OVERVIEW FOR JULY

In July Vietnam will have the presidency of the Council.

An open thematic debate on Children and Armed Conflict is expected in mid-July. It will consider the report of the Council’s Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict and related issues. (Our Crosscutting Report of 4 February 2008 provides detailed background information and it will be supplemented by an Update Report prior to the debate.)

A public session on the Middle East, in accordance with normal practice, is also expected. A briefing is likely—although a debate may also be possible. (Our Special Research Report of 17 December 2007 provides background on the history of Council involvement.)

Open meetings are also likely on:
- Afghanistan (briefing by new SRSG Kai Eide);
- Darfur/Sudan (renewal of the UNAMID mandate);
- Côte d’Ivoire (renewal of UNOCI mandate);
- Kosovo (report from Secretary-General on UNMIK reconfiguration); and
- Sierra Leone (resolution establishing new mission to follow on from UNIOSIL).

A meeting on Georgia is expected, but it remains to be seen whether the format will be open, closed or simply a briefing in consultations. Discussions on Somalia are also likely. A Secretariat briefing is possible but it remains to be seen whether this will be in consultations or an open meeting. The latter is more likely if the SRSG comes to New York. And a meeting on Ethiopia/Eritrea is likely if no agreement is reached by the end of June on a resolution which was under discussion at press time.

Consultations are expected on:
- Chad/CAR (in light of the expected report from the Secretary-General);
- DPRK (briefing by the Chair of Sanctions Committee);
- DRC (consideration of the Secretary-General’s quarterly report);
- Lebanon (review of implementation of resolution 1701); and
- Nepal (briefing by SRSG Ian Martin).

Issues which might arise include:
- Iran (developments arising from the resolution’s annex. No such reviews have occurred in the past three years.
- The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire, requested by presidential statement 2004/17, has still not been made public.
- The Council requested the Secretary-General on 29 November 2006 (S/2006/928) to update the index to Council notes and statements on working methods. This has not been published.
- On the DRC, the Council Sanctions Committee has not acted on individual sanctions under resolution 1898 against armed groups that recruit children, despite MONUC reports about the problem continuing on a serious scale. Nor has the Council resumed discussion of the issue of natural resources in the DRC, which was raised in its open thematic debate on the subject of natural resources and conflict in June 2007 (S/PV.5705).
- The Secretary-General has yet to put forward proposals for the delineation of...

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Aide-Memoire

Important matters pending for the Council include:
- The 2005 World Summit requested that the Security Council consider reforms for the Military Staff Committee. This has yet to be addressed.
- In its resolution 1327 (2000) on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi report, S/2000/809), the Council decided to review periodically the implementation of the provisions contained in the Brahimi report, S/2000/809.
- The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire, requested by presidential statement 2004/17, has still not been made public.
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Aide-Mémoire (continued)

the international borders of Lebanon, especially in the Sheb’a Farms area, in accordance with resolution 1701, and respond to the cartographic, legal and political implications of the alternative path suggested by the government of Lebanon in its seven-point plan.

- The Secretariat is yet to report to the Council on Kenya as requested in its 6 February presidential statement (S/PRST/2008/4).

- In a letter from its president (S/2007/722) on 7 December 2007 the Council asked the Secretary-General to provide an outline of the mandate of the adviser on the prevention of genocide and of the implications of upgrading this position from an Assistant Secretary-General to Under Secretary-General. At press time, no response had been released.

- UNAMI reports on human rights are now usually delayed by several months and are therefore quite outdated. (The last report, released in March, covered the period from 1 July to 31 December 2007.) In the past, the reports were produced every two to three months.

- The Council is yet to follow up on the Secretary-General’s recommendations regarding protection of civilians, presented in his October 2007 report (S/2007/643).

Recent developments on the situations covered in this Forecast are addressed in the relevant briefs. Interesting developments in the Council on other issues included:

- Cyprus: On 2 June, the Council received a report from the Secretary-General on UNFICYP (S/2008/353) noting that a window of opportunity had opened. On 13 June, the Council adopted resolution 1818 welcoming the Secretary-General’s analysis of recent developments, urging the parties to continue to work so full fledged negotiations can begin expeditiously and renewing the UNFICYP mandate until 15 December 2008.

- Counter-Terrorism: On 2 June, the Security Council adopted a presidential statement that condemned the terrorist attack that occurred outside the Danish Embassy in Islamabad (S/PRST/2008/19).

- International Tribunals: On 4 June, the ICTY and ICTR briefed the Council on their respective completion strategies (S/2008/326 and 356). The Council was told that the international community needed to boost efforts to apprehend fugitives and increase funding for the tribunals. The ICTY said that Serbia needed to do more to locate and arrest the remaining fugitives. Croatia was asked to hand over archival documents, and Bosnia-Herzegovina was urged to adopt a more pro-active approach. The ICTR called on Kenya to actively search for Félicien Kabuga and investigate his business interests. Both the ICTY and ICTR said that due to new arrests the trials would not be completed until next year. No formal Council decision was taken.

- Zimbabwe: On 23 June, Zimbabwe’s opposition officially withdrew from the presidential elections, due to be held 27 June, after weeks of increasing violence against its supporters. The Security Council held consultations on the situation on 12 and 18 June. On 19 June, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice convened a closed meeting of diplomats and humanitarian groups and urged the Council to take stronger action against the violence in Zimbabwe. On 23 June, there was an exchange of views between Council members and the representative of Zimbabwe in a closed meeting. Following this meeting, the Council was briefed by B. Lynn Pascoe, Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs, who said that the conditions for free and fair elections did not exist and that the elections should therefore be postponed (S/PV.5919). The Council adopted a presidential statement in which it condemned the campaign of violence against the opposition, noting that this had made it impossible to hold free and fair elections on 27 June. It called on Zimbabwe’s government to stop the violence, political intimidation and restrictions on the right of assembly, release detained political leaders and cooperate with all efforts aimed at finding a peaceful solution. Finally, it noted that the results of the 29 March elections, which the opposition won, should be respected and requested the Secretary-General to report on regional and international efforts to resolve the crisis (S/PRST/2008/23).

- Djibouti-Eritrea: On 12 June, the Security Council adopted a presidential statement that condemned Eritrea’s military actions against Djibouti on 10 June along the frontier between the two countries and called on both parties, particularly Eritrea, to commit to a ceasefire, withdraw their forces, and cooperate with efforts to resolve the matter peacefully. It also called on the Secretary-General to use his good offices to facilitate discussions to resolve the border situation (S/PRST/2008/20). On 24 June, the Council heard presentations from the parties on their views on the crisis and a Secretariat briefing. During the meeting, the representative from Djibouti stated that Eritrean troops were continuing their incursion, while Eritrea denied those accusations.

João Honwana, Director of the Africa Division of the UN Department of Political Affairs, described the situation as stable but tense with both sides regrouping on either side of the border (S/PV.5924). On 25 June, the Council issued a press statement requesting that a fact-finding mission be sent to the region (SC/9376).

- Iran: On 13 June, the Council heard a briefing by the Chairman of the 1737 sanction committee Belgian Ambassador Jan Grauls on activities of the committee from 18 March to 13 June. He said that the committee on 24 April approved a revised guideline incorporating relevant provisions of the resolution 1803, in addition to a consolidated list of individuals and entities subject to sanctions (S/PV.5909). On 16 June, the E3+3 transmitted to the Council a consolidated proposal for cooperation in several areas they sent to Iran to be used as a basis for renewed negotiations as soon as suspends uranium enrichment (S/2008/393).

- Iraq: On 13 June, the Council conducted a review of the mandate of the MNF-I, as requested in resolution 1790. It heard a briefing from the US on behalf of the MNF-I, from Ibrahim Gambari, Special Adviser on the International Compact with Iraq, on recent UNAMI activities, and from Warren Sach, Assistant Secretary-General, Controller, on the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB), which has audit oversight of the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI). A debate followed (S/PV.5910). The Council adopted a press statement on the continuation of the MNF-I mandate and of the DFI and IAMB arrangements. It also expressed appreciation for UN assistance to Iraq, recognised efforts made by the Iraqi government to improve security, national reconciliation and reconstruction and to combat terrorism and sectarian violence, and called upon the international
Sudan

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), which expires on 31 July. A resolution is expected, and it is likely to be the focus for significant new efforts in the Council to address:

- the ongoing violence and deteriorating humanitarian situation;
- the lack of full cooperation from Sudan with UNAMID’s deployment;
- UNAMID’s asset shortfalls; and
- lack of progress with a ceasefire and peace talks.

The Secretary-General’s quarterly report on the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS, deployed in the south) is also expected. The report is expected to include an assessment and recommendations regarding UNMIS’ role in the contested Abyei area.

It is unclear whether the report will be discussed in July or August.

Key Recent Developments

The situation in Sudan and the region continued to deteriorate in June. During a Council visit, members were informed that the World Food Programme may have to cut food rations to civilians in need in Darfur for the second time in recent weeks because of insecurity. Funding shortfalls have also led to cuts in humanitarian flights in Sudan.
In late May, a Ugandan officer serving under UNAMID was found dead in his vehicle near El Fasher. Under Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno reportedly said that the incident underscored the challenges faced by the mission’s lack of resources. Also in late May, a UNAMID convoy was ambushed and robbed by unidentified men.

In early June, the mediation team held a meeting with regional and international partners in Geneva. The discussions came amidst increasingly grim prospects for the peace process. The team had been focusing on increasing security and confidence through a ceasefire and UNAMID’s deployment, but progress has been elusive. The government recently ruled out negotiations with the rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and main rebel groups have refused to start negotiations with Khartoum.

A new position of joint chief mediator is being established by the Secretary-General and the AU to provide full-time leadership, based in Sudan, to the mediation team. (Observers point out that the chief mediator should be based in Darfur, as it would be the best location in terms of effectiveness and reach.) AU Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim and UN Envoy Jan Eliasson will continue to provide support and input. It is unclear when the appointment will be made.

On 24 June, Salim and Eliasson briefed the Council. Eliasson said that the parties have not been willing to come together for substantive talks, citing as challenges rebel fragmentation, competition and in-fighting. He also recognised that the movements lack trust in the government in view of its sustained mobilization of the entire Sudanese State apparatus.

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A Council mission visited Chad and Sudan in early June. Issues discussed include Sudanese cooperation with UNAMID, the peace process, cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the north-south situation. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir reiterated complaints against Chad for supporting Darfur rebels. Bashir also reportedly reiterated that Khartoum will not cooperate with the ICC.

In mid-June, Chadian rebels launched a new offensive and briefly took over a number of towns in eastern Chad, threatening a new attack on N’Djamena. Chad repeated accusations of Sudanese support for rebel groups. Observers have voiced increasing concerns about the intensification of a perceived proxy war between the two countries.

On 16 June, the Council adopted a presidential statement calling upon states in the region to implement commitments under the Dakar Agreement and expressing readiness to adopt measures against those who “constitute a threat to stability in the region or violate international humanitarian law.”

On 5 June, the ICC Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, presented his regular briefing on Darfur to the Council. He informed the Council that the Sudanese government is not cooperating with the Court and is not complying with resolution 1593 (in which the Council decided that the Sudanese government and all other parties to the conflict shall cooperate with the Court and the Chief Prosecutor). He recommended that the Council call on the government to stop the crimes and arrest two suspects indicted for war crimes (Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb), and that all parties should assist the Court and comply with resolution 1593.

He also informed the Council that he would present a second case on Darfur to ICC judges in July. He noted that evidence “shows an organized campaign by Sudanese officials to attack civilians, with the objective of physically and mentally destroying entire communities” and that “the commission of such crimes on such a scale, over a period of five years and throughout Darfur, has required the sustained mobilization of the entire Sudanese State apparatus.”

On 16 June, after a Costa Rican initiative and following difficult negotiations, the Council adopted a presidential statement which recalled resolution 1593 and urged Sudan and all other parties to cooperate with the Court. (See our 11 June Update Report for more details.) On the same day, the EU said it was ready to consider measures against individuals responsible for non-cooperation with the ICC.

In early June, renewed clashes between government and southern forces in the contested region of Abyei raised new concerns about the future of the north-south Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the potential for a renewed north-south civil war. Dozens were killed and tens of thousands displaced by the violence, which
included bombing and the burning of Abyei town to the ground.

On 8 June, the parties signed a roadmap on the return of displaced civilians and implementation of the Abyei Protocol (which is a separate part of the CPA dealing with the oil-rich region’s boundaries and administration as well as a 2011 referendum on its future status). The new agreement provides that:

- joint integrated units comprising northern and southern forces will be deployed to the region, as the parties’ forces withdraw;
- UNMIS will have freedom of movement and access in the area to carry out its mandate pursuant to the CPA (which had not been the case in recent years);
- civilians shall return to former homesteads, with resources to be provided by the Sudanese government;
- an interim administration will be appointed by the Sudanese presidency (a step mandated by the CPA but so far unfulfilled);
- the parties will refer their dispute over the findings of the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) to arbitration. Should the parties fail to agree on terms of reference within one month, the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague shall finalise the process within 15 days. (The ABC’s final report was issued in July 2005, but President Bashir and Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party rejected the findings.)

On 24 June, the Council adopted a statement welcoming the roadmap and encouraging full implementation. The statement also called on UNMIS to deploy robustly in the area to prevent escalation of the conflict in support of CPA implementation, and requested an assessment of UNMIS’ role vis-à-vis the recent violence and appropriate follow-up steps.

Considerable concern remains over other sensitive points in the CPA, including:

- demarcation of north-south boundaries;
- results from the recent census and the parties’ reactions;
- wealth-sharing and transparency in oil revenues; and
- arrangements for the 2009 elections, including an electoral law.

The situation in the south has also been complicated by setbacks in the Juba peace talks between the Ugandan government and the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). In early June, LRA fighters reportedly attacked southern soldiers. (The LRA for years terrorised south Sudan, allegedly with support from the National Congress Party. Some observers have voiced concern about a possible resumption of northern support.)

Options

The most likely option for the Council in July is a resolution renewing UNAMID and reiterating past calls for a ceasefire, a peace process and cooperation with the mission’s deployment.

Another option would be to explore a more vigorous Council involvement in improving security and managing the regional situation, including:

- steps toward supporting the establishment of a ceasefire and a peace process, including regular, informal interaction with the mediation team;
- increasing pressure on the parties by expanding the list of individuals and entities subject to targeted sanctions and developing a wider spectrum of measures and trigger mechanisms;
- establishing a new mechanism for closer Council monitoring of developments regarding UNAMID, perhaps mandating Council experts or the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations to meet regularly with the Departments of Political Affairs and Peacekeeping, and troop-contributing countries; and
- expanding the regional focus by organising informal interactions with the Chad-Sudan Dakar Agreement Contact Group, perhaps in an Arria-style format.

An additional option is for the Council to consider a more integrated approach to Sudan issues, including:

- closer monitoring of the CPA’s implementation, perhaps through informal Secretariat briefings every thirty days; and
- considering options for strengthening UNMIS, in close consultation with the Secretariat and the parties.

Key Issues

On Darfur, one key issue is whether there is anything the Council can do to support the mediation team on an ongoing basis and encourage the parties to move towards a genuine ceasefire and a peace process. Another is improving security and, in that context, how best to advance UNAMID’s deployment.

Justice and accountability issues are likely to remain in the minds of members in the light of the new cases to be presented by the ICC Chief Prosecutor.

The recent violence in Abyei resurrected the issue of whether the Council should increase its focus on the broader challenges facing Sudan. A related issue is whether there is anything the Council should do—including UNMIS’ role—on the north-south situation.

On the regional context, an urgent issue facing member states, the UN, the AU, the EU and other stakeholders is whether a more assertive approach is required.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Events in June—including the visiting mission, Chadian rebel attacks, instability in Abyei and ICC issues—seem to have heightened a sense of urgency in the Council about the delicate situation in Sudan and Chad.

There is a related feeling that more needs to be done regarding security—especially the need for a ceasefire and support for UNAMID. Some are also increasingly talking about the need to strengthen the arms embargo. But the strong divisions within the Council on how best to manage the situation and the lack of a collective, strategic vision seem to continue.

Some members—including the US, EU countries, Panama and Costa Rica—believe that more pressure on the Sudanese government regarding UNAMID and the
ICC is essential. Others including China, Russia, Libya, Indonesia and South Africa continue to voice sympathy for the government’s concerns and think more pressure should be applied to the rebels to come to the negotiating table. They have viewed Khartoum’s cooperation with UNAMID as a technical matter best resolved through discussions between the Secretariat and the government. And there is still reluctance in the Council—especially from Libya and France—on a more proactive role vis-à-vis Chad-Sudan relations and the conflict in Chad.

There also seems to be some concern in the Council that UNMIS could and should do more regarding Abyei in particular, but there also seems to be acknowledgment of its challenging political environment and lack of adequate resources.

Kosovo

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to discuss a further UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) report in July. At the time of writing, it was expected on 30 June. Some members are hoping for details of operational aspects of the Secretary-General’s reconfiguration of UNMIK, but this appears unlikely given the short time period between this new report and his 12 June report.

An UNMIK report on the 17 March incident in northern Mitrovica, where the UN police retook the UN courthouse from Serbian protestors, may also be discussed in July.

Key Recent Developments

The Secretary-General’s report outlining his plans to reconfigure UNMIK was circulated to Council members on 12 June. It covered the situation on the ground in Kosovo and the impact of the new constitution in Kosovo for UNMIK’s transitional role as the interim administrative authority. The Secretary-General emphasised that the UN remains status-neutral following Kosovo’s 17 February unilateral declaration of independence. Nevertheless, the entry into force of the constitution created a new reality. He therefore concluded that UNMIK must adapt its role in Kosovo. He noted the agreement between Kosovo and the EU for an “enhanced operational role” for the EU in the field of rule of law but suggested that under resolution 1244 this should be under a UN “umbrella” headed by the Secretary-General’s special representative for Kosovo. (Under this bilateral EU/Kosovo agreement, the EU will perform various operational roles in areas dealing with rule of law but suggested that under resolution 1244 this should be under a UN “umbrella” headed by the Secretary-General’s special representative for Kosovo. The EU responsibilities cover international policing, justice and customs. The UN role will include monitoring and reporting, facilitating arrangements for Kosovo’s engagement in international agreements, and facilitating dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade on issues of practical concern. (Please see our Update Report of 13 June for more information.)
The Council held an open debate on 20 June to discuss the 12 June report. The Secretary-General acknowledged the delicate and divisive nature of this issue. While it may not meet the aspirations of any of the key stake-holders, he said, he felt that his proposal represented “the least objectionable” way forward and that the package was a “practical and workable” solution.

Both Serbian President Boris Tadic and Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu addressed the Council during the open debate. The Serbian representative attended under rule 37 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council (this provides for a member to participate in discussions where its interests are affected) and the Kosovo representative under rule 39 (this allows the Council to invite someone to provide it with information). Over the months, there has been greater Council acceptance procedurally of direct Kosovo participation. In June there was no opposition to a Kosovo representative participating in an open meeting, unlike in December 2007. At that time the US and Europeans had wanted the Kosovo representative to be able speak in an open debate but Russia was opposed. As a result, there were three closed meetings with both parties participating between December 2007 and April 2008.

Tadic opposed the Secretary-General’s proposed reconfiguration of UNMIK, claiming that as long as 1244 is in force, Kosovo is part of Serbia. He called for new negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo. By contrast, Sejdiu supported the Secretary-General’s proposal and said that over the years UNMIK had progressively adapted itself as needed to changing circumstances. Thirteen Council members spoke, 11 endorsed the Secretary-General’s reconfiguration and two (Russia and Vietnam) opposed. South Africa and Libya did not deliver statements.

On 16 June, in a written reply to a letter from the Secretary-General, Sejdiu said that Kosovo took note that UNMIK would perform residual functions as well as rule of law functions for a limited period until the EU is able to operate. He said that Kosovo will “work closely” with the Secretary-General as he moves forward. Tadic, in his reply to a similar letter from the Secretary-General, apparently said that reconfiguration of the international presence should be decided by the Council.

Kosovo’s constitution, adopted in the context of the unilateral declaration of status as an independent state, came into force on 15 June. Serbs in the north responded by deciding to convene a separate parliament in northern Mitrovica on 28 June to represent citizens that consider Serbia their state. The 43 states that have recognized Kosovo’s independence offered congratulations. Russia called Kosovo’s new constitution a breach of international law.

Under the new constitution, Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu signed a decree on 18 June for the establishment of nine diplomatic missions: in Albania, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Britain and the United States.

On 20 June, Lamberto Zannier of Italy became the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Kosovo. According to the Secretary-General’s reconfiguration plan the special representative will be tasked to negotiate practical arrangements in police, justice, customs, transportation and infrastructure areas.

Options
The most likely option is for the Council to discuss the Secretary-General’s expected report but not take any action.

One option is for the Council to specifically decide whether the Secretary-General has the right to reconfigure UNMIK as proposed under resolution 1244. But this is unlikely given the differing views on this point within the Council.

Another option is to urge Kosovo and Serbia to resume negotiations. However, Kosovo has made it clear that it would not go along with this.

A possible option is to decide on a schedule for future regular reports from the Secretary-General on Kosovo. (The reporting cycle of the UNMIK report is not specified by a Council decision but they have tended to come out about every three months.)

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is how to handle the divisions over the Secretary-General’s reconfiguration plan.

A related issue will be how to react if Russia insists that the changes to UNMIK are sufficiently substantial to constitute a contradiction to resolution 1244 and proposes a Council decision to block the Secretary-General from reconfiguring UNMIK and bringing the EU rule of operation under UNMIK.

There are several continuing key security issues:
- How will the Serbian population in Kosovo react to the EU operating in Serb dominated areas, even under a UN umbrella?
- Is a soft partition being entrenched as a result of the strengthening of parallel institutions in the Serb-dominated areas?
- Will there be unrest if the pace of recognition of Kosovo’s independence does not pick up and the EU’s mission continues to be delayed?
- How will the future role of NATO forces in Kosovo under resolution 1244 be affected?

Council Dynamics
The Council is clearly divided over the UNMIK reconfiguration. The majority accept that the Secretary-General has the right to make operational changes and support his proposed changes to the international presence in Kosovo. While some, like the US and UK, would have preferred a more definitive statement leading to UNMIK’s eventual extinction, there seems to be an understanding of the Secretary-General’s need to strike a delicate balance.

It appears that Russia and Vietnam are the only two members that find unacceptable the Secretary-General’s attempts to reorganise the international presence in Kosovo. Russia seems likely to continue to insist that if the Secretary-General does not secure
Council approval for his plan, it would be a violation of both resolution 1244 and the UN Charter.

While continuing to advocate adherence to the UN Charter and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, China appears to have tacitly accepted the Secretary-General’s proposal to reconfigure UNMIK as compatible with resolution 1244 as well as the EU’s enhanced contribution.

**UN Documents**

**Security Council Resolution**
- S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) authorised NATO to secure and enforce the withdrawal of Yugoslav (FRY) forces from Kosovo and established UNMIK.

**Selected Presidential Statements**
- S/PV.5839 (18 February 2008) was the letter from Russia supporting the Council resolution on Kosovo presented to the Council on 17 July.
- Draft resolution on Kosovo (formally circulated on 17 July 2007 but withdrawn on 20 July 2007).

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General**
Lamberto Zannier

**UNMIK**
- Size of UNMIK mission: 1426 police, 37 military observers as of May 2008 (not including OSCE, EU and NATO expenditures)
- Size of OSCE mission: 999 staff (283 international and 716 local as of May 2007)
- Size of EU mission: 99 international staff, 334 local staff (31 October 2007)

**Cost**
$210.6 million for fiscal year 2007-2008

**KFOR (NATO FORCE)**
General Xavier de Marnhac (France)

**Size and Composition of Mission**
- Size: 15,900 troops
- NATO countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, UK and the US
- Non-NATO countries: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Morocco, Sweden, Switzerland and Ukraine

**Somalia**

**Expected Council Action**
The Secretary-General’s report on Somalia, requested in resolution 1814, is due in July. It is expected to include an update on:
- the Secretary-General’s strategy for Somalia, including relocation of the UN Political Office (UNPOS) to Somalia;
- efforts to establish a humanitarian coordination mechanism; and
- progress with establishing a human rights capacity within UNPOS.

A Secretariat briefing and consultations are likely. It is unclear whether formal action will emerge. Members will be paying close attention to developments following the recent agreement between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and elements of the opposition. Of particular importance will be whether concrete proposals for a multinational coalition force for Somalia will emerge.

The AU’s mandate for its Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) expires on 18 July, but the mission’s Council authorisation continues until 20 August.

Recommendations from the sanctions committee to the Council on targeted measures are due in mid-July.

**Key Recent Developments**

Humanitarian conditions in Somalia continue to worsen. Drought, inflation and soaring food prices threaten general starvation. There are now one million internally displaced and 450,000 Somali refugees. An estimated 2.6 million—more than a third of the population—are currently in need of assistance.

All sides—the TFG, Ethiopian forces and the opposing Shabaab militia—are being accused of violations against children, the Secretary-General reported on 30 May. He encouraged the Council to refer such violations to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Fighting involving TFG and Ethiopian forces against the Shabaab militia continues. On 1 May, Shabaab leader Aden Hashi Farah Ayrow was killed in a US air strike.
The regional situation also continued to deteriorate in June as fighting erupted between Eritrean and Djiboutian forces.

On 15 May, the Council adopted resolution 1814, which included:
- strong support for the Secretary-General’s incremental approach;
- continued contingency planning for UN peacekeeping; and
- a request for security arrangements to support relocation of UNPOS to Somalia.

In mid-May, peace talks commenced in Djibouti between the TFG and a wing of the opposition Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) under Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, mediated by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. In late May, a Council mission met these two parties in Djibouti. (For more information, please see our 22 May Update Report.)

On 9 June, these two parties reached agreement on:
- a 90-day renewable cessation of hostilities, starting within 30 days;
- the deployment within 120 days of a Council-authorised “international stabilisation force” excluding neighbouring countries, and Ethiopian withdrawal “after the deployment of a sufficient number of UN forces;”
- a statement by the ARS group condemning violence and disassociating itself from recalcitrant groups;
- pledges to ensure unhindered humanitarian access and assistance;
- a UN-chaired Joint Security Committee to oversee implementation; and
- a UN-chaired high-level committee to follow up on political cooperation between the parties and justice and reconciliation, and a related conference by 30 July.

The agreement is expected to be signed in Saudi Arabia in early July and Special Representative Ould-Abdallah is apparently working with regional partners on the proposed “stabilisation force,” but prospects are unclear.

There is concern about the viability of the agreement. This flow from the fact that the key opposition combatants were not at the table from the vagueness in the criteria for Ethiopian withdrawal (i.e., “sufficient number of UN forces”), and a perceived lack of realistic prospects for an “international stabilisation force.”

ARS leader Hassan Dahir Aweys and the Shabaab pledged to continue fighting, reiterating opposition to peace talks and international deployments. The Shabaab since then launched a number of attacks.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi reportedly said withdrawal could only happen “when we are convinced that there is no imminent danger.”

On 2 June, the Council adopted resolution 1816 authorising states cooperating with the TFG to take action to against piracy and robbery off the Somali coast, after notification to the Secretary-General by the TFG.

Related Developments in the Sanctions Committee

In early April, the Sanctions Committee received the Monitoring Group’s final report, which noted continuous arms flows into Somalia. All sides have reportedly had a role in violations, including the TFG and the Shabaab, as well as Ethiopia, Yemen, Eritrea and the US. The report says Ugandan troops under AMISOM, TFG and Ethiopian forces have been involved in arms sales. Uganda, Yemen and Ethiopia denied the findings.

Options

The most likely option for the Council in the short term is a further discussion of the situation in Somalia, followed perhaps with a statement on political reconciliation and support for the Djibouti agreement, and indicating that contingency planning for UN peacekeeping should continue. References to humanitarian access and respect for international humanitarian law, and support for strengthening of UNPOS and its relocation to Somalia are also possible.

Strengthening the sanctions regime, possibly through targeted measures against peace-spoilers and violators of the arms embargo is also an option. This would require a resolution establishing targeted measures and mandating the Sanctions Committee to adopt a list of individuals and entities. It seems unlikely that this will be taken up in July.

Another option might be to focus on encouraging greater UN assistance to AMISOM, perhaps requesting detailed recommendations from the Secretary-General in that regard.

Other options might include:
- addressing seriously the feasibility of a coalition of states providing the international stabilisation force requested in the Djibouti agreement (It remains to be seen whether concrete proposals will emerge under Ould-Abdallah’s leadership but informal meeting between the AU, the Arab League and concerned states might be of assistance in that regard);
- requesting states to cooperate with the TFG in curbing arms shipments to Somalia, perhaps using a framework similar to that established in resolution 1816;
- requesting states to report directly to the Sanctions Committee on measures taken to implement the arms embargo; and
- considering options regarding justice and accountability, including referral to the ICC.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is that the political process in Somalia does not seem likely to quickly improve security and create conditions for Ethiopian withdrawal. A related issue given the security situation is how far to go in supporting the Djibouti agreement.

A fundamental question is whether it will ever be possible to attract the other ARS elements and the Shabaab into a peace process. So far, peacemaking initiatives have emphasised inclusiveness, but recent statements from the Shabaab and other ARS elements indicate that they refuse a negotiated agreement with the TFG and are intent on fighting. This may encourage a Council policy of containment and
deterrence as exemplified in the Djibouti agreement’s request for an international stabilisation force.

The prospects for such a force—particularly a UN blue helmet operation—seem limited in the near future. The issue is whether there is anything else the Council can and should do to improve security and allay Ethiopian and TFG concerns. Strengthening AMISOM has been a perennial issue in this regard, but difficulties with financing and troop generation indicate that this may not be a credible option.

Other issues include:
- addressing the regional dimension, concerns about terrorism by the US and others, and the impact that these have on political reconciliation efforts;
- ensuring UNPOS’s security and relocation;
- addressing violations of international humanitarian law and lack of humanitarian access; and
- action on human rights and justice issues.

Council Dynamics
Members welcome the recent Djibouti agreement and Ould-Abdallah’s initiatives. But there is painful awareness of the potential weaknesses. Members seem genuinely stalemated by the lack of feasible options for improving security and creating genuine political reconciliation.

Some—such as African members, China, the US and Italy—have strongly supported the view that the Council should express determination to have a UN military force. However, there seems to be private acknowledgement that all of the existing options—a coalition stabilisation force, strengthening AMISOM, or deploying a UN operation—are problematic.

Some are interested in sanctions, but for others there is continuing scepticism about new measures, given their potential ineffectiveness.

Options for measures on human rights, justice and accountability are likely to continue to face traditional Council divisions.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**
- S/RES/1814 (15 May 2008) requested an update to the Secretary-General’s phased approach.
- S/RES/1801 (20 February 2008) renewed AMISOM for six months.

**Selected Presidential Statement**

**Selected Reports of the Secretary-General**
- S/2008/352 (30 May 2008) was the report on children.

**Latest Monitoring Group’s Report**
- S/2008/274 (24 April 2008)

**Other**
- S/PV.5915 (18 June 2008) was the briefing by the Council mission to Africa. 
- S/2008/309 (9 May 2008) was the Secretary-General’s response to the AU’s request for UN assistance to AMISOM.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General**
Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania)

**UNPOS: Size and Cost**
- Maximum authorised size: 44 international and 28 local civilians
- Size as of 30 April 2008: 18 international and 11 local civilians
- 2008 budget: about $16 million

**UNPOS: Duration**
15 April 1995 to present; mandate expires on 31 December 2009

**AMISOM: Size, Composition and Cost**
- Maximum authorised strength: 7,650 troops plus maritime and air components

**Georgia**

**Expected Council Action**
In July the Council expects the Secretary-General’s quarterly report on Georgia and a briefing by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Jean Arnault. No Council action is required.

In addition, the Secretary-General may brief members on findings from the Secretariat’s current assessment of the peace process. This could lead to discussion of the implications of the findings and next steps.

The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)’s mandate will expire on 15 October.

**Key Recent Developments**
On 30 May, the Council met at the request of Georgia to discuss the UNOMIG report on the downing of an unmanned aerial vehicle on 20 April. (Please see our Update Report of 29 May 2008 for further details.) The Georgian representative demanded official explanations, compensation, and a commitment to restrain from provocative acts. Russia questioned the evidence used in UNOMIG’s investigation.

On 31 May, Russia deployed a military unit to repair Abkhazia’s rail and road infrastructure. Georgia saw this action as preparation for infrastructure for possible military intervention. Russia described it as a humanitarian action aimed at improving people’s lives. The Russian action drew criticism from the US and NATO.

On 5 June, Georgia suspended flights of unmanned aerial vehicles over Abkhazia but reserved the right to restart them.

In the last few months there have been several attempts at quiet diplomacy:
In early May, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Matthew Bryza, visited Sukhumi to encourage both sides to rejuvenate the real peace process.

On 12 May, Georgia’s UN ambassador, Irakli Alasania, held the first direct talks with Abkhaz leaders in Sukhumi. He proposed taking small steps by discussing areas of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s April peace proposal like the return of displaced Georgians and the creation of free economic zones in Gali and Ochamchire.

Javier Solana, the European Union’s High Representative, visited Tbilisi and Sukhumi in early June seeking to “lower the temperature” and encourage a resumption of direct Georgian-Abkhaz talks. He said that the EU would take a more active role.

EU ambassadors in early June called for a resumption of dialogue without preliminary conditions.

The US, UK, Germany and France met in mid-June to discuss ways of encouraging dialogue between Tbilisi and Sukhumi. A meeting of the full Group of Friends (which also includes Russia) is expected before the Council discusses the UNOMIG report in July.

Georgia on 17 June arrested four Russian soldiers suspected of transporting weapons without proper documentation. They were released the next day.

Options
Council options include:
- no action;
- a press statement urging the parties to refrain from acts of violence or provocation to respect the Moscow agreement and to take steps to deescalate the situation; and
- approval of recommendations that might emerge from the Secretariat’s internal assessment if that is complete.

Key Issues
A key issue is whether the Council can at this stage play any role in revitalising the negotiating process.

A related issue is how to deescalate the tit-for-tat diplomacy and accumulating grievances so that brinkmanship does not spill over into armed hostilities.

A key procedural issue in July may be the format for and participation at the briefing. As a party to the conflict, Georgia is likely to ask to attend. But Russia may want a representative from Abkhazia to participate. Attendance by Abkhaz representatives has been controversial in the past. This issue might come up during the discussions in early July on the Council’s programme of work. Recent Kosovo precedents are likely to be discussed in detail.

Council Dynamics
Russia and the US continue to be the most active members on this issue. Council members like the UK and France, part of the Group of Friends, are also active. But most other members are keeping a low profile.

Despite the escalating tensions and increased potential for conflict, the Council has remained essentially disengaged. Solana’s recent visit may indicate that European non-permanent members will take a keener interest.

There seems to be growing support for Russia’s proposal that an Abkhaz representative should participate in some way. Members like Indonesia, South Africa, Vietnam and Panama agree that having representatives from both sides is in line with best practice for Council working methods. Both the Serbian and Kosovo representatives participated in discussions on Kosovo in June and this has led to a feeling that the Council should avoid double standards. It remains to be seen if agreement can be reached or even if this issue may be put to a procedural vote. If the latter, those supporting Russia’s request might prevail.

UN Documents

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<tr>
<th>Latest Security Council Resolution</th>
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<th>Selected Secretary-General’s Report</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/2008/219 (2 April 2008) was the latest Secretary-General’s report on the situation in Abkhazia.</td>
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**Useful Additional Source**
Nepal

Expected Council Action
In July the Secretary General’s Special Representative for Nepal, Ian Martin will brief the Council on the Secretary General’s latest report on the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) and the future of the mission. UNMIN’s mandate expires on 23 July.

At the time of writing, the UN had not received any request from Nepal regarding UNMIN’s future role.

Recent Key Developments
In mid-June Nepalese media reported that Maoist deputy chief Baburam Bhattarai had indicated that UNMIN would be needed to monitor the army camps but a large contingent would not be necessary. This was a shift from earlier reports that the Maoists’, who will make up the majority in the government, were hesitant about a future UNMIN presence.

On 15 June, Martin met with Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal, known as “Prachanda.” Among the issues discussed was army integration and the issue of adjustment and rehabilitation of Maoist combatants, which has become a sticking point in power-sharing negotiations.

Since the Constituent Assembly elections on 10 April, the three main parties—the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist)—have been negotiating the formation of a new government. While the Maoists won the largest number of seats for a constituent-drafting assembly, they did not secure a clear majority and still need to form a coalition government. In an attempt to resolve the deadlock, the Maoists, who had been insisting on the positions of prime minister and president, said they will give up the president’s post.

The seven Maoist ministers in the interim government resigned twice in June. The first time on 12 June was an attempt to press Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala to leave office. On 20 June, the seven ministers resigned collectively during a meeting of the seven ruling parties after negotiations failed to break the deadlock over the formation of the government. They currently remain outside the interim government.

On 28 May, the Constituent Assembly convened for the first time and proclaimed Nepal a republic. Both the Secretary-General and his Special Representative issued statements congratulating the people of Nepal on the achievement of convening a historic Constituent Assembly.

The first Constituent Assembly also agreed that former King Gyanendra had to vacate his palace in 15 days. He went without resistance on 10 June. The palace is to be converted into a museum.

On 22 May, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative Ian Martin briefed the Council following the Constituent Assembly elections. He said Nepal still faced very considerable challenges. In his report in May (S/2008/313), the Secretary-General said the UN “stands ready to provide continuing support for the completion and consolidation of the peace process.”

On 19 May, UNMIN condemned the killing of a local businessman, Ram Hari Shrestha, inside the Maoist cantonment as a breach of commitments made in the Agreement on Monitoring the Management of Arms and Armies (AMMAA). Maoist army commanders admitted to UNMIN that the murder was committed by members of their group.

On 18 June, the Maoists agreed to reign its youth arm, the Young Communists League (YCL), (which has functioned as an armed unit that uses violence and intimidation) and to restructure it into a political organisation in 15 days.

On 8 June, 185 Tibetan exiles were detained as they protested outside the Chinese embassy. Seven hundred protesters were detained for participating in anti-Chinese demonstrations on 19 June. The protesters are demanding an end to suppression of Tibetans in China. (There are about 20,000 Tibetans in exile living in Nepal.)

Options
The Council’s options will be steered by what the Nepalese government asks the UN to do. If the Council is asked to continue to support the peace process, the most likely option is a new mandate for a limited period.

A possible option if the Nepalese government indicates it wants UNMIN to assist, but has not yet clarified the role it would like it to play, is a possible rollover for one or two months.

In addition, the Council could ask the Secretary-General for a report on UNMIN focusing on lessons learned.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is how to handle the uncertainty as to whether there will be a request for continuing support beyond 23 July. Some ongoing UNMIN functions can be performed by UN agencies that will continue in Nepal, such as the UN Development Programme and the UN High Commission for Human Rights. Other functions such as arms monitoring will require UNMIN to continue in some form.

A related issue is what to do if there is no clear request for UNMIN by 23 July. Shutting down, then restarting a mission is likely to be impractical and much more costly than keeping it running.

A key issue therefore is where the parties are headed regarding the future of the national and former rebel armies in Nepal. This will be directly relevant to any possible future arms monitoring role for the UN.

Another issue is the future stability of the government. The differences which have emerged during the negotiations for formation of the government may signal ongoing fragility. A related issue is whether the Maoists can transform the YCL into a law-abiding body and keep it under control.

A further issue is how the new government will handle issues like compensation for victims, investigation into disappearances and the return of property and internally displaced persons, and whether it will have the political will to bring to justice those responsible for violence and human rights abuses. A perception that either side had impunity could trigger discontent and unrest.

Council Dynamics
Council members generally agree that there is a need for the UN to continue to support the peace process in Nepal. Most
are reluctant to discuss the form or role of the mission until the wishes of the Nepalese government are known.

China has clearly stated that any future role must begin with a request from the Nepalese government. Others, like the UK, which is the lead country on Nepal, have flagged that UNMIN’s future role should not be indefinite and would like to see an exit strategy discussed together with any new mandate.

The US position on dealing with the Maoists, who are still on its terrorism blacklist, appears to be softening. At the end of May, a US senior government official met Maoists leaders in Kathmandu signalling an attempt to work with the new government. However, the future relationship seems likely to depend on the Maoists fully embracing the political process.

Maoist leader Prachanda, tipped to be the prime minister in Nepal’s new government, has said he wants to have a policy of “equi-distance”—or not siding with any country and trying to have good relations with all Nepal’s neighbours. This could signal the start of a new balance in Nepal’s ties with both China and India.

Underlying Problems
A 25 percent fuel hike in early June led to protests in Kathmandu. Increasing fuel and food prices could pose a challenge for the new government. In January a similar increase was withdrawn after nationwide protests.

Other Relevant Facts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission</th>
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<td>Ian Martin (UK)</td>
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<th>Size and Composition</th>
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<tr>
<td>Latest figures are not available as UNMIN is in the midst of downsizing.</td>
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<th>Duration</th>
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<td>23 January 2007 to 23 July 2008</td>
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<td>$88.8 million</td>
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Lebanon

Expected Council Action
The Council in July will consider the Secretary-General’s report on resolution 1701, which ended the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006.

The improved but still fragile political environment in Lebanon will likely influence discussions in the Council. The new political situation may be an opportunity to revive the long term peace process envisaged in resolution 1701.

A presidential statement encouraging further progress on all elements of resolution 1701 is possible.

Key Recent Developments
Following the Doha agreement of 21 May between the Lebanese ruling majority and the Hezbollah-led opposition, which allowed the election of Michel Suleiman as Lebanese president and ended an 18-month political deadlock, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora was reappointed. At press time he was trying to form a unity ministerial cabinet, which met the opposition requirement that it have a veto power. This government would hold power until the 2009 parliamentary election. However, it seems that mutual distrust is hampering the process. Security incidents and clashes between supporters of the majority and the opposition parties, which left at least nine people dead and fifty wounded, also continued in Lebanon in past weeks, especially on 22 and 23 June in Tripoli where the Lebanese army deployed.

In early June, a series of high-level visitors arrived in Lebanon to support the Doha agreement and President Suleiman. French President Nicolas Sarkozy was first, on 7 June. He was followed on the next day by UK Foreign Minister David Miliband, who stressed the need to implement resolution 1701, including the issue of the Sheb’a Farms occupied by Israel. On 16 June, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited to Beirut and endorsed the Doha agreement. She also said that the issue of the Sheb’a Farms needed to be settled, noting this may help resolving regional issues. President Suleiman and Prime Minister Siniora reiterated that Israel had to withdraw from the Farms, and that the area should be placed under UN control until a formal delimitation agreement is reached between Syria and Lebanon.

On 14 June, France and the US issued a joint statement calling on Syria to quickly establish full diplomatic relations with Lebanon based on respect, equality, security and sovereignty. They reaffirmed their support for implementing the Doha agreement and for the Lebanese government and army.

On 10 June, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said he hoped that conditions would soon emerge to enable direct peace negotiations with Lebanon, including on the issue of the Sheb’a Farms. He reiterated this offer on 18 June. The Lebanese government stressed that the key requirement was for Israel to implement Council resolutions.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on 5 June said his country would consider opening an embassy in Lebanon after the unity government was formed.

On 2 June, the Council adopted resolution 1815 extending the mandate of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) into the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and other bombing attacks in Lebanon. The

UN Documents

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<th>Security Council Resolution</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1740 (23 January 2007) established UNMIN for 12 months.</td>
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<th>Secretary General’s Reports</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/2008/313 (12 May 2008) was the last report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for UN assistance in support of its peace process.</td>
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<th>Presidential Statement</th>
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<td>• S/PRST/2006/49 (1 December 2006) expressed support for the Secretary-General’s intention to send a technical assessment team to Nepal and noted that the Council would await formal proposals.</td>
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renewal extends until 31 December unless the Commission completes its mandate beforehand, in which case the Special Tribunal for Lebanon would take over ongoing responsibilities. The Council requested a report within six months.

On 1 June, Israel released Nassim Nisr, a Lebanese prisoner. Hezbollah returned the remains of Israeli soldiers killed during the 2006 war. Hezbollah hinted that this might be a prelude to the return of the two Israeli soldiers captured in 2006.

Options
The Council may decide to defer consideration of the 1701 report until the new Lebanese government presents its strategic plan for implementation of the Doha agreement—including a framework for the resumption of the inter-Lebanese dialogue aimed at tackling the issue of disarmament and other contentious issues—and react to it.

It could adopt a presidential statement:
- reaffirming the need for all parties to implement the Doha agreement in full, insisting in particular on the reinforcement of state authority over Lebanon’s territory, and welcoming the formation of a unity government;
- reiterating previous language on implementation of resolution 1701, in particular urging the parties to implement all aspects of the resolution; and
- reaffirming its strong support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence of Lebanon under the exclusive authority of its government.

A more proactive option for the Council could be to:
- urge intensified efforts to find a solution leading to Israeli withdrawal of the northern part of the village of Ghajar, on the border between Lebanon and the Golan Heights;
- request the Secretary-General to find a quick solution to the Sheb’a Farms issue (a first step might be obtaining confirmation from the parties that they agree with the definition of the area provided by the UN cartographer);
- encourage the resumption of Lebanese dialogue with the view to reaching an agreement on the disarmament of militias and, request the Secretary-General to provide assistance to this process; and
- remind the parties of the arms embargo and hold open the possibility of enhanced border surveillance if the situation does not improve.

Key Issues
The immediate issue is whether the Doha agreement’s provisions on the formation of a unity government can be implemented quickly and agreement can be reached on a new electoral law in view of the 2009 legislative elections.

The Doha agreement does not resolve the issue of disarmament of militias. This is to be taken up in the dialogue among all Lebanese factions which is supposed to resume after the government is formed. The Council had addressed this in resolution 1701. However, in his latest report (S/2008/135) the Secretary-General said the continuing political crisis in Lebanon was complicating efforts to implement resolution 1701. A related issue therefore is whether the Council should take an early opportunity to reinforce the political gains obtained at Doha in support of the 1701 process.

Key issues relating to the 1701 process include:
- Sheb’a Farms: The US statement regarding the need to deal with the Farms issue may indicate renewed impetus is possible on that front. In a previous report, the Secretary-General had stated that the UN cartographer had provisionally defined the area, but the border remained to be demarcated. Neither Israel nor Syria have reacted to this definition, and it seems that little progress has been achieved in talks among the Secretary-General, Israel, Syria and Lebanon on placing the Farms under provisional UN control. Israel’s willingness to withdraw forces from the area remains the key issue. It is unclear whether any movement on this may be linked to progress in the Syria-Israel peace negotiations on the Golan Heights. However, if Israel were to withdraw and the Farms were recognised as Lebanese rather than Syrian, this might reduce pressure for Hezbollah to see itself as a resistance movement and improve the prospects for the Lebanese dialogue.
- Illegal arms transfers: Israel claims that weapons are continuing to filter through the Syria-Lebanon border, and are then transferred to Hezbollah in the area controlled by the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), south of the Litani River. The UN has been unable to verify those allegations. In the absence of proof, there have been divisions in the Council on that issue. An issue is how to reinforce border surveillance by Lebanese forces within that context. It seems that the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT) remains the most likely Council tool. The Secretary-General in his previous report said he would send a new LIBAT mission. The team was delayed because of the May crisis but is expected to go to Lebanon soon. A separate report would be presented to the Council at a later stage.
- Prisoner exchange: This remains an important issue for the Council and one that has potential for progress as the 1 June exchange seemed to presage the release of more prisoners.
- Violations of Lebanese territorial integrity: While the situation along the Blue Line between Lebanon and Israel appears quiet, Israeli overflights have continued. This remains an issue in the Council.
- Ghajar: The northern part of this village in south Lebanon remains occupied by Israel contrary to resolution 1701. Talks continue between the Lebanese armed forces, Israeli Defense Forces and UNIFIL to determine the modalities of Israel’s withdrawal from the area. It seems that there has been some progress.
- Landmines: Under resolution 1701 Israel has to provide the UN with all remaining maps of landmines in Lebanon. To date this has not been done.

Council Dynamics
Many in the Council believe that the Doha agreement creates a positive context for further progress on the 1701 process.
However, underlying divisions are likely to reappear during discussions. Some (Libya, Indonesia and South Africa) particularly emphasise Israeli overflights. Others (the US especially) consider the issue of disarmament a priority.

Many (including France and the UK) believe that a successful political process is the only practical solution and fear that more intrusive measures would place the Lebanese government in a difficult position.

The US seems inclined to toughen language on Syria and Iran (as main sponsors of Hezbollah) and find new ways to secure the Syrian-Lebanese border, including a UNIFIL deployment along it. But neither the Lebanese government nor the main UNIFIL troop contributors (France and Italy) seem comfortable with this option. LIBAT has support among Council members as it represents a softer way to improve border surveillance.

### Other Relevant Facts

**UNIIIC Commissioner and Future Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal**
- Daniel Bellemare (Canada)

**Secretary-General’s Special Coordinator for Lebanon**
- Johan Verbeke (Belgium)

**UNIFIL Force Commander**
- Major General Claudio Graziano (Italy)

**Size and Composition of UNIFIL**
- Authorised: 15,000 troops
- Current (30 April 2008): 12,341 military personnel
- Troop-contributing Countries: Belgium, China, Croatia, Cyprus, France, FYR of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Nepal, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, Spain, Tanzania and Turkey

**Cost (approved budget)**

### Afghanistan

**Expected Council Action**

In July the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, Kai Eide, will brief the Council on the outcome of the international conference in Paris on 12 June on support of Afghanistan. The Council will also discuss the Secretary-General’s recommendations for changes in the operations of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), requested in resolution 1806. Possible recommendations include:

- increasing the number of provincial offices; and
- violations of Lebanese territorial integrity during May.
  - S/2008/334 (16 May 2008) was a letter from the Secretary-General transmitting a letter from Lebanon expressing the hope that UNIIIC’s mandate would be extended until 31 December 2008.
  - S/2008/302 (6 May 2008) was a letter from Lebanon on Israel’s violations of Lebanese territorial integrity during April.

**Key Recent Developments**

An International Conference in Support of Afghanistan was held on 12 June in Paris. Participants took stock of the two-year old Afghanistan Compact. The Afghan government launched its new five-year Afghanistan National Development Strategy. More than 80 countries participated. Twenty billion dollars was pledged, double that raised at the London Conference two years ago, and this has been seen as a sign of strong continuing commitment from the international community.

The Afghanistan development strategy, which is underpinned by the Afghanistan Compact, has three key pillars: security; governance, rule of law and human rights; and economic and social development. Participants stressed the need for both sustained financial and political commitment and better international aid coordination if the Afghan-led national development strategy is to be successfully implemented.

Ahead of the conference in Paris, Eide stressed that it was more than just a pledging conference and called for a “new deal” between Afghanistan and the international community.

A forum for civil society and the private sector was held on 24 May in Paris to provide inputs for the 12 June conference. Among the topics discussed was the need for a review of international aid to Afghanistan and aid coordination.

At the Bucharest summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) on 3 April,
NATO leaders issued a new strategic vision for Afghanistan. However, some observers have criticized NATO for not matching deeds to words in delivering on commitments such as providing military commanders with the tools needed for success and allowing flexibility of use of forces by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commanders.

In mid-June, shortly after the Paris conference, France announced that it would rejoin NATO’s military command structure, from which it had withdrawn in 1966. Earlier, it said it would send 700 more troops to eastern Afghanistan. Italy says it will allow a broader military role for Italian troops, and the UK committed 230 additional soldiers. Germany agreed to increase the level of troops available for duty in Afghanistan, allowing it to send an additional 1000 troops to northern Afghanistan by the end of 2008.

On 11 June, the Council adopted resolution 1817, introduced by France, restricting the trafficking to Afghanistan of chemical precursors used in narcotics production. The resolution calls on states to improve coordination with bodies like the International Narcotics Control Board and to tighten international and regional controls on the manufacture and trade of chemical precursors, and prevent their diversion to illicit markets. (Please see our 9 June 2008 Update for background details.)

Options
One option is a resolution endorsing the outcome of the Paris Conference on Afghanistan and the Secretary-General’s recommendations. However, some members do not see the need for a resolution.

An alternative option is a presidential statement which would support the recommendations for changes to UNAMA. It is likely to reiterate elements of the 16 June press statement which welcomed:
- the reaffirmation of the international community’s long-term commitment to Afghanistan;
- the Afghan government’s commitment to pursue political and economic reform, and take leadership for its development;
- the review of the Afghanistan Compact prepared by the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board co-chairs; and
- the support for the central role of the Secretary-General and UNAMA;

A further option is to defer a decision on the recommendations and to request the Secretary-General to include in his next report:
- an assessment of the challenges anticipated in implementing the recommendations; and
- a timetable for implementing the proposed changes to UNAMA.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is how far to go at this stage regarding the recommendations in the Secretary-General’s report. No change in UNAMA’s mandate is expected at this point. However, Council endorsement of the changes to UNAMA would help in the lead-up to discussion on the UNAMA budget.

Securing acceptance among UN agencies of the idea of a third pillar focusing on international aid coordination is also an issue. UNAMA has two main pillars, one handling political matters and the other development and humanitarian issues. Some argue a third pillar is essential to ensure better aid coordination and aid effectiveness in order to prevent Afghanistan aid fatigue and disillusionment from setting in. Others like the UN Development Programme argue that aid coordination can be brought under the second pillar so there is no need to create a new pillar.

A practical issue is the difficulty faced by UNAMA in recruiting and retaining staff. A special provision similar to that in the Iraq mission might be necessary to attract enough qualified personnel for additional provincial offices and a third pillar.

A continuing issue is combating corruption. Afghanistan’s president, Hamid Karzai, has reaffirmed his commitment to fighting corruption. Failure could affect aid commitments.

Council Dynamics
Members have differing views about the need for a resolution at this stage. Some members point to the precedent set by adopting a resolution after the London conference in 2006 and argue that the Council should do the same now. Others feel that a resolution was more relevant for the London conference because it created something new—the Afghanistan Compact.

Endorsing the Paris declaration by the Conference co-chairs’ may be problematic as it was not a document agreed by all participants. Russia, for example, is reluctant to endorse a document which refers to the “expanded role of the Secretary-General.” (The Council press statement issued on 16 June used “central role of the special representative and UNAMA” as an alternative.)

Other members argue against a proliferation of resolutions in the Council, and are liable to shy away from another resolution soon after the one on trafficking of chemical precursors and prefer to wait until there is a specific need to adjust the UNAMA mandate.

Council members like the UK and the US, together with the lead country Italy, continue to be key players on this issue. France has signalled Afghanistan as a key priority, and it is showing signs of wanting to play a more active role than it has in the past.

It appears that Eide has strong support from all members. The Council is likely to be in agreement on giving him the leeway to make changes that will allow him to implement his vision of UNAMA’s sharpened mandate. While no objections to the idea of setting up more provincial offices are anticipated, as the Council has endorsed this idea in the past, some members may request more information about the third pillar and its implications.

UN Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Security Council Resolutions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/1817 (11 June 2008) was the resolution restricting the trafficking of chemical precursors into Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/1659 (15 February 2006) endorsed the Afghanistan Compact</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Selected Presidential Statements

- S/RES/1401 (28 March 2002) welcomed international initiatives to improve security, stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan and reiterated support for the Afghan government.

Selected Report of the Secretary-General

- S/2008/159 (6 March 2008) was the latest report.

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAMA’s Chief of Mission

Kai Eide

UNAMA: Size, Composition and Duration

- Current strength: 225 international civilians, 1,075 local civilians, 16 military observers, three military police, 36 UN volunteers
- Duration: 28 March 2002 to present; mandate expires on 23 March 2009

ISAF Military Commander

General David McKiernan (US)

ISAF: Size, Composition and Duration

- Current strength: about 43,250 troops
- Contributors of military personnel: 40 NATO and non-NATO countries
- Current top contributors: US, UK, Germany, Canada, Italy and the Netherlands.
- Duration: 28 December 2001 to present; mandate expires on 13 October 2008

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF): Size, Composition and Duration

- Current strength:13,500 (this is an estimate as the troop numbers shift continuously)
- Top contributor: US
- Duration: 7 October to present

Useful Additional Sources

- Afghanistan National Development Strategy, Executive Summary
- Declaration of the International Conference in Support of Afghanistan, Issued under the Authority of the three co-chairs, the President of the Republic of France, the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Secretary-General of the UN, 12 June 2008

Chad/Central African Republic

Expected Council Action

In July, the Council is expected to discuss the forthcoming report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). The report is due by early July and a Secretariat briefing is likely.

Members will have in mind the issue of arrangements to replace the EU Force (EUFOR), but detailed discussions on this are not expected until later in the year.

At press time, formal Council action seemed unlikely, but a statement is possible particularly if the situation in the region deteriorates.

Key Recent Developments

The humanitarian situation remains critical in Chad and Central African Republic (CAR). In mid-June, Chadian rebels launched a new offensive, briefly taking over a number of towns in the east. The government again accused Sudan of assisting the rebels.

The attack in Chad seems to have heightened perceptions of need for a Council strategy to address the regional situation. Recently, a military commander serving with the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) noted that “if you want to solve, for example, the problem here in Darfur you will never achieve it without solving the problem in Chad.”

EUFOR contingents in Chad came under fire as government forces and rebels clashed in Goz-Beida, where tens of thousands of displaced civilians are located. The Chadian government complained that EUFOR had “cooperated with the invaders.” Observers say this underscores N’Djaména’s hope that the force will take sides and assist it against the rebels.

Rebels reportedly demanded that France and the EU should press the Chadian government into political reconciliation talks to be hosted by France.

On 16 June, the Council adopted a presidential statement, calling upon states in the region to implement the Dakar Agreement and expressing readiness to act against those who “constitute a threat to stability in the region or violate international humanitarian law.”

A Council mission visited Chad and Sudan in early June. In Sudan, President Omar al-Bashir reiterated complaints against Chad for supporting Darfur rebels. In Chad, the mission met Prime Minister Youssouf Saleh Abbas.

The Dakar Agreement Contact Group held a ministerial-level meeting on 9 June in Brazzaville to discuss plans to deploy a regional border monitoring force as provided for in the Agreement. A follow-up military experts’ meeting was held on 24 June in Senegal, when it was decided that Sudanese and Chadian troops would monitor the border together with regional military observers. It is unclear if and when this deployment will materialise.

On 21 June, the CAR government and two major rebel groups signed a comprehensive peace agreement in Libreville, a move seen as essential for a planned national political reconciliation conference. However, the rebel Front démocratique pour le peuple centralafricain (FDPC) did not sign as reported its leadership in Libya feared arrest in connection with proceedings at the International Criminal Court. The conference also faces challenges regarding rebel demands for security guarantees and amnesty.

At press time, a joint UN-EU technical assessment mission was dispatched to Chad and the CAR to prepare a study on post-EUFOR arrangements, in preparation for the Secretary-General’s report in September.
Continuing the low-key approach; the lack of progress with political reconciliation in Chad; and security risks if peacekeepers are dragged into the conflict.

**Counsel and Wider Dynamics**

The Council has so far coalesced around a low-key approach to issues in Chad and CAR. It has been reluctant to ask N’Djamena to address the political situation in Chad or to seriously address Chad-Sudan relations, and instead has limited itself to expressing concern with emerging developments and support for reconciliation initiatives. In part, this is connected to strong reservations from France and Libya.

**UN Documents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Security Council Resolution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/1778 (25 September 2007)</td>
<td>established MINURCAT and authorised the EU protection force.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Security Council Presidential Statements</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/PRST/2008/22 (16 June 2008)</td>
<td>was a recent statement on the June rebel offensive in Chad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PRST/2008/15 (13 May 2008)</td>
<td>condemned the attack near Khartoum and warned that no retaliatory action should be taken against civilian populations, or that would have an impact on stability in the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/PRST/2008/3 (4 February 2008)</td>
<td>contained an expression of support for external military assistance to the Chadian government.</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Council Visiting Mission</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/PV.5915 (18 June 2008)</td>
<td>was a briefing on the Council mission to Africa.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Latest Secretary-General’s Reports**

| S/2008/410 (23 June 2008)         | was the most recent BONUCA report. |
| S/2008/215 (1 April 2008)         | was the most recent MINURCAT report. |

**Other Relevant Facts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINURCAT: Special Representative of the Secretary-General</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victor da Silva Ángelo (Portugal)</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINURCAT: Size, Composition and Cost</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorised strength: up to 300 police</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**Democratic Republic of the Congo**

The Council will consider the structure and activities of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) based on the conclusions of the Council mission to the DRC on 7-8 June and the Secretary-General’s quarterly report. The mandate does not expire until 31 December. A Council presidential statement is therefore possible at this stage. Apart from changes in its structure, MONUC may...
expand its training program for Congolese forces and provide support for new peace initiatives in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Recent Developments
The Secretary-General’s report, expected in late June, may recommend a reconfiguration of troops in the east of the country, based on an assessment mission headed by the retired Canadian general and former UN military adviser, Maurice Baril. This may include moving the eastern focus of MONUC to Goma. Expanding training for the Congolese military is also a possibility.

On 13 June, MONUC released a report calling for the expansion of troop numbers and the policy of armed forces and provide support for new peace initiatives in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

On 11 June, the International Criminal Court (ICC) suspended its first scheduled trial. The accused, Thomas Lubanga, a militia leader charged with conscripting child soldiers in eastern Congo, had been imprisoned by the ICC for two years. The judges said the prosecution had withheld “significant” exculpatory evidence from the defence. Lubanga could be released or tried at a later date. On May 24, Jean-Pierre Bemba, a former vice-president and leader of the country’s main opposition party, the Mouvement du Libération du Congo (MLC), was arrested by Belgian authorities near Brussels on the basis of an ICC warrant. He is accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed by troops under his command in Bangui in the neighbouring Central African Republic. Bemba is the fifth Congolese suspect charged by the ICC. Four suspects are in custody while one, Bosco Ntaganda, is still at large.

Key Issues
The Council has to balance the need to enhance MONUC’s capabilities while preparing for a future drawdown, according to a nine-page report by France’s ambassador, Jean-Maurice Ripert, issued after the Council’s mission to the DRC on 7-8 June.

The Council mission had questions about how quickly militia would disarm, and whether the government would restructure its military and bring to justice human rights violators among its military and police. It also recommended that financial support be given to the Goma peace process.

Options
One option is for the Council to approve a reconfiguration of MONUC following the Secretary-General’s report. However, none of the likely recommendations seem to require a formal change to the mandate or additional personnel. Another option is to issue a statement on the report, incorporating also some of the observations and recommendations of its visit to the DRC in June.

Council Dynamics
Council members are agreed on the need to continue MONUC as a robust operation and to institute cutbacks only gradually. The US is mindful of containing costs and is wary of adding additional duties to MONUC’s already extensive mandate. France is the lead country on the DRC.

Underlying Problems
While the risk of large-scale violence is contained in eastern Congo, largely because of the presence of MONUC and the progressive dismantling of many armed groups, this part of the country (especially Ituri province) is marked by unequal access to land and an unequal sharing of revenues from natural resources. Land-related tensions threaten to fuel new confrontations, especially in the light of confused property laws. The absence of accountable institutions and a professional military that would protect rather than abuse civilians remain key problems. “[A] state of almost total impunity for serious offences continues to prevail,” the Secretary-General wrote in his April report.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1799 (15 February 2008) lifted the arms embargo for government forces and strengthened measures related to aviation and customs.
- S/RES/1804 (13 March 2008) demanded all members of Rwandan armed groups operating in eastern DRC lay down their arms, called upon DRC and Rwanda to implement commitments under the Nairobi communiqué, and asked states to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
- S/RES/1799 (15 February 2008) renewed the sanctions regime and the mandate of the Group of Experts
• Gregory Salter (UK, finance expert)
• Amadou Hamidou (Niger, customs expert)
• Abdoulaye Cissoko (Mali, aviation expert)
• S/2008/218 (2 April 2008) was the 25th
  resolution of the Group of Experts.
• S/PRST/2008/2 (30 January 2008)
  commended the government and other
  parties for organizing the Goma conference on a ceasefire and
disarmament of armed groups.

MONUC Report

  was the Monthly Human Rights
  Assessment on abuses by militia and
government security forces.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report

• S/2008/218 (2 April 2008) was the 25th report on the DRC and, inter alia,
  warned that redeployment of MONUC to the east would risk creating security
  vacuums and increased tensions in other parts of the country.

Selected Sanctions Committee Document

• S/2008/49 (11 February 2008) was the latest report of the Group of Experts
  for the DRC.

Other Relevant Facts

Chairman of the DRC Sanctions Committee

Ambassador R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa (Indonesia)

Group of Experts

• Abdoulaye Cissoko (Mali, aviation expert)
• Caty Clément (Belgium, regional expert)
• Amadou Hamidou (Niger, customs expert)
• Ramón Miranda Ramos (Spain, arms expert and Coordinator of the Group)
• Gregory Salter (UK, finance expert)

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission

Alan Doss (UK)

The DPRK has received about 40 percent of the energy aid promised in the Beijing Agreement of February 2007. Further installments are likely when the DPRK has completed more of the 11 steps in “disabling” its nuclear programme.

A handover of all nuclear material and permanent dismantling of all nuclear facilities—the last phase of the agreement—is still expected at a later stage. The US is offering political and economic inducements for North Korea’s complete denuclearisation. Following the DPRK’s 26 June nuclear declaration the US announced the removal of some trade sanctions under the US Trading with the Enemy Act and its intention to drop North Korea from its terrorist list. Removal of all trade sanctions, establishment of diplomatic relations and the signing of a formal peace treaty are expected to follow at later stages as the DPRK moves to complete denuclearisation.

In June, Japan announced it would lift some sanctions in light of North Korea’s recent cooperation on the issue of abducted Japanese civilians.

On 30 May, North Korea fired three short-range missiles into the Yellow Sea. The missile tests did not provoke much reaction, as they were fired well away from waters contested by South Korea.

North Korea’s 23 million citizens face a devastating food crisis. The UN World Food Programme warned in April that the annual food deficit is expected to increase from 1 million tons in 2007 to 1.66 million tons this year. The US announced on 16 May that it would transport 500,000 tons of emergency food aid to supplement the existing aid-for-disarmament deal. In mid-June, Russia also began food deliveries.

The HRC resolution adopted on 25 March expressed deep concern at the “systematic, widespread and grave violations” of human rights in North Korea and alarm at “the precarious humanitarian situation in the country”. The resolution also extended the mandate of the UN’s special rapporteur on human rights in the DPRK.

Expected Council Action

The Chairman of the Sanctions Committee on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Ambassador Marcello Spatafora of Italy, will brief the Council in July. The Committee, which was established by resolution 1718 following North Korea’s October 2006 nuclear test, must report to the Council every 90 days.

No formal Council action is expected. However, given the encouraging developments leading towards Pyongyang’s full disclosure of its nuclear programme, it is possible that the Council will issue a press statement. A process for review of the sanctions is also a possible option if the current trend continues.

Key Recent Developments

Ambassador Spatafora briefed the Council on 2 April. Resolution 1718 asked member states to report to the Council by 14 November 2006. Seventy three countries and the EU have submitted reports.

On 26 June, Pyongyang submitted a declaration of its nuclear activities to China, the chair of the six-party talks. At press time, it was also on the point of destroying the cooling tower of its Yongbyon nuclear reactor which shut down in July 2007.

In May, North Korea handed over 18,822 pages of documents constituting operating and production records of the Yongbyon reactor.
The Council has the following options:
- receive the briefing and take no action;
- issue a press statement welcoming the DPRK’s progress towards denuclearisation; and
- initiate a review of sanctions and request the Committee to consider possible options or recommendations in light of developments.

Key Issue
The key issue is whether the Council should play a role in seeking to encourage the recent developments by adding multilateral incentives to incentives offered bilaterally. A sanctions review is a possible device in this regard, although actual removal of UN sanctions is unlikely at this stage, given the US position.

Council Dynamics
The Sanctions Committee has been inactive for many months. Previously, most felt that non-engagement by the Council was the best strategy. There are no major indications that this will change. There seems to be little desire for the Council to assume a more proactive role.

UN Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Security Council Resolutions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1718 (14 October 2006) expressed grave concern over the DPRK’s nuclear test, imposed sanctions and set up the Sanctions Committee.</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Selected Letter</th>
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<tr>
<th>Other</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Letters submitted from UN member states on implementing resolution 1718.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• IAEA report (17 August 2007) (GOV/2007/45-GC(51)/19) verified the shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A/HRC/7/L.28 (25 March 2008) condemned the DPRK’s human rights violations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Côte d’Ivoire

Expected Council Action
The Council is expecting to receive the Secretary-General’s report on the Côte d’Ivoire peace process. The mandate of the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) expires on 30 July and Council action on renewal is expected.

Recent Developments
The Secretary-General’s previous report was issued on 15 April (S/2008/250). A technical assessment mission visited Côte d’Ivoire from 3 to 12 March to assess progress in preparing for elections and options for the mission in supporting the remaining tasks under the Ouagadougou Agreement.

The April report noted that the security situation was generally stable but expressed concern about the lack of progress on disarmament in the western part of the country, as well as the level of violent crime.

In April UNOCI also indicated that almost half a million Ivorians had been issued with new birth certificates, an initial step in allowing them to formally seek recognition of their right to vote in the planned national elections.

On 29 April, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General briefed the Council in private informal consultations and the Council issued a presidential statement welcoming the Ivorian decisions to hold presidential elections on 30 November 2008. The Council stated that it was encouraged by the adoption of a Code of Good Conduct for elections by all political parties, under the auspices of the Secretary-General. It also encouraged the mobile courts’ process for identifying the Ivorian population and registering voters, and anticipated the publication of the electoral list.

On 3 May, 1,000 Forces nouvelles rebels gathered at a demobilisation centre in the northern city of Bouaké to commence active disarmament. On 14 May, 192 FN ex-combatants received diplomas from the UN after completing a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme, including a course in cooperative management, at Ferkessédougou in northern Côte d’Ivoire. However, it is estimated that about 43,000 rebels have not yet disarmed. The present demobilisation initiative aims at having all Forces nouvelles fighters go to six specially prepared demobilisation sites in the northern and western parts of the country to disarm within the next five months before the elections.

On 9 to 10 June, a Council mission visited Côte d’Ivoire where it met key parties and partners on the ground. During the visit, it expressed support for the peace process and encouraged the parties to ensure a conducive environment for the holding of free, open and fair elections in November. The Council delegation also recalled the importance of certification of all stages of the electoral process by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General visited Côte d’Ivoire from 22 to 24 April. He reaffirmed the UN’s continued support and encouraged key political actors to continue making progress.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council in July is renewal of the UNOCI mandate. Other issues likely to be addressed include DDR, the national identification and the voter registration processes and how to ensure that the electoral calendar is not disrupted yet again. The future drawdown of UNOCI is also likely to come up although no decisions are expected.

Council Dynamics
Council members seem agreed on a cautious approach of maintaining the current mandate for UNOCI and the French forces, and preserving UNOCI’s troop level until the presidential elections. The Secretary-General recommends that the mission’s troop level should be maintained until two key benchmarks have been reached—the disarmament process and the restoration of state authority throughout the country. Those key benchmarks are presently not expected to be achieved until after the elections.

France is the lead country in the Council on this issue together with African members.
pointing out and finding solutions to strengthening the justice sector; providing economic and political fostering regional peace by cooperating strengthening human rights, including supporting the activities of the Peace executing the Peacebuilding Coopera supporting the development of an indee strengthening good governance; supporting security sector reform;

Security Council Report

Latest Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1721 (1 November 2006) prolonged by one year the transitional period in Côte d’Ivoire and reinforced the powers of the prime minister.

Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2007/8 (28 March 2007) endorsed the Ouagadougou Agreement, supported the appointment of Guillaume Soro as prime minister and requested a report from the Secretary-General on the UN’s future role in the peace process.

Selected Council Debate

- S/PV.5915 (18 June 2008) was the Council debate on the visiting mission to Africa from 31 May to 10 June.

Latest Security Council Press Statement

- SC/9152 (23 October 2007)

Latest Secretary-General’s Report

- S/2008/250 (15 April 2008) was the Secretary-General’s latest report on UNOCI.

Other

- S/2008/347 (30 May 2008) were the terms of reference for the Council visiting mission to Africa from 31 May to 10 June.

Sierra Leone

Expected Council Action

A Council resolution authorising the establishment of a follow on UN presence in Sierra Leone is expected. The new mission will be a peacebuilding office (of approximately sixty to seventy personnel) and will replace the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), when its mandate expires on 30 September.

Members will also be paying close attention to the local council elections in Sierra Leone which are scheduled for 5 July.

Key Developments

On 7 May, Assistant Secretary-General Dmitry Titov briefed the Council on the Secretary-General’s 29 April report. Titov said the situation in Sierra Leone was “generally calm” and that successful elections would represent an important step in democratisation. However, he noted concerns about tensions between supporters of the ruling party (All People’s Congress) and the primary opposition party (Sierra Leone People’s Party).

Titov also elaborated on the proposed functions for the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office (UNIPSIL), to assist the government of Sierra Leone with:

- supporting the activities of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and Fund;
- strengthening the justice sector;
- supporting security sector reform;
- pointing out and finding solutions to political tensions;
- strengthening good governance;
- providing economic and political opportunities to youth and women; and
- executing the Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework.

Other key elements as proposed by the Secretary-General included:

- strengthening human rights, including through implementing recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (eg: reparations for war victims and ratifying international treaties and incorporating them into domestic law);
- fostering regional peace by cooperating closely with other peace operations in the area; and
- supporting the development of an independent public broadcast system.

Ambassador Frank Majoor of the Netherlands, Chair of the PBC’s Country-Specific Meetings on Sierra Leone, briefed the Council on 7 May. He identified economic fragility, political tensions, youth unemployment, and the need for better coordination of PBC initiatives as challenges facing Sierra Leone.
On 14 May, at a meeting organised by UNIOSIL and the Political Parties Registration Committee in Freetown, representatives of major political parties committed to peaceful local council elections, while the police pledged to remain politically neutral.

Michael v. der Schulenburg was appointed Acting Executive Representative of the Secretary-General in Sierra Leone on 27 May. (The post of Executive Representative has been vacant since December 2007.) He also serves as head of UNIOSIL.

Related Developments in the PBC

A high-level stakeholders’ consultation on implementation of the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework was held in New York on 19 May. Several participants—including Bangladesh, the European Community, India, the International Parliamentary Union, Japan, Sweden, the UN, and the World Bank—pledged continued or increased support through the Framework. The meeting highlighted the need for a policy for coordinating aid; the importance of youth employment and empowerment in consolidating peace; the importance of continued focus and follow-up on securing legal and constitutional reforms; and the need to develop an enabling business environment. The PBC held a review of the Framework on 19 June. It called for continued international support for the local council elections; recommended the development of a strategy for the Sierra Leonean energy sector; and encouraged greater international assistance to help Sierra Leone develop its agricultural and private sectors.

Options

Council options include:

■ early adoption of a resolution establishing UNIPSIL, so as to ensure that the transition to UNIPSIL can be well prepared prior to UNIOSIL’s mandate expiry on 30 September;

■ including in the resolution key messages regarding the need for continued international attention and engagement regarding peace consolidation in Sierra Leone; and

■ delaying consideration of the transition to a peacebuilding office until a later date, particularly if the elections produce renewed tensions.

Other Council options include:

■ welcoming the local elections; and

■ urging calm if the elections produce renewed tensions.

Key Issues

The key issue the Council faces is ensuring that the drawdown and completion of UNIOSIL’s mandate, and transition to a peacebuilding office in Sierra Leone, does not introduce any destabilising factors. (Members will have in mind that transition in Burundi to a UN Integrated Office was followed by renewed problems.)

Council Dynamics

Council members generally support the drawdown of UNIOSIL, the completion of its mandate and its transition to a peacebuilding office. There seems to be wide support in the Council for the Secretary-General’s recommendations for UNIPSIL’s mandate. Some residual security concerns remain regarding the transition to a smaller peacebuilding office—in light of the violence on the occasion of the 2007 presidential elections and difficulties in other countries—although these have been somewhat allayed by the relative calm leading up to the elections.

The UK is the lead country on this issue.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1793 (21 December 2007) extended the mandate of UNIOSIL until 30 September 2008 and requested a completion strategy for the mission by 31 January, as well as specific proposals on the successor office in April.

Selected Secretary-General’s Report

- S/2008/281 (29 April 2008) was the latest report of the Secretary-General on UNIOSIL.

Other

- S/2008/137 (28 February 2008) was a letter from the Council president requesting further information from the Secretary-General on the drawdown of UNIOSIL between the 5 July 2008 local elections and its completion in September 2008.
- S/2008/63 (31 January 2008) was the letter from the Secretary-General conveying the completion strategy for UNIOSIL.
- S/2007/777 (28 December 2007) was a letter conveying the annual report of the Sanctions Committee on Sierra Leone.

Peacebuilding Commission

- PBC/2/SLE/6 (19 June 2008) outlined conclusions and recommendations of the biannual review of the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework.
- PBC/2/SLE/5 (19 May 2008) was the chair’s summary of the high-level stakeholders consultation on Sierra Leone.
- PBC/2/SLE/1 (3 December 2007) was the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework.
- PBC/OC/1/2 (21 June 2006) was a letter from the Council president to the Secretary-General referring Sierra Leone to the PBC.

Other Relevant Facts

UNIOSIL Acting Executive Representative of the Secretary-General

Michael v. der Schulenburg (Germany)

Size and Composition of Mission

Total budgeted staff of 298, comprising 82 international staff, 192 local staff and 24 UN volunteers

Duration

1 January 2006 to present; current mandate expires 30 September 2008
### Notable Dates for July

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reports Due for Consideration in July</th>
<th>Document Requesting Report</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 June</td>
<td>SG report on UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June</td>
<td>SG report (every four months) on the implementation of resolution 1701 (Lebanon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>late June</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>late June</td>
<td>SG report on UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or early July</td>
<td>SG report on International Conference in Support of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>early July</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on UNAMID (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mid-July</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mid-July</td>
<td>SG report on UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mid to late July</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 July</td>
<td>SG report on Iraq (oil for food programme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by 31 July</td>
<td>1540 Committee report on the implementation of the resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on the UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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### Important Dates over the Horizon

- The Secretary-General is expected to report on follow-up arrangements regarding EUFOR Chad-Central African Republic by September 2008.
- The next IAEA Board of Governors meeting is scheduled for 22-26 September 2008 in Vienna.
- In Iraq, provincial elections are currently planned for 1 October 2008.
- Legislative elections have been scheduled for 16 November 2008 in Guinea-Bissau.
- Presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire are now scheduled for 30 November 2008.

- Local council elections are scheduled in Sierra Leone.
- Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities respectively, are expected to meet.
- The Chairman of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict is expected to report to the Council on activities of the Working Group over the last year.
- Recommendations from the Somalia Sanctions Committee to the Council are due pursuant to resolution 1814.
- The Chairman of the Sanctions Committee on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Ambassador Marcello Spatafora of Italy, will brief the Council in July.

Also expected in July:
- A humanitarian workshop on Darfur with rebel groups and aid agencies is tentatively scheduled for 10-11 July in Geneva.
- A donor’s conference for Kosovo has been planned for 11 July in Brussels, hosted by European Commission and Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn.
- A meeting of states to consider the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects is planned for 14-18 July 2008 in New York.
- The AU mandate of the Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) expires on 18 July.
- The Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court may unveil new cases in connection with Darfur in July.

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