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The situation in Afghanistan and the extension of and possible changes in the UNAMA mandate are likely to be discussed in an open debate on 12 March.

An open debate on the Middle East is also being considered.

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The Council will receive a briefing from the Chairman of the Iran Sanctions Committee. Also, if the Council fails to vote on the third Iran sanctions resolution in February, discussions on the draft tightening the sanctions regime may continue in March.

The Council is likely to hold consultations on:
- Lebanon (to discuss the Secretary-General’s report on implementation of resolution 1701 and possibly also on a report on the establishment of the special tribunal);
- Somalia (to discuss the report from the Secretariat’s strategic assessment and fact-finding mission, initially expected in February); and
- Darfur (to discuss the quarterly Secretary-General’s report as well as developments related to the UNAMID deployment). The Council is also likely to be briefed by the Chairman of the Sudan Sanctions Committee.

At press time, it was uncertain whether the Council’s request for Secretariat reporting on Kenya in the 6 February presidential statement would result in a report or an oral briefing nor was it clear whether there would be a briefing by the Kenyan foreign minister, requested by the government in January.

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**Aide-Memoire**

Important matters pending for the Council include:
- The Council has yet to follow up on the Secretary-General’s recommendations on protection of civilians contained in his report of 28 October 2007.
- In a 21 November 2007 letter to the Secretary-General (S/2007/680), the President of the Council requested a briefing on steps the Secretariat is planning to provide for the enhanced physical security of the UNMOVIC archives, in particular those containing sensitive proliferation information. It is unclear when this information would be forthcoming.
- The Secretary-General’s report on enhancing cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, in particular the AU, requested in March 2007 (S/PRST/2007/7) and November 2007 (S/PRST/2007/42) has yet to be issued.
- The Council requested the Secretary-General on 29 November 2006 (S/2006/928) to update the index to Council notes and statements on working methods. This has not been published.
- The 2005 World Summit requested that the Security Council consider reforms for the Military Staff Committee. This has yet to be addressed.
- The post of the Special Representative for UNMEE has been vacant since May 2006.
- On West Africa, the Council has yet to follow up its 16 March 2007 consultations on cross-border issues.
- The most recent UNAMI report on human rights in Iraq covered the period 1 April-30 June 2007. The reports are usually produced every two to three months. A further report was therefore expected on 30 September.
- The post of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Afghanistan has been vacant since Tom Koenigs, the previous SRSG, left at the end of December 2007.
Chad and on the relocation of UNMEE in Ethiopia/Eritrea.

On Guinea-Bissau, the Council is expected to receive in March the PBC advice on the situation in the country, requested in December, and the Secretary-General’s quarterly report on UNOGBI. It is unclear whether the Council will deliberate on these reports in March.

Regarding Liberia, the Council may review and discuss plans for the draw down of UNMIL based on the upcoming Secretary-General’s report.

Also possible are briefings on:
- Myanmar by Ibrahim Gambari following his return from his trip to Myanmar and the region; and
- Nepal, the Secretariat may brief on UNMIN’s activities leading up to the elections scheduled for 10 April.

The Council may also wish to express its support for the peace process in Uganda and possibly request a briefing from the Secretary-General’s envoy, Joaquim Chissano.

Also in March, the Council is likely to discuss plans for its visiting missions during 2008, and it will hold its annual retreat with the Secretary-General.

Status Update since our February Forecast

Recent developments on the situations covered in this Forecast are addressed in the relevant briefs. Interesting developments in the Council on other issues included:
- Middle East: The Council on 22 January held an emergency meeting on the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, following a request by Saudi Arabia in its capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group (S/2008/31). Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe first briefed the Council on the recent escalation of violence in Gaza – Israeli incursions following rocket attacks against Israeli civilian areas – and an open debate followed (S/PV.5824 and resolution 1). Libya introduced a draft presidential statement expressing concern at the deterioration of the humanitarian situation due to the continued closure of the border crossings by Israel, and calling upon Israel to abide by its obligation under international law and to cease all illegal measures against civilians in Gaza. After six days of negotiations, the Council failed to reach a consensus, although it came close to it. A first negotiated draft was acceptable to all Council members except the US, who believed that any statement should also condemn daily rocket attacks against Israel as well as all acts of terrorism, and express concern at the humanitarian impact on Israeli civilians. A second negotiated text including US amendments was acceptable to all Council members except Libya. Frustration and disappointment at the Council’s inability to respond to the situation were reflected in a majority of delegations’ statements during the monthly debate on the Middle East held on 30 January (S/PV.5827). On 26 February, the Council held its next monthly debate on the Middle East. Robert Serry, UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, and John Holmes, Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, briefed the Council. Serry gave an assessment of the situation in light of the peace process and Holmes discussed his recent trip to the region, focusing on the humanitarian situation in Gaza.
- Security Sector Reform: On 23 January, the Secretary-General issued his long-expected report on security sector reform (SSR). The report includes a definition of the scope and content of SSR, a summary of UN experience, and lessons learned from UN engagement in SSR. It further lays out the basic principles for a UN approach to SSR, and proposals for a potential UN role as well as for developing a coherent UN approach in that regard (A/62/659–S/2008/39).
- Ethiopia/Eritrea: On 30 January, the Council extended the mandate of UNMEE until 31 July and demanded that the government of Eritrea immediately remove restrictions on fuel supplies to the mission (S/RES/1798). On 4 February the Council reiterated this demand in a press statement (SC/9240). The Secretary-General decided to start relocating UNMEE by land from Eritrea to designated sites in Ethiopia on 11 February. On 15 February the Council condemned Eritrea’s lack of cooperation with UNMEE, including the stoppage of fuel supplies which had made the mission’s temporary relocation from the country inevitable, and stated that it held Eritrea responsible for the safety and security of UNMEE while also expressing its determination to consider “further steps” in that regard (S/PRST/2008/7). Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, briefed the Council on 21 February on the relocation process. Since then there have been mixed reports regarding Eritrea’s cooperation with UNMEE’s relocation of personnel and equipment which had been re-routed through Asmara for airlifting.
- Western Sahara: On 4 February, the Council held consultations on Western Sahara following the Secretary-General’s latest report on the status and progress of the negotiations (S/2008/45), which noted that “although the parties … in a certain measure interacted with each other, they did not examine specific elements included in each other’s proposals.” The Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy Peter van Volsum briefed the Council during the consultations and discussions seem to have focused on the issue of confidence-building measures. The Council then adopted a press statement welcoming the report, supporting the next round of talks and agreeing on the need to move the process into a more substantive phase of negotiations (SC/9241).
- Secretary-General’s Briefing: Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon briefed the Council on the situations in Kenya, Chad and Darfur on 5 February. In comments to the press after the briefing, he reiterated his support for the “mediation efforts (in Kenya) of the Panel of Eminent African Personalities led by…Kofi Annan,” stated that he had urged the Council to work toward a quick resolve to the crisis in Chad and urged UNAMID troop contributing countries to expedite their preparations for the mission in Darfur.
- Timor-Leste: On 11 February, the Council adopted a statement condemning attacks against Timorese President José Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão carried out hours before. The Council also called on the Timorese government to bring those responsible to justice and urged all parties to resolve disputes through peaceful means (S/PRST/2008/5). On 21 February, the Council held an open debate on Timor-Leste, which included a briefing by Under Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno. Among the issues raised by members were the need for progress with security sector reform, institution-building, political
reconciliation and accountability (S/PV.5843). On 25 February, the Council renewed the mandate of the UN Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) for twelve months and requested the Secretary-General to develop a medium-term strategy for UNMIT with appropriate benchmarks (S/RES/1802).

■ Children and Armed Conflict: After an open debate on 12 February (S/PV.5834), the Council adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2008/6) calling for the full implementation of the monitoring and reporting mechanism on children and armed conflict and invited the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict to continue adopting conclusions and proposing effective recommendations. It also expressed its readiness to review the relevant provisions of its resolutions on children and armed conflict and to build on resolution 1612.

■ Kosovo: On 14 February, the Council held a closed meeting on Kosovo following Serbia’s request for an urgent meeting to discuss the expected declaration of independence by Kosovo (S/2008/92). Russia supported Serbia’s request in its letter to the Council calling for a meeting under article 35 of the UN Charter (S/2008/93). Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic of Serbia asked the Council to oppose a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo and called on the Secretary-General to order that the proclamation be declared null and void. He also said that the EU-led mission to Kosovo needed a mandate from the Security Council. On 17 February, at the request of Russia, following Kosovo’s declaration of independence, the Council held an emergency closed door meeting where it was briefed by the Secretary-General on the latest developments. On 17 February, Serbia asked for an emergency public meeting (S/2008/103) which was supported by Russia (S/2008/104). The public meeting was held on 18 February with the Secretary-General and Serbian prime minister, Boris Tadic, participating (S/PV.5839). In a press statement on 21 February, the Council condemned mob attacks on embassies in Belgrade (SC/9260).

■ ICTY: The Council on 20 February adopted resolution 1800, providing the Secretary-General the authority to appoint “additional ad litem Judges upon request of the President of the International Tribunal in order to conduct additional trials.”

Afghanistan

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to extend the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which expires on 23 March. An open debate on 12 March is likely. Unlike previous years when the mandate renewal was relatively straightforward, this time the vacancy of position of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative to Afghanistan as well as the rapidly deteriorating security situation raise the possibility of a technical rollover.

The Secretary-General’s report, also due in March, is expected to highlight a number of priority areas for the next year. It is also likely to suggest strengthening UNAMA’s coordination role and discuss possible ways of doing this.

Recent Key Developments

The first two months of 2008 saw several deadly suicide bombings. On 14 January, six people were killed in a suicide attack at the Hotel Serena in Kabul. On 17 February, a suicide bomb struck a crowd watching dog fighting outside Kandahar, killing more than 100 people, the worst single bombing attack since 2001. The next day a suicide bomber attacked a Canadian military convoy, killing at least 37 and injuring 30. Following both the 14 January and 17 February incidents, the Council condemned the suicide attacks “in the strongest terms” in press statements.

Stationing troops in the south has led to tensions among the NATO allies involved in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Ahead of a NATO defence ministers’ meeting in Lithuania on 7-8 February, US Defence Secretary Robert Gates said that the NATO alliance risked becoming a “two-tiered” organization,” with “some allies willing to fight and die to protect people’s security, and others who are not.” He urged NATO allies, with an eye in particular on Germany, to accept a greater share of the burden in southern Afghanistan.

The US, UK, Canada, the Netherlands and Australia provide significant numbers of combat troops. Many NATO countries are facing a domestic backlash and are reluctant to send more soldiers, cautious about exposing them to high-risk areas. Canada has threatened to pull out its 2,500 troops out of the Kandahar province unless NATO allies send in 1,000 more troops. In response, France will send more troops to the south, while the US is also sending 3,200 more Marines but only for a single seven-month tour.

Relations between the Afghan government and some international partners have been strained over the last few months. In late December, a senior UN official and the acting head of the EU’s mission were expelled following accusations that they had held “illegal” talks and had given cash to the Taliban. UN officials denied the allegations and said that the expulsion was a result of a misunderstanding. Some observers feel this incident highlighted divisions over whether the Taliban should be brought to the negotiating table.

Tensions related to human rights concerns have also been evident. In November, Canada stopped transferring prisoners to the Afghan authorities due to fear of torture and the difficulty of monitoring prisoners properly. That same month, Amnesty International issued a report accusing NATO countries of turning a blind eye to torture by transferring prisoners to Afghanistan. In October, an Afghan journalist was detained on charges of blasphemy and defaming Islam, offences punishable by death under the country’s law. He was sentenced to death on 22 January, raising international concerns.

On 8 February, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and British Foreign Secretary David Miliband made a surprise visit to Afghanistan where they visited Kandahar and met Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai in Kabul.

The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board—which monitors the Afghanistan Compact, a five-year framework for reconstruction between the Afghan government and the international community—held its seventh meeting in Tokyo on 5-6 February. A key topic of discussion was the UN Office on Drugs and Crime report which said that opium cultivation in rebel-controlled areas in southern and south western Afghanistan is expected to expand this year and that the
The cultivation of cannabis, the plant that yields marijuana and hashish, was steadily increasing. Poppy cultivation increased in eight provinces and decreased in 26, including 13 declared poppy-free. “Taxing” the crop is a source of revenue for the Taliban insurgency.

At the end of 2007, the Secretary-General offered the position of Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to Lord Paddy Ashdown, the British former High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Tom Koenigs, the previous SRSG, left his post at the end of December.) However, Ashdown withdrew his name on 27 January, following opposition from Karzai and some members of the Council. Karzai had interviewed Ashdown in Kuwait in December and apparently given initial approval. Observers note that Ashdown’s heavy-handed style in Bosnia and strong support from some Council members may have worked against him as Karzai has become increasingly wary of being seen to be too much under the influence of the West. Ashdown’s nationality, given Britain’s colonial past in Afghanistan, was also a possible obstacle. In addition, there are reports that Karzai may have been uncomfortable with the enhanced SRSG position Ashdown would occupy.

Options

Among the options in renewing the mandate are:

- adopting a resolution without significant change; or
- expanding UNAMA’s mandate to include a stronger role in security sector reform and human rights monitoring and an enhanced coordination role as well as electoral assistance.

Another option is a technical rollover if members want the new SRSG to be in place before a change of mandate.

Other options are:

- providing a timeframe for the Secretary-General to present his choice of SRSG;
- requesting the Secretary-General to provide more details of resources needed for a strengthened mandate;
- initiating a regional process led by the UN to engage Afghanistan’s neighbours and regional partners;
- discussing mechanisms such as a Contact Group or a tripartite commission (composed of the UN, the Afghan government and regional players) that could forge better coordination between UNAMA and other international actors; and
- considering ways of providing more assistance to the Afghan government in monitoring human rights, particularly leading up to elections.

Key Issues

A key issue is the deterioration in the security situation in recent months. The severity of the attacks in February was a stark reminder of the difficulties of creating a safe environment. A related issue is a possible backlash from the local population over the large number of civilian casualties from the recent suicide bombings.

There is also the impact of opium production on the security situation. As opium production continues to boom in areas of the south and southwest, the profits from the narco-economy are helping to prop up the insurgency. (Afghanistan supplies some 90 percent of the world’s illicit opium, and the Taliban receives up to $100 million from the drug trade.)

An immediate issue is whether UNAMA’s mandate should be expanded and in what areas. Giving the UN a greater role in coordination and cooperation requires support from other international actors and the Afghan government. This will not be easy as any perceived infringement on military strategy could result in friction with NATO generals. The Afghan government is increasingly uncomfortable with the UN becoming involved in combating corruption and crime, and may be sensitive to assistance on human rights.

A related issue is whether the Council should consider expanding UNAMA’s mandate to include electoral assistance before the Afghan government makes a formal request.

A growing concern for international partners is how to prevent further deterioration of human rights in Afghanistan. Allegations that prisoners are tortured, and that death sentences may be imposed for blasphemy are likely to be on the minds of some members.

Also unresolved is the type of political outreach and mediation UNAMA should undertake. While UNAMA has facilitated dialogue between the authorities and estranged tribes, the reaction of the Afghan government late last year to a UN official talking to the Taliban showed clear limits to UN activities.

An issue also is finding a balance between respecting the Afghan government’s desire both to stand on its own feet and win the hearts and minds of its people and its continued need for assistance with institution-building.

An ongoing issue is the search for a new SRSG. While the Council is not directly involved in filling this position, some members are likely to be concerned that UNAMA’s activities will be constrained if the position remains vacant too long.

An open question is whether there is a need to expand the role of the SRSG. Last year a “super envoy” or expanded SRSG role was suggested, with strong backing from the US. However, some countries are uncomfortable with tinkering with the current mandate of the SRSG and feel that it is sufficient if used effectively. The Afghan government is not keen to have this role expanded.

Another issue is how to assist in fostering better regional cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbours, particularly Pakistan.

Council and Wider Dynamics

The Council is of one mind on the need for a UN presence in Afghanistan. Although comfortable with UNAMA’s current mandate, members are likely to differ over any expansion of the mandate, particularly if it involves greater civilian-military cooperation. Members may also differ on whether a substantive resolution should be adopted now or after a new SRSG is in place.

In the past, there were divisions over handling civilian casualties between members of the Council with troops in Afghanistan (e.g., UK, US and Italy) and others. Council members like Libya, Indonesia and South Africa may want a greater focus on this issue than would members with troops in Afghanistan.

In September, Russia abstained from voting on extending the NATO-led ISAF resolution. It felt that the issue of maritime interdiction had not been clarified sufficiently and the resolution “should not have given priority to domestic considerations.” Russia’s position took other members, who expected a smooth adoption of the ISAF resolution, by surprise. While sharing similar positions to the US on issues like NATO’s role, there are growing differences between the two countries over how to fight the Taliban and the best methods for defeating the opium trade.

Other than Italy, which is the lead country in the Council on this issue, members do not
appear to have fresh ideas on how best to make UNAMA more efficient, relying heavily on Italy and recommendations from the Secretary-General.

**UN Documents**

- **Selected Security Council Resolutions**
  - S/RES/1401 (28 March 2002) created UNAMA.

- **Selected Presidential Statement**

- **Selected Report of the Secretary-General**
  - S/2007/555 (21 September 2007) was the latest report.

- **Other Relevant Documents**
  - SC/9251 (17 February 2008) was the Council press statement on the Kandahar attack.
  - SC/9226 (15 January 2008) was the Council press statement on the Kabul hotel bombing.
  - S/2007/494 (15 August 2007) was the latest ISAF report.

- **Other Relevant Facts**
  - **Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAMA’s Chief of Mission**
    - Vacant
  - **UNAMA: Size, Composition and Duration**
    - Current strength: 217 international civilians, 1,027 local civilians, 15 military observers, three civilian police, 32 UN volunteers
    - Duration: 28 March 2002 to present; mandate expires on 23 March 2008
  - **ISAF Military Commander**
    - General Dan McNeill (US)
  - **ISAF: Size, Composition and Duration**
    - Current strength: about 43,250 troops
    - Contributors of military personnel: 40 NATO and non-NATO countries
    - Current top contributors: US, UK, Germany, Canada, Italy and the Netherlands.
    - Duration: 20 December 2001 to present; mandate expires on 13 October 2008

**Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF): Size, Composition and Duration**

- Current strength: 13,500 (this is an estimate as the troop numbers shift continuously)
- Top contributor: US
- Duration: 7 October to present

**Useful Additional Sources**

- UNAMA’s website http://www.unama-afg.org
- ISAF’s website http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/index.htm
- Afghanistan Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, February 2008
- Revitalizing Our Efforts, Rethinking our Strategies, Afghanistan Study Group Report, 30 January 2008

**Chad/Central African Republic**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council is expected to pay very close attention to developments in Chad and the region as the political-security crisis unfolds. Consultations are possible, especially should the situation deteriorate, but at press time it seemed unlikely that proposals for Council action would emerge in March.

Members await the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), now expected by late March. MINURCAT’s mandate expires on 25 September.

**Key Recent Developments**

The crisis in Chad reached alarming levels when rebels attacked the capital N’Djamena in early February. Tens of thousands of Chadians fled to Cameroon and Nigeria. Concerns persist about reported abuses against the civilian population, in particular abduction and detention of several opposition leaders and members of civil society organisations, and arrests of journalists.

The crisis increased the risk of acute deterioration in humanitarian conditions in the region. Internal displacement in Chad is growing and the security situation continues to worsen in West Darfur.

The possibility exists of a further influx of refugees into Chad from West Darfur, where they fled from persisting attacks, and from Chad into the Central African Republic (CAR), where insecurity and banditry continues. Some 197,000 persons are internally displaced in the CAR. There are also 98,000 CAR refugees in Chad and Cameroon. An estimated 8,000 refugees poured across the border from Darfur to Chad in the week of 10 February alone, media reports say.

The violence has prevented many relief workers from reaching those in need. Some personnel have been evacuated and airmails may be halted. Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes expressed concern for the fate of an estimated 500,000 people in Chad in need of humanitarian assistance.

Following rebel attacks, deployment of the EU force for Chad and the CAR (EUFOR) was temporarily suspended.

There are persistent reports of mutual assistance to rebels by Chad and Sudan.

Chadian rebels have accused France of aiding Chadian President Idriss Déby militarily. Paris has denied any combat role, stating that its military support is limited to training, healthcare and intelligence under a bilateral accord. This has particular significance as media reports suggested that the bilateral arrangements might not have been sufficient to allow significant assistance to the Chadian government.

The AU Assembly adopted a decision stressing that “no authority that comes to power by force will be recognised by the AU” and mandating Libya and the Republic of Congo to initiate mediation efforts.

France called for weekend Council consultations on 3 February, followed by a Secretariat briefing on Chad. France introduced a draft presidential statement with a Council endorsement of international military assistance to the Chadian government.

This draft triggered concern from most members about its use of the words “all necessary means,” commonly used in resolutions authorising force, and about the absence of a formal Chadian request for support.

Chad subsequently sent a letter requesting assistance to “end this aggression.” Some
members then became concerned with the possible regional implications of the word “aggression” in the request and about the use of force against Sudan. Compromise was then found in de-linking Council support for assistance from the Chadian request and including a mention to the Charter.

On 4 February, the Council adopted a statement in which it:
- supported the 2 February AU decision strongly condemning the attacks, demanding an immediate end to violence and calling on “all the countries of the region” to respect “the unity and territorial integrity” of “the Member States of the African Union;”
- welcomed the AU decision to mandate Libya and Congo to initiate mediation efforts;
- urged “states in the region” to abide fully by obligations toward common borders, in particular the Tripoli, Riyadh and Sirte agreements (signed between Sudan and Chad); and
- called upon members to “provide support, in conformity with the United Nations Charter, as requested by the Government of Chad.”

Following the presidential statement, French President Nicolas Sarkozy said that there was now a unanimous Council decision and France would have the means to respond if Chad were attacked.

Hostilities seemed to ebb around 5 February. Salah Gosh, head of Sudanese intelligence, was reported to have said that Sudan had been cooperating with the Libyan-Congolese mediation efforts, having convinced the Chadian opposition to withdraw. Tensions between Chad and Sudan persist.

On 12 February, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Victor da Silva Ângelo, said that a political process is needed, including respect for borders. At press time, it seemed that he may arrive in Chad in the next weeks, and might look for a low-key support role vis-à-vis political reconciliation in Chad.

Calls for dialogue and a peaceful solution were echoed in an EU Council decision on 18 February. The decision also recalled “full support to the 13 August 2007 Political Agreement” with “almost all political parties belonging to the legal opposition,” and considered it “the cornerstone of a broader road map leading to legislative elections in 2009.”

There is increasing concern about Chadian rebels associating French assistance to the government with the role of EUFOR and MINURCAT and related perceptions of lack of neutrality.

At a Council briefing on 26 February, the Chadian foreign minister apparently reiterated N’Djamena’s focus on international pressure on Sudan to stop supporting rebels and implement bilateral agreements. Members raised concerns about the fate of opposition leaders.

EUFOR difficulties with the generation of assets and troops continued in the meanwhile. Matters seem to have been resolved at least for the initial stages of deployment, particularly after France assumed the lead on logistics in mid-January.

EUFOR’s deployment resumed in mid-February. Initial operational capability is expected by well into March, and full capability in May before the rainy season.

The mission plans high visibility operations including mobile patrolling and quick reaction force interventions. It seems the force will not block rebel advances unless civilians are in danger, and will operate in co-location with MINURCAT.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- continuing the wait-and-see approach;
- actively managing the challenges facing MINURCAT and the EU force by considering a mandate for MINURCAT on political reconciliation in Chad, perhaps including support for the Libyan-Congolese mediation and coordination with the AU;
- actively monitoring the domestic political process in Chad closely by holding meetings with concerned member states, the Libyan-Congolese mediators and the AU;
- mandating MINURCAT to play a liaison role with the all parties in Chad as a way of preserving neutrality of UN and EU deployments; and
- encouraging talks between Sudan and Chad by requesting the Secretary-General to approach regional states and the AU to discuss the current situation and future prospects for improving Sudanese-Chadian relations.

Key Issues
The key issue is whether and how to become more involved in supporting political reconciliation in Chad as well as between Sudan and Chad. Related issues include:
- the continuing destabilisation in Chad and N’Djamena’s security needs;
- the potential for further deterioration of Chad-Sudan relations and a regionalised conflict;
- humanitarian conditions;
- challenges of all-inclusive political reconciliation in Chad, and whether and when to consider a more active Council involvement;
- security risks for MINURCAT and EUFOR if they are perceived as taking sides and as a result are dragged into the conflict;
- managing the complexities of coordinating simultaneous deployments in Chad and Darfur; and
- operational challenges for the EU and UN deployments, including assets, logistics, environment and management, as well as political and security developments in Darfur.

Council Dynamics
Until recently, members seemed primarily focused on the crisis in Darfur. The focus was on how best to protect civilians and contain the spill-over from the Darfur conflict rather than political dynamics regarding conflicts in Chad and the CAR.

But recent developments in Chad have rekindled concerns about military and political domestic strife, implications for the humanitarian situation and rebel perceptions of MINURCAT and EUFOR. It seems that some EU members have expressed strong concern about this and appear to have pressed it with France in the context of French military support to the Chadian government.

Members appear to have acquiesced around a regional approach to the Chadian crisis, having expressed support for the Libyan-Congolese efforts. It seems unlikely that France and Libya will be ready for the UN to assume a stronger political role. This approach seems to have found support from some members that are sympathetic to the Chadian government’s apparent preference for regional mediation. But it remains to be seen whether there is scope for the Council and the UN to take a more limited, but nevertheless active role.

Similarly, there is acute awareness of the wider links among Sudan, Chad and rebel groups as well as the potential for further spiralling of the regional crisis. France in particular appears strongly concerned with future prospects for the Chadian government. Most so far seem to have leaned towards a more cautious approach emphasising the role of regional neighbours in improving the border situation.
Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to continue monitoring the difficulties faced by the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and developments on Chad-Sudan relations. Consultations are likely, but it is unclear if proposals for Council action will emerge.

At press time, the Sanctions Committee was expected to consider a request from Khartoum for sanctions against the rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM).

The Secretary-General’s quarterly Darfur report is expected. The mid-term briefing of the sanctions’ Panel of Experts is due by 29 March.

Key Recent Developments
High levels of violence and lawlessness continue in Darfur, with persisting displacement of civilians, decreasing humanitarian access and looming crop failures.

Recently the government launched a large counteroffensive in West Darfur against the JEM. Reports say government forces alongside Janjaweed attacked and burned towns in the area, which were then looted by the militias. Particularly deadly was an air and ground attack by Sudanese government and allied militia against the town of Sirba on 8 February, according to UN investigators. Around 12,000 civilians recently crossed into Chad, and others were blocked along the border by unidentified armed men.

Open hostilities involving the government, the JEM and Chadian regular forces have severely curtailed humanitarian access to about 160,000 civilians in West Darfur. The JEM also acknowledges fighting Sudanese forces in eastern Chad.

The crisis in Chad reached alarming levels after rebels attacked N’Djamena in early February. Chad-Sudan relations deteriorated and reports persisted that they were supporting each other’s rebels. In early February, the Chadian government threatened to block entry of Darfuri refugees.

Other concerns include large-scale mobilisation and shifting alliances of Arab militia in South Darfur and the regional situation.

UNAMID still faces Khartoum’s hesitation on troop composition, flight and customs clearances, and land use. High-level contacts with the Sudanese government to speed deployment included a visit by the head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno to Addis Ababa and Darfur and talks between the Secretary-General and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir.

The Secretary-General proposed to Bashir that the Secretariat could accelerate deployment of African contingents (from Ethiopia and Egypt in February and March), to be followed by Thai and Nepalese units, the first non-African ground troops. At press time, it was unclear whether Khartoum had agreed to their deployment. The status-of-forces agreement between Sudan and the UN was finally signed on 9 February.

Briefing the Council on 8 February, Guéhenno cautioned that UNAMID remained severely under-resourced for its mandate, warning that current resources were insufficient to provide protection or to meet “the high expectations of Darfur’s civilians.” There were significant challenges in bringing UNAMID up to UN standards. He reminded Sudan that the force had to be “predominantly” but not “exclusively” African in character. Additional issues included:

- the need for Khartoum’s cooperation on full freedom of movement for UNAMID and extending visas to mission contractors;
- expediting pre-deployment arrangements; and

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Sudan/Darfur

Expected main contributors: France, Mali, Egypt, and Yemen

Cost: approved budget 1 July 2007–30 June 2008: $182.44 million
Wahid, Eliasson explained, has preconditions and has regional backing. The SLM-Abdul gested greater focus on security as an tion Movement, SLM), and the group is ical talks. Two rebel groups appear to have cantly complicate our collective efforts to support” the implementation of resolution 1769 and a peace agreement in Darfur.

UN Envoy Jan Eliasson also briefed the Council on 8 February on the status of political talks. Two rebel groups appear to have substantial conditions to join the process. JEM-Khalil Ibrahim said it would participate only if there were two movements in the negotiations (JEM and the Sudan Liberation Movement, SLM), and the group is involved in military activities. (Some warn that the JEM appears to have a much broader political agenda than the others and has regional backing.) The SLM-Abdul Wahid, Eliasson explained, has preconditions linked to improvements in security.

Eliasson said steps towards an eventual peace agreement would take longer than initially hoped. The parties were not ready to engage in substantive talks and lacked consolidated positions. Eliasson also suggested greater focus on security as an enabler for political reconciliation, specifically by encouraging a credible ceasefire through unilateral declarations.

Options
The most likely option is to continue to leave UNAMID’s deployment issues to the Secretariat. Another is to provide active support, perhaps further meetings with potential contributors to address asset shortages.

Other options include:
- seeking regular exchanges with the mediation team, perhaps in an informal setting of meetings of experts, particularly on efforts to reach a ceasefire;
- exploring ways to support a solution to the regional crisis; and
- signalling the possibility of sanctions and/or actively discussing a spectrum of targets measures, a strengthened arms embargo and aviation-related measures.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is ensuring quick progress on the security track, including:
- Khartoum’s cooperation towards UNA MID, including troop composition and robustness, permission for night flights, water and land use;
- deployment arrangements;
- UNAMID’s lack of resources, bearing in mind dangerous precedents from the past;
- the crisis in Chad and support for rebels by both Chad and Sudan; and
- the mission’s unparalleled management, infrastructure, logistical, security and environmental challenges.

An emerging issue is whether and when to resort to additional sanctions, and whether to adopt targeted measures against all or some of the parties. Another is how best to support a new ceasefire.

A parallel issue is progress on political reconciliation, including substantive rebel participation, balanced with the needs of civil society, the government (given north-south tensions) and Arab communities; and deterring attempts to influence the talks through force or obstruction.

Council Dynamics
Traditional fault lines between members continue on how best to address Khartoum’s cooperation with UNAMID’s deployment. There also seems to be little appetite for taking a more active role in managing the regional dimension beyond support for regional mediation (led so far by Libya).

It is unclear whether Sudan’s request for sanctions against the JEM will be realised. Similar proposals in the past seem to have met divisions over whether to extend the measures to other parties, including the government.

Underlying Problems
The 31 January Secretary-General’s report on the situation between north and south noted several unresolved issues on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement’s implementation, including: troop redeployment; Abyei; border demarcation; census; elections; and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. The Council heard a briefing by Special Representative Ashraf Qazi on 19 February.

A recent assessment of the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) revealed the need for:
- a review of the mission’s military component and humanitarian coordination;
- a review of resources and clarification on its mandate on demarcation, census and elections;
- greater integration of activities on rule of law and security institutions; and
- a possible new mandate on security sector reform.

UN Documents

Related Developments in the Sanctions Committee
Sudan’s appointment of Council-sanctioned militia leader Musa Hilal for a government post appears to have attracted the concern and criticism of some members, including Europeans and the US. Following a Russian proposal, the issue was brought to the Sanctions Committee, where members sent a letter to Sudan reminding it of existing sanctions against Hilal on 15 February. The mid-term briefing of the Panel of Experts for Sudan to the Sanctions Committee is due by 29 March.

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UN Documents
The Secretary-General is also expected to report developments on the establishment of a special tribunal for the trial of suspects in the murder of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The Council is likely to hold consultations on this matter.

**Key Recent Developments**

Security continues to deteriorate in Lebanon. On 12 February, one of Hezbollah’s top leaders, Imad Mughniyeh, was killed in a car bombing in Damascus. At his funeral in Beirut on 14 February, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah blamed Israel for Mughniyeh’s death and threatened it with open war. Iran highlighted its relations with Hezbollah by sending its foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, to the funeral. On the same day, thousands of Lebanese supporters of the “March 14” government majority (Hezbollah’s political opponents) gathered in Beirut to commemorate the third anniversary of Hariri’s assassination. Tensions between the two sides were high.

On 3 February, two Lebanese were killed by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) near Ghajar on the border between Lebanon and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Israel said the two were gunmen who had opened fire at the IDF. Lebanese security sources said Israel opened fire.

On 27 January, clashes between Lebanese soldiers and mostly Shi’a civilians erupted in south Beirut, killing at least seven. After an army investigation, 19 soldiers were charged with firing at protesters and disobeying military orders, while 58 civilians were charged with rioting and attacking soldiers.

The Council has responded to terrorist attacks in Lebanon. The latest press statement, adopted on 30 January, condemned the 25 January bombing that killed Captain Wissam Eid of the Lebanese Internal Security Forces and injured several others. Captain Eid was involved in the investigation of the murder of Hariri. The Council agreed to a request from the Lebanese government for help from the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) in investigating Eid’s killing.

Lebanon’s political situation remains deadlock. Although all factions agreed on Army Chief General Michel Suleiman as a consensus candidate in November, at press time Lebanon was still without a president. On 26 February, elections were delayed for the fifteenth time to 11 March after parliament failed to agree on the composition of a future government. The opposition wants veto power in the cabinet or a three-way split of seats with the governing coalition and the president. The coalition has rejected these demands.

Arab League mediation in the political process continues to seek implementation by the parties of the three-point plan adopted in January, which includes election of the president, formation of a national unity government, and promulgation of a new election law. On 27 January, at an emergency session in Cairo, Arab foreign ministers agreed that the League’s Secretary-General Amr Moussa should continue mediation. He visited Beirut and left on 10 February “with some hope.” If the election is postponed again, the League may assess the situation at its next ministerial meeting in Cairo early in March, and at the annual summit at the end of March in Damascus.

In an interview on the Lebanese TV channel LBC on 5 February, Geir Pedersen, the departing UN special coordinator, called resolution 1701 a success because “we have managed to preserve calm for more than 18 months in South Lebanon.” He said investigations were still incomplete on attacks against the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) although “none of the clues we have point to Hezbollah.” On 15 February, Pedersen left his post and has not been replaced yet.

On 13 February, the Secretary-General announced that the management committee for the special tribunal had been established. He also said that financial contributions met the first 12 months of budgeted operations.

**Options**

The Council remains seriously concerned about the presidential crisis in Lebanon. In the absence of political agreement, little progress can be made on the 1701 process, which among other things calls for the government of Lebanon to extend its control over all Lebanese territory. The Council adopted a cautious approach and decided not to issue its usual presidential statement following the last 1701 report on 30 October. Thus, one option is for the Council to hold
Kidnapped Israeli soldiers and Israeli over-flights: The two issues remain connected, given the UN’s failure to secure the release of the two soldiers. Israel says its over-flights are therefore justified.

Landmines: Although Israel has recently provided the UN with some data on cluster bomb sites in south Lebanon, it has not complied with the demand in resolution 1701 to provide precise coordinates. UN mine clearance personnel are discovering around ten new sites per month. More than thirty Lebanese have been killed and about 200 wounded since the end of the 2006 war. The UN Mine Action Coordination Center for South Lebanon described this as one of the worst uses of cluster munitions in history.

UNIFIL: Troop contributors have been concerned about safety, particularly in light of the recent attacks against UNIFIL troops. Two peacekeepers were wounded on 8 January. Another issue is how UNIFIL’s investigative capacity is being reinforced.

There is also concern whether the Lebanese army, composed of all factions, will be able to hold together amid increasing sectarian tensions. Hezbollah strongly criticised the role of the army during the 27 January riots when seven protesters were killed in a mainly Shi’a suburb of Beirut during protests over power cuts.

If presidential elections fail on 26 February, the Council must decide whether or how to pressure the parties into agreement. Clearly, securing Syria’s cooperation would be helpful, but its official support for the Arab League plan did not translate into concrete action. Whether the Council should intervene—or leave the issue to the Arab League—is an open question.

On the tribunal, the main issue at this stage is a transition from investigation to prosecution. If that occurs, the Council may not have to extend the mandate of UNIIIC, which expires in June.

Council Dynamics

There is still consensus on the necessity of full implementation of resolution 1701. France, the UK and the US, in particular, believe that the 1701 process is important regardless of the political situation and are willing to remain in the lead. It seems, however, that traditional fault lines on 1701 issues are likely to emerge during discussions, and perhaps will be more divisive with the new Council composition. Members like Libya, Indonesia and South Africa may emphasise the need for Israel to stop its over-flights, while others may insist on disarmament issues.

There also appears to be consensus that the Council should keep a low profile on the elections, at least for now, to let the Arab League mediate.

Criticism of Syria is mounting among the Council’s western members. Many believe that Syria wants to maintain its influence over Lebanon and may want to delay the establishment of the tribunal by refusing to cooperate on the elections. In the absence of progress, some Council members may try to push for a stronger stance against Syria.

Several Non-Aligned members seem to think there is too much activity on Lebanon and that adopting frequent statements may be counterproductive, have a negative impact and appear biased. This was illustrated when a French attempt to issue a Council press statement for the third anniversary of Hariri’s assassination was countered by South Africa, Libya and Indonesia on those grounds. It seems that China, Russia and Vietnam were also sceptical.

On the tribunal, members like China, Panama, Russia and South Africa that abstained on resolution 1757, which established the tribunal, appear to remain cautious about Council support for the tribunal.

UN Documents

Selected Resolutions

- S/RES/1757 (30 May 2007) established the special tribunal under Chapter VII and requested a report within ninety days.
- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah and authorised a reinforcement of UNIFIL.

Latest Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2007/46 (11 December 2007) expressed “deep concern at the repeated postponements of the presidential election in Lebanon”.
- S/PRST/2007/29 (3 August 2007) was the latest statement on implementation of resolution 1701.

Latest Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2007/684 (28 November 2007) was the last UNIIIC report.
- S/2007/641 (30 October 2007) was the last report on resolution 1701.
Lebanon: The Forgotten Crisis

Latest Letters

- S/2007/525 (4 September 2007) was the report on the establishment of the tribunal.
- S/2008/78 (7 February 2008) was a letter from Lebanon on Israeli violations of Lebanese territory in January.
- S/2008/74 (5 February 2008) was a letter from Lebanon informing the Council about the 3 February incident in which Israel opened fire at two Lebanese citizens.
- S/2008/57 (31 January 2008) was a letter from Cuba as Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Chairman complaining about the Council’s refusal to allow NAM to participate in the 30 January debate on the Middle East, and enclosing a statement on the situation in the Middle East including on Lebanon.

Press Statement

- SC/9234 (30 January 2008) condemned the terrorist attack that killed Captain Eid.

Other Relevant Facts

UNIIIC Commissioner and future Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal

Daniel Bellemare (Canada)

Secretary-General’s Special Coordinator for Lebanon

To be appointed

UNIFIL Force Commander

Major General Claudio Graziano (Italy)

Size and Composition of UNIFIL

- Authorised: 15,000 troops
- Current: 30 November 2007: 13,264 military personnel
- Troop-contributing countries: Belgium, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, France, FYR of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Spain, Tanzania and Turkey

Cost (approved budget)


Useful Additional Sources

- Flooding South Lebanon: Israel’s Use of Cluster Munitions in Lebanon in July and August 2006, Human Rights Watch, Volume 20, No. 2(E), February 2008
  http://hrw.org/reports/2008/lebanon0208/
  http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/0124_lebanon.aspx

Kenya

Expected Council Action

Members will follow developments in Kenya closely, but whether this will translate into Council action is unclear. Consultations seem likely if the situation deteriorates further or there is significant progress with political talks.

At press time, it was uncertain whether the Council’s request for Secretariat reporting on Kenya in the 6 February presidential statement would result in a report or an oral briefing, and when this would occur.

Key Facts

Kenya plunged into a political, security and humanitarian crisis following the 27 December elections. An estimated 600,000 people were displaced in weeks as numerous reports of abuses against civilians emerged, including arbitrary killings, rape and arson.

Politically motivated violence quickly evolved into ethnic bloodshed—often with suspicions oforchestration—and laid bare conflicts over wealth and land.

Although the violence seems to have decreased somewhat, tensions persist as political leaders negotiate a power-sharing agreement. There are strong concerns that the situation may turn volatile again if meaningful progress is not made soon.

On 27 December, presidential, parliamentary and local elections were held, with strong competition between the Party of National Unity (PNU) of President Mwai Kibaki and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) of opposition leader and presidential contender Raila Odinga.

As the tense vote-tallying proceeded, partial results indicated a lead by Odinga that was later reversed. This attracted strong complaints by the opposition of vote-rigging and corruption to benefit Kibaki and the PNU.

The electoral commission announced Kibaki as the winner on 30 December, while the ODM obtained the majority in the parliament.

Demonstrations and violence ensued, reportedly from supporters of both sides targeting civilians from Kibaki’s ethnic Kikuyu community as well as Odinga’s Luo followers. Instability has been concentrated in central, western and coastal Kenya. On 1 January, thirty people were burned alive while sheltering inside a church.

EU observers questioned the credibility of electoral results, citing lack of access to some counting centres in the Central Province as well as evidence of irregularities. Strong international criticism also emerged from the UK, France and the EU.

In early January, a mediation initiative by the then AU Chairman, Ghanaian President John Kufuor, was launched with support from the US, the UK, the EU and the AU.

Odinga’s ODM strongly supported the Kufuor mediation but continued to call for new elections. After some resistance, Kibaki’s PNU acquiesced to international mediation while insisting the election results were valid. It said the ODM should challenge results in Kenyan courts, which the opposition has dismissed as biased.

On 8 January, Kufuor arrived in Kenya, but settlement prospects were diminished by the concurrent nomination of Kibaki supporters for key cabinet posts.

On 10 January, talks broke down. The opposition complained that the PNU had backed off an agreement engendering the possibility of a re-run and an interim government, reportedly because of pressure from some in the PNU. The parties then agreed to mediation by an AU-backed panel of African eminent persons led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

As the violence worsened, international pressure for a negotiated solution increased, including from the AU Peace and Security Council, the US, the EU, and the UK, as well as the Secretary-General during talks at the margins of the AU Summit in late January and in a subsequent visit to Nairobi.
The Security Council was briefed by Under Secretary-General B. Lynn Pascoe on 30 January. He presented an overview of the political, security and humanitarian situation, noting that the Secretariat had been providing support to the mediation team. He also noted difficulties in getting the parties to publicly renounce violence, and concerns with the need for investigations into human rights abuses in Kenya.

After a Belgian proposal, Council members agreed on an oral press statement calling “on Kenya’s leaders to do all that is in their power to bring the violence to an end and to restore calm.”

In a letter dated 28 January, Kenyan Foreign Minister Moses Wetangula asked to brief the Council. Members appeared divided on the issue. Some saw a need to hear a counterview. Others were uncomfortable with denying a request from a government. At press time, it was unclear if and when the briefing would occur.

Similar concerns emerged during the recent AU Summit. Kibaki’s presence appears to have elicited divisions among AU members, with some apparently supporting him and others strongly concerned with the electoral problems and the ensuing violence.

The AU Assembly then adopted a decision calling for an investigation into human rights violations and urged the parties to commit to a peaceful solution in conformity with rule of law. However, the decision did not mention the conduct of the elections, stressing instead the need for a “collective reflection” on the challenges linked to the tension and disputes that “often characterise electoral processes in Africa.”

The Council adopted a presidential statement on 6 February under agenda item “Peace and Security in Africa” which:

■ emphasised the need for dialogue, compromise and action to end violence;
■ recalled the need to avoid impunity;
■ welcomed the decisions by the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Secretary-General’s Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide to dispatch missions to Kenya; and
■ requested the Secretary-General to report on UN support to the mediation and the regional impact of the Kenyan crisis, including on UN operations.

Members did not agree on a proposal to mention the need to address complaints about the presidential election.

Difficult negotiations mediated by the Annan-led panel started in late January. After delays, the parties agreed on a four-point negotiating agenda including an end to the violence, the humanitarian situation, the political crisis, and land and historical injustices (on which agreement is expected only within a year).

The talks have mostly focused on an agreement to end the political crisis. The opposition has apparently accepted power-sharing in lieu of a rerun of the elections, provided a new post of prime minister is created. This would require constitutional changes that some PNU members had resisted.

The parties seem agreed on a power-sharing arrangement, as well as on an independent panel to review the elections (but whose mandate seemingly does not include a final determination of election results).

At press time, talks had stalled on the new prime minister’s powers, cabinet positions and new elections if the coalition government collapses.

On 25 February, Under Secretary-General John Holmes briefed the Council on the humanitarian situation in Kenya and regional implications. Members expressed concern about the humanitarian, reconciliation and socio-economic aspects and the importance of returns, justice and protection of human rights.

Options
Options include:

■ requesting interim briefings from the Secretariat on political reconciliation and the humanitarian situation;
■ inviting the AU, concerned member states and the mediation team to discuss in informal consultations, or perhaps through the Council’s Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention in Africa;
■ inviting the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Secretary-General’s Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide to brief the Council on the results of their fact-finding missions; and
■ holding an open debate, should the situation deteriorate, and adopting a statement, perhaps in conjunction with the AU Peace and Security Council.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is how best to assist political reconciliation towards a credible power-sharing agreement. Related issues are:

■ the continuing potential for violence, including fragmentation within the parties;
■ the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Kenya;
■ the wider regional effects of the Kenyan crisis, including supply lines for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan;
■ questions of justice and accountability for the violence; and
■ maintaining Council involvement while preserving the AU’s leadership and initiative on the political talks.

Council and Wider Dynamics
The Council is unanimous in acknowledging the gravity of the situation in Kenya and its regional implications and supports the mediation efforts under Kofi Annan. There is also support for ensuring justice and accountability for the violence.

Some members have been critical of the conduct of the election and are concerned that an electoral precedent in Kenya could have an impact elsewhere. Most, however, seem to prefer a more cautious approach and focus on political reconciliation.

African members seem focused on ensuring that Council action is coordinated with the AU and preserves its leadership of the negotiating process.

Underlying Problems
The wave of violence has severely hurt Kenya’s economy, in particular its important tourism industry, which has ground almost to a standstill. The economic impact of the crisis has a potential for destabilising the country further, and in turn may affect stability in the region.

UN Documents

Selected Presidential Statement

■ S/PRST/2008/4 (6 February 2008) was the recent statement on the Kenyan crisis.

Other

■ S/PV5845 (25 February 2008) was the recent Holmes briefing.

Other Relevant Facts

Panel of Eminent African Personalities
Kofi Annan (Ghana)
Graça Machel (Mozambique)
Benjamin Mkapa (Tanzania)
Useful Additional Source


### Somalia

#### Expected Council Action

The Council is awaiting a report from the Secretary-General on results of the Secretariat’s strategic assessment and fact-finding mission to Somalia. The results are expected to include:

- options for future UN involvement, such as relocating the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) to Mogadishu;
- progress with contingency planning for a UN peacekeeping mission; and
- proposals for UN assistance to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

The report, originally due in February, is now expected by 10 March.

Consultations are likely to explore proposals to ameliorate the security situation, give assistance to AMISOM, and support political reconciliation. At press time, it was unclear whether this would translate into action in March.

#### Key Recent Developments

The humanitarian situation in Somalia continues to deteriorate rapidly. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation estimates that close to two million people are in need of humanitarian assistance for the next six months.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs says that aid operations have never been as restricted as at present, with roadblocks, shelling, and the targeting of aid workers. On 8 and 9 February, four grenades were thrown at the UN compound in Mogadishu. No casualties were reported.

Because of the insecurity and lawlessness, a number of relief organisations have decided to pull out staff. In early February, Denmark took over naval anti-piracy patrols from France for two months, providing protection for UN food shipments, the World Food Programme reported.

The regional situation is also volatile, particularly the standoff between Ethiopia and Eritrea, recent events surrounding the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea and the unrest in Kenya. (For more details, please see our Kenya brief in this issue.)

The Council heard a briefing by the Secretariat on 15 February, where the preliminary findings of the Secretariat’s recent fact-finding mission to Somalia were presented. (Options on future UN involvement will be discussed after the Secretary-General’s forthcoming report is received in March.)

Among the issues raised were:

- humanitarian and security situations;
- strengthening AMISOM; and
- political reconciliation.

On 15 February, Somali and AU representatives made an urgent plea to the Council at an open meeting, calling for future UN takeover of peacekeeping responsibilities in Somalia. AU Permanent Observer Lila H. Ratsifandrihamanana also called for UN assistance to AMISOM in the meantime, noting that the AU plans to hold a high-level meeting to refocus international attention on Somalia and mobilise support for the political process. She further called upon the Council to consider changes to the arms embargo to allow the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to establish and equip defence forces, and to take action against peace spoilers.

On February 20, the Council adopted resolution 1801, which, inter alia:

- renewed the Council’s authorisation for AMISOM for six months;
- requested the Secretary-General to intensify his political reconciliation efforts and, looking forward to his forthcoming report, requested options to strengthen UNPOS, support full AMISOM deployment and prepare for possible UN peacekeeping in Somalia; and
- called upon all international organisations and member states to support the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, and requested that “they work through him at all times so that a coordinated effort can be attained.”

The new Somali Prime Minister, Nur Hassan Hussein, appears to have initiated dialogue with various stakeholders including opposition groups, but details remain unclear. The Prime Minister has seemingly indicated his willingness to talk to the Asmara-based Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (an umbrella group based in Eritrea and co-chaired by former Union of Islamic Courts leader Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed).

During a trip to Qatar and Egypt in mid-February, Ahmed reiterated the Alliance’s position that as a precondition to reconciliation talks, Ethiopian troops should leave, an idea which the TFG has resisted given its security needs.

#### Options

Regarding security, the most likely option in the short term will be exploring ways to strengthen AMISOM, including a UN support package. Other options include:

- considering a pledging conference for AMISOM, perhaps through the auspices of the AU and the International Contact Group;
- considering alternatives in case additional troop contributions to AMISOM do not materialise;
- discussing arrangements in that regard with potential troop contributors (from Africa and outside), the AU and perhaps the Arab League;
- exploring options within the sanctions regime, such as targeted measures against spoilers.

Regarding political reconciliation, one option is to continue to push for a cessation of hostilities and new broad-based negotiations. Related options include:

- endorsing a package to strengthen the role of UNPOS, including relocation to Mogadishu as well as related security requirements;
- actively supporting Ould-Abdallah’s efforts to coordinate mediation initiatives, perhaps by sponsoring a meeting with the AU, the Arab League and concerned member states;
- encouraging the development of a detailed plan for an all-inclusive reconciliation conference, agreed amongst key Somali stakeholders, on participation, venue, agenda and modalities.

#### Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is how best to support progress on the political and security tracks.

On political reconciliation, the question is how to establish a meaningful, inclusive dialogue process and to steer the parties towards:

- all-inclusive talks, including the participation of insurgents and dealing with reservations by some states about reported connections between some rebels and terrorist organisations;
a compromise power-sharing arrangement; and

An emerging issue is the potential for proliferation of regional mediation efforts and related concerns with lack of coordination.

For the security crisis, issues include:
- the need for Ethiopian withdrawal and the security vacuum this might leave for the TFG;
- the decision of some insurgents to oppose political talks while Ethiopian troops are on the ground;
- fragmentation among insurgents, in particular the rise of the al-Shabaab militia and its international connections;
- related concerns with the possible connections between insurgents and terrorist groups;
- support for AMISOM, and whether other member states are willing to participate militarily;
- funding issues—including whether the Council is willing to agree to finance support packages from the UN budget; and
- whether conditions exist for UN peacekeeping.

A third set of issues relates to how best to manage the wider linkages between the situation in Somalia and the region, in particular Ethiopia and Eritrea.

**Council Dynamics**

There is continuing consensus within the Council on the need for progress with security and political reconciliation.

Discussions leading to resolution 1801 revealed disagreement on whether to renew AMISOM’s authorisation as a short rollover. This was apparently proposed by South Africa to ensure a substantial follow-up to the Secretary-General’s forthcoming report, with strong support from Italy and the US. Others—including the UK, France, Belgium and Russia—appear to have preferred to renew it for six months and appeared cautious about possible signals emerging from a rollover, including lack of support for the mission or perceptions that UN peacekeeping was imminent.

On the political track, support for a meaningful and inclusive process—leading to a new constitutional process and elections in 2009—continues to be the guiding principle. However, members seem cautious about pressure on the TFG to move towards resuming talks. Members also appear sympathetic to ongoing regional efforts on political reconciliation but are concerned about coordination issues that this may create for Ould-Abdallah.

Members now seem focused on the forthcoming report, and keen on receiving practical options for action. African members seem very concerned with AMISOM’s prospects and strongly support UN peacekeeping. Others still appear concerned that the environment so far is not conducive for a UN peacekeeping operation and that there may be difficulties with troop and asset generation per the example of the UN-AU hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

There continues to be strong support for strengthening AMISOM, including a UN support package, and for creating conditions for Ethiopian withdrawal. Some, especially the US and European members, seem reluctant about direct UN financial assistance and concerned about repeating the experience with support packages in Darfur, preferring instead to focus on logistical, communications and management support.

Most seem unenthusiastic about the viability of sanctions options.

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**Guinea-Bissau**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council is expected to receive the Secretary-General’s quarterly report on the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS), created in 1999 to help consolidate peace efforts in the country. The Council is also expected to receive the Peacebuilding Commission’s (PBC) advice on the situation in Guinea-Bissau, requested from the PBC in a letter on 11 December. It is unclear whether the Council will deliberate on the expected reports in March.

**Recent Developments**

On 19 December, the PBC placed Guinea-Bissau on its agenda. The Council on 11 December had written to the PBC indicating its support for the request made by Prime Minister Martinho N’Dafa Cabi of Guinea-Bissau for the country to be placed on the Commission’s agenda. Members of the Council also invited the PBC to provide advice on the situation in the country, which has become a haven for South American cartels smuggling cocaine to Europe. On 28 December, the Chairman of the PBC wrote to the President of the Security Council informing him of the admission of Guinea-Bissau onto the Commission’s agenda and of his intention to respond to the latter’s request for advice.

On 12 December, the Council was briefed by the Secretary-General’s Representative in Guinea-Bissau, Shola Omorogbe, on the situation in the country on the basis of the Secretary-General’s latest report. Under Secretary-General Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the UN Office on Drug and Crime, also briefed the Council during the meeting on the urgency of combating the concurrent phenomenon of international drug trafficking through Guinea-Bissau. A few days later, at a conference in Lisbon where he drew heavily on his comments to Council, Costa stated: “Guinea-Bissau is under siege. The threat
posed by drug traffickers is so great that the state is on the verge of collapse.” He warned that the task was enormous as the state had lost control of its territory: it had one rusty ship to patrol a rugged coastline, no control of airspace, and no radios or phones for police. By contrast, drug operatives had much greater resources at their disposal.

In a press statement issued after the meeting, the Council reiterated its concern at the security threat posed by drug trafficking and organised crime and it noted the progress made by the government of Guinea-Bissau, with the support of the international community and the UN system, towards developing a robust anti-narcotics trafficking programme. It stressed the importance for a successful outcome of the Lisbon Conference on 19 December and the regional conference on drug trafficking to be organised later this year by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The statement called on the international community to support security-sector reform in the country and encouraged all national stakeholders to support the organisation of free and fair legislative elections in 2008.

In an exchange of letters (S/2007/700 and S/2007/701) between the Secretary-General and the Council President in late November and early December, the mandate of UNOGBIS was extended until 31 December 2008 and revised. The mandate now allows UNOGBIS to assist in mobilising international support for the government’s efforts to eradicate drug trafficking.

The revised mandate of UNOGBIS for 2008 includes:
- assisting national reconciliation and dialogue;
- facilitating security-sector reform;
- supporting efforts to combat drug trafficking, human trafficking and organised crime;
- assisting in the holding of legislative elections in 2008;
- promoting respect for the rule of law and human rights;
- integrating a gender perspective into peacebuilding activities;
- facilitating efforts to curb proliferation of small arms and light weapons;
- assisting in galvanising international assistance; and
- improving cooperation with the AU, ECOWAS, the Community of Portuguese-Language Countries, the EU and other international partners.

The Secretary-General’s letter also referred to the Council’s presidential statement of 19 October requesting him to recommend ways the UN could effectively assist the country’s efforts towards stabilisation. The Secretary-General said he would explore the possibility of transforming UNOGBIS into an integrated mission after legislative elections later this year. Costa recommended a long-term development plan and short-term enhancement of security measures.

### Related Developments in the Peacebuilding Commission

The Commission on 19 December established a country-specific configuration (CSC) to support Guinea-Bissau’s peacebuilding initiatives following the inclusion of that country on the PBC’s agenda. The CSC is chaired by Brazilian Ambassador Maria Luiza Viotti. During the first meeting of the Guinea-Bissau CSC on 21 January, the chair talked about her forthcoming visit to the country (23-25 January), with the aim of:

- acquainting the PBC with the situation and priorities for peacebuilding;
- discussing the major peacebuilding issues and challenges; and
- explaining the processes and purpose of the PBC’s involvement in the country.

She subsequently reported on 5 February to the CSC on the trip. On 13 February, the CSC was briefed by the Peacebuilding Support Office and the World Bank on mapping of resources and shortfalls in funding for peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau.

On 20 February, the CSC held a meeting on Guinea-Bissau during which the Prime Minister N’Dafa Cabi of Guinea-Bissau made a presentation on his country’s identified priority areas for assistance from the PBC and the peacebuilding challenges. At press time, the CSC was set to start preliminary discussions on elements for a strategic framework for the country on 27 February.

### Key Issues

The immediate task for the Council will be to consider and follow up on recommendations from the Secretary-General’s report and PBC’s advice and to identify key areas where the Council could take action.

### Options

Options before the Council include:

- issuing a statement to encourage synergy and interaction with PBC country-specific strategies;
- further amending the existing UN mission mandate to enhance collaboration between UN operations and PBC activities, based on recommendations from the Secretary-General and the PBC; and
- establishing more regular and timely interaction with the PBC on the situation in the country. This could include invitations for briefings from PBC representatives when the Council considers the situation in Guinea-Bissau.

### Council Dynamics

Council members appear to be awaiting the Secretary-General’s report to inform any subsequent action that they may decide to take on the situation in the country. UNOGBIS could be transformed into an integrated mission after legislative elections, if they are successful.

Following the recent admission of Guinea-Bissau onto the agenda of the PBC, Council members are poised to interact with the Commission, especially through the submission of the requested advice from the PBC on the country as well as allowing the Commission to have the space to respond to the “peacebuilding gap” in the country.

No single member has leadership of the issue at this stage. African members remain concerned about ensuring effective consolidation of peace efforts. European members are particularly concerned about the country’s emergence as a major transit hub for drug trafficking to Europe.

### Underlying Problems

Problems include an alarming increase in organised crime, drug trafficking, trafficking in children for domestic or farm work, and the proliferation of illicit small arms. Guinea-Bissau’s lack of economic diversity has impaired the government’s capacity to deal with these issues as it lacks adequate funding. Its law enforcement capabilities are nearly non-existent. Political tensions are reportedly intensifying, ahead of legislative elections scheduled for this year. The inclusion on the PBC’s agenda is expected to help to mobilise international assistance to meet some of the most crucial of these challenges.
Other Relevant Facts

Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNOGBIS

Shola Omorogie (Nigeria)

Size of UNOGBIS Staff

thirty, including international civilians, military advisers, a police adviser and local civilians

Duration

6 April 1999 to present; mandate expires on 31 December 2008

Useful Additional Source

Assisting Guinea-Bissau: International Conference on Drug Trafficking in Guinea-Bissau, speech by Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, in Lisbon, Portugal, 19 December 2007


Liberia

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to receive the Secretary-General’s report on the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which is due by late March. Resolution 1777 of September 2007 requested the Secretary-General to report on plans to draw down the level of peacekeepers. UNIMIL’s mandate expires on 30 September.

Recent Developments

On 19 December, the Council renewed arms and travel embargoes on Liberia for another year and also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 20 June. It left in force its assets freeze on former President Charles Taylor, his family and associates. The Council, which last year lifted the ban on Liberian diamond exports, encouraged the Liberian government to ask the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) to review the country’s implementation. The KPCS, set up to keep “blood diamonds” from reaching world markets, was invited to report to the Council.

On 7 January, the Special Court for Sierra Leone resumed the trial of Taylor at The Hague after a six-month delay to allow him to prepare his defence.

Public hearings commenced on 8 January at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) established to inquire into human rights violations during the country’s 14-year civil war, which ended in 2003 and left the nation in ruins. The seven-member Commission, patterned along the South African TRC, is meant to investigate crimes and provide a forum for victims, witnesses and alleged perpetrators to relate their version of events.

The new Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia, Ellen Margrethe Løj, arrived in the country to take up her post on 17 January. “There is a lot of peace-building work to be done to ensure that Liberia does not slide back into conflict and chaos,” she told UNMIL. Following a violent mob attack on a police station 20 February, in which UNMIL intervened to rescue detained suspected murderers, she urged Liberians not to resort to vigilantism but rather to allow the country’s justice system work. Løj was chair of the Council’s Liberia Sanctions Committee in 2005 and 2006 when she was Denmark’s UN ambassador.

On 1 February, a French military vessel intercepted and seized 2.5 tonnes of cocaine from a ship reportedly outside Liberian waters, and towed it into port because the ship was flying the Liberian flag. The drug seizure was the largest in the country’s history.

Related Developments in the Sanctions Committee

On 5 December, the Panel of Experts monitoring the sanctions on the country submitted its report to the Sanctions Committee. The report said Liberia began exporting rough diamonds in early September. The Kimberley Process found five parcels that did not meet its standards, but cleared four other shipments. The Panel found no evidence of significantmovements ofarms or ex-combatants across Liberia’s borders although it noted an increase in armed robbery, with firearms involved in about a third of the cases. It said that little headway had been made in freezing the assets of Taylor, his family and associates in Liberia or in Nigeria. The Liberian House of Representatives has defeated a government bill to freeze the assets. (Two legislators, Taylor’s estranged wife Jewel Howard Taylor and his former son-in-law Edwin Snowe, are on the assets freeze list.)

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council involves ensuring a successful drawdown of UNMIL and effective peace and development. In the light of the recent cocaine seizure and similar incidents in West Africa, another issue is how to prevent Liberia from becoming a major transit point for drug trafficking to Europe.

Options

Options before the Council include:

- issuing a statement supporting the
Secretary-General’s report on the reduction of peacekeepers; and

• issuing a statement of concern about the potential for Liberia to become a hub for drug trafficking, and appealing for international support to help the country patrol its coastal waters.

Council Dynamics
Some members would like to see an early troop drawdown in the country to release scarce resources for pressing peacekeeping engagements elsewhere, but others are awaiting the Secretary-General’s evaluation.

The United States (whose president visited Liberia on 21 February), and African members of the Council are in the lead on this issue.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1793 (21 December 2007) granted exemption from the Council’s travel ban for witnesses who might need to appear before the Special Court for Sierra Leone dealing with the trial of former Liberian President Charles Taylor.
- S/RES/1792 (19 December 2007) renewed the arms and travel sanctions and as well as the mandate of the Panel of Experts.
- S/RES/1777 (20 September 2007) renewed the mandate of UNMIL for a one year and endorsed the Secretary-General’s recommendations for the mission’s draw-down.
- S/RES/1753 (27 April 2007) lifted the diamonds embargo and decided to review this decision after receiving reports from the Panel of Experts and KPCS.
- S/RES/1731 (20 December 2006) renewed sanctions.
- S/RES/1532 (12 March 2004) imposed an assets freeze against former President Charles Taylor and associates.
- S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003) imposed sanctions.
- S/RES/1509 (19 September 2003) established UNMIL.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2007/479 (8 August 2007) was the latest UNMIL report.
- S/2007/143 (13 March 2007) was a report on cross-border issues in West Africa.

Other

- S/2007/689 (5 December 2007) was the latest report of the Panel of Experts.
- SC/9183 (29 November 2007) was about the delisting of Grace Beatrice Minor from the Liberia Sanctions Committee assets freeze and travel ban list.
- S/2007/547 (14 September 2007) was the letter from the chairman of the Liberia Sanctions Committee conveying the two letters constituting the report of the KPCS to the Council.

Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Ellen Margrethe Løj (Denmark)

UNMIL: Size, Composition and Cost

- Strength as of 30 November 2007: 13,534 military and 1,183 police
- Key contributing countries: Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Pakistan
- Cost: 1 July 2007 – 30 June 2008: $721.72 million

UNMIL: Duration


Chairman of the Liberia Sanctions Committee

Giadalla Azuz Ettalhi (Libya)

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to renew the sanctions regime on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), as well as the mandate of the Group of Experts, which both expire on 31 March. The Council is also expected to receive the next regular report of the Secretary-General on the UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in late March. MONUC’s mandate expires on 31 December.

Recent Developments

On 15 February, the Council adopted a resolution rolling over the DRC sanctions regime (arms embargo, aviation restrictions, assets freeze and travel ban) and the mandate of the Group of Experts until 31 March.

On 6 February, the Congolese authorities arrested and transferred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, a former militia leader charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity in the north-eastern province of Ituri. Ngudjolo is the third ICC detainee from the DRC, following the arrests of Germain Katanga and Thomas Lubanga. The ICC Registrar thanked the DRC for having arrested Ngudjolo immediately after the tribunal issued a warrant.

On 23 January, the Group of Experts on the DRC submitted its latest report to the DRC Sanctions Committee, based on six weeks of investigations in the region. Among other issues, the report called for MONUC to strengthen its monitoring capacity in an effort to control arms flowing into the country and for the Kinshasa government to notify the UN of all incoming military shipments. However, Congolese authorities told the experts that they had no obligation to disclose such information. The Group also recommended that the Council ask the government and its international partners to restart “an effective” disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process for members of illegal armed groups.

On 22 February, the Congolese-Tutsi leader of the rebel National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), renegade General Laurent Nkunda, suspended the CNDP’s participation in the peace commission set up following the 23 January peace agreement reached between the DRC government and rebels operating in eastern DRC. Nkunda announced this in protest against UN allegations of the killing of at least thirty Hutu civilians by his insurgent forces last month, and has denied the allegations while calling for the legal constraints that the right action should not be taken to mean the Nkunda’s forces had withdrawn from the ceasefire agreement. Recent developments occurred against a backdrop of challenges to the peace agreement posed by reported incidents of renewed fighting in eastern DRC. At press time, Nkunda’s forces had not resumed participation in the commission.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is how to streamline the sanctions regime, particularly its provisions concerning the notification process for arms transfers by the DRC government and its arms suppliers. This would send a signal of the Council’s support for the positive gains made in the country, while retaining a cautious approach in addressing the whole issue of sanctions.

the ICC Registrar thanked the DRC for having arrested Ngudjolo immediately after the tribunal issued a warrant.
A related issue is the length of the renewal period for the sanctions as well as the mandate of the Group of Experts. Following up on resolution 1698, which extended sanctions to those responsible for abusing and recruiting children in armed conflict, is another issue, but it is unlikely to be taken up at the present time.

Options
Options before the Council include:
- extension of the sanctions regime with modifications and extension of the mandate of the Group of Experts;
- extension of the sanctions regime without any modifications (unlikely);
- deferring consideration to April of the Secretary-General’s report that is due in March (likely);
- consideration of the upcoming Secretary-General’s report and, possibly, issuing a Council statement; and
- following up in the DRC Sanctions Committee on the grave concerns on the abuse of children voiced by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict and imposing penalties on those deemed responsible. (This seems unlikely at this stage but may well be taken up after the “streamlining exercise” of the sanctions regime).

Council Dynamics
There appears to be a general consensus among Council members about keeping the framework of the sanctions regime in place while streamlining specific aspects in response to realities on the ground. The need to allow sufficient time to redesign the sanctions regime was the reason for the six-week rollover of both the sanctions and the Panel of Experts’ mandate. The focus seems to be on streamlining the arms embargo, such as attempting to simplify the notification process for the DRC government and its arms suppliers.

Both China and the US, which have supported the DRC government’s push for exemption from the arms embargo, appear for now to be comfortable with the present approach of the Council to this issue.

France is the lead country on DRC-related issues in the Council.

Underlying Problems
Weak state institutions, the illicit flow of arms, the continued presence of illegal armed groups and formidable socio-economic challenges continue to impede efforts at peacebuilding.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

Latest Presidential Statement
- S/PRST/2007/44 (21 November 2007) commended the DRC and Rwanda on their 9 November agreement (S/2007/649, annex) and urged full implementation.

Selected Press Statement
- SC/9113 (12 September 2007) expressed concern about violent clashes in eastern DRC.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report
- S/2007/671 (14 November 2007) recommended MONUC’s renewal at current levels for one year.

Selected Secretary-General’s Letter
- S/2007/586 (2 October 2007) was the Secretary-General’s letter informing the Council of his appointment of the latest Group of Experts.

Selected Letters from the DRC to the Council
- S/2007/550 (18 September 2007) was a letter urging the Council to ask MONUC to help end impunity in eastern DRC.

Selected Sanctions Committee Document
- S/2008/43 (11 February 2008) was the letter from the Chair of the DRC Sanctions Committee to the President of the Security Council conveying the latest report of the Group of Experts on the DRC.

Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to extend the mandate of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) before it expires on 31 March, and to approve its new organisational plan. The Council is expected to endorse, perhaps in an annex to the resolution, the reorganisation plan prepared by Mike Smith of Australia, the new executive director of CTED, the body of experts that advises the Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). A public debate when the resolution, to be drafted by the US, is adopted is a possibility.

Key Recent Developments
The executive director has presented a new organisational plan to the CTC as requested in resolution 1787 of 10 December, which extended the CTED’s mandate until 31 March. The CTED’s first organisational plan in 2004 was based on resolution 1535, which established the expert group in 2004. This plan has now been updated and approved by members of the CTC, with some revisions.

The updates deal with the prohibition on incitement to terrorism as called for in resolution 1624 of September 2005 as well as with human rights concerns in the context.
of resolution 1373. The document also emphasises the CTED’s participation in the Secretary-General’s Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, which is composed of 24 UN agencies working to implement a global counter-terrorism strategy. Other recommendations concern internal operations, some of which meet the Council’s criticisms as voiced during a December 2006 review.

**Reorganisation Plan**

Highlights of the recommendations of the CTED’s working methods and changes in its operational structure are as follows:

- **Consistency and quality in work output:** Participants from each geographical team with the technical expertise required by resolutions 1373 (which established the CTC after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US) and 1624 will be tasked with reviewing all documents produced by the CTED “to bring greater consistency and conformity of judgment” before they are released. These changes are aimed at ensuring consistency and quality in CTED’s work output.

- **Flexibility in country visits:** There will be tailor-made and focused visits to regions whose countries are identified as suffering from “a certain common vulnerability.” This might involve short visits to several capitals in succession or a subregional meeting in one central location. The CTED is proposing to increase the number of countries visited each year by cutting back on the scope of each visit.

- **Improvement in cross-cluster management:** Duties of the current three geographical clusters, or teams, are to be reassigned. Each cluster leader will be responsible for developing strategies, conducting a dialogue with countries involved after a preliminary assessment and identifying countries for future visits as well as spelling out the focus of such visits.

- **Cross-cutting technical groups:** Establishing five cross-cutting groups for technical assistance: terrorist financing; border security; arms trafficking and law enforcement; legal issues (such as legislation, mutual legal assistance, and extradition); as well as issues related to the prohibition of incitement to commit acts of terrorism and to human rights. Each technical group will consist of the experts from each of the three geographical clusters, who are expected to agree on common standards to be applied across the board. In particular:

  **Technical assistance:** In response to repeated concerns about weaknesses in CTED’s technical assistance, this area will be led by the Head of the Technical Assistance Office, who is also the CTED deputy executive director. The technical assistance group is expected to review current strategies and develop a strategy to engage with donors involved in technical assistance.

  **Resolution 1624 and the human rights aspects of counter-terrorism:** On the incitement of terrorism and human rights, a group will be established to see how it can advise the CTC to assist states to address such issues. The CTED intends to respond to concerns that any measures states take to combat terrorism comply with obligations under international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law.

- **Public communication:** A comprehensive public communication strategy will be developed to improve understanding of CTC/CTED’s role in the counter-terrorism field among UN member states and the public at large.

- **Cooperation and collaboration among experts of counter-terrorism committees:** The aim is to develop new mechanisms and practices to improve cooperation and collaboration between CTED and the experts of the 1267 (Al-Qaida and Taliban) and 1540 (weapons of mass destruction) Committees as well as “to participate actively” in the Secretary-General’s Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

The reorganisation plan and renewal of the mandate may be discussed in a public debate. It is unclear whether this debate would be open to allow non-Council members to speak. Some elected Council members have been pushing for consultations with the wider UN membership, an approach that has not gained favour among all the permanent members. The argument against broader consultation is that CTED’s mandate is technical in nature and discussion in an open forum would not be appropriate. However, others argue that public consultations would facilitate wider support for the work of CTC and CTED among UN members.

Several members and non-members expressed concerns about a number of issues related to CTC and CTED in a debate on the counter-terrorism committees on 14 November. Among these concerns were the lack of interaction between the CTC and the wider UN membership. The CTED was urged to improve its relationship with non-members, especially those who are donors. It was pointed out that those efforts were needed for this relationship to be better structured and further enhanced. Delegates also questioned the method of selecting countries to visit, saying they were mostly in the developing world, and called for even-handedness in the process. And some asked whether the CTED was the appropriate body in the UN system to facilitate counter-terrorism technical assistance.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1624 (14 September 2005) mandated that all states must prohibit incitement to terrorism.
- S/RES/1535 (26 March 2004) established the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate and endorsed CTED’s original organisational plan.
- S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001) created obligations on all states to adopt certain counter-terrorism measures and established the CTC to monitor its implementation.

**Other Relevant Documents**

- S/2006/80 (8 February 2008) contained the organisational plan for the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate.
- S/PV5779 (14 November 2007) was the verbatim record of the Council debate on the “Briefings by Chairmen of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council.”
- A/RES/60/288 (20 September 2006) is the General Assembly Resolution adopting the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
- S/2004/642 (12 August 2004) is the Organisational Plan for the CTED.
Notable Dates for March

Reports Due for Consideration in March | Document Requesting Report
--- | ---
29 February | SG monthly report on Darfur S/RES/1769
29 February | SG report on implementation of resolution 1701 (every four months) S/RES/1701
mid-March | SG semi-annual report on UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) S/RES/1662
20 March | SG report on UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) S/RES/1777
25 March | SG quarterly report on Chad/ CAR S/RES/1778
31 March | SG report on UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) S/RES/1244
31 March | SG report on UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) S/RES/1794
late March | SG quarterly report on Darfur S/RES/1769
late March | SG quarterly report on UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) S/RES/1580

March 2008 | Mandates Expire | Relevant Document
--- | --- | ---
23 March | UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) | S/RES/1746
31 March | Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) | S/RES/1787
31 March | Democratic Republic of the Congo sanctions and Group of Experts | S/RES/1799

March 2008 | Other Important Dates
--- | ---
2-4 March | President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is expected to visit Iraq and meet with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and Prime Minister Nouri Maliki.
20 March | The Council is expected to receive a briefing and report from the Chairman of the 1737 Sanctions Committee concerning Iran.
29 March | The mid-term briefing of the Panel of Experts for Sudan to the Sanctions Committee is due by this date.
late March | The Council may receive a briefing from the Secretariat on Nepal in the lead-up to the 10 April elections.

Also expected in March:
- The fourth round of talks between Morocco and the Polisario is scheduled for 16-18 March in Manhasset, New York.
- A parliamentary session to elect a new Lebanese President has been scheduled for 11 March.
- An Arab League Summit has been scheduled for 29-30 March in Damascus.
- The Secretary-General is likely to present a report on progress in the establishment of the Lebanon special tribunal in early March.
- The Council is expected to receive the Peacebuilding Commission’s advice on the situation in Guinea-Bissau.
- Preparatory work on the demarcation of the border between north and south Sudan may begin.
- The Human Rights Council expects the report of Special Rapporteur on Sudan Sima Samar in March.
- The Secretary-General is likely to present a report on enhancing cooperation between the UN and regional organisations, especially the AU.

Important Dates over the Horizon
- A referendum on a new constitution in Myanmar has been scheduled for May.
- The Human Rights Council will hold the first session of the Universal Periodic Review from 7 to 18 April.
- A census is now planned for April in Sudan.
- Constituent assembly elections in Nepal, delayed twice from 22 November and 20 June, have been scheduled for 10 April.
- Council members have invited the AU Peace and Security Council to a joint meeting in New York on 16 April. Discussions are ongoing regarding the agenda.
- A referendum on a new constitution in Myanmar has been scheduled for May.
- Local government elections are scheduled for June in Sierra Leone.
- Presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire are now expected before the end of June 2008, postponed from 31 October 2007.
- The Secretary-General is expected to submit to the Council a report on Small Arms in April 2008.
- A meeting of states to consider the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in small arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects is planned for 14-18 July 2008 in New York.
- Local elections are currently planned for 1 October in Iraq.

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