OVERVIEW FOR APRIL

In April South Africa will have the Presidency of the Council. The combination of a large number of scheduled items for consideration and ongoing unresolved issues seems likely to make April an extremely busy month.

An important open thematic debate is scheduled for 17 April, at a high level. It will combine two key thematic issues on the Council agenda:

- Conflict prevention;
- Cooperation between the UN and regional organisations.

It will be preceded, on 16 April, by the second formal meeting between the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC). (The first meeting with the PSC took place in 2007 in Addis Ababa.) Debates are also under discussion on:

- Small Arms;
- Georgia (to renew the mandate of UNOMIG);
- Western Sahara (to renew the mandate of MINURSO);
- Sudan (to renew the mandate of UNMIS); and
- Iraq (for briefings by the SRSG and the US)

A public session on the Middle East, in accordance with normal practice, is also expected—although the format is unclear at this stage and is likely to be influenced by developments.

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Important matters pending for the Council include:

- The Council has yet to take up the Secretary-General’s recommendations on protection of civilians contained in his report of 28 October 2007.
- In a 21 November 2007 letter to the Secretary-General (S/2007/680), the President of the Council requested a briefing on steps the Secretariat is planning to provide for the enhanced physical security of the UNMOVIC archives, in particular those containing sensitive proliferation information. This information is not yet forthcoming.
- In its resolution 1327 (2000) on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi report, S/2000/809), the Council decided to review periodically the implementation of the provisions contained in the resolution’s annex. No such reviews have occurred in the past three years.
- The Secretary-General’s report on enhancing cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, in particular the AU, requested in March 2007 (S/PRST/2007/7) and November 2007 (S/PRST/2007/42) had not been published as of press time.
- The Council requested the Secretary-General on 29 November 2006 (S/2006/928) to update the index to Council notes and statements on working methods. This has not been published.
- The 2005 World Summit requested that the Security Council consider reforms for the Military Staff Committee. This has yet to be addressed.
- On the DRC, the Council Sanctions Committee has not acted on individual sanctions under resolution 1698 against armed groups that recruit children, despite MONUC reports about the problem continuing on a serious scale. Nor has the Council resumed discussion of the issue of natural resources in the DRC, which was raised in its open thematic debate on the subject of natural resources and conflict in June 2007 (S/PV.5705).
- On West Africa, the Council has yet to follow up its 16 March 2007 consultations on cross-border issues.
- UNAMI reports on human rights in Iraq are now coming so late as to be completely outdated. (The March 2008 report covered the period from 1 July to 31 December 2007.) In the past, the reports were produced every two to three months.
- The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire, requested by presidential statement 2004/17, has still not been made public. Also on Côte d’Ivoire, the December 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not been published.
- The Secretary-General has yet to put forward proposals for the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in the Sheb’a Farms area, in accordance with resolution 1701, and respond to the cartographic, legal and political implications of the alternative path suggested by the government of Lebanon in its seven-point plan.
- The Secretariat was to report to the Council on Kenya as requested in its 6 February presidential statement (S/PRST/2008/4).
- The Council is yet to consider the 23 January Secretary-General’s report on security sector reform (S/2008/39).
Debates are also possible on:
- Kosovo (depending on developments in the region);
- Somalia (to adopt a Council response to the Secretary-General’s “strategic approach” presented on 14 March. But much will depend on progress in negotiations);
- Ethiopia/Eritrea (Major decisions on the future of the force may need to be taken); and
- Counter-Terrorism (to renew the mandate of the 1540 Committee and its group of experts).

A public meeting or a briefing on Nepal is likely following the elections on 10 April. In addition, consultations or briefings are expected on:
- Lebanon (progress with the tribunal, the 1559 report and to respond to developments);
- Côte d’Ivoire (the Secretary-General’s report on progress towards the elections);
- DPRK (North Korea) (to hear a report from the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee);
- Sierra Leone (report and briefing on UNOSIL progress);
- Liberia (report and briefing on UNMIL progress);
- Haiti (report and briefing on MINUSTAH progress); and
- Chad (depending on developments).

On Myanmar, it remains to be seen whether consultations at the expert level on a draft presidential statement will resume in April and whether Myanmar will be in the footnote to the April programme of work.

On Uganda, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)-affected areas, Joaquim Chissano, may brief the Council.

Status Update since our March Forecast

Recent developments on the situations covered in this Forecast are addressed in the relevant briefs. Interesting developments in the Council on other issues included:

- Middle East: Council members held a weekend session on 1 and 2 March to discuss the growing violence in the Gaza Strip and southern Israel in response to a Libyan request for a meeting to address the situation (S/2008/142). During the meeting, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon addressed the Council. He condemned and called for an end to rocket attacks from Gaza that endangered the lives of Israeli civilians. Additionally, while recognising Israel’s right to self-defense, he condemned what he called Israel’s “disproportionate and excessive use of force” and called on Israel to “cease such attacks” (S/PV.5847). The Permanent Observer of Palestine, Riyad Mansour, stated that Israeli actions constituted “war crimes” and called on the Council to “uphold international law and its Charter responsibilities and act to bring an end to this cycle of violence and counter-violence.”

Daniel Carmon, Deputy Permanent Representative of Israel, stated that his country had a right to defend its civilians from attacks from Hamas in accordance with article 51 of the UN Charter. After the meeting, Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, which held the Council presidency in March, read out a media statement agreed by the Council that summarised the debate, called for an end to the violence and requested all parties to adhere to their responsibilities under international law.

Following the session, Libya introduced a draft resolution addressing the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Negotiations among experts followed and Council consultations were scheduled to discuss the draft on 6 March. The US introduced a press statement condemning the terrorist attack against Jerusalem’s Mercaz Harav Yeshiva which killed 8 students and took place just before the scheduled consultations. It seems that the US reluctance to engage in discussions on the draft resolution before adopting the press statement, or to incorporate language on the situation in Gaza in the statement, coupled with Libya’s refusal to adopt any text not mentioning the humanitarian disaster in Gaza and the failure to agree on holding discussions on the two texts in parallel, once again paralysed the Council.

On 25 March, the Council held its monthly debate on the Middle East (S/PV.5859 and Resumption 1). Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said he was deeply concerned by the prospects of renewed violence in Gaza and southern Israel. Israel and the Permanent Observer of Palestine participated in the debate, as did Lebanon, Syria, the Arab Group, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement and the EU.

- Iran: Following a Council debate on 3 March (S/PV.5848), Council members adopted resolution 1803 with one abstention (from Indonesia) which placed Iran additional sanctions related to its nuclear programme. New mandatory measures included a travel ban on some individuals listed in previous resolutions, an expansion of the list of individuals and entities subject to an assets freeze and an embargo on nuclear-related dual-use items, with the exception of items for exclusive use in light water reactors and when necessary for technical cooperation with the IAEA. The resolution invited member states to inspect carefully materials travelling to and from Iran via Iranian cargo vessels. New discretionary measures also included a call to increase scrutiny of activities of “financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran,” as well as vigilance in granting export credits to Iran.

On 17 March, the Chairman of the 1737 Sanctions Committee on Iran, Belgian Ambassador Johan Verbeke, briefed the Council on the activities of the Committee (S/PV.5853). He noted that 88 countries had so far submitted reports to the Committee under resolution 1737, and 72 submitted reports under resolution 1747. He also emphasized that resolution 1803 broadened the scope of the committee’s mandate. Only the US and Burkina Faso made comments after the briefing.

- Kenya: On 5 March, the Council heard a Secretariat briefing on recent developments in Kenya, including the power-sharing agreement signed in late February. Members apparently welcomed the developments but expressed concern about the fragile security situation. Members also underlined their expectation of further Secretariat reporting—as requested in the 6 February presidential statement (S/PRST/2008/4)—as well as interest in briefings by the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide.

- Great Lakes Region: On 13 March, the Council demanded that the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), ex-Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR)/Intera- hamwe and other Rwandan armed groups
operating in eastern DRC—referred to in the “Nairobi Communiqué” signed between of the governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda on 9 November 2007—and lay down their arms and submit to the Congolese authorities and MONUC for their disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDRRR) (resolution 1804). The Council also demanded that the illegal armed groups immediately stop recruiting and using children, release all children associated with them and put an end to gender-based violence. The Rwandan authorities welcomed the Council’s resolution, reiterated their determination to cooperate with the DRC on the matter and encouraged Rwandan armed groups in eastern DRC to comply with the DDRRR process in a letter on 14 March (S/2008/180).

Myanmar: On 18 March, Ibrahim Gambari, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy on Myanmar briefed the Council on his visit to Myanmar from 6 to 10 March (S/PV.5854). He expressed disappointment at not obtaining any tangible outcome but also stressed that it was important for the UN to keep engaging with the authorities. The Council met in consultations after the public briefing. Subsequently the elements of a draft presidential statement were circulated but at press time no agreement had been reached.

Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED): On 19 March, the Council held an open debate on threats to international peace and security resulting from terrorist acts (S/PV.5855). During the debate, Mike Smith, the Executive Director of the CTED, presented changes to the organization and plan of work of CTED. In addition to developing several new working methods, the main organisational change discussed by Smith was the creation of five cross-cutting groups under the CTED’s Assessment and Technical Assistance Office for technical assistance; terrorist financing; legal issues; border control, arms trafficking and law enforcement; and issues related to the prohibition of incitement to commit acts of terrorism and to human rights. On 20 March, the Council adopted resolution 1805 which welcomed the recommendations in the CTED's reorganisation plan and extended the mandate of the CTED until 31 December 2010.

Afghanistan: On 20 March, the Council extended UNAMA’s mandate for 12 months until 23 March 2009 in resolution 1806 as recommended in the Secretary-General’s latest report (S/2008/159). It also decided on a significant clarification and enhancement of UNAMA tasks, especially in the areas of coordination and political reconciliation. This responded to the point made during an open debate (S/PV.5851) on 12 March by Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehenno that UNAMA did not need additional powers but that its mandate needed to be sharpened. On 6 March, the Secretary-General informed the Council in a letter (S/2008/165) that he intended to appoint Kai Eide as his Special Representative for Afghanistan, and the president of the Council in a letter on 7 March (S/2008/166) informed the Secretary-General that he had brought this matter to the Council’s attention.

Northern Uganda: The Council was briefed in private consultations on 26 March by the UN Department of Political Affairs on the progress of the ongoing peace talks between the Ugandan government and the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which are being facilitated by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General to the LRA affected areas, former President Joachim Chissano of Mozambique.

Guinea-Bissau: On 26 March, the Council was briefed by the Representative of the Secretary-General to Guinea-Bissau, Shola Omorie, on recent developments in the country and the latest report of the Secretary-General on Guinea-Bissau submitted to the Council on 17 March (S/2008/181). The Chairman of the Peace-Building Commission’s country specific configuration on Guinea-Bissau, Brazilian Ambassador Maria Luiza Viotti, also apprised the Council of the Commission’s activities towards understanding and meeting the peacebuilding priorities and challenges of the country. The Council issued a press statement on 27 March in which it reiterated its support for the peace consolidation efforts of the government of Guinea-Bissau and called on the international community to provide resources for the holding of legislative elections on 16 November (SC/9286). It also requested the Secretary-General to provide proposals on how the UN could provide assistance “in an integrated and holistic manner” to Guinea-Bissau.

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): At press time the Council was expected to extend, on 31 March, the sanctions regime and the mandate of the Group of Experts on the DRC.

Cooperation with Regional Organisations/Conflict Prevention

On 17 April, the Council is expected to hold an open debate (possibly with high-level representation) combining two thematic issues on its agenda:

- UN cooperation with regional organisations; and
- conflict prevention.

During the debate, it will consider the Secretary-General’s report on enhancing cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, in particular the AU, which was requested in March 2007 (S/PRST/2007/7) and November 2007 (S/PRST/2007/42). It will also consider the Secretary-General’s recent report on the implementation of resolution 1625 of 14 September 2005, on strengthening the effectiveness of the UN’s role in conflict prevention, particularly in Africa.

The debate will be preceded on 16 April by a meeting of the Council with members of the AU Peace and Security Council following up on the agreement reached last year in Addis Ababa during a meeting with the visiting delegation of the UN Security Council to hold annual meetings between the two.

Security Council Report will publish a detailed Update Report in advance of these meetings.

Small Arms

Expected Council Action

A report from the Secretary-General on small arms is likely to be submitted to the Council in April. At press time, the incoming president, South Africa, was tentatively planning a debate on small arms on 25 April. It is possible that regional organisations will be invited to participate in addition to Council members. The format however remains subject to change depending on consultations with the Council and the level of interest in participation.

Background

For in-depth background please see our June 2006 Profile on Small Arms report at www.securitycouncilreport.org.
In 2006 the Council failed to reach agreement on an Argentinean initiative for a resolution to enhance Council input to the debate on small arms. Prior to that, the Council had addressed the issue of small arms only in presidential statements and in the limited context of illicit trafficking. It had reminded member states to fully implement the Programme of Action (adopted in 2001) to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all aspects. The Secretary-General had reported to the Council on twelve specific recommendations on ways the Council could contribute to dealing with the question of illicit trade in small arms.

The Argentinean draft sought to focus on the wider issue that uncontrolled spread of small arms compromises the effectiveness of the Council’s efforts to promote international peace and security and in itself constitutes a threat to peace. There were also ideas to request member states to adopt measures, in particular to ensure the observance of arms embargoes. Although the draft resolution largely drew upon consensus language from previous Council statements and had the strong support of several Council members including France and the UK with agreement from China and South Africa to frame the debate in such a way that it can draw interest and be constructive. It appears that the main focus may be on how to best take into account the problem of small arms when the Council deals with specific issues (such as arms embargoes, security sector reform, disarmament demobilisation and reintegration programmes, etc.) rather than expanding the discussions to potentially controversial issues, such as civilian possession of small arms.

A challenge for the Council will be for South Africa to frame the debate in such a way that it can draw interest and be constructive. It appears that the main focus may be on how to best take into account the problem of small arms when the Council deals with specific issues (such as arms embargoes, security sector reform, disarmament demobilisation and reintegration programmes, etc.) rather than expanding the discussions to potentially controversial issues, such as civilian possession of small arms.

A presidential statement is a possibility. Security Council Report will publish an Update Report with more insights in April.

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- **S/RES/1631 (17 October 2005)** stressed the role of regional organisations in addressing the issue of small arms.
- **S/RES/1612 (26 July 2005)** on children and armed conflict highlighted the link between illicit trafficking in small arms and the use of child soldiers.
- **S/RES/1467 (18 March 2003)** outlined measures to increase support for the ECOWAS moratorium on small arms in West Africa with the declaration on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in West Africa.
- **S/RES/1296 (19 April 2000)** on protection of civilians in armed conflict emphasised the importance of incorporating DDR in peace agreements.

**Selected Presidential Statements**

- **S/PRST/2007/24 (29 June 2007)** requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on small arms to the Council on a biennial basis.
- **S/PRST/2006/38 (9 August 2006)** welcomed the decision of ECOWAS to transform the Moratorium on Import, Export and Manufacture of Light Weapons into a binding Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials.
- **S/PRST/2005/7 (17 February 2005)** called on arms-exporting countries to exercise the highest degree of responsibility in the trade in small arms and requested an update from the Secretary-General on the implementation of the twelve recommendations contained in his 2002 report on small arms.

**Latest Secretary-General’s Report**

- **S/2006/109 (17 February 2006)** focused on the implementation of the twelve recommendations outlined in 2002 to identify and trace illicit trade in small arms.

**Other Documents**

- **S/PV.5390 and resumption 1 (20 March 2006)** was the latest debate on small arms.
- **A/C.1/60/L.55 (12 October 2005)** was an international instrument adopted by the General Assembly to enable states to identify and trace illicit small arms and light weapons.
- **A/CONF.192/15 (20 July 2001)** was the Programme of Action adopted by member states.

**Somalia**

**Expected Council Action**

Pressure on the Council to do something on Somalia is likely to continue in April. At press time, an Arria-style meeting with NGOs to discuss Somalia was scheduled for 31 March under UK chairmanship.

Also, members had started expert-level consultations on a draft response to the Secretary-General’s 14 March report. Elements expected to be considered include:
- supporting the Secretary-General’s...
phased strategic approach;
- supporting political reconciliation in Somalia and, in this context, strengthening and safely relocating the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) back to Somalia;
- strengthening the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), including a UN support package; and
- arrangements for international assistance to patrol Somali waters and address piracy.

The expected high-level thematic debate on cooperation with regional organisations (organised at the initiative of the South African presidency), and the Council’s expected joint meeting with the AU Peace and Security Council in April are also likely to put the spotlight on Somalia.

The Council is also expected to renew the mandate of the sanctions Monitoring Group, which expires on 30 April. The Group’s report is due in mid-April.

Key Recent Developments

Fighting between insurgents, Ethiopian troops and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces continued unabated in Mogadishu, and markedly increased in south-central Somalia. There was a sharp increase in attacks by the al-Shabaab militia, which appear to have a scale and organisation unprecedented over the past twelve months.

On 3 March, the US launched strikes at an alleged al-Qaeda target in southern Somalia, reportedly an al-Shabaab commander. Washington subsequently included the al-Shabaab in its list of terrorist organisations.

There are now more than 700,000 displaced Somalis and increasing reports of lack of access to food, water and humanitarian assistance. Complaints persist against TFG and Ethiopian forces for abuse of the civilian population, attacks on media outlets and killings and looting at Mogadishu’s Bakara market (a stronghold of the Hawiye clan). (On 5 March, the Council was briefed on the latter.)

In a 20 February letter, AU Commissioner Alpha Konaré presented proposals for a UN assistance package for AMISOM. This comprised approximately $800 million in financial support plus an appropriate number of management staff and logistical support.

On 14 March, the Secretary-General presented proposals for a broader UN strategic perspective for Somalia and contingency peacekeeping plans. The strategy comprises three pillars—political, security and programmatic—and envisages four phases and related activities around those three pillars, including:

- first, facilitate UN support for political reconciliation by gradually relocating UN staff to south-central Somalia (options for security for UN personnel are still being developed), strengthen AMISOM and reach agreement on an agenda for reconciliation talks. (The Secretary-General also recommended that the Council strengthen the mandate and capacity of UNPOS, authorise a “coalition of willing partners” to secure key areas and perhaps establish a maritime task force);
- secondly, after political dialogue is established with initial support from 60-70 percent of Somali actors, move UNPOS to Mogadishu and table a proposal for Ethiopian withdrawal;
- thirdly, after a broad-based political agreement, including a code of conduct on use of arms and a phased Ethiopian withdrawal, begin deployment of an 8,000-strong impartial stabilisation force to complement AMISOM; and
- fourthly, when political agreements and the security situation are consolidated, and there is clear support from local actors for UN deployments, begin deployment of a 30,000-strong UN peacekeeping operation.

On 20 March, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah and Assistant Secretary-General Edmond Mulet briefed the Council. Ould-Abdallah argued that the Council should consider, alongside AMISOM, a “strong interim multinational presence.” He also stressed that accountability issues should be addressed and that those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity should be brought to account in the International Criminal Court or other international or local forum. He further suggested establishing a commission of inquiry into serious crimes.

Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin and Ould-Abdallah separately visited Somalia in late February. Reports suggest that there was a difference of views between Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf and Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein on participation in future reconciliation talks, with Hussein favouring the inclusion of all opposition groups.

In a 12 March statement, the TFG said it was “ready to reconcile with any Somali citizen,” and that negotiations could take place at “any location” under Ould-Abdallah’s mediation. The Special Representative is now expected to begin contacting key stakeholders on timing and modalities for the talks.

Important divisions remain. Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, leader of the Asmara-based Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia, continues to condition talks on Ethiopian withdrawal. Al-Shabaab reportedly ruled out reconciliation with some elements in the TFG—even if Ethiopian troops leave. It is hostile to all foreign peacekeepers.

Options

One option for the Council in April is to adopt a resolution:

- supporting the “strategic approach” and agreeing on the sequencing of the various steps in the process;
- adopting a support package for AMISOM;
- strengthening UNPOS’ mandate;
- authorising UNPOS’ relocation to Somalia and appropriate close protection security for the UN office and personnel;
- authorising international maritime patrolling of Somali waters;
- expressing support for Ould-Abdallah’s efforts and addressing the framework for political reconciliation talks and accountability issues;
- renewing the mandate of the sanctions Monitoring Group;
- adopting a spectrum of targeted sanctions for dealing with any actors that refuse to enter into or frustrate political talks; and
- taking up the justice and accountability issue, and, as a first step, requesting the Secretary-General to develop recommendations regarding a commission of inquiry.

Other options—if Council members are not ready to go so far—include:

- calling for a funding conference for AMISOM, perhaps through the auspices of the AU and the International Contact Group;
- encouraging additional troop contributions to reinforce AMISOM, perhaps by inviting potential troop contributors (from the AU and the Arab League) to meet with the Council (or perhaps its working group
on peacekeeping) and indicating a willingness to include non-AU contingents within a new authorisation resolution; on political reconciliation, vigorously demanding a cessation of hostilities and new broad-based negotiations, while actively supporting Ould-Abdallah’s current mediation (perhaps by inviting the AU, the Arab League and concerned member states to a meeting in New York); and encouraging the Secretary-General to quickly provide a detailed plan for solely relocating UNPOS and recommendations on support for AMISOM.

Key Issues
The key immediate issue for the Council is whether to endorse and begin to implement the phased approach proposed by the Secretary-General more or less as a whole, or whether to decide to consider the various proposals incrementally. But fundamental issues underlie this question.

The UN seems to be about to become engaged in progressively rehabilitating Somalia back to the status of sovereign state under the UN Charter and international law; but the question is whether internal, regional and international legitimacy can be restored and violent opposition quietened by addressing only some of the symptoms of the current malaise.

The Secretary-General’s strategic framework goes some way towards addressing a number of aspects of this issue. However, it remains to be seen if it is sufficiently comprehensive, neutral and consistent with past lessons learned—including the importance of consent and of justice and accountability issues. It seems that a sustainable strategy for Somalia would require the Council and key stakeholders to meaningfully address a number of critical related questions:

- How broad-based should the political reconciliation process be? This includes deciding on some principles on how far to go in including elements of the Islamic opposition, and with what limitations. It seems that any future framework would need to balance (i) how to get enough of the opposition to the table to secure legitimacy and a reasonable prospect of negotiating an end to much of the violence; (ii) how best to deal with the al-Shabaab and its apparent refusal to participate in political talks with some in the TFC leadership; and (iii) the security concerns of Ethiopia as well as the US.
- Critical to the security situation is a major parallel question: the Council has remained silent about the presence and conduct of Ethiopian troops, as well as foreign involvement in the insurgency and the US military strikes against targets of opportunity in Somalia. Council members at this point are likely to prefer a forward-looking approach rather than revisiting the past. However, in as much as these issues continue into the future, the potential remains for serious negative impacts on the reconciliation process if the UN and the Council, because of ongoing silence, can be accused of being partial.
- Can the Council continue to avoid recognising the regional dimension to the violence in Somalia, in particular the impact that the absence of a comprehensive Council approach towards the Eritrea-Ethiopia border standoff is having?
- Are major financial and troop contributors seriously ready to entice a path that will very likely lead to a huge expansion of peacekeeping activity? Meaningful progress in Somalia will require contributors to invest very substantially.
- Should the Council include in the sequence steps to address justice and accountability issues?

Council Dynamics
Most members appear to have welcomed the Secretary-General’s strategic framework for Somalia. There seems to be much support—in principle—for a comprehensive approach involving sequential elements and a blueprint culminating in a UN operation. But there is growing acknowledgement that UN peacekeeping deployments in Somalia will not be feasible at this stage in the absence of progress in the political and security dimensions. Members’ focus as a result seems to be shifting towards strengthening AMISOM, relocating UNPOS to Somalia and making arrangements for a maritime task force.

There is a degree of frustration—particularly among African members—about the lack of specific options from the Secretary-General for improving the security situation and supporting AMISOM in the short term. There is also scepticism about the feasibility of a stabilisation force separate from AMISOM, as proposed by the Secretary-General.

Pressure for adopting a UN support package is likely to continue, although African members appear to have adopted a cautious stance on the Konaré letter, not wanting at the outset to stimulate opposition from top UN financial contributors. Some members—including France, the US and Russia—appear opposed to using UN assessed contributions to finance AMISOM; others have complained of double-standards regarding UN assistance to the AU in Darfur.

On the maritime task force, there is reluctance within the Council about adopting a mandate that could lead to the use of force or is linked to counter-terrorism objectives.

On political reconciliation, some members still seem cautious about pressure on the TFG. And there appears to be concern from some, in particular the US, about inclusiveness because of some insurgents’ alleged terrorist linkages and sympathy towards Ethiopian concerns.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- • S/RES/1801 (20 February 2008) renewed AMISOM for six months.
- • S/RES/733 (23 January 1992) imposed an arms embargo.

Latest Report of the Secretary-General
- • S/2008/178 (14 March 2008), which included the recent AU request for a $800 million UN support package.

Latest Monitoring Group’s Report
- • S/2007/436 (17 July 2007)
- • S/PV.5858 (20 March 2008) was the recent Ould-Abdallah briefing.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNPOS
Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania)

Chairman of the Sanctions Committee
Dumisani S. Kumalo (South Africa)

AMISOM: Size, Composition and Cost
- Maximum authorised strength: 7,650 troops plus maritime and air components
- Strength as of 14 March 2008: about 2,500 Ugandan and Burundian troops
- Key financial contributors: EU, Italy, Sweden, China and the Arab League

AMISOM: Duration
Sudan/Darfur

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to continue to closely monitor developments in Darfur, including the security situation, deployment of the UN-AU Mission (UNAMID) and political reconciliation. Consultations are likely on the Secretary-General’s expected monthly report. Darfur issues are also likely to emerge during the Council’s expected joint meeting with the AU Peace and Security Council in April.

It is unclear, however, whether there will be any proposals for formal action on Darfur in April. Council members seem to be struggling to come up with new ideas.

On the north-south issue, members are also expected to renew the mandate of the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), which expires on 30 April. Changes to the mandate and size were not expected at press time, and the current hands-off approach seemed likely to continue. The Secretary-General’s report is due in early April.

Key Recent Developments

The humanitarian and human rights situation in Darfur has reached a critical stage with continuing clashes in the west and rebel ambushes in the south, along with crop failures, banditry and resulting food insecurity. The military offensive in West Darfur has included joint attacks by Sudanese armed forces and Janjaweed militia against the rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). These attacks have been supported by fighter jets and helicopter gunships, with reports of deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian assets.

There has been an acute increase in displacement in Darfur and in refugee movement into Chad, where there are already 250,000 Sudanese and 180,000 displaced Chadians. Insecurity and funding shortages halved food deliveries in Darfur in mid-March. Tens of thousands of civilians were reported inaccessible by aid organisations due to a ban on humanitarian flights and access restrictions imposed by rebels. UNAMID human rights monitors were also reportedly denied access to certain areas in West Darfur by the government.

The situation along the border with Chad is also highly volatile. In early March, a French soldier died and another was wounded after their vehicle crossed into Sudan from Chad as part of a reconnaissance mission under the EU Force (EUFOR).

On the margins of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference summit in Dakar, Chad and Sudan on 12 March signed a new agreement to defuse tensions and stop mutual support for rebels. The agreement, negotiated under the auspices of Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade and witnessed by the Secretary-General, is the latest in a series of attempts to improve Chad-Sudan relations, which are seen as critical for progress in Darfur and eastern Chad. The Dakar agreement also established an international contact group reportedly comprising Congo, Gabon, Libya and Senegal to oversee implementation.

However, as with previous such agreements, there is concern about its effectiveness. Sudan had reportedly expressed scepticism about the usefulness of a new agreement and rebels dismissed its potential for improving the situation. In late March, Chad and Sudan accused each other of violating the agreement.

In mid-March, the Darfur mediation team held consultations in Geneva with regional partners and international observers. Discussions focused on steps ahead for the peace talks in view of the ongoing delays with reaching a common rebel negotiating position and also the deteriorating security situation. The team also met with rebel leader Abdel Wahid al-Nur (who so far refuses to join the process in the absence of a meaningful ceasefire) and representatives of the five Council permanent members.

The team reportedly reiterated the need for security and the deployment of UNAMID for the resumption of peace talks. But prospects of a ceasefire appear grim; the JEM in particular has insisted on a broad political agreement before ceasing hostilities and bilateral negotiations with the government.

On 11 March, Assistant Secretary-General Edmond Mulet briefed the Council. He said that fighting in Darfur made “clear that preparing for political negotiations (did) not seem to be a priority for either the Government or rebel movements,” and added that “a peacekeeping operation alone” could not bring security to Darfur.

Mulet noted that the deployment of military units particularly from Egypt, Ethiopia and Nigeria, as well as formed police units from Nepal, Indonesia and Egypt were underway. Pursuant to an agreement with Khartoum, Thai and Nepalese military contingents would follow. Further deployments were not expected before mid-2008.

The mission continues to face critical challenges regarding:

- lack of helicopters, aerial reconnaissance aircraft, and logistics and transport units;
- limited logistical capacity;
- transition to the UNAMID logistics supply system; and
- ageing equipment inherited from the AU mission.

In early March, Russia said it was willing to contribute helicopters for UNAMID, most likely with crews supplied by other members. Further Secretariat discussions with Bangladesh and Ethiopia on transport helicopters have also continued. However, no firm arrangements had materialised at press time.

On 6 March, the “Friends of UNAMID” group was launched with US and Canadian support. The group—comprising Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Tanzania, the UK, the US and the EU—is expected to support UNAMID troop contributors with training and equipment.

Regarding the north-south situation, tensions continued in the Abyei area after renewed clashes between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Misseriya tribe, which the SPLA accuses of being supported by Khartoum.

Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) continues to face challenges. Key issues include:

- the census is now scheduled for 15-30 April, but funding from Khartoum was still to be resolved at press time;
- there are divisions between north and south on the draft electoral law;
the report of the Technical Ad Hoc Border Committee is still pending and no agreement has been reached on Abyei’s borders;
- southern suspicion over transparency regarding oil revenues continues; and
- no tangible progress has been made on troop redeployment and joint integrated units.

Regarding UNMIS, it seems that a recent assessment concluded that no major changes to the mandate would be required, but restructuring would be needed to improve mandate implementation. Ongoing concerns include:
- UNMIS’ lack of freedom of movement in Abyei;
- how best to manage the increasing tensions on the ground, given that UNMIS was militarily configured as an observer mission; and
- coordination with UNAMID and the political process in Darfur.

Options
Regarding the south, the most likely option is a renewal of UNMIS. Another option would be to decide to put in place some procedures to follow the CPA’s implementation more closely, and perhaps request regular Secretariat briefings (for example, every 45 days), as preparations for the census and the 2009 elections are made.

On Darfur, one possibility is that the Council will continue to leave UNAMID’s deployment issues to the Secretariat and to the newly-formed Friends of UNAMID, with support from bilateral diplomatic initiatives.

A second option is a more forward-looking strategy, mandating Council experts to meet regularly to discuss issues frustrating UNAMID’s deployment and prepare letters for the Council president or other demarches under the “silence” procedure to influence the parties concerned.

A third option is to try to reenergise the political reconciliation process by:
- seeking regular exchanges with the mediation team, perhaps in an informal setting of meetings of experts;
- strongly demanding a ceasefire, and perhaps setting a deadline; and
- reminding the parties of their obligations towards the ICC under resolution 1593.

A fourth option is to shift to a specifically regional approach to the resolution of the issues, and to incorporate some or all of the above elements in such an approach.

Key Issues
On the north-south situation, the key issue is that the CPA’s implementation is still at risk. A related issue is whether the recent trend to step back from the north-south situation may in fact create more problems than it solves. An important question is whether the Council should become more involved in encouraging the CPA’s implementation, and how best to do so (bearing in mind the parties’ ownership of the process) and how to factor in the wider regional dimensions.

On Darfur, the key issue for the Council is that current strategies seem unlikely to deliver quick progress on political reconciliation or on the security track (particularly regarding a ceasefire), on the continuing abuses against civilians by all sides and on the increasing regionalisation of the problem.

Regarding UNAMID, issues include:
- Khartoum’s cooperation regarding UNAMID, including troop composition and robustness, permission for night flights, water and land use;
- UNAMID’s lack of resources and delays in deployment arrangements;
- the crisis in Chad and support for rebels by both Chad and Sudan; and
- UNAMID’s unparalleled management, infrastructure, logistical, security and environmental challenges.

Finally, the issue of justice and accountability remains in the background. The issue is rarely discussed in the Council, even in the light of Sudan’s non-compliance with resolution 1593 and its lack of cooperation with the ICC.

Council Dynamics
Council members appear increasingly alarmed with the recent humanitarian and human rights developments in Darfur, Sudan’s military tactics, the dim prospects for political reconciliation and for UNAMID.

A degree of cooperation regarding UNAMID’s asset requirements has emerged—but basically outside the Council context. Initiatives such as the Friends of UNAMID seem to have helped a little. In terms of contacts with Sudan, China appears to have adopted a stronger position, having reportedly signalled that Sudan should show more flexibility on UNAMID.

More pressure on the rebels to return to the negotiating table is favoured by a number of Council members including China, Russia and Libya. However, other members (including the US, the UK and France) have argued that consideration of the sanctions option should include the conduct of all parties. Indonesia appears ready to propose that

Related Developments in the Sanctions Committee
The Sanctions Committee met in late February to discuss Sudan’s request for sanctions against the JEM. Given members’ ongoing divisions regarding sanctions options, the Committee decided on a limited response in a letter to Sudan requesting more details regarding the individuals in question and their alleged conduct.

Related Developments in the Human Rights Council (HRC)
On 10 March, Special Rapporteur Sima Samar briefed the HRC on her recent human rights report on Sudan. The report notes that “the protection of human rights in the Sudan remains an enormous challenge.” Despite some progress with the drafting of new laws, this had not had an impact on the human rights situation.

Regarding Darfur, Samar told the HRC that Khartoum and Darfur rebels had “failed in their responsibility to provide protection to civilians in areas under their control and are violating international human rights law and international humanitarian law.” (An 18 March report by the High Commissioner for Human Rights also found that “the scale of destruction of civilian property” in the context of the January-February military attacks on three towns in West Darfur “suggested that the damage was a deliberate and integral part of a military strategy,” leading to at least 115 killed and 30,000 displaced.)

Samar reiterated the recommendation to Khartoum to implement the proposals of the group of human rights experts on Darfur, accelerate CPA implementation, address impunity and cooperate with UNAMID and the International Criminal Court (ICC). She further recommended that all warring factions respect international humanitarian law and end attacks on civilians, and that the South Sudan government strengthen rule of law institutions and address impunity.
the Council demands a ceasefire backed by a threat of further measures.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1769 (31 July 2007) established UNAMID.
- S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred Darfur to the ICC.
- S/RES/1590 (24 March 2005) established UNMIS.

Latest Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2008/98 (14 February 2008) was the latest UNAMID report.
- S/2008/64 (31 January 2008) was the latest UNMIS report.

Other Relevant Facts

- S/PV.5849 (11 March 2008) was the recent Mulet briefing.
- A/HRC/7/22 (3 March 2008) was the recent Sudan human rights report to the HRC.
- S/AC.51/2008/7 (5 February 2008) were the conclusions of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict regarding Sudan.
- S/2007/584 (2 October 2007) was the latest Panel of Experts’ report.

Ethiopia-Eritrea

Expected Council Action

In April, the Council is expected to focus on the future of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) following the mission’s recent evacuation from Eritrea. A report (due at press time) with options and recommendations is expected from the Secretary-General. UNMEE’s mandate expires on 31 July.

Key Recent Developments

A crisis has been building for UNMEE over recent months. It reached a critical point on 1 December when the Eritrean authorities froze fuel deliveries to the mission. The Secretary-General alerted the Council in a letter on 21 January. He indicated that, as a last resort, he would send a letter appealing to Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki to intervene personally to ensure reinstatement of fuel supplies. On 25 January, the Secretary-General’s Acting Special Representative for UNMEE, Azouz Ennifar, briefed the Council in consultations on the Secretary-General’s regular report on the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The report recommended extending UNMEE’s mandate for only one month in view of the stoppage of fuel supplies. On 30 January, the Council decided to extend the mandate of UNMEE until 31 July and demanded that the Eritrean government immediately remove restrictions on fuel supplies. The Council apparently decided to extend the mission’s mandate for six months because it did not want to be seen as acquiescing to constraints imposed by Eritrea. It reiterated its demand in a press statement on 4 February and requested Eritrea to facilitate the work of a UN technical assessment mission due in the region that month.

On 1 February, the Secretary-General wrote to inform the Council that he had not received a response to his letter to President Afwerki and indicated that if fuel supplies were not reinstated by 6 February he would be compelled to begin relocation of UNMEE from Eritrea to ensure the mission’s safety. On 11 February, UNMEE’s relocation from Eritrea commenced by land to designated sites in Ethiopia after the assessment mission finalised an emergency relocation plan during its visit to Addis Ababa from 6 to 11 February. The mission was unable to visit Eritrea as the local authorities refused it entry. On 14 February, the UN Secretariat briefed UNMEE troop contributors on the relocation. They, in turn, expressed concern about the deteriorating situation and the safety of UNMEE personnel.

The Council issued a presidential statement on 15 February condemning Eritrea’s lack of cooperation with UNMEE, stating that it held Eritrea responsible for the safety and security of UNMEE while also expressing its determination to consider “further steps.” In closed consultations on 21 February, the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Edmond Mulet, briefed the Council on the relocation process and its difficulties. Eritrea subsequently disputed the UN Secretariat’s reports on the obstacles posed to UNMEE’s relocation in a letter to the president of the Council on 5 March.

On 13 March, the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, updated the Council on the Secretary-General’s 3 March special report on the UNMEE relocation. The report gave
an update on the efforts to temporarily relocate UNMEE military personnel from Eritrea to their home countries and Ethiopia, as well as the obstacles posed by the Eritrean authorities to the effort. It also indicated that a residual presence of UNMEE personnel would be retained in Asmara, including the Deputy Special Representative and Chief of Mission Support, to secure and inventory equipment and materiel left behind and to provide essential liaison services. UNMEE personnel deployed on the Ethiopian side would remain there until the Council decided the future of the mission. The report also highlighted the Secretariat’s various contacts with Eritrea and Ethiopia. In a letter to the president of the Council on 10 March, Eritrea disputed the Secretary-General’s contention that it had obstructed UNMEE’s relocation and claimed that the UN Secretariat’s communications with the government on this matter left much to be desired and had caused the difficulties.

Key Issues
The main issue for the Council is how to avoid a relapse into violent conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea and whether in light of recent events there is still a useful role for UNMEE. The related underlying issue of compliance with the border demarcation remains to be addressed in this regard. A series of immediate issues include ensuring the safe relocation of all UNMEE personnel and securing the mission’s equipment.

Options
Options before the Council include:

- credibly addressing the need for Ethiopia to accept fully and without delay the boundary decision as a means finding effective closure to the matter;

- continuing with ad hoc fragments of UNMEE as an alternative, including relocating the force headquarters and its integral units from Eritrea to Ethiopia, and transforming UNMEE into an observer mission supported by a smaller military-protection force (perhaps with liaison offices in Addis Ababa and Asmara); and

- encouraging the AU and its members with influence in the region to engage with both parties to find a closure to the border dispute.

Council Dynamics
Council members seem to tacitly acknowledge that they have not dealt effectively with the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea leading to Eritrean frustrations over implementation of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC) decisions. However, Council members disagree with the methods adopted by Eritrea particularly its tactic of stifling UNMEE’s operations to draw attention to the issue.

A consensus is yet to emerge in the Council on whether UNMEE has a future. The Secretary-General’s report may facilitate its deliberations in that regard. A major concern is whether it will be possible to obtain the consent of both host countries for a modified UN presence in the area in the light of recent developments. Council members are concerned about violent conflict if the Algiers accords (signed in 2000 on the cessation of hostilities) fail. There is also uncertainty about the impact if the moderating effect of a UN presence is removed.

Another major factor is the concern of troop-contributing countries that are unhappy at both the performance of the Security Council and the treatment of UNMEE personnel by Eritrea.

In the long term, most Council members expect to return their focus to the core issue of implementing the Algiers accords and securing Ethiopia’s cooperation.

Belgium is the lead country on the issue in the Council.

UN Documents

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<th>Selected Security Council Resolutions</th>
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<td>• S/RES/1312 (31 July 2000) established UNMEE.</td>
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<th>Selected Presidential Statement</th>
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<td>• S/PRST/2008/7 (15 February 2008) condemning Eritrea’s lack of cooperation with UNMEE which had made the mission’s temporary relocation from the country inevitable, and stated that it held Eritrea responsible for the safety and security of UNMEE.</td>
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<td>• S/PRST/2007/43 (13 November 2007) reiterated the Council’s call on Ethiopia and Eritrea to implement the 2002 boundary decision without delay.</td>
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Selected Letters

- S/2008/172 (10 March 2008) contained Eritrea’s response to the Secretary-General’s report on the relocation of UNMEE.
- S/2008/156 (4 March 2008) was the letter conveying Eritrea’s response to the UN Secretariat’s report on Eritrea’s conduct.
- S/2008/114 (3 March 2008) conveyed a document from the Permanent Mission of Eritrea to the UN seeking to refocus attention on the need for the Council to find closure to the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute.
- S/2008/66 (1 February 2008) was the letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council informing of Eritrea’s continued restrictions of supply of fuel to UNMEE and his intention to send a technical assessment mission to the region.
- S/2008/54 (29 January 2008) contained Eritrea’s response to the report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea (S/2008/40).
- S/2007/693 (30 November 2007) contained Eritrea’s response to a letter dated 27 November from Ethiopia’s foreign minister to the President of the EEBC.
- S/2007/660 (8 November 2007) contained Eritrea’s position on the EEBC.
- S/2007/580 (27 September 2007) contained Eritrea’s position regarding Ethiopia’s perspective on its perceived breaches of the Algiers Agreement.
- S/2006/1036 (28 December 2006) contained Eritrea’s position on the appointment of a special representative.
- S/2006/890 (15 November 2006) and 905 (20 November 2006) contained respectively Ethiopia’s and Eritrea’s position on the EEBC’s intention to convene a meeting on options for moving the demarcation process forward.
Key Recent Developments

The intense fighting in West Darfur involving the Sudanese government and the rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) has led to the arrival of tens of thousands of new Sudanese refugees in Chad, adding to the existing 250,000. There are also an estimated 180,000 internally displaced Chadians.

In Chad, concern at a possible new rebel offensive continues. The government extended the state of emergency, but observers note this has also been used to crackdown on the political opposition as a viable political force.

The situation along the border between Sudan and Chad is highly volatile. In early March, a French soldier died and another was wounded after their vehicle inadvertently crossed into Sudan from Chad as part of a reconnaissance mission under the EU Force (EUFOR).

On 17 March, EUFOR was officially declared operational.

On 12 March, Chad and Sudan signed a new agreement to defuse tensions and stop mutual support for rebels. The Dakar agreement also established an international contact group reportedly including Congo, Gabon, Libya and Senegal to oversee implementation.

It was the latest in a series of attempts to improve Chad-Sudan relations. However, as with previous such agreements, there are concerns about its effectiveness. Sudan reportedly expressed scepticism about the usefulness of a new agreement while rebels dismissed its potential for improving the situation. In late March, Chad and Sudan accused each other of violating the agreement.

In the CAR, the situation remains highly volatile. The rebel Armée populaire pour la restauration de la démocratie (APRD) is still active in the northwest, a region outside the area of operations of MINURCAT and EUFOR. There are reports that the APRD and the Chadian army have become embroiled in inter-communal tensions in the area, with a number of Chadian army incursions noted particularly in January through March. Displacement and abuse of civilians continues.

A domestic committee for the establishment of political dialogue in the CAR is expected to propose a framework for talks to the government by 31 March. (The committee includes government officials, opposition groups, rebels and civil society.)

The security situation in the CAR further deteriorated after a group of Ugandan rebels belonging to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) crossed the border from the Democratic Republic of the Congo in early March. LRA leader and International Criminal Court indictee Joseph Kony is believed to be amongst LRA fighters in the CAR. There were reports of looting and abductions from an LRA attack against a village in southern CAR.

Options

Options for the Council include:
- continuing the wait-and-see approach;
- adopting a low-key regional approach by establishing regular Council expert meetings with concerned member states, the Libyan-Congolese mediators and the AU, and by supporting reconciliation efforts by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Victor da Silva Angelo;
- managing the challenges by considering a mandate for MINURCAT on political reconciliation in Chad, perhaps including support for the Libyan-Congolese mediation and coordination with the AU and UNAMID; and
- following the situation in northwestern CAR more closely, perhaps including a statement expressing concern and supporting political reconciliation efforts.

Key Issues

The key issue is whether and how to become more involved in promoting political reconciliation in Chad and CAR as part of a wider regional approach. Related issues include:
- the continuing destabilisation in Chad and the potential for further deterioration of Chad-Sudan relations and a regionalised conflict;
- security risks for MINURCAT and EUFOR if they are perceived as taking sides and as a result are dragged into the conflict;
- managing the complexities of coordinating simultaneous deployments in Chad and Darfur; and

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**Selected Secretary-General’s Reports**

- S/2008/145 (3 March 2008) was a special report on the temporary relocation of UNMEE from Eritrea.
- S/2008/40 (23 January 2008) was the latest regular UNMEE report.

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**Selected Secretary-General’s Press Release**

- SC/9240 (4 February 2008) was a press statement demanding immediate resumption of fuel supplies to UNMEE and requesting the Eritrea to facilitate the work of a UN technical assessment mission due in that region.

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**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission**

Vacant, pending appointment; acting representative Azouz Ennifar (Tunisia)

**Size and Composition**

- Authorised maximum strength: 4,200 military personnel
- Strength as of 31 January 2008: 1,674 military personnel
- Key troop-contributing countries: India, Jordan and Kenya

**Cost**

Approved budget: 1 July 2007-30 June 2008: $118.99 million

**Duration**

31 July 2000 to present; mandate expires 31 July 2008

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**Chad/Central African Republic**

**Expected Council Action**

Consultations on Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) are expected in April. Members now expect by early April the Secretary-General’s progress report on the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). A statement is possible, particularly if the security situation deteriorates further. MINURCAT’s mandate expires on 25 September.
operational challenges for the EU and UN deployments, including assets, logistics, the volatile operational environment and management, as well as political and security developments in Darfur.

Council Dynamics
There is awareness of the potential for a regionalised conflict, and the wider links between the sources of conflict in Sudan, Chad, CAR and rebel groups, and related risks for EUFOR and MINURCAT. But Council members so far appear inclined to continue with a wait-and-see approach leaving the issues to initiatives by regional neighbours and others such as France.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolution
- S/RES/1778 (25 September 2007) established MINURCAT and authorised the EU protection force.

Selected Presidential Statement
- S/PRST/2008/3 (4 February 2008) contained an expression of support to external military assistance to the Chadian government.

Latest Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2007/739 (17 December 2007) was on MINURCAT.
- S/2007/697 (5 December 2007) was on the UN Peacebuilding Office in the CAR (BONUCA).

Other
- S/2008/160 (5 March 2008) was a Sudanese letter on the recent border incident involving EUFOR.
- S/2008/139 (4 March 2008) contained an AU communiqué on Chad encouraging mediation by the Republic of Congo and Libya.

Other Relevant Facts

MINURCAT: Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Victor da Silva Ângelo (Portugal)

MINURCAT: Size, Composition and Cost
- Authorised strength: up to 300 police and fifty military liaison officers
- Strength as of 29 February 2008: 57 police and six military observers
- Main police contributors: Côte d’Ivoire, France, Mali and Niger
- Cost: approved budget 1 July 2007–30 June 2008: $182.44 million

Côte D’Ivoire

Expected Council Action
The Council will review the Secretary-General’s report, due 15 April, on preparations for the electoral process in Côte d’Ivoire. The sanctions’ Group of Experts is expected to submit its interim report to the Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee. The Council will review the sanctions regime, particularly sanctions against individuals and diamond sanctions, by 30 April. (The mandate of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) continues until 30 July).

Recent Developments
On 15 January 2008, the Council renewed the mandate of UNOCI and the French forces until 30 July to assist the Ivoirian parties in implementing the outstanding objectives under the 2007 Ouagadougou Agreement (including identification and registration of voters, disarmament and dismantling of militias, and the unification and restructuring of the defence and security forces). The Council accepted the Supplementary Agreements, signed on 28 November by President Laurent Gbagbo and Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, which delayed the date for national elections until June. The Council requested the Secretary-General to keep it regularly informed, particularly about the preparations for the elections.

The Secretary-General reported on 2 January that while security and political conditions in Côte d’Ivoire had improved in recent months, those gains were fragile in light of the slow progress in achieving key benchmarks of the Ouagadougou Agreement, including those concerning the dismantling of militias and disarming ex-combatants. He explained that while the national armed forces and those of the Forces Nouvelles had shown more resolve to collaborate, “systematic factors of instability” continued to pose a threat to the future of the peace process. These factors include the lack of significant progress in unifying the defence and security forces and the dismantling of militias, as well as a rise in criminal activities due to weapons proliferation.

The Secretary-General noted that achieving the goals set out in the various agreements would require a redoubling of efforts by the parties and their international partners, including provision of resources required for a number of key processes, the identification of the population, voter registration, disarmament and the reestablishment of state authority. He further noted that developments since the signing of the supplementary agreements to the Ouagadougou Agreement were encouraging and might later lead to proposals for a gradual downsizing of UNOCI troop levels.

On 17 March, UNOCI transferred control of three disarmament facilities in the country’s northern region, which has been under the de facto control of the rebel Forces Nouvelles since 2002, to the Ivoirian Government as part of a new beginning for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) effort. At a ceremony held to mark the event in the northern town of Ferkessedougou, 118 former rebel fighters surrendered their weapons to formally join the DDR process outlined by the Ouagadougou Agreement.

MINURCAT: Duration
September 2007 to present; mandate expires on 25 September 2008

EU Force: Size, Composition and Cost
- Expected strength: 3,700 troops and 600 on reserve.
- Expected main contributors: France, Ireland, Poland, Sweden and Finland
- Cost: EUR 119.6 million

EU Force: Duration
17 March 2008 to present; mandate expires on 17 March 2009.

BONUCA: Special Representative of the Secretary-General
François Lonseny Fall (Guinea)

BONUCA: Size
Strength as of 30 November 2007: 27 international staff, five military, six police

BONUCA: Duration
15 February 2000 to present; mandate expires 31 December 2008

FOMUC: Size and Composition
- Current strength: 500 troops
- Contributors: Gabon, Republic of Congo and Chad

FOMUC: Duration
October 2002 to present; mandate expires 31 December 2009
The Secretary-General’s Special Representative (SRSG) to Côte d’Ivoire, Choi Young-Jin, and President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, facilitator of the Ivorian peace process, met on 23 January in Ouagadougou to discuss ways of accelerating the peace process underway in Côte d’Ivoire to end the crisis that has divided the country between the rebel-held north and government-controlled south since 2002.

On 28 February, the director of UNOCI’s electoral assistance division, Ahmedou El Becaye Seck, announced in Abidjan that the mission had repaired almost 90 percent of polling stations across Côte d’Ivoire ahead of the national presidential elections planned for June. UNOCI had also assisted in updating the country’s electoral cartography to enable easier identification of the population and register voters before the polls by local authorities.

In mid-February, the 2007 annual UN report on children and armed conflict was issued, indicating that Côte d’Ivoire had been taken off the UN Secretary-General’s global list of child recruiters because militias and other armed groups were said to have stopped recruiting children into their ranks. However, some NGOs operating in the country, such as Save the Children, say that while there is no evidence that children are being recruited or are active soldiers, many are still associated with the armed forces and are working for combatants by cooking, cleaning and running errands.

On 25 March, election certification criteria proposed by the SRSG were welcomed by the Ivorian parties and promulgated.

Key Issues
A major issue is assessing progress of the electoral process, which appears to be slow.

Another key issue is the review of the sanctions regime on Côte d’Ivoire (arms embargo, assets freeze, travel ban and diamond sanctions). The Ivorian authorities have not requested any specific exemptions from the sanctions regime although the Council has indicated its preparedness to consider a request along those lines (e.g. partial lifting of the arms embargo for law and order purposes).

Options
Options before the Council include:
- maintaining the current sanctions regime;
- renewing sanctions with modifications (an unlikely option at this stage, especially since the Ivorian authorities have not yet made a formal request to the Sanctions Committee for any specific exemption); and
- addressing the risk of postponement of the national elections scheduled for June and perhaps approving procedures for closer monitoring of progress in the coming months.

Council Dynamics
Council members appear pleased with the relative progress being made in stabilising the security situation in Côte d’Ivoire. However, consensus seems to be emerging within the Council that the sanctions regime and the mandate and size of UNOCI should not be changed until after the elections. Council members remain anxious about progress with the elections and are awaiting the Secretary-General’s report to inform their deliberations. There is a fear that it is becoming less likely that elections will be held in June because of the slow pace in meeting benchmarks (e.g. identification and registration of voters, the disarmament process and dismantling of militia, and the unification and restructuring of the defence and security forces).

Some Council members (e.g. Indonesia, South Africa and China) have in the past pushed for some form of relaxation of sanctions in line with positive developments in the country. However, there now seems to be an understanding within the Council to adopt a cautious approach on sanctions around negative developments on the ground by scheduling periodic reports.

France traditionally plays a leading role on this issue in the Council together with African members.

UN Documents

Latest Security Council Resolutions

Latest Security Council Press Statement
- SC/9152 (23 October 2007)

Latest President Statement
- S/PRST/2007/8 (28 March 2007) endorsed the Ouagadougou Agreement, supported the appointment of Guillaume Soro as prime minister and requested a report from the Secretary-General on the UN’s future role in the peace process.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report
- S/2008/1 (2 January 2008) was the Secretary-General’s latest report on UNOCI.

Other
- S/2007/611 (17 October 2007) was the latest report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire.
- S/2007/515 (30 August 2007) was the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire.
- S/2007/223 (19 April 2007) was the latest International Working Group’s communiqué, requesting its two co-chairs to consult with ECOWAS and the AU on its future role and recommendations to Security Council.
- S/2007/144 (13 March 2007) contained the Ouagadougou Agreement.
region by peaceful means; expresses the importance of resolving problems in the presence of authorised parties. The Russian draft reaffirms resolution 1244 and proposes further initiatives from Russia was still being discussed. Consultations are also possible, if the situation in northern Kosovo deteriorates. The Secretary-General deplored the violent attacks against UN personnel and urged all communities “to exercise calm and restraint.” He also pledged that the UN would take all measures required to implement its mandate. NATO condemned the violence and said it would respond firmly under its UN mandate to any acts of violence following its UN mandate. Russia expressed misgivings about the wisdom of resisting the Serb occupation and made accusations of lack of restraint. The US condemned the violence against the UN police and NATO troops.

In mid-March, Serbia submitted a plan for the functional division of Serb and Albanian populations in Kosovo. The proposal acknowledges UNMIK’s authority in Kosovo but claims that the police, judiciary and customs should be controlled by Serbs in parts of Kosovo where Serbs are a majority. (The proposal, rejected by the Kosovo government, is a first step from the current “soft” partition to a more definitive but still de facto new status for northern Kosovo.) Since the declaration of independence on 17 February, 33 countries (18 from the EU) have formally recognised Kosovo. Some observers see the recognition by near neighbours—Croatia and Hungary on 19 March, and Bulgaria on 20 March—as giving new momentum to the process. The three countries issued a joint statement saying their decision was based on “thorough consideration” and underlining the importance of protecting the Serb minority. Serbia has declared that countries that recognise Kosovo are in breach of international law. It has recalled its ambassadors from countries that have extended recognition.

(Please see our Update Report on 10 March for other developments regarding Kosovo’s declaration of independence.)

Key Issues
A key issue is the potential for further violence, particularly in the north. A related issue is how to respond to Serbian involvement in parallel institutions in northern Kosovo and the consequential possibility of this “soft partition” becoming entrenched, and a frozen conflict situation developing.

A second key issue is how the UN should respond to the situation in Kosovo. The takeover of the UNMIK headquarters building was seen by UNMIK as a clear red line that justified immediate action. Some Council members feel the action was hasty and could have been resolved without violence. A connected issue for the future is whether and when UNMIK and NATO forces will use force in trying to maintain stability in northern Kosovo.

A third key issue is the differences in the Council over the interpretation of resolution 1244 and specifically the implications for UNMIK’s presence. Related to this is the dilemma the Council may face in supporting the Secretary-General. So far he has continued to use 1244 as the legal framework for UNMIK’s presence and scope of activities.

If the Secretary-General indicates that he is going to restructure UNMIK in the light of developments, the question becomes what is needed to give effect to such a decision. Some feel that no new resolution is needed. Others are likely to insist that UNMIK cannot be adjusted without amending resolution 1244.

A continuing issue is whether other territories with independence aspirations are being stimulated by Kosovo’s action. Related to this is whether some governments might now react more strongly against autonomy movements lest they show signs of wanting independence.
Options
The Council’s options will depend largely on the evolving security situation and on what the Secretary-General may suggest in his report. Given the deadlock over this issue it is likely that the majority in the Council will prefer to simply have the briefing but take no action.

One option if the Council wants to be kept better informed of the situation on the ground is to request the Secretary-General to provide monthly briefings.

Although unlikely given the current dynamics in the Council, other options still remain, including:
- beginning work on a resolution to replace 1244, refocusing UNMIK and authorising the EU mission;
- agreeing to a new framework for negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade; and
- requesting UNMIK to work with Serbia on the key concerns such as the status of the Kosovo Serb population, the Serbian Orthodox Church, customs, judges and police.

Council Dynamics
While Council members agree that 1244 and UNMIK should continue and on the need for the Secretary-General to report regularly to the Council, members are continuing to apply differing interpretations of 1244. Some (the US and Europeans) see 1244 as consistent with the EU mission. Others (like Russia) feel that this is contrary to 1244. Positions appear to be rigidifying. China, at the time of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, said that it was “gravely concerned.” It may now take a stronger position against the independence declaration.

In discussing Russia’s proposed presidential statement members were unable to agree on even basic common elements. While a lot of energy has been put into this issue, with numerous meetings over the past 12 months, the Council has only managed to issue one press statement (condemning the mob attacks on embassies in Belgrade on 20 February). Instead, public statements have been made by different groups or member states conveying their particular positions, thus providing a clear picture of the divisions within the Council.

Many of the non-permanent members are increasingly ready to see Kosovo become a less active issue on the Council’s agenda.

UN Documents
Security Council Resolution
- S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) authorised NATO to secure and enforce the withdrawal of Yugoslav (FRY) forces from Kosovo and established UNMIK.

Selected Presidential Statements
- S/PVST/2005/51 (24 October 2005) declared it was time to begin the political process to determine the future status of Kosovo.

Selected Letters
- A/62/703-S/2008/111 (17 February 2008) was the letter from Serbia on its position on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
- A/62/700-S/2008/108 (17 February 2008) was the letter from Russia transmitting its Foreign Ministry’s statement on Kosovo following the declaration of independence and calling for an immediate emergency meeting of the Council.
- S/2008/104 (17 February 2008) was the letter from Russia supporting Serbia’s request for a meeting.
- S/2008/103 (17 February 2008) was the letter from Serbia asking for an emergency public meeting after Kosovo declared independence.
- S/2008/93 (12 February 2008) was the letter from Russia supporting Serbia’s request for meeting of the Council.
- S/2008/92 (12 February 2008) was the letter from Serbia requesting an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the situation in Kosovo.
- S/2008/7 (4 January 2008) was the letter from Serbia commenting on the Secretary-General’s December UNMIK report.
- S/2007/168 and Add. 1 (26 March 2007) was the letter transmitting UN Special Envoy Martti Anttisaari’s report on Kosovo’s future status and the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.

Selected Reports
- S/2008/768 (3 January 2008) was the last report of the Secretary-General on UNMIK.
- S/2007/723 (10 December 2007) was the report of the Troika.

Other
- S/PV.5839 (18 February 2008) was the open meeting following Kosovo’s independence declaration.
- Statement issued on 17 February 2008 by the UK, France, Croatia, Belgium, Italy, Germany and the US.
- Statement issued on 20 July 2007 by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, UK and the US, co-sponsors of the draft resolution on Kosovo presented to the Council on 17 July.
- Draft resolution on Kosovo (formally circulated on 17 July 2007 but withdrawn on 20 July 2007).

Georgia
Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) which expires on 15 April.

The Council will discuss the Secretary-General’s report on the situation in Abkhazia in early April and is likely to be briefed by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Jean Arnault. Options to improve confidence-building efforts as well as possibilities for strengthening UNOMIG’s patrolling capacity are likely to be discussed.

Key Recent Developments
Russia on 6 March withdrew from the sanctions regime that had been established in 1996 by the Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to put pressure on Abkhazia. Russia announced to the CIS that “by reason of a change in the circumstances” it was no longer bound to ban trade, economic, financial and transport ties with Abkhazia. Georgia described Russia’s action as an “overt attempt” to infringe on its sovereignty and territorial integrity and create a “threat of destabilization.” Both countries outlined their positions in letters circulated as UN documents. The US and the EU expressed concern at Russia’s move and
support for Georgia’s territorial integrity. There are also concerns that the lifting of sanctions might lead to more weapons flowing into the area.

On 7 March, Abkhazia called on Russia, the UN, the EU and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe to recognise its independence.

NATO members remain undecided about a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Georgia—the first step to NATO membership. Georgia’s handling of opposition protests late last year affected its reputation with some NATO members. The issue is expected to be on the agenda during the NATO summit in Bucharest on 2-3 April. Russia’s incoming president, Dmitry Medvedev, on 25 March spoke out against NATO membership for Georgia. Russia has also warned that giving Georgia NATO membership would push Russia to recognise the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Russia’s Duma on 13 March recommended that the Russian government open “missions” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as Moldova’s Transnistria region. On 21 March, it adopted a nonbinding declaration urging the Kremlin to consider “the question of expediency of recognising the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,” thus moving closer but still stopping short of an outright call for formal recognition. In his 18 March meeting with the Secretary-General, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili discussed implications of Kosovo’s declaration of independence on Georgia.

Earlier in the year there had been hopes that relations between Georgia and Russia would improve. Following his re-election in the 5 January snap presidential election, Saakashvili showed willingness to mend ties with Moscow. On 21 February, he met Russian President Vladimir Putin ahead of the informal CIS summit. This ended on a positive note with both sides expressing hope for better relations. A promising sign was that airline service recently resumed after being suspended last year.

The Group of Friends of the Secretary-General of Georgia met in Geneva on 18-19 February. (The Group consists of France, Germany, Russia, the UK and US. Croatia, as the newly elected Eastern European Council member, will attend meetings in New York.)

Following a visit to Georgia at the end of February, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, voiced concern about conditions in detention facilities and asked for results of an official inquiry into the crackdown on protestors last November to be made public.

Options

The most likely option is a six-month mandate renewal with no change to UNOMIG’s mandate. The Council may include language urging both sides to exercise restraint and to look for creative ways of bringing about a political settlement.

Key Issues

A key issue is whether Russia’s decision to unilaterally lift CIS sanctions on Abkhazia will result in Georgia showing less flexibility.

Another key issue is whether the more tense environment will heighten the risk of conflict between Georgian and Abkhaz forces. Some observers believe that Georgia’s behaviour has been constrained by its desire for NATO membership. If NATO membership looks unlikely in the near future, Georgia may have less cause to hold back when faced with Abkhaz provocation. With the end of winter, there are also concerns that the potential for open conflict is likely to rise.

Another issue is whether in these circumstances UNOMIG has the resources to fulfil its mandate. Unmanned aerial vehicles have been discussed but the Abkhaz side has raised questions about possible misuse of these vehicles.

A continuing question is whether the Council can do more to break the political deadlock. Related to this is Georgia’s request for a review of the peace process. The Secretariat is undertaking an internal assessment of UNOMIG’s role and may be able to offer some suggestions later this year.

Council Dynamics

Last year, Kosovo overshadowed the issues in Georgia. Now there is awareness that the Georgian situation needs greater attention, particularly if Abkhazia continues to push for independence. Many members are expecting tough discussions on the resolution given the current mood in the Council on questions of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russia may push for a briefing from a representative from Abkhazia to participate in a closed session. This would meet resistance from the US, which strongly supports Georgia’s position. However, past US-Russia clashes over participation issues relating to Kosovo may influence positions on this issue. (In the end, solutions were found that allowed both Serbians and Kosovars to participate.) As with the Kosovo issue, it is likely that a number of non-permanent members will prefer to remain on the sidelines rather than get caught up in this issue.

UN Documents

Latest Security Council Resolution

Selected Secretary-General’s Report
• S/2008/38 (23 January 2008) was the latest Secretary-General’s report on the situation in Abkhazia.

Selected Letters to the President of the Council
• S/2008/168 (10 March 2008) was the letter from Russia on its withdrawal from the regime of restrictions on Abkhazia.
• S/2008/167 (7 March 2008) was the letter from Georgia conveying its reaction to Russia’s withdrawal from the regime of restrictions.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission
Jean Arnault (France)

UNOMIG: Size and Composition
• Authorised strength as of 31 January 2009: 149 total uniformed personnel, including 131 military observers and 18 police
• Key troop contributors: Germany, Pakistan and Bangladesh

Duration
August 1993 to present

Cost
1 July 2007-30 June 2008: $36.71 million (gross)

Other Facts
Size of CIS troops: about 1,800 Russian troops
**Expected Council Action**

In April, the Council is expected to hold consultations and discuss a report on the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). On 15 October 2007, resolution 1780 renewed the MINUSTAH mandate until October 2008, but requested the Secretary-General to submit interim reports. Council members will be looking to the forthcoming report to see whether it contains initial clues on a consolidation plan for MINUSTAH “with appropriate benchmarks to measure and track progress.”

Hédi Annabi, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Haiti, is likely to brief the Council during April. (He is also expected to visit Latin American capitals of major troop-contributing countries.)

**Key Recent Developments**

On 21 January, Annabi said the security situation in Haiti had improved significantly since major gangs had been dismantled, but also said peace and stability remained fragile. He said the time was not ripe for a dramatic downsizing of MINUSTAH. It should remain long enough to ensure that the UN would never have to return, he said. He also referred to the limited scope of reconstruction activities that MINUSTAH could perform as it is not a development agency.

The situation along the border with the Dominican Republic deteriorated in recent months with allegations of cross-border incursions, kidnapping and cattle theft.

Allegations of sexual misconduct by Sri Lankan peacekeepers led to the repatriation on 3 November 2007 of 108 Sri Lankan soldiers (including three commanders)—out of a contingent of 950.

On 17 October 2007, President René Préval stated that the current constitution, established in 1987, was a threat to Haiti’s stability because of its complexity (particularly the electoral system) and ambiguities. He called for constitutional reform. Some have raised suspicions that Préval’s underlying purpose might be to seek to remain in power beyond his term, which ends in 2011. A presidential commission has been tasked to study elements for reform and is expected to submit recommendations, although it is unclear when. The constitution, however, is difficult to amend. A related issue in Haiti is a proposal to allow dual citizenship (currently forbidden) so that members of the Haitian diaspora could return and play a role in Haiti’s political process.

At the end of February a vote of non-confidence in Prime Minister Jacques-Edouard Alexis, protesting the government’s economic policy, failed by a large majority.

An important development for the judicial reform process was the adoption by the parliament of three major laws in December 2007 on training of magistrates, the status of magistrates and the Superior Council, which will oversee their functions.

On 15 October 2007, the Council extended MINUSTAH for 12 months and reaffirmed its role in supporting the Haitian government in constitutional and political processes, institution-building, police and justice reform, disarmament and reintegration. The Council mandated it to undertake deterrent actions to decrease the level of violence. The resolution also reemphasised MINUSTAH’s role of coordinator for development actors in Haiti. New elements included:

- an endorsement of recommendations made by the Secretary-General for reconfiguring the mission: reducing its military component while increasing the number of police units, and strengthening MINUSTAH’s capabilities in border control, engineering and mobility;
- support for Haitian efforts to strengthen border control, in particular through the establishment of maritime patrols;
- a call on all humanitarian and development actors to complement MINUSTAH’s security operations with activities aimed at improving the population’s living condition; and
- a request to the Secretary-General to provide a “consolidation plan” including benchmarks to measure and track progress of the implementation of MINUSTAH’s mandate (conditions under which MINUSTAH could withdraw).

**Options**

There is little appetite for Council action in April. A statement may be a possibility. It could:

- welcome the Secretary-General’s report;
- encourage MINUSTAH’s coordinating role;
- reiterate the importance of indicators of progress for MINUSTAH; and
- signal a possible Council mission to Haiti.

**Key Issues**

Key issues the Council is likely to discuss are:

- **Border security and the fight against narcotrafficking**, in particular whether the maritime patrols have been put in place (Uruguay pledged to provide several small patrol boats) and whether border management experts will be sent to Haiti.
- **The security situation** and how to sustain recent improvements including the effectiveness of the gradual increase of MINUSTAH’s police component at the expense of the military. Discussions may focus on police activities.
- **Constitutional and electoral questions**, in particular President Préval’s constitutional reform to reduce the frequency of elections.
- **Judiciary and police reforms** are continuing issues. There are currently about 8,400 Haitian police officers and it is estimated that 14,000 are necessary to ensure minimum security.
- **Finally, the issue of corruption and response of the Haitian parliament**, in particular whether the pace of the parliament’s adoption of reform legislation is being sustained.

Another issue is the difficulty in identifying suitable benchmarks to track progress. The Secretary-General’s report may not contain much detail—more may be available for the next reporting cycle in September—but this issue is likely to colour discussions. Some members think that this is crucial. However, others fear the definition of indicators will prematurely determine how much longer MINUSTAH will remain.

A key issue is the link between economic and social development and stability. Some members argue that there is a need not only to focus on security indicators but also development indicators and institutional indicators (e.g. successful elections,
improved rule of law, etc). A related issue is whether it will be possible to measure the sustainability of any benchmarks.

Another important issue is the need for more effective coordination between donors and other development actors (including UN agencies) in Haiti, MINUSTAH and the Haitian government. The 2004 to 2006 Interim Cooperation Framework, which aimed at identifying priority areas of intervention to support Haiti’s development, and the monthly UN Heads of Agency meetings and regular donor meetings to coordinate aid (usually held by the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator), seem not to have worked to harmonise donors’ strategies. MINUSTAH has increasingly taken over coordination activities, but for some its mandate still remains too weak. A related issue is also whether emphasis should be placed on ownership by the Haitian government of development resources, despite legitimate concerns about its capacity to properly manage funds and development processes. An international donors’ conference is scheduled for 25 and 26 April in Port-au-Prince, at the initiative of the Haitian government, with the aim of strengthening coordination among key actors in implementing the final Poverty Reduction Strategy that the Haitian government outlined in November 2007.

Finally, an issue which remains to be discussed is whether the Council should visit Haiti and when would be the best time. The last Council visit was in April 2005.

Council and Wider Dynamics
There seems to be an increasing consensus among the Group of Friends of Haiti (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Peru, Uruguay and the US) and within the Council that both security and development are necessary. However, some members (US and Canada) believe that MINUSTAH’s development-related activities should be limited to quick-impact projects and assistance to the Haitian government for institutional reforms and the rule of law, and that development actors such as the UN Development Programme should lead on development tasks. They concede that perhaps MINUSTAH could coordinate poverty-reduction strategies. Others (particularly the Latin American members) are pushing for more MINUSTAH’s development-related activities—although they acknowledge the existence of limitations.

All seem to agree that eventually, full ownership of the stabilisation process by the Haitian government is necessary.

Uruguay recently joined the Group of Friends as a troop contributor. Peru continues to be the Group’s coordinator, although it is no longer a Council member. There is currently no Latin American Group of Friends’ member on the Council. For that reason, and also because of a general interest in Haiti, Panama expressed its desire to become a member of the Group of Friends. But its candidacy was rejected ostensibly because Panama does not contribute militarily and financially. It seems that both Panama and Costa Rica, as Council members, will be invited to participate in some discussions of the Group. However, France and the US will take the lead on Haiti in the Council, replacing Peru. Many within the Group of Friends support the idea of a Council’s visit to Haiti.

Despite a general consensus on Haiti, defining indicators of progress may become contentious because of differing visions within the Council on the future of MINUSTAH. Some support giving the force a clear deadline for withdrawal. Mindful of previous mistakes of premature UN withdrawals, others want to see clear progress in several important aspects before determining a timeframe for MINUSTAH’s disengagement. Such benchmarks would include the end of President Préval’s term, reform of the judiciary, the national police and the prison system, and improvements in the economic situation that would be felt by the population. Members of the Group of Friends in particular seem to agree that it is still too early to address the issue of an eventual drawdown of the force. Some in the Council (Burkina Faso, China, South Africa) may be interested in placing Haiti on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)—although not in the very near future—but many others, including the Haitian government itself, believe that the situation in Haiti is not ready. Nevertheless, the demand for benchmarks echoes the PBC’s existing indicators for measuring progress in the transition from conflict to sustainable development, and it may be that there are other lessons the Council can draw from the work of the PBC.

UN Documents
Selected Security Council Resolution
- S/RES/1780 (15 October 2007) renewed MINUSTAH’s mandate for one year.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report
- S/2007/503 (22 August 2007)

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Hédi Annabi (Tunisia)

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Luiz Carlos da Costa (Brazil)

Force Commander
Major General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz (Brazil)

Humanitarian and Resident Coordinator, UNDP Representative
Joel Boutroue (France)

Size and Composition of Mission
- Authorised strength as of 15 August 2007: 20,207 uniformed personnel and 1,927 civilian personnel
- Current strength as of 31 January 2008: 18,561 uniformed personnel, 1,140 civilian personnel and 197 UN Volunteers

- Contributors of military personnel: 252 Argentinian, 13 Brazilian, 64 Canadian, 53 Chilean, 29 Croatian, 11 Ecuadorian, 27 French, 77 Guatemalan, 91 Jordanian, 81 Panamanian, 55 Pakistani, 73 Paraguayan, 54 Peruvian, 67 Philippine, 37 Portuguese, 140 Russian, 10 Slovakian, 22 Sri Lankan, 41 United States and 3 Uruguayan

- Contributors of police personnel: 20 Argentinian, 35 Beninese, 36 Burkinabe, 35 Cameroonian, 36 Canadian, 36 Central African, 10 Chad, 51 Chilean, 2 Chinese, 14 Colombians, 12 Croatian, 20 DR Congolaise, 13 Egyptian, 26 El Salvadorian, 57 French, 14 Grenadian, 5 Guinean, 10 Jordanian, 5 Madagascar, 5 Malian, 13 Nepalese, 5 Nigerian, 5 Pakistanis, 10 Philippines, 2 Romanian, 3 Russian, 3 Rwandese, 3 Senegalese, 6 Spanish, 3 Sri Lankan, 3 Togolese, 1 Turkish, 3 United States and 3 Yemenis

Cost
1 July 2007 - 30 June 2008: $535.37 million
Useful Additional Sources

Iraq

Expected Council Action
In April the Council is expecting a report on the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI). Staffan de Mistura, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, is likely to brief the Council in a public session. The US is also likely to brief the Council on the Multi-National Force in Iraq (MNF-I). A debate will follow these briefings, involving participation by Iraq and most Council members.

Key Recent Developments
On 15 March, UNAMI issued a human rights report covering 1 July to 31 December 2007. It noted a marked decrease in violent attacks in the last three months of 2007 as a result of the MNF-I surge, but recognised that Iraq still faced real challenges with sectarian violence. It welcomed improvements in the handling of detainees by Iraqi and coalition forces but emphasised that more efforts were needed in particular regarding the detention of suspects for an indefinite period without charge.

De Mistura last briefed the Council on 21 January. He said priority areas for UNAMI included assisting the Iraqi government in resolving disputed internal boundaries, providing assistance to refugees willing to return, reconstruction and electoral assistance, supporting the Iraq Compact and advancing regional dialogue. The US also gave a briefing on the activities of the MNF-I.

Despite security gains in late 2007, violent death tolls affecting Iraqi civilians rose again in February. At a US Senate hearing in Washington on 11 March, the top official at the US Government Accountability Office, David Walker, said that although the number of insurgent attacks against the US military had dropped from an average of 180 a day in June 2007 to 60 in September 2007, the number of attacks has since remained unchanged.

The situation deteriorated along the Turkey/Iraq border. Turkey conducted several air raids and ground incursions into Kurdistan to fight insurgents from the Kurdistan Workers Party. On 22 February, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for utmost restraint from both sides in border actions.

On 22 February, Moqtada al-Sadr extended for another six months a ceasefire on his Mahdi Army militia. However, the truce quickly came under strain. At time of writing, heavy fighting was taking place in Basra between the Mahdi army and the Iraqi forces—supported by air strikes by British forces—after the Iraqi authorities in Basra imposed a new curfew to reestablish law and order. British forces had returned control of Basra to the Iraqis in December.

The Iraqi Red Crescent said on 6 January that 46,000 Iraqi refugees returned home from Syria between September and December 2007. However, there are reports that the number of refugees is still in excess of 2 million. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has decided to strengthen its presence in Iraq and offered to help the Iraqi government assess conditions required for return.

On 12 January, the Iraqi parliament approved the Accountability and Justice Law, permitting former Ba’athist officials to hold government jobs again. It was interpreted as a positive development toward reconciliation, but some criticised the law for not being comprehensive and for failing to provide Ba’athists with access to evidence used in barring them from state employment or pension rights.

On 13 February, a package of three pieces of legislation was adopted by the Iraqi parliament:
- the 2008 budget ($48 billion);
- an amnesty law for some of the 50,000 prisoners detained without trial by Iraqi and coalition forces (although it includes many exceptions); and
- a law on the power of Iraq’s governorates—although it remains vague about prerogatives given to the governorates on issues such as taxes and the formation of security agencies.

On 27 February, the Presidential Council sent the governorates law back to parliament for amendment. At issue are two provisions said to be contrary to the constitution: the right of the Iraqi parliament to dismiss a local governor by absolute majority and the timing of provincial elections, set in the legislation for 1 October 2008.

Options
Formal Council action is unlikely.

Key Issues
Several key issues may be addressed:
- The status of Kirkuk: The referendum on whether the Kirkuk governorate should be incorporated into the Kurdistan region was postponed until June. This issue is crucial because of oil reserves in the area and the diverse ethnic composition (many communities in Kirkuk expelled from the region under Saddam Hussein have returned). Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution calls for the return of refugees, compensation for lost property and the reversal of border alterations. A census and then a referendum on the region’s status were supposed to take place by 31 December 2007. However, many uncertainties about article 140 have not been resolved, including the determination of eligible voters, and options for the referendum. Some Council members may be interested in UNAMI’s strategy to assist in the preparation of this referendum.
- Constitutional review process: The Constitutional Review Committee requested a six-month extension of the
Council Dynamics

In the January debate, many Council members reaffirmed their support for UNAMI’s contacts with political forces in Iraq, and members supported an increased UN role in political reconciliation, subject to security constraints.

Some (Russia and Panama in particular) have expressed concerns about the Awakening Councils (coalitions among Sunni tribal leaders to ensure security, which started in the Anbar province and have now become a wider force in the country). These concerns seem to be about a lack of supervision of non-governmental militias. Indonesia has also raised concern about the necessity to prepare the Iraqi forces to be ready to substitute for the MNF-I if it is withdrawn. Libya is concerned that the underlying problem is essentially due to the presence of foreign forces which it believes encourages violence. It has expressed concern that meaningful political dialogue among Iraqis is not possible at this time.

Underlying Problems

The ongoing impact on civilians who have lost their lives either as a result of military operations or from the resulting sectarian violence is a major underlying concern for many Council members. Precise numbers are very hard to determine and estimates vary considerably. The website Iraq Body Count estimates that between 80,000 and 90,000 civilians have died since the March 2003 invasion. US researchers from Johns Hopkins University estimate that 600,000 people died between 2003 and 2006 as a direct result of the conflict. The World Health Organisation published a study estimating the number to be around 151,000 between 2003 and 2006.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1790 (18 December 2007) renewed the mandate of the MNF-I for one year, with a review by 15 June.
- S/RES/1770 (10 August 2007) renewed UNAMI for one year and revised its mandate.

Latest UNAMI Report

- S/2008/19 (14 January 2008)

Records of the last Security Council briefing and debate on Iraq

- S/PV.5823 (21 January 2008)

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Staffan de Mistura (Sweden)

Deputy Special Representative for Political Affairs

Michael von der Schulenburg (Germany)

Deputy Special Representative for Humanitarian, Reconstruction and Development Affairs

David Shearer (New Zealand)

Secretary-General’s Special Advisor on the International Compact with Iraq

Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria)

Useful Additional Sources

- Debating Devolution in Iraq, Reidar Visser, Middle East Report Online, 10 March 2008 http://www.merip.org/mero/mero031008.html
- Iraq’s Civil War, the Sadrist and the Surge, International Crisis Group, Middle East Report N°72, 7 February 2008 http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5286
**Lebanon**

**Expected Council Action**
In April the Council will discuss a report from the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) on the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The report is expected on 27 March. (The UNIIIC mandate expires in June.) The UNIIIC Commissioner and future Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Daniel Bellemare, is likely to brief to Council on progress of the investigation.

Also, the Council will have before it a report under resolution 1559 which in 2004 called for the disarming of militias in Lebanon and free and fair presidential elections. Terje Reed-Larsen, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the implementation of resolution 1559, will likely brief the Council.

**Key Recent Developments**
On 12 March, the Secretary-General published a report on the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon that confirmed that the preparatory phase was almost completed. It noted that consultations were underway regarding transferring the investigation from UNIIIC to the prosecutor, indicating that a declaration that the tribunal is “operational” may be expected soon. The Council addressed this report in consultations on 27 March and adopted a press statement (SC/9287) taking note of the substantial progress that has been made.

On 10 March, the Council held consultations on the implementation of resolution 1701, which in 2006 called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah and authorised a reinforcement of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe and Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet briefed on developments. It seems that they attributed current difficulties in implementing resolution 1701 to the ongoing domestic political crisis in Lebanon. Recent belligerent statements from Hezbollah were mentioned along with its possible rearming with weapons smuggled from Syria. Other issues raised included the deadlocked situation in Ghajar (where Israel continues to occupy the northern part of the village in contradiction of resolution 1701), incidents near the Blue Line between Lebanon and Israel, and ongoing Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace.

The report on the implementation of resolution 1701 published on 28 February also indicated that the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT) would be dispatched to Lebanon again soon. It noted a lack of progress on the provision by Israel of data for clearing cluster munitions, the exchange of prisoners and the delineation of the Syrian-Lebanese border, in particular in the Sheb’a Farms area.

Lebanese presidential elections were delayed on 11 March to 25 March, and again, for the seventeenth time, to 22 April. Despite an agreement on a presidential candidate and unanimous support for the Arab League mediation, Lebanese factions failed to agree on the composition of the future government and on a new electoral law.

In late February, the US confirmed that a guided-missile destroyer, the USS Cole, was patrolling close to (but outside) Lebanese territorial waters. This was strongly criticised by Syria and by Hezbollah as military interference.

**Options**
Options for the Council on the tribunal and the UNIIIC reports are to:
- take no action and await developments; or
- adopt a statement welcoming the steps taken by the Secretary-General and encouraging transfer of the investigation to the tribunal before UNIIIC’s mandate expires.

Regarding implementation of resolution 1559 options include:
- a statement expressing concern at the presidential vacuum and urging the Lebanese factions to find a solution; and
- expressing concern at reports of militias rearming contrary to the disarmament objectives of resolution 1559.

**Key Issues**
The timing of the transition from UNIIIC to the tribunal is a key issue. The Council will be looking to hear Bellemare’s position on this issue.

A related issue is how much progress UNIIIC has made in identifying possible suspects in the Hariri murder and other bombings in Lebanon and links between them. (The tribunal will be competent to judge suspects involved in other cases of assassinations based on the existence of such links.) It may be that UNIIIC will continue to be cautious about revealing much information preferring to leave it to the prosecutor to publicly reveal outcomes in indictments.

A major issue with significant bearing on all of the problems in Lebanon on the Council’s agenda is whether the Arab League summit scheduled for 29-30 March in Damascus will make progress towards resolving the Lebanese political crisis. The Lebanese government decided on 25 March to boycott in protest against Syrian support for the opposition political factions in Lebanon. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have also decided to reduce the level of their presence at the summit. This signals tensions within the Arab League on the Lebanese issue. If the summit makes no progress on Lebanon, an issue will be whether the Council should again take up the wider underlying issues.

Regarding the 1559 report, issues likely to come up include:
- whether there are new allegations or evidence of weapons transfers across the Syrian-Lebanese border; and
- whether there have been new reports of sustained military activities by militias (in October the Lebanese government expressed concerns at the establishment of military bases close to the Syrian border by the PFLP-General Command and Fatah al-Intifada receiving weapons from Syria, although Syria has strongly rejected those assertions).

**Council Dynamics**
During the last consultations on resolution 1701, the US and some European members emphasised concern about arms transfers, cluster munitions, and the lack of progress on prisoners. The Europeans expressed concern about Israeli overflights, and the US about the role of Iran and Syria in relation to alleged breaches of the arms embargo. Indonesia, Libya, Russia and South Africa pointed out that there was no evidence of arms smuggling. Russia criticised the US decision to send a warship close to Lebanon. It seems that there was a
common concern at Hezbollah’s provocative statements, along with the need to address the situation in Ghajar and to try to get to the bottom of allegations regarding arms transfers. Council members apparently supported the Secretary-General’s plan to send another LIBAT mission as well as the Arab League mediation.

The consensus on the necessity to implement resolution 1701 is undermined somewhat by divisions on priorities and a wide scepticism that in the absence of progress on the domestic political front there is little hope of progress on the 1701 process. (At press time, there was no agreement on a Council response to the 1701 report.) The divisions on priorities will likely make discussions on the 1559 report also difficult. In particular, any attempt to increase pressure on Syria or to criticise breaches of the arms embargo will likely meet resistance (by Libya, South Africa, Russia and perhaps Burkina Faso). As to the political crisis in Lebanon, some think that the Council should address this issue. However, others believe that it should remain a Lebanese internal issue.

On the issue of the tribunal, some members (China and Libya in particular) fear that in the current environment the process is becoming politicised. They prefer therefore that discussions on the investigation and the tribunal should be conducted separately from other issues. In addition, some—including China, Indonesia and Russia—are seeking clear information about the progress of the investigation before it is transferred to the tribunal. A dispute about the renewal of the UNIIIC mandate could be brewing.

UN Documents

Selected Resolutions

- S/RES/1757 (30 May 2007) established the Special Tribunal under Chapter VII and requested a report within 90 days and then regularly.
- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah and authorised a reinforcement of UNIFIL.
- S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) urged withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, extension of the Lebanese government’s control over all Lebanese territory and free and fair presidential elections.

Latest Presidential Statement


Latest Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2008/173 (12 March 2008) was the latest report on the tribunal
- S/2008/135 (28 February 2008) was the latest report on resolution 1701.
- S/2007/684 (28 November 2007) was the latest UNIIIC report.
- S/2007/629 (24 October 2007) was the latest report on resolution 1559.

Selected Letters

- S/2008/164 (6 March 2008) was Syria’s position paper on the 1701 report.
- S/2008/155 (4 March 2008) was a letter from Lebanon detailing Israeli violations of Lebanon’s territorial integrity in February.
- S/2008/102 (15 February 2008) was Lebanon’s position paper on the 1701 report.

Latest Press Statement


Other Relevant Facts

UNIIIC Commissioner and Future Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal
- Daniel Bellemare (Canada)

Special Tribunal’s Registrar
- Robin Vincent (UK)

Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Implementation of Resolution 1559
- Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway)

Secretary-General’s Special Coordinator for Lebanon
- To be appointed

Useful Additional Source

  http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?f_a=view&id=19928

Nepal

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to consider the report on the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) in April. (The report is likely to focus on the results of the constituent assembly elections scheduled for 10 April and to discuss the activities of UNMIN following the elections.) A Council statement following the elections in April is possible, but decisions on the future of UNMIN seem likely to be postponed until the government in Kathmandu has had an opportunity to take a consensual decision.

On 23 January, the Council extended UNMIN’s mandate for six months until 23 July at the request of Nepal’s government.

Key Recent Developments

At press time, the Secretariat was scheduled to brief the Council on 27 March on developments leading up to the April elections.

On 22 March, UNMIN together with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Nepal released the first of a series of election reports warning that continuing violence in the Terai region and clashes between party supporters could undermine the polls. Among the recommendations are that armed groups seek political accommodation through dialogue and parties abide strictly by the election code of conduct and stop intimidating voters. The report also said that the Communist Party of Nepal must stop preventing parties from campaigning in areas where it is strong.

On 12 March, Ian Martin, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Nepal, said at a press briefing in Kathmandu that the constituent assembly elections were on track and UNMIN was helping to ensure that all parties could campaign freely.

The security situation remains fragile. In January, student activists staged a two-day protest against a rise in fuel prices, which led the Nepal Oil Corporation to withdraw the increase. In February, a 16-day strike called by Madhesi groups in the Terai region demanding more rights led to a blockade of Kathmandu and the stoppage of oil deliveries. The strike ended on 28 February after the government signed an accord giving greater representation to minorities in state and local authorities. It also agreed to
autonomous regions for the Madhesi under a future federal democratic structure. UNMIN expressed deep concern over the killing of a candidate from the Terai region for the constituent assembly elections. It said that violence and threats against candidates were a “serious obstacle to the creation of a free and fair elections atmosphere for the election.”

In mid-March, tensions in Tibet spread to Nepal as Tibetan exiles demonstrated in front of the UN offices and the Chinese embassy in Nepal. There have been reports of arbitrary arrests and use of force against the demonstrators.

On 17 March, armed groups from Nepal’s Terai region demanded greater autonomy and threatened to disrupt the April elections. They called for a general strike from 28-30 March and then again from 7 April to the day of the election, 10 April.

The UN Electoral Expert Monitoring Team (EEMT) made its fourth visit to Nepal from 3-17 March. The EEMT was established on 23 January 2007 under resolution 1740, which also established UNMIN. The EEMT is responsible for monitoring the constituent assembly electoral process to ensure a result that accurately reflects the will of the Nepalese people. At the end of its two-week visit in March, the EEMT said that while there were improvements in security, scheduling and inclusiveness, there was a risk that resurgent violence could undermine a free and fair poll.

Key Issues
A key issue is the prospect of disruption and violence before, during and after the elections and whether there is anything the Council can do that could help achieve an optimistic outcome.

A connected issue is whether the government can effectively address the concerns of traditionally marginalised groups ahead of the elections and whether key players will cooperate so that free and fair constituent elections take place.

Also of concern is the fragility of the seven-party alliance. Unity of this alliance is essential for stability following the elections.

Now that the UN verification of arms and armed personnel is complete, there is a question over former combatants who were disqualified from the benefits of the programme either because they did not present themselves during the second phase of verification or were under 18 years and recruited after the ceasefire. There is no plan for how to deal with them now that they are discharged. Related to this are issues concerning the merging of the Nepal Army and the People’s Liberation Army.

Of direct concern to the Council is the issue of UNMIN’s role after the elections and whether it will be able to fulfil its mandate by July or whether a longer presence will be needed. In this regard, the views of the Nepal government will be critical, and experience in other situations suggests that in the immediate post-election period governments take some time to reach conclusions on such matters.

Options
The Council has the following options:
- discuss the outcome of the elections and UNMIN observations but take no action;
- adopt a Council statement on the elections;
- begin discussions about a possible new mandate for UNMIN (this is likely if there is a prompt request from Kathmandu that UNMIN should stay beyond the elections); and
- request the Secretary-General to provide a drawdown timetable for UNMIN ahead of the 23 July end of mandate (this is only likely if it seems that UNMIN’s mandate will end in July).

Council and Wider Dynamics
Council members are united in wanting to see free and fair elections for the constituent assembly in April. However, there are more divergent views on whether and what role UNMIN should play following the elections.

China has been cautious about any signs of UNMIN moving beyond its original mandate. It has been constant in its position that any extension of or changes to UNMIN’s mandate must be in line with what Nepal’s government wishes.

Some other members, like the UK, feel that there will be a need for UNMIN to stay on in some format but want to be sure that any new mandate will allow it to achieve its objectives.

India has continued to be actively engaged. However, relations between UNMIN and India were somewhat strained in recent months. A comment by the then-UN Development Fund resident representative in early February that India could help check the Terai groups led to an official complaint to the UN from the Indian government. India has also been concerned that some statements by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Nepal could be perceived as exceeding UNMIN’s mandate.

UN Documents
Security Council Resolution
- S/RES/1740 (23 January 2007) established UNMIN for 12 months.

Secretary General’s Reports
- S/2008/5 (3 January 2008) was the last report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for UN assistance in support of its peace process.

Presidential Statements
- S/PRST/2006/49 (1 December 2006) expressed support for the Secretary-General’s intention to send a technical assessment team to Nepal and noted that the Council would await formal proposals.

Latest Press Statement

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission
Ian Martin (UK)

Size and Composition
871 staff (208 international staff, 126 UN volunteers, 387 national staff, 144 armed monitors and six police advisers as of end of January 2008)

Duration
23 January 2007 to 23 July 2008

Cost
$88.8 million

Useful Additional Source
**Western Sahara**

**Expected Council Action**
The Council will discuss the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in April and developments at the most recent talks between Morocco and the Frente Polisario. Peter van Walsum, the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, is expected to brief the Council and provide an assessment of the negotiations and perhaps recommendations. The Council is likely to extend the mandate of MINURSO which expires on 30 April.

**Key Recent Developments**
On 17 and 18 March, Morocco and the Polisario held the fourth round of talks in Manhasset in search of a mutually acceptable solution to the situation in Western Sahara. Representatives of the neighbouring countries, Algeria and Mauritania, were present at the opening and closing sessions and were consulted separately during the meeting. Peter van Walsum facilitated the discussions.

According to a communiqué issued by van Walsum with the agreement of the parties, the talks focused on implementation of Council resolutions 1754 and 1783. In 2007, these resolutions called on the parties to negotiate without precondition and in good faith, taking into account developments since 2006 with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which would provide for self-determination by the people of Western Sahara consistent with the UN Charter. The talks focused mainly on administration, justice and resources issues. However, the parties agreed to explore establishing family visits between the refugee camps in Algeria and the Moroccan-controlled territory of Western Sahara by land—in addition to the current visits by air—and to continue the talks at a later date. Morocco seemed to relax to a small degree its previous insistence that the talks focus on the political process and not discuss the expansion of confidence-building measures.

Overall it seems that there was very little progress on the political issues since the last round. Again the parties made statements of their respective positions on thematic issues and it seems they remained reluctant to engage in interactive discussions, despite their previous agreement to move the process into a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations.

One problem seems to be that Morocco still refuses to even discuss one of the proposals on the table, which includes independence as an option. In response the Polisario refuses to discuss autonomy as the sole option. After the talks, the Moroccan delegation made a statement about its territorial integrity, and said that the choice was not between autonomy and independence but between autonomy and status quo. The Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs Taleb Fassi Fihri, a member of the delegation that attended the Manhasset talks, stated at a press conference that Morocco was ready to engage in substantial discussions about the autonomy plan only. The delegation also attacked attempts by the Polisario to raise human rights issues.

Van Walsum visited the region ahead of the talks and held in-depth consultations with the parties. He met the Polisario Secretary-General Mohamed Abdelaziz and other members of the Polisario leadership on 9 February. He also met senior Moroccan officials in Rabat. Van Walsum said that he was in the region to listen to the views of both the parties and the neighbouring states, Algeria and Mauritania, on how to move into more substantial negotiations and provide for the self-determination for the people of Western Sahara. He also held discussions with officials in Algiers and Nouakchott.

On 25 January, the Secretary-General’s report on the third round of negotiations (which took place from 7 to 9 January) said that the parties remained far apart and that “there was hardly any exchange that could be characterized as negotiations.”

On 4 February, the Council held consultations and adopted a press statement supporting van Walsum’s plan to tour the region ahead of the March round of talks and welcoming the parties’ agreement to move the process into a more substantial phase of negotiations. (It seems that the optimism in that statement may have been misplaced when set alongside the March outcome described above.)

Human Rights Watch reported in January 2008 in its annual World Report that Morocco’s authorities continued to harass human rights defenders and Sahrawi activists in the Western Sahara. Repression of public protests, it says, was fiercer in Western Sahara than elsewhere in the kingdom. The 2007 Western Sahara country report on human rights published in March 2008 by the US Department of State also noted that political rights for residents in Western Sahara remained circumscribed. It added that “international human rights groups and Sahrawi activists maintained that the Moroccan government subjected Sahrawis who were suspected of supporting either Western Saharan independence or the Polisario to various forms of surveillance, arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention, and in many cases, torture.”

**Options**
The Council is likely to adopt a resolution. It has the following options:
- renew MINURSO for less than six-months, and signal that the presence of MINURSO is seriously linked to progress in the negotiations;
- expand the MINURSO mandate to include a human rights element;
- choose either the Moroccan plan or the Polisario plan and require the parties to use that as a basis for negotiations. (This would be a clear departure from previous resolutions which have treated the two plans more or less neutrally, although the Moroccan efforts were defined as “serious and credible”);
- demand that the parties engage without preconditions in discussions of both plans;
- decide that the two plans should be put to a binding referendum (This was the initial rationale for the establishment of MINURSO);
- call on the parties to further engage on confidence-building measures; and
- simply renew the MINURSO mandate for six months and reaffirm language contained in resolution 1783 and call upon the parties to engage in substantive negotiations.

Another option would be for the Council to clarify language contained in previous resolutions, in particular specifying who the parties are (as Morocco claims that the Polisario is not the sole representative of the Sahrawi population), or emphasising the necessity for both parties to engage on each other’s plan and show flexibility, as the
Secretary-General had recommended in his last report.

**Key Issues**
The main issue at this stage is whether the Council should explore options to pressure the parties to engage in substantive discussions, or uphold the approach in resolutions 1754 and 1783 which was based on not trying to impose any solution but simply facilitating agreement by both parties, and to this end give more time to the parties. A possible instrument of pressure which had been considered in the past by the US—although never formally proposed in the Council—is linking the extension of MINURSO’s mandate to progress in the negotiations, threatening to withdraw it completely. But the Secretary-General has warned against that—especially in the context of increasing calls within the Polisario to take up arms again.

A separate issue is whether to expand the MINURSO mandate to include human rights elements. An increasing number of Council members appear to consider this an important issue.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**
Some members, including South Africa, continue to be critical of the Group of Friends (comprising France, Russia, Spain, the UK and the US) due to its lack of inclusiveness and apparent unwillingness to engage in substantial discussions with the rest of the Council. The US has the lead in the Council.

France, and possibly also the US, may be inclined to try to tilt language in the resolution in favour of the Morocco plan. Both France and the US have recognised the Moroccan autonomy plan as a serious and credible effort, expressed their support for Morocco’s efforts to help resolve this issue and believe this plan to be a good realistic starting point that could lead to a settlement of this conflict. But others within the Group of Friends remain strongly opposed to this and the existence of these divisions is again likely to influence any outcome to reflect the lowest common denominator—the need for the parties to continue the negotiations and to engage on the substance, support for previous resolutions and for the efforts of van Walsum.

South Africa remains concerned about the reluctance of Morocco to seriously engage.

During the 4 February consultations, South Africa emphasised the need for self-determination and called on the parties to engage more in discussions on confidence-building measures. It also reiterated its concern for the absence of discussions on human rights.

During the same consultations, it seems that Croatia and Panama strongly emphasised the need for self-determination. Costa Rica also insisted that MINURSO should be given a human rights mandate (Panama seems to hold this view as well), but also believes that in the absence of progress, the Council should explore an exit strategy for MINURSO. Many have also emphasised the need for progress on the confidence-building measures.

**Underlying Problems**
Tensions between Morocco and the Polisario are likely to grow if the possibility of renewed conflict continues. Both sides have recently accused each other of conducting unusual military manoeuvres, and it seems that voices are being raised within the Polisario for renewing the fight. This may have prompted Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika in March to encourage negotiations by saying that the parties had not yet exhausted all possibilities offered by negotiations. And on 19 March the Spokesperson of the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated Algeria’s attachment to a peaceful solution.

Family visits by land have so far been impossible to organise, although they would be cheaper and would allow more people to be transported, because the land border between Algeria and Morocco is closed. There would need to be a new agreement between Morocco, Algeria and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees for land visits to take place.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>UN Documents</th>
<th>Selected Resolutions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S/RES/1783 (31 October 2007) called upon the parties to continue negotiations taking into account the efforts made since 2006, requested the Secretary-General to report on these talks by 31 January, and extended MINURSO’s mandate for six months.</td>
</tr>
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<td>S/RES/1754 (30 April 2007) called for negotiations without preconditions and extended MINURSO’s mandate for six months.</td>
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**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General**
Julian Harston (UK)

**Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy**
Peter van Walsum (Netherlands)

**MINURSO Force Commander**
Major General Zhao Jingmin (China)

**Size and Composition of Mission**
- Authorised strength: 231 military personnel and six police officers
- Strength (as of 31 January 2008): 222 total uniformed personnel, including 27 troops, 6 police officers, 189 military observers; supported by 96 international civilian personnel, 148 local civilian staff and 23 UN volunteers

**Troop Contributing Countries**
Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Croatia, Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Uruguay and Yemen

**Cost (approved budget)**
1 July 2007 – 30 June 2008: $47.64 million (A/C.5/62/23)

**Useful Additional Sources**
- Statement by Mahfoud Ali Beiba, Head of the Polisario delegation at the opening session of the fourth round of negotiations in Manhasse, 17 March 2008 [http://www.arso.org/AliBeibaManhasse170308.htm](http://www.arso.org/AliBeibaManhasse170308.htm)
- Statement by Chakib Benmoussa, Moroccan Interior Minister, on behalf of
the Moroccan delegation at the opening session of the fourth round of negotiations in Manhasset, 17 March 2008 (in French only) http://www.maec.gov.ma/en/default.html


DPRK (North Korea)

Expected Council Action
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is expected to be on the Council’s work programme in April. The Chairman of the Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Marcello Spatafora of Italy, will provide a briefing during Council consultations on the issue. The Committee has been largely inactive since early 2007 after deciding to await the outcome of the six-party talks on the DPRK’s nuclear programme. The briefing is unlikely to contain any new information leading to Council action. However, the scheduled briefing may provide an opportunity for Council members to take stock of the wider political situation. A press statement on progress in the six-party talks is possible.

Key Recent Developments
The six-party talks among China, Japan, Russia, the US, DPRK (North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) faltered at the end of 2007 when the DPRK failed to submit a full declaration about its nuclear programme as it had agreed. The meeting between the chief US and North Korean negotiators on 13 March in Geneva raised hopes for a breakthrough. However, it seems that little progress was made.

In exchange for closing down its Yongbyon nuclear reactor in July and providing a full accounting of its nuclear programme, DPRK was to receive 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil and 500,000 tons of fuel-oil equivalents. Pyongyang says it received 200,000 tons of fuel oil and “very little” of the fuel-oil equivalents. It seems the balance is being withheld pending delivery of the declaration.

The New York Philharmonic orchestra visited Pyongyang in February. Some considered it a small breakthrough—it was the first significant US cultural visit. However, subsequent routine military exercises between South Korea and the US drew sharp criticism from Pyongyang.

Options
The Council could:
- receive the briefing and take no action;
- adopt a press statement, perhaps welcoming the recent bilateral meeting in Geneva but stressing that substantive progress needs to be made; and
- request recommendations from the Committee on future options for its work.

Key Issues
The key issue is whether Council members see that they have a relevant role in helping to move the six-party talks forward. A related issue is whether signalling a possible review of sanctions may be a helpful incentive.

Council Dynamics
Council members are not particularly focused on this issue. For some time there has been little appetite for a more active role.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

• S/RES/1718 (14 October 2006) expressed grave concern over the nuclear test by North Korea, imposed sanctions and set up the Sanctions Committee.
• S/RES/1695 (15 July 2006) condemned North Korea’s launch of ballistic missiles.

Selected Presidential Statement

• S/PRST/2006/41 (6 October 2006) was the statement expressing concern over North Korea’s declaration that it would conduct a nuclear test.

Selected Letter


Other

• Letters submitted from UN member states on implementing resolution 1718 http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/mstatesreports.shtml
• IAEA report of 17 August 2007 (GOV/2007/45-GC(51)/19) verifying the shut-down of the Yongbyon reactor

Liberia

The Council in April is expected to consider the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which was submitted to the Council on 20 March. Our March 2008 Forecast Report previewed the issues likely to arise, the options for the Council and the relevant political dynamics in the Council. Resolution 1777 of 20 September 2007 requested the Secretary-General to report on plans to draw down the numbers of peacekeepers. The key issues for the Council involve ensuring a successful drawdown of UNMIL and effective peace consolidation. A recent major cocaine seizure (mirroring other incidents in West Africa) highlights concerns about the possibility of Liberia becoming a major transit point for drug trafficking to Europe.

Sierra Leone

In late April, the Council is expected to receive the Secretary-General’s report containing additional ideas on the drawdown of the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) as well as the mandate, structure and strength of an envisaged follow-on integrated political office. (The Secretary-General had, on 31 January, submitted to the Council a completion strategy for UNIOSIL and told the Council he would also update them with the upcoming report.) On 28 February, the Council requested that he include further information on the drawdown of UNIOSIL between local elections scheduled for 5 July and the completion of the mission in September, as well as proposals on the mandate, structure and strength of the replacement integrated political office.

At press time, it was unclear whether the Sierra Leone report will be taken up during April or in May during the presidency of the UK, the lead country on this issue.
The Committee is supported by a group of eight experts who evaluate the level of implementation of the resolution by each state. It has developed a tailored approach that considers risk factors and each state’s capacity. Legislative suggestions and operational best practices have been developed by the Committee to assist its outreach and dialogue with states. Member states needing this assistance have been informed of available assistance from other members, as well as international and regional organisations.

**Key Issues**

While the response to resolution 1540 has been generally good, a key issue is that many countries still have a long way to go to achieve full implementation of the resolution. As of 17 December, 45 countries had not yet reported to the Committee and their progress therefore cannot be properly evaluated. A related issue was identified by the former Chairman of the 1540 Committee, Ambassador Peter Burian of Slovakia, during his briefing to the Council on 17 December 2007. He pointed out that, while the experts are making progress in engaging these states, the complexity of the provisions of the resolution and the lack of capacity in many states to respond to the multiplicity of reporting requirements by the UN may be causes of delays in reporting.

The Committee’s second biennial report to the Council, due by 27 April, will therefore not be a complete picture of the status of implementation of the resolution because it does not yet have input from a number of states.

A second key issue is whether the Committee dialogue and outreach activities (including seminars and workshops with states, sub-regional, regional and international organisations) have now achieved broad acceptance of the requirements of resolution 1540. It seems that much of the scepticism which marked the adoption of resolution 1540 back in 2004 has dissipated.

A related issue is whether the Committee’s approach to facilitation of assistance is widely welcomed and whether assistance is actually reaching those who most need it. (The fact that 45 countries have not yet been able to report to the Committee raises some questions in this regard.) The Committee has concluded that for full implementation of resolution 1540, it is important for many states to receive relevant assistance. Ambassador Burian suggested in December 2007 that future outreach activities should focus more on assisting states with issues of implementation.

**Council Dynamics**

There is general unanimity in the Council on the future course of the 1540 Committee. Some, including permanent members, express strong support for the Committee’s work and its continuation beyond the April 2008 expiration of its current mandate. Most have welcomed the work the Committee has done in areas of facilitating assistance and conducting outreach to states, including helping them find ways in which they can report on implementation and support continuation of this work.

**UN Documents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Council Resolutions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1673 (27 April 2006) extended the mandates of the Committee and the experts until 27 April 2008.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1540 (28 April 2004) established the measures to prevent proliferation of WMDs and their delivery systems and the monitoring committee.</td>
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<th>Presidential Statement</th>
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<tr>
<th>Selected Security Council Meeting Records</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/PV.5806 (17 December 2007) was the last open debate in which the chairmen of subsidiary bodies briefed the Security Council.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Other Relevant Fact</th>
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<tr>
<td>Chair of the Terrorism/Weapons of Mass Destruction Committee (1540)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jorge Urbina (Costa Rica)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Useful Additional Source**

Website of the 1540 Committee http://www.un.org/sc/1540/
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Notable Dates for April</th>
<th>Important Dates over the Horizon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reports Due for Consideration in April</td>
<td>■ A referendum on a new constitution in Myanmar has been scheduled for May.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document Requesting Report</td>
<td>■ Parliamentary elections are planned for 11 May in Serbia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 March</td>
<td>■ Local government elections are scheduled for June in Sierra Leone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG report on UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)</td>
<td>■ A Council visiting mission is being considered. Options include Central Africa, the Horn of Africa, DRC, Côte d’Ivoire and Haiti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 March</td>
<td>■ A meeting of the International Compact for Iraq is planned for June in Europe, possibly in Stockholm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG report on UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) (Lebanon)</td>
<td>■ An international conference to review progress on implementation of the Afghan Compact is scheduled for June in Paris.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>late March</td>
<td>■ Presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire are now expected by the end of June 2008.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG monthly report on the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)</td>
<td></td>
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