OVERVIEW FOR FEBRUARY

In February, Panama will have the presidency of the Council. A major focus will be increasing the number of Council meetings opened to participation from the wider UN membership.

An important thematic debate is scheduled for 12 February on Children in Armed Conflict. The Foreign Minister of Panama, Samuel Lewis Navarro, is expected to preside and it seems likely that the Foreign Minister of France, Bernard Kouchner, will also be present. It is expected to be an open debate.

Open debates were also under discussion at time of writing on:
- Darfur (to discuss the UNAMID deployment);
- Somalia (to discuss the renewal of the authorisation of the AU force AMISOM);
- Timor-Leste (to renew the UNMIT mandate and consider conclusions from the visiting mission).

A public session on the Middle East is also expected—although the format is unclear at this stage and is likely to be influenced by developments.

Debates are also possible on:
- Kosovo (depending on developments in the region);
- Iran (the draft resolution on sanctions, elements of which had been agreed by the P5 plus Germany at time of writing and were being made available informally)

Aide-Memoire

Important matters pending for the Council include:
- The Council is yet to follow up on the Secretary-General’s recommendations on protection of civilians contained in his report of 28 October 2007.
- The Council requested the Secretary-General on 29 November 2006 (S/2006/928) to update the index to Council notes and statements on working methods. This has not been published.
- The 2005 World Summit requested the Security Council to consider reforms for the Military Staff Committee. This has yet to be addressed.
- The Secretary-General’s report on security sector reform, requested in February 2007 (PRST 2007/3), has not been issued.
- The post of the Special Representative in Ethiopia-Eritrea has been vacant since May 2006.

On the DRC, the Council Sanctions Committee has not acted on individual sanctions under resolution 1698 against armed groups that recruit children despite MONUC reports about the problem continuing on a serious scale. Nor has the Council resumed discussion of the issue of natural resources in the DRC, raised in its open thematic debate on the subject of natural resources and conflict in June (S/PV.5705).

On West Africa, the Council is yet to follow up its 16 March 2007 consultations on cross-border issues.

The Secretary-General’s report on options for further implementation of resolution 1625 on conflict prevention, particularly in Africa, requested in August in PRST 2007/31 had not been published as of this writing. (However, advance copies were reportedly available to Council members in mid-January.)

The most recent UNAMI report on human rights in Iraq covered the period from 1 April to 30 June 2007. The reports are usually produced every two to three months. A further report was therefore expected on 30 September.

The Secretary-General has yet to put forward proposals for the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in the Sheb’a Farms area, in accordance with resolution 1701, and respond to the cartographic, legal and political implications of the alternative path suggested by the government of Lebanon in its seven-point plan.

The Council referred Guinea-Bissau to the PBC and on 19 December 2007 it formally became the third country to be placed on the PBC’s agenda. No official document has been published at press time.
to elected members); and
- **Counter-Terrorism** (the recommendations for improvement of CTED—although this may need to wait until March).

A public meeting on the **DRC** is expected to renew the sanctions regime and the mandate of the Group of Experts.

Also, a public meeting to appoint temporary judges for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) requested by the president of the Tribunal (S/2007/788), is likely.

In addition consultations or briefings are possible on:
- **Lebanon** (progress with the tribunal and to respond to developments);
- **Sierra Leone** (consideration of a completion strategy for the UN mission);
- **Western Sahara** (to review the Secretary-General’s report on progress);
- **Conflict Prevention** (to consider the recommendations of the December seminar organised by Congo and the advice of the Council’s Working Group); and
- **Myanmar** (depending on developments).

Mandates expiring in January and requiring Council decisions are:
- **DRC** (sanctions and Group of Experts);
- **Somalia** (AMISOM); and
- **Timor-Leste** (UNMIT).

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### Status Update since our January Forecast

Recent developments on the situations covered in this Forecast are addressed in the relevant briefs. Interesting developments in the Council on other issues in January included:

- **Subsidiary Bodies**: On 3 January, the Council decided on the chairs and vice-chairs of subsidiary bodies, as well as Council members of the Peacebuilding Commission for 2008 (S/2008/2). (Please see our *Update* of 4 January).

- **North Korea**: Ambassador Marcello Spatara of Italy, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee on the Democratic Republic of North Korea, briefed the Council on the Committee’s activities on 3 January. (See S/2007/778 for an overview of the Committee’s 2007 activities.)

- **Chad/Central African Republic**: The Council adopted a press statement on 7 January that “welcomed progress made in the deployment of MINURCAT and encouraged contributors to make available to MINURCAT and EUFOR the personnel and resources required for the implementation of their mandates” (SC/9221). In the statement, the Council expressed concern at recent actions of illegal armed groups in eastern Chad and western Sudan and tensions it has engendered between the two countries.

- **Côte d’Ivoire**: On 15 January, the Council considered (S/PV.5820) the Secretary-General’s latest report on UNOCI (S/2008/1) and adopted resolution 1795, which renewed UNOCI and the French forces which support it until 30 July 2008, “in order to support the organization in Côte d’Ivoire of free, open, fair and transparent elections”. Presidential elections are currently planned before the end of June.

- **Terrorism**: On 15 January, the Council adopted a press statement that condemned the 14 January suicide attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul, Afghanistan (SC/9226). In the statement, the Council “reiterated that no terrorist act can reverse the path towards peace, democracy and reconstruction in Afghanistan”.

- **Kosovo**: The Council held consultations on UNMIK on 15 January and a debate on 16 January (S/PV.5821). During the debate, Serbian President Boris Tadic called for “resumed negotiations” on the future status of Kosovo, and noted that “respect for… sovereignty and territorial integrity is guaranteed by the UN Charter and called on the Council “to prevent the promotion and adoption of a unilateral measure on the independence of Kosovo.” After the debate, the Council held a closed meeting with President Tadic, Hashim Thaci of Kosovo and Joachim Rucker, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNMIK (S/PV.5822, which was also issued as a communiqué).

- **Myanmar**: On 17 January, the Council held consultations on Myanmar. The Council adopted a press statement reiterating full support for the efforts of the Secretary-General’s Special Advisor, Ibrahim Gambari, and “underscored the importance of further progress, noting that an early visit to Myanmar by Mr. Gambari could help facilitate this” (SC/9228).

- **Iraq**: On 21 January, Staffan de Mistura, Special Representative of the Secretary General, briefed the Council on UNAMI following the Secretary-General’s latest report (S/2008/19). Mr. de Mistura told the Council that the UN could continue to support Iraq’s recovery by helping the government to assist returning refugees and internally displaced persons, resolve internal border disputes, support economic reconstruction and address health concerns. US Ambassador Zalmai Khalilzad briefed the Council on the work of the Multinational Force in Iraq, emphasising recent security gains and efforts toward national reconciliation. He suggested in the coming year that the Force would focus on strengthening the capacity of the Iraqi armed forces and ministries (S/PV.5823).

- **Nepal**: On 23 January, the Council adopted resolution 1796, extending UNMIN’s mandate for six months in keeping with the Secretary General’s recommendation in his 3 January report (S/2008/5).

- **Middle East**: The Council held a debate and consultations on the Middle East on 22-25 January. These were held after Saudi Arabia requested an urgent meeting to address recent developments in the occupied territories (S/2008/31). Calling the humanitarian situation in Gaza “extremely fragile,” Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe reiterated the Secretary-General’s emphasis on “the responsibilities of all parties to adhere to their obligations under international humanitarian law and to not endanger civilians” (S/PV.5824 and resumption 1). At press time, Council members were discussing a draft presidential statement to address the situation in Gaza. On 30 January, the Council is expected to hold its monthly debate on the Middle East.

- **Georgia**: At press time, the Council was expected to hold consultations on UNOMIG on 29 January.

- **Ethiopia/Eritrea**: At time of writing, the Council was expected to extend the mandate of UNMEE on 30 January.
Security Council output fell significantly in 2007. The number of resolutions dropped from 87 to 56, while the total of presidential statements fell from 59 to fifty. The combined figures represent a fall of 27 percent—or forty fewer decisions in 2007 than in 2006.

The number of decisions does not necessarily mean a reduction in activity, however. To the contrary, the Council remained very busy in 2007, although some of the more intense activity did not result in agreed outcomes.

The number of Council meetings also dropped significantly. This is not surprising because of the high correlation between the convening of formal meetings and the level of prior agreement on outcomes. Interestingly, the number of meetings also fell by 27 percent.

Below is a chart that reproduces the statistics first published in our March 2007 Forecast report covering 2006 and which now includes data for 2007. (Additional statistical analysis of the 2007 figures is available on our website www.securitycouncilreport.org.)

What is the story behind these statistics? In part, this represents some good news. When the figures are broken down to the country-specific level, it is clear that 50 percent of the fall in activity—twenty decisions—is related to just four country situations: Côte d’Ivoire, North Korea, Haiti and the DRC. In all four cases, reduced tensions led to a reduced need for Council attention. In the case of Haiti and DRC, the successful completion of elections in 2006 was a major factor.

But the other 50 percent is less easy to understand. It seems that the more troubled political dynamics in the Council in 2007 may be part of the explanation. The failed attempts to pass resolutions on Myanmar and Kosovo left legacies that resulted in an overall less cooperative atmosphere. And the Kosovo draft resolution consumed a huge amount of Council energy.

There was a big drop (from 12 to seven) in the number of Council decisions on Sudan. This represents 12.5 percent of the overall reduction in activity.

The total number of decisions on thematic issues fell from 26 to 23. But this figure conceals a much more dramatic fall in the number of thematic resolutions, down from 15 to five. It seems that political dynamics may explain part of this trend, particularly the apparent tendency to substitute thematic resolutions with presidential statements.

Another factor that may have influenced the totals was the concern by a number of members that too many draft presidential statements had little substance and were not going to influence events on the ground.

Possible contributing factors also include the fact that the two of the largest generators of draft Council decisions, France and the UK, had changes of political leadership in their capitals. And the change in leadership in the Secretariat in 2007 may also have played a role. The number of reports from the Secretary-General to the Council on country-specific issues dropped by 20 percent.

Another partial explanation is the fact that in 2006 there was an unusually high number of “technical” resolutions. These included ten “rollover” resolutions briefly extending mandates, whereas in 2007 the Council only needed to resort to this device on five occasions. Similarly, in 2006 there were four technical extensions of terms for ICTY and ICTR judges, whereas there was only one such resolution in 2007 (for the ICTY Prosecutor).

We should note that we also decided to test the hypothesis that the significant reduction in decisions in 2007 might have been offset by a shift to greater use of press statements. But while the number of Council press statements did rise slightly in 2007, it seems that 2006 had been a low year for press statements and that the 2007 figure was still below the average for the previous five years.
Children and Armed Conflict

Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to discuss the Secretary-General’s report on children and armed conflict in an open debate on 12 February. The Foreign Minister of Panama is expected to preside and the Foreign Minister of France seems likely to attend.

The Secretary-General is expected to suggest that the Council consider giving equal weight to all categories of grave violations against children as triggers for placement of parties in the two annexes on his report, rather than just the issue of recruiting and using children.

In early February, work is expected to begin on negotiating a draft Council decision. (Expanding the categories for placing groups on the list would require a resolution.)

Please see the separate Security Council Report publication Children and Armed Conflict, which is the first of a new series of crosscutting reports which will approach thematic issues on the Council agenda systematically tracking the way in which the thematic principles are applied by the Council in individual country specific situations.

Key Recent Developments
Resolution 1612, adopted in July 2005, established a monitoring and reporting mechanism to collect, organise and verify information on violations against children in armed conflict and on progress made by parties in the Secretary-General’s annexes in complying with international norms on children and armed conflict.

For each situation, a Secretary-General’s report is considered by the Working Group. The report is based on information from a UN taskforce on the ground. Six criteria are used for monitoring and reporting:
- recruiting and use of child soldiers;
- killing and maiming of children;
- rape and other grave sexual violence against children;
- illicit exploitation of natural resources;
- abduction of children; and
- denial of humanitarian access to children.

The monitoring and reporting mechanism has now been established in six conflicts listed in Annex 1 (situations on the Council’s agenda) of the Secretary-General’s report: Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Nepal, Somalia and Sudan. Two Annex 2 situations (those not on the Council’s agenda), Sri Lanka and Uganda, have voluntarily agreed to set up the monitoring and reporting mechanism. Myanmar and the Philippines are open to setting it up. Colombia has yet to give written consent.

The Working Group meets every two to three months and considers two situation-specific reports from the Secretary-General as well as an overview on other conflicts affecting children. It has met 11 times since establishment in November 2005. It adopted terms of reference, designed a “tool kit” of possible actions in response to violations and has considered 14 reports. It is now on the second round of reporting for the DRC, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire and Burundi. Reports on the Philippines and Colombia have yet to be considered.

Conclusions have been adopted on ten of the 14 reports. Conclusions were published regularly until the last quarter of 2007. Reports on Côte d’Ivoire and Chad were considered in October but at press time, conclusions have not been released.

Options
One option is for the Council to simply express support and encouragement for the Working Group and its potential achievement and for the monitoring and reporting mechanism. In that event, a presidential statement might be considered.

A more ambitious option is to work on expanding the mechanism. This might involve:
- adopting a resolution in February; or
- adopting a presidential statement indicating agreement to develop additional measures and inviting the Working Group to prepare a draft resolution for its consideration.

Other options include:
- requesting the Secretary-General to include a dedicated section on children and armed conflict in all his country-specific reports to the Council; and
- requesting the Secretary-General and the Working Group to ensure the publication of reports highlighting the follow up of Working Group action including responses from the parties.

Key Issues
The key issue is whether the Council should adopt a new resolution to expand criteria for inclusion of situations in Annex 1. The more significant question in this regard is whether to give equal weight to all categories of grave violations of children involved in armed conflict. Since the start of the Secretary-General’s annexes, the gateway criterion has simply been use of child soldiers. Some feel this should be expanded to at least one more criterion, such as sexual violence. Others argue that all categories of grave violations should be used.

Another key issue is how to increase pressure against persistent violators. More transparency with follow up reports is one aspect. The issue of further targeted sanctions also lies in the background.

Another issue is ensuring that the Council’s thematic approach is not undermined by failure to follow up with enforcement measures such as sanctions. One possibility is to expand the mandate of the Working Group and request it to recommend individuals for targeted measures to the Council and oversee implementation of such measures when there is no appropriate sanctions committee.

Another issue is ensuring that the Secretariat establishes monitoring and reporting mechanisms in all situations being considered by the Working Group.

An issue is sustaining Working Group momentum. There seems to be some slowing in publishing Working Group conclusions. Linked with this is measuring the Group’s effectiveness against action taken.

Council and Wider Dynamics
In the past, members have put aside differences (such as whether to look at situations not on the Council’s agenda) and allowed important developments to occur in the Working Group on both substance and procedure. However, expanding the monitoring and reporting mechanism seems likely to stimulate some heavy discussion which may make it difficult to get agreement on the details of any such initiative in February. More time may be needed.

France, as Chair of the Working Group, has been the main driver behind many developments. The UK is now openly supportive. The US is actively involved but cautious about certain recommendations and the legal implications of Working Group decisions.

Italy and Belgium are generally supportive and are likely to accept some expansion of the criteria used for the Secretary-General’s list. China, while acknowledging the importance of the issue, remains cautious about moving too quickly. Russia, on the other
hand, is open to having all six egregious violations used as criteria.

Among the non-permanent members, South Africa and Indonesia, have been reluctant to take strong action. New member, Costa Rica, is likely to be supportive and active. The level of likely African involvement is unclear although many recall the key leadership played by Benin when it was on the Council.

### UN Documents

#### Security Council Resolution

#### Selected Presidential Statements

#### Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2007/758 (21 December 2007) was the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Sri Lanka.
- S/2007/686 (28 November 2007) was the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Burundi.
- S/2007/666 (16 November 2007) was the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Myanmar.
- S/2007/515 (30 August 2007) was the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire.
- S/2007/520 (29 August 2007) was the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the Sudan.

#### Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict Documents
- S/AC.5/2007/17 (25 October 2007) were the conclusions on the DRC.
- S/AC.5/2007/16 (24 September 2007) were the conclusions on Chad.
- S/AC.5/2007/14 (20 July 2007) were the conclusions on Somalia.
- S/AC.5/2007/12 (20 July 2007) were the conclusions on Uganda.
- S/AC.5/2007/9 (13 June 2007) were the conclusions on Sri Lanka.

### Sudan/Darfur

#### Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to focus more closely on the difficulties surrounding the deployment of the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and is likely to seek briefings on meetings between the Secretariat and Sudan, including expected discussions in the margins of the AU Summit in Addis Ababa from 25 January to 3 February. It is unclear whether the Council will also focus more deeply on the peace process or whether proposals for formal Council action will arise.

In addition to the monthly report on Darfur, the Secretary-General’s quarterly report on the north-south situation is expected by 31 January.

#### Key Recent Developments
The grave humanitarian situation in Darfur continues, and conditions may deteriorate due to an increasing risk of crop failure in Darfur. Conflict between the government and rebels has increased recently, including significant aerial bombardments in response to reported advances by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Observers note this may trigger a strong government offensive soon.

The situation along the border with Chad also appears to have deteriorated, with complaints by Khartoum and N’Djaména and reports of Chadian army incursions and bombardments.

On 22 December, the General Assembly adopted a resolution approving UNAMID’s budget. Concern with procurement procedures used by the Secretary-General in response to UNAMID’s fast-deployment needs gave rise to extensive criticism. The amount agreed was $1.28 billion, below the $1.48 billion requested by the Secretary-General, justified on the basis of likely lower financial requirements due to the delays in UNAMID’s deployment.

On 1 January, UNAMID formally took over peacekeeping responsibilities from the AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS).

The Secretary-General and some Council members expressed strong criticism after a UNAMID convoy of twenty marked white vehicles came under attack by government forces on 8 January.

At a Council briefing on 9 January, Under Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno presented a report on the mission’s continuing difficulties including shortages in troops and assets. So far, only a relatively small number of deployments have been made, including a Bangladeshi formed police unit and part of a Chinese engineering unit originally agreed under the heavy support package to AMIS. Further support package units are expected only by late March apparently due to logistical and administrative delays. Egyptian and Ethiopian units are expected to begin deploying by late February.

Despite relatively positive signals in December, Khartoum continued to oppose some non-African contingents equipped with critical engineering and rapid-reaction capabilities from Norway, Sweden, Thailand and Nepal. Important arrangements regarding flight clearances and access to land and water have also faced obstruction.

In early January, Khartoum reportedly rejected the Norwegian and Swedish pledges, which have since been withdrawn. (Some rebels have also reportedly opposed Egyptian, Pakistani and Chinese contributions.)

Other difficulties with significant consequences for UNAMID’s deployment schedule include:
- cancellation of a pledge for a logistics unit and another for an aerial reconnaissance unit;
- difficulties in negotiations with other troop contributors, as some now appear to set conditions for participation such as limiting operations to daytime, as well as to slow deployment preparations due to safety concerns, particularly after the recent government attack against the UNAMID convoy; and
- persistent difficulties with securing mobility assets (especially helicopters), seemingly due to wider concerns of some potential contributors with commitments elsewhere, or to apprehension about the volatile operational environment and untested command-and-control structures and lack of technically adequate units.

The Secretariat has been struggling on the helicopter issue. The alternatives so far identified—multi-country helicopter units,
converting civilian helicopters or borrowing from other UN missions—have so far been considered unfeasible or counterproductive. There is a possibility that the concept of operations will need to be modified if a suitable option is not found soon.

It appears that the UK hosted a brainstorming meeting on the helicopter issue with the Secretariat and some member states in mid-January. A further meeting may take place by the end of the month.

Following the 8 January attack on the UNAMID convoy, the US circulated a draft presidential statement condemning the attack, calling on member states to provide outstanding mobility assets and on Khartoum to:

- accept the proposed list of troop contributors;
- facilitate UNAMID’s access to land and water;
- grant flight clearances;
- issue visas in a timely manner; and
- finalise an appropriate status-of-forces agreement.

Divisions among members—particularly opposition to criticism of Khartoum—continued. Agreement was reached on 11 January on a statement condemning the attack by Sudanese forces but limiting the call on Sudan to “concluding all necessary arrangements.”

A Secretariat delegation travelled to Khartoum in mid-January to discuss deployment issues. At press time, it was unclear whether progress would be made.

On the political negotiations for a peace agreement, it seems that preparations continue for a new rebel meeting to find a common negotiating position. Informal discussions among rebels on how to overcome fragmentation also continue, but the degree of progress has been limited. Some condition participation in peace talks on issues such as unification of all rebel groups, rather than coalescence around a common position under one negotiation team, or on a ceasefire. Some have also voiced continuous opposition to AU Envoy Salim A. Salim and to Libya as a venue for talks. Rebel discussions have not included key commanders such as JEM’s Khalil Ibrahim and Abdul Wahid al-Nur.

Discussions are also ongoing on the nomination of an AU-UN chief mediator, but it is unclear when a final decision will be made.

In mid-January, Khartoum appointed Janjaweed leader Musal Hilal as a government adviser. (Hilal was indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2007 for his role in crimes committed in Darfur.) The move attracted strong international criticism of Sudan for defiance of its obligation to cooperate with the ICC under Council resolution 1593.

**Related Developments on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)**

Tensions between the north and south on the CPA’s implementation appear to have receded after agreement was reached on a number of points of contention, including troop redeployment, funding for border demarcation and a census (now scheduled for April), and transparency in the oil sector, with the notable exception of Abyei’s fate. Southern representatives have reportedly resumed their participation in the central government after months of suspension, and northern troops reportedly finalised redeployment away from the south on 9 January. However, insecurity persisted particularly on the western sector of the north-south border, after clashes between southern forces and tribal militia previously aligned with the north in January.

**Options**

One option is to continue to leave UNAMID deployment issues to the Secretariat.

Another is deciding to take a more active role in resolving those problems by establishing an ad hoc working group on Darfur and:

- mandating the group to hold informal discussions with troop contributors as necessary;
- establishing weekly meetings of the working group with Sudan and the Secretariat to review progress and resolve emerging issues; and
- empowering its chair to travel to Sudan as necessary to negotiate solutions.

Another option is to become more involved in the peace process through regular consultations with the mediation team perhaps within a new Darfur working group.

**Key Issues**

The key issue for the Council is ensuring quick progress on the peacekeeping track, including:

- Khartoum’s continued ambiguity towards UNAMID;
- troop composition and robustness, permission for night flights, water and land use;
- emerging difficulties with troop generation due to Khartoum’s posture and security concerns;
- the absence of mobility-asset contributions;
- risks that lack of robustness may create for UNAMID; and
- the mission’s unparalleled management, infrastructure, logistical, security and environmental challenges.

A parallel issue is progress with political reconciliation, including:

- reaching a ceasefire;
- reaching agreement on negotiation modalities, notably regarding land, power-sharing and relationship with the CPA;
- achieving a peace agreement quickly with substantive rebel participation and unity, and balancing this with the needs of civil society, the government (given north-south tensions) and Arab communities; and
- deterring attempts to influence the talks through force or obstruction.

A major issue is whether insufficient action at this juncture will be seen as strategic failure with the kind of consequences that occurred in the 1990s for the UN and peacekeeping in general. A similar issue arises in the context of Khartoum’s continuing defiance of its obligation to cooperate with the ICC.

**Council Dynamics**

Discussion of the US draft presidential statement following the 8 January attack on UNAMID indicates that the traditional fault lines between members continue, in particular on the issue of whether to openly criticise Khartoum and resort to pressure over UNAMID’s deployment needs.

The US, the UK and several other members, frustrated at Khartoum’s perceived flouting of commitments, want to ratchet up the public pressure by using stronger language in Council statements and resolutions.

However, others see little value in public criticism, which they believe will be self-defeating. They prefer to deal with the realities of UNAMID’s deployment by arguing that it is necessary to negotiate to secure Khartoum’s continuing cooperation. China, Russia, Indonesia, Libya and South Africa
are likely to lead the case for re-energising dialogue with Khartoum.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**
- S/RES/1769 (31 July 2007) established UNAMID.
- S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred Darfur to the ICC.
- S/RES/1590 (24 March 2005) established UNMIS.

**Selected Presidential Statement**
- S/PRST/2008/1 (11 January 2008) was the latest UNMIS report.
- S/2007/759 (24 December 2007) was the latest UNMIS report.
- S/2007/624 (23 October 2007) was the latest Panel of Experts’ report.

**Latest Secretary-General’s Reports**
- S/RES/1757 (20 July 2007) and S/2007/759 (24 December 2007) were letters sent by Sudan and Chad on the recent border tensions.
- S/RES/1752 (17 July 2007) and S/2007/624 (23 October 2007) were letters sent by Sudan and Chad on the recent border tensions.
- A/RES/62/232 (22 December 2007) approved funding for UNAMID.
- S/RES/1769 (31 July 2007) to present; mandate expires 30 April 2008

**Other Relevant Facts**
- UNMIS: Duration
  - 31 July 2007 to present; mandate expires 31 July 2008
- **UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General**
  - Ashraf Qazi (Pakistan)
- **UNMIS: Size and Cost**
  - Maximum authorised strength: Up to 10,000 military personnel including some 750 military observers; up to 715 police
  - Strength as of 31 December 2007: 8,804 troops, 596 military observers, and 637 police
  - Civilian component as of 30 November 2007: 865 international, 2,580 local and 257 UN Volunteers
  - Cost: 1 July 2007 - 30 June 2008: $887.33 million

It seems that the delay in the presentation of a new resolution reflects a lower sense of urgency triggered by the December 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report (see our January 2008 Forecast for details).

Tensions between Iran and the US continued. On 6 January, a naval incident occurred in the Strait of Hormuz. The White House warned Iran that its action was provocative and dangerous. Iran accused the US of orchestrating a propaganda campaign.

ElBaradei visited Iran on 11 and 12 January and met Iran’s leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Iran and the IAEA agreed that implementation of all remaining verification issues specified in the August 2007 work plan for resolving outstanding issues would be completed by 13 February.

**Options**

The Council could adopt the resolution as presented.

Another option might be to give more emphasis to the “dual track” aspects and call for renewed negotiations. In this regard:
- ■ if the P5 are reluctant to see changes in the resolution itself, additional elements of interest to elected members could be inserted in a separate presidential statement (as the Council routinely does every six months on the Golan Heights issue— with a resolution on UN Disengagement Observer Force and a presidential statement on the wider political context); and
- ■ the Secretary-General could be requested to designate an envoy tasked to conduct talks with Iran perhaps working with the EU envoy Javier Solana and brief the Council.

**Key Issues**

A key issue is whether any elected members will push to delay the resolution pending the outcome of the IAEA work plan process.

An underlying issue stems from the fact that the NIE report seems to have led to renewed questioning of the appropriateness of the Council’s role on the Iranian nuclear issue at this stage. It is unclear to what extent this
may raise significant domestic political problems for some elected members.

**Council Dynamics**

It seems that the P5 are willing to allow some time for discussions on the draft. They are likely to resist amendments especially if they undercut the substance of the draft which is already a result of several months of negotiations. However, many elected members in the past have expressed frustration for not being able to contribute to the substance.

Some elected members are expected to have strong reservations about the draft. Libya has difficulties in principle with sanctions regimes—given its own experience—and is likely to prefer that the Council not take up a new resolution. Libya seems to prefer that direct negotiations to resolve difficulties in principle with the crisis be a major part of the mix and seems to believe that additional sanctions could make things worse. Indonesia seems concerned that the timing of a third resolution is not appropriate since the work plan is about to be completed, and may fear that additional sanctions could hamper that process. Indonesia also seems to doubt that there is a real threat to international peace and security because there is no proof that Iran is developing a military nuclear programme and, in any case, it has the right to enrich uranium. South Africa in the past shared this approach.

It remains to be seen whether the mildness of the resolution—its focus on vigilance rather than enforcement, and the references to progress in the implementation of the IAEA work plan and emphasis on negotiations—will lead to some of these concerns being muted and any proposals to amend the resolution being relatively moderate.

There seems to be consensus in the Council on the need for Iran to re-establish confidence in the peaceful nature of its past and current nuclear programme and to allow more transparency. Everyone seems to believe that Iran should ratify and implement the additional protocol.

**UN Documents**

**Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1747 (24 March 2007) imposed additional measures against Iran and reinforced existing ones.
- S/RES/1737 (23 December 2006) imposed measures against Iran under Chapter VII, article 41, of the UN Charter.
- S/RES/1696 (31 July 2006) demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.

**Latest IAEA Board Resolution**

- GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006) underlined the necessary steps that Iran should take to re-establish confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme and reported the issue to the Security Council.

**Latest IAEA Report**

- GOV/2007/58 (15 November 2007)

**IAEA/Iran Work Plan**

- INFCIRC/711 (27 August 2007)

**Latest Letters**

- S/2007/780 (31 December 2007) was a letter from the chairman of the 1737 Sanctions Committee transmitting a report covering the activities of the Committee from 23 December 2006 to 31 December 2007.
- S/2007/765 (28 December 2007) was a letter from Iran reacting to the NIE report.

**Useful Additional Source**


**Somalia**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council is expected to renew authorisation for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which expires on 20 February. An open debate is also expected in mid-January.

The Council is also due to receive a report from the Secretary-General on contingency planning for UN peacekeeping in Somalia, as well as options for strengthening AMISOM. It is unclear whether the report will be ready before the AMISOM re-authorization.

The new authorisation resolution is likely to repeat key messages on the need for political reconciliation, improving the humanitarian situation and strengthening AMISOM. On the other hand, it is unclear whether new options will emerge, particularly on the security dimension.

**Key Recent Developments**

Clashes between insurgents and Ethiopian troops alongside Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces continued in recent weeks, especially in Mogadishu and its environs. TFG and Ethiopian forces have responded with cordon-and-search operations and roadblocks. Both sides have been accused of abuse against civilians, violations of international law and harassment of aid workers.

Piracy off the Somali coast continues to rise. The number of incidents reportedly tripled in 2007.

The security deterioration continues to take a toll on the civilian population, with mounting displacement and obstacles to aid delivery. This has been compounded by forced evictions of displaced persons by TFG officials attempting to regain the use of former government buildings and deny territory to insurgents.

The regional situation has also deteriorated with political instability in Kenya and the continuing dangerous standoff between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The TFG’s attempts to improve its legitimacy and gather support from the political opposition continues. Somali Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein announced his new cabinet in early January. After a difficult start in December, it now appears that a smaller new cabinet of 18 ministers will be formed. Half the ministers are from outside the parliament, in a bid to form a more professional and less politically charged cabinet.

A number of members of the Somali transitional parliament have already criticised the nominations, some complaining about the exclusion of their respective clans.

It is unclear whether the government will be able to improve relations with the opposition, in particular the Hawiye clan’s leadership. It seems that consultations are being held with a view towards a large reconciliation conference but the prospects are unclear.

Fragmentation also seems to be increasing within the insurgency. Media reports suggest that there are increasing divergences between the al-Shabaab militia (formerly associated with the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and still active in Somalia) and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (an umbrella group based in Eritrea and
Options on the security track include sponsoring a major initiative to strengthen AMISOM, either through the Council’s Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations or the International Contact Group for Somalia. This could include:

- signalling willingness to consider extending the authorisation for AMISOM to a wider group of countries;
- a pledging conference;
- meetings with potential contributors (from Africa and outside), the AU and perhaps the Arab League; and
- developing a UN support package for AMISOM following the Darfur model.

Regarding the political dimension, one option is to explicitly push for much more broadly-based negotiations than has been the case to date, and:

- demanding a ceasefire to facilitate negotiations;
- requesting the Secretary-General to immediately increase resources to support a negotiating process designed to lead to a genuine government of national unity, including sufficient resources for appropriate close protection security for UN personnel involved; and
- encouraging a more detailed plan from Ould-Abdallah, agreed with key Somali stakeholders, on participation, venue, agenda and modalities for an all-inclusive reconciliation conference.

Another option would be to address the increasing piracy. This could include calling on the TFG to enter into agreements to allow concerned UN member states’ naval vessels access to Somali territorial waters for counter-piracy patrols.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is whether and how to become more active on both the security and political tracks, beyond general statements of support.

On the political dimension, the key issue is how best to establish a meaningful, inclusive dialogue process and to steer the parties towards:

- a compromise power-sharing arrangement; and

A related issue is whether UIC elements must be included and, if so, how to overcome reservations by those concerned about possible terrorist connections.

For the security situation, issues include:

- the need for Ethiopian withdrawal;
- the need for support for AMISOM, and particularly whether there are possibilities of military support from a wider range of UN member states, and whether the authorising resolution should therefore be broader;
- funding issues—including whether the Council is willing to agree to fund support packages from the UN budget; and
- whether conditions exist for UN peacekeeping.

An emerging issue is the potential lack of coordination amongst various international peacemaking and security initiatives.

Council Dynamics
Council members seem inclined to move forward with political reconciliation issues. There continues to be support for AMISOM, and some interest in looking at options on how best to address piracy issues.

Support for a meaningful and inclusive political process is strong. This would be focused on establishing a new constitutional process towards elections in 2009, with substantial UN support. Some have expressed support for TFG leadership in this regard, but there has been frustration among members also about the degree of TFG openness to meaningful negotiations. Given the new Somali cabinet, however, it is unclear how far members will want to go in February in terms of pressuring the TFG to move forward with a new political process.

On security, while there is consensus that AMISOM should be strengthened, some (such as Belgium and Russia) have already voiced concerns that the current environment is not sufficiently permissive to allow a UN peacekeeping operation. Others now seem to privately agree with this conclusion. Some appear concerned about the negative effects of wider linkages between improving security and counter-terrorism activities in Somalia.

Nevertheless, some have continued to insist that the Secretariat present a detailed contingency peacekeeping plan.
Most seem open to options whereby other member states beyond the AU would be authorised to provide support for AMISOM or some other coalition model, but note that the absence of concrete proposals prevents serious consideration of formal Council action in that regard. Some UN members appear to be bilaterally looking into options to support AMISOM, but so far substantive discussions have not taken place within the Council.

**Timor-Leste**

### Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), which expires on 26 February. There is some interest in looking into UNMIT’s mandate in light of the Council visit last November. It is unclear whether adjustments will be necessary or whether signalling key messages on the implementation of UNMIT’s mandate will be sufficient.

### Key Recent Developments

The humanitarian and security situation in Timor-Leste continues to be fragile, including threats from gang activity, weakness of the security sector and the uncertain future of the “petitioners” (whose sacking from the military was one of the immediate causes of the 2006 violence). An estimated 100,000 civilians remain displaced as a result of the 2006 riots.

Major political divisions among the Timorese leadership continue. The opposition has reiterated its rejection of the legality of the current government and called for early elections.

In December, Timor was the focus of high-level international activity, including a Council open debate. There were also visits by the Secretary-General and by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, who pledged that Australian military assistance would continue.

The Secretary-General’s 17 January report noted ongoing difficulties in UNMIT’s training and mentoring of Timorese police. Some government officials have raised concerns, appealing for a speedier handover of policing responsibilities, as well as the number of UNMIT police with appropriate training skill sets. Other concerns include a relatively low number of UNMIT police deployed in the districts and their high turnover.

The report notes, however, that the current training standards should not be lowered, and that a phased handover—which would determine UNMIT’s future size—could start in April.

### Options

Options for the Council include a resolution renewing UNMIT and:

- reiterating its commitment to long-term stability in Timor-Leste;
- reiterating the urgent need for progress with security sector reform, particularly the finalisation of a national security framework, reconstitution of the police and reforming the military;
- requesting the Secretary-General to pay particular attention to the optimum integration of the various UNMIT elements and to address this aspect in future reports; and
- reinforcing the need for accountability for the 2006 violence, in particular the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry, and conditions for the return of displaced persons.

Other possibilities include:

- asking the Secretary-General to pay close attention to UNMIT’s role and relationship with the Timorese police;
- deciding to emphasise the issues of effective security sector reform and optimum mission integration by inviting key stakeholders to an Arria-style meeting;
- adjusting UNMIT’s mandate to emphasise needs and gaps in security sector reform and training, and strengthening UNMIT’s role on political reconciliation; and
- addressing in the resolution accountability issues for the 1999 violence.

### Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is ensuring that key elements contributing to the overall security situation are addressed, particularly:

- political reconciliation;
- overcoming institutional weaknesses, especially through reform of the security sector (including the military, the police and the judiciary);
- the interplay between reconciliation and accountability; and
- the root causes of instability (such as development-related issues including unemployment).

A procedural issue is whether security sector reform and mission integration aspects can be addressed in sufficient depth in the time available or whether a separate ongoing process of consideration should be launched.

A number of related issues regarding UNMIT are likely to loom large, including:

- whether to consider changes to UNMIT’s mandate now or at a later stage; and
- devising a longer-term strategy for UN assistance that ensures Timorese self-reliance.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1772 (20 August 2007) renewed AMISOM.

**Selected Presidential Statement**


**Other**

- S/PV.5805 (17 December 2007) was the latest Council briefing by Ould-Abdallah.

**Latest Report of the Monitoring Group**


**Reports and Letters of the Secretary-General**

- S/2007/658 (7 November 2007) was the latest Secretary-General’s report.
- S/2005/730 (21 November 2005) was an exchange of letters renewing the mandate of the UN Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS).

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNPOS**

Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania)

**Chairman of the Sanctions Committee**

Dumisani S. Kumalo (South Africa)

**AMISOM: Size and Composition**

- Maximum authorised strength: 7,650 troops plus maritime and air components
- Strength as of 1 January 2008: about 2,240 Ugandan and Burundian troops

**AMISOM: Duration**

February 2007 to present: AU mandate expires on 18 July 2008 and Council authorisation expires on 20 February 2008

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Council and Wider Dynamics
At a Council open debate on 13 December, members highlighted conclusions from the November visit, including political reconciliation, the need for economic development, security sector reform and unresolved aspects of the 2006 unrest, such as accountability for the violence, the “petitioners” issue and the future of displaced persons were emphasised.

There seemed to be consensus on the need for a continuing UNMIT presence in Timor-Leste. Most, however, emphasised that UN assistance should focus on building key capacities towards Timorese self-reliance and that the Secretary-General should outline how much assistance would still be needed. There seems to be some concern with creating a dependency on international involvement along with a consciousness of the need to avoid repeating past mistakes from a premature pull-out.

Some supported a review of UNMIT’s responsibilities vis-à-vis those of the Timorese police and emphasised the mission’s role in the reform of the security sector. The US, in particular, also indicated support for a stronger UNMIT role in political reconciliation and assistance in policy objectives such as economic development and governance and perhaps adjusting the mandate to this end.

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Atul Khare (India)

Size, Composition and Cost
• Maximum authorised strength: up to 1,608 police and 34 military officers
• Police/military as of 31 December 2007: 1,480 police and 33 military
• Civilian staff as of 30 November 2007: 445 international and 765 local
• Key police contributors: Malaysia, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Portugal
• Approved Budget (1 July 2007–30 June 2008): $153.1 million

Useful Additional Source

Lebanon
Expected Council Action
The Council will continue to follow events in Lebanon closely, particularly the ongoing negotiations regarding the presidential election. The Council’s position on the need to resolve the impasse quickly is clearly on record. Further Council action is only expected in February in the event of specific adverse incidents.

The Secretary-General will likely report on progress regarding the establishing of the special tribunal for Lebanon in late February. The Council may hold consultations on that issue.

Key Recent Developments
At press time, the presidential election had not yet been held, having been postponed 13 times (it was re-scheduled for 11 February). President Emile Lahoud’s term in office ended on 23 November. In late November, all Lebanese factions seemed ready to elect General Michel Suleiman, the current commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, as president. However, the Hezbollah-led opposition has continually delayed the actual election, using it as a bargaining lever to force the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora to agree to change the composition of the government and allot it a third of the seats, giving it de facto veto power.

There have been many international initiatives to end the impasse.

■ France has consistently played a leading role in trying to bridge the gap between the parties.
■ Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Beirut in November and subsequently held telephone talks with Lebanon’s political leaders.
■ The Council on 11 December adopted a presidential statement calling for an immediate election.

On 17 December, at the occasion of the Paris donors’ conference for the Palestinian territories, a communiqué on Lebanon was issued by the representatives of Egypt, France, Italy, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, the UK, the US and the EU. It called for an immediate presidential election, insisted that outside powers should respect Lebanon’s constitution and democratic institutions, condemned all political assassinations in Lebanon and supported the legitimate, democratically-elected Lebanese government and the Lebanese army.

On 6 January, the Arab League adopted a three-point plan, endorsing the choice of Michel Suleiman, calling for his immediate election and for the formation of a national unity government in such a way that no party could impose or block any decision. The president would be the arbiter in any contested decision, and there would be a new electoral law.

■ Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa went to Beirut twice in January to lobby the parties, and to Syria where he met President Bashar Al-Assad. He then said that the Arab League initiative had reached a closed door that could be re-opened but that the parties needed more time.

■ On 14 January, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said that Lebanon’s political crisis would be taken to the UN if the Arab League plan failed.
■ Another Arab League foreign ministers’ meeting was scheduled for 27 January in Cairo.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions
• S/RES/1704 (25 August 2006) established UNMIT.

Latest Report of the Secretary-General
• S/2008/26 (17 January 2008)

Other
• S/PV.5801 (13 December 2007) was the Council debate on Timor-Leste.
• S/2007/711 (6 December 2007) was the report of the Council visiting mission.
• S/2006/822 (2 October 2006) was the Report of the Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste.

International Stabilisation Force
• Size as of 14 November 2007: approximately 950 troops
• Contributors: Australia (780 troops) and New Zealand (170 troops)

Security Council Report
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In December, in deference to the electoral process, the Council initially had delayed consultations on the latest report of the Secretary-General. (Please see our December 2007 Forecast). However, it seems that eventually Council members accepted that, in light of the prolonged electoral delays, normal Council business regarding Lebanon should continue. The report was considered on 12 December.

On 12 December, a terrorist attack in Baabda killed General François el-Hajj of the Lebanese Armed Forces, and others. The Council adopted a presidential statement condemning the attack.

Several developments in January prompted Council action.

- On 8 January, a roadside bomb wounded two Irish peacekeepers.
- On the same day, Israel complained to the Council about the firing from southern Lebanon of two rockets into northern Israel. At press time this incident was being investigated by UNIFIL.
- Also on 8 January, Lebanon complained to the Council about Israel’s detention of a Lebanese shepherd who had allegedly crossed the Blue Line.

The Council on 11 January adopted a French-sponsored press statement condemning the first two incidents and calling on all parties to respect the Blue Line.

On 15 January, another attack targeted a US embassy vehicle in northern Beirut, killing four Lebanese. This was condemned by the Council in a press statement on 18 January.

On 21 January, the Lebanese army opened fire on Israeli warplanes flying over south Lebanon. This was the second such incident.

Finally, on 25 January, another bombing in Beirut killed Captain Wissam Eid, a member of the Internal Security Forces and a senior intelligence officer. Other people were killed and at least 30 were wounded. And on 27 January, demonstrations in Beirut turned violent and at least seven people were killed. At press time France was considering submitting a press or presidential statement to the Council.

On 21 December, the Secretary-General announced that the UN and the Netherlands had signed a headquarters’ agreement enabling the special tribunal for Lebanon to be based at The Hague. He also announced that he had accepted the recommendations of the selection panel and would formally appoint the judges and announce their names at a later stage. The Secretary-General made no comment about the date on which the tribunal will become operational.

Commissioner Serge Brammertz on 5 December held his final briefing (he was replaced on 1 January by Daniel Bellemare) on progress in the investigation of Rafik Hariri’s murder and all other bombings in Lebanon by the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC). He said that the Commission had identified a number of people who might have been involved in the preparation and execution of the crime. He also reported that links might exist between some of the perpetrators in various attacks, and that confirming those links would be a priority in the coming months. He said that cooperation with Syria had improved considerably, but despite these positive developments, it was still impossible to tell when the investigation would end.

Options
Options include:
- reiterated concerns about the election’s delays;
- welcoming the Arab League plan; and
- continuing the wait-and-see approach so as to avoid any risk of destabilising the political process.

On the tribunal, Council options include:
- welcoming the recent developments in a press or a presidential statement; and
- calling on all member states to make voluntary contributions to the tribunal’s trust fund.

Key Issues
The main issue remains whether any Council action at this stage could make a positive difference. There has been reluctance to do anything that might undercut the Arab League mediation. However, that mediation seems to be losing momentum. A related issue is whether the current power vacuum may be a cause—or at least an aggravating factor—in the increase in violence witnessed in the last two months.

A further related issue is whether the status quo is becoming in effect a new constitutional reality. The longer it continues, the more people become accustomed to it and governance carries on.

The main issue regarding the tribunal is when it will be operational. At press time, the necessary 51 percent of the tribunal’s costs to be covered by member states had not been secured. Another issue is whether the tribunal prosecutor would continue to be the UNIIIC commissioner.

Council Dynamics
France has the lead on Lebanon. On the Lebanese presidential election, the general mood remains one of “wait and see”. Many in the Council are concerned that further Council action is likely to risk unsettling the Lebanese political process. It remains to be seen how much longer France and the US would wait before pushing the Council to take up the issue again.

It also remains to be seen how the presence of new Council members will influence dynamics. An interesting development is the role that Libya played during negotiations on the 11 January press statement. It seems that Libya, supported by most if not all non-European elected members, argued that it was inappropriate to condemn the rocket attack against Israel without also referring to Israel’s ongoing violations of Lebanon’s airspace because both constitute violations of resolution 1701. After almost two days of negotiations, agreement was reached on a text that also included a paragraph recalling all previous condemnations of violations of resolution 1701.

UN Documents

Selected Resolutions
- S/RES/1757 (30 May 2007) established the tribunal under Chapter VII and requested a report within ninety days.
- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah and authorised a reinforcement of UNIFIL.
- S/RES/1595 (7 April 2005) established UNIIIC.
- S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) called upon all foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon, for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, supported the extension of the control of the Lebanese government over all Lebanese territory and declared its support for a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon in accordance with Lebanese constitutional rules and without foreign interference.

Latest Presidential Statements
condemned the terrorist attack that claimed the life of Lebanese armed forces General François El-Hajj and killed and wounded others.

• S/PRST/2007/46 (11 December 2007) expressed “deep concern at the repeated postponements of the presidential election in Lebanon.”

Latest Secretary-General’s Reports

• S/2007/684 (28 November 2007) was the ninth UNIIIC report.
• S/2007/641 (30 October 2007) was the latest report on resolution 1701.
• S/2007/525 (4 September 2007) was the Secretary-General’s latest announcement on the special tribunal.

Press Releases

• SC/9230 (18 January 2008) was the Council’s press statement condemning the 15 January terrorist attack against a US diplomatic vehicle in Beirut.

Other Relevant Facts

UNIIIC Commissioner and Future Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal

Daniel Bellemare (Canada)

Secretary-General’s Special Coordinator for Lebanon

Geir O. Pedersen (Norway)

Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for implementation of resolution 1559

Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway)

UNIFIL Force Commander

Major General Claudio Graziano (Italy)

Size and Composition of UNIFIL

• Authorised: 15,000 troops
• Current (30 November 2007): 13,264 military personnel, supported by some 304 international civilian and 583 local civilian staff
• Troop-contributing countries: Belgium, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, France, FYR of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Spain, Tanzania and Turkey

Cost (approved budget)


Useful Additional Sources


Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate

Expected Council Action

The report of the executive director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) pursuant to resolution 1787, which extended the CTED’s mandate until 31 March, will provide the framework for an in-depth review of the CTED by the Council. At the time of writing, discussions had begun in the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) on this report (which is not yet publicly available). It is unclear when final action will take place in the Council but it is expected before the CTED mandate expires at the end of March.

Background

The CTED was established in 2004 by resolution 1535 as a special political mission, and it has been subject to periodic reviews and renewals. The Council’s December 2006 review highlighted a number of problems and weaknesses in the operations and effectiveness of the CTED. The upcoming review is likely to focus on the CTED’s effectiveness, but other developments, including the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the General Assembly in 2006, are also expected to be major elements of the discussion.

Key Recent Developments

The new executive director of the CTED, Assistant Secretary-General Mike Smith of Australia, assumed office in mid-November. With this appointment coming so close to the original expiry of the CTED’s mandate in December, the Council decided in resolution 1787 to roll over the CTED mandate to 31 March. The Council requested Smith to submit recommended changes in the CTED’s organisation by 8 February.

In preparing his recommendations to the CTC, Smith undertook broad consultations, as promised in his statement to the CTC on 19 November. He has been consulting members of the CTC, the wider UN membership, the CTED staff and other UN counter-terrorism bodies, as well as drawing on discussions with counter-terrorism experts outside of the UN system.

Key Issues

In light of the concerns raised in 2006 in the CTC about the CTED’s effectiveness and its ability to facilitate technical assistance for counter-terrorism capacity-building, the following issues are expected to be discussed in the CTC.

- **CTED’s work methods.** Both Council and non-Council members have expressed concern in the past about inconsistency
and lack of even-handedness in concentration on certain states and regions while ignoring others, including in the choice of states for country visits. Also, non-Council members have raised concerns about limited access to the CTC and the CTED.

- **Technical assistance facilitation.** The facilitation of technical assistance for counter-terrorism capacity-building is one of the three principal areas of CTED’s responsibilities. There seems to be wide agreement that while the CTC and the CTED have achieved some success in their monitoring functions, much remains to be done with regard to facilitation of counter-terrorism capacity-building assistance.

- **Human rights dimension.** The extent to which CTED should include a human rights dimension in its capacity-building for combating terrorism continues to be unsettled. The current review of CTED’s mandate may provide an opportunity for this issue to be resolved. (CTED has one human rights expert on its staff.) Some Council members consider that CTED, as it engages with states in evaluating their level of implementation of resolution 1373, should also be looking at whether those measures are consistent with international human rights norms and ensuring that capacity-building does not have the unintended consequence of undermining UN norms in this regard.

- **Incorporating the relevant areas of the UN Global Strategy.** The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UN Global Strategy), which was adopted by the General Assembly on 8 September 2006, recognised the role of the CTC and CTED in efforts to combat terrorism. The CTED and the experts of the 1267 Committee (Al-Qaida and Taliban sanctions) and the 1540 Committee (weapons of mass destruction) are already participating in the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, a grouping of some 24 UN bodies and agencies established by the Secretary-General to coordinate the UN’s role in the implementation of the UN Global Strategy. However, only CTED has staff available on a full-time basis to support counter-terrorism work within the UN system. The capacity for CTED to play a larger role in assisting the Secretariat and member states to implement the UN Global Strategy will therefore also be an important issue.

The issues which lie in the background and which may surface in discussions include:
- whether there should be an open debate in the Council to receive views and input from the wider UN membership after the CTC has completed its work but before the issue is taken up by the Council;
- whether the CTC, the 1540 Committee and the 1267 Committee should be merged forming a single, coherent monitoring function for the Council and, in the process, bringing together the different expert groups as well; and
- whether the technical assistance aspects of CTED’s work would be better located under the auspices of UN bodies with much greater experience in dealing with technical assistance and perhaps be under the umbrella of the UN Global Strategy rather than the Security Council alone.

**Council Dynamics**

There are differences of approach within the Council on the role of CTC and CTED in the UN efforts against terrorism. In the past, the Council adopted a security focus and, for most permanent members, the monitoring aspect of CTED’s work should therefore take precedence. On the other hand, a succession of non-permanent members has taken the view that CTED should be doing much more in facilitating capacity-building. Some non-permanent members take an even more forward position, seeming to suggest that CTED should get out of assistance facilitation altogether and that its capacity and reserves in this regard should be transferred to other UN bodies and agencies better suited to providing technical assistance.

The issue of transparency, including an open meeting at a sufficiently early time to receive wider input, are also likely to become a significant part of the Council dynamics on the issue and may trigger requests from outside the Council as well.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolution**

- S/RES/1624 (14 September 2005) mandated that all states must prohibit incitement to terrorism.
- S/RES/1535 (26 March 2004) established the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate.

**Other Relevant Documents**

- A/RES/60/288 (8 September 2006) was the General Assembly resolution adopting the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

**Useful Additional Source**


**Conflict Prevention**

**Expected Council Action**

The Security Council Working Group on Conflict Prevention has before it the Secretary-General’s report on implementation of resolution 1625. Recommendations from a 3 December seminar organised by the Working Group are also available. However, it is unclear whether proposals will come forward for Council action on this issue in February, or perhaps in April when South Africa has the Council presidency.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 14 January, Council members reportedly received advance copies of the Secretary-General’s report. Due since 27 October, the report is likely to be formally released in early February. (For detailed background on this issue see our November 2007 Forecast and 24 August 2007 Update.)

The 3 December seminar, organised by the Council’s Working Group, involved UN member states, the UN, regional organisations, think tanks, NGOs and the private sector.

Recommendations from the seminar included:
- instituting better procedures to allow rapid reaction by the Council to crises;
- giving a clearer preventive diplomacy mandate to the Secretary-General;
- paying particular attention to disputes with the potential to become a threat to international peace and security; and
- enhancing existing partnerships between the Council and regional organisations.
Recommendations from the seminar were expected to be used as a basis for drafting a decision for consideration by the Council.

Key Issues
A major issue is whether the Council will be ready in February to take up in a substantive way recommendations from the Secretary-General’s report and the December seminar. Another major issue involves the future role of the Working Group. (There was concern in the past that its working methods tended to lead in the direction of abstract discussion. South Africa (the new chair) seems determined to reenergise the Group and perhaps move it in the direction of contributing to country-specific problems.)

Options
Options for the Council include:
- a substantive discussion in February of the Secretary-General’s report and the recommendations from the seminar and adoption of a resolution or presidential statement;
- undertaking an initial discussion in February but deferring action until the Working Group can produce some clearly defined measures for consideration by the Council; and
- encouraging the Working Group to bridge the gap between conflict prevention at the conceptual level and its effective application in specific contexts. (The Secretary-General observed in his 2006 report to the General Assembly on the prevention of armed conflict (A/60/891) that while a culture of prevention had begun to take hold at the UN, an “unacceptable gap remains, however, between rhetoric and reality.”)

Council Dynamics
Council members generally seem to support a culture of prevention within the UN as an efficient alternative to expensive and complex peacekeeping missions and humanitarian operations. However, it seems that some of the permanent members may be less supportive of this. Overall, the Council appears to be favourably disposed towards the idea of using the Secretary-General’s report as well as viable proposals from the seminar to assist in further streamlining the Council’s complementary role with the Secretariat in elaborating global conflict-prevention strategies, and possibly the adoption of a resolution or presidential statement.

The UK and France were instrumental in helping to develop resolution 1625 and seem keen to see conflict prevention become a natural extension and integral part of the UN’s work. They welcome the recent developments in refocusing attention on this issue.

South Africa is expected to spearhead related Council action following its assumption of the Chair of the Working Group in January.

Underlying Problems
Differing views exist among the wider UN membership. Some are concerned that a prevention culture could lead to international intervention or might infringe on sovereignty. These kinds of concerns have contributed to the limited progress in the area of conflict prevention in recent years in the intergovernmental machinery. However, it seems that some important developments are underway in regard to capacity-building in the Secretariat, in particular with respect to the Secretary-General’s good offices and mediation capacity (including activities such as mediation training for UN staff, the development of an on-line database with mediation-related materials and the creation of a standby cadre of specialists to support mediation efforts), as well as the Council’s cooperation with the AU (especially efforts towards fulfilling some of the demands of the Council’s 16 June 2007 joint communiqué with the AU Peace and Security Council, such as information sharing on situations of conflict on their respective agendas). Challenges still remain with regard to developing an enhanced and structured relationship with the AU, particularly in the area of developing sustainable mechanisms for extending assistance to the AU’s capacity and resource base.

Reports of the Working Group
- S/2005/828 (22 December 2005) was the report on a seminar held by the Working Group on cooperation between the UN and African regional organisations in the field of peace and security.

Selected Presidential Statements
- S/PRST/2007/31 (28 August 2007) requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on the options for further implementation of resolution 1625.
- S/PRST/2007/1 (8 January 2007) requested the Secretary-General to provide the Council with more regular analytical reporting on regions of potential armed conflict and stressed the importance of establishing comprehensive strategies on conflict prevention.
- S/PRST/1997/46 (25 September 1997) noted that addressing the challenges of conflict in Africa required a comprehensive approach and called on the Secretary-General to produce a report to address the issue.

Selected Security Council Debates
- S/PV.5735 and resumption 1 (28 August 2007) was the discussion on the role of the Security Council in conflict prevention and resolution, in particular in Africa.

UN Documents

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<td>• S/RES/1653 (27 January 2006) addressed conflict prevention and resolution in the Great Lakes region.</td>
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<td>• S/RES/1625 (14 September 2005) was a declaration on the Council’s role in conflict prevention, particularly in Africa, and was adopted during the World Summit.</td>
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<td>• S/RES/1318 (7 September 2000) was the adoption of the Millennium Summit declaration on maintaining peace and security, especially in Africa.</td>
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<th>Selected Security Council Debates</th>
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<td>• S/PV.5735 and resumption 1 (28 August 2007) was the discussion on the role of the Security Council in conflict prevention and resolution, in particular in Africa.</td>
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Recent Developments

Violence eased in the eastern DRC provinces at the time of a peace conference in Goma, capital of North Kivu, from 6 to 22 January. The conference was supported by the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC).

On 23 January, a peace agreement was signed between the DRC government and armed rebel groups (including Nkunda’s forces and the Mai Mai). The pact reportedly included provisions for:

- an immediate ceasefire;
- a phased withdrawal of all rebel forces (more than twenty such movements) from North Kivu and MONUC moving to former rebel positions to establish a buffer zone;
- resettlement of thousands of villagers;
- granting of amnesty in regard to insurrection against the government to all rebels, but no exemptions for human rights violations; and
- establishing a technical commission, comprising Congolese officials and experts from the US, EU and AU (the sponsors of the peace talks) to oversee the integration of the rebels into the national army and the enforcement of a permanent ceasefire.

The agreement was silent on the status of General Nkunda. He had been accused of serious crimes by the DRC government and it remains to be seen how this aspect will play out. Another uncertainty is the impact on the Hutu rebel movements—Democratic Front for the Liberation Rwanda (FDLR) and the Interahamwe militia (forces that Nkunda claims to be protecting ethnic Tutsis from). It appears that a combination of the Goma agreement along with the agreement reached between the DRC and Rwanda on 9 November, where Kinshasa resolved to forcibly disarm and hand over to Kigali members of Hutu militia groups operating in eastern DRC suspected of responsibility for the 1994 Rwanda genocide, is expected to address this contentious issue.

At press time, the Council was discussing a statement welcoming the agreement, urging the implementation of its provisions and calling on the international community, in particular the neighbours, to support the new dynamic launched by the Goma conference.

On 14 December, the President of the Security Council referred to the DRC Sanctions Committee the “grave concerns” of the Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict regarding “repeated violations” of resolution 1612 by named persons in DRC.

On 21 December, the Council renewed MONUC’s mandate until 31 December 2008. The resolution expressed its intention to authorise MONUC by end of January to assist national authorities with local elections this year. At press time the Council was discussing a draft resolution authorising MONUC’s assistance to the elections.

In December, the Group of Experts submitted a brief confidential interim report on its activities to the Sanctions Committee. A full report was submitted to the Committee in late January.

Key Issues

The major sanctions issue is the length of the renewal period for the arms embargo, the government’s request for exemptions, travel ban and assets freeze and the mandate of the Group of Experts. An important issue (given that February will also be a month with specific focus on children in armed conflict) is a follow up to resolution 1698 on sanctions against those involved in recruiting or using children in the conflict, especially in light of recent reported violations in eastern DRC.

Options

Options for the Council include:

- renewing the current sanctions and mandate of the Group of Experts for another six months;
- renewal of the sanctions and/or mandate of the Group of Experts for a more extended period (e.g. one year);
- removing arms related restrictions on the DRC government; and
- following up in the DRC Sanctions Committee the grave concerns expressed to the Committee by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict and taking action with respect to the named persons.

Council Dynamics

Members appear comfortable with the renewal of the mandate of the Group of Experts and the sanctions regime, especially the travel ban and assets freeze. However, the length of the extension remains an open question because of the need to balance sanctions enforcement with the situation on the ground, including the government’s preference that the notification requirement on its arms acquisitions be removed. The US and China support early removal of arms restrictions on the DRC government, while other Council members generally have preferred a more cautious approach.
Van Walsum is due to visit the region in early February to hold consultations with Morocco, the Polisario, Algeria and Mauritania.

From 14 to 20 December, the Polisario held a “congress” (usually held every three to four years) in its outpost of Tifariti. In a statement carried by the Algerian official news agency, the Polisario said that if current negotiations fail, the Moroccan government would assume full consequences including possibly for resumption of hostilities.

In his October report on MINURSO, the Secretary-General had noted that the two sides held mutually exclusive positions and that the parties could not be said to have entered into negotiations. He emphasised that both the Moroccan and the Polisario plans should be discussed as both are recognised in resolution 1754, which in April 2007 had called for negotiations without preconditions. In the report, the Secretary-General also noted that even if Morocco “may not be interested in the Frente Polisario’s explanation, which presupposes openness to an independent Western Sahara, it will still have to participate in such a discussion.”

In October the Secretary-General also launched an appeal for funding confidence-building measures led by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as current funding was not sufficient to continue activities. UNHCR may be forced to end the exchange of family visits. It seems that there has been no response from potential donors at press time.

The Council adopted resolution 1783 on 31 October 2007 renewing MINURSO’s mandate for six months. One issue was whether the Council would take up the Secretary-General’s recommendation to try to stimulate the political process. The Council did so and called on the parties to continue to show political will and engage in substantive, good-faith negotiations without preconditions. The language followed fairly closely its previous resolution, except for a more extensive reference to past efforts to find solutions. Resolution 1783 did not
address human rights despite the Secretary-General’s call on the parties to ensure respect for the human rights of the people of Western Sahara. Apparently this was not even raised during discussions among the Group of Friends.

Options
Council options include:
- adopting a wait and see posture;
- actively encouraging the parties to agree to discuss both plans in substance;
- calling for talks on further confidence-building measures;
- calling on member states to contribute financially to the UNHCR confidence-building programme; and
- simply welcoming the Secretary-General’s report and encouraging the parties to continue the talks.

Key Issues
The key issue is whether to make another effort to push the parties to engage in substantive discussions and, if so, whether to insist that they discuss both plans or focus on thematic issues and confidence-building, or whether to wait until the next mandate renewal in April.

Council Dynamics
The Council remains divided on the issue. Some non-aligned countries (in particular, Panama and South Africa) and Russia sympathise with the Polisario position. France and the US lean towards Morocco. The five new members are unlikely to significantly alter the dynamics. Libya is likely to have a balanced position. It seems to have good relations with both Algeria and Morocco.

The issue is usually discussed first among the Group of Friends (France, Russia, Spain, the UK and the US). However, the divergent views in the Council are also represented in the Group, so any outcome is usually already a compromise. The process leading to resolution 1783 in October demonstrated the difficulty for Council members not in the Group to play a significant role. It seems that in the Group of Friends, the US, supported by France, proposed that the draft refer to the Moroccan plan specifically as one realistic basis for negotiations. But Russia and the UK thought this was too much of a tilt in Morocco’s favour. Eventually the language was proposed which preserved the earlier even-handed approach.

In the Council, South Africa criticised the Moroccan plan as a unilateral attempt to prevent the Saharan people from exercising their right to self-determination. South Africa also raised a concern that resolution 1783 made no mention of human rights violations in Western Sahara (S/PR.5773).

At press time it was still unclear whether the US, which has the lead, would propose a text responding to the Secretary-General’s report.

There seems to be little enthusiasm for Council action, although a statement reiterating that the parties must continue to talk and engage on substance is a possibility.

UN Documents
Selected Resolutions
- S/RES/1783 (31 October 2007) called upon the parties to continue negotiations taking into account efforts made since 2006, requested the Secretary-General to report on these talks by 31 January, and extended MINURSO’s mandate for six months.
- S/RES/1754 (30 April 2007) called for negotiations without preconditions and extended MINURSO’s mandate for six months.

Secretary-General’s Latest Report
- S/2008/45 (28 January 2008)

Selected Letters
- S/2007/714 (6 December 2007) was a letter from Morocco complaining that the Polisario’s congress due to take place from 14 to 18 December in the buffer strip is a breach of the ceasefire agreement.
- S/2007/210 (16 April 2007) was a letter from South Africa to the Council transmitting the Polisario plan.
- S/2007/206 (11 April 2007) was a letter from Morocco to the Council transmitting the Moroccan plan.

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Julian Harston (UK)
Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy
Peter van Walsum (Netherlands)
MINURSO Force Commander
Major General Zhao Jingmin (China)
Size and Composition of Mission
- Authorised strength: 231 military personnel and six police officers
- Strength (as of 30 November 2007):
  - 242 total uniformed personnel, including 48 troops, six police officers and 188 military observers

Key Troop Contributing Countries
Malaysia, Egypt, Russia, Ghana, France, China and Honduras

Cost (approved budget)

Sierra Leone

Expected Council Action
The Council is likely to consider a report from the Secretary-General on a completion strategy for the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL). Under resolution 1793 this was due by 31 January.

Key Recent Developments
On 21 December, the Council adopted resolution 1793 extending the mandate of UNIOSIL until 30 September 2008. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to submit by 31 January a completion strategy for UNIOSIL, including:
- at least a 20 percent reduction in staff by 31 March;
- a continued mission at 80 percent of the current strength until 30 June; and
- the termination of the Office’s mandate by 30 September.

(The intention is to replace UNIOSIL with a UN integrated political office to carry forward the peacebuilding process. The Secretary-General was requested to submit specific proposals to that end in April.)

Related Developments in the Sanctions Committee
On 28 December, the annual report of the Sanctions Committee on Sierra Leone was submitted to the Council. Against the backdrop of the security situation in the country, the Committee’s chairman suggested consideration of streamlining the legal basis for the sanctions regime. The report also indicated that the Committee was awaiting feedback from the Sierra Leonean government on the future of the travel embargo. On 17 December, the Committee chairman had briefed the Council along similar lines on its work.

On 7 January, the Special Court for Sierra Leone resumed the trial of former Liberian president Charles Taylor at The Hague after
a six-month delay to allow him to prepare his defense. Taylor faces 11 charges arising from the conflict in Sierra Leone of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including use of child soldiers, sexual violence and physical violence. The trial is scheduled to take about 18 months. Resolution 1793 granted exemption from the Council’s travel ban for witnesses who might need to appear before the Court.

**Related Developments in the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)**

On 12 December, the PBC adopted a cooperation framework for Sierra Leone to guide the work of the Commission and the government of Sierra Leone over the next three years. The framework outlined key peacebuilding challenges facing the country including governance, security and justice sector reforms, youth unemployment and energy sector development.

**Key Issues**

Key issues for the Council over the coming months will be a successful drawdown and completion of UNIOSIL’s mandate while ensuring consolidation of peace in the country.

**Options**

Options include the following.

- Considering the January report on the drawdown of UNIOSIL in informal consultations and giving the Secretary-General feedback.
- Deferring consideration of the January report and taking it up at the same time as the April report on the future UN presence in the country.
- Reinforcing the Council’s collaboration with the PBC by holding a formal Council meeting on the drawdown report and inviting Sierra Leone and key PBC members to speak, and the Peacebuilding Support Office to brief during the drawdown period. This might be seen as a contribution both to Sierra Leone’s peace consolidation and the longer term process for integrating the PBC’s advice into the Council’s decisions.
- Taking up the conclusions of the sanctions committee about the need to streamline the sanctions regime and perhaps asking the Committee for specific recommendations.

**Council Dynamics**

The UK has taken the lead in prompting a report from the Secretary-General on a completion strategy for UNIOSIL by 31 January. It wants a clearer picture of the components of the mission to be affected by the drawdown as well as some reference points for monitoring progress in its implementation. Council members generally seemed ready to signal the Council’s resolve to terminate UNIOSIL’s mandate as scheduled. Despite the Secretary-General’s preference for a single report covering both completion strategy and the successor office in April, the Council requested two separate reports—one in January to be followed by another one in April.

The UK takes the lead on Sierra Leone. However, African members retain a strong interest and will be vigilant about the link between peace consolidation and mandate termination, especially if there are any signs of renewed risk of violence.

**Underlying Problems**

The recent elections highlighted that the deep-seated political tensions and schisms among the Sierra Leone population along ethnic and geographical lines are still close to the surface. They could re-emerge in the lead-up to the local government elections likely to be held in June. Moreover, the country continues to face serious economic challenges (a root cause of the war), with widespread poverty, worsening youth unemployment and endemic corruption.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1793 (21 December 2007) extended the mandate of UNIOSIL until 30 September 2008 and requested a completion strategy for the mission by 31 January, as well as specific proposals on the successor office in April.
- S/RES/1750 (30 March 2007) noted that UNMIL should continue to provide administrative and related support and security for activities in Liberia of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

**Selected Presidential Statement**

- S/PRST/2007/23 (28 June 2007) addressed the work of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

**Selected Secretary-General’s Report**

- S/2007/704 (4 December 2007) was the latest report of the Secretary-General on UNIOSIL.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**UNIOSIL Executive Representative of the Secretary-General**

Victor da Silva Angelo (Portugal)

**Size and Composition of Mission**

Total budgeted staff of 298, comprising 82 international staff, 192 local staff and 24 UN volunteers

**Duration**

1 January 2006 to present; current mandate expires 30 September 2008
Notable Dates for February

Reports Due for Consideration in February

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>17 January</td>
<td>SG report on UN Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) (S/2008/26)</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 January</td>
<td>SG report on UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)</td>
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<td>31 January</td>
<td>SG monthly report on Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 January</td>
<td>SG report on the negotiations between Morocco and Frente Polisario</td>
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<tr>
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<td>SG report on a completion strategy for the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL)</td>
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early February

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SG report on Conflict Prevention and Resolution, particularly in Africa and on further options for the implementation of resolution 1625</td>
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<td>SG report on children and armed conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 February</td>
<td>SG report on Somalia</td>
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<td>8 February</td>
<td>Report of the Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) on changes to the organisational plan for the CTED</td>
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<td>late February</td>
<td>SG report on Lebanon regarding implementation of resolution 1701</td>
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February 2008

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<td>15 February</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo sanctions and Group of Experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 February</td>
<td>Council authorisation of AMISOM (Somalia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 February</td>
<td>UN Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)</td>
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February 2008

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<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>25 January to 3 February</td>
<td>The AU Summit is scheduled to be held in Addis Ababa</td>
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<td>3 February</td>
<td>Second round of the Serbian presidential elections is scheduled</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 February</td>
<td>The Lebanese presidential election is scheduled for 11 February, after postponement for the 13th time</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 February</td>
<td>The Council is expected to hold a debate on children and armed conflict</td>
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Also expected in February:
- Presidential elections are planned in the Republic of Cyprus on 17 February.
- EUFOR troops are expected to begin deployment in Chad.
- The Secretary-General is likely to present a report on progress in the establishment of the Lebanon special tribunal in late February or early March.
- Preparatory work on the demarcation of the border between north and south Sudan may begin.

Important Dates over the Horizon

- The fourth round of talks between Morocco and the Polisario is scheduled for 11-13 March in New York.
- A census is planned for April in South Sudan.
- The Secretary-General is expected to report on security sector reform.
- Constituent assembly elections in Nepal, delayed twice from 22 November and 20 June, have been scheduled for 10 April.
- Presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire are now expected before the end of June 2008, postponed from 31 October 2007.
- Local government elections are scheduled for June in Sierra Leone.
- The Secretary-General is expected to submit to the Council a report on Small Arms in 2008 and a meeting of states to consider the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in small arms and Light Weapons in all aspects is planned for 14-18 July 2008 in New York.

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