OVERVIEW FOR JANUARY

In January Libya will have the presidency of the Council. For a newly elected Council member, assuming the presidency in its first month is a huge burden. However, Libya seems to have made a big effort to prepare and they have had the benefit in December and part of November of being present in informal consultations as guest observers. Also the list of mandates expiring in January is shorter than for many other months.

Important procedural decisions will be required in the first days of the year—the election of the chairs and vice-chairs of Council subsidiary bodies and of Council representatives on the PBC.

It seems that the Council will not have any thematic debate in January.

A major debate on the Middle East is expected. Discussions were still continuing at time of writing as to whether this would be in the format of an open debate—at which the wider UN membership could participate—or whether it would be limited to Council members.

Debates are expected on
- Kosovo (perhaps following a briefing by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative); and
- Iraq (on UNAMI and the MNF).

In addition consultations or briefings are likely on:
- Afghanistan (the possibility of a new Special Representative briefing the Council).
- On West Africa, the Council is yet to follow up its 16 March consultations on cross-border issues.
- The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire, requested by presidential statement 2004/17, has still not been made public. Also on Côte d’Ivoire, the December 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not been published.

A report from the Secretary-General on options for further implementation of resolution 1625 on conflict prevention, particularly in Africa, requested in August in presidential statement 2007/31 to be submitted within sixty days has not been published as of this writing.

The last UNAMI report on human rights in Iraq covered the period from 1 April to 30 June 2007. The reports are usually produced every two to three months. A further report was therefore expected on 30 September.

The Secretary-General has yet to develop proposals for the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in the Shb’a Farms area, in accordance with resolution 1701, and advise on the cartographic, legal and political implications of the alternative path suggested by the government of Lebanon in its seven-point plan.

Aide-Memoire

Important matters pending before the Council include:

- A letter from the Council president to the Secretary-General of 29 November 2006 (S/2006/928) requested an updated index to Council notes and statements on working methods. This index had not been published at press time.
- The 2005 World Summit requested the Security Council to consider reforms relating to the Military Staff Committee. This has yet to be addressed.
- The Secretary-General’s report on security sector reform, requested in February in presidential statement 2007/3 and expected in November has not been issued yet.
- The post of the Special Representative in Ethiopia-Eritrea has been vacant since May 2006.
- On the DRC, the Council has still not taken up individual sanctions under resolution 1698 against armed groups that recruit children despite MONUC reports about the problem continuing on a serious scale. Nor has the Council resumed discussion of the issue of natural resources in the DRC, notwithstanding its open thematic debate on the subject of natural resources and conflict in June (S/PV.5705).
- The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been issued, and advises on the cartographic, legal and political implications of the alternative path suggested by the government of Lebanon in its seven-point plan.

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The mandates expiring in January and requiring Council decisions are:
- **Côa d’Ivoire** (UNOCI);
- **Ethiopia/Eritrea** (UNMEE);
- **Nepal** (UNMIN); and
- **Somalia** (AMISOM)

A number of other situations could be discussed in informal consultations and could result in outcomes approved in formal open meetings. These include:
- **DRC** (the intensified fighting in eastern DRC could lead to consideration of the situation);
- **Lebanon** (tensions over the presidential election continue);
- **Myanmar** (a further discussion is possible); and
- **The non-proliferation issues relating to Iran** (it is unclear whether or when a third sanctions resolution will be discussed in the Council).

**Status Update since our December Forecast**

Recent developments on the situations covered in the Forecast are covered in the relevant briefs. Interesting developments in the Council on other issues in December included:

- **Guinea-Bissau**: On 3 December, the Council agreed to the Secretary-General’s request to extend the mandate of UNOGBIS until 31 December 2008 (S/2007/701). In his request, the Secretary-General also expressed his intention “to explore the possibility of transforming… UNOGBIS into an integrated mission” upon successful completion of 2008 legislative elections. The Council referred Guinea-Bissau to the PBC and on 19 December it formally became the third country to be placed on the agenda of the PBC. (No official document had been released at press time.)

- **Central African Republic**: On 3 December, the Security-Council agreed (S/2007/703) to the Secretary-General’s request (S/2007/702) to extend the mandate of BONUCA until 31 December 2008. The Secretary-General’s latest report on BONUCA was submitted to the Council on 5 December (S/2007/697).

- **UNIIIC (Lebanon)**: On 5 December, Serge Brammertz, UNIIIC Commissioner, briefed the Council on the investigation of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and others (S/2007/684). Brammertz noted that “it is of paramount importance that the Commission continue to receive the administrative support it needs, particularly in the area of recruitment and staff retention.” He also noted that in the next reporting period UNIIIC “will continue to implement its action plans and…pursue all lines of inquiry” (S/2007/5801). In a letter from Prime Minister Fuad Siniora to the Secretary-General following the assassination, the Lebanese government requested UNIIIC’s help in investigating the attack (S/2007/735) and the Council agreed (S/2007/736). On 14 December, the Secretary-General informed the Council that the Special Tribunal Headquarters Agreement had been initialled by the UN and the Netherlands.

- **Burundi**: On 6 December, Ambassador Johan Løvald of Norway and chair of the PBC’s country-specific configuration for Burundi, urged the Council to continue to monitor the situation in Burundi closely and stated that Burundi’s political stability is paramount for the peacebuilding process there to be successful (S/PV.5793). He noted that the Secretary-General’s recent report on BINUB had highlighted various peacebuilding priorities, including implementation of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement and security sector reform (S/2007/682). On 19 December, the Council extended the mandate of BINUB until 31 December 2008 (S/RES/1791).


- **Northern Uganda/LRA**: On 6 December, the Council approved (S/2007/720) the Secretary-General’s request (S/2007/719) to extend the mandate of the office of Joaquim Chissano, Special Envoy for the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) affected areas, until 31 December 2008.

- **Genocide Prevention Mandate**: On 7 December, the Council took note (S/2007/722) of the Secretary-General’s letter regarding the appointment (S/2007/721) of Francis Deng as Special Representative for the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities and Edward Luck as Special Adviser on Responsibility to Protect. The Council requested “further details.”

- **ICTY/ICTR**: During a Council debate on the Tribunals’ most recent assessment reports on 10 December (S/PRST/2007/45), the outgoing ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, who will be replaced by Serge Brammertz on 1 January, said that while the Tribunal had had many successes, she was disappointed that former Bosnian Serb army commander Ratko Mladic and former Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic had not been arrested (S/2007/683). ICTR Prosecutor Hassan Jallow reported to the Council that while the ICTR hoped to complete its trial activities by the end of 2008, new arrests could prolong the Tribunal’s workload. Mr. Jallow also reported that the Tribunal had recently begun referring cases to national jurisdictions (S/2007/676).

- **Terrorism**: On 11 December, the Council adopted a presidential statement condemning the terrorist attacks in Algiers near UN offices, which killed 37 people including 17 UN employees (S/PRST/2007/45). On 12 December, the Council adopted a presidential statement condemning the terrorist attack that claimed the life of Lebanese armed forces General François el-Haj and killed and wounded others (S/PRST/2007/47).

- **Lebanon**: The Council adopted a presidential statement on 11 December that expressed “its deep concern at the repeated postponements of the presidential election in Lebanon” (S/PRST/2007/46). On 12 December, the Council held consultations...
Expected Council Action

In January, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Joachim Rucker will brief the Council on the Secretary-General’s latest report on the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Against the background of a possible announcement by Kosovo of plans to declare independence, the UNMIK report is expected to reopen December’s difficult discussions in the Council.

Informal consultations are likely to continue as the situation develops. Further initiatives by Russia are possible.

Recent Developments

December saw renewed discussions in the Council and the EU on the future of Kosovo as the 10 December deadline for the end of negotiations between the Troika (EU, Russia and the US) and the two parties passed.

The Troika submitted its report to the Secretary-General on 7 December. Between 10 August and 3 December it met the two parties ten times. The report said that, while there had been substantive discussions between Belgrade and Pristina, neither party was “willing to cede its position on the fundamental question of sovereignty over Kosovo”. (Pristina insisted on full independence, and Belgrade offered only wide autonomy). The Troika, nevertheless, concluded that the process had been useful as the two parties had engaged in high-level direct dialogue and had pledged to refrain from provocative actions that could jeopardise security.

The day the Troika submitted its report to the Secretary-General, Russia circulated to Council colleagues draft elements for a possible presidential statement. The draft contained many points but a central element was a proposed call on both parties to continue to seek a negotiated solution and for the Contact Group to support a continued negotiating process. The Council consultations on 2 December revealed fundamental differences on this point.

Serbia publicly said that a unilateral declaration of independence would be a violation of international law and that it would refer any such declaration to the International Court of Justice. Russia made it clear that it would regard a unilateral declaration of independence as a violation of resolution 1244 which would open serious risks to international peace and security and that Russia would ask the Council to annul it.

EU leaders met on 14 December and agreed that negotiations had been exhausted. They agreed to support a European Security and Defence Policy mission to Kosovo. The mission is likely to be authorised at the EU foreign ministers meeting on 28 January 2008. They also agreed to offer Serbia a substantial incentive—a fast-track route for joining the EU once pre-conditions such as arresting war criminals were met.

On 19 December the Council met in a closed formal session to discuss the Troika’s report. This was preceded by lengthy consultations on the format. (The US and Europeans wanted the Kosovo representative to be able to speak in an open debate but Russia was opposed.) Ultimately it was agreed to hold a private meeting with the Serbian representative attending under rule 37 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Council (this provides for a member to participate in discussions where its interests are affected) and the Kosovo representative under rule 39 (this allows the Council to invite someone to provide it with information). Following the session, the US and EU members of the Security Council read a joint statement which concluded that the potential for a negotiated solution had been exhausted. Russia however continued to maintain that there was still room for negotiation. Russia also circulated an updated version of its presidential statement which included a new element—a road-map of the negotiating efforts.

NATO agreed on 7 December to keep its force in Kosovo (KFOR) at current levels and to provide extra troops to deter any potential violence.

On 12 December, Serbia announced that it would hold presidential elections on 20 January and 8 February. Some observers believe that Kosovo may hold off any moves towards independence until after the elections.
There are reports of a plan for many European countries to recognise Kosovo in a coordinated sequence followed by a number of Muslim nations.

**Options**
The Council has the following options:
- wait for developments before taking any steps;
- review the implications for resolution 1244 and UNMIK in the light of developments including security issues (if any);
- start discussions on a presidential statement based on areas of common agreement so as to show support for UNMIK and the efforts made by the Troika;
- agree to call for further negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia (while unlikely, it is an option that Russia is likely to press for);
- agree on a resolution to replace 1244 (this would be difficult given the lack of consensus on this issue but some EU countries may push for a Council resolution).

**Key Issues**
Several questions surround a possible declaration of independence.
- Is this consistent with resolution 1244 and how should the Council respond?
- If the EU chooses to take on some or all of UNMIK’s civilian and police role can this be done using resolution 1244 as a basis?
- What will be the effect of independence on minorities in Kosovo and is there a risk of further fragmentation? Should the Council do something in January to build trust and confidence in these communities?
- Will there be unrest after a declaration of independence? Related issues are whether NATO could contain any crisis and whether Bosnia and Herzegovina might be affected. If the situation becomes unstable, how will a united Council position to maintain regional peace and stability be forged?

**Council and Wider Dynamics**
Fundamental differences continue to divide the Council. Russia wants negotiations to continue while the US and most European members believe there is no point in further talks because there is no credible basis for moving forward.

Russia, in contrast to its position last June/July now wants the Council to take decisions on the status issue whereas the US and the Europeans now prefer to let events in the region drive the outcome rather than the Council.

While preferring to remain on the side-lines and for the European members and the US to work out their differences with Russia, non-European elected members have voiced concern about respecting international law. The proposal to use rule 39 for the Kosovo representative to speak on 19 December also sparked their concern. Russia made it clear that if this occurred they might use it as a precedent. However, China, Indonesia and South Africa stressed that such matters should be decided on a case-by-case basis. It seems that some members are also open to the idea of negotiations continuing for a period.

Among the new Council members Croatia is expected to take a lively interest in this issue. The other four new members are likely to play a low-key role in January.

In dealing with this issue the Council has been tested in its ability to produce proactive solutions to substantive and procedural matters. The difficulty in finding common ground seems likely to continue to test the Council’s dynamics.

**UNMIK**
- Size of UNMIK mission: 1996 police, forty military observers as of 30 October 2007
- Size of OSCE mission: 1300 staff (310 international and 990 local as of 30 September 2006) (Pillar 3) and 443 (99 international and 344 local staff as of 31 October 2007) (Pillar 4)
- Size of EU mission: 125 international staff, 336 local staff

**Cost**
$217.9 million for fiscal year 2006-2007 (not including OSCE, EU and NATO expenditures)

**Size and Composition of Mission**
- Size: 15,000 troops
- NATO countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, UK and the US
- Non-NATO countries: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Morocco, Sweden, Switzerland and Ukraine

**Security Council Resolution**
- S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) authorised NATO to secure and enforce the withdrawal of Yugoslav (FRY) forces from Kosovo and established UNMIK.

**Selected Presidential Statements**
- S/PRST/2005/51 (24 October 2005) declared it was time to begin the political process to determine the future status of Kosovo.

**Selected Letters**
- S/2007/606 (11 October 2007) was the letter from the Serbian permanent representative commenting on the latest UNMIK report.
- S/2007/168 and Add. 1 (26 March 2007) was the letter transmitting Martti Ahtisaari’s report on Kosovo’s future status and the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.

**Selected Reports**
- S/2007/743 (17 December 2007) was the European Council Presidency Conclusions on Kosovo.
  - S/2007/723 (10 December 2007) was the report of the Troika.
  - S/2007/582 (28 September 2007) was the latest report of the Secretary-General on UNMIK.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General**
Joachim Rucker (Germany)

**KFOR (NATO FORCE)**
General Roland Kather (Germany)

**Troika:**
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**Others**
- Statement issued on 20 July 2007 by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, UK and the US, co-sponsors of the draft resolution on Kosovo presented to the Council on 17 July.
- S/2007/437 (17 July 2007) was the draft resolution on Kosovo.

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Somalia

**Expected Council Action**

Somalia will be on the minds of Council members in January due to the acute crisis there. The Council is expected to renew the authorisation for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which expires on 17 January. However, it remains unclear whether this will be a simple technical rollover or whether, in light of the recommendations from the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the Council will begin work on a more comprehensive approach.

**Key Recent Developments**

At his first briefing to the Council, on 17 December, Ould-Abdallah presented a bleak picture of Somalia after 17 years of crisis and urged immediate action on two tracks to address political and security issues. He stressed that continuing the current approach would be harmful and that the only effective option is a new course of action by the international community simultaneously on the political and security fronts to create a broad-based government with the capacity to administer the country.

On 19 December, the Council responded to Ould-Abdallah’s briefing with a presidential statement. Although there were proposals for the statement to explicitly acknowledge the gravity of the situation as outlined by Ould-Abdallah, there was no agreement on this and the statement simply reiterated the current Council position. This may suggest that the Council members feel that they needed further time to reflect on Ould-Abdallah’s proposals. However, the statement does set a deadline of 8 February for the Secretary-General to report on the issue.

Violence has intensified and the humanitarian situation has deteriorated in recent weeks. More than half the population of Mogadishu (over 600,000 people) are estimated to have fled, and the number of refugees and internally displaced persons in Somalia may be as high as 3 million and 1 million, respectively. UNICEF has called for safe areas for children. Piracy off the Somali coast is severely threatening World Food Programme supplies.

Political progress has been largely absent. President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed’s choice of Nur Hassan Hussein as new prime minister on 22 November initially appeared to be a positive development; it was well received internationally and ratified almost unanimously by parliament on 24 November. However, on 3 December, the day after Hussein appointed his cabinet, five ministers resigned, claiming their clans were not adequately represented. On 16 December, Hussein dismissed his entire cabinet after parliament rejected the new line-up. Although a constitutional change had allowed more ministers to come from outside parliament, this was not adequately reflected in Hussein’s government and it lacked international support. He has stated that half his new cabinet will consist of non-parliamentary technical experts.

**Options**

The most likely option in January seems to be a rollover of the authorisation for AMISOM.

Another option is for the resolution to authorise a broader coalition of states, as participants in the force, thereby enabling non-AU countries to provide troops.

A further possible option would be to begin addressing the first track of Ould-Abdallah’s recommendations—the political dimension—by explicitly endorsing much more broadly based negotiations than has been the case to date, setting a fixed time frame, demanding a ceasefire to facilitate negotiations and requesting the Secretary-General to immediately increase resources to support a negotiating process designed to lead to a genuine government of national unity.

Further options, if there is reluctance to proceed beyond the technical rollover in January, but looking forward to discussion of the Secretary-General’s report in February, include:

- tasking experts to begin work on a detailed response to Ould-Abdallah’s recommendations; and
- inviting key actors who are playing an active and constructive role, such as Saudi Arabia, to meet with Council members to discuss peacekeeping options, perhaps in the context of the Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations.

**Key Issues**

The key issue, given the history of past UN peacekeeping in Somalia, is the security crisis in and around Mogadishu and the reluctance of many Council members to move towards approving a UN mission that could end up repeating the previous Mogadishu experience. A related issue is the presence of Ethiopian troops. In theory this was to help to provide some stability but now it seems to have become a major source of tension. If the Ethiopians are to be replaced by a wider coalition than the current AU one, key issues arise, including whether the UN and the Council should play a role in coordinating the exercise even if, in the short term, it will not be a UN force. Related issues include whether the UN can provide assistance to such a force, perhaps following the “light” and “heavy” support models from Darfur.

**Council Dynamics**

Most Council members have supported the drawing up of contingency plans for a possible future UN peacekeeping operation when conditions permit. Some feel that an assessment mission should be sent without delay. Others seem to believe that conditions on the ground are not favourable for an assessment mission. Some members are also concerned that the cost implications of a UN operation may not be sustainable. These concerns have combined to lead the Council into a very cautious initial response to Ould-Abdallah’s recommendations.

However, South Africa clearly feels AMISOM in its current configuration is no longer sufficient. There is substantial support for AMISOM from most members, including Belgium, Ghana, Indonesia, Italy, Panama, Russia, the UK, and the US, and perhaps including a willingness to explicitly encourage more bilateral financial and logistical assistance to AMISOM. Additional interest is growing in how the Council can support an ad hoc coalition to replace or reinforce AMISOM as the best practical step towards the long-term goal of a UN operation.
AMISOM: Size and Composition

• Maximum authorised strength:
  - 7,650 troops plus maritime and air components
  - Strength as of 30 October 2007: about 1,600 Ugandan troops

AMISOM: Duration

February 2007 to present: AU mandate expires on 17 January 2008 and Council authorisation expires on 20 February 2008

Iran

Expected Council Action

At press time, efforts to prepare a third resolution on sanctions against Iran were continuing. But the recent US intelligence assessment that Iran had stopped its nuclear weapons programme in 2003 seems to have impacted the political dynamics and, probably, the pace of negotiations. It is unclear when a draft resolution might be presented to the Council by the P5 plus Germany.

Key Recent Developments

EU envoy Javier Solana and the Iranian nuclear negotiator Said Jalili met on 30 November in London to discuss renewed negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme. Solana later described the talks as “disappointing”. E3+3 political directors met on 1 December and agreed that, since there was no new opening from Iran, work on elements of a new resolution should start.

On 3 December, a new US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was published indicating that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons programme in 2003.

IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei said the NIE report could help defuse the crisis as it provided a window of opportunity for Iran to prove that its nuclear programme was peaceful, and he urged the parties to enter into negotiations as soon as possible.

US President George W. Bush said that the report confirmed his sense that Iran remained a danger because it confirmed that there had been a weapons programme and it could be restarted anytime. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad portrayed the report’s conclusions as a “victory” for Iran. On 11 December, he said there should be dialogue with the US. Former nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani also suggested that the E3+3 should hold face-to-face talks with Iran.

Israel suggested that, in its assessment, Iran’s nuclear weapons programme had resumed in 2005.

In a statement on 14 December, the EU renewed support for additional UN sanctions and additional unilateral measures as well.

On 13 December, Russia and Iran signed an agreement to complete the Bushehr nuclear plant project. Delivery of fuel, which had been delayed several times, began in December. The US said this confirmed that Iran had no need to continue its enrichment programme, since fuel was available.

On 18 December, the Chairman of the 1737 Sanctions Committee reported to the Council on the Committee’s activities covering the period 20 September to 18 December and said that 87 member states had reported to the Committee on implementation of resolution 1737, and 71 on implementation of resolution 1747.

Options

If there is agreement among the P5, there are several options to incrementally increase pressure on Iran (see our December 2007 Forecast for details).

A separate but perhaps parallel option might be for the Council to call for renewed negotiations, following a “dual track” approach.

A less likely option—but one which might appeal to elected members—would be to defer demands to stop uranium enrichment for a defined period and instead focus on negotiations involving the key actors to reach a deal under which Iran would sign the Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty allowing the IAEA to verify that enrichment is not for military purposes, in return for international assistance in launching industrial scale nuclear activity.

Key Issues

The main upcoming issue in the Council seems likely to be the impact of the NIE report on the wider Council membership. Concerns about the civilian nature of Iran’s nuclear programme were triggered by the IAEA discovery in 2003 of concealed nuclear activities, and assessments that Iran probably had a nuclear weapons programme. In the current circumstances, however, a key issue may be whether the necessary level of confidence could best be achieved by Iran’s implementing the work-plan clarifying its past activities and accepting the optional protocol rather than by further sanctions.
For the US (and the Europeans) the issue is that this is insufficient because the current nuclear programme cannot be verified by the IAEA, and meanwhile, uranium enrichment continues in violation of binding Council decisions.

The other key issue is whether to emphasise the possibility of a window of opportunity for a strengthened diplomatic initiative, following ElBaradei’s assessment that there seems now to be more room for negotiations.

Council Dynamics
France and the UK said that the NIE report did not affect their intention to pursue additional sanctions. They believe, like the US, that contrary to expectations, the NIE report actually reinforces the concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme, because it reveals that until 2003 Iran was working towards nuclear weapons in breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

China and Russia seem to believe there is now less urgency about additional sanctions. While there may still be consensus on the need for a third resolution, divisions seem to remain on the appropriate incremental increase and the need for a parallel negotiating track.

On 13 December, China’s ambassador to the UN, Wang Guangya, said China preferred a “dual track” approach—a revitalised diplomatic initiative along with a new sanctions resolution. This seems to be a position shared by others, including some in the EU.

The position of elected members remains to be seen and may be affected by the extent to which P5 members find ways to involve them in the ongoing discussions. Some consider that additional sanctions are unnecessary at this time. Others fear that new sanctions would have a negative impact on the work-plan. Several (including Indonesia and South Africa) would prefer an emphasis on diplomacy at this point.

UN Documents
Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1696 (31 July 2006) demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and expressed its intention to adopt measures under article 41 in case of Iranian non-compliance.
- S/RES/1747 (24 March 2007) imposed additional measures against Iran and reinforced existing ones.
- S/RES/1737 (23 December 2006) imposed measures against Iran under Chapter VII, article 41, of the UN Charter and expressed its intention to adopt further measures under article 41 in case of Iranian non-compliance.

Latest IAEA Board Resolution
- GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006) underlined the necessary steps that Iran should take to reestablish confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme and reported the issue to the Security Council.

Latest IAEA Report
- GOV/2007/58 (15 November 2007)

Useful Additional Sources
- Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, 14 December 2007
- GOV/2007/692 (30 November 2007) was a letter by Iran on its cooperation with the IAEA.

Sudan/Darfur
Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to follow very closely the situation in Darfur, in particular issues surrounding the peace process and the deployment of the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). (The mission formally takes over peacekeeping responsibilities in Darfur on 31 December.) The Secretary-General’s quarterly report on Darfur is expected by the end of the year.

Key Recent Developments
The humanitarian and security situation in Darfur remains very serious. Under Secretary-General John Holmes travelled to Sudan in late November. He expressed concern about the continuing displacement of civilians and stressed that improved security was needed before displaced persons can return. (It seems that the government supports immediate returns.) At a briefing for Council members on 6 December, Holmes reported continuing lack of humanitarian access, violence against civilians and lack of observance of humanitarian principles by all parties.

The Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno-Ocampo, briefed the Council on 5 December. He noted that Khartoum had not complied with its obligations under resolution 1593, in which the Council referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC. Moreno-Ocampo further noted that Sudan had not taken steps to begin domestic prosecutions against those indicted by the ICC, having most recently nominated one of the indictees to a national monitoring group in charge of overseeing UNAMID’s deployment. He warned of a “calculated, organised campaign by Sudanese officials to attack individuals and further destroy the entire community.”

The ICC Prosecutor urged the Council to be consistent with its decisions and send a strong and unanimous message to Sudan on resolution 1593 and the arrest warrants, noting that “the same consistency is needed throughout” the UN. He also reported on upcoming indictments related to attacks against civilians, humanitarian personnel and the AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS), as well as government officials’ collusion to protect indictees.

European members of the Council circulated a draft presidential statement recalling resolution 1593, urging Sudan to cooperate with the ICC and expressing deep concern over Khartoum’s failure to arrest and surrender indictees. However, it appears that clear agreement was proving difficult to reach on a written text. The president of the Council therefore spoke to the media on 7 December outlining the essence of the elements on which there was substantial agreement in the Council.

On 12 December, Ambassador Johan Verbeke of Belgium submitted a letter to the Council President on behalf of EU members of the Security Council. The letter contained...
the Conclusions of the Council of Europe on Sudan/Chad, which reiterated the urging of European members for Sudan to cooperate with the ICC and drew “attention to the lack of cooperation by the Government of the Sudan concerning the deployment of an effective force” in Darfur.

Since November, the UN-AU mediation team has been consulting with key stakeholders on how best to address rebel fragmentation and resume the talks. At press time, a rebel meeting to reach a common position similar to the one held in Arusha in August 2007, appeared possible.

In early December, UN Envoy Jan Eliasson underscored that UNAMID’s deployment was a necessary measure to monitor a future cessation of hostilities.

At press time, concern about Sudan’s lack of cooperation with UNAMID’s deployment and the absence of pledges for mobility assets (in particular helicopters) persisted. It seems that potential contributors of such assets have either declined to pledge, expressed concern with command and control arrangements or indicated lack of suitable assets.

On 6 December, the Secretary-General sent a letter to Council members that he would send a high-level team to discuss these issues at the EU-Africa summit in Lisbon on 8-9 December. He urged Council members to exercise their influence and noted that “with only three weeks left” before the transfer from AMIS to UNAMID, “the situation has become acute.”

At a briefing on 13 December, the Secretariat noted some positive developments following the Lisbon meeting, including Sudan’s acceptance of the original draft status-of-forces agreement and advanced negotiations on land use and night flights. It appears that Sudan will respond on troop composition soon.

Options

Options include:

- continuing to leave deployment issues to the Secretariat, or actively managing these issues, perhaps including a warning to Sudan and initiating discussions with potential contributors of mobility assets;
- holding further consultations with the mediation team;
- signalling and/or actively discussing a possible spectrum of sanctions; and
- pressing for a ceasefire.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is ensuring quick progress on the peacekeeping track, including:

- Khartoum’s reluctance regarding UNAMID;
- associated problems including troop composition and robustness, permission for night flights and land use;
- addressing the absence of mobility-asset contributions;
- managing risks that lack of robustness may create for UNAMID, mindful of dangerous precedents elsewhere;
- funding decisions from the General Assembly; and
- UNAMID’s unparalleled management, infrastructure, logistical, security and environmental challenges.

A parallel issue is progress with political reconciliation, including:

- achieving a peace agreement quickly with substantive rebel participation and unity, and balancing this with the needs of civil society, the government (given north-south tensions) and Arab communities;
- other negotiation modalities, notably on substance (including land and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement);
- reaching a ceasefire; and
- deterring attempts to influence the talks through force or obstruction.

A major issue for the Council is whether and when to resort to sanctions and who to target if progress on the tracks above prove elusive.

A key emerging issue is how best to address justice and accountability, particularly Sudan’s lack of compliance with resolution 1593 and wider issues of political reconciliation and peacekeeping.

Council Dynamics

Members seem deeply concerned with the challenges facing UNAMID from Sudan’s cooperation, the absence of mobility assets and the potential for delays in deployment as the 31 December deadline approaches.

Some members—including the US, UK and France—seem particularly concerned with risks over the mission’s ability to carry out its mandate effectively. They appear convinced that Sudan’s perceived pattern of obstruction to UNAMID will persist and will require continuous pressure.

Members such as China, Russia and Indonesia are likely to continue to prefer dialogue with Khartoum. However, Sudan’s continuing ambiguity may make this difficult.

Discussions following the ICC prosecutor’s brief underscored existing divisions among members on justice and accountability issues. Most expressed support for the ICC and the adoption of a Council statement on Sudan’s obligations. Some added the need to balance investigations by also focusing on crimes committed by rebels. Russia and Indonesia emphasised the need for dialogue with Khartoum, and Indonesia and Qatar emphasised the need to safeguard domestic jurisdiction. China in particular appeared to favour a larger focus on the political and peacekeeping tracks, leaving justice issues until the security situation improves.

The majority supported the European draft statement mentioned above, particularly after the removal of the expression of concern with Khartoum’s failure to arrest and surrender indictees. Some—China in particular—seem to have initially opposed the draft, noting that it may be unhelpful for the peace process, and later supported issuing it as a press statement. Subsequent consultations revealed some uncertainty as to the overall level of agreement. The Council’s
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UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1769 (31 July 2007) established UNAMID.
- S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred Darfur to the ICC.

Latest Secretary-General’s UNAMID Report


Other

- S/2007/730 (12 December 2007) was the Belgium letter on behalf of Security Council members in the EU, which called on the Government of Sudan to cooperate with the ICC.
- S/PV.5789 (5 December 2007) was the ICC prosecutor’s recent briefing.
- A/HRC/6/19 (28 November 2007) was the recent human rights report on Darfur.
- A/62/540 (8 November 2007) was a report on UNAMID funding by the UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.
- S/2007/584 (2 October 2007) was the latest Panel of Experts’ report.

Other Relevant Facts

UNAMID: Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur
Rodolpbe Adada (Republic of Congo)

UN and AU Special Envoys
UN: Jan Eliasson (Sweden)
AU: Salim A. Salim (Tanzania)

UNAMID: Size
Maximum authorised strength: up to 19,555 military, 3,772 police and 19 formed police units

UNAMID: Duration
31 July 2007 to present; mandate expires 31 July 2008

AMIS: Size and Composition

- Total authorised strength: about 10,000 military and 1,500 police
- Strength as of 23 May 2007: 6,143 military and 1,360 police
- Key troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda and Senegal

AMIS: Duration
25 May 2004 to present; mandate expires 31 December 2007

Afghanistan

In September, Tom Koenigs, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Afghanistan announced that he would step down from his post on 31 December 2007. At press time, the Secretary-General was expected to choose Koenig’s successor and inform the Council by the end of the year. It is possible that the Council will want to meet with the new Special Representative in January.

While the Council does not decide on the appointment some members have indicated interest in a more high-profile person in this position who would be able to coordinate the international efforts in Afghanistan. This is likely to become a key issue when the Council considers the mandate of UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan in March 2008.

Ethiopia/Eritrea

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), which expires on 31 January. The next regular report of the Secretary-General on UNMEE is due in January.

Key Recent Developments

On 30 November, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) dissolved itself. In the absence of agreement between the parties on the placement of border markers, the Commission considered the boundary between the two countries now finalised and marked by coordinates on maps and not by actual placement of pillars on the ground. (The EEBC had set the end of November 2007 as the deadline for the parties to comply with the border-delimitation decision, or have the Commission delineate the boundary by coordinates.

While Ethiopia and Eritrea earlier expressed reservations about such a “virtual” demarcation by the EEBC, at press time they had made no related public pronouncements.)

On 13 November, the Council was briefed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on the situation. The Council also considered the Secretary-General’s 1 November report. The Secretary-General expressed serious concern about the continuing tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the failure to resolve their longstanding boundary dispute and the military build-up along their common border. He stressed the need for the two parties to find common ground. He recalled that Ethiopia accepted the 2002 border delimitation decision “without preconditions,” but now it was rejecting demarcation. Also, he raised concern about Eritrean restrictions on UN peacekeepers and helicopter flights. The report also stated that the continued military build-up in the border area and shooting incidents underscored the risk that miscalculation by either party could result in the situation deteriorating even further.

In a presidential statement on 13 November, the Council reiterated its call for immediate concrete steps to be taken by Ethiopia and Eritrea to implement without preconditions the 2002 EEBC delimitation decision. Overall, the thrust of the statement was similar to previous pronouncements. It called on the parties to commit to sustainable peace in the region, to refrain from using force and to settle their disagreements by peaceful means.

Key Issues

A key immediate issue is whether, in the light of the ongoing stalemate, to renew the existing mandate of UNMEE. Other major issues include whether to endorse the final decisions of the EEBC and whether the Council might consider some new initiatives to steer Ethiopia and Eritrea towards reducing tensions. A related issue is the concern that these bilateral tensions might increasingly affect regional stability, particularly in Somalia.
Options
The most likely option is renewing the mandate of UNMEE without substantial modifications. This option would maintain a low-key approach based on encouraging the parties to continue to adhere to the requirements of the Algiers Agreement that ended the 1998-2000 border war and invoking again the prestige of the witnesses to this Agreement (Algeria, the AU, the EU and the US).

Another option would be to move beyond the low-key approach of repeated calls for restraint to a more proactive approach to the current impasse given the threat to international peace and security in the region. This could involve some or all of the following:
- exploring some real enticement measures to incentivise Ethiopia’s compliance with the EEBC’s decisions, including urging development partners to exert positive influence;
- encouraging active involvement of regional bodies, especially the AU (a witness to the Algiers Agreement);
- intensifying demands for Ethiopia to accept fully and without delay the boundary decision, noting that prolonged non-compliance with these demands could lead the Council to consider non-military action under article 41 of the UN Charter;
- encouraging non-Council members with influence in the region to engage with both parties to find a closure to the issue;
- encouraging the appointment of a new special representative (vacant since May 2006) to facilitate finding a solution to the impasse; and
- mandating its Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations to discuss with Eritrea the issues relating to restrictions on UNMEE and encouraging the Group to meet regularly with the two countries.

Another option would be to renew the mandate of UNMEE but with modifications based on options suggested in the Secretary-General’s December 2006 report such as:
- reducing UNMEE’s strength;
- relocating the force headquarters and its integral units from Asmara to Ethiopia, leaving a small liaison office in Asmara;
- transforming UNMEE into an observer mission supported by a smaller military-protection force; or
- converting UNMEE into a small liaison mission with offices in Addis Ababa and Asmara.

This, however, appears to be an unlikely option at this stage.

Council Dynamics
Despite the operational constraints on UNMEE’s monitoring mandate, its deterrent role remains generally appreciated by the Council. Therefore, Council members appear ready to renew its mandate. A withdrawal or significant downgrading of UNMEE could be interpreted as a costly failure on the part of the Council, and most members see its continuation as useful in demonstrating its commitment to peaceful resolution of the dispute.

Most members have gone along with a low-key Council approach for almost two years. At press time, the Secretary-General was reported to be concerned about the growing need to break the stalemate and was considering sending Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe to undertake consultations with the parties. This may account for the silence of the Council (and the Secretary-General) following the EEBC 30 November statement to avoid inadvertently exacerbating the situation.

The low-key approach has largely been predicated on the US wish to work outside the Council to persuade the two countries to re-engage. US efforts seem to have significantly diminished recently. Success seems more elusive following the closer US-Ethiopian relationship over events in Somalia. Recent statements by Eritrea indicate that it views the US as being biased against it. Ethiopia’s military involvement in Somalia has further complicated the situation bringing in regional dimensions (with Ethiopia supporting the transitional government and Eritrea supporting the ousted Islamists).

It remains to be seen whether Council members will bring an infusion of new resolve to find closure to the issue. Belgium is the lead country in the Council on the issue.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions


and approved the drawdown.
- S/RES/1312 (31 July 2000) established UNMEE.

Selected Presidential Statement


Selected Letters

- S/2007/693 (30 November 2007) contained Eritrea’s response to a letter dated 27 November from Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister to the President of the EEBC.
- S/2007/660 (8 November 2007) contained Eritrea’s position on the EEBC.
- S/2007/580 (27 September 2007) contained Eritrea’s response to a letter from Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister to the President of the EEBC.
- S/2007/366 (15 June 2007) contained Eritrea’s position on its perceived breaches of the Algiers Agreement.
- S/2006/1036 (28 December 2006) contained Eritrea’s position on the appointment of a special representative.
- S/2006/890 (15 November 2006) and 905 (20 November 2006) contained respectively Ethiopia’s and Eritrea’s position on the EEBC’s intention to convene a meeting on options for moving the demarcation process forward.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2007/645 (1 November 2007) was the latest UNMEE report.

Secretary-General’s Press Release

- SG/SM/11215 (11 October 2007) was a press release expressing concern over rising tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Wider discontent within Nepal, particularly among the Madhesi community continued. (The Madhesi, who occupy the Terai plains in the south, feel they have been sidelined in favour of Nepal’s more populated north and are demanding greater autonomy, more seats in the national legislature and a guaranteed number of representatives in the administration.) On 10 December, a Madhesi minister and three deputies resigned over the government’s failure to stop violence in the south. In early October, general strikes were called by various ethnic rights groups. These crippled economic activity in southeastern Nepal, and curfews were imposed.

Relations between the government and the Maoists remained tense. In addition to their demands about the monarchy and proportional representation, the Maoists seem to be demanding that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) be merged with Nepal’s national army. In addition, the Maoists are seeking information about 1,000 people who disappeared during the insurgency and also called for the dissolution of the recently formed Peace and Reconstruction Ministry as further pre-conditions for holding the constituent assembly elections.

On 6 December, an EU delegation (made up of Portugal, as current president, Slovenia as the next president and the European Commission) stressed the importance of constituent assembly elections to the success of the peace process and the need for peace to be accompanied by economic development. It warned that further delay would erode the credibility of democratic transformation and legitimacy in Nepal and indicated that the EU was ready to send an election-observer mission to Nepal in order to support this process. The EU, Nepal’s largest aid donor, has also said that it would support Nepal’s request for an extension of UNMIN’s mandate.

At the time of writing, UNMIN was completing the second phase of registration of Maoist combatants which focused on deter-

mining the age and recruitment date to exclude those under 18 years and recruited after the ceasefire. Although the figures have not been formally released, there are indications that some PLA soldiers would not pass verification.

Options
The Council’s options for UNMIN’s renewal will be constrained by Nepal’s formal request. Options include the following.

- Renewing UNMIN for six months. (This is likely if the elections have been set for March or April by the time the Council considers UNMIN’s mandate extension).
- Renewing UNMIN for six months but with provisions for possible extension if it seems elections may not be held before June 2008.
- Not renewing UNMIN. (This seems unlikely as most members feel that UNMIN should remain despite the setbacks.)

Options in considering UNMIN’s mandate include:

- keeping the same mandate;
- formally expanding it to give UNMIN a wider role to assist in the peace process; and
- encouraging the Secretary-General’s Special Representative to support the reconciliation of the parties and reinforce discussions on security sector reform within the existing mandate.

Another option is to ask the Secretary-General to initiate a review of the situation and to come forward with proposals to reenergise the peace process and implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and other agreements with the parties with the aim of agreeing on a roadmap toward elections and beyond.

Key Issues
The key issue is ensuring that the peace process is not derailed. Some observers believe that the international community has failed to fully comprehend the underlying tensions and subtleties of the political situation in Nepal.
A related issue is whether the Maoists and the seven-party alliance can put aside their differences and move forward, with compromise solutions to the most recent demands.

Another issue is to avoid further postponement. Repeated delays seem to be having an adverse impact on the credibility of the government.

A significant new issue is the potential for instability as a result of discontent in marginalised ethnic groups in the south. (The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) released a report on 12 December which said that most of the 130 civilians killed from January to October 2007 came from the Terai region.)

Another key issue is the increasing criticism of UNMIN from both the government and Maoists in Nepal. Maoists accuse UNMIN of exceeding its mandate and interfering in Nepal’s internal affairs. The government seems reluctant about expanding UNMIN’s mandate. The local press has been running critical articles for some months.

A related question is how UNMIN could be more effective without expanding its mandate. In his report in October, the Secretary-General said that the mandate’s limited focus constrained UNMIN’s ability to “adequately assist the overall management of the peace process” and that the UN stands ready to offer all necessary assistance. Over the last few months, Martin has indicated that his team is willing to play a more active role in the peace process although he has emphasised that UNMIN will remain within its mandate.

A longer-term issue is the military cantonments. UNMIN has been unable to stop a number of illegal exits. Another concern is the number of child soldiers who remain in the cantonments. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed last November asked for the immediate release of minors who had been associated with a fighting force, and provided for their rehabilitation and reintegration. OHCHR said in November that the PLA was forcing some child soldiers who had voluntarily left the camps to return.

Council and Wider Dynamics
When UNMIN was being set up most Council members, based on the relatively optimistic information available at the time, accepted that it could be a focused mission of limited duration. However, now with the elections twice postponed and increasing understanding of the complexity of the situation and its dynamic nature, there is acknowledgement that UNMIN should continue for at least a further six months. However, members are more divided over how long UNMIN should remain in Nepal after the elections and how much the UN should try to do to help.

China and India take an active interest in this issue. In an early December visit to Nepal, a high-level delegation from the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee expressed concern over the “deepening political crisis” and stressed the need to push ahead with the peace process. While India is not a member of the Council, it has a close relationship with Nepal and has been a significant player behind the scenes. India has reinforced its support for the peace process through recent diplomatic visits and public statements in the Indian media. Both China and India have indicated that they do not want to see a prolonged UN presence on their borders.

Underlying Problems
In a report released in mid-December, OHCHR said that Nepal risked returning to violence if human rights abusers are not brought to justice and criminal activities are not controlled. The report indicated that human rights had been marginalised and subordinated to political considerations in the peace process.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolution
- S/RES/1740 (23 January 2007) established UNMIN for 12 months.

Secretary General’s Report
- S/2007/612 (18 October 2007) was the last report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for UN assistance in support of its peace process.

Presidential Statement
- S/PRST/2006/49 (1 December 2006) expressed support for the Secretary-General’s intention to send a technical assessment team to Nepal and noted that the Council would await formal proposals.
military had hoped. It is unclear whether this may slow the pace of US troop withdrawals, which seem to be linked to improvements of Iraq’s security forces. (A significant development, though, was the transfer of security responsibility on 16 December from the UK forces to Iraqi authorities in Basra.) The new Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd said in November that 550 of the 1,500 Australian troops in Iraq would be withdrawn by mid-2008.

It seems that there has been progress by the MNF-I in Iraq in improving security. Local ceasefires between former combatants and the Iraqi authorities and the MNF-I have been secured, most successfully in Anbar province, and the Sunni insurgency appears to be diminishing. But major terrorist attacks continue, and the security situation remains very fragile. Violence in Baghdad has decreased, and some refugees are beginning to return. Politically, it seems little has been achieved. Iraq is still divided, and the government still struggles to exert its influence.

De Mistura arrived in Baghdad on 12 November. He said he would ensure maximum UN engagement with Iraq’s government and people. He has been very active with international, regional and internal actors in exploring ways to implement UNAMI’s mandate of advising and assisting Iraqis to establish inclusive political dialogue and reconciliation.

The last expanded meeting of foreign ministers of Iraq’s neighbouring countries, aimed at promoting regional dialogue and reinforcing the government’s efforts at national reconciliation, took place in Istanbul on 2-3 November. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said the recent decrease in casualties was an opportunity to transform military and political developments into a basis for broader national reconciliation. Three working groups launched in March have focused on energy supplies, Iraqi refugees and security-cooperation issues. An objective, he said, was establishing a mechanism to facilitate communication between neighbouring states while maintaining a coherent direction (this was agreed by the ministers). Recognising Turkey’s security concerns, he said it was unacceptable that Iraqi territory be used for cross-border attacks, referring to the ongoing crisis on the Turkey-Iraq border involving Kurdish guerrillas.

Humanitarian conditions in Iraq remain dire. However, the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration estimates that around 46,000 refugees have returned, including 10,000 to Baghdad. But the Iraqi Red Crescent Society said on 5 November that the number of internally displaced Iraqis was 2.3 million, a 16 percent increase since August. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are more than 4.4 million refugees outside Iraq. A positive development in late November was the Iraqi cabinet’s decision to provide $25 million to support Iraqi refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

At press time, it seemed likely that the referendum on the future of Kirkuk province, focusing on the question of whether it should be incorporated into the Kurdistan Regional Government, would be postponed.

Options
An option for the Council is to adopt a press statement following the UNAMI and MNF-I briefings welcoming the positive trends, providing encouragement to both the Special Representative and UNHCR for the roles they are performing, and reminding all the main Iraqi actors of the importance of political reconciliation.

Key issues
The main issue is the evolving relationship between the UN and Iraq as the Iraqi state slowly strengthens. The approach taken by Iraq to the renewal of the MNF-I mandate seems to confirm a growing determination by Iraq to end at least some of what it sees as visible symbols of occupation and to restore some appearances of independence and full sovereignty. The presence of the MNF-I clearly remains essential for Iraq. But one result of this determination to change the dynamic seems, ironically, to be Iraqi opposition to the UN authorising the MNF-I. Foreign forces remaining, but under bilateral agreements, seems to be a preferred outcome, and this is apparently also welcome to the US. Meanwhile, the UN is expanding its non-security functions, especially in humanitarian assistance and political reconciliation. An issue for the Council will be how to adjust its own approach to Iraq in light of these developments and how to support substantive dialogue between Iraqi actors.

At time of writing, it seems that funding will not be available for the UN to construct secure office facilities. Capacity for perimeter defence and close protection therefore assumes much higher importance. A further issue is the question of security for UN personnel. A contingent of the MNF-I has provided this security for the UN. If the mandate is not renewed in 2008, as is the wish of the Iraqi government, a question will arise whether to continue the link of the contingent to the MNF-I or whether to provide a discrete Council mandate for it. (The 11 December bombings in Algiers in which many UN staff members died have reinforced concerns on this issue.)

Another issue concerns obstacles to UNAMI’s delivery of humanitarian assistance, especially problems of coordination with implementing partners. Another challenge is responding to short term emergencies while sustaining a longer-term role aimed at strengthening infrastructure and services.

Council Dynamics
Dynamics in the Council are unlikely to be affected by the presence of new Council members. Broad support for the new UN role in Iraq is likely to continue with most members ready to display support for UN activity on regional stability, national reconciliation, protection of the Iraqi population and respect for human rights and humanitarian law, and the refugee crisis.

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1770 (10 August 2007) renewed UNAMI for one year and revised its mandate.
- S/RES/1723 (28 November 2006) extended the mandates of the MNF.

the DFI and IAMB until 31 December 2007.
• S/RES/1546 (8 June 2004) endorsed the formation of the interim government and the holding of elections by January 2005, welcomed the end of the occupation by 30 June 2004, endorsed the proposed timetable for the political transition, requested quarterly reports, detailed the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, UNAMI and the MNF.

Latest UNAMI Report
• S/2007/608 (15 October 2007)
• SG/SM/11256 (5 November 2007) was the Secretary-General’s remarks at the Istanbul meeting of Iraq’s neighbouring countries.

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq
Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria)
Deputy Special Representative for Political Affairs
Staffan de Mistura (Sweden)
Deputy Special Representative for Humanitarian, Reconstruction and Development Affairs
Michael von der Schulenburg (Germany)
Deputy Special Representative for Humanitarian, Reconstruction and Development Affairs
David Shearer (New Zealand)
Secretary-General’s Special Advisor on the International Compact with Iraq

Useful Additional Sources
■ Shi’ite Politics in Iraq: The Role of the Supreme Council, International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 70, 15 November 2007
■ Biddle: Security, Political Improvements Seen in Iraq in Recent Months, interview with Stephen Biddle, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 November 2007
■ Rot Here or Die There: Bleak Choices for Iraqi Refugees in Lebanon, Human Rights Watch, December 2007

Côte d’Ivoire

Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) which expires on 15 January 2008. The Council’s deliberations are expected to be guided by a new report of the Secretary-General on UNOCI (due in early January) as well as input from an upcoming meeting of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) scheduled for late January. It is possible that the Council may decide on a technical rollover of the mandate for a short period to enable it to reflect on the outcome of the ECOWAS meeting.

Key Recent Developments
In late November, discussions were held between Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo and Prime Minister Guillaume Soro (leader of the former rebel Forces nouvelles) on a new implementation calendar for the Ouagadougou Agreement of 4 March 2007. Their discussions culminated on 28 November in the signing of two supplementary agreements which fixed dates for national elections by the end of March 2008. The agreements also provided for resumption of the disarmament process by 22 December and the return of civil servants to the northern parts of the country by the end of January.

The agreed extension of the implementation calendar seems to imply a further extension of Gbagbo’s tenure as president and may lay to rest an issue flagged earlier by his opponents. (Gbagbo’s original presidential mandate expired on 30 October 2005. Since lack of progress in the peace process made it impossible to hold national elections, his tenure was extended twice for a maximum of one year each time by the AU with endorsement by the Council.)

On 29 October, the Council adopted resolution 1782, extending the current sanctions regime (arms embargo, diamond sanctions, travel ban and assets freeze) on Côte d’Ivoire as well as the mandate of the Group of Experts until 31 October 2008. The Council did not accede to the Ivorian government’s earlier call for partial lifting of the weapons embargo and individual sanctions. However, the resolution indicated that the Council would consider a formal request, but so far none has been received. Provision was made in the resolution for reviewing sanctions twice within the one-year extension period. The first review could follow either full implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement and holding of credible elections, or at the latest 30 April. A further review is due by the 31 October expiry date.

On 22 October, the Council held private consultations on the peace process and was briefed by Djibril Bassolé, foreign minister of Burkina Faso, representative of the facilitator of the Ouagadougou Agreement (President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso), and by Abou Moussa, acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Côte d’Ivoire. The Council issued a press statement calling on all parties to meet their commitments under the Ouagadougou Agreement, while voicing concern about meeting benchmarks such as identification and registration of voters, ensuring the disarmament and dismantling of militias and restoring state authority throughout the country.

It also indicated that it was necessary to maintain the mandates of UNOCI and of its supporting French forces, as well as the troop levels of UNOCI. Council members stated their intention to review the situation by 15 January, on the basis of a new report by the Secretary-General.

On 17 October, the Panel of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire submitted its report to the Chairman of the Council’s sanctions committee on that country. This report, among other things, cited untraced weapons in the country as remaining a matter of concern, described illegal arms trafficking in the region as an issue of concern and signalled increased problems of access for embargo inspections following the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement.

The newly appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Côte d’Ivoire, Choi Young-Jin (Republic of Korea), assumed his duties on 21 November and seems to have since engaged key political actors and civil society. His presence is expected to further bolster the UN’s role in the peace process in the country.

Key Issues
The major issue is the renewal of the mandate of UNOCI. Another related issue is the UN contribution to a successful and sustainable implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement. This includes the identification and registration of voters, the disarmament process and dismantling of militia, the unification and restructuring of the defence and security forces, the restoration of state authority throughout the country, the protection of human rights and the staging of free and fair national elections. One lingering issue is a possible formal request by the Ivorian authorities for the lifting of individual sanctions (also mentioned in the Ouagadougou Agreement)
and the partial lifting of the arms sanctions for law and order purposes. No official request seems to have been received, although President Gbagbo mentioned the issue in his statement to the General Assembly during its General Debate in September.

Options
Options before the Council include:
- renewing UNOCI’s mandate and current troop levels without any substantial changes (a likely option);
- renewing the mandate with changes, including provision for review of troop levels in the light of the situation during and after the general elections; and
- expressing its support for the recently signed supplementary agreements to the Ouagadougou Agreement.

Council Dynamics
There appears to be general agreement in principle among Council members at this stage, although at press time there was still some uncertainty about the Secretary-General’s recommendations. But the prevailing view seems to be one of strong support for a UN presence to keep the fragile peace in the lead up to Côte d’Ivoire’s national elections.

With the departure of Ghana and the Republic of Congo from the Council, Burkina Faso is expected to play a leading role on this issue in the Council in January 2008, especially in the light of the role of its president as facilitator of the Ouagadougou Agreement. In addition, Burkina Faso is currently the Chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which continues to play a major role in conflict resolution initiatives in the region.

France also traditionally plays a leading role on this issue in the Council.

UN Documents
Latest Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1721 (1 November 2006) prolonged by one year the transitional period in Côte d’Ivoire and reinforced the powers of the prime minister.

Latest Presidential Statement
- S/PRST/2007/8 (28 March 2007) endorsed the Ouagadougou Agreement, supported the appointment of Soro as prime minister and requested a report from the Secretary-General on the UN’s future role in the peace process.

Latest Security Council Press Statement
- SC/9152 (23 October 2007)

Latest Secretary-General’s Report
- S/2007/593 (8 October 2007) was the Secretary-General’s latest report on UNOCI.

Other
- S/2007/611 (17 October 2007) was the latest report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire.
- S/2007/515 (30 August 2007) was the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire.
- S/2007/223 (19 April 2007) was the latest International Working Group’s communiqué, requesting its two co-chairs to consult with ECOWAS and the AU on its future role and recommendations to Security Council.
- S/2007/144 (13 March 2007) contained the Ouagadougou Agreement.

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Choi Young-Jin (Republic of Korea)

Group of Experts
Grégoire Bafouatika, Republic of Congo (aviation)
Agim de Bruycker, Belgium (diamonds)
Lipika Majumdar Roy Choudhury, India (finance/Coordinator of the Group)
Claudio Gramizzi, Italy (arms)
Vernon Paul Kulyk, Canada (customs)

Size and Composition of UNOCI
- Strength as of 30 October 2007: 9,159 total uniformed personnel, including 7,833 troops, 189 military observers and 1,137 police.
- Key troop-contributing countries: Bangladesh, Ghana, Jordan, Morocco and Pakistan

Approved UNOCI Budget
1 July 2007 - 30 June 2008 $493.70 million

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Expected Council Action
The Security Council Sanctions Committee on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is expected to receive the report of its Group of Experts. The Committee is expected to report in February. However, in light of the intensified fighting in eastern DRC, wider consideration of the situation is possible.

Key Recent Developments
There has been a steep rise in clashes between government forces, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo or FARDC) and renegade general Laurent Nkunda’s forces (Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple or CNDP) in the volatile North Kivu province since early December when the government launched a major military offensive against Nkunda. The UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) is reported to be providing logistical support to government forces. MONUC’s mandate allows it to act in support of the government and ensure protection of civilians. The mission has also stated that it will not allow any illegal armed group, particularly the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), to occupy areas from which dissident forces have been evicted.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees indicated that the ongoing violence in eastern DRC has displaced tens of thousands of people and that makeshift refugee camps in the Goma area are “about to reach capacity” and expressed concern about the risk of human rights abuses and violence against civilians.

MONUC reported that rival armed groups have been forcibly recruiting hundreds of children and sending them to fight in the front lines in North Kivu. Nkunda’s forces and the FDLR have been identified as the main groups indulging in this practice.

At press time, the Council seemed set to renew the mandate of MONUC on 21 December.
Key Issues
The major scheduled issue in January relates to monitoring implementation of the sanctions regime (arms embargo, travel ban and assets freeze). But in light of the recent violence, possible sanctions against political and military leaders involved in recruiting or using children in armed conflict, as provided in resolution 1698, could arise. (The Committee seems to have deliberated on the issue but more than a year has elapsed since the resolution was adopted and it is yet to come out with any such measures in the face of reported violations.)

Options
Options for Council members include:
- taking up the wider situation in eastern DRC if the violence continues into January;
- calling for a briefing by the Secretariat if the security situation in the country continues to deteriorate;
- issuing either a presidential or a press statement expressing concern about current situation in the country;
- deciding to sanction users or recruiters of children in armed conflict; and
- requesting the Sanctions Committee to take recent developments into account in preparing its recommendations for February.

Council Dynamics
The upcoming report will be the first by the newly reconstituted Group of Experts. Council members are likely to be interested in how the change in the Group’s composition has affected the report’s contents. Apart from the aviation expert, the Group is presently composed of new members who have had a relatively short period (six to eight weeks) to conduct actual investigations on the ground as well as acquaint themselves with the key players. (Although resolution 1771 was adopted on 10 August the Group was appointed only on 2 October.)

The submission of the upcoming report also seems to have timed to provide Council members and the Committee sufficient time to consider it before the renewal of the Group’s mandate.

The tenure of Ambassador Jorge Voto-Bernales of Peru, current chairman of the DRC Sanctions Committee, ends on 31 December along with his country’s membership on the Council. A new chairman will be appointed by the Council. It is difficult to tell at this stage how this will affect the dynamics of the work of the Committee.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1771 (10 August 2007) renewed the sanctions regime, with some modifications to the arms embargo, and the mandate of the Group of Experts until 15 February 2008.

Latest Presidential Statement
- S/PRST/2007/44 (21 November 2007) commended the DRC and Rwanda on their 9 November agreement (S/2007/679, annex) and urged full implementation.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report

Selected Secretary-General’s Letter
- S/2007/586 (2 October 2007) was the Secretary-General’s letter informing the Council of his appointment of the latest Group of Experts.

Selected Letters from the DRC to the Council
- S/2007/550 (18 September 2007) was a letter urging the Council to ask MONUC to help end impunity in eastern DRC.

Selected Group of Experts’ Report
- S/2007/423/16 July 2007 was the latest Group of Experts’ report submitted pursuant to resolution 1698.

Other Relevant Facts

Chairman of the DRC Sanctions Committee
- Ambassador Jorge Voto-Bernales (Peru)

Group of Experts
- Abdoulaye Cissoko (Mali, aviation expert)
- Caty Clément (Belgium, regional expert)
- Amadou Hamidou (Niger, customs expert)

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission (MONUC)
- Alan Doss (UK)

MONUC Force Commander
- Lieutenant-General Babacar Gaye (Senegal)

Size, Composition and Cost of Mission
- Strength as of 31 October 2007: 17,388 military and 994 police
- Main troop contributors: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Uruguay
- Approved budget (1 July 2007-30 June 2008): $1,166.72 million

Duration
- 30 November 1999 to present; mandate expires on 31 December 2007

Chad/Central African Republic

Expected Council Action
Council members are expected to follow closely in January the situation in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) as well as progress with the deployment of the EUPOL Quattrocchi and the UN Mission in the region (MINURCAT). The report of the Secretary-General was published on 17 December.

Key Recent Developments
The political and security situation in Chad and the CAR remains highly volatile.

In the CAR, insecurity persists particularly in the northwest and along the border with Chad and Cameroon, where the number of internally displaced is rising due to clashes between government forces and rebels as well as banditry. (MINURCAT and the EU force will only be deployed in the northeast.) The Council expressed its concern in a press statement on 12 December and urged the CAR government to engage in all-inclusive dialogue.

A number of initiatives involving the CAR, Cameroon and Chad appear to be underway, including a conference within the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) in early 2008. CEMAC’s multinational force in the CAR (FOMUC) was recently renewed for two
years and increased to 500 troops to address the situation in the northwest.

In Chad, major clashes between government forces and two rebel groups took place in the east, particularly along the border with Sudan. The resumed violence quickly affected access to vulnerable populations, and there are concerns that the humanitarian situation may deteriorate. Chad reportedly accuses Sudan of complicity.

The fighting seems to be threatening the peace agreement reached under Libyan auspices between the Chadian government and rebels, including the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) and the Assembly of Forces for Change.

The UFDD has reportedly threatened to fight any foreign military presence on Chadian territory, including the EU force should it be perceived as taking sides. (In this regard, French aircraft appear to be assisting the Chadian army.)

Difficulties surrounding the EU protection force persisted during December, particularly shortfalls in helicopters and funding. Media reports suggest that a French proposal to use common EU funds to reimburse contributors met with reluctance within the EU. At press time, there was hope that the force could be deployed by January, but it was unclear whether this schedule would be met.

An initial MINURCAT civilian nucleus was deployed in N’Djamena in November. Full deployment (particularly in eastern Chad) and recruitment of Chadian police were scheduled to be concluded by March or April 2008. This, however, appears dependent on the pace of the EU force deployment and the security situation. Preparations for the nomination of the special representative of the Secretary-General are underway, but it is unclear when this will be finalised. MINURCAT will be funded through the peacekeeping budget, and recruited Chadian police through a trust fund.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- continuing the wait-and-see approach;
- more actively managing the challenges facing MINURCAT and the EU force by considering a UN role in political reconciliation in Chad;
- establishing a mandate for the UN to play a liaison role with the parties as a way of preserving the neutrality of the UN and EU deployments;
- stimulating a regional approach to political reconciliation in Chad, perhaps by initiating an informal meeting with key regional players; and
- actively reinforcing the Secretariat’s efforts to secure sufficient financial resources for the overall MINURCAT operation.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is addressing the lack of civilian protection in eastern Chad and northeast CAR resulting from the spillover from Darfur. A consequential issue is how best to move forward quickly with EU and UN deployments. Other issues include:
- the challenges of political reconciliation in Chad and associated risks for MINURCAT and the EU force if they are perceived as taking sides and as a result are dragged into the conflict; and
- logistical and administrative challenges for the EU and UN deployments.

Council Dynamics
There is continuing recognition in the Council of the need for improving civilian protection given the spillover from Darfur, particularly in Chad. Members are aware of the difficulties of the EU force with funding and asset shortfalls, but most consider that these aspects should be addressed within the EU.

There is also continuing awareness of the potential difficulties arising from the lack of a sustainable political process in Chad. The recent collapse of the peace agreement and the declarations of Chadian rebels seem to have reminded some members of the risks surrounding the deployments. Previously, the issue has been addressed regionally, through Libyan-led peace talks. It appears unlikely that France and Libya will be ready for the UN to take leadership of the political dimension as a means of addressing the challenges in Chad but it remains to be seen whether there is scope for the Council and the UN to take a more limited, but nevertheless active role.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolution
• S/RES/1778 (25 September 2007) established MINURCAT and authorised the EU protection force.

Georgia

Expected Council Action

In January, the Council is expected to receive the Secretary-General’s report on the situation in Abkhazia and brief it by his Special Representative Jean Arnault. Although no decision is required at this stage, members are likely to be focusing on the heightened tension in the region and the implications for UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). In October the Council asked the Secretary-General to report on progress made in supporting the parties in implementing confidence-building measures and establishing intensive and meaningful dialogue.

UNOMIG’s mandate expires on 15 April 2008.

Key Recent Developments

The domestic situation in Georgia has been tense in recent months. In response to the firing in September of Defence Minister Irakli Okruashvili, opposition groups challenged President Mikhail Saakashvili’s governing style and protested about the uneven benefits of the economic boom. On 7 November, 50,000 people took to the streets of Tbilisi demanding an early presidential election. The police cracked down using tear gas and rubber bullets. Many were injured. Following the protests the Georgian parliament announced a 15-day state of emergency that restricted public gatherings and cut off private news broadcasts.

The state of emergency was lifted ahead of schedule on 16 November after strong pressure from the US and the EU. The ban on the private television station Imedi (part-owned by Rupert Murdoch and Badri Patarkatsishvili, a leading critic of Saakashvili’s government and a candidate in the upcoming presidential elections) was not lifted until 6 December.

Saakashvili’s assertion that Russia had been involved in stirring up civil strife strained relations further between Moscow and Tbilisi. Georgia expelled three diplomats from the Russian embassy in Tbilisi. Russia countered by expelling three Georgian diplomats in Moscow. Russia’s decision to allow residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to vote in Russia’s December parliamentary elections added to Georgia’s list of grievances.

Saakashvili conceded to the demand for early elections, which will be held on 5 January. He resigned on 25 November to run as a candidate. Nino Burjanadze, the speaker of parliament, took over as interim president. In another sign of the deteriorating Moscow-Tbilisi relationship, Georgia said that it will not invite Russian observers or the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to monitor the January presidential elections.

Lado Gurgenidze, the interim prime minister appointed after the state of emergency, on 5 December cited social tensions as a major factor in the demonstrations that led to a state of emergency. He downplayed the earlier allegations of a Russian role in the rallies.

On 29 November, Georgian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs George Manjgaladze met the permanent representatives of the Secretary-General’s Group of Friends of Georgia (France, Germany, Russia, the UK, the US and in New York, Slovakia) in Tbilisi and provided information on the return of internally displaced persons and refugees. He also discussed the situation in Abkhazia with UN Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn Pascoe.

On 25 October, the first high-level contact between Tbilisi and Sukhumi (the Abkhaz capital), took place when David Bakradze, the Georgian state minister for conflict resolution, and Sergey Shamba, the Abkhaz de facto foreign minister, met to discuss the 20 September clash between Georgian Interior Ministry forces and an Abkhaz military unit in which seven Abkhaz militiamen were captured. Georgia agreed to hand over Abkhaz personnel, and both sides agreed that the quadrupartite meetings, last held in November 2006, should be resumed. On 27 October, Georgia released the militiamen to UNOMIG. (The quadrupartite sessions bring together representatives from the Georgian and Abkhaz sides, along with Russian peacekeepers and UNOMIG, to discuss ongoing developments in the conflict zone.) Boris Gryzlov, head of Russia’s largest political party, United Russia, has said that Abkhazia and South Ossetia could be given formal diplomatic recognition by January 2008 or sooner, depending on development of events in Kosovo.

On 12 December, the Secretary-General called for “calm and restraint” in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. He had taken note of the allegations made by both sides about potential threats and the increase in armed forces in the zone of conflict and the Kodori Valley, but said that UNOMIG had not been able to corroborate the claims so far.

Options

The Council has the following options:

- take no action;

- issue a statement in the context of the presidential elections if the security situation deteriorates significantly in January;

- renew its support for the quadrupartite meetings and call for improved monitoring in the zone of conflict if the post-election period seems positive; and

- request the Secretary-General to provide a report with suggestions on how to re-energise the peace process, for discussion in April.

Key Issues

The immediate key issue is whether the January election will lead to a calming of tensions or possibly trigger further destabilisation. Although Imedi was allowed back on air on 12 December, its month-long closure affected perceptions of press freedom in the lead up to the elections. Other concerns include fears of vote-rigging in the provinces and lack of transparency in campaign financing.

An issue is the cost of providing the necessary equipment to ensure better monitoring in the zone of conflict. UNOMIG has completed its feasibility study for the deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles and artillery radar, and there are clear budgetary implications, although members supported the idea when it was raised in October. (Initial estimates indicate a budget increase of between 10 to 20 percent.)

An underlying question is the effect of a possible unilateral declaration of independence from Kosovo. If Russia acted on past hints that it might recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the impact on Georgia could be a heightened sense of nationalism, perhaps overriding current domestic political differences.

Another issue is whether there is any way for the Council to do more to get both sides to implement the confidence-building measures endorsed in resolution 1752 and to encourage greater political dialogue. (Political dialogue has been suspended since July 2006. See our 12 October 2006 Update Report.)

A related issue is whether the Council should initiate a review of the peace process, and how this should be done.

Council Dynamics

The key Council players continue to be the US and Russia with some European members taking a keen interest. Positions have become more entrenched over time and recent developments in other regional situations (Kosovo and Bosnia) have added complications.
Members now brace themselves for a tense discussion whenever Georgia is on the Council’s agenda. However, Russia in October surprised many members by having few objections to the UNOMIG mandate renewal resolution.

Elected members have traditionally taken a back seat, especially since much discussion takes place outside the Council by the Group of Friends (which is led by non-Council member Germany). While still preferring not to become too involved, some non-permanent members may now be seeking to pay more attention to the issue.

### UN Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latest Security Council Resolution</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/1752 (13 April 2007) endorsed proposals for confidence-building measures.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Secretary-General’s Report</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/2007/588 (3 October 2007) was the latest Secretary-General’s report on the situation in Abkhazia.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Letters to the President of the Council</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/2007/605 (15 October 2007) was the letter from Georgia on the detention of members of an armed group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/2007/589 (3 October 2007) was the letter from Georgia on the 6 September attack on Georgian police.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Other Relevant Facts

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission**

Jean Arnault (France)

**UNOMIG: Size and Composition**

- Authorised strength as of 30 September 2007: 147 total uniformed personnel, including 130 military observers and 17 police
- Key troop contributors: Germany, Pakistan and Bangladesh

**Duration**

August 1993 to present

**Cost**

1 July 2007 - 30 June 2008: $36.71 million (gross)

### North Korea

**Expected Council Action**

The Chairman of the Sanctions Committee on the Democratic Republic of North Korea, Ambassador Marcello Spatafora of Italy, will brief the Council in January. Although resolution 1718, adopted in October 2006 after North Korea’s nuclear test, mandated a report every ninety days, because of the positive developments in 2007 the Sanctions Committee seems unlikely to have much to report.

Formal Council action is not expected. Nonetheless, there may be some interest in a press statement marking progress toward denuclearisation.

**Key Recent Developments**

Progress seems to be continuing in implementation of the February six-party agreement (between China, Japan, Russia, the US, North Korea and South Korea) through which North Korea agreed to terminate its nuclear programme in return for fuel and economic aid.

North Korea shut down its Yongbyon nuclear reactor in July, with some oversight from the IAEA, in line with the first phase of the February agreement and received 50,000 tons of fuel oil. Under phase two, an additional 950,000 tons of fuel or equivalent assistance have been promised in exchange for North Korea disabling and declaring its entire nuclear programme.

At time of writing, other encouraging developments were also under way. In October, after a six-party plenary in Beijing, North Korea agreed to promote full disclosure of its nuclear programme by 31 December. A US-led team of specialists began disabling the Yongbyon facilities in November, and there were hopes of completion by year’s end.

In early December, President George W. Bush sent a letter to North Korean leader Kim Jong-il encouraging denuclearisation. On 12 December, North Korea responded through diplomatic channels signalling willingness to continue implementation of the six-party agreement.

Some concerns remain on disclosure by North Korea of all aspects of its nuclear programme. Media reports suggest possible uranium enrichment and support for alleged Syrian nuclear activities. At press time, it was unclear whether North Korea would be able to complete its disclosure document by the end of the year.

**Options**

The Council has the following options:

- listen to the briefing and take no action;
- adopt a press statement, perhaps encouraging six-party progress; and
- request recommendations from the Committee on future options for its work.

**Key Issue**

The key issue is whether the Council wants to be proactive in supporting the recent momentum. A related issue is whether to signal some willingness to revise the mandate of the Sanctions Committee encouraging denuclearisation steps while remaining alert to any obstacles.

**Council Dynamics**

There is broad agreement that intensifying sanctions is unnecessary at this stage.

### UN Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Security Council Resolutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/RES/1718 (14 October 2006) expressed grave concern over the nuclear test by North Korea, imposed sanctions and set up the Sanctions Committee.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Presidential Statement</th>
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<tr>
<td>S/PRST/2006/41 (6 October 2006) was the statement expressing concern over North Korea’s declaration that it would conduct a nuclear test.</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Selected Letter</th>
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<tr>
<td>S/2006/481 (4 July 2006) was the letter from Japan requesting a meeting of the Security Council after North Korea launched a ballistic missile.</td>
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</table>

**Other**

Notable Dates for January

Reports Due for Consideration in January

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Report Description</th>
<th>Document Requesting Report</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 December</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on the UN Mission in the CAR and Chad (MINURCAT)</td>
<td>S/RES/1778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late December</td>
<td>SG report on Conflict Prevention and Resolution, particularly in Africa and on further options for the implementation of resolution 1625, delayed from 29 October</td>
<td>S/PRST/2007/31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 December</td>
<td>SG report on UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)</td>
<td>S/RES/1244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 December</td>
<td>SG monthly report on AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)</td>
<td>S/RES/1769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 January</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)</td>
<td>S/RES/1528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 January</td>
<td>SG report on UN Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)</td>
<td>S/RES/1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-January</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)</td>
<td>S/RES/1770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-January</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)</td>
<td>S/RES/1740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 January</td>
<td>1533 Sanctions Committee concerning the DRC Group of Experts report</td>
<td>S/RES/1771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 January</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)</td>
<td>S/RES/1781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 January</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)</td>
<td>S/RES/1320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late January</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)</td>
<td>S/RES/1784</td>
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January 2007 Mandates Expire Relevant Document

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Mandate Expire</th>
<th>Relevant Document</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 January</td>
<td>UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire)</td>
<td>S/RES/1765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 January</td>
<td>AMISOM (AU Mission in Somalia)</td>
<td>S/RES/1772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 January</td>
<td>UNMIN (Nepal)</td>
<td>S/RES/1740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 January</td>
<td>UNMEE (Ethiopia/Eritrea)</td>
<td>S/RES/1767</td>
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January 2007 Other Important Dates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 January</td>
<td>AU-UN Mission in Dafur (UNAMID) is expected to continue operation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 January</td>
<td>Daniel Bellemare will assume responsibilities as head of the UN International Independent Investigation Committee for Lebanon (UNIIIC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 January</td>
<td>Serge Brammertz will assume responsibilities as prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, replacing Carla Del Ponte.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 January</td>
<td>In Georgia, presidential elections and a referendum on the timing of parliamentary elections have been scheduled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-9 January</td>
<td>The third round of UN-sponsored talks on Western Sahara between Morocco and Frente Polisario are expected to resume in NY.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Important Dates over the Horizon

- The Secretary-General is expected to report on security sector reform.
- Presidential elections are planned in the Republic of Cyprus for February 2008.
- Constituent assembly elections in Nepal, delayed twice from 22 November and 20 June, have been tentatively scheduled for April.
- The Secretary-General is expected to submit to the Council a report on Small Arms in 2008 and a meeting of states to consider the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects is planned for 14-18 July 2008 in New York.
- Presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire are now expected in early 2008, postponed from 31 October.

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Also expected in January:
- A briefing by the Chairman of the 1718 Sanctions Committee concerning North Korea is expected in early January.
- The US is expected to brief the Council on the Multinational Force in Iraq in mid-January.
- Serbian presidential elections are scheduled for 20 January and 8 February.