



# SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT

## MONTHLY FORECAST

### SEPTEMBER 2008



27 August 2008

This report is available online and can be viewed together with Update Reports on developments during the month at [www.securitycouncilreport.org](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org)

## OVERVIEW FOR SEPTEMBER

Burkina Faso will hold the Council's September presidency. This is always a busy month at the UN, but most activities revolve around the General Assembly's annual debate, due to start this year on the 23rd.

Several meetings on issues related to the Council's agenda are likely to be scheduled to take advantage of the presence of high-level participants. They will be held, however, in parallel or on the margins, and will include a high-level meeting on Africa planned for 22 September, as well as a meeting of the Middle East Quartet some time during the general debate. A high-level

meeting on the Millennium Development Goals is also planned. Iran's nuclear programme and a possibility of additional Council sanctions may also be discussed by the visiting leaders of E3+3.

The September programme of the Council at this stage appears relatively light.

Burkina Faso is planning to hold one **open debate on mediation and the settlement of conflicts**, drawing on that country's leaders' rich recent experience. President of Burkina Faso Blaise Compaoré will chair the meeting expected to take place in the third week of the month. >>page 2

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## Aide-Memoire

Important matters pending for the Council include:

- The 2005 World Summit requested that the Security Council consider reforms for the **Military Staff Committee**. This has yet to be addressed.
- In its resolution 1327 (2000) on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the **Brahimi report**, S/2000/809), the Council decided to review periodically the implementation of the provisions contained in the resolution's annex. No such reviews have occurred in the past three years.
- The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in **Côte d'Ivoire**, requested by presidential statement 2004/17, has not been made public yet.
- The Council requested the Secretary-General on 29 November 2006 (S/2006/928) **to update the index** to Council notes and statements on working methods. This has not been published.
- On the **DRC**, the Council Sanctions Committee has not acted on individual sanctions

under resolution 1698 against armed groups that recruit children, despite MONUC reports about the problem continuing on a serious scale.

- The Secretary-General has yet to put forward proposals for the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in the **Sheb'a Farms** area, in accordance with resolution 1701, and respond to the cartographic, legal and political implications of the alternative path suggested by the government of Lebanon in its seven-point plan.
- The Council is awaiting the PBC's response to its May request for advice and recommendations on the situation in the **Central African Republic** (S/2008/383).
- The Secretariat is yet to report to the Council on **Kenya** as requested in its 6 February presidential statement (S/PRST/2008/4).
- Similarly, the Council awaits the results of a Secretariat fact-finding mission on the situation between **Djibouti and Eritrea** requested in press statement SC/9376 of 24 June 2008. The statement further requested the Secretary-General to brief

the Council on the situation, "if possible [in] under two weeks". It appears that the Secretariat is currently drawing up the results of the fact-finding mission, but it is unclear when a briefing will take place.

- In a letter from its president (S/2007/722) on 7 December 2007 the Council asked the Secretary-General to provide an outline of the mandate of the **adviser on the prevention of genocide** and of the implications of upgrading this position from an Assistant Secretary-General to Under Secretary-General. At press time, no response had been released.
- **UNAMI reports on human rights** are now usually delayed by several months and are therefore quite outdated. (The last report, released in March, covered the period from 1 July to 31 December 2007.) In the past, the reports were produced every two to three months.
- The Council is yet to follow up on the Secretary-General's recommendations regarding **protection of civilians**, presented in his October 2007 report (S/2007/643).

Two mandates need to be renewed:

- **Chad and the Central African Republic** with the mandate of MINURCAT expiring on 25 September; and
- **Liberia** where the UNMIL mandate expires on 30 September.

The Council is likely to continue devoting a considerable amount of attention to **Georgia**. At press time two draft resolutions, one by France and the other by Russia, had been circulated, and Russia on 26 August recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Although the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in **Afghanistan** does not expire until 13 October, the Council may renew it in September, as was the case the last two years.

There will also be the usual monthly **briefing on the Middle East**, probably in the third week of the month. Since the Middle East Quartet will be meeting in New York, it

has been suggested that the Quartet provide a briefing to the Council. No decision had been made at press time.

There is likely to be considerable activity related to **sanctions**.

- The Council will receive a briefing from the chair of the **Iran Sanctions Committee** (1737).
- Reports from sanctions monitoring bodies for **Somalia** and **Sudan** are also due.
- At press time, members were discussing strengthening the Somalia sanctions regime through the adoption of new **targeted sanctions in Somalia** calling for additional measures against peace spoilers and arms embargo violators. A new resolution may be adopted in September.

Other issues that may come up in September are:

- the adoption of the **introduction to the annual report** of the Council to the General Assembly (in the last several years this has been done in a public meeting);

- discussions on the Secretary-General's report on the operation in **Haiti** due 31 August, and on the October renewal of MINUSTAH;
- a briefing on the **Djibouti/Eritrea** situation, requested by the Council in June;
- a briefing on the visit of the Special Envoy to **Myanmar**;
- discussions on **Zimbabwe** as a follow up to the Council's June presidential statement (S/PRST/2008/23); and
- discussions on a report, expected in late August or early September, by the **Lebanese** Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT).

Some additional issues have been on the minds of members, but it is unclear whether they will emerge in September. These include:

- the issue of whether to suspend proceedings before the **International Criminal Court** on **Darfur**; and
- arrangements for the deployment of an international military presence in **Somalia**.

## Status Update since our August Forecast

Recent developments on the situations covered in this *Forecast* are addressed in the relevant briefs. Interesting developments in the Council included:

- **Sierra Leone:** On 4 August, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1829 authorising the creation of a follow on peacebuilding office in Sierra Leone, the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), to replace the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) for a period of one year commencing on 1 October.
- **Kosovo:** On 6 August, the Council was briefed by Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations in closed consultations, on the UN's review of the actions taken by UN peacekeepers at Mitrovica on 17 March. No decisions were taken.
- **Georgia:** At press time, the Council had met seven times in August to discuss the situation in Georgia. It first met late on 7 August at Russia's request for consultations followed by an open meeting (S/PV.5951). After Georgia and the US requested a meeting, the Council held consultations to discuss a possible press statement and then held an open meeting (S/PV.5952) on 8 August. On 9 August, the Council held consultations and

was briefed by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Edmond Mulet. On 10 August, the Council held an open debate with Georgia's participation and was briefed by Under Secretary-General B. Lynn Pascoe and Mulet (S/PV.5953) after having had private consultations. The Council held a closed meeting on 11 August, during which Mulet and Pascoe briefed the Council. On 19 August, at the request of Georgia, the Council held consultations followed by an open meeting where Mulet and Pascoe again briefed the Council (S/PV.5961). Several drafts of a resolution on the situation in Georgia have been circulated. On 11 August, the French circulated a first French draft. This was followed by a second French draft on 19 August. On 20 August, Russia formally circulated its draft resolution (S/2008/570). The Council held closed consultations on 22 August and discussed the Russian and French draft resolutions.

- **Iraq:** On 7 August, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1830, renewing the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) for a period of 12 months. The resolution calls upon the government of Iraq and other member states to continue to provide security and logistical support to UNAMI. On 6 August, the Council

held an open debate (S/PV.5949) during which it was briefed by Under Secretary-General B. Lynn Pascoe on the report on UNAMI's activities (S/2008/495). The US on behalf of MNF-I described a sustained decrease in security incidents and violence. Nonetheless, Al-Qaida remained a serious threat, and the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq was of concern.

- **Counter-Terrorism (1540 Committee):** On 18 August, the 1540 Committee presented its second report (S/2008/493) to the Security Council on the status of implementation of resolution 1540 on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (S/PV.5955). The report indicated that although states had taken additional measures since the first report of the Committee in April 2006, further measures needed to be taken to implement resolution 1540 in full. The report called for the 1540 Committee to strengthen its clearing house role for channeling assistance to member states through enhancing its dialogue with member states to identify projects; making better use of financial mechanisms to build capacity to implement resolution 1540; and working more closely with global and regional bodies in developing innovative mechanisms to achieve implementation. >>page 3

## Status Update since our August Forecast (continued)

- **Algeria:** On 19 August, the Council met following consultations to discuss the terrorist attacks of earlier that day in Issers, Algeria (S/PV.5962). It adopted a presidential statement that condemned the attacks, underlined the need to bring those responsible to justice and reiterated the Council's determination to fight all forms of terrorism (S/PRST/2008/31).
- **Mauritania:** The Council met on 19 August to discuss the situation in Mauritania (S/PV.5960). It adopted a presidential statement that condemned the Mauritanian military's overthrow of the democratically elected government; welcomed statements by the AU, the EU and other members of the international community condemning the coup; and demanded "the immediate release of President Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi and the restoration of the legitimate, constitutional, democratic institutions immediately" (S/PRST/2008/30).
- **Timor-Leste:** On 19 August, the Council held an open debate (S/PV.5958) during which it was briefed by Atul Khare, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Timor-Leste on the Secretary-General's report on the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) (S/2008/501) and by Zacarias da Costa, Timor-Leste's Minister for Foreign Affairs. In his 29 July report, the Secretary-General recommended that no adjustments be made to the UNMIT mandate and strength given the fragility of the situation. The Council adopted a presidential statement reaffirming support for UNMIT, and acknowledging that the political, security, social and humanitarian situation in the country remains fragile. The statement also reaffirmed the importance of the review and reform of the security sector and ongoing efforts to reach accountability and justice (S/PRST/2008/29).
- **Middle East:** On 20 August, the Council held its monthly consultations on the Middle East, including the Palestinian Question. Under Secretary-General B. Lynn Pascoe gave a briefing on the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations and indirect talks between Israel and Syria. Pascoe emphasised that Hamas and the Palestinian Authority should both release detainees as a first step toward reconciliation. Israeli settlement activity also continued, and there has been no progress on talks for the release of the Israeli soldier captured in 2006 by Hamas. Finally, he pointed out that economic and daily life in Gaza remained extremely difficult. On Lebanon, he said that the past month was marked by positive political development, yet security concerns remained (S/PV.5963).
- **Pakistan:** On 21 August, the Council met following consultations to discuss the suicide attacks that occurred in Wah Cantt, Pakistan, earlier in the day (S/PV.5964). It adopted a presidential statement that condemned the attacks, underlined the need to bring those responsible to justice and reiterated the Council's determination to fight all forms of terrorism (S/PRST/2008/32).
- **Lebanon:** At press time, Council members were discussing a draft resolution introduced by France extending until 31 August 2009 the UNIFIL mandate. A meeting of UNIFIL troop contributors took place on 25 August (S/PV.5965) and at press time adoption of the resolution was scheduled for 27 August.
- **Burundi:** On 26 August, the Council held a debate on the situation in Burundi. Members were briefed by the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General for Burundi Youssef Mahmoud; the Chair of the PBC country specific configuration on Burundi, Ambassador Anders Lidén of Sweden; and Ambassador Augustin Nsanze of Burundi. The Council subsequently met in private consultations on the matter, after which its president read a statement to the press.
- **DRC:** On 26 August, the chairman of the DRC Sanctions Committee, Ambassador R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa (Indonesia), reported to the Council in private consultations on the latest report of the Group of Experts' on sanctions in the DRC.
- **Working Methods:** At press time, the Council was scheduled to hold an open debate on 27 August to discuss its working methods. The debate is being held in response to a request (S/2008/418) of the Group of Small Five or S5—Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland. (Please see our *Update Report* of 12 August 2008 on working methods.)

## Georgia

### Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to continue its focus on Georgia in September. At press time, it had met seven times in a combination of closed consultations and open meetings. Two draft resolutions, one by France and the other by Russia, were on the table at the end of August. The Council may also have to consider the impact of Russia's recognition on 26 August of South Ossetia and Abkhazian independence.

### Recent Developments

The Russia-Georgia conflict began on 7 August when the Georgian military deployed a large force into South Ossetia to "neutralise" rebel forces. Russia responded by sending in its troops. (Please see our 12 August *Update Report* for more details.)

By 15 August Russia and Georgia had signed a ceasefire plan brokered by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, current president of the EU. On 15 August, Georgia signed the agreement containing the following six principles:

1. all parties to renounce the use of force;
2. immediate cessation of hostilities;
3. free access to humanitarian aid;
4. withdrawal of Georgian forces to their places of permanent deployment;
5. withdrawal of Russian forces to the line prior to 7 August 2008 (the additional provision to this principle that "pending the definition of an international mechanism, the Russian peacekeeping forces may implement additional security measures" was further clarified in a letter from Sarkozy to Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili); and

6. international discussions on lasting security and stability arrangements for Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Since the start of the conflict on 7 August, the Council has met several times both as a whole and at the expert level. A second French draft resolution was circulated on 19 August when the Council met in closed consultations and in an open meeting. The French draft contained the following:

- reaffirmation of Georgia's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity;
- a demand for full and immediate compliance with the ceasefire agreement; and
- a demand for the immediate withdrawal of Russian forces to pre-7 August positions and the return of Georgian forces to their usual bases.

On 20 August, Russia produced its own draft resolution on the situation in Georgia.

It contained the six principles of the cease-fire agreement but did not mention Georgia's sovereignty, independence or territorial integrity.

On 21 August, the Council discussed in closed consultations the French and Russian drafts, the nature of the withdrawal and the modalities that might allow some Russian troops to remain in Georgia. Russia later formally circulated its draft.

On 22 August, Russia announced that it had completed the pullout of troops from Georgia. Britain, France and the UK said the withdrawal was not complete and called for further withdrawal.

On 26 August, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed decrees recognising South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states.

French President Sarkozy has called an EU leaders summit for 1 September to discuss future relations between the EU and Russia.

At a 19 August meeting, NATO ministers called on Russia to observe a ceasefire and withdraw its troops immediately and said that under the present circumstances NATO could not have "business as usual" relations with Russia. The next day Russia said it would halt military cooperation with NATO.

## Options

The Council has the following options:

- continue negotiations on a consensual resolution;
- vote on the Russian draft; or
- choose not to take any action.

Another option during the month if a resolution is adopted is a second resolution elaborating on the details of the international mechanism referred to in the Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement.

An additional option is to ask the Secretary-General to prepare recommendations on the role of the UN in monitoring the cease-fire and for the UN Observer Mission in Georgia's (UNOMIG) future.

## Key Issues

The key issue is what role the Council can play in resolving the current crisis. Related to this is whether having a consensual resolution at this point can reinforce the peace in this tenuous situation.

A connected issue is how much adopting a resolution can move forward unresolved issues such as:

- the consequences of the 26 August Russian recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia;
- legitimacy and implications of the security zone mentioned in Sarkozy's letter where the Russian peacekeeping forces would implement additional security measures;
- incentives that could be provided to Georgia in order for it to agree to abide by a resolution that, from its point of view, would be a less than perfect solution;
- the need for a more definite timetable for allowing the Russian peacekeepers to "implement additional security measures"; and
- whether international observers will be necessary in the immediate future and would this involve UNOMIG expanding to South Ossetia or will there need be two separate missions and how will this affect UNOMIG's mandate.

A significant issue is how to address key contentious matters such as territorial integrity and the final status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, particularly in the light of Russia's recognition of their independence.

An issue is whether the question of "obligatory abstention" should be raised. This refers to a provision in the UN Charter regarding a requirement for a party to a dispute to abstain from voting. (Please see our 12 August *Update Report* for more details.)

Another issue is the type of international mechanism to be set up and how this will affect UNOMIG.

## Council Dynamics

Most members want a consensual resolution but Russia's recognition of South Ossetia's and Abkhazia's independence has made this unlikely. The US and the European members of the Council object to the Russian draft as it does not include references to Georgia's territorial integrity. They have also called for further clarification of the six principles. Russia is clearly against mentioning territorial integrity and it appears to be supported by South Africa and Libya. Indonesia has shown sympathy for the Russian draft but is also interested in further clarifications. Vietnam, China, the Latin American countries and Burkina Faso have not openly taken sides.

## UN Documents

### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/2008/570 (21 August 2008) was the draft resolution circulated by Russia.
- S/RES/1808 (15 April 2008) extended UNOMIG until 15 October 2008.

### Selected Letters to the President of the Security Council

- S/2008/561 (19 August 2008) was the letter from France requesting a meeting of the Council on 19 August.
- S/2008/562 (16 August 2008) was the letter from Georgia on events occurring during the conflict.
- S/2008/557 (15 August 2008) contained the appeal of the parliament of Georgia to the international community.
- S/2008/545 (11 August 2008) was a letter from Russia stating its position on the conflict.
- S/2008/543 (9 August 2008) were the statements by the Georgian Foreign Ministry.

### Selected Council Meeting Records

- S/PV.5961 (19 August 2008) was the meeting on 19 August.
- S/PV.5953 (10 August 2008) was the meeting on 10 August.
- S/PV.5952 (8 August 2008) was the record of the meeting in the afternoon of 8 August.
- S/PV.5951 (8 August 2008) was the record of the meeting in the early hours of 8 August.

### Other

- Letter from President Sarkozy to President Saakashvili (16 August 2008)

## Somalia

### Expected Council Action

Somalia could be back in the Council again in September. The Sanctions Committee is expected to provide a midterm briefing, and at press time, a new sanctions resolution appeared to be under discussion. The goal would be to impose targeted measures against peace spoilers and violators of the arms embargo. However it remains to be seen whether there is actually going to be agreement on imposing real measures or simply a framework, and whether the measures will be even-handed or only applied to anti Transitional Federal Government (TFG) factions.

Informal discussions on options to improve security in Somalia and support implementation of the recent Djibouti Agreement between the TFG and opposition Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) are also likely to continue.

### Key Recent Developments

The Djibouti Agreement was formally signed on 18 August after almost an eight week delay. It had been initialled in Djibouti on 9 June and was supposed to be signed by the end of June. From 16 through 18 August, parties to the Djibouti Agreement held the first meetings of the two committees mandated by the agreement: the High Level Committee (which deals with political cooperation, justice and reconciliation) and the Joint Security Committee (which is tasked with implementing security arrangements). The parties adopted the terms of reference for both committees and discussed implementation of the Djibouti Agreement.

On 19 August, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1831, renewing the mandate of AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for a further six months. The resolution encourages the Secretary-General to continue to explore ways and means with the AU to strengthen UN logistical, political and technical support for the AU to assist in the full deployment of AMISOM.

There are still concerns the TFG is on the verge of splitting into separate camps under President Abdullahi Yusuf and Prime Minister Nur Adde Hassan Hussein. On 31 July, 32 members of parliament called on Nur Adde to resign. This followed the decision by Nur Adde and members of his cabinet on 29 July to dismiss Mogadishu mayor, Mohamed Dheere. Yusuf revoked the order to dismiss Dheere on 31 July, and ten out of 15 cabinet ministers, believed to be allies of Yusuf, resigned on 2 August. Five had reportedly been replaced by 5 August. On 24 August, it was reported Yusuf and Nur Adde had reached a preliminary agreement for reconciliation after meeting in Addis Ababa since 15 August.

Despite the signing of the agreement, violence worsened across Somalia. On 20 August, fighting erupted between Islamic insurgents and clan militias in the southern port city of Kismayo reportedly killing at least seventy people and displacing an esti-

mated 3,000 families. On 24 August, it was reported that the insurgents were in control of Kismayo and the 500-kilometre stretch of road connecting Kismayo with Mogadishu.

On 23 August, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah deplored the violence in Kismayo and expressed his sadness at the continuation of fighting between the TFG and ARS in and around Mogadishu and Afgoye on 16 and 17 August which resulted in a large number of civilian deaths. Heavy fighting also erupted on 21 August in Mogadishu between government/Ethiopian troops and Islamic insurgents resulting in at least 20 deaths. Four Ethiopian soldiers reportedly were killed on 19 and 20 August. Aid workers, faced with the growing challenge of responding to the needs of millions of vulnerable Somalis, have also been subject to increasing numbers of attacks, resulting in an estimated 22 deaths of aid workers in 2008.

In a communiqué issued after the signing of the Djibouti Agreement, the TFG and the ARS called on the Security Council to accelerate the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force to facilitate the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia. Earlier in August, the chairman of the ARS, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, called on Arab countries to send peacekeepers to Somalia.

On 6 August, Canada announced it would deploy a frigate to Somalia to protect UN World Food Programme (WFP) maritime convoys in accordance with resolution 1814, which on 15 May called on member states to protect shipping involved in delivering humanitarian aid to Somalia. (The WFP delivers 80 percent of its aid to Somalia by sea. Naval escorts had been suspended since the Netherlands ended its deployment on 30 June.)

On 11 August, France and Spain announced they would deploy frigates in a coordinated initiative to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia under resolution 1816 of 2 June which condemned maritime piracy off the Somali coast and urged states to increase and coordinate their efforts to deter such acts. (Pirates have hijacked at least 35 ships off the Somali coast in 2008 alone, including four in the period 19 - 21 August.)



### Related Developments in the Sanctions Committee

The Somalia Sanctions Committee met with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, on 24 July to discuss possible targeted measures to be imposed against arms embargo violators and those determined to be impeding the political process, as requested in resolution 1814 of 15 May. The Committee seems supportive of imposing individual targeted sanctions (including travel bans and financial sanctions), and designating persons and entities subject to the individual measures. Consideration is also being given to introducing an arms embargo against individuals and entities directly supplying weapons. Targeted measures against those violating the arms embargo were recommended by the Panel of Experts on Somalia in S/2003/223 of March 2003, but have never been adopted. Since resolution 1474 of April 2003 the Council has repeatedly ignored reports of the Sanctions Monitoring Group on those breaching the arms embargo.

### Options

One option for the Council is to adopt a resolution introducing targeted measures (travel bans and assets freezes) against named individuals. An alternative would be to adopt a framework resolution leaving the actual task of identifying specific individuals to the Committee.

Another option is for the Council to take up existing recommendations from the Sanctions Monitoring Group to further strengthen the arms embargo, including:

- a comprehensive border surveillance and interdiction effort;
- a trade embargo on the export of charcoal; and
- a ban on foreign vessels fishing in Somali waters, and a trade embargo on the export of fish caught in Somali waters.

Another option on the security situation could be to task the Secretariat with devel-

oping a concept of operations for an international stabilisation force, and also developing a firm list of states willing to contribute troops, funding and equipment. (This latter point would be in line with the 2000 Brahimi Report on UN Peace Operations, which recommends that the Council “leave in draft form resolutions authorizing missions with sizeable troop levels until such time as the Secretary-General has firm commitments of troops and other critical mission support elements”.)

Other options include:

- revisiting the issues associated with a peacekeeping operation and establishing benchmarks for the Somali parties to make real progress on;
- requesting concrete options from the Secretary-General on ways and means to strengthen UN logistical, political and technical support for AMISOM; and
- calling on the Secretariat to provide more detailed information on options for the provision of security for the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) with a view to its early relocation from Nairobi to Somalia.

### Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is whether sufficient progress has been made in the peace process and the security situation to warrant taking further steps towards an international force.

A related issue is what the Council can do to reinforce the political reconciliation process. Given the primary requirement of the agreement is to ensure the cessation of all armed confrontation and given the increase in violence immediately after its signature, a related issue is whether this agreement will bring durable peace and thus whether it can be a sufficient foundation for a peacekeeping deployment. The rift in the TFG leadership and their lack of focus on the peace agreement further calls into question the agreement’s ability to hold.

A major underlying issue is whether it will be possible to attract major elements from Somalia’s armed insurgency into a peace process under the current strategies or whether new strategies need to be developed and what impact Council action could have on this issue.

An important question is whether any states are willing and able to provide troops (with

training in counter insurgency and counter terrorist techniques), funding and robust equipment given that other operations especially in Darfur continue to struggle to attract key logistical assets.

With regard to sanctions, a central issue is whether the Council members will reach agreement on persons and entities to be subject to the individual measures and whether this will remain unresolved and delegated to the Committee. A related issue is whether the measures will target all arms embargo violators and peace spoilers in a balanced way, or whether it will focus only on those not currently party to the Djibouti Agreement. A related issue is the possible impact of this in terms of the perceptions of the UN taking sides.

Another issue is whether any measures will also address the problem of regional support for spoilers.

Other issues include:

- the regional dimension, including foreign support for the insurgency;
- ensuring security and relocation for UNPOS;
- lack of progress with increasing staff for UNPOS;
- addressing violations of international humanitarian law and the lack of humanitarian access; and
- human rights and justice issues.

### Council Dynamics

Members are united in their concern for the humanitarian situation in Somalia and the need to support Somali initiatives in implementing the Djibouti Agreement. However there are differences on how best to do this. Given the Djibouti Agreement calls for the deployment of an international stabilisation force, most members seem to be focussing on whether this is feasible.

Many Council members appear to favour the introduction of additional measures against arms embargo violators and those impeding the political process. Some see this as an opportunity to support the parties to the Djibouti Agreement. Others consider targeted sanctions as an acknowledgement of factors including the Monitoring Group’s earlier and repeated recommendation that individual targeted sanctions be imposed on violators. Others also refer to the AU call for measures against those undermining the peace and reconciliation process.

In general there is a sense that the Djibouti Agreement has made it much easier to choose. Spoilers of the peace process can be identified as those not supporting the agreement. Targeted measures would therefore play a useful role punishing and potentially deterring these entities and individuals. However, while there appears to be broad support in principle for the introduction of targeted sanctions, agreeing on the targeted individuals or entities is likely to continue to pose problems.

The AU is pushing for the Council to establish an interim international stabilisation force, which would be followed by a UN peacekeeping operation. Other Council members supporting the deployment of some form of stabilisation or peacekeeping force include the US and Italy. However, the funding for a coalition based stabilisation force will have to be borne by the troop-contributing countries and donors. Given the cost and the risk, identifying a suitable lead nation is recognised as a major problem.

Most Council members are therefore reserving their positions on any deployment at least until the Secretariat can produce a comprehensive list of options for the Council to consider. Some are already dismissing the type of force earlier recommended by the Secretary-General in March (up to 27,000 troops). Instead, they have suggested a smaller force which would conduct activities in order of priority rather than simultaneously (for example, securing humanitarian corridors to Mogadishu followed by securing Mogadishu and then moving out to wider Somalia).

There is awareness that action in some form needs to be taken. But there is also real scepticism that there is enough progress on the political and security fronts (some are saying that the security situation has worsened). There are also serious concerns about the ability to implement any planned deployment. Many members are keen to avoid the asset problems faced by the peacekeeping mission in Darfur and especially to avoid exacerbating the current logistical and force generation problems confronting UN-AU Mission in Darfur. Many want evidence of real commitments from states offering troops, funding and equipment.

Despite Khartoum's political and diplomatic efforts to counter the ICC prosecutor's request for an arrest warrant against Bashir, its cooperation with UNAMID appears to have improved, reportedly including long-delayed permission for night flights.

There are nonetheless also reports of increased government pressure and implied threats. The Secretary-General's Special Representative and Head of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), Ashraf Qazi, noted that the government had said that "the issuance of an arrest warrant against President Bashir could create a situation that might have serious consequences for United Nations staff and infrastructure in the Sudan."

The Sudanese government also unveiled a reconciliation initiative for Darfur including a national dialogue conference, but as of yet no dates have been officially announced. The government also appointed a prosecutor to head domestic proceedings on serious crimes in Darfur. But scepticism remains due to the timing, the lack of Sudanese legislation dealing with such crimes, and weaknesses in the Sudanese judiciary. The government reportedly continued to refuse to execute pending ICC arrest warrants for Ahmed Haroun and Ali Kushayb.

UNAMID's deployment made some progress with the arrival of Egyptian and Ethiopian contingents in August. Long-standing shortages of troops and assets continue, however, as the mission struggles with logistical challenges. It is unclear whether the mission will be able to deploy 80 percent of its authorised strength by the end of the year as planned.

In August, Sudan and Chad restored diplomatic relations. Media reports indicate that would be in the context of another Libyan-sponsored peace plan, and a summit to formalise it may be in the works. The AU-sponsored Dakar Agreement Contact Group has continued talks on the establishment of a border monitoring force. A new meeting of the Contact Group is currently scheduled for 26 August in Eritrea.

Tensions between Chad and Sudan continue, however, with persistent reports of each

## Sudan

### Expected Council Action

Darfur will continue to be a focus for the Council in September. In particular Council members are expected to discuss issues relating to the deployment of the UN-AU Mission (UNAMID) and current proceedings before the International Criminal Court (ICC).

It is unclear whether any formal proposals for a suspension of proceedings against Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir before the ICC will emerge in September.

A report from the sanctions Panel of Experts is due by 15 September.

### Key Recent Developments

Violence against civilians and humanitarian workers remains on the rise, with reports of a new government offensive in north Darfur. In early August, the aid organisation Médecins Sans Frontières announced that it would pull out from locations in North Darfur amidst rising insecurity and repeated attacks. Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes cautioned that "impunity for such attacks must end". He noted that the government has a responsibility to ensure security throughout its territory, but also that the armed opposition groups in Darfur have a clear obligation to guarantee the security of relief workers and access to vulnerable populations.

On 31 July, the Council renewed the UNAMID mandate for 12 months in resolution 1828. This was preceded by intense negotiations on a proposal, following a request to the ICC from its prosecutor for an arrest warrant against al-Bashir, to include language suspending ICC proceedings under article 16 of the Rome Statute. The majority resisted this proposal, but compromise was found in emphasising the need to bring the perpetrators of serious crimes to justice (and the government's obligations in this respect) and also mentioning some Council members' concerns related to the request for an arrest warrant against al-Bashir. The resolution took note of those members' intention to consider these matters further.

The US remained resolutely opposed to any compromise and abstained in the vote, signalling its opposition to reopening the ICC issue. Ambassador Alejandro Wolff, the US Deputy Permanent Representative, said that this would "send the wrong signal" to al-Bashir and "undermine efforts to bring him and others to justice."

## UN Documents

### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1831 (19 August 2008) renewed AMISOM for six months.
- S/RES/1816 (2 June 2008) authorised action against piracy in Somalia.
- S/RES/1814 (15 May 2008) requested an update to the Secretary-General's phased approach and reiterated the Council's intention to strengthen the arms embargo.
- S/RES/733 (23 January 1992) imposed an arms embargo.

### Selected Reports of the Secretary-General

- S/2008/466 (16 July 2008) was the most recent report.
- S/2008/178 (14 March 2008) contained the strategy for Somalia.

### Latest Monitoring Group's Report

- S/2008/274 (24 April 2008)

### Other

- S/PV.5942 (23 July 2008) was the most recent Council briefing by Ould-Abdallah.
- S/2000/809 (21 August 2000) was the Brahimi Report.

## Other Relevant Facts

### Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania)

### UNPOS: Size and Cost

- Maximum authorised size: 44 international and 28 local civilians
- Size as of 30 June 2008: 16 international and 11 local civilians
- 2008 budget: about \$16 million

### UNPOS: Duration

15 April 1995 to present; mandate expires on 31 December 2009

### AMISOM: Size, Composition and Cost

- Maximum authorised strength: 8,000 troops plus maritime and air components
- Strength as of 16 July 2008: about 2,650 Ugandan and Burundian troops
- Key resource contributors: US, EU, Italy, Sweden, China and the Arab League

### AMISOM: Duration

February 2007 to present: AU mandate expires on 17 January 2009 and Council authorisation expires on 19 February 2009.

country providing support to the others' rebel groups. There is also a perception that the likelihood of deploying a credible border monitoring mission may be low given unfulfilled similar commitments from the 2006 Tripoli Agreement between Chad and Sudan.

The north-south situation remains fragile, and significant challenges for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) continue. However, a joint administration for the contested area of Abyei was established in early August in accordance with the roadmap agreed between the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM).

In his July report on Sudan, the Secretary-General warned that "the most critical outstanding issue after that of Abyei remains the demarcation of the 1 January 1956 boundary. The delay in this process has caused the two sides to deploy forces along border areas to attain better bargaining positions, creating a *de facto* border line as a consequence. Local flashpoints in those areas have the potential to escalate into confrontations larger than the recent clashes witnessed in Abyei."

In a briefing to the Council on 18 August, Special Representative Qazi provided an assessment of the status of the CPA implementation and UNMIS' response to the recent crisis in Abyei. He cautioned that "ultimate success will require the parties to realise that peace can be consolidated only through the full implementation of the Abyei road map and the successful demarcation of the 1956 border." He further underscored that UNMIS, being a "Chapter VI mission", "neither possesses the robust intervention capability nor was it provided the requisite political and military space by the parties, including the freedom of movement for monitoring and verification."

## Options

The most likely option for the Council in September is a wait-and-see approach on the humanitarian situation, UNAMID's deployment and the peace process. If the security situation deteriorates, the Council may consider adopting a statement expressing concern and signalling intention to consider measures against peace spoilers.

But another set of options would include exploring more vigorous Council involvement in improving security and managing the regional situation, including:

- supporting the convening of an international conference to generate momentum for a ceasefire;
- requesting regular briefings from the chief mediator, perhaps in consultations;
- establishing a new mechanism for closer Council monitoring of developments regarding UNAMID;
- setting a timeframe for the investigation on the 8 July attacks against UNAMID;
- increasing pressure on the parties by expanding the list of individuals and entities subject to targeted sanctions and developing a wider spectrum of measures and trigger mechanisms;
- re-energising the Sanctions Committee by seriously responding to the forthcoming findings of the Panel of Experts, including official (and perhaps public) demarches against violators; and
- expanding the regional focus by organising informal interactions with the Chad-Sudan Dakar Agreement Contact Group, perhaps in an Arria-style format.

On justice and accountability, options include:

- adopting a wait-and-see approach on the ICC's consideration of its prosecutor's request for an arrest warrant against al-Bashir;
- reaching an understanding with Sudan that al-Bashir's ICC proceedings could be suspended for one year provided that there is a watertight arrangement on Sudan's cooperation with the ICC over other indictees, improved cooperation with UNAMID, and concrete steps towards a ceasefire. (A necessary measure in this regard might be to consider a spectrum of sanctions against the rebels should they refuse to cease hostilities.); and
- some other watertight arrangement that would ensure legal accountability for ICC indictees, perhaps along the lines of the Lebanon tribunal (which applies domestic law but uses international judges and a neutral location—but a problem in this option is the absence of domestic legislation in Sudan incorporating the relevant international crimes).

## Key Issues

On Darfur, the key issue is whether there is anything the Council can do to encourage the parties to move towards a genuine ceasefire and a peace process. Another is improving security and, in that context, determining how best to advance UNAMID's deployment.

Justice and accountability issues seem likely to preoccupy members, in particular whether an appropriate balance can be found that:

- preserves the integrity and independence of the ICC and avoids impunity;
- encourages Sudan's cooperation with UNAMID;
- improves the prospects of a ceasefire and peace process in Darfur; and
- preserves overall stability in Sudan.

One key issue in this regard is that, should the option of domestic judicial mechanisms in substitution for the ICC be considered, important challenges would arise. In addition to issues relating to judicial capacity and independence, Sudan's legal system does not contain specific provisions for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.

Still another issue is whether the Council should increase its focus on the broader challenges facing Sudan, in particular whether there is anything the Council should do on the north-south situation. This includes how best to ensure progress in implementing the CPA on elections in 2009 and a southern independence referendum in 2011; demarcating the north-south border and the status of Abyei; and oil-revenue sharing.

## Council and Wider Dynamics

Divisions within the Council on ICC issues are expected to continue. China, Russia, South Africa, Libya, Burkina Faso and Indonesia support the suspension of ICC proceedings. Other Council members believe it is more important to safeguard legal mechanisms and to ensure accountability.

But recent developments on the ICC issue also seem to indicate that some of those members may be open to the possibility of an article 16 suspension of ICC proceedings for al-Bashir. This would be provided there are serious steps from Khartoum in improving cooperation with the ICC, including credible action against other indictees, as well as real cooperation with UNAMID's deployment, facilitating humanitarian assistance and creating genuine conditions for a peace process. (There also seems to be a perception that pressure may be required on the rebels in that regard.) Many seem unconvinced of Khartoum's recent efforts on domestic mechanisms for justice and accountability, being mindful of past similar initiatives that they see as lacking credibility.

Council members and within the Secretariat in reaching a quick decision so as to allow for timely troop generation and in order to avoid a security vacuum.

A report of the Secretary-General on MINURCAT is due and is expected to include options and recommendations with respect to both issues. Another report, from the EU on EUFOR's activities, is also due.

It seems that agreement within the Council on a post-EUFOR arrangement, perhaps with the force's re-hatting under MINURCAT, is achievable. An important factor, however, will be prior agreement from the Chadian government.

Members are also acutely aware of the unresolved issues regarding political reconciliation in Chad. It is unclear whether there will be a demand for a specific political reconciliation role for MINURCAT in the mandate.

### Key Recent Developments

The humanitarian and security situation in Chad and the region remain extremely precarious. Civilians and humanitarian workers continue to face great challenges from attacks, militia infiltration in camps, banditry, lawlessness and impunity, gender-based violence and the recruitment of children. There are concerns about a renewed rebel offensive once the rainy season ends in September.

No progress was made on political reconciliation in Chad. The EU-sponsored Inter-Chadian Agreement of 13 August 2007 between the government and the political opposition has not been implemented, nor has the Libyan-sponsored Sirte Agreement of 25 October 2007 between the government and major rebel groups. (The Inter-Chadian Agreement provides for a census, amendments to the electoral law and voter registration with a view to elections in 2009. Rebels pulled out of the Sirte Agreement and have refused to lay down arms.)

Chadian civil society groups have apparently denounced President Idriss Déby's resistance to initiating a meaningful national

## UN Documents

### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1828 (31 July 2008) renewed UNAMID.
- S/RES/1769 (31 July 2007) established UNAMID.
- S/RES/1672 (25 April 2006), 1591 (29 March 2005) and 1556 (30 July 2004) imposed sanctions.
- S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.
- S/RES/1590 (24 March 2005) established UNMIS.

### Selected Security Council Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2008/27 (16 July 2008) was a statement signalling the Council's determination to take action against those responsible for the 8 July attack against UNAMID troops.
- S/PRST/2008/24 (24 June 2008) was a statement on Abyei.
- S/PRST/2008/21 (16 June 2008) was a statement urging Sudan's cooperation with the ICC.

### Selected Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2008/443 (7 July 2008) was the latest UNAMID report.
- S/2008/267 (22 April 2008) was the latest UNMIS report.

### Selected Council Meeting Records

- S/PV.5956 (18 August 2008) was the recent briefing by Special Representative Ashraf Qazi.
- S/PV.5947 (31 July 2008) was the record of the adoption of resolution 1828.
- S/PV.5905 (5 June 2008) was the most recent briefing by ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo.

### Other

- S/2008/525 (5 August 2008) and 481 (23 July 2008) were letters from the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and the AU Peace and Security Council calling on the UN Security Council to suspend ICC proceedings.
- S/2008/460 (15 July 2008) was the report of the June Council mission to Africa.
- SC/9391 (9 July 2008) was a press statement condemning the 8 July attack against UNAMID troops.
- A/HRC/7/22 (3 March 2008) was the most recent Sudan human rights report to the Human Rights Council.
- S/2007/584 (2 October 2007) was the latest Panel of Experts' report.

## Other Relevant Facts

### UNAMID: Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur

Rodolphe Adada (Republic of Congo)

### Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator

Djibrill Yipènè Bassolé (Burkina Faso)

### UNAMID: Size, Composition and Cost

- Maximum authorised strength: up to 19,555 military, 3,772 police and 19 formed police units
- Strength as of 31 July 2008: 7,967 troops, 158 observers and 1,870 police
- Main troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa and Senegal
- Cost: 1 July 2008—30 June 2009: \$1.5 billion

### UNAMID: Duration

31 July 2007 to present; mandate expires 31 July 2009

### UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Ashraf Qazi (Pakistan)

### UNMIS: Size, Composition and Cost

- Maximum authorised strength: up to 10,000 military and 715 police personnel
- Strength as of 31 July 2008: 8,710 troops, 546 observers and 622 police
- Main troop contributors: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh
- Cost: 1 July 2008—30 June 2009: \$858.77 million

### UNMIS: Duration

24 March 2005 to present; mandate expires 30 April 2009

## Chad/MINURCAT

### Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), which expires on 25 September.

An important aspect of discussions is likely to be the issue of future arrangements for a military presence in Chad after March 2009, when the mandate of the EU Force in the region (EUFOR) expires. The EU has already indicated that its preference for EUFOR's mandate not to be renewed beyond March in line with the prior understanding behind resolution 1778, which authorised EUFOR. There is therefore strong interest among

dialogue. Those groups, it seems, perceive Déby's strategy as being one of dividing the opposition by offering government posts while resisting broader institutional reforms. They have reportedly urged that priority be given to addressing the armed conflict, and have criticised the Inter-Chadian Agreement for excluding civil society and being limited to elections. But some observers have apparently voiced concern about rebels' trustworthiness given their lack of a clear political agenda, and their refusal to lay down arms.

Sudan and Chad recently agreed to restore diplomatic relations. Media reports say that this is in the context of another Libyan-sponsored peace plan, and that a summit to formalise it may be in the works. The AU-sponsored Dakar Agreement Contact Group, established with respect to the 13 March agreement between Chad and Sudan, also held talks on the establishment of a border monitoring force, expected to include 200 monitors from Contact Group members (which include the Republic of Congo, Gabon, Libya, Eritrea and Senegal) plus 1,000 from Sudan and Chad each. A new meeting of the Contact Group is currently scheduled for 26 August in Eritrea.

Tensions between Chad and Sudan continue, however, with persistent reports of the two countries providing support to each others' rebel groups. There is also a perception that the prospects of deploying a credible border monitoring mission may be very low (given unfulfilled similar commitments from the 2006 Tripoli Agreement between Chad and Sudan).

Progress with deploying MINURCAT and EUFOR has also been slow, which appears to be due to logistical challenges, as well as issues of generating troops and assets. As of July, EUFOR's troop strength stood at 3,200 (out of 3,700 planned). Agreement was reached with non-EU members Russia and Albania for the provision of troops and equipment. Talks were also being held with Croatia and Ukraine. Some progress has reportedly been made with MINURCAT's training of Chadian gendarmerie (the *Détachement intégré de sécurité*, or DIS) for security in camps in eastern Chad. Out of planned 850 gendarmes, 270 had reportedly completed the training programme as of early August.

In his July report on MINURCAT, the Secretary-General warned that "EUFOR and

MINURCAT are not in a position to directly address the problem of cross-border movement by armed groups. Furthermore, the mandates of MINURCAT and EUFOR limit the role of the two missions to addressing only the consequences and not the issues underlying the conflict in Chad. Unless these fundamental issues are addressed, and in the absence of a viable dialogue between the Government and all opposition groups, the resources invested by the international community in Chad risk being wasted."

On 25 June, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC, of which Chad is a member) adopted a communiqué urging a role for MINURCAT, EUFOR and the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) on border security. (This may signal a change in Chad's position, and raises questions vis-à-vis the Dakar Agreement border force.)

In late June-early July, a joint EU-UN mission visited the region to provide recommendations on arrangements for an international military presence post-March 2009, when EUFOR expires. During the trip, the Chadian government apparently requested that the number of DIS gendarmes be increased from 850 to 1,700.

In a 22 July document, the EU Council again urged that, after duly consulting the Chadian and Central African authorities, "all steps be taken to ensure that arrangements for following up the EU's operation are put in place, with the possible inclusion of a United Nations operation".

The Secretariat and the EU are currently working on future peacekeeping options, including re-hatting EUFOR as a component of MINURCAT. There is a strong interest in moving quickly so as to avoid a security vacuum after the departure of EUFOR. Some EUFOR contributors have already indicated interest in continuing under MINURCAT, and the Secretariat is currently in talks with other potential contributors.

On 7-8 August, the Secretary-General's Special Representative and Head of MINURCAT, Victor da Silva Ângelo, convened a two-day roundtable in Stockholm to take stock of the deployment of MINURCAT and EUFOR ahead of Council discussions on the issue in September. Participants included the Chadian government, the UN, the EU, the AU, the Council's permanent members and Libya.

There seem to be plans for some Secretariat officials to travel to Chad to discuss future peacekeeping options, but as of this writing no date had apparently been scheduled yet. At press time, it seemed unlikely that the recommendations to the Council would include a strong political reconciliation mandate for MINURCAT in Chad, given the government's apparent opposition.

## Options

The first set of options is for the Council to:

- renew MINURCAT, while perhaps supporting the increase in the number of Chadian DIS gendarmes from 850 to 1,700; and
- authorise a post-EUFOR military protection arrangement as a UN peacekeeping operation with generation of new contingents to proceed as quickly as possible, with EUFOR personnel to remain in a transitional role. A further option would be to re-hat EUFOR as a military component of MINURCAT.

This first set of options could address uncertainties about the security presence in eastern Chad. But it is based on the assumption that the fragile situation in Chad and threats to civilians are primarily due to the conflict in Darfur, and that current regional and international efforts for political reconciliation in Chad and between Chad and Sudan will yield tangible results. It carries the risk that, should those efforts make no progress, MINURCAT and the post-EUFOR arrangement would be left in a difficult ongoing situation without a credible exit strategy.

A second option is for the Council to renew MINURCAT, reach an early agreement on a post-EUFOR arrangement and:

- acknowledge that the conflict in Chad and the region is also a result of domestic political instability;
- establish an expanded mandate for MINURCAT vis-à-vis political reconciliation in Chad with a view to a credible ceasefire and all-inclusive national dialogue;
- include in the mandate support for and assistance in the implementation of the Inter-Chadian and Sirte Agreements; and
- request MINURCAT to coordinate and liaise with the Dakar Agreement Contact Group, with a view to establishing a credible border-monitoring mechanism.

A third option, in the event of government opposition to a UN role in political

reconciliation in Chad, is for the Council to:

- demand implementation of the existing agreements;
- encourage regional players to play a more proactive role in re-energising talks between the Chadian government and rebels; and
- request MINURCAT to liaise and actively support the EU, the AU, Libya and the Dakar Agreement Contact Group in the implementation of the agreements, and call on all concerned parties to cooperate with MINURCAT.

A related option is for Council members to consider a range of measures to contain the conflict in Chad and encourage implementation of existing agreements, including an arms embargo and targeted measures against peace spoilers.

### Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is the immediate need to secure a follow-on security presence once EUFOR's mandate ends.

An ongoing question has been whether the political instability in Chad should be recognised as a problem in its own right, and whether the Council should be involved in encouraging a solution. This raises a number of related issues, including:

- the need for an all-inclusive national dialogue;
- whether to set preconditions to rebel participation, including that they lay down arms; and
- whether the Council and MINURCAT should become involved in that respect.

The underlying issues include:

- the lack of a credible exit strategy for MINURCAT and EUFOR's follow-on presence;
- security risks if peacekeepers are dragged into the conflict especially in the absence of a political reconciliation component in the mandate; and
- the proxy war between Chad and Sudan, and the need for credible border monitoring.

### Council and Wider Dynamics

There is real awareness in the Council of the fragility of the situation in the region and within Chad. Members are conscious of the interconnectedness of the conflicts in Sudan and Chad, and the support that each country has rendered for the other's rebel groups. There also seems to be a perception within the Council, particularly

from EU members, that the current peacemaking efforts in Darfur are unlikely to yield tangible results.

Council members appear to agree that, given the likely security situation and the EU's intention to end its EUFOR mandate in March, there needs to be a follow-on security presence but this would need the consent of the Chadian government. Within the EU, there also seems to be a particular concern with the need for a meaningful response to the problem of banditry and lawlessness, and the related need to speed up MINURCAT's deployment and training for Chadian gendarmerie.

Because of the government's previous reluctance about a UN role in political reconciliation in Chad, the current wait-and-see approach has had some support particularly from France and Libya. Some argue that rebels should lay down arms as a precondition for talks. Others, however, point out to the fact that this policy has not been the case in peacemaking efforts in Darfur.

### UN Documents

#### Selected Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1778 (25 September 2007) established MINURCAT and authorised the EU protection force.

#### Selected Security Council Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2008/22 (16 June 2008) was a statement on the June rebel offensive in Chad.
- S/PRST/2008/15 (13 May 2008) condemned a Darfur rebel attack near Khartoum.
- S/PRST/2008/3 (4 February 2008) contained an expression of support for external military assistance to the Chadian government.

#### Latest Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2008/532 (7 August 2008) was a report on children and armed conflict in Chad.
- S/2008/444 (8 July 2008) was the most recent MINURCAT report.

### Other Relevant Facts

#### MINURCAT: Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Victor da Silva Ângelo (Portugal)

#### MINURCAT: Size, Composition and Cost

- Authorised strength: up to 300 police and 50 military liaison officers



- Strength as of 31 July 2008: 200 police and 33 military observers
- Main police contributors: Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and France
- Cost: approved budget 1 July 2008–30 June 2009: \$315 million

#### MINURCAT: Duration

September 2007 to present; mandate expires on 25 September 2008

#### EU Force: Size, Composition and Cost

- Expected strength: 3,700 troops and 600 on reserve
- Strength as of July 2008: 3,247 troops
- Main contributors: France (1,671), Ireland (408), Poland (299), Austria (177) and Sweden (174)
- Cost: €119.6 million

#### EU Force: Duration

17 March 2008 to present; mandate expires on 17 March 2009

### Useful Additional Source

- 25 June 2008 CEMAC Communiqué

## Iran

### Expected Council Action

The E3+3 countries (France, Germany and the UK plus China, Russia and the US) have been discussing further sanctions against Iran in light of its ongoing noncompliance with Council demands to stop uranium enrichment. However, recent events in Georgia have created tensions between Russia on the one hand and the US and the Europeans. The tensions seem likely to slow down discussions on the Iranian nuclear issue.

The September general debate of the General Assembly in New York is likely to provide an opportunity for the E3+3 to hold high-level meetings on Iran's nuclear programme. This year the debate will be held from 23 September to 1 October.

At press time, it was unclear whether there would be any major development on the Iran nuclear issue in September. A report and a briefing by the chairman of the 1737

Sanctions Committee is due in September. (The Committee was established under resolution 1737, which in December 2006 imposed Chapter VII measures against Iran not involving the use of armed force.)

### Key Recent Developments

Javier Solana, the EU Foreign Policy Chief and E3+3 representative, on 14 June travelled to Iran with representatives from the E3 (France, Germany and the UK) and from China and Russia to present Iran a new offer for negotiations. This new proposal reinforced the 2006 E3+3 package of incentives by adding new political and economic measures such as improvement of direct dialogue between the E3+3 and Iran, promotion of cooperation (in particular on Afghanistan and drug trafficking) and of Iran's constructive role in international affairs, reaffirmation of the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and of the prohibition against the threat or use of force in international relations. Other measures included assistance to Iran for economic, social and human development projects (education and emergency response capabilities in particular). The E3+3 also proposed to establish a joint monitoring group for the implementation of a future agreement. In addition to this proposal, Solana submitted a paper outlining the way forward, which would include three steps:

1. a preliminary period of talks between Solana and the Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili;
2. a maximum six-week pre-negotiation phase during which Iran would not increase its number of centrifuges and the E3+3 would not adopt any new sanctions—a “double freeze” period that would allow some talks to take place in the absence of uranium enrichment suspension; and
3. formal negotiations within the framework of “double suspension” involving Iran suspending its sensitive nuclear activities (including uranium enrichment) and the Council suspending its sanctions.

On 15 July, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that Iran was ready to open comprehensive negotiations but that it would never accept preconditions.

On 19 July, Solana and representatives of the E3+3 met with Jalili in Geneva to discuss this revised package. Jalili introduced a proposal setting modalities for starting

negotiations, but this did not include any movement on the “freeze” of “suspension” issues. It seems that Jalili sought to concentrate on common ground between the Iranian proposal for negotiations on long-term cooperation in the political, security, economic and nuclear fields made in May, and the E3+3 proposal. (Those common points include launching a dialogue between Iran and the E3+3, cooperation on regional security issues and drug trafficking, and cooperation on trade, investment and the provision of energy, including nuclear energy.) The decision to ignore the key issues of freeze and suspension led the E3+3 to ask Jalili to provide a clearer answer to their proposal within two weeks.

On 5 August, Iran said that it was ready to provide an answer if the E3+3 presented their position on Iran's proposal in May. (The E3+3 never formally responded to it.) The US described this answer as a “stalling tactic” while the UK, France and Germany expressed disappointment at what they saw as a negation of their proposal. Accordingly, on 7 August the E3+3 agreed to consider further sanctions against Iran. Despite the breakdown of discussions on the E3+3 proposal, Jalili and Solana on 11 August agreed in a telephone conversation to continue talks.

On 28 July, President Ahmadinejad announced that Iran now possessed between 5,000 and 6,000 nuclear centrifuges, almost twice what it disclosed in April 2007.

A rise in tensions between Iran and the US was also visible on 9 and 10 July when Iran conducted ballistic missile tests. In response the US said it was ready to defend its allies in the region if they are attacked.

On 8 August, the EU amended its common position implementing Security Council sanctions against Iran. The new amendments slightly extended sanctions in resolution 1803 by calling on the EU's financial institutions to exercise “restraint” (not just vigilance) on export credits, and decreeing that EU member states inspect Iran-bound cargoes.

On 13 June, the chairman of the 1737 Sanctions Committee, Belgian Ambassador Jan Grauls, briefed the Council on the activities of the Committee in the previous three months. He said that to date, 89 country reports were submitted to the Committee

under resolution 1737 of 2006, 76 reports under resolution 1747 of 2007 and 51 reports under resolution 1803 of 2008. (Resolution 1803 requested states to submit implementation reports by 2 May.)

During the briefing, France indicated that Iran had been in violation of resolution 1803 since 3 June as the resolution gave Iran three months to comply and the IAEA reported on non-compliance. The UK said that three steps were still required of Iran to re-establish confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme: suspension of uranium enrichment activities, implementation of the Additional Protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty granting special access to sensitive sites for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and resolving all past outstanding issues of concern for the IAEA. The US said that the Council should stand ready to adopt additional measures against Iran.

### Key Issues

The main issue for the Council at this stage is whether the E3+3 will find a common position on another round of sanctions against Iran in the coming weeks.

A related issue in the minds of some Council members is whether there is much appetite to give to the diplomatic track significantly more time. Iran has repeatedly indicated its refusal to accept preconditions for negotiations and has not complied with the previous four Council resolutions.

### Council and Wider Dynamics

Although the E3+3 seem to agree on the need to continue the dual-track approach of increasing pressure while seeking a diplomatic solution, divisions seem to be deepening regarding the immediate way forward. For Russia and China, Iran's proposal in May and that of the E3+3 in June have similarities on the basis of which a dialogue could be initiated. The Russians and Chinese also seem to hold the view that there should be more flexibility on the condition of suspension of uranium enrichment for beginning substantive discussions. They seem to believe that the current diplomatic track still has a chance to produce results.

France and the UK seem eager for the Council to adopt enhanced sanctions quickly. Germany and the US seem to believe that the timing is not ideal for adopting further sanctions at this stage even

though they also considered Iran's answer to the E3+3 proposal as unacceptable.

The US showed important flexibility by having a representative attend the talks with Jalili in Geneva on 19 July. The US also accepted a "pre-negotiation period" which would only require Iran to stop expanding its enrichment capacity but not suspend it completely.

Following its ministerial conference in Tehran from 27 to 30 July 2008, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) made a statement on Iran's nuclear issue reaffirming the right of all states to develop production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and stressing that Iran's choice must therefore be respected. It welcomed positive developments in cooperation between the IAEA and Iran, and said the only way to resolve the current nuclear issue is to pursue substantive negotiations without preconditions among all relevant parties. This outcome is likely to be reflected in positions of NAM members on the Council.

## UN Documents

### Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1803 (3 March 2008) imposed additional measures against Iran and reinforced existing ones.
- S/RES/1747 (24 March 2007) imposed additional measures against Iran and reinforced existing ones.
- S/RES/1737 (23 December 2006) imposed measures against Iran under Chapter VII, article 41, of the UN Charter (measures not involving the use of armed force).
- S/RES/1696 (31 July 2006) demanded that Iran implement steps required by the IAEA to re-establish confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme and, in this context, suspend uranium enrichment activities.

### Latest IAEA Board Resolution

- GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006) underlined necessary steps that Iran should take to re-establish international confidence in its nuclear programme and reported the issue to the Council.

### Latest IAEA Report

- GOV/2008/15 (26 May 2008)

### Latest IAEA Information Circulars

- INFCIRC/733 (1 August 2008) was the statement on Iran's nuclear issue

adopted by the Non-Aligned Movement Ministerial Conference in Tehran.

- INFCIRC/729 (16 June 2008) was Iran's proposed package in May for constructive negotiation.

### Selected Letters

- S/2008/554 (15 August 2008) was a letter from Iran reiterating that its nuclear programme is peaceful, that all ambiguities regarding its nuclear activities have been removed and that, therefore, there is no ground for placing this issue on the Council's agenda; the letter also rejected accusations that some Iranian banks have been involved in financing related to nuclear proliferation and terrorism activities.
- S/2008/520 (1 August 2008) was a letter from France, the UK and the US providing information on overseas branches and subsidiaries of Bank Melli and Bank Saderat so that states can exercise vigilance over the activities of these Iranian banks in their territories in conformity with resolution 1803.
- S/2008/482 (22 July 2008) was a letter from Israel calling on the international community to address the threats posed by the emergence of a nuclear Iran, and alleging that Iran is a regional source of instability and extremism that exports terrorism by supporting Hamas and Hezbollah.
- S/2008/397 (17 June 2008) was a letter from Iran enclosing Iran's 13 May proposed package for constructive negotiation with the E3+3.
- S/2008/393 (16 June 2008) was a letter from the UK enclosing the E3+3's 12 June letter to Iran and revised package of proposals for possible areas of cooperation.
- S/2008/377 (6 June 2008) was a letter from Iran protesting Israeli threats of resorting to use force against Iran.
- S/2006/521 (13 July 2006) was the 2006 E3+3 proposal for a comprehensive long-term arrangement with Iran.

### Selected Records of Council Meetings

- S/PV.5909 (13 June 2008) was the latest briefing by the chairman of the 1737 Sanctions Committee.

### Useful Additional Sources

- David Albright, Paul Brannan and Jacqueline Shire, "Can Military Strikes



Destroy Iran's Gas Centrifuge Program? Probably Not", *Institute for Science and International Security*, 7 August 2008  
<http://www.isis-online.org>

- Meeting between Solana and Jalili in Geneva, 19 July 2008  
[http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files\\_156/iran\\_301/the-iranian-nuclear-issue\\_2724/meeting-of-mr-solana-with-the-iranian-negotiator-saeed-jalili-19.07.08\\_11676.html](http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files_156/iran_301/the-iranian-nuclear-issue_2724/meeting-of-mr-solana-with-the-iranian-negotiator-saeed-jalili-19.07.08_11676.html)
- William J. Burns, "US Policy Toward Iran", US Under Secretary for Political Affairs Opening Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, 9 July 2008  
<http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2008/106817.htm>
- Alon Ben-Meir, "Mediating the Nuclear Impasse," Electronic Briefing Paper, *Center for International Political Studies*, No. 44/2008, University of Pretoria, 2008  
<http://www.cips.up.ac.za/index.php?ebriefinglist+2447>

## Haiti

### Expected Council Action

The Secretary-General's report on the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is due by 31 August. In September, the Group of Friends of Haiti (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Peru, Uruguay and the US) is likely to review the report and discuss options for a draft resolution renewing MINUSTAH's mandate—due to expire on 15 October. Discussions are expected to also focus on Haiti's political situation, which has deteriorated since April when the Council received its last briefing on Haiti. Some discussion of benchmarks for future reconfiguration is also likely as recommendations were promised by the Secretary-General in his 26 March report on MINUSTAH. However, the recent political and security setbacks may have introduced new factors. Council consultations on the report seem unlikely in September.

## Key Recent Developments

Haiti has seen considerable social and political turmoil in recent months. On 4 April, violent demonstrations broke out in several cities over the rising cost of living. According to the World Food Programme (WFP), global food and fuel prices have risen an estimated 55 percent since June 2007. Haiti was particularly affected. According to Oxfam, prices of commodities such as rice and beans had doubled since the beginning of 2008. Currently Haiti has one of the highest daily caloric deficits per person in the world (on average Haitians have 460 kcal per day while the daily requirement is 2100 kcal per day). During the protests, which lasted several days, the UN compound was attacked. Three Sri Lankan peacekeepers on patrol were shot at and wounded and a Nigerian police officer was killed in Port-au-Prince.

Because of the unrest, on 12 April the Haitian senate voted to dismiss Prime Minister Jacques-Edouard Alexis. After a three-month impasse, Michele Pierre-Louis was approved by the senate on 31 July to be the new prime minister (the lower house of parliament having approved her nomination on 17 July). An economist, Pierre-Louis said that one of her priorities would be to facilitate investments in Haiti, foster national food production and development of infrastructure. At press time, she had yet to form a new government. On 21 August, some Haitian political parties said they would back the prime minister's political programme. MINUSTAH issued a statement saying that this was a first step in efforts to place the interests of the Haitian people above political actors' own interests.

On 2 June, during a high-level conference on world food security in Rome, hosted by the Food and Agricultural Organisation, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon highlighted the problems of Haiti saying that there was an urgent need to tackle the food crisis in Haiti and calling for immediate humanitarian aid and steps to boost agricultural production. On 4 June, the World Food Programme said that it would provide \$1.2 billion in additional food aid in the 62 countries hit hardest by the crisis caused by surging food and fuel prices. This means for Haiti that the number of people receiving food aid would be tripling. On 5 August, the EU announced that it would provide \$5 million for Haiti.

It seems that several of MINUSTAH's civilian priorities—in particular, supporting Haitian authorities in institutional and police reform—have been delayed due to this five-month political vacuum. However, on the security front, MINUSTAH reinforced its land border presence to deter smuggling and trafficking and improve security.

On 2 June, MINUSTAH announced that a kidnapping gang had been broken up in Port-au-Prince. According to UNICEF, there has been a surge in the number of kidnappings of children in 2008, particularly in May. This was confirmed in a report on grave violations against children compiled by the child protection unit of MINUSTAH, released in July and covering the period January-July 2008. The report also found that children continue to be affected by armed violence despite the general security improvements in Haiti. In particular, sexual violence against children remains a high concern, and there has been an "alarming increase" in the trafficking of children to the Dominican Republic for labour and sexual exploitation. (Nearly 750 children were repatriated by the Dominican authorities in the first five months of 2008.)

The Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti of the UN Economic and Social Council cancelled its annual trip to Haiti, originally planned for 27-30 April, because of the uncertain political context. However, it met in Washington DC and New York and produced a report on 27 June analysing key issues for Haiti's long-term development and providing information on the food crisis. It made several recommendations to improve the economic and social situation, in particular for aid coordination, institutional capacity-building, and how to use Haitian and international levers to boost economic and social development and respond to the food crisis.

Briefing the Council on 8 April, Hédi Annabi said that there could not be any durable progress in the absence of a minimum level of political consensus. While MINUSTAH has a role in promoting constructive political dialogue, the international community could also do more to encourage a responsible approach by all political actors. The Council adopted a press statement in which it welcomed progress achieved in judicial and prison systems' reform. It strongly deplored the 4 April violence and condemned attacks against UN personnel. The Council also expressed concern at the

humanitarian situation and encouraged international donors to strengthen levels of assistance.

On 26 March, the Secretary-General published an interim report on the activities of MINUSTAH. He noted that although significant progress had been made towards the stabilisation of Haiti, the situation remains fragile. In particular, divisions among branches of the government have distracted from the reform agenda. He expressed concern for the rising number of kidnappings and the increase in the cost of living. He also reported on progress on identifying key benchmarks for the consolidation of the emerging stability. Those benchmarks could include: successful elections and the resolution of political differences; formation of a sustainable security structure; establishment of independent and credible judicial and penal systems; and extension of state authority throughout the country. Socio-economic indicators could include: improvement in the living standards of the population; availability of basic services to the population; increase in state revenue and in the Gross Domestic Product; and rise of employment rates and of internal and foreign direct investment. Progress towards those benchmarks would guide future MINUSTAH activities and reconfiguration. The Secretary-General said that his August report would provide additional details.

## Options

It is unlikely that the Council will take any action in September.

An option is for the Group of Friends and Council members to take advantage of the time available and arrange for some joint meetings so as to improve the overall dynamics and chances for smoother interactions in October.

## Key Issues

The main issue for the Council is the re-emergence of political instability and violence. This concern has given rise to the idea of a Council visit to Haiti which would be the first since 2005.

A related issue is the implications for MINUSTAH's civilian activities. The unrest in April, the continued divisions between the executive and the legislative branches, and the presence of political spoilers indicate that stabilisation cannot be achieved without political reconciliation. (MINUSTAH already has a mandate to support the politi-

cal process in Haiti, including through good offices, and to assist the government in its efforts to bring about national dialogue and reconciliation.) But there is criticism that the Council does not pay active attention to the full range of peacebuilding needs—in particular the “root causes” and that in this regard the recent developments are a “wake up call” for the Council.

The food crisis and the unrest it has generated are seen as an issue of great concern.

Another major issue is the Secretary-General’s assessment of the current situation in Haiti—whether the crisis is temporary and linked to economic circumstances or structural. Council members will also be keen to examine the detailed proposal for a consolidation plan and see whether the political situation has affected the proposed indicators.

Border control remains an important issue and the Council will be keen to hear about developments regarding the formation and deployment of maritime patrols as requested in resolution 1780. (At press time, Uruguay had yet to provide the boats.)

### Council and Wider Dynamics

All Council members seem to agree on the need to visit Haiti. Costa Rica has the lead and Panama is co-leader. But it seems that a prevailing view—especially among the Group of Friends—is that the visit should take place after the formation of the new Haitian government so as not to be seen to be pressuring Haiti’s parliament, and also to keep discussions on MINUSTAH’s mandate renewal separate from the visit.

Overall there seems to be a strong consensus within the Group of Friends on the necessity to renew MINUSTAH for one more year without any change to its mandate. Some, however, (Canada in particular) may want to emphasise MINUSTAH’s political role in preventing further instability.

The foreign and defence vice-ministers of the nine Latin American troop-contributing countries (the “2x9 mechanism”), Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, are expected to meet in Montevideo on 29 August and define a common position on the renewal of the MINUSTAH mandate. It seems that most have concerns regarding the current political vacuum and appear willing to strongly support the consolidation

of democratic consensus. They also seem interested in further promoting quick impact projects as their main effect is to reinforce the popularity of MINUSTAH (polls continue to show that MINUSTAH receives mixed reviews from the Haitians). A main issue for most are land and maritime border controls to combat drug trafficking.

On the question of indicators for stabilisation, the Latin-American troop contributors apparently believe that there needs to be a mix of security, socio-economic development and political indicators. This position may not be shared by some in the Council such as China which tends to believe that MINUSTAH should not be involved in development-related tasks and that the Peacebuilding Commission could soon have a role to play.

### Underlying Problems

Substantial financial aid to tackle the food crisis in Haiti is still needed. For example, the WFP so far has only received 13 per cent (or \$12.4 million) of the \$96 million necessary to assist 1.7 million people in Haiti. Rising costs have forced WFP to revise its funding requirements upwards by 22 per cent.

### UN Documents

#### Latest Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1780 (15 October 2007) renewed MINUSTAH’s mandate for one year.

#### Latest Secretary-General’s Report

- S/2008/202 (26 March 2008)

#### Latest Press Statement

- SC/9293 (8 April 2008)

#### Latest Security Council Meeting Record

- S/PV.5862 (8 April 2008)

#### Latest Report of the ECOSOC Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti

- E/2008/90 (27 June 2008)

### Other Relevant Facts

#### Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Hédi Annabi (Tunisia)

#### Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Luiz Carlos da Costa (Brazil)

#### Force Commander

Major General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz (Brazil)



### Humanitarian and Resident Coordinator, UNDP Representative

Joel Boutroue (France)

### Size and Composition of Mission

- Authorised strength as of 15 August 2006: military component of up to 7,200 troops and police component of up to 1,951 officers.
- Current strength as of 31 July 2008: 9,040 total uniformed personnel, including 7,105 troops and 1,935 police, supported by 474 international civilian personnel, 1,166 local civilian staff and 192 UN Volunteers.
- Contributors of military personnel: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Jordan, Nepal, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, United States and Uruguay.
- Contributors of police personnel: Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, DR Congo, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Grenada, Guinea, Italy, Jordan, Madagascar, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Turkey, United States, Uruguay and Yemen.

### Cost

1 July 2008-30 June 2009: \$601.58 million

### Useful Additional Sources

- Report of grave violations against children in the context of armed violence in Haiti, MINUSTAH Child Protection Unit, January – July 2008  
<http://www.minustah.org/pages/Unit%E9-de-Protection-de-l%92enfant>
- Poverty reduction strategy paper – November 2007  
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/HAITIEXTN/0,,menuPK:338184~pagePK:141159~piPK:141110~theSitePK:338165,00.html>

## Afghanistan

### Expected Council Action

The mandate of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan expires on 13 October, but the Council may renew it during September. (For the last two years the Council has considered the renewal early in order to accommodate European concerns that a Council resolution be in place before parliaments consider extending ISAF troop commitments in October.)

The mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) expires on 23 March 2009.

The Secretary-General's next report on developments in Afghanistan is expected in the second half of September. An open debate on the report is likely to be held in October.

### Key Recent Developments

In July violence reached its worst level since 2001 with 260 civilian deaths. June was the deadliest month for foreign troops since 2001, with 45 killed. Further, in an ambush on 18 August, ten French paratroopers were killed representing the largest single loss of foreign troops in ground battles since 2001. Aid agencies warned in August that armed clashes and conflict-related violence had increased by about 50 percent in 2008 compared to 2007. According to the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), the 2,500 killed in armed conflict thus far in 2008 included as many as 1,000 civilians, with two-thirds of the reported civilian casualties attributed to Taliban insurgents.

Investigations by UNAMA into reports that civilians had been killed in US-led coalition air raids in Herat on 22 August revealed that some ninety civilians were killed, including sixty children. It is one of the worst cases of foreign forces killing civilians in Afghanistan since 2001. On 25 August, the Afghan government called for a review of agreements regulating the presence of international troops in Afghanistan. At press time, Russia circulated a draft press statement deploring the air strikes.

From January to July, over 84 security incidents involving aid organisations were reported, with 19 NGO staff dead. Three more international aid workers and their Afghan colleague were killed on 13 August. Many aid agencies have restricted the scale

and scope of their operations. Twelve World Food Programme convoys were attacked in the first six months of 2008, resulting in the loss of 466 tonnes of food.

On 7 July, a suicide bomber targeted the Indian embassy in Kabul. Reports listed 58 dead including two Indian diplomats and 141 injured.

US Defence Secretary Robert Gates has reportedly endorsed a \$20 billion Afghan government proposal to nearly double the size of the Afghan army over the next five years to 120,000 troops. The funds would also finance an Afghan Air Corps. Gates also reportedly supports unifying the command structure of ISAF and the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom forces, with the intention of improving coordination of all forces in Afghanistan. US prisons and counterterrorism operations to capture or kill high-value Taliban and Al-Qaida leaders seem likely to remain under sole US command.

On 3 July, the Secretary-General reported to the Council on the outcomes of the International Conference in Support of Afghanistan in Paris, held on 12 June. Conference participants decided UNAMA would lead all aspects of coordination within Afghanistan. His report concluded that to provide support in priority areas identified at the conference, UNAMA's capacity would need strengthening in key areas including elections, support for the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), aid effectiveness, institution-building and the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Additional personnel would also be required for overall aid coordination and the establishment of six new field offices. (A new aid coordination unit focusing on aid effectiveness and ANDS implementation will be established under UNAMA's second pillar, which deals with development and humanitarian issues.)

On 9 July, the Council debated the security and humanitarian challenges facing Afghanistan in addition to the outcomes of the Paris Conference. The Council was briefed by the Secretary-General's Special Representative Kai Eide and John Holmes, the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.

Eide said the Paris Conference had created new momentum. There were two important pillars of the ANDS, the undertaking of a massive institution-building effort and the expansion of key sectors of the economy.

He warned that if donors did not align resources behind the ANDS, it could not be implemented. Although UNAMA faced significant tasks, they could be addressed within the mandate specified in resolution 1806, which in March had extended UNAMA's mandate. However, Eide said the issue was the need for more resources.

Holmes said humanitarian needs were serious and growing. Food insecurity had been exacerbated by drought and the rise in global food prices. Afghanistan had limited capacity to absorb millions of returnees. He said civilian deaths had sharply increased compared with last year and more needed to be done to protect civilians. Holmes also said the humanitarian community was finding it progressively harder to respond because of insecurity and lack of access.

During the Council debate, Afghanistan's foreign minister, Rangin Dâdfar Spantâ, said Afghan and international forces were fighting an enemy that was transnational in composition and international in focus, based outside Afghanistan's borders. One of the main factors contributing to the deterioration of the security situation was the *de facto* truce in the tribal areas in Pakistan. A joint, coherent and integrated approach undertaken by both the Afghan and Pakistani governments was required to eliminate terrorist bases, he said.

The Council issued a statement on 11 July welcoming the outcomes of the Paris Conference, including financial pledges made in support of the ANDS and the Afghan government's commitments to promote security, good governance, the rule of law, human rights and socioeconomic development, and to pursue political and economic reform, including by taking concrete steps to combat corruption. The statement recalled the strengthened role of UNAMA and the Secretary-General's Special Representative in leading and coordinating aid. It also endorsed the recommendation for greater resources, and welcomed the further expansion of UNAMA's field presence.

The Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan announced in July that from January to June it had cleared 38,297 antipersonnel mines, 419 anti-tank mines, 957,362 explosive remnants of war and 65.36 square kilometres of land.

According to the 2008 Afghanistan Opium Survey from the UN Office on Drugs and

Crime, there was a 19 percent decrease in the area under poppy cultivation in 2008 (compared to a 17 percent increase in 2007). Opium production declined by only six percent because of greater yields. The number of opium-free provinces increased from 13 to 18. Two thirds of all opium in Afghanistan is cultivated in Helmand.

A Council mission to travel to Afghanistan later in the year is under discussion.

### Options

The most likely option is for the Council to extend the authorisation of ISAF by adopting a resolution similar to 1776. That 2007 resolution, compared with the one from the year before, added language on the protection of civilians, reconstruction and reform of the Afghan prison sector, regional cooperation, and the training, mentoring and empowerment of Afghan national security forces, in particular the Afghan National Police. Given the recent large number of civilian casualties caused during coalition military operations, language on protection of civilians could be strengthened.

The Council could also pursue additional options including:

- recognising that widespread corruption is a major impediment to stability and prosperity in Afghanistan, and welcoming the Afghan government's recent commitment to intensify its actions to combat corruption;
- going beyond the 11 July language regarding the importance of providing UNAMA with the necessary resources and expertise to carry out its mandate, and the need for international actors to accept a UN coordination role and work more closely together and with the government of Afghanistan to build government capacity;
- welcoming the conduct of the 23rd Tripartite Commission meeting on 19 August and encouraging future cooperation between Pakistan, Afghanistan and the coalition in efforts to secure the Afghan-Pakistan border;
- reinforcing the international community's commitment to the process of Afghanisation, particularly in meeting security challenges;
- requesting more timely quarterly reports on ISAF's activities since the latest circulated to the Council, on 12 May, only covered the period from 1 November 2007 to 31 January 2008.

### Key Issues

Key issues for the Council are the deteriorating security situation, the growing number of civilian deaths and increasing threats to aid agencies. Tensions are rising in Afghanistan over the civilian death toll following coalition activities. The growing number of civilian deaths is having a serious impact on Afghan support for ISAF and US-led forces.

Another issue is how the Council can encourage the Afghan government to seriously address justice and accountability issues. Impunity for human rights violations undermines the delivery of justice, as well as security and stability in Afghanistan. Despite the Afghan government's commitment in 2006 to implement the three-year Action Plan on Peace, Reconciliation and Justice in Afghanistan, limited progress has been made.

Corruption is an issue affecting the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact and undermining confidence in the rule of law. During the Paris Conference, the government committed itself again to intensify actions to combat corruption. Council members are aware of the need for serious achievements to be made in combating corruption.

A longstanding issue is the disparity in the geographical distribution of aid. The use of aid to achieve military or political objectives is a contributing factor. This creates perverse incentives in secure areas, which perceive that insecurity attracts aid. Provincial Reconstruction Teams, being led by different countries, also have widely varying levels of funding.

Another issue is how the Council will address regional sympathies for the Taliban, which continue to erode gains made by the government and the international community. The future stability of both Afghanistan and Pakistan depends on the development of an effective strategy to counter Taliban and Al-Qaida in Pakistan's tribal border areas.

The Council has endorsed the views of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative on the areas that require greater attention by UNAMA. One issue is whether UNAMA will receive the additional funding necessary to strengthen its role in Afghanistan. Another is whether donors will honour commitments to align their efforts behind financing and implementing the



ANDS. A related issue is whether government institutions are strengthened and accountability mechanisms introduced, particularly with regard to the requirements of donors before they commit funds to Afghanistan's budget.

Russia abstained during the vote in September 2007 to renew ISAF's authorisation citing that it had not received clarity regarding wording sought by Japan pertaining to the maritime interception component of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Russia noted that OEF operated outside the context of the UN and that the Council had not been briefed on its activities in sufficient detail (there is no direct UN authorisation of OEF, although several resolutions have explicitly acknowledged OEF, making it clear that the action is not illegal). Since December 2001, the Japanese government had been providing fuel and water to US Navy and other coalition ships engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom. Resolution 1776, which in 2007 expressed its appreciation for the maritime interdiction component, was issued in the month preceding the expiration of Japan's Anti-Terrorism Special Measure Law on which Japan based its activities. On 11 January, Japan enacted new legislation covering this matter, the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law. Given the controversy the naval operation has generated in Japan, and given this new law is required to be renewed yearly by the Japanese parliament, it is possible that language related to the maritime interdiction component of Operation Enduring Freedom could again be proposed for inclusion in the ISAF renewal.

### Council Dynamics

Council members recognise the critical role of ISAF in assisting the Afghan government achieve peace and stability.

Viet Nam received quiet praise for its careful and inclusive handling of the debate on Afghanistan in July.

Libya continues to be concerned with the ongoing deterioration of security and the major increases in civilian casualties.

European members are also worried about the growing number of civilian casualties and the deteriorating situation. China and Russia have specifically voiced concerns that ISAF operations have caused unnecessary civilian casualties.

Italy, Belgium, Panama, Indonesia, Burkina Faso and South Africa emphasise the need for further progress in the crucial area of regional cooperation.

Panama and the UK have both raised Afghan government corruption as an issue that must be urgently resolved.

At the time of writing, it was not clear whether wording regarding the maritime interdiction component of Operation Enduring Freedom would again be included in the ISAF resolution and whether the Secretariat will take account of Russia's concerns about a lack of briefing.

## UN Documents

### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1817 (11 June 2008) was the resolution restricting the trafficking into Afghanistan of chemical precursors for narcotics production.
- S/RES/1806 (20 March 2008) extended UNAMA's mandate until 23 March 2009.
- S/RES/1776 (19 September 2007) extended ISAF's mandate until 13 October 2008.
- S/RES/1659 (15 February 2006) endorsed the Afghanistan Compact and its annexes.
- S/RES/1401 (28 March 2002) created UNAMA.

### Selected Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2008/26 (11 July 2008) welcomed the outcome of the Paris conference, recalled the strengthened role of UNAMA and the Special Representative of the Secretary General, and endorsed the increase of resources of UNAMA to fulfil this role.

### Selected Reports of the Secretary-General

- S/2008/434 (3 July 2008) was the special report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 1806 (2008) on UNAMA.
- S/2008/159 (6 March 2008) was the latest UNAMA report.

### Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAMA's Chief of Mission

Kai Eide

### UNAMA: Size, Composition and Duration

- Current strength: 226 international civilians, 1,078 local civilians, 16 military observers, three civilian police, 39 UN volunteers
- Duration: 28 March 2002 to present; mandate expires on 23 March 2009

### ISAF Military Commander

General David D. McKiernan (US)

### ISAF: Size, Composition and Duration

- Total strength: about 52,700 troops
- Contributors of military personnel: 40 NATO and non-NATO countries
- Current top contributors: US, UK, Germany, Canada, Italy and the Netherlands.
- Duration: 20 December 2001 to present; mandate expires on 13 October 2008

### Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF): Size, Composition and Duration

- Current strength: 13,500 (this is an estimate as the troop numbers shift continuously)
- Top contributor: US
- Duration: 7 October 2001 to present

## Liberia

### Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) which is due to expire on 30 September. The Council is also expected to consider the August report from the Secretary-General regarding progress on benchmarks for the drawdown of UNMIL.

### Recent Developments

On 15 August, the Secretary-General submitted his latest report on UNMIL to the Council. It noted that the overall situation in the country remained fragile, despite general political stability and improvement in key economic and social indicators. The Secretary-General highlighted progress made on benchmarks for the mission drawdown and included recommendations on possible reductions in UNMIL's military and police components—a reduction of the mission's military strength by 1460 troops and an increase in UN-formed police units

from five to seven (i.e. from 605 to 845 personnel) starting from September 2008 and some internal adjustments to the police component to accommodate eight additional correction officers. He explained that the decision to bolster the UNMIL police component was necessitated by the inability to meet certain core benchmarks. The Secretary-General also recommended the extension of UNMIL's mandate for another year.

On 14 July, Stephen Rapp, the prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) which is currently trying former Liberian President Charles Taylor on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity stemming from his role in Sierra Leone's brutal civil war, said that the legal proceedings demonstrated that "the trial of a former chief of State can be conducted openly and fairly" and expressed his satisfaction with progress made. Taylor has been charged with 11 counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. He has denied all charges. (The Special Court, which was jointly established by the Sierra Leonean government and the UN, is tasked with trying those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious infringement of Sierra Leonean law and international humanitarian law carried out on the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996). The trial of Taylor by the Special Court, which went into recess on 21 July after hearing testimonies from 35 prosecution witnesses, resumed on 18 August. The actual trial was considered to have commenced when Taylor made an appearance in the court on 20 June.

On 11 and 12 August, Alhaji G.V. Kromah, former head of the disbanded United Liberation Movement (ULIMO), appeared before the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The ULIMO fought against Charles Taylor's rebel National Patriotic Front of Liberia in the early days of the country's civil war. Kromah's appearance before the TRC is the first by the head of a defunct warring faction. It is thought that this latest development could contribute to assuaging apprehension amongst Liberians about the ability or willingness of the TRC to summon and exercise subpoena powers over warlords, legislators, the presidency and other individuals who gained notoriety during the country's

protracted civil war. (The decision to establish the TRC formed part of the August 2003 peace agreement. It was set up in 2005 to “promote national peace, security, unity and reconciliation,” and provide opportunity to hold culprits accountable for violations of international humanitarian law and gross human rights violations which took place in Liberia between January 1979 and October 2003.)

### Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is renewing the mandate of UNMIL before its expiration on 30 September.

A related issue is striking the right balance between the previous drawdown timetable and ongoing concerns about a premature reduction of UNMIL.

The issue of a transition from a peacekeeping to peacebuilding focus is another key concern.

### Options

Options before the Council include:

- extending UNMIL’s current mandate only for six months thereby allowing for more in-depth discussion of downsizing the mission to be deferred until early 2009;
- renewing the mandate UNMIL with or without some modifications for another year; and
- initiating a higher focus on Liberia’s post conflict needs in a more holistic sense than the narrow security focus applied in the past.

### Council Dynamics

The Council’s dynamics remain unchanged. The US and African members reportedly prefer a cautious drawdown of UNMIL in tune with the security situation, while European members are likely to want to explore a faster redistribution of the mission’s peacekeeping resources to conflict zones elsewhere. In effect, there is Council consensus in principle that the drawdown should continue, albeit with differences of opinion as to how fast it should be carried out.

Although the Liberian government has not asked for the country to be placed on the Peacebuilding Commission’s agenda, Liberia is increasingly recognised as a country whose peacebuilding needs require better coordination and oversight. While it may be a candidate for inclusion on the Commission’s agenda in the future, in the short term it is likely to remain on the

Security Council agenda in view of the continuing fragility. But at present there is concern that there is no apparent strategy for collective transitional oversight and coordination. The Council therefore has an opportunity to advance its focus from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.

### Underlying Problems

High youth unemployment remains a major problem, as employment generation continues to pose a key challenge in the country. The Secretary-General’s latest report also highlights the issues of arms and drug trafficking, together with the activities of ex-combatants, including illegal mining in inaccessible areas all over the country. This presents an ominous brew of potentially destabilising factors, especially when viewed against the backdrop of how those forces fuelled the country’s civil war.

## UN Documents

### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1819 (18 June 2008) requested the Secretary-General to extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Liberia until 20 December 2008.
- S/RES/1792 (19 December 2007) renewed the arms and travel sanctions as well as the mandate of the Panel of Experts.
- S/RES/1777 (20 September 2007) renewed the mandate of UNMIL for one year and endorsed the Secretary-General’s recommendations for the mission’s drawdown.
- S/RES/1753 (27 April 2007) lifted the diamonds embargo.
- S/RES/1731 (20 December 2006) renewed sanctions.
- S/RES/1532 (12 March 2004) imposed an assets freeze against former President Charles Taylor and associates.
- S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003) imposed sanctions.
- S/RES/1509 (19 September 2003) established UNMIL.

### Selected Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2008/553 (15 August 2008) was the latest UNMIL report.
- S/2007/479 (8 August 2007) was the Secretary-General’s drawdown plan for UNMIL.

### Other

- SC/9354 (13 June 2008) was the press release on the delisting of Montgomery Dolo from the Liberia Sanctions Committee travel ban list.



- S/2008/371 (12 June 2008) was the latest report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia.
- SC/9336 (21 May 2008) was the press release on the delisting of Gabriel Doe, Khalid Eldine, Wesseh Dennis and Zarr Koffi from the Liberia Sanctions Committee travel ban list.
- SC/9290 (31 March 2008) was the press release on the delisting of Gerald Cooper from the Liberia Sanctions Committee travel ban list.
- S/2008/85 (8 February 2008) was the letter from the Secretary-General appointing the Panel of Experts on Liberia.
- SC/9183 (29 November 2007) was the press release on the delisting of Grace Minor from the Liberia Sanctions Committee assets freeze and travel ban list.

## Other Relevant Facts

### Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Ellen Margrethe Løj (Denmark)

### UNMIL: Size, Composition and Cost

- Strength as of 31 July 2008: 12,815 uniformed personnel and 1,086 police
- Key contributing countries: Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Pakistan
- Cost: 1 July 2008–30 June 2009: \$631.69 million

### UNMIL: Duration

September 2003 to present; mandate expires 30 September 2008

### Chairman of the Liberia Sanctions Committee

Giadalla Azuz Ettalhi (Libya)

### Panel of Experts on Liberia

- Guy Lamb (South Africa, expert on arms and security)
- Thomas R. Creal (US, expert on finance)
- Wynet V. Smith (Canada, expert on natural resources and coordinator of the Panel)

## Notable Dates for September

Reports Due for Consideration in September	Document Requesting Report
15 August by 31 August	SG report (S/2008/553) on UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) S/RES/1777 SG semi-annual report on UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) S/RES/1780
September	Report of the Lebanese Border Assessment Team (LIBAT) S/PRST/2007/12
September	Quarterly report of the 1737 Sanctions Committee on Iran S/RES/1737
15 September	Final report of the Sudan Panel of Experts S/RES/1779
by 15 September	SG report on UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) S/RES/1778
20 September	Mid-term report of the Somalia Sanctions Committee Monitoring Group S/RES/1811
by 22 September	SG semi-annual report on UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) S/RES/1806
by 30 September	SG report on UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) S/RES/1794
by 30 September	SG quarterly report on UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) S/RES/1580
by 30 September	SG report on UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) S/RES/1244
by 30 September	SG report (every 60 days) on UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) S/RES/1828

September 2008 Mandates Expire	Relevant Document
25 September	UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) S/RES/1778
30 September	UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) S/RES/1777
30 September	UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) S/RES/1793

### September 2008 Other Important Dates

- 3 September *Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities respectively, are scheduled to initiate comprehensive negotiations.*
- 22-26 September *The next IAEA Board of Governors meeting is scheduled in Vienna.*

Also expected in September:

- A Secretariat briefing on the results of the Djibouti-Eritrea fact-finding mission is possible.
- Sima Samar, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Sudan, is expected to present her report to the Human Rights Council.
- An EU report to the Security Council on EUFOR Chad-Central African Republic is due.
- The Middle East Quartet will meet in New York on the margins of the General Assembly.

## Important Dates over the Horizon

- Legislative elections have been scheduled for 16 November 2008 in Guinea-Bissau.
- Presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire are now scheduled for 30 November 2008.
- Council missions to Afghanistan and Haiti are currently being discussed for later this year.

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