OVERVIEW FOR NOVEMBER

In November Indonesia will have the presidency of the Council.

It seems that the Council may have four major open debates in November:
- in early November an open thematic debate on Cooperation between the Council and Regional Organisations appears possible;  
- on 19 November an open debate on Protection of Civilians is expected;  
- on 21 November an open debate on the Middle East seems likely; and  
- an open debate (if past practice is followed) is possible following the briefing to the Council of the three Chairs of the Council’s counter-terrorism committees—the CTC, the 1267 and the 1540 Committees.

The Council will also have a closed meeting on 2 November with the President of the International Court of Justice.

With all of these events to schedule, plus accommodating:
- the annual retreat sponsored by Finland (on 15-16 November) that the Council members have with the incoming newly elected members;
- a Council mission to Timor-Leste later in the month; and  
- the Thanksgiving holidays. It will be important for non-Council members wanting to participate in the open debates to register their interest in writing with the president of the Council at an early date.

The only mandate expiring in November is EUFOR, the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A formal meeting to extend the mandate is expected the morning of 15 November. It is possible that, in addition, the Council will also act in November to renew the mandate for the multinational force in Iraq. This would involve renewal a month earlier than it is due. The actual timing will depend on the request from the Government of Iraq.

A number of other situations are likely to be discussed in informal consultations and could result in outcomes approved in formal open meetings. These include:
- Darfur (the growing fragility of the peace process and the persistence of the fighting seems likely to lead to Council consultations and a possible call for a ceasefire as well as reinforcement of the need for progress with UNAMID deployment);
- DRC (discussion of the Secretary-General’s recommendations on drawdown of MONUC forces is possible—as is a statement on the fragile situation in the east of the country; but as the MONUC mandate does not expire until December, work is likely to be at the level of Council experts—unless there are dramatic developments);
- On West Africa, the Council is yet to follow up its 16 March consultations on cross-border issues.
- On Sierra Leone, the Secretary-General’s report based on a comprehensive assessment, to assist the Council in defining UNOSIL’s exit strategy, requested by resolution 1734 and to be submitted “closer to the election date” is overdue.

Aide-Memoire

Important matters awaiting attention include:
- The 2005 World Summit requested the Security Council to consider reforms relating to the Military Staff Committee. This has yet to be addressed.
- Since a briefing in March, the Council has not addressed the issue of northern Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army.
- The post of the Special Representative in Ethiopia-Eritrea has been vacant since May 2006.
- On the DRC, the Council has still not taken up individual sanctions under resolution 1698 against armed groups that recruit children. Nor has the Council resumed discussion of the issue of natural resources in the DRC, notwithstanding its open thematic debate on the subject of natural resources and conflict in June (S/PV.5705).
- Status Update since our October Forecast

CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUE

Forecast

Status Update since our October Forecast

- Myanmar .................................................. 3
- Darfur/Sudan .......................................... 5
- Lebanon .................................................. 6
- Iraq ......................................................... 8
- Ethiopia/Eritrea ...................................... 10
- Iran ....................................................... 11
- Somalia ............................................... 12
- Bosnia and Herzegovina ..................... 14
- Timor-Leste .......................................... 16
- Counter-Terrorism: Briefings to the Council ............ 16
- Democratic Republic of the Congo ............ 18
- Sierra Leone .......................................... 20
- Prevention of Armed Conflict .................. 21
- Notable Dates for October ....................... 24
- Important Dates over the Horizon .......... 24

This report is available online and can be viewed together with Update Reports on developments during the month at www.securitycouncilreport.org
Recent developments on the situations covered in this Forecast are addressed in the relevant briefs. Interesting developments in the Council on other issues in October included:

**Côte d’Ivoire:** On 1 October, the Secretary-General’s UNOCI report expressed concern with the failure of the parties to adhere to the timetable established by the Ouagadougou Agreement (S/2007/593). (Meeting the conditions set out in the agreement is a precondition to organising a presidential election in 2008.) The Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire on 17 October reported resistance to embargo inspections as well as discrepancies between declared and actual armaments of the government and the Forces Nouvelles (S/2007/611). At the time of writing, it was expected that both the Group’s mandate and the sanctions regime would be renewed by the Council on 29 October. The Secretary-General appointed Choi Young-jin of Korea as his Special Representative for Côte d’Ivoire.

**Iraq:** In a 5 October presidential statement, the Council condemned the 3 October terrorist attack in Baghdad that wounded the Polish ambassador to Iraq and killed his driver and at least one Iraqi civilian (S/PRST/2007/36). On 27 September the Secretary-General reported on steps taken to dispose of the UNMOVIC archives (S/2007/568). He requested some guidance from the Security Council on the duration for keeping the material sealed, whether earlier privileged access to the documents should be permitted and whether a mechanism should be established to advise the Secretary-General on individual cases for access. It seems that the Council is planning in the next few weeks to respond to these requests in a letter.

**North Korea:** The 1718 Committee briefed the Council in consultations on 8 October.

**Kosovo:** The Council held consultations on UNMIK on 9 October and considered the Secretary-General’s report (S/2007/582).

**Afghanistan:** On 15 October, Special Representative of the Secretary-General Tom Koenigs briefed the Council noting that progress had been made, including legislation upholding press independence. However, weak governance urgently needed to be addressed and an integrated political-military strategy was required to combat violence in the country (S/PV.5760 and SC/9143).

**Georgia:** On 15 October, the Security Council adopted resolution 1781 extending the mandate of UNOMIG until 15 April 2008. It urged “all parties to consider and address seriously each other’s legitimate security concerns” and “refrain from any acts of violence or provocation.”

**Haiti:** On 15 October, the Council adopted resolution 1780 extending the mandate of MINUSTAH for a year. While reducing the military component of the force to 7,060, the resolution increased the police component to 2,091 in order to realign MINUSTAH’s activities to reflect the changing circumstances on the ground.

**Security Council Elections:** On 16 October, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Croatia, Libya and Vietnam were elected to the Security Council by the General Assembly. These five new non-permanent members will begin their two year term on the Council on 1 January 2008, replacing Congo, Ghana, Peru, Qatar and Slovakia.

**Peacebuilding Commission:** On 17 October, the Council debated (S/PV.5671) the annual report of the Peacebuilding Commission (S/2007/458). The chair of the Commission, Ambassador Yukio Takasu of Japan, noted the progress that had been made during the Commission’s first year, called for steps to be taken to include additional countries on the Commission’s agenda and advocated for enhanced coordination among relevant actors to strengthen the Commission’s work. Controversy is ongoing about the limited list of participants invited to speak in the debate.

**Nepal:** The Secretary-General’s report on 18 October noted the significant challenges that the peace process currently faces and called the postponement of constituent assembly elections for a second time “a major disappointment” (S/2007/612). On 9 October, a statement was read to the press by Council president, Ambassador Leslie K. Christian of Ghana, expressing disappointment at the delay of the elections (please see UN Webcast archive).

**Guinea-Bissau:** On 19 October, the Council considered the Secretary-General’s report on Guinea-Bissau (S/2007/576). In a presidential statement, the Council reaffirmed its support for efforts to consolidate peace in Guinea-Bissau, expressed concern about drug trafficking in the country and stated that it would consider Guinea-Bissau’s request for inclusion on the Peacebuilding Commission’s agenda (S/PRST/2007/38).

**Western Sahara:** On 19 October, the Secretary-General’s report on Western Sahara noted that while Morocco and Frente Polisario had demonstrated a willingness to negotiate, their views on the status of Western Sahara were “mutually exclusive” and thus “prevented each party from seriously discussing the other party’s proposal.” The Secretary-General also rec-
ommended that MINURSO’s mandate be extended for an additional six months (S/2007/619). At the time of writing, the Council was expected to renew MINURSO’s mandate by 31 October.

- **Terrorism:** On 22 October the Council condemned the terrorist attack of 18 October in Karachi, Pakistan and urged states to cooperate with Pakistan to bring those responsible to justice (S/PRST/2007/39).

- **Women, Peace and Security:** On 23 October, the Council held an open debate on women, peace and security (S/PV.5766) and the Secretary-General’s report (S/2007/567). A presidential statement reaffirmed the role of women in conflict prevention and resolution as well as in peacebuilding. It also urged the Secretary-General to increase the number of female representatives serving in “good offices” capacities and condemned violence against civilians, especially women and children, in armed conflict (S/PRST/2007/40).

- **Middle East:** On 24 October, Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe briefed the Council in an open session on the Secretary-General’s support for recent political dialogue between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. He expressed the Secretary-General’s hope that the upcoming international meeting on the conflict would include significant Arab participation and help to create the foundation of a durable peace process (S/PV.5767 and SC/9155).


- **Sudan:** On 23 October, the Secretary-General’s latest report on Sudan noted the lack of progress with implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, including north-south border demarcation, Abyei’s status and preparations for the 2009 elections (S/2007/624). The Council is expected to renew the mandate of UNMIS by 31 October.

### Myanmar

**Expected Council Action**

The Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Myanmar, Ibrahim Gambari is expected to brief the Council again in November after his visit to Myanmar (which at press time was expected in early November).

Council action is expected to depend on what is achieved during his visit. Progress, such as the opening of a genuine dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and the release of significant numbers of political prisoners, could lead to a positive presidential statement noting progress made. However, if there is little concrete evidence of movement on the benchmarks established in the Council’s 11 October statement and the Human Rights Council’s resolution of 2 October, stronger action is likely.

**Key Recent Developments**

Following Gambari’s 5 October briefing, the Council adopted its first presidential statement on Myanmar on 11 October. This reaffirmed strong support for the Secretary-General’s good offices mission and strongly deplored the use of violence against peaceful demonstrations. It emphasised the early release of political prisoners and outlined what the Council expected of the government, including genuine dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi, all concerned parties and ethnic groups. It called on the government to address political, economic, humanitarian and human rights issues and to seriously consider Gambari’s recommendations and proposals. Myanmar said that it “regretted” the presidential statement as the situation in Myanmar did not harm regional or international peace and stability.

The Secretary-General then sent Gambari back to Asia. Commencing 13 October, he visited Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, China and Japan and was expected in Myanmar in early November. He asked ASEAN countries to work with him to deliver concrete results and urged India and China to push Myanmar harder for reform.

Myanmar’s foreign minister, Nyan Win, confirmed on 19 October, in a letter to the Secretary-General, that a visit by Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, the Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, was acceptable. This followed a decision of the Human Rights Council in Geneva requesting Pinheiro to seek an urgent visit to Myanmar and urging Myanmar to cooperate with him. Pinheiro will report to the Human Rights Council on 11 December. This is the first time in four years that Pinheiro, appointed in 2001, has been given permission to visit Myanmar.

Myanmar continued arresting protesters in October. It acknowledged detaining nearly 3000 people although many reports suggest the actual numbers detained and killed are much higher. Human rights groups believe that over 1,500 remain in detention while extrajudicial executions and torture are widespread. On 20 October the curfew in Yangon was lifted.

After Gambari’s visit in early September, Myanmar’s leader, General Than Shwe, said that he was willing to meet Aung San Suu Kyi if she gave up calls for sanctions. The government appointed a liaison officer to build “smooth relations” with her. On 25 October she was allowed out of her house to meet with him.

On 18 October, the government announced the appointment of a 54-member constitutional drafting committee as the next step on its road map to democracy. Some see this as a setback for inclusive dialogue as it cements government control over the process.

On 19 October, the US added more military leaders to its sanctions list and tightened further sanctions on US exports. The EU also tightened sanctions, banning imports of Burmese timber, gemstones and precious metals.

Responding to events in September and the death of a Japanese photographer during the demonstrations, Japan froze $4.7 million of aid.

While also supporting stronger EU sanctions, the UK offered an incentive by suggesting an economic recovery package if the government moves towards a democratisation process. Gambari also suggested that incentives could help push the Myanmar government to move in the right direction.

Regional leaders at the ASEAN Summit, ASEAN-India and the ASEAN-East Asian (China, Japan and Republic of Korea) summits in November are expected to discuss Myanmar.
Options

The Council has several procedural options in addition to the briefing from Gambari. It could:

- request the High Commissioner for Human Rights and Pinheiro to brief the Council after his November visit to Myanmar;
- consider an Arria-style meeting to obtain feedback from NGOs on the situation in Myanmar (both Gambari and Pinheiro could be involved in such a meeting);
- invite the chair of ASEAN to participate in a dialogue with Council members, either in a closed formal session or an informal Arria-style meeting; and
- invite Myanmar to a dialogue in a closed Council meeting or an informal Arria-style meeting.

Options on substance could include:

- requesting the Secretary-General to convene a core group comprising some Council members, key Asian countries and other interested parties to work with Gambari on the details of a credible reform process for Myanmar;
- establishing a joint Council/ASEAN group to support a serious process of dialogue between the Myanmar government and opposition parties; and
- inviting the Secretary-General to locate his Special Envoy in Southeast Asia to engage in discussions with the Myanmar government for a specified period of time.

A presidential statement conveying a combination of carrots and sticks to encourage the authorities in Myanmar to work with the UN is also an option.

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is how to establish a productive dialogue with Myanmar on a genuine process of dialogue and reconciliation. There have been some small concessions since Gambari’s first visit, but it is still unclear whether Myanmar is serious about concrete action.

A related issue is how the Council sustains momentum and continues speaking with one voice. The October presidential statement projected a united Council position and maintaining cohesion for maximum impact is an ongoing issue.

Another issue is how to support and strengthen the Secretary-General’s good offices.

Council and Wider Dynamics

The presidential statement which was agreed to by all members is seen by all Council members as a significant development. Some members not previously inclined to have the Council discuss Myanmar played a constructive role, even producing constructive alternative language to help negotiations. Council members particularly welcomed Indonesia’s role, since, as a member of ASEAN, it is in a strong position to contribute positively. Indonesia has indicated interest in being part of a potential core group and is able to share its own experiences of democratisation.

Others, such as the UK, US and France are also concerned about maintaining pressure on the Myanmar government and not letting the issue slip from the agenda. China’s underlying position that the situation is not really a threat to international peace remains, and it is still resistant to imposing sanctions. Still, it is likely, if Myanmar does not show any signs of genuine reconciliation in the next few weeks, some members will press for stronger action.

ASEAN members are also sceptical about sanctions at this stage. They believe sanctions cannot work in practice and that engagement must continue. Like China and India, ASEAN is concerned about civil war and ethnic conflict if the regime were to collapse rapidly. ASEAN does not at this stage feel able to take the lead but is more inclined to play an active supporting role. India, like China, seems to prefer to work behind the scenes.

UN Documents

Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2007/37 (11 October 2007) was the presidential statement strongly deploring the use of violence against demonstrations and emphasising the importance of early release of prisoners.

Draft Resolution

- S/2007/14 (12 January 2007) was the draft resolution vetoed by China and Russia.

Selected Letters

- S/2007/591 (5 October 2007) was the letter from Japanese permanent representative to the UN conveying Japan’s position on developments in Myanmar.
- S/2007/590 (3 October 2007) was the letter from US permanent representative to the UN requesting an urgent meeting of the Council to discuss Myanmar.

Selected General Assembly Resolutions

- A/RES/59/263 (23 December 2004) requested the Secretary-General to provide his good offices and pursue his discussions with the government and people of Myanmar.
Darfur/Sudan

Expected Council Action
Council members are expected to closely monitor Khartoum’s level of cooperation over the deployment of the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and the challenges facing the peace talks, in particular the lack of rebel attendance. (At press time, the talks were due to start on 27 October.) Consultations on Darfur are likely but it remains unclear whether members may consider any action in November.

Key Recent Developments
The situation in Darfur appears to have further deteriorated with reports of a surge in attacks involving the government and associated militia, and rebels. The fighting appeared linked with attempts to shape the security environment on the ground ahead of the peace talks in Libya. There were reports of an ongoing government military build-up, apparently in preparation for a new offensive in Darfur.

On 29 September, ten AMIS peacekeepers were killed in an attack against the AU compound in Haskanita in northern Darfur. The town was almost entirely burned down shortly after government forces regained control. The Council condemned the attack in a presidential statement on 2 October.

Another attack occurred on 8 October against a stronghold in southern Darfur of the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minnawi (SLA/MM), the only rebel group to have signed the Darfur Peace Agreement. Dozens of civilians were killed. Media reports suggest government forces alongside militia carried out the attacks, which Khartoum denies.

At press time, the majority of rebel groups had stated they would not travel to Sirte for the start of the peace talks. There were complaints of Libya as a venue for the talks, of the need for time to prepare a rebel position and of lack of clarity on modalities. Rebels further denounced Khartoum’s actions as a government strategy to block formation of a common rebel position and participation in the peace talks.

In early October, the southern Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) announced withdrawal from the national government citing the north’s unwillingness to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This attracted widespread concern over the future of north-south relations and prospects for renewed destabilisation in Darfur, where one rebel group as a result now questions Khartoum’s authority to negotiate in Sirte.

At press time, UNAMID still lacked pledges for key assets. The latest Secretary-General’s report further noted lack of cooperation from Khartoum with UNAMID’s deployment, which “is being delayed owing to the challenges...to obtain land for the construction of UNAMID offices and accommodation in Darfur, as well as delays in obtaining feedback regarding the list of troop-contributing countries submitted to the Government.”

On 24 October, members adopted a presidential statement on the need for a ceasefire, political settlement and cooperation with UNAMID’s deployment, underlining willingness to take action against spoilers.

The General Assembly now has before it the issue of financing for UNAMID’s first year. The Secretary-General indicated in a letter that, flexibility in administrative and procedural standards would be required to speed up deployment. A contract for logistical services for UNAMID, signed in mid-October, appears to have attracted some concern about transparency.

Sudan continued to avoid its obligations under resolution 1593 concerning the International Criminal Court (ICC). Khartoum reportedly released ICC defendant Ali Kushayb from custody in recent weeks, citing lack of evidence. The government insists that it will not surrender Kushayb or Ahmad Harun to the Court.

Options
Options include:
■ signalling that the Council may determine a date and time for a ceasefire if the parties do not cease hostilities;
■ developing a plan for active Council support for the peace talks, including regular consultations with the mediation team;
■ considering amongst experts a possible element of a resolution identifying a spectrum of targeted sanctions against those that impede the peace process or refuse to cease hostilities;
■ considering the recommendations of the sanctions Panel of Experts, including extending the arms embargo to non-governmental entities in eastern Chad, strengthening the current embargo, and aviation-related measures;
■ considering steps to increase the Council’s involvement in managing north-south issues, perhaps as part of a revised, broader strategy for Sudan (at press time, a US-sponsored draft renewing the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) appeared to signal that);
■ if foot-dragging persists, clearly warning Khartoum that delays in cooperating with UNAMID’s deployment are unacceptable, while perhaps setting a deadline for a response to pending issues;
■ supporting the Secretariat in generating troop-contributing countries’ commitment for aviation and transport assets, perhaps through the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations; and
■ reminding the parties that justice issues remain on the table and perhaps recalling the potential synergies between peace processes and justice and accountability.

Key Issues
The key challenge now appears to be how to ensure that the peace talks are successful and avoid the difficulties encountered by previous mediation attempts. Related issues are how best to reach a ceasefire and ensure rebel participation, while deterring attempts to influence the talks through the use of force on the ground or extended obstruction.

The peace talks face an additional number of key issues:
■ Participation of Key Constituencies: incorporating the views of civil society, the internally displaced and Arab communities;
Negotiation Modalities: managing the peace process, notably timing (such as whether to rely on deadlines) and substance (including critical issues such as land, once only one aspect in wealth-sharing but now increasingly seen to be much more complex, given the realities in Darfur); and

Sufficient Resources: human and financial, for the peace talks.

A major issue for the Council is whether to become more engaged in managing those challenges. This includes the issue of when and whether to raise the stakes for potential peace spoilers through sanctions.

A parallel issue is ensuring that peacekeeping deployments proceed successfully. This raises the immediate question of how to respond to Khartoum’s reluctance to cooperate and the shortage of military-asset contributions. Other peacekeeping issues include:

- coordination between the AU and the UN, and with deployments in Chad and the Central African Republic;
- UNAMID’s cooperation with the sanctions Panel of Experts;
- securing funding from the General Assembly for an expected $2.6 billion;
- UNAMID’s unparalleled management, infrastructure, logistical, security and environmental challenges; and
- potential differences of view on UNAMID’s mandate to protect civilians.

On justice and accountability, the key issues are how and when to address Khartoum’s refusal to cooperate with the ICC, China, Russia, South Africa, Congo, Qatar and Indonesia appeared uncomfortable with a UK proposal of a reference in the latest statement to possible sanctions against those seeking to undermine the peace process by impending judicial processes. Whether a compromise can be built around a low-key approach while preserving the Court’s credibility and potential for deterring spoiler behaviour remains to be seen.

UNAMID: Duration
31 July 2007 to present; mandate expires 31 July 2008

AMIS: Size and Composition
- Total authorised strength: about 10,000 military and 1,500 police
- Strength as of 23 May 2007: 6,143 military and 1,360 police
- Key troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda and Senegal

AMIS: Duration
25 May 2004 to present; mandate expires 31 December 2007

Lebanon

Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to hold at least two sets of informal consultations on Lebanon in November. One, early in the month, will address the report on resolution 1559, and another later in the month will cover issues arising under resolution 1701, such as disarmament and arms smuggling, and the Sheb’a Farms.

The presidential elections in Lebanon (postponed to 12 November) are likely to dominate current Lebanese politics. In the short term, the Council is likely to be cautious about any immediate action on resolution 1701 issues, although a statement on the elections prior to 12 November seems likely.
Key Recent Developments
For recent developments relating to the presidential election issues and resolution 1559 please see our Update Report of 26 October 2007.

On 15 October, Israel returned to Lebanon both a prisoner captured in the 2006 war and the bodies of two Hezbollah fighters. In return, Hezbollah returned the body of an Israeli civilian who had drowned and washed ashore in Lebanon in 2005. Mediated by a facilitator appointed by the Secretary-General, the exchange was described by Israeli officials as “an additional step in the framework of negotiations” for the return of two Israeli soldiers kidnapped by Hezbollah in July 2006.

Also on 15 October, the Lebanese army arrested members of radical Islamist networks planning an attack against the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in south Lebanon.

In August, Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos visited Syria and met with President Bashir al-Assad. Press reports indicated that Syria stated its willingness to transfer the Sheb’a Farms to Lebanon and implement Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora’s seven-point plan until formal steps could be taken to establish Lebanese sovereignty over the Farms. Israel reiterated that it would not withdraw from the Farms.

In the south, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) appear to be expanding cooperation in accordance with resolution 1773, which in August extended UNIFIL’s mandate. In the past two months, there have been more mixed patrols and more reinforcement of checkpoints. Work continues to demarcate the Blue Line more visibly, and no breach of the ceasefire was reported. Israeli overflights violating Lebanese airspace, however, have continued.

Options
At the time of writing the political uncertainty makes it difficult to assess options relating to resolution 1701 issues, especially as the Council is intending to address these issues later in the month.

Our Update Report of 26 October looks at more immediate options with respect to issues under resolution 1559.

However, three possible points include:

- welcoming the 15 October transfer of the prisoners and human remains, and encouraging further progress in this regard;
- welcoming progress by the UN cartographer on the geographical definition of the Sheb’a Farms; and
- requesting the Secretary-General to make recommendations on possible interim steps regarding the Sheb’a Farms. (Based on Syrian and Lebanese statements that the Farms are Lebanese, this could include possible expansion of UNIFIL’s area of operations to include the Farms, replacing the UN Disengagement Observer Force.)

Key Issues
A key practical issue is whether the UN cartographer has completed work on geographical definition of the Sheb’a Farms. It may be that the technical work is now complete. However, while the cartographer met Israeli counterparts to facilitate mapping, it seems that there has been little progress with Israel, Syria and Lebanon on political aspects.

A related issue is the timing for Council action on the delineation of the Farms. The Secretary-General was requested in resolution 1701 to develop, “in liaison with relevant international actors and the concerned parties” proposals to delineate borders in the Sheb’a Farms area. The technical mapping only satisfies part of this mandate and a big question is whether the Council is ready to take action now or would prefer instead to request clear political recommendations from the Secretary-General.

A related issue is the lack of progress by the Syrian-Lebanese boundary committee in delineating other parts of the border. Syria in the past stated that Israel should withdraw from the Farms before work could begin on delineating any of the border. Its recent position may be more nuanced with respect to the Farms and dealing with that issue separately may now be a possibility. It may be that wider border demarcation issues can be postponed. However, that may become an issue in the Council.

This may dovetail with the next steps in implementing the recommendations from the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT), which visited the Syrian-Lebanese border in May and June 2007. (Please see our July 2007 Forecast Report.) The main question is whether Syria is sufficiently controlling the border, and whether allegations that Syria is permitting export of weapons across the border can be verified.

Disarmament remains an important issue. Israel continues to allege that Hezbollah is rebuilding its capacity in the south (and UNIFIL recognises the difficulty in completely securing the Litani River line). Israel has asked UNIFIL to more actively search for weapons and has been critical of UNIFIL’s fulfilment of its mandate under resolution 1701, using this as an argument that overflights are needed for security reasons.

The interpretation of UNIFIL’s mandate has been an underlying issue. Resolution 1701 requested that UNIFIL “assists” the LAF to establish a zone free of weapons and armed personnel in the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line. The issue is whether this means that UNIFIL should proactively look for weapons, or whether it requires leadership by the LAF. A related factor is that the LAF, against the background of the domestic political uncertainty, is reluctant to initiate search operations.

A further issue may be how much attention should be given to the recent Hezbollah-Israel swap of bodies and prisoner, and prospects for the return of the two Israeli soldiers.

Council Dynamics
France, the US and the UK traditionally take the lead.

The US seems reluctant to address the issue of placing the Sheb’a Farms under any formal interim UN control. It seems to consider that Syria has a responsibility for
is unlikely to find much support in the Coun...-addressed within the framework of a peace treaty between Israel and Syria. In contrast, France is more supportive of the compromise approach in the Lebanese seven-point plan.

Russia and France have been cautious about addressing disarmament and arms smuggling. However, this is a priority for the US because of Israel’s security concerns. Reinforcement of the arms embargo is unlikely to find much support in the Council at present, although some may want to reiterate a call on Syria to do more to control its border.

For other members—especially Indonesia, Panama and South Africa—the question of Israeli overflights in violation of resolution 1701 is important. They also tend to resist naming regional countries (Syria and Iran) as violators of the arms embargo, maintaining that allegations of their involvement in smuggling are not proven.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**
- S/RES/1773 (24 August 2007) extended UNIFIL until 31 August 2008 and replaced the quarterly reporting mechanism by a four-monthly mechanism.
- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah and authorised a reinforcement of UNIFIL.
- S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) urged Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon and the disarmament of militias.

**Presidential Statements on 1701**
- S/PRST/2007/29 (3 August 2007)
- S/PRST/2007/12 (17 April 2007)
- S/PRST/2006/52 (12 December 2006)

**Latest Secretary-General’s Reports**
- S/2007/629 (24 October 2007) was the latest report on resolution 1559.
- S/2007/392 (28 June 2007) was the latest report on resolution 1701.

**Selected Letters**
- S/2007/420 (9 October 2007) was a letter from Lebanon transmitting a statistical table of Israeli violations of resolution 1701.
- S/2007/594 (5 October 2007) was a letter from Lebanon on Israel's persistent refusal to provide maps of cluster bombs in south Lebanon.
- S/2007/519 (30 August 2007) was a letter from Israel transmitting a summary of violations of the Blue Line from 19 June to 21 August and reiterating its concern about the presence of armed Hezbollah elements south of the Litani River and at the transfer of weapons from Syria.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Secretary-General’s Special Coordinator for Lebanon**
Geir O. Pedersen (Norway)

**UNIFIL Force Commander**
Major General Claudio Graziano (Italy)

**Size and Composition of UNIFIL**
- Authorised: 15,000 troops
- Current (30 September 2007): 13,264 military personnel, supported by 279 international civilian and 452 local civilian staff.
- Troop-contributing countries: Belgium, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, France, FYR of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Tanzania and Turkey.

**Cost (approved budget)**

**Useful Additional Sources**
- Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s seven-point plan

### Iraq (MNF Renewal)

**Expected Council Action**
The mandate of the Multinational Force (MNF) in Iraq expires on 31 December. However, the Council is likely to bring forward the renewal of the MNF mandate and act on this in November. At the time of writing it is unclear when the Iraqi government request for the renewal of the MNF mandate will be received.

**Key Recent Developments**
On 19 October, the US briefed the Council on MNF activities in Iraq, and the Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe presented the latest report on the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) to the Council. He emphasised that UNAMI had to be afforded the necessary political and humanitarian space to implement its new mandate, and issued a strong appeal for member states to support the UN’s efforts. While welcoming UNAMI’s new role, many Council members expressed concern at the worsening humanitarian situation and at increasing violence during the debate which followed Pascoe’s briefing. France mentioned that it supported a strengthening of the UN’s role in Iraq in the context of a withdrawal horizon for foreign forces. South Africa called for tighter regulations governing the actions of private security companies.

On 8 October, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced that the UK would start cutting its 5,000-strong military presence in Iraq before the end of the year, reducing to 2,500 in early 2008. On 2 September, British forces completed withdrawal from their last base in Basra, handing over control of the province to Iraqi security forces.

On 29 September, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said that the next one-year extension of the UN mandate for the MNF would be the last. It would then be replaced by a long-term bilateral security agreement with the US, similar to the ones the US already has with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar and...
Egypt. He also said that the Iraqi government would ask the Council to note Iraq’s intention to enter into negotiations with the US to reach such security agreements.

On 11 September, General David Petraeus, the US commander of the MNF, told the US Congress that he believed the situation in Iraq remained too fragile to undertake rapid troop reductions, but recommended a withdrawal of the surge combat forces (approximately 28,500 troops) by mid-2008.

The Iraqi parliament failed to agree on oil investment and revenue-sharing laws, and laws on reintegration of former Baathist members into government, which had been requested by the US Congress as evidence of progress. Parliament reconvened on 4 September but so far has been unable to pass any major pieces of legislation.

On 5 June, the parliament approved a law that the Iraqi cabinet should consult parliament before any extension of the MNF mandate. The draft law was submitted by the Shi’a Sadrist block and supported by Sunni Arabs, but opposed by the Kurds and by the Shi’a supporters of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. It seems that this was in response to the cabinet’s failure last year to respect a verbal agreement with the parliament that it would include some conditions for the MNF renewal in its letter to the Council. However, there seem to be different interpretations about whether or not this law is binding, and whether this law was ratified—the government has not rejected it, but the law has not been published in the official journal either. This remained unclear at the time of writing.

The government coalition seems to have become more fragile in recent months. In June, July and August, several ministers withdrew from the cabinet, including those from the most important Sunni group, the Accords Front. Eight of the 29 ministers currently serving now boycott cabinet meetings.

All these developments have contributed to strained relations between the Iraqi government and the US. The Iraqi government’s position in response to the Blackwater security firm’s killing of a number of Iraqi civilians is also likely to add to the tensions.

Options
Council members are likely to respond positively to any Iraqi request for a MNF renewal and be guided by any concerns or conditions suggested by Iraq. However, additional options include:

- requesting a review process of the MNF by June 2008;
- introducing language recognising that once Iraqi security forces are ready to undertake security responsibilities over the whole territory, the MNF mandate in Iraq would end (similar to language in resolution 1723, which was adopted last year);
- indicating, if the Iraqi government requests this in its letter, that this is the last time the Council is giving the MNF a mandate to operate in Iraq;
- reminding the MNF of its responsibility to respect international humanitarian and human rights law; and
- addressing the humanitarian risks arising from the presence of private security companies in an active combat zone.

Key Issues
A major issue may arise from the division between the Iraqi cabinet and parliament. Prime Minister al-Maliki faces increasing domestic criticism, especially from parliament, about the MNF presence in Iraq. Whether he will agree to consult parliament in accordance with the June 2007 legislation and put to the Council parliament’s conditions for the MNF renewal remains to be seen. This issue is also relevant in the context of national reconciliation, not just between factions but between institutions as well.

Immunity from prosecution (in particular by private security companies) could also become an issue during discussions within the Council.

Council Dynamics
The US and the UK have the lead and will present a draft resolution to the rest of the Council after receiving the Iraqi letter. They will be opposed to any firm timetable. The terms of the formal Iraqi request for MNF renewal are unlikely to take them by surprise. However, it remains to be seen whether they will have to compromise with Iraq on conditions for the MNF renewal.

Opposition to the MNF renewal by other Council members is very unlikely. However, some may propose amendments. Last year, France proposed language on the completion of the MNF mandate in Iraq when Iraqi forces are ready to assume full responsibility for the maintenance of security and stability in the country. France also requested a six-month review process. Other countries such as Indonesia and Russia may also be interested in a more nuanced approach to approving the presence in Iraq than in previous years.

Iraq’s prime minister supports the US and the UK in opposing any timetable for MNF troop withdrawal. Both the US and the UK seem comfortable with his approach that this would be the last MNF mandate renewal to be authorised by the UN. It remains to be seen, however, how comfortable Council members as a whole are with that approach. It also remains to be seen whether the 5 June legislation will come up. The US and the UK are likely to argue that this is an Iraqi internal matter and that the Council should be guided by the letter from the Iraqi government.

UN Documents
Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1723 (28 November 2006) extended the mandates of the MNF, the Development Fund for Iraq and the International Advisory and Monitoring Board until 31 December 2007.
- S/RES/1546 (8 June 2004) endorsed the formation of the interim government and the holding of elections by January 2005, welcomed the end of the occupation by 30 June 2004, endorsed the proposed timetable for the political transition, requested quarterly reports, detailed the mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, UNAMI and the MNF.

Latest UNAMI Report

Other Relevant Facts

MNF Senior Leaders
• General David H. Petraeus, Commanding General (US)
• Lieutenant General William Rollo, Deputy Commanding General (UK)

MNF Coalition Partners Participating in Ground Operations as of October 2007 (ranging from more than 5,000 to 100 or fewer soldiers)
US (around 168,000 troops), UK, Georgia, Australia, South Korea, Poland, Romania, El Salvador, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Mongolia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Albania, Armenia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Moldova

Useful Additional Sources

Ethiopia/Eritrea

Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to consider the Secretary-General’s report on the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) in early November. The impending deadline set by the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC) for demarcating the borders between the two countries is also likely to come up in informal consultations. A presidential or a press statement is possible. UNMEE’s mandate expires on 31 January 2008.

Recent Developments
The stalemate and mounting tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea remain. Both sides exchanged accusations during the annual general debate of the General Assembly. On 1 October, the foreign minister of Eritrea reiterated that Ethiopia had been allowed to frustrate the implementation of the EEBC “because of the unwarranted positions of some UN Security Council Member States,” and that the Council had chosen to placate Ethiopia at the expense of international law and the interests of regional peace and security. He called on the UN to ensure the implementation of the final border decision and said that Eritrea had learned of a letter from Ethiopia indicating that it intended to renounce the Algiers Agreements (which ended hostilities between the two countries and set the framework for settlement of the border dispute). In response, Ethiopia’s representative dismissed the accusations as “baseless,” while counter-accusing Eritrea of being an obstacle to the full implementation of the Algiers Agreements and the EEBC decision. This oral exchange reflected more detailed positions in recent letters to the Security Council in late September and October.

In a related development, the yet to be released twenty-fifth report of the EEBC to the Secretary-General was reported to have been publicised on an Eritrean government website. This drew strong reactions from Ethiopia, which indicated that it had not yet been formally furnished with a copy and that Eritrea sought to manipulate the disclosure for its own ends.

On 10 October, the Secretary-General issued a press statement on the escalating tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, including shooting incidents, as well as the military build-up in the border area. He called on them to exercise utmost restraint, maintain their commitment to the Algiers Agreements, preserve the integrity of the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) and facilitate the implementation of the delimitation decision of the EEBC.

(For more information on recent developments please see our October 2007 Forecast Report)

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council remains how best to steer Ethiopia and Eritrea towards reduced tensions. A related issue is whether the 27 November deadline set by the EEBC for compliance—after which it will formally delineate the boundary by coordinates (i.e. using maps and not by actual placing of pillars on the ground)—will further heighten tensions. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have expressed strong reservations about such a “virtual” demarcation by the EEBC. The links between bilateral tensions and instability in the wider region, especially Somalia are also a key issue. Finally, a further key issue is the Ethiopian threat to withdraw from the Algiers Agreement.

Options
The Council’s options include:
- reassessing the situation before the EEBC’s 27 November deadline and taking decisive action if it considers the situation likely to deteriorate significantly;
- continuing to persist with a more low key approach based on encouraging the parties to continue to adhere to the requirements of the Algiers agreement and perhaps invoking again the prestige of the witnesses to the Algiers Agreement (Algeria, the AU, the EU and the US);
- intensifying its demands for Ethiopia to accept fully and without delay the boundary decision and for the immediate withdrawal of Eritrea’s troops from the TSZ and for lifting restrictions on UNMEE and in particular addressing the threats of withdrawal from the Algiers Agreement;
- encouraging use of available avenues, including using non-Council members with influence in the region to engage both parties to find a closure to the issue;
- encouraging the appointment of a new Special Representative (the post has been vacant since May 2006) to facilitate finding a solution to the impasse; and
- mandating its Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations to take up the issue and encouraging the Group to meet regularly with the two countries.

Council Dynamics
It seems that Council members are concerned about the implications of the approaching EEBC November deadline but not to the extent that they consider that it will of itself precipitate hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea or any fundamental
change in the dynamics of the situation. Most members seem to continue to prefer a low key approach of repeating calls for restraint and expressing concern with ongoing tensions. But some may be looking for new options in light of the failure of past alternatives.

UNMEE’s deterrent role has been generally appreciated by the Council, and most members see it continuing to be useful in demonstrating its commitment to peaceful resolution of the dispute, despite the operational challenges affecting the implementation of its monitoring mandate.

Belgium is the lead country in the Council on the issue.

Underlying Problems

Potential for violent conflict remains if the deterrent effect of UNMEE is removed or if the Algiers commitment fails.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1312 (31 July 2000) established UNMEE.

Selected Letters

- A letter dated 25 October 2007 contained Eritrea’s position in regards to the 27 November deadline of the EEBC.
- A letter 22 September 2007 contained Ethiopia’s notification to Eritrea on perceived breaches of the Algiers Agreements.
- S/2006/1036 (28 December 2006) contained Eritrea’s position on the appointment of a Special Representative.
- S/2006/890 (15 November 2006) and 905 (20 November 2006) contained respectively Ethiopia’s and Eritrea’s position on the EEBC’s intentions regarding the demarcation process.

Secretary-General’s Press Release

- S/2007/440 (18 July 2007) was the latest UNMEE report.
- S/2006/992 (15 December 2006) contained options for UNMEE and the November EEBC decision.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission
Vacant, pending appointment; acting representative Azouz Ennifar (Tunisia)

Size and Composition

- Authorised maximum strength: 4,200 military personnel
- Strength as of 31 August 2007: 1,686 military personnel
- Key troop-contributing countries: India, Jordan and Kenya

Cost
Approved budget: 1 July 2007-30 June 2008: $118.99 million

Duration
31 July 2000 to present; mandate expires 31 January 2008

Expected Council Action

The Council is unlikely to take up the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme in November. Discussions among the EU3+3 (France, Germany and the UK plus China, Russia and the US) are likely to continue following the completion of the report from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on progress for implementation of the work plan agreed between Iran and the IAEA to resolve outstanding issues to be submitted to the IAEA board of directors on 22 November. The views of the EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana outlining progress on talks with the Iranian nuclear negotiator are also likely to be influential.

The EU3+3 seem to have agreed in September that if there is not a “positive outcome” to the efforts of Solana and Mohamed ElBaradei, they would start work on a third sanctions resolution.

Key Recent Developments

The IAEA reported in late August that Iran was still not complying with resolutions 1737 and 1747 asking it to suspend uranium enrichment. In September, the EU3+3 met several times to discuss the way ahead, taking into account the Iran-IAEA agreement to resolve the outstanding issues.

An EU3+3 meeting was held on the margins of the General Assembly in New York on 28 September, at the level of foreign ministers. They adopted a statement reflecting a new “dual track” approach. In it, they:
- expressed their commitment to engage into negotiations with Iran on a comprehensive long-term agreement to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue, after Iran suspends uranium enrichment;
On 20 October, Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani resigned and was replaced by Said Jalili, a close ally of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. It seems that Larijani had tried to resign from his position previously. There are fears that this replacement may indicate less flexibility from Iran.

On 23 October, Solana and the new Iranian nuclear negotiator met in Rome to discuss Iran’s nuclear programme. Both sides described those talks as “constructive,” but there was no movement on the issue of uranium enrichment suspension, and in a statement made on the same day, Iranian President Ahmadinejad said that Iran would not retreat “one iota” from its nuclear programme. Further discussions are expected by the end of November.

On 16 October, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with President Ahmadinejad at a summit meeting of five Caspian Sea nations in Iran. It seems discussions included completion of the nuclear power plant Russia is building in Bushehr, and plans to cooperate on space, aviation and energy.

On 15 October, EU foreign ministers discussed French-sponsored proposals to reinforce EU unilateral sanctions (such as broader cut-offs in bank lending) before another Security Council resolution. It seems that France had the backing of the UK, but Germany and Italy were more reluctant. A statement was adopted, which said that “the EU will consider what additional measures it might take in order to support the UN process.”

The US and its European partners are likely to be pressing in November for a tougher approach.

It seems at the time of writing that the Europeans and the US believe that prospects for success in the Solana-Jalili talks are low.

Documents

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<th>Security Council Resolutions</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1747 (24 March 2007) imposed additional measures against Iran and reinforced existing ones.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1737 (23 December 2006) imposed measures against Iran under Chapter VII, article 41, of the UN Charter and expressed its intention to adopt further measures under article 41 in case of Iranian non-compliance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1696E (31 July 2006) demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and expressed its intention to adopt measures under article 41 in case of Iranian non-compliance.</td>
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Useful Additional Sources

- EU3+3 statement of 28 September can be found at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ps/ps/2007/sep/92944.htm
- EU3+3 June 2006 package proposal of a long-term agreement if Iran takes steps required by the IAEA Board can be found at http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/E3%20proposal%20June%202006.pdf

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to consider in informal consultations the Secretary-General’s report on Somalia, which now seems likely to be available by the end of October. Despite the worsening situation in Somalia, it seems unlikely that any new concrete proposals on political reconciliation, sanctions or support for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) will emerge. AMISOM’s Council authorisation expires on 20 February.

Key Recent Developments

Humanitarian and security conditions in Somalia continue to deteriorate. In late September, the Secretary-General noted that food security and nutrition have deteriorated dramatically. In recent months, those in need of humanitarian assistance increased from 1 to 1.5 million. Attacks against media organisations led to eight assassinations of journalists so far this year,
The rift within the TFG between Yusuf and Gedi was longstanding, but its recent focus had been on control of the budget and natural resources. A major repositioning of domestic actors seems underway. President Yusuf also faces additional difficulties, including political opposition within the TFG and parliament, estranged relations with the rival Hawiye clan and the insurgency. Moreover, his power base in Puntland has been increasingly volatile.

Related Developments in the Sanctions Committee

The 751Sanctions Committee on Somalia held discussions in preparation for a briefing to the Council by the Committee chairman on measures to strengthen the arms embargo and their implementation, as requested in resolution 1772. A note by the chairman summarising the Committee’s discussions was presented to the Council on 24 October.

There appeared to be strong support within the Committee for improving the effectiveness of the arms embargo, but there also seemed to be divisions on whether to maintain the current regime and wait for more clarity on the political landscape, or adopt targeted measures against peace spoilers and those attacking AMISOM. So far, there seems to be agreement on sending a note verbale to the entire membership on the need to observe the embargo.

An added issue is that names for targeted sanctions in the short run would need to be submitted by Committee members, in particular by those with good practical knowledge on Somalia. The next Monitoring Group’s report is not likely before January.

Options

Options include:

- emphasising more bluntly the need for all-inclusive reconciliation;
- demanding a ceasefire;
- taking steps to increase the flow of information about the situation on the ground.

on political reconciliation efforts and on regional initiatives, by sending a small Council mission to the region and inviting TFG officials, regional players, the AU and members of the international contact group to brief the mission;

- requesting detailed and early recommendations from the Secretariat on establishing a UN political presence in Somalia and enhancing security for UNPOS in Mogadishu and an initial package of UN logistical and technical assistance to AMISOM;

- signalling readiness to authorise a UN support package and to consider regional options to strengthen AMISOM;

- taking no action at this stage.

Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is whether there is anything more it can do at this moment to encourage progress on political reconciliation. Related issues are whether to:

- encourage a “peace process roadmap” leading to elections in 2009;
- be more assertive about the need for a broad, all-inclusive political reconciliation process; and
- take further steps to reinforce UN support for and monitoring of existing efforts.

A second key issue is the security situation and whether to:

- encourage a ceasefire and Ethiopian withdrawal; and
- request the Secretary-General to accelerate UN efforts to strengthen AMISOM.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Council members seem inclined to step back somewhat from their earlier level of involvement in security and political reconciliation issues in Somalia.
Some seem to want to press for more details from the Secretariat on planning for a UN peacekeeping operation, although this is paralleled by recognition that deployment does not appear feasible in the medium-term given the security situation and the concerns of potential troop contributors. Many seem troubled by the lack of options and the interconnectedness of the issues.

For the time being, external support for AMISOM has been mostly bilateral. There were some reports that a specific proposal following up on the idea of an African-Arab force could be presented by the end of October, but it is unclear if and when this may materialise. Most Council members see a need for more details ahead of concrete discussions, and in particular, some more direct input from Saudi Arabia and the Arab League if they are interested in pursuing this idea.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1772 (20 August 2007) renewed AMISOM.
- S/RES/1766 (23 July 2007) renewed the Monitoring Group’s mandate.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report

Other
- S/2007/566 (20 September 2007) was a Secretary-General’s letter reporting on progress with steps requested in resolution 1772.
- S/2007/436 (17 July 2007) was the latest Monitoring Group report.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania)

Chairman of the Sanctions Committee
Dumisani S. Kumalo (South Africa)

AMISOM: Size and Composition
- Maximum authorised strength: 7,650 troops plus maritime and air components.
- Strength as of 25 September 2007: about 1,600 Ugandan troops.

AMISOM: Duration
February 2007 to present; AU mandate expires on 17 January 2008 and Council authorisation expires on 20 February 2008

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to reauthorise the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) before the end of its mandate on 21 November.

In November the High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Miroslav Lajčak, is expected to present his report to the Council. This is likely to analyse political developments over the last six months and outline his future strategy. These reports are in accordance with annex 10 of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the conclusions of the London Peace Implementation Conference of 1995.

The Council has not had an active role in Bosnia and Herzegovina for some years. It generally discusses Bosnia and Herzegovina twice a year, with its main function being to reauthorise EUFOR annually.

Greater attention is likely this year, however, given the enhanced interest of many members in the Balkan situation following the Council’s mission to Kosovo. Also, there seems to be a growing concern about the persistence of internal instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the possible repercussions in the region.

Key Recent Developments
Following the approval in May of the text of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU, it seemed that Bosnia and Herzegovina was on track for resolving some of the factors causing instability and would be rewarded by taking the first step towards EU accession. However, Bosnian politicians were unable to agree on police reform by the 15 October deadline and were therefore unable to sign the SAA at the EU foreign ministers meeting in Luxembourg. Progress on accession is therefore on hold. On 28 October, Bosnia’s political leaders reached an agreement to move police reform forward but no details were available at press time.

On 16 October, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the chief civilian actor for peace implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, announced it would shift its focus to economic reforms. On the same day, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s leaders signed a document committing them to improve the business environment.

Lajčak has also hinted strongly that he could use his powers to dismiss officials over blocking police reform. The High Representative’s powers were authorised by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), based on annex 10 of the Dayton Peace Agreement. This empowers the High Representative to remove public officials who violate legal commitments and the Dayton Peace Agreement and to impose laws if Bosnia and Herzegovina’s legislative bodies fail to do so.

On 19 October, Lajčak imposed new rules on decision-making in parliament and the council of ministers. These rules change the way a quorum is calculated by counting ministers and lawmakers who attend, rather than including those who do not. Bosnia’s Serb politicians have threatened to quit the government if Lajčak does not reverse his measures. They claim that the reform upsets the ethnic balance established by the Dayton Peace Agreement.
The Secretary-General on 25 October voiced his concern about political developments and urged political leaders to show restraint. He also reiterated his support for Lajčák.

At the meeting of the PIC Steering Committee Board on 18 and 19 June, political directors issued a strong declaration expressing grave concern over the political situation. The PIC oversees the Dayton peace process and meets regularly to give guidance to the High Representative. Its Steering Committee Board members are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, the US, the EU Presidency, the European Commission and the Organisation of Islamic Conference.

The OHR, which began work in 1995, had been expected to complete its work by the end of June 2007. However, the slowing pace of reform and the greater political instability led the PIC to decide in February to extend the OHR until June 2008. The PIC Steering Committee is expected to review this decision when it meets on 30 and 31 October.

The foreign ministers of the Contact Group on the Balkans (including Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and comprising the UK, US, Italy, France, Russia and Germany) issued a statement on 27 September expressing concern that progress on the Dayton Agreement and reform had “come to a halt” and “extremist rhetoric” is on the rise.

Politicians in Bosnia have continued to foment nationalist sentiment by suggesting partition into ethnic entities. During the October 2006 elections, Republika Srpska Prime Minister Milorad Dodik threatened to hold a Bosnian Serb referendum on independence. He has also indicated that one of the consequences of a unilateral declaration of independence from Kosovo is that others in a similar situation should have the right to demand independence. Dodik also recently supported the partition of Bosnia's Federation into two entities, one dominated by the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and the other by Bosnian Croats.

Options
The Council’s most likely option in November is a simple 12-month renewal of EUFOR. However, other options include scheduling a review in March following the PIC Steering Committee’s February meeting. Another option is to include in the resolution language that emphasises the importance of moving forward with reforms and the urgent need to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

Alternatively, Council members could choose to address the stalled reform process and the deteriorating political climate in a presidential statement, highlighting the concerns and trying to nudge the reform process back on track.

If it wants to keep a closer watch, the Council may request more regular briefings from the High Representative.

Key Issues
A key issue is the increasingly tense political situation, which seems to be marked by a reopening of the divide among ethnic communities. Since the elections in October 2006, extremist rhetoric and nationalist politics have increased. Observers note that Dodik and Haris Silajdzic, the Muslim member of the tripartite presidency, have vastly different political agendas, which makes it difficult for them to agree on reforms.

A related issue is the lack of progress on police and constitutional reform. Discussions on police reform, which started in 2004, came to a standstill this year. Currently, Bosnia’s entities (the Bosniak-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska) control the local police, rather than the central government. The EU wants police budgetary and legislative matters determined at state level, an end to political interference in policing, and the establishment of policing regions based on functional rather than ethnic divisions. While Bosnia and Herzegovina’s leaders signed a commitment to pursue constitutional reform in November 2005, they have not been able to bridge their differences over the shape of the future state.

Another issue is possible political instability if the High Representative uses his powers and dismisses key officials. A related question is whether Lajčák has the right to use his powers in this situation since they relate to the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement, whereas police reform has emerged more directly in response to the EU’s SAA process, which some see as a technically a separate issue.

A further issue related to potential instability is the use that some leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina have made of the Kosovo final status issue to further their own political aims. The reaction of Bosnian Muslims to the International Court of Justice decision on Srebrenica in February this year also made it clear that past hostility is far from forgotten.

A future issue is the possible need to extend the OHR beyond June 2008. The Council may have to consider how best to synchronise any extensions with the mandate of EUFOR. This could become contentious as some members prefer a transfer of authority to the Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities sooner rather than later.

A continuing issue for some Council members is Republika Srpska’s cooperation with the ICTY in helping to deliver war crimes suspect Radovan Karadžić. It is likely to be given more attention as ICTY moves towards its deadline of completing all trials by the end of 2008.

Council and Wider Dynamics
While members agree that responsibility should be transferred to Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities, there are differences on how quickly this might happen. In the past,
Russia had advocated an early transfer and disagreed with OHR’s extension beyond June 2007. However, given recent developments, many members seem to be more cautious about terminating its mandate prematurely.

Negotiations over the resolution are not expected to be easy. Last year, Russia objected to standard preambular paragraphs referring to territorial integrity. This may have been related to the negotiations on Kosovo’s final status. The same issue came up with respect to Georgia in 2006 but was resolved. It did not arise in the UNOMIG renewal in October 2007.

**UN Documents**

*Selected Security Council Resolutions*
- S/RES/1764 (29 June 2007) welcomed and agreed to Miroslav Lajčák’s designation as High Representative.
- S/RES/1722 (21 November 2006) was the most recent EUFOR resolution.
- S/RES/1575 (22 November 2004) established EUFOR.
- S/RES/1088 (12 December 1996) contained the authorisation of the establishment of a multinational stabilisation force (SFOR).
- S/RES/1031 (15 December 1995) was on the implementation of the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina and transfer of authority from the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to the multinational implementation force (IFOR).
- S/RES/743 (21 February 1992) established UNPROFOR.
- S/RES/713 (25 September 1991) marked the start of the UN’s involvement in the former Yugoslavia.

*S/1995/999 and annexes (29 November 1995) was the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Annexes, signed in Dayton.

**Useful Additional Sources**
- Statement on Bosnia and Herzegovina by Contact Group Ministers, 27 September 2007
- Communiqué by the PIC Steering Board of 19 June 2007 and 27 February 2007
- Letter from the President of the Security Council to the Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the security Council position on police officers denied certification or decertification by the UN IPTF, 30 April 2007

**Timor-Leste**

**Expected Council Action**

In late November, Council members are expected to undertake a field mission to Timor-Leste. It seems that after the period of violence and instability in 2006-07, the formation of the new Timorese government has encouraged the Council to accept the importance of displaying, on the ground, evidence of an enduring commitment to Timor-Leste. The mission will also assess progress with the implementation of Council resolutions. South Africa is likely to lead the mission. The mandate of the UN Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) expires on 26 February.

**The Proposed Visiting Mission**

At press time, members appeared close to finalising the terms of reference for the mission, which could include:
- reaffirming the Council’s commitment to the promotion of long-term stability in Timor-Leste;
- encouraging all actors to engage in dialogue;
- supporting and encouraging efforts to ensure justice and accountability and the implementation of UN recommendations, and stressing that UNMIT’s mandate is a significant contribution to that endeavour; and
- assessing progress with implementing UNMIT’s mandate.

Discussions on the possibility of referring Timor-Leste to the Peacebuilding Commission were initially an option, but were excluded due to the Timorese government’s preference for leaving the issue for a later stage. However, the longer term future of UN involvement is likely to be in the minds of members.

During the mission, members are expected to meet Timorese government officials, key donors and UNMIT personnel. It is unclear how many Council members will participate, and at what diplomatic level, but it seems likely that it will be a small mission of possibly six to eight members.

**Counter-Terrorism: Briefings to the Council**

**Expected Council Action**

Twice a year the chairs of the Security Council’s three counter-terrorism committees brief the Council. The next briefing is due in November when the chairs of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC, established under resolution 1373), the Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism Committee (WMD, resolution 1540) and the Al-Qaïda and Taliban Sanctions Committee (resolution 1267) will address the Council. No formal outcome is expected.
The joint briefings started in April 2005. So far, there have been six joint briefings, including three last year, which have been held in formal public meetings. The November briefing may be followed by an open debate. Non-Council members who wish to participate will need to register their requests in writing.

Several developments related to counter-terrorism may be foreshadowed in the briefing:
- the mandate of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) expires on 31 December, and a comprehensive review is supposed to be undertaken prior to the renewal of this mandate;
- the mandates of the 1540 Committee and its Group of Experts expire on 27 April 2008; and
- the mandate of the 1267 Committee’s Monitoring Team expires on 30 June 2008.

**Semi-Annual Briefings by the Counter-Terrorism Committees Chairs**

The joint briefing by the three committees focusing on counter-terrorism is intended to bring closer collaboration and cooperation among them. The committee chairs use the semi-annual meeting to inform the Council, and the wider UN community, of progress made implementing the relevant counter-terrorism resolutions of the Council, in particular the committees’ work over the preceding six months and their work plan for the next period. In the past, the briefing has provided an opportunity for non-Council members to comment on the work of the committees, their support mechanisms and the Council’s role in UN counter-terrorism efforts.

In the last joint briefing to the Council in May, each chair reported on the committees’ work, their support mechanisms and the work contemplated for the ensuing months. They reported on how they and their experts had engaged with member states on implementing provisions of the relevant resolutions. They also discussed how the committees had paid special attention to developing best practices and guidance for member states, and how the committees had conducted outreach through seminars and worked to improve cooperation with relevant regional and international organisations. In the case of the CTED and the Monitoring Team, the chairs reported on country visits conducted and contemplated. Also, the CTC chair reported during the last briefing on progress made by the CTED preparing the Preliminary Implementation Assessments of member states and the work of the CTC’s subcommittees in approving them. These Assessments provide the CTC with an indication of each state’s implementation of the provisions of resolution 1373. They also assess the capacity-building assistance needed by those states lacking the required counter-terrorism capacity.

The November briefings seem likely to follow the same pattern, providing the Council with an update of the progress made on the programme of work of each committee and their support mechanisms.

The CTC chair is expected to report on the provisions of resolution 1624, which requires all states to criminalise and prevent incitement to terrorism. The chair is also likely to highlight the outcome of the fifth special meeting of the CTC with sub-regional, regional and international organisations. The focus of this meeting, scheduled for 29-31 October in Nairobi, is the “Prevention of Terrorist Movement and Effective Border Security.”

The chair of the 1267 Committee is likely to report on the progress made since the last briefing, particularly in its review of the list of targeted individuals and entities. The chair will also likely discuss the outreach of the Monitoring Team with states through country visits, cooperation with relevant international organisations and initiatives to engage the private sector. (In December the Committee, in keeping with past practice, is also likely to report on how states have implemented sanctions measures and what areas may require further Council action.)

The chair of the 1540 Committee is expected to report on the work of the Committee and its experts in the preceding months and discuss the goals set for the Committee before its mandate expires. The Committee and its experts have continued outreach activities to advise states of their obligations to implement provisions of the resolution and have provided guidance. Its experts have also established working relationships with relevant international organisations and are expected to continue to build on those efforts.

**Developments in the General Assembly**

The General Assembly adopted its Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in September 2006. This emphasised the importance of cooperation on counter-terrorism issues within the UN system. It also pointed to specific actions that the CTC and the CTED could take within their respective mandates, along with areas for greater synergy on counter-terrorism among UN bodies in general.

To promote the Global Strategy, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, comprising some 24 UN bodies and agencies, was established within the Secretariat. A representative of each of the monitoring mechanisms of the Council’s three counter-terrorism committees participates in the meetings of the Task Force and provides expertise to its activities.

The relative balance between the General Assembly and the Security Council on the issues remains controversial, however, with many non-Council members expressing concern that the current structures unduly favour the Council.

**Council Dynamics**

There have been suggestions that a comprehensive review and restructuring of all
Council counter-terrorism efforts would be desirable, given that the mandates of all three are set to expire by mid-2008. However, none of the permanent Council members appear ready at this time to take the lead in moving forward with such an initiative.

It remains to be seen whether the expiry of the CTED’s mandate at the end of the year will prompt a fundamental review. While some Council members are dissatisfied with the status quo, its mandate is expected to be extended.

It also remains to be seen whether there will be an open debate in November and if so, the extent of participation among UN member states and the impact this debate may have on the Council in December when it comes to consider the CTED review.

UN Documents

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1535 (26 March 2004) established the CTED and its mandate.
- S/RES1540 (28 April 2004) established the 1540 Committee and its mandate.
- S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001) established the CTC and its mandate.
- S/RES1267 (15 October 1999) established the Al-Qaida and Taliban Committee and its mandate (modified and enhanced by subsequent resolutions).

**Selected Presidential Statements**


**Other Selected Documents**

- S/PV.5679 (22 May 2007) is the transcript of the meeting of the Security Council at which the chairs of the three counter-terrorism committees briefed the Council.

**Democratic Republic of the Congo**

**Expected Council Action**

Council members will receive the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). It is due by 15 November and expected to contain possible benchmarks for a drawdown of MONUC. There is a possibility of discussions in informal consultations perhaps leading to a statement on the deteriorating situation in the eastern part of the country. No action on the drawdown plan is likely in November although it is likely to be discussed at the experts’ level in anticipation of a draft resolution on renewal of MONUC’s mandate, which expires on 31 December.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 10 August the Council adopted resolution 1771 which extended sanctions and the mandate of the Group of Experts to 15 February and modified the arms embargo. This exempted technical training and assistance “agreed to by the government” and intended to support police and army units integrating in North and South Kivu and Ituri provinces. However, the embargo on supply of arms and related materiel to those provinces was retained.

In early September Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes visited the DRC to focus on the situation in the eastern part of the country. On 11 September, he briefed the Council on his visit.

Four days previously, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations briefed the Council on the deteriorating situation in the east. Following the meeting with Holmes, the Council issued a press statement expressing concern about clashes in North Kivu between the renegade elements loyal to Laurent Nkunda and the Armed Forces of the DRC (Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, or FARC), as well as the continuing activities of the Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda, or FDLR) and other illegal armed groups. The statement expressed strong concern about continuing atrocities against civilians. The Council also urged all parties to comply with international humanitarian law and to respect the ceasefire and initiate dialogue regarding the clashes in North Kivu.

The DRC government subsequently expressed surprise at the Council’s request that it begin dialogue with Nkunda and recalled that he was subject to the Council’s individual sanctions and called him “a war criminal.” Council members are reported to have subsequently explained privately to the DRC that “dialogue” was not to be misconstrued to mean negotiations offering the same status to the rebels as legitimate actors. Rather, what was being sought was a lasting political solution to the crisis through communication between the parties.

On 27 August, a meeting (facilitated by the US) of officials from Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda was held in Kigali to consider regional security concerns, and to deliberate on possible joint operations to stem rebel activity in eastern DRC. Dissident groups operating in eastern DRC...
include Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army and Hutu rebels living in exile since the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Ahead of the meeting, Rwanda on 15 August criticised the DRC for ceasing military operations against Hutu rebels that were said to be bolstering their position along the border. The DRC government subsequently refuted the claim. The foreign minister of Rwanda visited Kinshasa on 3 September, and afterwards a joint declaration on commitments regarding mutual security concerns was issued.

On 26 September, six people were killed in a gunfight between Ugandan and DRC troops near Lake Albert. This marked the second time in two months that fighting had broken out between troops from the two countries. The incident raised concern about tensions over the precise boundaries of the lake, which prospectors believe may have immense petroleum reserves and thus has assumed significant political and commercial importance.

Against a background of ongoing violent clashes between the government army and Nkunda’s forces, MONUC mediators announced on 6 September that a ceasefire had been brokered between the opposing parties, although there was concern that the belligerents were using the lull to strengthen their military positions. Nkunda’s forces were reported to have resumed fighting with government forces two weeks after the ceasefire was negotiated. On 8 October, Nkunda declared the truce nullified in the face of continuing violent clashes with government forces in eastern DRC. However, he proposed a truce on 10 October after suffering heavy losses and offered 500 of his troops for demobilisation—a gesture greeted with caution by Kinshasa. Nkunda later rejected the government’s ultimatum of 15 October to stop hostilities and integrate his forces into the army or face a fresh offensive, stating that his forces cannot give up arms without negotiations. The ultimatum has since been extended to an unspecified date.

The Secretary-General reconstituted the membership of the Group of Experts. Only the aviation expert was retained. It appears that certain Council members were influential in these changes because they had been unhappy with some elements of the Group’s recent reports.

In line with a request to him by the DRC government in March, the Secretary-General on 11 October requested the Council to authorise MONUC to provide full support to local elections in the DRC envisaged for the second half of 2008 and on the same scale as the national elections in 2006.

On 18 October Germain Katanga, former leader of an Ituri armed group (Force de résistance patriotique en Ituri, or FRPI) was handed over to the International Criminal Court (ICC) by the government in connection with the 25 February 2005 attack on UN peacekeepers in Ituri, which resulted in the death of nine peacekeepers. Katanga had been in government custody since 2005. The ICC’s interest in Katanga is related to the Court’s investigation into atrocities committed in Ituri. Katanga has been placed in the ICC detention centre in The Hague.

Key Issues
The key issue is the long-term future of MONUC as well as the deterioration in the security situation in eastern DRC. Also there is lingering US concern to keep down MONUC expenditures, which may emerge as an issue.

Options
In view of continuing security tensions, the options for the Council could include:
- calling for another briefing by the Secretary if the security situation continues to deteriorate;
- issuing either a presidential or press statement; and
- keeping under review the Secretary-General’s report on setting out drawdown proposals in shaping the Council’s response, and asking delegation experts to take this into account when commencing preliminary thinking about MONUC’s mandate renewal in December.

Council Dynamics
Most Council members (including France, Belgium and South Africa) seem inclined to maintain MONUC’s size in the short term if there is no substantial improvement in the fragile security situation. The US has been relatively quiet on the drawdown of MONUC in recent months, apparently because of the fragile security situation. It may prefer to push for enhancing the capacity of the new DRC government to effectively control and secure its territory.

There is also concern on the need to avoid a repeat of Timor-Leste and Burundi, where early withdrawal of UN peacekeepers resulted in deteriorating security and heightened concerns about long-term stability, human rights and governance. Furthermore, the Secretary-General’s request for MONUC support to the 2008 local elections on the same scale as that for the 2006 national elections has given added impetus for circumspection concerning MONUC’s future.

Council members expect the Secretary-General’s report to provide a perspective for the Council on an eventual exit strategy for MONUC, and possible signals to the DRC government on clear benchmarks that must be met along the way. This is likely to receive extensive consideration during deliberations in December ahead of the expiration of MONUC’s mandate. The submission of the upcoming report also appears to have been timed to provide the Council ample opportunity to consider it before the renewal of MONUC’s mandate, when a reference to MONUC’s drawdown is highly likely.
Lead countries in the Council on the DRC issue are Belgium, France and African members.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1771 (10 August 2007) renewed the sanctions regime, with some modifications to the arms embargo, and the mandate of the Group of Experts until 15 February 2008.

Selected Presidential Statement
- S/PRST/2007/28 (23 July 2007) was the Council’s appointment of the latest team of Group of Experts.

Selected Press Statement
- SC/9113 (12 September 2007) expressed concern about violent clashes in eastern DRC.

Selected Secretary-General’s Report
- S/2007/156 (20 March 2007) was the latest MONUC report.

Selected Secretary-General’s Letter
- S/2007/586 (2 October 2007) was the Secretary-General’s letter informing the Council of his appointment of the latest team of Group of Experts.

Selected Letters from the DRC to the Council
- S/2007/550 (18 September 2007) was a letter urging the Council to ask MONUC to help end impunity in eastern DRC.
- S/2007/543 (17 September 2007) was a letter containing the government’s reaction to the Council’s press statement on the DRC.

Other Relevant Facts

Group of Experts
- Abdoulaye Cissoko (Mali, aviation expert)
- Caty Clément (Belgium, regional expert)
- Amadou Hamidou (Niger, customs expert)
- Ramón Miranda Ramos (Spain, arms expert and coordinator of the Group)
- Gregory Salter (United Kingdom, finance expert)

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission (MONUC)
William Lacy Swing (US), to be succeeded by Alan Doss (UK)

MONUC Force Commander
Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye (Senegal)

Size Composition and Cost of Mission
- Strength as of 30 September 2007: 17,361 military and 991 police
- Main troop contributors: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Uruguay
- Cost: 1 July 2007-30 June 2008 $1,166.72 million

Duration
30 November 1999 to present, mandate expires on 31 December 2007

Sierra Leone

Expected Council Action
A long overdue report from the Secretary-General on the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), including proposals for defining UNIOSIL’s future role, could lead experts to begin work on a draft resolution. The UNIOSIL mandate expires on 31 December.

Recent Developments
Ernest Bai Koroma of the All People’s Congress won Sierra Leone’s presidential runoff election on 8 September and was sworn in as president on 19 September. Stability appears to have been achieved following tension and violence before and immediately after the runoff election. However, the situation remains fragile.

On 18 September, the Secretariat briefed Council members on the presidential elections. The Council issued a press statement that noted the results of the elections and encouraged the international community to sustain its support to Sierra Leone.

On 9 October, the Special Court for Sierra Leone sentenced two former leaders of the pro-government militia, Civil Defense Forces, to terms of six and eight years respectively, for war crimes committed during the country’s civil war.

Related Developments in the Peacebuilding Commission
The chairman of the PBC’s Sierra Leone country-specific configuration, Ambassador Frank Majoor of the Netherlands, visited the country on 11 October to follow-up on the post-election situation and development of the Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework. The Framework had been delayed due to the elections. The chairman subsequently briefed the PBC Sierra Leone configuration on 19 October on his trip. The expectation is for the Framework to be finalised by the end of the year.

Key Issues
Key issues before the Council include the future of UNIOSIL and effective consolidation of peace. A related issue is how to
factor into Council consideration of these issues the advice of the PBC. Another issue relates to residual matters from the Special Court.

**Options**

Options include:
- maintaining the current mandate of UNIOSIL;
- transforming UNIOSIL into a purely political mission; and
- enhancing collaboration with the PBC in peace consolidation and in integrating its advice into the Council’s decisions.

**Council Dynamics**

Council members (especially African members and the UK) attach importance to avoiding a premature Council disengagement, especially against the backdrop of recent violence surrounding the elections, which were seen as a test of the country’s recovery from the 1991-2002 civil war. Some Council members seem open to the possibility of a decision to transition towards withdrawal of the military component of UNIOSIL and transforming its mandate into a political mission.

In terms of the dynamics affecting the interface between the Council and the PBC on this issue, the Council appears to be largely ceding activities relating to effective consolidation of peace and stability to the PBC. (The PBC has been involved in tackling the root causes of the past conflict, enhancing good governance, supporting economic recovery, as well as requisite security sector reforms, and promoting access to justice and human rights). But it remains unclear how Council members will involve the PBC in its decision-making process. There was some unhappiness following the recent Council debate on the PBC annual report regarding the extent of participation.

The UK and Ghana are the lead countries on this issue.

**Underlying Problems**

Root causes of the war, including youth unemployment and poor living standards remain.

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**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1750 (30 March 2007) noted that UNMIL should continue to provide administrative and related support and security for activities in Liberia of the Special Court of Sierra Leone.
- S/RES/1734 (22 December 2006) extended the mandate of UNOSIL until 31 December 2007 and requested a comprehensive assessment of UNOSIL’s role closer to the election date.

**Selected Presidential Statement**

- S/PRST/2007/23 (28 June 2007) was on the work of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

**Selected Secretary-General’s Report**

- S/2007/257 (7 May 2007) was the fourth report of the Secretary-General on UNOSIL.

**Other**

- SC/9121 (19 September 2007) was on the results of the run-off presidential elections.

**Peacebuilding Commission**

- PBC/SIL/2006 SR.3 (13 December 2006) and SR.4 (13 December 2006) were the summary records of the third and fourth meetings of the PBC.
- PBC/OC/1/2 (21 June 2006) was a letter from the Council president to the Secretary-General referring Sierra Leone to the PBC.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**UNIOSIL Executive Representative of the Secretary-General**

Victor da Silva Ângelo (Portugal)

**Size and Composition of Mission**

- Total budgeted staff of 298, comprising 82 international staff, 192 local staff and 24 UN volunteers
- Duration: 1 January 2006 to present; current mandate expires 31 December 2007

**Prevention of Armed Conflict**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council is expected to consider a report from the Secretary-General on options for further implementation of resolution 1625. Adopted at a heads of state level summit in 2005, this resolution addressed the Security Council’s role in the prevention of armed conflict, particularly in Africa. The report may be considered in informal consultations and will be utilised by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa. It may also contain useful material for members wishing to participate in an open debate on cooperation between the Security Council and regional organisations tentatively scheduled for 6 November.

(For detailed background on the Council’s previous work on conflict prevention, please see our 24 August Update Report.)

**Recent Developments**

On 28 August, under the presidency of Congo (also chair of the Working Group), the Council held an open debate on conflict prevention in Africa. A presidential statement adopted at the end of the debate requested within sixty days a report on options for further implementation of resolution 1625.

The open debate on 28 August stimulated two follow-up meetings of the Working Group. The Group is planning a seminar on a global conflict prevention strategy in Africa. The seminar is to be held in early December in New York. Participation from delegations and the UN system and relevant regional organisations, think tanks, NGOs and the private sector is expected.
A task force including all African members of the Council (and open to participation by other Council members) is preparing for the seminar. Other relevant stakeholders including the Economic and Social Council, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations, the Peacebuilding Support Office, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the African Union and the European Union will also be invited to participate in the task force. The task force’s recommendations will be submitted to the Group for its endorsement. A briefing on the activities of the Group will be made to the Council before the seminar is held. Recommendations from the seminar will then be used to inform the drafting of a resolution for consideration by the Council.

Key Issues
The key issue is whether the Council should take up the Secretary-General’s report in November or wait until after the seminar.

Options
Options include:
- deferring consideration of the report at the Council itself until the recommendations from the seminar are also available; and
- approving a letter from the president of the Council to the chair of the Working Group requesting that the Group and the seminar consider the report and its conclusions and take them into account in its recommendations to the Council.

Council Dynamics and Working Group Activities
Council members expect the Secretary-General’s report to assist in further streamlining the complementary roles of the Council and the Secretariat in elaborating international conflict prevention strategies as well as assist the Working Group (comprising all Council members) in planning the proposed December seminar.

While Council members seem agreed on the need to press on with implementing resolution 1625, there is lingering concern among some members (e.g. Congo) to ensure that concrete conclusions are drawn from the seminar and feed into a possible resolution in December. Council members are increasingly aware of the importance of enhancing within the UN a culture of prevention as a viable and far less costly alternative to expensive and complex peacekeeping missions and humanitarian operations and, in particular, overcoming the difficulty of mobilising political will to act on emerging situations before they become a crisis.

Congo is the lead country on this issue.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1631 (17 October 2005) addressed the issue of cooperation between the UN and regional organisations.
- S/RES/1625 (14 September 2005) was a heads-of-state and heads-of-government level declaration adopted during the World Summit on the Council’s role in conflict prevention, particularly in Africa.
- S/RES/1366 (30 August 2001) addressed the issue of DDR in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates and stated that preventing armed conflict was a major part of the Council’s work.
- S/RES/1327 (13 November 2000) emphasised the importance of the Secretary-General in conflict prevention and reaffirmed the role of women in conflict prevention and resolution and peacebuilding.
- S/RES/1318 (7 September 2000) was the adoption of the Millennium

Summit declaration on ensuring an effective role for the Council in maintaining peace and security, especially in Africa.

- S/RES/1170 (28 May 1998) established an ad hoc working group for six months to review recommendations in the Secretary-General’s 13 April 1998 report on conflict, prepare a framework for their implementation and make proposals for concrete action for the Council.

Reports of the Working Group

- S/2005/828 (22 December 2005) was the report on a seminar held by the Working Group on cooperation between the United Nations and African regional organisations in the field of peace and security.

Selected Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2007/1 (8 January 2007) focused on threats to international peace and security.
- S/PRST/2002/2 (31 January 2002) made recommendations for achieving conflict prevention and resolution in Africa and noted that the Council would consider establishing a Working Group to monitor these recommendations.
• S/PRST/1999/34 (30 November 1999) recognised the importance of building a culture of armed conflict prevention and the need for a contribution from all principal UN organs to achieve this goal.
• S/PRST/1997/46 (25 September 1997) noted that addressing the challenges of conflict in Africa required a comprehensive approach and called on the Secretary-General to produce a report to address the issue.

Selected Security Council Debates
• S/PV.5735 and resumption 1 (28 August 2007) was the discussion on the role of the Security Council in conflict prevention and resolution, in particular in Africa.
• S/PV.5705 and resumption 1 (25 June 2007) focused on the maintenance of international peace and security.
• S/PV.5649 and resumption 1 (28 March 2007) discussed the relationship between the UN and regional organisations.
• S/PV.5156 (30 March 2005) was a wrap-up session of the Council’s work for the month with the discussion focusing on Africa.
• S/PV.4766 (30 May 2003) was a wrap-up discussion on the Council’s monthly activities that dealt with conflicts in Africa.
• S/PV.4538 (22 May 2002) dealt with the situation in Africa and the Working Group.
• S/PV.4334 and resumption 1 (1 January 2001) focused on the role of the Security Council in the prevention of armed conflict and the report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict (S/2001/574).
• S/PV.4174 (20 July 2000) was an open debate on conflict prevention.

• S/PV.3819 (25 September 1997) was the first ministerial-level debate on the situation in Africa.

Selected Reports of the Secretary-General
• A/60/891 (18 July 2006) was a progress report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on the prevention of armed conflict.
• A/60/L.1 (15 September 2005) was the 2005 World Summit Outcome document.
• S/2001/574 (7 June 2001) was the Secretary-General’s first comprehensive report on conflict prevention.
• S/2000/809 (21 August 2000) was the Brahimi report on peacekeeping.
• S/1998/318 (13 April 1998) was the Secretary-General’s report on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa.

Other Relevant Facts
Chair of the Working Group
Pascal Gayama
(Congo: July 2006 - Present)
Basile Ikouebe
(Congo: January 2006 to June 2007)

• A/60/891 (18 July 2006) was a progress report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on the prevention of armed conflict.
• A/60/L.1 (15 September 2005) was the 2005 World Summit Outcome document.
• S/2001/574 (7 June 2001) was the Secretary-General’s first comprehensive report on conflict prevention.
• S/2000/809 (21 August 2000) was the Brahimi report on peacekeeping.
• S/1998/318 (13 April 1998) was the Secretary-General’s report on the causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa.

Other
• S/2007/496 (14 August 2007) was the letter from Congo containing the terms of reference for the open debate on 28 August on conflict prevention and resolution, especially in Africa.
• DPA/MS/2007/1 (15 June 2007) was a note verbale inviting member states to nominate candidates to serve as standby specialists to enhance the Secretariat’s mediation support capacity.
• S/2002/1352 (12 December 2002) were recommendations from the Working Group to the Security Council on how to enhance the effectiveness of special representatives and representatives of the Secretary-General in Africa.
• S/2002/979 (29 August 2002) were recommendations from the Working Group regarding Groups of Friends, coordination between the Security Council and the AU, and peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau.
Frente Polisario

A report from Mohammed ElBaradei on Iran is due to the IAEA and Myanmar will be an issue under discussion at the ASEAN summit.

SG report on Somalia

S/RES/1772

Parliamentary elections are expected to be held in Kosovo.

The next meeting of Iraq’s neighbours will be held in Istanbul, at the EUFOR (early November).

November 2007 Other Important Dates

2-3 November

The next meeting of Iraq’s neighbours will be held in Istanbul, at the ministerial-level. There are media reports that the US is proposing a tripartite committee of the US, Turkey and Iraq to defuse current border tensions between Iraq and Turkey.

7-8 November

South Africa and Slovakia are hosting a workshop on security sector reform in Cape Town. The Secretary-General’s report on this issue is expected in late November for Council consideration in December.

12 November

A further meeting of the Lebanese parliament is expected to discuss election of a new president.

17 November

Parliamentary elections are expected to be held in Kosovo.

20 November

Myanmar will be an issue under discussion at the ASEAN summit.

22 November

A report from Mohammed ElBaradei on Iran is due to the IAEA and another report from EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana on Iran is due to the EU3+3.

Important Dates over the Horizon

- The second round of UN-sponsored talks on Western Sahara between Morocco and Frente Polisario are expected to resume in Europe by the end of the year, the venue and exact dates are yet to be determined.
- The constituent assembly elections in Nepal have been postponed to an unspecified date and have been delayed twice from 22 November and 20 June.
- The Council’s Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa is planning a seminar in early December in New York on global conflict prevention strategy in Africa.
- The report of Kosovo’s Contact Group to the Secretary-General is due on 10 December.
- Presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire are now expected in early 2008, postponed from 31 October.
- Municipal and local elections in Sierra Leone are expected in May 2008.

Notable Dates for November

Reports Due for Consideration in November  Document Requesting Report

29 October  SG report on the implementation of resolution 1701, including UNIFIL (every four months)  S/RES/1773

29 October  SG report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict  S/RES/1674

29 October  SG report on Conflict Prevention and Resolution, particularly in Africa and on further options for the implementation of resolution 1625  S/PRST/2007/31

31 October  SG report on the UN Assistance Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) on operational capacity and progress on implementation  S/RES/1769

31 October  SG quarterly report on the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)  S/RES/1767

late Oct/early Nov  SG report on Somalia  S/RES/1772

early November  High Representative’s report on EU Force Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR)  S/RES/1722

15 November  SG report with benchmarks for the drawdown of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC)  S/RES/1756

mid-November  SG assessment report on the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), delayed from mid-August  S/RES/1734

27 November  Commissioner’s report on the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) regarding Lebanon (every four months)  S/RES/1748

November 2007 Mandates Expire  Document Requesting Report

21 November  EUFOR  S/RES/1722

Also expected in November:

- The Council is expected to hold two open debates in November: one on cooperation between the Council and regional organisations is tentatively scheduled for 6 November and another on protection of civilians in armed conflict is expected in mid November.
- The Council is expected to receive its semi-annual briefing from the 1373 (Counter-terrorism), the 1267 (Al-Qaida/Taliban), and the 1540 Committees.
- Staffan de Mistura, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Iraq, is expected arrive in Iraq in early November.
- Ibrahim Gambari, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy to Myanmar, is expected to visit the country in early November. Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, is expected to visit Myanmar in mid-November.
- The EU protection force authorised by resolution 1778 is expected to start deploying in Chad in November.
- The Council is expected to undertake a mission to Timor-Leste in late November.
- A US-initiated international meeting on peace in the Middle East is being planned for late November or early December.

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