV.6066 and resumption 1). Holmes’s remarks focused on the conduct of hostilities and the need for strict compliance with international humanitarian law with particular reference to the situation in Gaza, as well as the DRC, Somalia, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. Forty-nine countries participated in the debate. The Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2009/1) endorsing the revised Aide Memoire on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict that had been drafted by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in consultation with Council members. The first meeting of a Security Council Expert Group on the Protection of Civilians was convened by UK on 16 January. Its establishment was recommended by the Secretary-General in his last report on protection of civilians.

- **Chad/CAR:** On 14 January, the Council adopted resolution 1861 extending the mandate of UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) until 15 March 2010 in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). The resolution also authorised the deployment of a 5,200 strong military component of MINURCAT to follow up EUFOR in both Chad and the CAR after its mandate expires on 15 March 2009.

- **Djibouti/Eritrea:** On 14 January the Council adopted a resolution (S/RES/1862) urging Djibouti and Eritrea to solve their border dispute peacefully and demanding that Eritrea withdraw its forces from the disputed area no later than five weeks from its adoption. It also requested the Secretary-General to report on the situation by 25 February.

- **LRA Affected Areas:** On 16 January, Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes briefed the Council on the humanitarian situation in the areas affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The Council released a press statement (SC/9576) strongly condemning the recent attacks carried out by the LRA which resulted in over 640 dead and over 400 abducted, as well as the displacement of 104,000 people. The Council demanded the LRA cease all attacks on civilians and urged them to surrender, assemble, and disarm, as required by the Final Peace Agreement.

- **UN Office for West Africa:** On 21 January, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), Said Djinnit, briefed the Council on the latest developments and the subregion and introduced the latest report of the Secretary-General on UNOWA (S/2009/29). The report highlighted cross-cutting and cross-border developments in the subregion and the activities the office had undertaken since July 2008. It expressed concern about regional food insecurity, the impact of the global financial crisis, election-related issues, as well as security sector reform, human rights and transitional justice, and the role of law in the West African subregion.

- **Peacekeeping:** January saw the launch of a French-British initiative to improve the handling of peacekeeping issues. On 22 January, Council members participated in an informal seminar on peacekeeping and on 23 January the Council held a public thematic debate (S/PV.6075). During the debate Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain Le Roy said that there was a need to find new and innovative ways to tackle the challenges of modern peacekeeping. Under Secretary-General for Field Support Susana Malcorra noted that there...
was a need to find a more strategic approach and explore more efficient ways of working. A French-British non-paper grouped the main issues into three categories: effective strategic oversight; addressing the resource constraints; and lessons of implementation. Among the other areas raised during the debate was greater involvement of the Council in planning and follow-up; strengthening dialogue with the Secretariat; strengthening military expertise and better management of available resources. Representatives from the troop-contributing countries (TCCs) stressed the importance of triangular consultations involving the Council, the Secretariat and TCCs. The French-British initiative is expected to continue over the next several months with possible outcomes in mid-2009.

■ Nepal: On 23 January, the Council extended the mandate of the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) for another six months at the request of the Nepalese government (S/RES/1864). In adopting resolution 1864 the Council endorsed the Secretary-General’s report which recommended a phased, gradual withdrawal of UNMIN staff and concurred with his view that the current monitoring arrangement could not be maintained indefinitely. On 16 January, the Council heard a briefing from the Secretary-General’s Special Representative Ian Martin (S/PV.6069) and considered the report of the Secretary-General on Nepal (S/2009/1).

■ Côte d’Ivoire: On 27 January, the Council adopted resolution 1865 extending the mandate of UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) for six months. The resolution authorised the reduction of UNOCI’s troop level from 8,115 to 7,450 in line with the Secretary-General’s recommendations and urged the Ivorian political actors to quickly find agreement on a new and realistic time frame for free, open, fair, and transparent elections.

■ International Humanitarian Law: At press time the Council had scheduled a private meeting for 29 January on Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Respect for International Humanitarian Law. This is a French initiative, conceived as a thematic issue rather than with a country-specific focus (and before the violence in Gaza). The meeting will focus on possible measures the Council can consider to more effectively prevent and stop violations of international humanitarian law. The ICRC, OCHA, the UN Office of Legal Affairs, OHCHR and UNHCR have been invited to brief the Council. France has prepared a concept paper for the meeting and has also proposed that the Council might adopt a presidential statement.

■ Subsidiary Bodies—Elections to Fill Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) Vacancies: The Council elected Mexico and Burkina Faso to fill the two vacancies for Council members on the PBC. (At time of writing the official document was not available.)

Security Council Statistics for 2008

In 2008 the total number of Council decisions (resolutions and presidential statements) increased by seven from 2007, i.e. from 106 to 113. The increase in overall Council activity was much more significant. The number of formal meetings increased by 20 percent (from 202 to 243).

There was no major change in the number of reports submitted to the Council by the Secretary-General. The number of press statements also remained at the same level as the year before.

Below is a chart that shows annual Council output as measured by resolutions and presidential statements since 1990. (SCR first published Council statistics in our March 2007 Forecast. Please refer to our website for an analysis of 2006 and 2007 Council output.)

There were significant changes in Council output at the country-specific and thematic levels in 2008, reflecting new developments. The number of decisions on Somalia doubled compared with 2007 as the situation in that country continued to worsen.
new development in the Council was the focus on anti-piracy measures following the surge in piracy off the coast of Somalia. Another important development was the consensus on strengthening the Somalia sanctions regime.

There were five meetings on the situation in Zimbabwe, but the only outcome was a presidential statement. A proposed resolution was vetoed by China and Russia.

There was a significant increase in the number of meetings on Sudan (from 14 to 23). This reflected ongoing concerns about the situation in Sudan but also, in particular, problems with the deployment of the UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

Myanmar continued to be discussed by the Council at about the same level in 2008 as in 2007.

There was a notable increase in decisions on thematic issues. The number of thematic resolutions increased by more than 50 percent compared to 2007 (from five to 12). The 2008 total is therefore closer to that in 2006 when the Council adopted 15 thematic resolutions. There was a new resolution on women, peace and security (sexual violence) and on UN cooperation with regional organisations.

Some of the increase in 2008 can be explained by a doubling of decisions on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda due to technical issues (extension of terms of judges).

The Council also adopted resolutions for the three counter-terrorism committees of the Security Council, extending the mandates of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (for two years), the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team (for 18 months) and the 1540 Committee on weapons of mass destruction and terrorism (for three years). Since these mandates are renewed at different intervals, the number of resolutions will inevitably vary from one year to the next. In 2007 there was only one resolution on counter-terrorism.

There was a marked drop in the number of decisions related to the Middle East, from 15 in 2007 to ten in 2008. On Israel-Palestine, the number of meetings remained the same (a majority being monthly briefings), but the Council remained deeply divided and was unable to respond to specific crises on the ground. However, an important development was the resolution adopted on 16 December in support of the peace process—in effect the adoption 12 months late of a resolution originally envisaged after the conclusion of the Annapolis summit meeting. Another important feature in 2008 was the marked reduction of Council focus on Lebanon. The political crisis was left to players outside the UN and the Council mainly focused on briefings and mandate renewals.

There was a fairly substantial rise in the number of formal Council meetings with no corresponding increase in output. The crisis in Georgia in August is an example. It led to a flurry of dramatic meetings but no outcomes. Zimbabwe, referred to above, was another example.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Expected Council Action

In February the tense security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is expected to be on the Council’s programme of work. The detention of General Laurent Nkunda and the new joint military campaign by DRC and Rwanda forces against the Rwandan Hutu rebel Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda, or FDLR—an armed militia linked to the 1994 Rwandan genocide and responsible for violence in North Kivu—radically changes the dynamics in eastern DRC. It seems likely to raise some new concerns in the Council about the situation, especially about the role of future mediation and in particular about the risks for civilians.

Key Recent Developments

In eastern DRC in January. On 20 January Rwandan troops crossed the border with DRC consent to undertake a joint operation with the DRC forces against the FDLR.

Contrary to resolution 1856 the UN was excluded from the planning and oversight of this operation. On 28 January the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) accepted an invitation to second staff to the headquarters of the operation and announced its willingness to provide other assistance (including monitoring and mentoring) to the joint military operation as well as to help with the reintegration of Nkunda’s Congrès national pour la défense du peuple, or CNDP troops and repatriation to Rwanda of FDLR members.

On 23 January the Rwandan authorities detained Nkunda, the CNDP leader. The DRC immediately requested his extradition on the grounds that Nkunda was Congolese and had committed crimes on DRC territory. There are reports that he has been transferred to DRC custody.

On 27 January the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide briefed the Council in a private discussion following his visit to DRC in late 2008.

On 28 January the French presidency of the Council spoke orally to the media following a briefing by Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet. He said that, while Council members were encouraged by the cooperation between DRC and Rwanda, the protection of civilians was a major issue and they called for respect for international humanitarian law. He also expressed the need for MONUC to be more closely involved in oversight of the operation and envisaged the need for a new wider UN mediation role.

Earlier in January internal divisions in the CNDP emerged. One of its main commanders, Jean-Bosco Ntaganda—an International Criminal Court (ICC) indictee—challenged Nkunda’s continued leadership of the CNDP and defected to cooperate with DRC government forces.

On 15 January the Council was briefed by the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, on the mediation between the Congolese government and the CNDP. Obasanjo had called on members to “use whatever leverage” they had with the Congolese parties to attain a sustainable solution. He noted that immediately before his briefing to the Council both parties had assumed an intransigent stance. It seems the mediation has now been overtaken by the detention of Nkunda and the collapse of his military support.
Obasanjo alerted the Council about the emerging cooperation between DRC and Rwanda. He said that the DRC and Rwanda had agreed on a military plan to put pressure on the FDLR. Council members subsequently met Obasanjo in closed consultations to continue discussion of the recent developments.

In January the DRC situation has also been affected by the continued predation by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the Province Orientale region of the DRC. Joint military operations were carried out by the DRC, South Sudan and Ugandan armies against the LRA. On 16 January the Council issued a press statement strongly condemning the recent LRA attacks. It emphasised that those responsible must be brought to justice. The Secretary-General on 30 December condemned the appalling atrocities and demanded that the LRA respect all rules of international humanitarian law.

Hearings were held from 12 to 15 January by ICC judges on charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes against former Congolese rebel warlord Jean-Pierre Bemba. Bemba had been arrested in May 2008 on a warrant from the ICC on charges relating to the period between 2002 and 2003 when former President Ange-Felix Patasse of the Central African Republic, requested Bemba’s Congolese Liberation Movement to assist him suppress coup attempts in his country. Bemba joined Thomas Lubanga, a former Congolese militia leader and two other alleged Congolese warlords also indicted by the ICC. The trial of Lubanga opened on 26 January 2009. He is accused of recruiting child soldiers and is the first defendant to appear before the ICC since its inception.

Key Issues

One issue for the Council is whether recent developments might open the way to a durable closure to the cycle of violence involving the Congolese army, CNDF/FDLR, pro-government militias and regional actors which is estimated to have killed thousands and displaced over a million people between 2006 and 2009.

A second alternative is whether, to the contrary, the use of military force in the joint DRC/Rwanda military operation against the FDLR will stall (as the joint operation against the militarily much weaker LRA has stalled) and inevitably result in renewed attacks against civilians or even ethnically inspired violence against FDLR supporters among the Hutu minority in eastern DRC. (In this context further input from the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Francis Deng, could add value.)

A third issue is how much leverage the Council has lost—given the initial decision by Rwanda and the DRC to marginalise the UN. The exclusion of MONUC from the planning of joint operations between DRC and Rwanda against the FDLR was seen as directly contravening the provisions of resolution 1856 and it raises yet another complicating factor.

A fourth issue is what the future role for mediation efforts by Special Envoy Obasanjo is and whether the joint military operation should be urgently supplemented by a renewed and comprehensive plan to resolve the FDLR problem peacefully.

A fifth question is whether it any longer makes sense to try to get additional UN troops on the ground. The problems addressed in resolution 1856, including the protection of civilians could become less acute if the joint operation by DRC and Rwanda is quick and successful. But equally if the operation is paralysed, risks for civilians will reemerge. However, the role of the MONUC protection mandate becomes much more problematic if it is seeking to protect civilians against the joint strength of the DRC and Rwandan armies. Monitoring and mentoring may help, but a key issue is whether the Council can devise a more vigorous way to back this up.

A final issue is how the Council should act, in a prevention mode, so as to avoid a possible humanitarian disaster in the wake of clashes between the DRC-Rwanda joint forces and the FDLR. (The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has expressed concern about possible massive civilian displacements that might be caused by intensive military operations.)

Options

Options for the Council in February include:

- adopt an essentially passive strategy and await further developments; or
- adopt an active strategy by:
  1. welcoming the detention of Nkunda, noting the importance of rule of law issues relating to him personally, but also demanding that all those charged with serious crimes (e.g. Ntaganda) be detained as well;
  2. calling attention to risks associated with the military option chosen by Rwanda and DRC, including for the fragile humanitarian situation, and the critical need for protection of civilians;
  3. convening a private meeting with the DRC and Rwanda to listen directly to their positions but also to lay out a clear Council expectation that they ensure protection of civilians and respect for international humanitarian law;
  4. calling for the opening of a parallel track offering peaceful alternatives including fair treatment for FDLR members accused of atrocities, serious incentives for other FDLR supporters and offering a Council leadership role in this regard;
  5. sending a small urgent Council mission to the region to regain Council leverage and leadership and report back to the Council with options for demobilisation and repatriation strategies for FDLR supporters and associated civilians;
  6. requesting the Secretary-General to immediately readjust the Obasanjo

Developments in the Sanctions Committee

On 22 December the Council adopted resolution 1857 renewing the DRC sanctions (i.e. weapons restrictions, assets freeze and travel ban) and the mandate of the Group of Experts until 30 November 2009. It introduced two new categories:

- individuals obstructing access to or distribution of humanitarian assistance in eastern DRC; and
- individuals or entities supporting illegal armed groups in the eastern DRC through illicit trade of natural resources.
mandate to address the full spectrum of community reconciliation issues in eastern DRC and provide support for the Security Council leadership; and (vii) noting with concern the exclusion of MONUC from the planning of joint military operations by DRC and Rwanda against the FDLR and non-compliance with resolution 1856 and insisting that MONUC observers be given comprehensive access to operations in the field.

**Council Dynamics**

While Council members were initially encouraged by signs of increasing cooperation between the DRC and Rwanda, the detention of Nkunda and the joint operation against the FDLR have added a completely new dimension to the equation. Also the fact that the joint operations were planned and carried out without the participation of MONUC as required by the Council’s 22 December resolution 1856 is seen by some members as constituting a new and worrying dynamic in the region, bypassing the UN.

In light of these developments, Council members initially preferred to wait and see the unfolding of events. It seems at time of writing that this approach may not continue as evidenced by the press comments by the French presidency of the Council on 28 January.

The pace at which significant events are unfolding on the ground could prompt Council action, especially with regard to concerns about the humanitarian implications.

France is the lead country on this issue in the Council.

### UN Documents

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1843 (20 November 2008) authorised the temporary deployment of additional troops to reinforce MONUC’s capacity.
- S/RES/1807 (31 March 2008) lifted the arms embargo for government forces, strengthened measures related to aviation and customs.
- S/RES/1698 (31 July 2006), 1649 (21 December 2005) and 1596 (18 April 2005) strengthened sanctions, including, in resolution 1698, provisions against actors recruiting and using children in armed conflict in the DRC.
- S/RES/1596 (18 April 2005) and 1596 (18 April 2005) strengthened sanctions, including, in resolution 1698, provisions against actors recruiting and using children in armed conflict in the DRC.
- S/2008/791 (15 December 2008) was the resolution adopted by the Special Session of the Human Rights Council.

**Latest Presidential Statements**

- S/PRST/2008/48 (22 December 2008) welcomed regional efforts to address the security threat posed by LRA.
- S/PRST/2008/40 (29 October 2008) condemned the rebel CNDP offensive in the eastern region of the DRC and noted the request for reinforcement of MONUC.
- S/PRST/2008/38 (30 September 2008) expressed concern about the resurgence of violence in the eastern parts of the DRC, requested a comprehensive analysis of the situation.

**Latest Secretary-General’s Report**

- S/2008/728 (18 November 2008) was the fourth special report on the DRC.

**Selected Sanctions Committee Document**

- S/2008/773 (12 December 2008) was the latest report of the Group of Experts for the DRC.

**Other**

- SC/9576 (16 January 2009) was the statement of the Security Council expressing concern about LRA activities.
- SG/SM/1/2029 (30 December 2008) was the Secretary-General’s press statement on the LRA.
- S/2008/791 (15 December 2008) was the response from Rwanda to the accusations of the Group of Experts for the DRC.
- S-8/1 (1 December 2008) was the resolution adopted by the Special Session of the Human Rights Council.

### Other Relevant Facts

**Chairman of the DRC Sanctions Committee**

Ambassador Baki Ilkin (Turkey)

**Group of Experts**

- Sergio Finardi (Italy, aviation expert)
- Jason Stearns (USA, regional expert and coordinator of the Group)
- Mouctar Kokouma Diallo (Guinea, customs expert)
- Peter Danssaert (Belgium, arms expert)
- Dinesh Mahtani (UK, finance expert)

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission**

Alan Doss (UK)

**MONUC Interim Force Commander**

Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye (Senegal)

**Size, Composition and Cost of Mission**

- Strength as of 30 November 2009: 16,587 troops, 718 military observers, 1,079 police, 934 international civilian personnel and 2,183 local civilian staff, 591 UN volunteers.
- Approved budget (1 July 2008 - 30 June 2009): $1,242.73 million

**Duration**

30 November 1999 to present; mandate expires on 31 December 2009.

### Useful Additional Resource

**Conflict Risk Alert: DR Congo**, International Crisis Group, 27 January 2009

### Sudan/Darfur

**Expected Council Action**

Consultations in the Council on the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) are expected in February. The Under Secretary-General for the Department of Field Support, Susana Malcorra, and the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Alain Le Roy, are likely to brief the Council. A briefing by the Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator Djibrill Bassolé is possible. The UNAMID mandate expires on 31 July.

The Secretary-General’s quarterly report on the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) is also expected to be discussed in early February. Please see our January Forecast for details.
International Criminal Court (ICC) judges returned on 5 January from a month-long judicial recess and are expected to rule shortly on the prosecutor’s application to issue an arrest warrant against Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir.

Key Recent Developments
The situation in Darfur remains dire, with more than 2.5 million people living in internally displaced person (IDP) camps dependent on humanitarian assistance. Attacks against aid workers and their property reached unprecedented levels in 2008. These attacks were mainly attributed to rebel movements, but many incidents also occurred in areas under government control.

UNAMID has now lost 22 personnel, including a peacekeeper that died on 29 December. Violence and ongoing clashes continue to limit UNAMID and humanitarian access to affected populations.

Despite the unilateral declaration of a cease-fire on 12 November by the Government of Sudan, bombing attacks against rebels continue. In his briefing to the Council on 19 December, Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Alain Le Roy, said south and north Darfur had been bombed by the government in late November. After weeks of relative calm the Sudanese army bombed Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) positions in the Muhajeriya area of south Darfur on 13 January. Ground fighting between JEM forces and the government-backed faction of the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement led by Minni Minnawi (SLA/M) was also reported in the area, which hosts a civilian population of 30,000. On 18 January, JEM reportedly took full control of Muhajeriya, SLA/M’s former stronghold. Further government bombing was reported on 24 January. UNAMID reported 3,000 newly displaced as a result of the fighting. Clashes were also reported between the government and rebels on the outskirts of El Fasher in north Darfur on 26 January. Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet briefed the Council on the two situations in closed consultations on 28 January. The Council condemned the increased military activities and called on all parties to cease hostilities. In addition to clashes between the government and rebels, inter-ethnic fighting in other parts of south Darfur has resulted in hundreds of deaths since early December and the displacement of thousands of civilians.

On 23 January, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and UNAMID issued a report concluding that Sudanese security forces had violated international human rights law in the August attack on Kalma IDP camp. The report found 33 IDPs were killed and at least 108 injured after lethal force was used in an unnecessary and disproportionate manner.

As of 31 December, approximately 58 percent of UNAMID uniformed personnel comprising 12,374 military personnel and 2,803 police had deployed. Contributing forces’ lack of essential equipment and their need for additional training continues to impede the full deployment of UNAMID. On 5 January, the US government announced support to airlift equipment and vehicles into Darfur. The operation commenced on 14 January with the transportation of Rwandan equipment. On 20 January, the third meeting of the tripartite coordinating mechanism on UNAMID met to resolve key issues relating to its deployment. During the meeting, a memorandum of understanding on air operations was signed by the Sudanese government and UNAMID to further facilitate the airlift component of the deployment.

On 14 January, the African-Arab Ministerial Committee on Peace in Darfur met in Qatar to discuss peace negotiations in Darfur. Co-chaired by the Qatari Prime Minister, the AU Chair and the Arab League Secretary-General, the Committee included Saudi Arabia, Libya, Algeria, Syria, Egypt, Morocco, Tanzania, South Africa, Nigeria, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Senegal and Burkina Faso. It was formed in September to organise and sponsor peace negotiations between the Sudanese government and rebels. The Committee agreed to send a delegation to New York to mobilise international support for the peace process in Darfur and to seek a referral from the Security Council of ICC proceedings related to Sudan. The committee stressed the mediation efforts of Qatar and AU-UN Chief Mediator Djibril Bassolé who was also in Qatar. On 11 January two Sudanese civil society groups submitted an application to the ICC requesting that no arrest warrants be issued on Darfur-related cases. The application argued the warrants would have a detrimental impact on peace in Sudan.

Progress on peace negotiations continues to be slow and the pending decision by the ICC on Bashir may be a factor. JEM military commander Suleiman Sandal reportedly said JEM would mark the ICC indictment of Bashir with some form of action. The Sudanese government has accused JEM of building up forces in Chad, ready for an attack should Bashir be indicted. Representatives of the Sudan Liberation Movement met in Switzerland from 14-24 December to discuss the peace process in Darfur. Participants reportedly insisted that disarmament of Janjaweed militias and the expulsion of new settlers from Darfur were indispensable preconditions before any talks with the government.

Key Issues
A key issue is the outcome of the decision of the ICC. Related issues include:
- ensuring, regardless of the ICC decision, that Khartoum continues to implement commitments made in October to expedite the deployment of UNAMID;
- salvaging momentum towards a political solution in Darfur; and
- recommitment to implementing the north-south peace agreement.

A second issue is whether the Council can better use the current moment to put pressure on the regime in Khartoum to secure change in relation to Darfur that several members of the Council have been demanding.

Should an arrest warrant be issued, key issues could arise for foreigners’ safety and on how to deter opposition groups from exploiting the situation.

Another issue which is likely to have a major impact on the Council’s handling of Sudan is the approach by the new US administration, which at the time of writing was unclear.
Underlying all of the above issues is the need for a new framework to reenergize substantive and more united rebel participation. A question for the Council is what it can do to encourage this. In this regard, a possible issue being raised is whether the 14 January statement from the African-Arab Ministerial Committee (co-chaired by Qatar) calling for the invocation of an article 16 will have an adverse effect on Qatar’s acceptance by the rebels as a neutral sponsor of the peace talks.

Another key issue is UNAMID’s continued lack of critical resources and its inability to deter the ongoing high levels of attacks against humanitarian personnel and IDP and refugee camps.

**Options**

In light of the pending ICC announcement, one option is for the Council to adopt a wait-and-see approach on all Darfur issues.

An alternative option is a more proactive approach designed to head off as far as possible some of the risks and prepare the ground for a more active role in the coming months. It could, for instance:

- request the AU Peace and Security Council to provide updated details of its 21 July proposal to set up an independent panel to examine the Darfur situation and submit recommendations on handling issues of accountability and combating impunity;
- request a report on the range of actions or options Sudan would need to take to meet the complementary principle under the Rome Statute;
- announce its intention to consider, if the situation deteriorates, a balanced package of targeted sanctions against spoilers of the peace process and against persons or groups protecting ICC indictees;
- increase pressure on the parties that continue to resist participating in peace negotiations;
- set a timeframe for the investigation on the 8 July attacks against UNAMID (about which the Council said it was determined to take action);
- consider the establishment of UN mentoring teams within UNAMID and UN Mission in Central African Republic and Chad to train and assist the Sudan/Chad joint border monitoring force (once established) in policing the arms embargo; and
- request the Secretariat include in future reports to the Council comprehensive benchmarks of performance over time by Khartoum, rebel groups and other key stakeholders in terms of pledges made and the status of their implementation.

**Council Dynamics**

There is consensus in the Council that a political solution to the conflict in Darfur is the key to unlocking a solution to the crisis. But there remains a division on the sequencing of peace and justice.

On deferring ICC proceedings, divisions among the P5 appear unchanged, with the US, UK and France unsatisfied that Khartoum has taken tangible concrete steps to warrant a deferral. It remains to be seen whether any initiatives arising from the proposed Qatar-led AU/Arab League Ministerial delegation to New York, or perhaps arising out of the AU summit in late January, will influence the Council on this issue.

Also, it remains to be seen how the new US administration will pursue Sudan issues. During her confirmation hearing as Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton said the Obama administration was reviewing US policy toward Darfur. She also said that while she agreed with the existing US policy of accelerating the full deployment of UNAMID, she was considering other options including a no-fly zone and further sanctions. Susan Rice, the new US Permanent Representative to the UN, mentioned Sudan several times during her hearing, including the need for “much more effective action” against the “ongoing genocide in Sudan”.

Russia has recently appointed a special envoy to Sudan. It seems likely that Russia will play a more active role on Sudan issues in the future.

**UN Documents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Security Council Resolutions</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1828 (31 July 2008) renewed UNAMID.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Selected Reports**

- S/2008/840 (31 December 2008) was the annual report of the 1591 Committee.
- S/2008/781 (12 December 2008) was the latest UNAMID report.
- S/2008/647 (11 November 2008) was the final report of the Panel of Experts.

**Selected Council Meeting Records**

- S/PV.6054 (19 December 2008) was the latest UNAMID briefing.
- S/PV.6043 (15 December 2008) contains the briefing by the Chairman of the Sudan Sanctions Committee.
- S/PV.6029 (3 December 2008) was a briefing by Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes.

**Other Relevant Facts**

- **UNAMID: Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur**
  - Rodolphe Adada (Republic of Congo)
- **Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator**
  - Djibrill Yipènè Bassolé (Burkina Faso)
- **UNAMID: Size, Composition and Cost**
  - Maximum authorised strength: up to 19,555 military personnel, 3,772 police and 19 formed police units (total police 6,432)
  - Strength as of 31 December 2008: 12,374 military personnel and 2,803 police
  - Main troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt and Ethiopia
  - Cost: 1 July 2008-30 June 2009: $1.5 billion

**UNAMID: Duration**

31 July 2007 to present; mandate expires 31 July 2009
**Somalia**

**Expected Council Action**
The Council expects to receive an initial report from the Secretary-General by 30 January on measures to strengthen the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) as requested in resolution 1863 of 16 January. In February the Council is likely to receive a more comprehensive report and briefing. The Secretary-General’s reporting will likely draw on the findings of a joint UN technical assessment mission (composed of experts from the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Political Affairs and Field Support) that was dispatched to the Horn of Africa on 12 January to explore how the UN can support AMISOM and to hold consultations on assistance to Somalia’s transitional security forces.

**Key Recent Developments**
The Council has recently adopted two resolutions on counter-piracy measures, renewing on 2 December the provision in resolution 1816 authorising states and regional organisations to enter Somalia’s territorial waters to combat piracy for 12 months and expanding it on 16 December to include operations on land. (For more details, please see our December 2008 and January 2009 Forecasts.)

On 14 January, the US convened the first meeting of the International Contact Group on Piracy off the coast of Somalia, responding to the Council’s call for more international cooperation. The group said it would regularly inform the Council of its activities. It will also consider establishing a centre in the region to coordinate information on Somali piracy.

The key focus more recently, however, was the possibility of authorising a peacekeeping force for Somalia. No agreement could be reached on the issue of deploying a coalition military force to impose security as no country responded to the Secretary-General’s request for contributions to such a coalition. In a letter dated 19 December the Secretary-General outlined alternative proposals on how to address security challenges in Somalia, including reinforcing AMISOM, building Somali capacity and establishing a maritime task force.

On 22 December, the African Union extended AMISOM’s mandate but only until 16 March, signaling once again that the mission was only intended as a temporary measure. It reiterated its request to the Council for an international stabilisation force for Somalia to be followed by a UN peacekeeping operation and called for an AMISOM support package as proposed by the Secretary-General.

At the end of December, the US pushed for authorisation of a UN peacekeeping operation but failed to gain sufficient support. As a compromise, the Council on 16 January adopted resolution 1863, essentially deferring this issue. It expressed its intention to establish a UN peacekeeping operation by 1 June and in the short term it renewed AMISOM’s authorisation for up to six months and decided that UN resources should be made available to AMISOM. (This is similar to the support packages which had previously been made available to the AU mission in Sudan.)

There were several significant political developments. On 25 November the parties to the Djibouti Agreement, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS), agreed on a power sharing proposal envisaging establishment of a national unity government within two months, enlargement of parliament from 275 to 550 members (200 seats reserved for ARS and 75 for civil society groups and the diaspora) and presidential elections in January. It was agreed to extend the transitional period (defined by the Transitional Federal Charter of the Somali Republic) by two years.

Somalia’s then-President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed rejected the proposal, widening the rift with Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein following their disagreement over a new cabinet. On 14 December, Yusuf tried to sack the prime minister. However, the Somali parliament overwhelmingly voted (143 out of 170 legislators) to reinstate him. In spite of the vote, the president named former interior minister Mohamed Mohamud Guled as prime minister. Increasingly isolated and facing growing international criticism, Yusuf resigned on 29 December. This was hailed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, as a “patriotic and courageous decision”. In accordance with the transitional charter the speaker of parliament, Sheikh Adan Madobe, was named interim president.

Yusuf’s resignation was widely seen as a window of opportunity for the political process. However, new divisions over electing a new president quickly emerged, this time between Hussein and Madobe. Madobe argued for elections to be held in Baidoa with the existing composition of parliament whereas Hussein and Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (chairman of ARS) wanted the president elected by the enlarged parliament envisaged by the power-sharing agreement, to be seated in Djibouti. Madobe apparently changed his position, and on 26 January, at a meeting held in Djibouti, the parliament approved the enlargement. More than a dozen candidates, including Hussein and Sharif, had announced their intention to seek the presidency. At press time it was still unclear whether the elections would be held within the thirty days from Yusuf’s resignation as required by the transitional charter.

Another significant development was Ethiopia’s troop withdrawal. The last Ethiopian soldiers reportedly left Somalia on 26 January. There were conflicting reports about the impact on security. In a press statement on 16 January, AMISOM said that bases vacated by the Ethiopians in Mogadishu had been taken over by TFG and ARS forces and not by insurgents as reported in the media. On 26 January there were reports that the Islamist insurgent group Al-Shabaab had taken over control of Baidoa, the seat of the Somali parliament, after Ethiopian forces left the city.

**Key Issues**
Developments in the security situation will remain a key issue. It may be too early to tell whether the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops will strengthen or weaken Al-Shabaab, which has been fighting the Ethiopians.
Al-Shabaab has reportedly said that they will now target AMISOM forces (already, there are reports of attacks) and will fight as long as foreign troops remain in Somalia.

The political process is the other key issue. Election of a new president and implementation of the power-sharing agreement could provide the basis for a more unified, inclusive and effective political leadership necessary to improve the security situation. But the new power structures can be effective only if they are generally inclusive. A critical question, therefore, is whether groups that have so far rejected the Djibouti Agreement will join the process. There were reports in January that Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed met secretly with Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, the leader of the Asmara-based ARS faction which has rejected the agreement. It remains to be seen whether this could be a first step towards reconciliation.

Implementation of the Council’s recent decision to strengthen AMISOM and support for Somali capacity building to improve security will also be a focus for the Council. This will largely depend on the capacity of the UN to move quickly on the financial and logistical issues to get resources to the African troop contributors. There are already signs that some members of the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee, which must approve the expenditures, are unhappy with the Council decision.

The Council request to the Secretary-General for further recommendations on a possible mandate for a UN peacekeeping force is also an issue. In resolution 1863 the Council identified as possible elements: facilitation of humanitarian assistance, providing security for the political process, ceasefire monitoring, security for UN personnel and assisting Somali security forces. Protection of civilians was notably absent, although many reports confirm this is a key issue (including the briefing by Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes to the Council on 14 January).

Impunity was briefly referred to in the pre-amble of resolution 1863. Many Somalis seem to see absence of justice as an obstacle to peace. It is being addressed under the Djibouti Agreement where the possibility of a commission of inquiry and an international court has been discussed. A Human Rights Watch report issued on 8 December detailed crimes and human rights abuses committed by all sides in the conflict and called on the Council to establish an independent commission of inquiry to investigate serious crimes committed in Somalia.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- deciding that pending UN assistance packages being available, its members in their national capacities will demonstrate support to resolution 1863 politically, logistically and financially;
- establishing in the Somalia Sanctions Committee the list of individuals and entities to be targeted by sanctions and reviewing the recommendations of the latest report from the Monitoring Group; and
- announcing an intention, as the Djibouti Agreement process develops, to assist as appropriate in establishing an independent commission of inquiry to investigate serious crimes committed in Somalia.

Council Dynamics
The issue of a possible UN peacekeeping operation for Somalia came to a head in late December after the Secretary-General concluded that a multinational force was not an option in the absence of pledges. The US and UK introduced competing draft resolutions. The US proposal was to extend the authorisation of AMISOM until 1 June and establish a UN peacekeeping operation on that same date. The UK proposal, on the other hand, put more emphasis on strengthening AMISOM and expressed only the Council’s willingness to consider establishing a peacekeeping operation to take over from AMISOM without specifying any date for further action.

The US proposal was supported by China, Viet Nam and African members, but met strong opposition from European members and Russia. UK and France reiterated their argument that there must be further progress in the peace process and improved security before the Council authorised a peacekeeping operation. This forced the US to give up its attempt to have the resolution adopted in December and to reach a compromise in January on resolution 1863.

Japan, an incoming member, expressed reservations about the assessed funding implications of the proposed support package for AMISOM but joined the consensus. It is likely to remain concerned about the budgetary impact.

The US approach under the new administration remains to be seen. The new US ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, reportedly said during her senate confirmation hearing that she was “skeptical about the wisdom” of establishing a UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia under the current circumstances.

UN Documents

- S/RES/1863 (16 January 2009) renewed authorisation of AMISOM for up to six months, approved using UN resources to strengthen AMISOM, and expressed the Council’s intention to establish a UN peacekeeping operation by 1 June 2009.
- S/RES/1853 (19 December 2008) renewed the mandate of the Monitoring Group for 12 months.
- S/RES/1851 (16 December 2008) expanded the anti-piracy authorisation to include action on land in Somalia and called for enhanced coordination.

Selected Presidential Statement


Selected Report of the Secretary-General

- S/2008/709 (17 November 2008) was the most recent report.
Zimbabwe

Expected Council Action
In February, Council members are expected to be monitoring the political situation and humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe closely. It is unclear whether or when this might evolve into more concrete discussions.

Key Recent Developments
Zimbabwe has remained in the grip of a deteriorating humanitarian and political crisis since March, when the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) won a majority of parliamentary seats from President Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union—Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF) party, and MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai won the first round of presidential elections. Tsvangirai did not contest the June run-off election, however, citing state orchestrated violence against his supporters. A power-sharing agreement brokered in September by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) remains unimplemented due to a political stalemate over control of key ministries.

Tsvangirai returned to Zimbabwe on 17 January in a fresh attempt to end the political crisis. However, the negotiations failed to produce a breakthrough and consideration was deferred to a SADC meeting on 26 January. That meeting concluded with two seemingly opposing statements on its outcome. While SADC’s communiqué indicated that the MDC had agreed to a timeline to form a unity government with Zanu-PF a subsequent MDC statement said that the party had not acceded to the timeline but stopped short of rejecting SADC’s conclusions outright. The MDC indicated that it would define its position by the close of that week. At press time this had not been made public. The sticking point still revolves around the distribution of government posts. The MDC feels it could be marginalised if it accepts a junior partner role hence its insistence that it should administer the home affairs ministry, which has oversight of the police, if the Zanu-PF retains control over the departments of national security and defence.

The gravity of the political stalemate was underlined by the collapse in recent months of the health, water and sanitation systems. A consequence was the onset of a cholera epidemic that since August has claimed more than 2,800 lives. The World Health Organization indicated that more than 50,000 people have been infected. Over 1,500 new cases emerge daily. An emergency report issued by Physicians for Human Rights in January described the health situation as a man made disaster, placed the blame on the Mugabe regime and called for urgent intervention by the UN and Zimbabwe’s neighbours to stem the loss of life.

Reports by leading international rights advocacy organisations like Human Rights Watch have indicated that repression of supporters of the opposition, human rights advocates and health workers—including those involved in fighting the cholera epidemic—has been rife.

On 22 November, the Zimbabwean government refused to issue entry visas to “Global Elders”, including former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, former US President Jimmy Carter and Graça Machel, former first lady of South Africa and Mozambique. The three had said they were interested only in humanitarian and not political issues. Annan subsequently said that the situation in Zimbabwe was far worse than he had originally thought and said a tougher stance was needed to be taken to end the political deadlock in the country.

On 15 December, the Council held a high-level closed formal meeting to consider the situation in Zimbabwe. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and British Foreign Secretary David Miliband were present. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon briefly on developments in the country and reportedly described the situation as a failure of the leadership in Zimbabwe to address the political, economic, human rights and humanitarian crises. He indicated that Mugabe had not been forthcoming about UN direct involvement in mediation during his last meeting with him in Doha in late November. However, Mugabe had subsequently agreed to allow Assistant Secretary-General Haile Menkerios to visit the country. (Menkerios privately briefed the Council on the situation in Zimbabwe on 20 November.)
Council members apparently discussed the need to accelerate appropriate humanitarian relief and the importance of additional effort being made by the region to end the political crisis. No formal Council decisions were taken.

During a press conference on 17 December Ban called for better and quicker results from the SADC mediation in the Zimbabwe crisis.

**Key Issues**
The key issue for the Council is whether the SADC input will be accepted or whether that process has now reached the end. A related issue is whether the Council can now help resolve the political stalemate quickly and in a sustainable way restore the consensus in the Council in June 2008 when there was a Council decision in presidential statement S/PRST/2008/23.

**Options**
If the stalemate continues, options could include:
- convening a closed Council meeting and inviting SADC members to participate in it with the intention to review developments before moving to a more decisive phase;
- sending a Council mission to meet with selected SADC leaders;
- adopting a presidential statement similar in tone to that of the June 2008 presidential statement;
- adopting a resolution condemning continued repression in Zimbabwe, expressing concern about the impact of the situation in Zimbabwe on peace and security in the region, and calling for an urgent resolution of the crisis in Zimbabwe;
- revisiting the July 2008 discussions of sanctions against Zimbabwe leadership in light of the much worsened situation in Zimbabwe but perhaps adopting a sequenced approach under which sanctions would only come into effect if specific benchmarks were not met;
- continuing formal and informal discussions on Zimbabwe but delaying a related formal statement until consensus is attained on how the Council should address the situation; and
- deciding to keep the issue under review and requesting further briefings in the weeks ahead.

**Council Dynamics**
Council dynamics have undergone a fundamental shift from an initial lack of consensus when the Council first considered the situation in 2005 to that of an agreement on formal inclusion of Zimbabwe on the Council’s agenda in 2008, (albeit under the generic title “peace and security in Africa”). In June 2008 there was consensus on adopting a presidential statement. In July the consensus broke down and the Council failed to adopt a sanctions resolution.

Resistance to sanctions against Zimbabwe in the Council came from most of the Non-Aligned Movement group members but also from Russia and China. They argued that the political and humanitarian developments in the country were essentially internal in nature and thus not suitable for discussion in the Council.

In June 2008, three key factors contributed to the Council’s collective willingness to take up the situation:
- the heightened level of political violence and dire humanitarian situation;
- xenophobic attacks on refugees, including many Zimbabweans, in South Africa; and
- the 16 April call by eight Council members (Belgium, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Italy, Panama, the UK and the US) expressing concern about the situation in Zimbabwe and calling for free and fair elections during the high-level debate in the Council on peace and security in Africa.

When the Council on 11 July failed to adopt a draft sanctions resolution against certain individuals responsible for the political violence in Zimbabwe, Belgium, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Italy, Panama, UK and US voted in the affirmative. China, Viet Nam, Libya and South Africa voted against the draft text, with Indonesia abstaining. Burkina Faso’s affirmative vote was noteworthy. It represented a change in position from African Council members’ traditional low-key stance of deferring to SADC mediation efforts.

During the period of negotiations over the implementation of the power sharing agreement there has been a willingness to keep the issue under review, and the Council has had briefings in private consultations by the Secretariat. However, there is still caution as to how to respond to developments in Zimbabwe in the wake of the failed attempt at adopting a sanctions resolution.

In December, members were comfortable with focusing on the deteriorating humanitarian situation and the need to end the stalemate in the political process. China and Russia, in a departure from past positions, reportedly did not insist that the situation in Zimbabwe was a purely internal political matter. The obvious security implications of a spill-over effect on neighbouring countries if the power sharing agreement collapses seems to be having an impact on the Council again. Council members are apparently closely following the African Union’s deliberations on Zimbabwe during its summit in Addis Ababa from 26 January to 3 February.

It remains to be seen how the five new non-permanent countries on the Council (Austria, Japan, Mexico, Turkey and Uganda) will affect the dynamics. Uganda has indicated that it supports the AU’s position on Zimbabwe, highlighting the role of SADC. It appears that Austria, Japan and Mexico might prefer a more proactive role for the Council. The position of the new US administration will also likely play a role in changing the dynamics on the Council.

**UN Documents**

**Presidential Statement**
- S/PRST/2008/23 (23 June 2008) was the Council presidential statement on the situation in Zimbabwe.

**Letters**
- S/2008/407 (18 June 2008) was the letter from Belgium’s permanent representative addressed to the Council president, requesting a briefing on Zimbabwe.
- S/2005/490 (26 July 2005) was the letter from the permanent representatives of Australia, Canada and New
Zealand addressed to the Council president expressing concern with “the growing humanitarian and human rights crisis in Zimbabwe”.

• S/2005/489 (26 July 2005) was the letter from the British permanent representative addressed to the Council president confirming the request made in S/2005/485 to discuss issues of human settlements in Zimbabwe.

• S/2005/485 (26 July 2005) was the letter from the British permanent representative addressed to the Council president requesting a meeting to discuss human settlements.

**Meeting Records**

- S/PV.6044 (15 December 2008) was the official communiqué of the 6044th closed meeting of the Council.
- S/PV.5921 (23 June 2008) was the verbatim record of the 5921st meeting of Security Council.
- S/PV.5920 (23 June 2008) was the communiqué of the Secretary-General regarding the 5920th (closed) meeting of the Council.
- S/PV.5919 (23 June 2008) was the verbatim record of the 5919th meeting of Council.
- S/PV.5868 (16 April 2008) was the verbatim record of the 5868th meeting of the Council.
- S/PV.5237 (27 July 2005) was a communiqué of the Secretary-General regarding the 5237th (closed) meeting of the Council.

**Other**

- S/2008/447 (8 July 2008) is the Council draft resolution on Zimbabwe.
- Resolution of the AU (1 July 2008) on Zimbabwe.
- Statement of the spokesperson for the Secretary-General (30 June 2008) on Zimbabwe.
- Statement of the spokesperson for the Secretary-General (22 June 2008) on Zimbabwe.

**Useful Additional Resources**

*Health in Ruins: A Man-Made Disaster in Zimbabwe, January 2009*

*Crisis without Limits: Human Rights and Humanitarian Consequences of the Political Repression in Zimbabwe* (Human Rights Watch), 22 January 2009

**Myanmar**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council is expected to ask the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Myanmar, Ibrahim Gambari, for a briefing in the latter half of February after his visit to Myanmar (at press time his visit was expected from 31 January to 3 February). Gambari is also expected to visit other countries in the region and brief the Secretary-General (who will be in Delhi in early February) before coming back to New York in mid-February. This will be Gambari’s seventh visit to Myanmar since becoming Special Adviser.

Any Council action will be dependent on the outcome of Gambari’s visit. No firm decision has been made on the format or timing of the briefing, but the expectation is that it will be informal and possibly before the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit which is scheduled for 27 February.

**Key Recent Developments**

In December 2008, 270 activists including monks, student leaders and National League for Democracy (NLD) members were sentenced to long jail terms for their roles in anti-junta protests in 2007 and for helping victims of cyclone Nargis in May.

On 9 December nine supporters of detained Myanmar pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi were arrested for holding a protest in Yangon calling for her release. In September, the junta freed seven political prisoners, including Win Tin, a 79-year-old journalist, who had been imprisoned since 1989. However, according to Human Rights Watch, in August and September 39 arrests were made.

On 3 December, 112 former government leaders wrote to the Secretary-General urging him to visit Myanmar and pressing for the release of political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi. The initiative was led by former Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik and signatories of the letter included former US Presidents George HW Bush and Jimmy Carter, former British Prime Ministers Tony Blair, Margaret Thatcher and John Major and former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The Secretary-General said he would consider another visit if “a meaningful outcome” could be expected.

On 9 December, the Secretary-General met with the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Myanmar. In remarks to the press following the meeting he acknowledged growing frustration that UN’s efforts have not yielded the results hoped for. Following the 27 September 2008 ministerial-level meeting of the Group of Friends, members called for the Myanmar government “to work more closely with and respond more positively” to the UN’s good offices to address issues of concern, such as the release of political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and the initiation of an all-inclusive dialogue between the Myanmar government and the opposition. (The Group of Friends includes the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam of ASEAN, the EU, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia and Norway.)

**Options**

The Council has several options, including:

- listening to the briefing but taking no action; and
- if the Myanmar government appears more open to working with the UN, a cautiously positive presidential statement also reinforcing previous calls for the release of political prisoners, inclusive national reconciliation and genuine dialogues as well as the need to address humanitarian and economic issues might be a possibility, along with some new incentives.
Other options include:

- Initiating a process of six-party talks (bearing in mind the format used with the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea) by inviting the relevant participants to a closed Council meeting; and
- Finding a way of getting more involved in the mechanisms set up to deliver humanitarian aid in order to build a stronger relationship with the Myanmar government.

**Key Issues**

A key issue is whether the Council now needs a fresh approach to dealing with the Myanmar situation. Some Council members are now interested, if there is news of a positive shift in Myanmar, in the idea of incentives to make concrete steps forward, including the release of prisoners and embarking on an inclusive dialogue ahead of the 2010 elections. This also appears to be in line with the Secretary-General’s thinking and the goal of some to develop greater trust between the Myanmar government and the UN.

An issue is whether the Secretary-General should visit Myanmar soon, and if he does, what sort of input can the Council provide ahead of a visit by the Secretary-General.

Another issue is timing. Should the Council act in mid-February so that there is a message for leaders at the ASEAN Summit, which takes place on 27 February, or is it wiser to wait until after the summit? A related issue is finding alternative ways of working closely with ASEAN.

A growing issue is the impact of the increasing number of refugees from the Rohingya community in Myanmar, Muslim minorities, many of whom fled to Bangladesh to avoid persecution and are now arriving by boat in neighbouring countries. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has expressed concern about possible mistreatment of the Rohingya seeking asylum in Thailand.

**Council Dynamics**

This issue is likely to continue to be a divisive one for members of the Council. China’s position is that this issue should not really be a major feature on the Council’s agenda. Viet Nam, as a member of ASEAN, espouses constructive engagement and prefers a light-handed approach. It remains to be seen if Japan, which became an elected Council member in January, will take on a bridging role between the Asian and western countries on the Council or if it will align itself more closely with the other Asian countries.

Among the European nations, although there is a real interest in keeping this issue before the Council, there are differences in whether or not to offer carrots instead of just sticks. France seems open to incentives. The UK seems more reluctant and appears concerned about appearing to reward the Myanmar government.

The US position under the new administration is being closely watched. It remains to be seen if the US position may be open to a new approach for dealing with the Myanmar government.

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<th>UN Documents</th>
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<tr>
<td>Presidential Statements</td>
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<tr>
<td>- S/PRST/2008/13 (2 May 2008) was the presidential statement noting the commitment of the Myanmar government that the referendum would be free and fair and underlining the need for the Government of Myanmar to “establish the conditions and create an atmosphere conducive to an inclusive and credible process”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- S/PRST/2007/37 (11 October 2007) was the presidential statement strongly deploiring the use of violence against demonstrators and emphasizing the importance of early release of prisoners.</td>
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<th>Selected Press Statements</th>
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<tr>
<td>- SC/9228 (17 January 2008) was the press statement affirming the Council’s support for the objectives set out in its October presidential statement and regretting the slow progress on meeting those objectives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- SC/9171 (14 November 2007) was a press statement on Myanmar.</td>
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<td>- S/PV.5753 (5 October 2007) was the record of the discussion following the crackdown in Myanmar.</td>
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**Georgia**

**Expected Council Action**

Council action on Georgia is expected in February. The mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) expires on 15 February. Several options are being considered, from another technical rollover to a new mission mandate.

Gaining increasing support is the idea of a rollover and the possibility of an interim security regime which would more clearly define the security guidelines for the mission to operate in the changed environment.

(UNOMIG was originally based on the 1994 ceasefire agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia known as the Moscow agreement, which Georgia declared null and void on 29 August 2008.)

The Council is expecting the Secretary-General’s report on Abkhazia in early February and a briefing by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Georgia and UNOMIG’s head, Johan Verbeke, probably on 10 February.

**Key Recent Developments**

In October 2008, the Council agreed on a four month technical rollover for UNOMIG through resolution 1839. This represented a delicate compromise. Russia argued that the mission should be changed because Abkhazia had declared its independence and both the name of the mission and past resolutions incorporated references to the territorial integrity of Georgia became highly controversial. To finesse the issues and buy some time, the October resolution did not mention the name of the operation or the country of its deployment. Instead, it referred only to the “United Nations mission” and recalled all previous resolutions including resolution 1808, which on 15 April had extended UNOMIG until 15 October 2008.

Following the 12 August ceasefire agreement (a French mediated accord that called for internationally mediated talks focusing on security and stability and repatriation of refugees) there were three rounds of Geneva talks jointly chaired by the UN, EU and the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on 15 October, 18 November and 17-18 December. The next round is scheduled for 17-18 February. The first two meetings stalled over procedural issues relating to the participation of Abkhaz and South Ossetian officials. The meeting in December, however, began to focus on substantive issues such as proposals for joint incident prevention and response mechanisms, free movement of people through crossing points, and joint visits to sensitive areas. A working group discussed concrete steps to improve living conditions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, but there are still issues over guaranteed access for experts and delivery of humanitarian goods.

The OSCE mission in Georgia began shutting down on 1 January. Russia had vetoed an extension of this mission on 22 December on the grounds that South Ossetia was now an independent state and therefore the observer mission should be modified. Russia is suggesting two missions, one in South Ossetia and one in Georgia. On 15 January, Greece, which had taken over the OSCE chair on 1 January, presented a new initiative to Russia aimed at keeping the OSCE in South Ossetia. The Greek plan involves involvement from the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, an OSCE mission to Tbilisi and a support mission in the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali.

On 16 January, a Georgian policeman was shot and killed while on duty near the South Ossetian administrative boundary line. The EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia released a press statement which said that it saw the attack as a “totally unacceptable breach of the Sarkozy-Medvedev Agreements” under which all sides had agreed to end hostilities. It also said that the incident should be investigated on both sides of the South Ossetian administrative boundary.

Russia on 20 January warned that it would impose “special economic measures” against countries supplying weapons to Georgia. The Russian cabinet has been asked to work on the measures that would be taken against foreign nations, organisations and individuals that sell weapons to Georgia. (In September, Russia had circulated a draft Council resolution seeking an arms embargo against Georgia.)

On 9 January, the US and Georgia signed a bilateral charter on a strategic partnership aimed at increasing cooperation in defense, trade and energy. The agreement provides a roadmap for cooperation including US assistance to Georgia’s military to help it qualify for NATO membership.

In early December, Irakli Alasania resigned as Georgia’s ambassador to the UN. He issued a statement on 24 December accusing Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili of precipitating the armed conflict in August and calling on all “decent and patriotic persons” to join forces to avert the impending “crisis” and restore security, stability and prosperity. Alasania said he will not form a separate opposition party but appears likely to align himself with the opposition which is calling for early elections.

Options

Three possible options include:

- a further technical rollover to allow for the mandate of a new mission to be developed;
- a “rollover plus” which would include some form of guidance for the mission on an interim security framework and possibly include:
  - reference to former security agreements, including the August ceasefire agreement or if the intention is to be more detailed, language taken from the Moscow agreement;
  - provisions for IDPs; and
  - a more concrete role for the UN in the Geneva talks, highlighting ways the UN could work with the EU in Georgia
- and a fully updated resolution with a comprehensive mandate for a new mission.

Although unlikely, a possible option is the shutting down of the mission if a P5 member decides to vote against all the above options.

Other options include:

- requesting the Secretary-General to develop the criteria needed for the mission to operate safely and effectively in Abkhazia in the short term as a new mandate is being developed;
- senior experts of the Council meeting with the Secretariat as a kind of joint working group to explore the needs of a new mission before developing a more comprehensive mandate; and
- considering ways in which the UN could be supportive in the Caucasus in a more holistic manner.

Key Issues

The key immediate issue is providing the UN mission with some basis to operate in the changed environment from 15 February.

A second key issue is that the current situation puts UN peacekeepers at risk because Russian peacekeepers, which previously provided protection, have stopped this role in Abkhazia.

A related issue is how to develop a new mandate for the mission given the short time available and the diametrically opposed views among some Council members on core issues like territorial integrity.

Another issue is the risk arising from the presence of heavy weapons and military in the security zone and restricted weapons zone. There are reports of increased tensions and provocations along Georgia’s frontiers with South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

An issue is whether the Geneva talks are sufficiently broad in focus to develop a political process that builds new confidence and prevents a renewed escalation of the conflict.

Also, assuming the OSCE has to completely withdraw in February and the EU observer mission on the Georgian border is not allowed into South Ossetia, a significant issue will be the lack of information on the situation in South Ossetia.

Connected to the withdrawal of the OSCE is the impact on the Geneva talks given that it was one of the co-chairs.
Of growing concern is the political stability of President Saakashvili’s government in the wake of the August conflict and subsequent declarations of independence from South Ossetia and Abkhazia. His judgment in precipitating the conflict with Russia has been called into question, as has his leadership style.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

Both Georgia and Abkhazia have indicated that they support a UN presence. This sentiment is echoed by most Council members who appear keen that there should be a new UN mission set up. However, there are key differences over the type of mission envisaged. The US remains opposed to anything that implies a change of status or constitutes acceptance that Georgia’s territorial dimensions are in question. It prefers a technical rollover at this stage. (It remains to be seen whether there will be new policy directions from the Obama administration on Georgia and on relations with Russia.)

Russia continues to hold the position that Abkhazia is now independent and that the mission needs to be neutral as between Georgia and Abkhazia. It has suggested two missions, one in Tbilisi and one in the Abkhaz capital Sukhumi. Although US-Russia relations have deteriorated recently, with the Georgia conflict leading to heated exchanges in the Council, there are some indications that Russia is also open to a rollover on the basis that this might give room for negotiations later in the context of a more improved bilateral relationship.

The European members of the Council support Georgia’s territorial integrity and follow developments with the EU mission in Georgia carefully. France continues to be actively engaged following its involvement on this issue during its EU presidency in the second half of 2008. But there is also an air of pragmatism. There is a sense that real movement on a new mission to replace UNOMIG can only happen if the US and Russia show some flexibility. Germany, while not a Council member, continues to play a role as the chair of the Group of Friends and is involved in producing the first draft of the resolution.

New members and those from outside the region appear to be waiting for the US and Russian positions to be more clearly defined. With the situation in the Middle East consuming so much energy in January, many members have not given much thought to Georgia. However, there is a growing awareness that this is not an issue that can be ignored for too long.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**


**Selected Secretary-General’s Report**

- S/2008/631 (3 October 2008) was the last report on of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission**

Johan Verbeke (Belgium)

**Size and Composition**

- Size as of 30 November 2008: 156 total uniformed personnel, including 137 military observers and 19 police
- Key troop-contributors: Germany, Pakistan, and Bangladesh

**Duration**

August 1993 to present

**Cost**

1 July 2008-30 June 2009: $36.08 million (gross)

**Timor-Leste**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council is expected to hold an open debate on Timor-Leste in February and renew the mandate of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) before it expires on 26 February. Major changes to the mandate seem unlikely.

The Secretary-General’s progress report is expected in early February. Council members are likely to be interested in the medium-term strategy and benchmarks for tracking progress, which it had asked the Secretary-General to develop in consultation with Timor-Leste in resolution 1802 in February 2008.

These strategy and benchmarks are likely to focus on these areas:

- review and reform of the security sector;
- strengthening the rule of law;
- economic and social development; and
- promotion of a culture of democratic governance and efforts to enhance dialogue and reconciliation.

**Key Recent Developments**

Since the February 2008 attacks on President José Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão by a group led by former military officer, Alfredo Reinado, the security situation has remained relatively calm.

A press report on 23 December stirred up controversy when it quoted a purported UN security report as stating that Timor-Leste remained on the brink of anarchy. UNMIT’s acting special representative, Finn Reske-Nielsen, on 24 December said that UNMIT felt good about the progress made in Timor-Leste in 2008. He also praised the resiliency of the Timorese people given the difficult start to the year. The Timor-Leste government questioned the authenticity of the report.

Progress continued to be made in resolving the problems of the internally displaced persons (IDPs). Some 55,000 IDPs have been relocated either to their original places of residence or to another residence. Most of the IDP camps in Dili are closed, and the remaining nine camps are expected to be disbanded in February.

The National Police Force of Timor-Leste (PNTL) has begun taking over responsibility for policing from UNMIT following two years of certification and training.

The UNMIT Serious Crimes Investigations Team (SCIT) started its investigations last February after UNMIT and the Timorese government signed an agreement to allow investigators access to files of the former UN Serious Crimes Unit. SCIT was created in January 2007 following the adoption of resolution 1704 of 25 August 2006. The Council decided that UNMIT would assist
the Office of the Prosecutor-General of Timor-Leste, through a team of investigators, to investigate cases that had not been covered by the former Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) and to address the outstanding cases of serious human rights violations committed in the country in 1999.

The former SCU had been established by the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor following resolution 1272. It was responsible for conducting investigations and preparing indictments to bring to justice those responsible for crimes against humanity and other serious crimes committed in East Timor in 1999. The mandate of the SCU was not renewed in May 2005. The new SCIT is limited to investigation tasks. Unlike the SCU it does not have the power to indict. Prosecution lies in the hands of the Timor-Leste Office of the Prosecutor. The SCIT has 396 cases to investigate over the next three years. It has so far conducted 36 investigations.

On 11-12 December, the Timorese government, with support from the UN, hosted a seminar on security sector reform and development. A diverse range of national and international actors attended and discussed topics including national security legislation and policy.

On 19 August, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of UNMIT, Atul Khare, briefed the Council during an open debate. Following the debate the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2008/29) which commended the Timorese leaders and institutions for the “rapid, firm and responsible manner” in which they responded to the events of 11 February. It also reaffirmed the importance of the review and reform of the security sector and the need for sustained support from the international community in helping Timor-Leste develop its institutions and justice sector.

Options
Options for the Council include a resolution renewing UNMIT and:

- reiterating its commitment to long-term stability in Timor-Leste;
- welcoming the Secretary-General’s medium-term strategy and benchmarks to measure and track progress of key areas;
- stressing the importance of the reform of the security sector in Timor-Leste;
- addressing the urgency of managing the economy and addressing socioeconomic problems; and
- emphasising the importance of continued support from the international community.

Other possibilities include:

- adjusting UNMIT’s mandate to include greater attention to peacebuilding issues, particularly security sector reform and training;
- asking the Secretary-General to produce an assessment of when the PNTL will be ready to assume full policing responsibility in order to set clear transfer deadlines and benchmarks;
- setting benchmarks that show clear progress in key areas which need to be met during the period of the new mandate;
- considering a review of the justice sector by the government and UNMIT;
- reiterating the need for a comprehensive review of the future role and needs of the security sector called for in resolution 1802; and
- highlighting the importance of continued efforts to reach accountability and justice and the promotion and protection of human rights.

Key Issues
A key issue is ensuring that the security situation remains stable. Recently, crimes have been assault, public disorder and domestic disputes. However, the underlying tensions between key political actors and groups continue to simmer. There has also been some discord over UNMIT mentoring among members of the PNTL, and issues remain over when the PNTL would be ready to take over full policing functions.

Another important issue is how to move the priority from maintaining security to peacebuilding and achieving durable peace and stability, keeping in mind the importance of national ownership.

There are several issues related to the national police. First, the mistrust between the Timor-Leste Defence Force and the PNTL continues. A second issue is how to close the remaining capacity and operational gaps so that the PNTL can take over from the UN Police. UNMIT has said that PNTL still has to meet several criteria before it can assume full responsibility. This includes the PNTL being able to respond appropriately to the security environment, final certification of at least 80 percent of eligible officers, availability of initial operational logistical requirements, institutional stability and mutual respect between military and the national police. Finally, there is the issue of whether a robust UN police presence is needed beyond UNMIT and if so, how to provide this.

A question related to the larger strategic issue is how best to use the benchmarks provided by the Secretary-General for the four priority areas (security sector, rule of law, economic and social development, and democratic governance) in renewing UNMIT’s mandate and eventually drawing down the mission. In this sense the discussion in February can be seen as an initial practical example of the challenges raised in the Council debate on peacekeeping and effective oversight on 23 January.

In this regard an example of a potential ongoing issue is how to monitor the relocated IDPs in the receiving communities so that there is early warning of any potential reemergence of security problems.

A significant issue is what extra capacity will be needed for the UN to assist with elections for village (suco) and sub-village (aldeia) chiefs and councils which will be held country wide in the second half of 2009. (UNMIT has already received requests from the government for assistance.) The February mandate renewal may need to reflect resources needed for this.
Human rights and justice issues include:
- the need to strengthen UN support in the justice sector to address issues like the backlog of cases; and
- continuing impunity for crimes committed during the 2006 crisis, as well as during the 1999 UN sponsored referendum on independence. (In May 2008 President Horta issued a decree granting full and partial pardons to 94 prisoners.)

Economic issues include falling oil prices and its effect on the Timorese economy, and the ability to create sustainable, long-term economic growth in the non-oil sector based on job creation and expanding the public investment programme.

Council and Wider Dynamics
At the moment Timor-Leste is not at the top of Council priorities. Most members are awaiting the Secretary-General’s report before deciding on their positions. At the last public debate no Council members chose to speak and the floor was dominated by members of the core group such as Australia, Portugal, Malaysia and New Zealand. In January, Japan became the lead country in the Council on this issue and it is likely to give it some priority.

There is unlikely to be opposition to renewing UNMIT’s mandate as there appears to be consensus over the continuing UNMIT presence in Timor-Leste. The dangers of a premature withdrawal have not been forgotten. There is also some agreement that it is not the right time to reduce the UNMIT police and that even after the transfer of police authority from UNMIT police to Timorese police, substantial numbers of UNMIT police will be needed in a mentoring and support role.

Some members may wish to have clearer benchmarks in the new mandate so that adjustments to UNMIT’s mandate and strength can be made in the future. They may wish to discuss ways benchmarks could be used.

Underlying Problems
Although most IDPs have been moved out of the camps, the government is now struggling to provide essential services in communities where there has been a large influx of former IDPs. Other problems involving IDPs include disputed land ownership issues and a lack of employment opportunities.

### UN Documents

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**
- S/RES/1745 (22 February 2007) renewed UNMIT’s mandate for 12 months.
- S/RES/1704 (25 August 2006) established UNMIT.

**Latest Report of the Secretary-General**
- S/2008/501 (29 July 2008)

**Other**
- S/PRST/2008/5 (11 February 2008) was the statement condemning the attacks on Ramos-Horta and Gusmão.

### Other Relevant Facts

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission**
Atul Khare (India)

**Size, Composition and Cost**
- **Maximum authorised strength:** up to 1,748 police and 34 military officers
- **Size as of 30 November 2008:** 1,542 police and 32 military liaison officers
- **Civilian staff as of 30 October 2008:** 343 international and 879 local, 131 UN Volunteers
- **Key police contributors:** Malaysia, Portugal, Bangladesh and Pakistan
- **Approved budget** (1 July 2008–30 June 2009): $180.84 million

### Expected Council Action

The Council is expecting a briefing on Iraq from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Iraq, Staffan de Mistura. (The next report on the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) is expected by 18 February.) The UNAMI mandate expires on 7 August.

The focus in February is likely to be on the regional elections which take place on 31 January. A Council statement is possible.

It is unclear whether the Council will also receive a briefing on the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) and its International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB). Resolution 1859 of 22 December requests reporting on this by 31 March. The Council synchronised the last IAMB briefing with the UNAMI briefing in June. Resolution 1859 also encouraged the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to brief the Council in January.

The annual report of the sanctions committee established by resolution 1518 is expected in early 2009. The committee was to identify and freeze assets of senior officials of the former Iraqi regime and their families. The committee has been largely dormant and did not meet in 2008.

A report by the working group on outstanding issues from the oil-for-food programme is anticipated. The Council is yet to take a formal decision on how to resolve related outstanding issues (for more details please see our October 2008 Forecast).

### Key Recent Developments

Electoral campaigning for the 31 January elections in 14 of Iraq’s 18 provinces commenced on 8 December. A total of 14,431 candidates (including 3,912 women) repre-
senting 407 political entities will contest 440 seats. In the lead-up, several candidates have died in what appear to be politically motivated killings.

In the three Kurdish provinces, elections are yet to be scheduled by the Kurdish Regional Government. Elections in Tamim/Kirkuk governorate are also delayed until a power-sharing arrangement is in place and a separate election law is drafted (a committee is expected to conclude work on this issue by 31 March). Political tensions were heightened during the pre-election period.

Rumours about a possible vote of no confidence in Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki persist. Kurdish President Massoud Barzani joined the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council in resisting Maliki’s establishment of tribal support councils. These are seen by some as a means to centralise his power.

On 23 December, Sunni politician Mahmoud al-Mashhadani resigned as Parliament speaker after complaints by Kurdish and Shiite blocs regarding his performance. Disagreements over his replacement have led to the fragmentation of the main Sunni coalition, Tawafiq, weakening the bloc before provincial elections. A new speaker is expected to be elected when parliament reconvenes on 3 February.

Despite the electoral tensions, Iraq’s overall security situation continues to improve while remaining fragile. In the fourth quarter of 2008, civilian deaths fell by almost 63 percent compared with the same period in 2007. The lack of essential services has replaced security as the biggest concern for most Iraqis, who still live without clean water, electricity, sewage services and healthcare.

The UN mandate of the multinational force expired on 31 December. On 4 December, after months of uncertainty, Iraq’s presidency council approved security and strategic framework agreements with the US, which govern the presence of US forces after their UN mandate expires and define longer-term cultural, economic and security ties. To secure parliamentary support, the Iraqi government met Sunni demands to hold a referendum on the agreements no later than 30 July. Approval for non-US troops to also remain in Iraq after 31 December was granted on 28 December. Countries covered include the UK, Australia, El Salvador (which announced the end of its mission on 22 January), Estonia, Romania and the NATO training mission.

Nine coalition force partners concluded their activities in Iraq between September and December.

On 22 December, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1859 extending until 31 December 2009 arrangements to deposit DFI proceeds from export sales of petroleum, petroleum products and natural gas into the DFI and the monitoring activities of the IAMB, including DFI-related immunity provisions which prevent creditors from being able to seize Iraqi oil revenue and financial assets. Iraq reportedly earned about $60 billion in crude oil sales in 2008 and relies on oil exports for about 95 percent of its revenue. On 22 December the Paris Club of creditor nations cancelled $7.8 billion of Iraq’s Saddam-era debt owed to members.

Creditors agreed in 2004 to waive about $32 billion or 80 percent of Iraq’s total debt over four years.

After resolution 1859 was adopted, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said that although remarkable progress had been achieved, Iraq still faced many challenges. These include undertaking constitutional review, finding sustainable solutions to power and resource sharing, adopting hydrocarbons legislation, resolving disputed territories, building government capacity on service provision and facilitating the safe return of returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Given that the current Iraq government inherited immense debt and international claims from Saddam Hussein’s regime, the administration was requesting an extension of DFI arrangements to allow time to qualify and settle legitimate claims, and to ensure Iraq’s resources and financial assets were available for reconstruction projects.

In late December, Turkey said the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) had suffered heavy losses in military airstrikes in northern Iraq since 16 December. Earlier, in November, the US, Iraq and Turkey formed a joint committee to combat the PKK. This committee is expected to meet every two months to exchange intelligence and coordinate security measures. Kurdistan’s authorities have reportedly demanded UNAMI pressure on Iran and Turkey to end their military action in Kurdistan.

Options
Since the Council meeting will take place soon after the governorate elections, an option for the Council is to adopt a statement marking the outcome.

Another option, given the now clear commitment to drawdown US forces in Iraq, is for the Council to start thinking about whether the UN could or should play a larger role in Iraq and in particular, assisting Iraq in identifying political solutions to address core grievances. The appointment of a dedicated negotiator to work with Iraq and within the region on a comprehensive strategy is an option.

A third option is to begin consultations with Iraq about the need to continue the sanctions committee.

(For options on the outstanding oil-for-food issues, please see our October 2008 Forecast.)

Key Issues
A key issue in light of the heightened tension is how successful the conduct of the 31 January elections proves. (It will also be interesting to see whether the formula where parties winning three or more seats give every third seat to a female candidate will yield the 25 percent quota as was intended in the electoral law.)

Other key issues include:

- National/political reconciliation: This remains a major underlying issue. Many Council members will be following this closely. It seems that progress in resolving issues fundamental to peace and prosperity is poor.
- Disputed internal boundaries, including Kirkuk: Article 23 of the Governorate Electoral Law created a parliamentary committee to make recommendations by 31 March on power sharing, violations
against public and private property and Kirkuk’s demographic changes after which a special law for elections in the ethnically disputed governorate will be drafted. The final UNAMI report on the remaining disputed areas, expected in November 2008, has been delayed to ensure its release does not interfere with elections and the work of this committee.

**Constitutional review process:** In July, the Constitutional Review Committee provided the presidency council and prime minister with its final report, including issues where it had been unable to reach a consensus. Outstanding issues include the power of the presidency, competencies of governors and regions versus the centre and allocation of oil and gas revenues.

**Humanitarian efforts to support the return of refugees and internally displaced persons:** The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that more than 2.8 million people are still displaced in Iraq with another two million outside Iraq, mainly in Jordan and Syria. UNHCR will expand its operations in Iraq in 2009 and will have a presence in 14 of Iraq’s 18 provinces.

**Human Rights:** The recent UNAMI human rights report for the January-June 2008 period may be addressed by some Council members.

Another issue is the difference between the Council and the IAMB on who within the IAMB should brief the Council. The IAMB previously informed the Council that briefings should be done by the Secretary-General’s designee. (This followed a request made by Russia during a Council meeting in December 2007 for a briefing on DFI activities by the IMF in Washington.) It seems the IAMB position is unchanged following the Council’s decision in resolution 1859 to request a briefing from the IMF and World Bank.

A key question is whether, as the US presence in Iraq declines, it will continue to maintain an ongoing heightened focus in helping Iraq resolve outstanding political issues and whether it will work principally bilaterally as in the past or shift to more multilateral support.

**Council Dynamics**

Broad support for UNAMI continues with most members supportive of the UN role on national reconciliation, human rights, and the peaceful return of IDPs and refugees. Turkey will be an important new influence on Council dynamics. Turkey has two key interests in Iraq—a strong political interest in Iraq, maintaining its multiethnic structure (particularly in Kirkuk) and terrorism, specifically the PKK elements located in northern Iraq. It is likely, therefore, it will take a particular interest in UNAMI’s activities on disputed internal boundaries and national reconciliation.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1859 (22 December 2008) extended the arrangements for the DFI and the IAMB, including immunity provisions, until 31 December 2009.
- S/RES/1830 (7 August 2008) renewed UNAMI for a further year.
- S/RES/1518 (24 November 2003) established a sanctions committee on Iraq.

**Latest UNAMI Report**

- S/2008/688 (6 November 2008)

**Last Security Council Briefing and Debate on Iraq**

- S/PV.6059 (22 December 2008)

**Latest Letters**

- S/2008/784 (16 December 2008) welcomed the Secretary-General’s proposal for a new security agreement with the US.
- S/2008/783 (12 December 2008) was a letter from the Secretary-General notifying the Council of his intention to conclude with the US an agreement regarding the continued provision of security support to the UN.
- S/2008/492 (25 July 2008) was a letter from the Secretary-General to the Council on the resolution of outstanding issues related to the oil-for-food programme.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General**

- Staffan de Mistura (Sweden)

**Deputy Special Representative for Political Affairs**

- Andrew Gilmour (United Kingdom)

**Deputy Special Representative for Humanitarian, Reconstruction and Development Affairs**

- David Shearer (New Zealand)

**Secretary-General’s Special Advisor on the International Compact with Iraq**

- Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria)

**Coalition Force Personnel**

- **Strength as of January 2009:** approximately 148,000
- **Composition as of January 2009:** US, UK, Australia, Romania and Estonia.

**UNAMI**

- **Composition as of 31 December 2008:** 222 troops (Fiji), six military observers, up to 446 international civilian staff and 592 local civilian staff.

**Useful Additional Resource**

UNAMI Human Rights Report, 1 January - 30 June 2008 (released in December)

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**Sierra Leone**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council is expected to consider the first report of the new UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) in early February. (Its mandate expires on 30 September.) Council members will be looking closely to see whether the UNIPSIL model is adding value.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 4 August the Council adopted resolution 1829 which established UNIPSIL as a replacement for the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) for 12 months beginning on 1 October 2008. The Council requested UNIPSIL to focus on support to the government of Sierra Leone in:

- providing political support to national and local efforts in identifying and resolving tensions and threats of potential conflict;
- monitoring and promoting human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law;
consolidating good governance reforms, especially anti-corruption instruments such as the Anti-Corruption Commission; and

- supporting efforts towards decentralisation, a review of the 1991 Constitution and enactment of relevant legislation.

The Council welcomed the peaceful and democratic local elections in July 2008 as another important milestone in consolidating sustainable peace in the country. It also emphasised the importance of the continued support of the UN system and the international community for the long-term peace, security and development of Sierra Leone.

UNIPSIL was tasked with coordinating the work of the various UN funds, agencies and programmes in the country. The Council stressed the need for the UN system to support and cooperate fully with UNIPSIL. UNIPSIL was also mandated to coordinate with the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and support its work, as well as implement the Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework and projects supported through the Peacebuilding Fund. The Council requested a progress report by 31 January 2009. (The Secretary-General in his April 2008 report had recommended that the Council establish a UN peacebuilding office to tackle the political, economic and peacebuilding challenges facing Sierra Leone.)

The representative of Sierra Leone welcomed the resolution as another “significant phase in the United Nations experiment in post-conflict peacebuilding” and expressed gratitude for the support of the international community in that regard. He said that Sierra Leone needed sustained UN support to achieve the goals of the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework in the areas of energy, justice and security sector development, youth employment, governance and capacity-building. He also emphasised the need for continued support for the country if the risks to peace and security are to be contained.

Michael von der Schulenburg (who had been acting UN Representative since May) was appointed executive representative of the Secretary-General in Sierra Leone on 8 January. In accordance with Council resolution 1829, he concurrently serves as Resident Representative of the UNDP and UN Resident Coordinator.

Related Developments in the PBC

On 15 December the Commission held its second biannual review of progress in implementing the 7 December 2007 Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework, resulting in the adoption of conclusions and recommendations including:

- recommending that the government of Sierra Leone finalise its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, strengthen its monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and put in place emergency plans and long-term strategies for energy sector investment and development;
- calling on the UN and international partners to direct budgetary funding and contribute to UN multi-donor efforts on Sierra Leone, and assist the poverty reduction strategy and change agenda; and
- calling on the PBC itself to galvanise all stakeholders to support Sierra Leone in attaining its priorities, including assisting the government in widening its donor base.

On 7 January the Organisational Committee of the PBC confirmed Ambassador Frank Majoor of the Netherlands as chair of the Sierra Leone configuration as it commenced its third year of work.

Key Issue

The key issue for the Council is whether UNIPSIL is adding value to sustainable peace consolidation. A second issue is whether there are areas where Council attention is needed to sustain progress.

Options

The main option the Council may consider is whether to respond at this time to note-related developments in the country (and if so, whether to issue a formal statement) or to wait until after the second report in May.

Council Dynamics

The content of the first report will likely influence members’ positions on next steps. The presence of the new members of the Council—Austria, Japan, Mexico, Turkey and Uganda—is not expected to significantly affect the dynamics of the Council in terms of the currently existing consensus among members towards consolidating peace in Sierra Leone through peacebuilding.

The UK is the lead country on this issue in the Council.

Underlying Problems

Some of the serious socioeconomic problems that were factors in the war remain. These include widespread poverty and youth unemployment, in addition to inadequate resources to effectively combat endemic corruption and the drug trafficking challenges currently beginning to affect most of the West African subregion. While significant gains have been made in national reconstruction efforts since the end of the country’s civil war, Sierra Leone remains at the bottom of the UNDP Human Development Index. Also, the national and local elections highlighted the fact that political tensions and divisions along ethnic and geographical lines are still close to the surface.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1829 (4 August 2008) authorised the creation of UNIPSIL to replace UNIOSIL for one year commencing 1 October.
- S/RES/1793 (21 December 2007) extended the mandate of UNIOSIL until 30 September 2008 and requested a completion strategy for the mission by 31 January, and specific proposals on the successor office.

Selected Secretary-General’s Report

- S/2008/281 (29 April 2008) was the latest report of the Secretary-General on UNIOSIL.
Other

- S/2009/18 and S/2009/17 (8 January 2009) was the exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Council president on the appointment of Michael von der Schulenburg as the executive representative for UNIPSIL.
- S/PV.5948 (4 August 2008) was the letter from the Secretary-General referring Sierra Leone to the PBC.

Peacebuilding Commission

- PBC/3/SLE/2 (15 December 2008) outlined conclusions and recommendations of the second biannual review of the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework.
- PBC/2/SLE/SR.4 (19 June 2008) was the summary record of the Sierra Leone configuration’s fourth meeting (biannual review of the Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework and report of the PBC’s visit to Sierra Leone between 1-7 June 2008.)
- PBC/2/SLE/6 (19 June 2008) outlined conclusions and recommendations of the biannual review of the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework.
- PBC/2/SLE/5 (19 May 2008) was the chair’s summary of the high-level stakeholders consultation on Sierra Leone.
- PBC/2/SLE/1 (3 December 2007) was the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework.
- PBC/OC/1/2 (21 June 2006) was a letter from the Council president to the Secretary-General referring Sierra Leone to the PBC.

Other Relevant Facts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIPSIL Executive Representative of the Secretary-General</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Michael von der Schulenburg (Germany)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Size and Composition of Mission</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff strength (as of December 2008): 14 international civilian, one local civilian, five military observers, two police and nine UN volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
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<td>1 October 2008 to present; current mandate expires 30 September 2009</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Lebanon

Expected Council Action

Lebanon will be on Council members’ minds in February because the mandate of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC), considering the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, is due to expire. However, the Council is expected to let it lapse. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon is scheduled to commence functioning on 1 March.

Key Facts

UNIIIC was established by resolution 1595 in 2005 to assist the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of the Hariri assassination on 14 February 2005. In December 2005, the Council expanded UNIIIC’s mandate to include assistance to the Lebanese authorities investigating other terrorist attacks and political assassinations that took place in Lebanon between 1 October 2004 and 12 December 2005.

The Lebanese government subsequently requested that UNIIIC extend assistance to investigation of new attacks. As a result, UNIIIC has been involved in the investigation of twenty other attacks.

The Special Tribunal was established in 2007 by resolution 1757. Its mandate is to continue to investigate and then prosecute perpetrators of the Hariri assassination. It also has jurisdiction over all other attacks where UNIIIC is assisting in the investigation if it is found that they are connected to the Hariri murder and are of similar nature and gravity. The latest UNIIIC reports indicate that some involved in the Hariri murder were associated with other attacks.

Resolution 1757 noted that the Special Tribunal shall commence functioning on a date to be determined by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Lebanese government, taking into account the progress the investigation.

Key Recent Developments

In his latest report on the Tribunal on 26 November, the Secretary-General said the Tribunal was on track to begin functioning on 1 March. From that date investigations would be led by the Office of the Prosecutor in The Hague. He also indicated that UNIIIC would not need to be prolonged beyond that date. On 18 December the Secretary-General confirmed in a letter to the Council that the Special Tribunal would commence functioning on 1 March.

On 2 December, the Council received Commissioner Daniel Bellemare’s request for an extension of UNIIIC’s mandate to 28 February, so investigations could continue without interruption and operations, staff and assets could gradually be transferred to The Hague.

Bellemare briefed the Council on 17 December. The same day the Council adopted resolution 1852 extending UNIIIC’s mandate until 28 February.

Overall, the situation in Lebanon has been calm in the last two months. However, on 8 January, the firing of three rockets from southern Lebanon into Israel raised fears that this might trigger a wider conflict given the ongoing war between Hamas and Israel in Gaza. The UN Secretary-General condemned this incident and reminded Israel and Hezbollah of their obligations to respect the 2006 ceasefire. Additional troops from the UN Interim Force in Lebanon and Lebanese forces were deployed in the south and patrols intensified to deter further incidents.

Options

A press statement acknowledging the end of UNIIIC’s mandate is a possible option.

Key Issues

The end of UNIIIC means that the investigation will no longer be covered by the
provisions of resolution 1636, a key provision of which was a call for states’ cooperation with the investigation. Resolution 1757 and the Tribunal’s statute do not specify whether states other than Lebanon have an obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal.

A related issue is the question of sanctions under resolution 1636. Individual sanctions against suspects can only be designated following decisions by UNIIIC or the Lebanese government. It is unclear whether this issue will be problematic.

Council Dynamics

There is consensus at this stage that UNIIIC’s mandate should be allowed to lapse. At press time there was no urgency for discussing issues relating to the provisions of resolution 1636.

UN Documents

Resolutions on UNIIIC and the Tribunal

- S/RES/1852 (17 December 2008) extended UNIIIC’s mandate until 28 February.
- S/RES/1757 (30 May 2007) established the Tribunal under Chapter VII.
- S/RES/1686 (15 June 2006) extended UNIIIC’s mandate by one year.
- S/RES/1664 (29 March 2006) requested the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Lebanon to establish a tribunal of international character.
- S/RES/1644 (15 December 2005) extended UNIIIC’s mandate by six months and expanded its mandate.
- S/RES/1636 (31 October 2005) urged Syria to cooperate with the investigation and established sanctions against suspects in the assassination.
- S/RES/1595 (7 April 2005) established UNIIIC.

Recent UNIIIC Reports

- S/2008/752 (2 December 2008)
- S/2008/210 (28 March 2008)

Secretary-General’s Reports on the Tribunal

- S/2008/734 (26 November 2008)
- S/2007/525 (4 September 2007)
- S/2006/176 (21 March 2006) identified the international assistance needed to try those eventually charged with the Hariri assassination before a tribunal of international character.

Letters from Lebanon and the Secretary-General requesting UNIIIC’s Technical Assistance for Other Cases

- S/2008/60 (31 January 2008) was on the murder of Major Wissam Eid.
- S/2007/735 (12 December 2007) was on the murder of General François el-Hajj.
- S/2007/556 (20 September 2007) was on the murder of parliamentarian Antoine Ghanem and others.
- S/2007/356 (14 June 2007) was on the murder of parliamentarian Walid Eido.
- S/2007/91 (15 February 2007) was an exchange of letters on the Ain Aaleq bombings.
- S/2006/914 (22 November 2006) was on the murder of Lebanese Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel.
- S/2005/783 (13 December 2005) was a letter from Lebanon requesting the expansion of UNIIIC’s mandate to include investigation of attacks in Lebanon from 1 October 2004.

Other Relevant Facts

UNIIIC Commissioners

- Daniel Bellemare (Canada) 1 January 2008-present
- Serge Brammertz (Belgium) 11 January 2006-31 December 2007
- Detlev Mehlis (Germany) 13 May 2005-11 January 2006

Special Tribunal Prosecutor

Daniel Bellemare (Canada)

Tribunal’s Registrar

Robin Vincent (UK)

Tribunal Location

The Hague, Netherlands

Tribunal Cost

- Amount available in the trust fund for the first year of operations: $51.2 million
- Amount pledged for the second year: $2.3 million
- Amount pledged for the third year: $2.3 million

Useful Additional Resources

- Handbook on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, International Center for Transitional Justice, 10 April 2008
An international meeting on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is expected to be held in Moscow in early 2009.

The Special Tribunal on Lebanon, based in the Hague, is expected to commence functioning on 1 March.

A Security Council visit to Haiti is currently being discussed and could possibly occur in March. An international donors’ conference on Haiti is also being considered and could take place at the end of March in Washington, DC.

Senate elections in Haiti are scheduled in April 2009.

Legislative elections in Lebanon are scheduled for May 2009.

Presidential elections in Iran are scheduled for 12 June 2009.

Presidential and legislative elections in Sudan are to be held before July 2009.

Legislative elections in Chad are currently slated for 2009.

Presidential elections are expected in Afghanistan in September 2009.

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Notable Dates for February

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<tr>
<th>Reports Due for Consideration in February</th>
<th>Document Requesting Report</th>
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<tr>
<td>23 January SG report on UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)</td>
<td>S/RES/1812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 January SG report on UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL)</td>
<td>S/RES/1829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 January SG report on the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)</td>
<td>S/RES/1828</td>
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<tr>
<td>by 6 February SG report on UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)</td>
<td>S/RES/1839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 February SG report on UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)</td>
<td>S/RES/1836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by 16 February SG report on UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)</td>
<td>S/RES/1802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 February SG report on Djibouti/Eritrea</td>
<td>S/RES/1862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by mid February SG quarterly report on UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)</td>
<td>S/RES/1830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by 27 February SG report on UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)</td>
<td>S/RES/1244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by 27 February SG report on implementation of resolution 1701 (Lebanon)</td>
<td>S/RES/1832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by 28 February 1267 Monitoring Team report on progress of States’ implementation of sanctions measures.</td>
<td>S/RES/1822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by late February SG quarterly report on UN Mission in Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)</td>
<td>S/RES/1834</td>
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Important Dates over the Horizon

- An international meeting on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is expected to be held in Moscow in early 2009.
- The Special Tribunal on Lebanon, based in the Hague, is expected to commence functioning on 1 March.
- A Security Council visit to Haiti is currently being discussed and could possibly occur in March. An international donors’ conference on Haiti is also being considered and could take place at the end of March in Washington, DC.
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