In October Ghana will have the presidency of the Council.

It seems that Ghana will highlight the issue of Women, Peace and Security as a thematic issue during its presidency. The month will begin with an Arria style meeting focused on this issue, which will feature a presentation by the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, on the impact on women of the conflict in Darfur and Chad.

A formal open meeting of the Council will follow on 23 October. The Council is likely to come under considerable pressure to move beyond reaffirmation of past documents and adopt something concrete by way of a mechanism to inject some better accountability into future handling of this issue.

In addition to the meeting on Women Peace and Security, formal open meetings of the Council are expected on:
- The Middle East (the regular monthly briefing);
- Haiti (renewal of the MINUSTAH mandate);
- Georgia (renewal of the UNOMIG mandate);
- Western Sahara (renewal of the MINURSO mandate);
- Sudan (renewal of the UNMIS mandate); and
- Côte d'Ivoire (renewal of the sanctions regime and mandate for the Sanctions Committee's Group of Experts).

Each of the mandate renewals seems likely to involve complex substantive political issues in addition to the renewal questions and could involve considerable work by the Council members' experts. And in the case of Georgia, procedural problems are also possible. (When it was last on the agenda in July, a dispute was only resolved by meeting in a closed formal format.)

A number of other situations are likely to be discussed in informal consultations and could result in outcomes approved in formal open meetings. These include:
- Afghanistan (outcome of a recent high-level meeting in New York which recommended a higher level of UN leadership);
- Darfur (support for the peace process, a possible ceasefire and progress with the UNAMID deployment);
- Ethiopia/Eritrea (a possible response to heightened tension could lead to an earlier election date) is now due.

The 2005 World Summit requested the Security Council to consider reforms relating to the Military Staff Committee. This has yet to be addressed.

The UNAMI report on human rights in Iraq, usually produced every two to three months, has not been published since March. The last one covered the period from 1 January to 31 March 2007.

Despite a quarterly reporting requirement mandated by resolution 1546 the report on the Multinational Force in Iraq due on 13 September is overdue. The last MNF report was published on 13 June.

Since a briefing in March, the Council has not addressed the issue of Northern Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army.

The post of the Special Representative in Ethiopia-Eritrea has been vacant since May 2006; the post of the Special Representative in Côte d'Ivoire is vacant and has been awaiting appointment since mid-February.

On the DRC, the Council has still not taken up individual sanctions under resolution 1698 against armed groups that recruit children. Nor has the Council resumed discussion of the issue of natural resources in the DRC, notwithstanding its open thematic debate on the subject of natural resources and conflict in June (S/PV.5705).

On Western Sahara, the Security-General's report based on a comprehensive assessment, to assist the Council in defining UNOSIL's exit strategy, requested by resolution 1734 and to be submitted "closer to the election date" is now due.
meeting than previously envisaged);
- **Guinea-Bissau** (an African interest in the Council taking a higher profile on this situation could lead to a formal meeting);
- **Iraq** (UNMOVIC) (safe and effective archiving of the inspection agency’s information will be discussed);
- **Kosovo** (a routine report is due but the event seems likely to reopen some tense issues);
- **Lebanon** (tensions over the presidential election could lead to early Council discussions);
- **Myanmar** (recent developments are likely to trigger a briefing by Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari on his visit, when he returns);
- **North Korea** (recent positive developments may stimulate some Council response);
- **Nepal** (a briefing on recent problems with the peace process and implications for the November elections could lead to a Council response); and
- **Somalia** (discussion of political reconciliation and peacekeeping issues is likely).

Security Council Report expects to be publishing web based Update Reports on some of these issues during the month.

### Status Update since our September Forecast

Recent developments on the situations covered in this Forecast are addressed in the relevant briefs. Interesting developments in the Council on other issues included:

- **Algeria**: A presidential statement on 7 September condemned the 6 September terrorist attack in Batna, Algeria which led to the deaths of over twenty people (SPRST/2007/32).
- **Liberia**: On 9 September, Special Representative Alan Doss briefed the Council on the situation in Liberia and recommended a drawdown of the mission tied to the achievement of measurable security sector reform benchmarks. On 20 September, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1777 extending the mandate of UNMIL until 30 September 2008 and endorsing the recommendation of the Secretary-General to decrease the size of the military and police components.
- **Timor-Leste**: On 10 September, the Council considered the Secretary-General’s most recent UNMIT report which commended the political progress that had been achieved during recent elections but noted ongoing challenges related to the security sector, justice and accountability, and IDPs (S/2007/513). A presidential statement was adopted echoing the Secretary-General’s support of the political progress in the country while highlighting “the need for all parties to resolve any disputes through exclusively peaceful channels and within the framework of democratic institutions” (S/PRST/2007/33).
- **Democratic Republic of the Congo**: On 11 September, the Council was briefed by John Holmes, the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, regarding the situation in the DRC. Alarmed by reports of violence in North Kivu between the Armed Forces of the DRC and the forces of Laurent Nkunda—in addition to the activities of other armed elements in the region—the Council issued a press statement that urged all parties “to comply with international humanitarian law…, to facilitate access for humanitarian operators to the persons affected by the conflict…, [and] to respect the ceasefire and initiate a dialogue” (SC/9113). In a 17 September letter to the Council the DRC stated that the unrest in North and South Kivu was attributable to the presence of regular armies, militias and armed groups, primarily from Rwanda, on its territory. DRC noted its surprise that the Council had requested it to engage in dialogue with Nkunda, and expressed the view that he should be prosecuted for violations of international law (S/2007/543).
- **International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda**: On 14 September the Council extended the terms of office of the prosecutors for the criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In resolution 1775, the Council extended the term of Carla Del Ponte (ICTY) until 31 December 2007. Russia abstained. In resolution 1774, the Council unanimously extended the term of Mr. Hassan Bubacar Jallow (ICTR) for four years or until the completion of the Tribunal’s work.
- **Lebanon**: On 19 September the Council was briefed by Nicolas Michel, Under Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, on the most recent Secretary-General’s report on the establishment of a special tribunal for Lebanon (S/2007/525). The Council issued a press statement encouraging the Secretary-General to continue efforts to create the tribunal (SC/9119). At the request of the Lebanese government (S/2007/556), the Council invited UNIIIC to provide technical assistance to investigate the terrorist attack which killed parliamentarian Antoine Ghanem and several others (S/2007/557). This attack was condemned by the Council in a presidential statement (S/PRST/2007/34). The parliament postponed until 23 October its 25 September session at which it was supposed to elect the new president before President Emile Lahoud’s term ends in November. The Council approved a press statement on 27 September calling for free and fair elections to take place (SC/9130).
- **Sierra Leone**: On 19 September, the Council issued a press statement congratulating Sierra Leone on its presidential elections in which Ernest Bai Koromo of the All People’s Congress Party won the run-off over Solomon Berewa of the Sierra Leone People’s Party. The press statement also encouraged continued international support for Sierra Leone (SC/9121).
- **Middle East**: On 20 September, the Secretariat briefed the Council on the situation in the Middle East, particularly concerning the Palestinian issue (SC/9124). Deep concern was expressed about the challenging security, humanitarian and economic challenges facing the region. Progress in discussions between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas was noted.
- **Myanmar**: On 20 September, Special Adviser Ibrahim Gambari briefed the Council on Myanmar. He expressed concern with the situation of political detainees in the country and emphasised that the UN, especially in the context of the Secretary-General’s good offices, should continue to work toward a solution to the current unrest by engaging all relevant actors. After the Myanmar government initiated a crack-down on protestors, the Security Council held an emergency meeting on 26 September during which it supported the Secretary-General’s decision to send Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari to the region. A brief statement was read to the press by the Council president for September, Ambassador Jean-Maurice Ripert of France, urging restraint, especially on the part of the government.
- **Chad/CAR**: On 25 September, the Council unanimously passed resolution 1778, which established the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and authorised the deployment of an EU force to collaborate with MINURCAT to protect displaced civilians.
- **Summit on Africa**: On 25 September, the Council held a summit-level meeting on the challenges of attaining peace and security in Africa (S/PV.5749). The discussion focused on issues such as the crises in Darfur and Somalia, cooperation between the UN and the AU and the problem of child soldiers.
**Women, Peace and Security**

**Expected Council Action**

On 23 October the Council will hold a debate on women, peace and security. A report from the Secretary-General assessing progress and presenting a new framework for inter-agency activities for the period covering 2008-2010 is expected, as well as a “concept paper” from Ghana as president of the Council. The debate seems likely to concentrate on the way forward for implementing resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, with particular focus on accountability for implementation. A presidential statement is likely.

The possibility of creating a monitoring mechanism for sexual violence and other forms of gender-based violence is likely to be a feature of the discussion.

**Key Recent Developments**

The 2006 Secretary-General’s report, published on 27 September, assessed progress on the system-wide action plan. Noting some progress, the Secretary-General said member states and other actors would need to strengthen their political will and commitment in order to reinforce political momentum for implementing resolution 1325.

The last Council open debate on women, peace and security, on 26 October 2006, focused on the role of women in peacekeeping and post-conflict situations. At that time, the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, Rachel Mayanja, said the UN should do more to encourage member states to adopt national action plans to integrate women in peace and security issues, especially in countries recovering from conflict. The Council adopted a presidential statement:

- recognising the vital role of women in consolidating peace, and that their protection and empowerment was necessary;
- encouraging gender mainstreaming in institutional reforms in post-conflict countries, at local and national levels, and welcoming the role that the Peacebuilding Commission could play; and
- strongly condemning sexual misconduct by all personnel in UN peacekeeping missions and urging full implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping.

On 4 December 2006, the UN convened a conference on eliminating sexual exploitation and abuse in field operations, gathering UN staff, member states and NGOs. Then Secretary-General Kofi Annan reported that his “zero-tolerance” policy was still not getting through to civilians and soldiers, and that allegations of sexual misconduct by UN peacekeepers continued.

On 18 December 2006, the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations called for measures against sexual exploitation and abuse involving troop-contributing countries (A/60/19). It requested a working group of experts to design a revised model memorandum of understanding between the UN and troop contributors, in addition to drafting a policy statement on support to victims.

On 7 March, under South Africa’s presidency, the Council adopted a presidential statement, which largely reiterated language contained in resolution 1325 and previous statements. It also urged the Secretary-General to continue to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf and in UN field operations.

The issue of impunity for violence against women was a leading theme at the last International Women’s Day on 8 March, in relation to the Secretary-General’s 2006 in-depth study on all forms of violence against women mandated by the General Assembly (A/61/122/Add.1). At an interagency event, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reiterated the proposal of former Secretary-General Kofi Annan of 2006 that the Council develop a monitoring mechanism to improve its contribution to preventing and redressing violence against women in armed conflict.

On 8 March, 12 UN agencies launched a new initiative called UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict, with the aim of increasing coordination on prevention and response services, and improving accountability.

**Options**

The options this year include:

- following the approach of the March statement by reaffirming previous statements such as the Council’s commitment to implementing resolution 1325 and reiterating its call on the UN and member states to enhance the role of women, take gender issues into consideration in peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives, and end impunity for gender-based violence;
- taking up the Secretary-General’s proposal and deciding to make sexual violence against women and girls an annual focus in Council’s work, and establishing a monitoring mechanism such as an ad-hoc or permanent working group for gender-based violence (perhaps based on the model of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict);
- mandating a reporting mechanism on sexual violence within peacekeeping missions; and
- designating a Council member as a focal point or lead actor on this issue.

**Key Issues**

A key issue is whether the Council is ready, in terms of implementing resolution 1325, to establish mechanisms which will enhance its own accountability. A related issue is whether to approach this on an incremental basis.

Another issue is how to define the scope of any such mechanism so that it is sufficiently related to the Council’s actual responsibilities and its agenda.

Allegations of sexual misconduct by UN staff in peacekeeping missions are likely to remain a continuing issue.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

Ghana has been particularly active on this issue during its Council membership in 2006-2007. It has conducted roundtables on gender and peacekeeping and, jointly with Denmark, organised an Arria formula briefing. It seems willing to push for a substantial debate of various options for the way forward.

The UK has played a leading role in the past, as has France. South Africa and Ghana are members of the Friends of 1325, which includes 28 states from various regions under the leadership of Canada.

NGOs are eager for the Council to address accountability issues on all key elements of resolution 1325 (i.e. to “unpack” resolution 1325). Many NGOs believe that the 1325 process has been stalled for the last two years because of a lack of political will and are concerned that in its recent decisions, the Council has done little more than reiterate past pronouncements.

EU Council members seem to support the idea of monitoring mechanisms. Many Council members seem to believe that it may be possible to build political will by limiting the breadth of the issue and focusing at least initially on a specific aspect.
Gender-based violence during conflict seems to be the most likely area of focus. On that basis, a monitoring and reporting mechanism similar to that on child soldiers might be more palatable.

China and Russia in the past have had reservations about the creation of a monitoring mechanism with wide scope, in part because of their traditional reluctance to have the Council involved in thematic issues, but also perhaps because of uncertainty as to where a broad focus might lead in terms of geographical situations.

Underlying Problems
Implementing resolution 1325 by the Council itself has been mixed, in terms of incorporating references to the resolution and gender perspectives into the mandates of peacekeeping operations. Since January 2006, the Council has reaffirmed resolution 1325—either in preambles or in operative paragraphs—in 17 resolutions on Lebanon, Sudan, Haiti, Timor-Leste, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, the DRC and Somalia. It has also provided a mandate for women’s protection, respect for women’s rights and incorporation of gender considerations in peacekeeping tasks—including the prevention, investigation and prosecution of cases of gender-based violence—for MINUSTAH in Haiti, UNMIT in Timor-Leste, UNMIS in Sudan, BINUB in Burundi, UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire, UNAMA in Afghanistan, and MONUC in the DRC. But practical implementation of 1325 is missing in Liberia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Western Sahara, Georgia, Cyprus, Kosovo, Golan Heights and India/Pakistan.

The Council however routinely requests the Secretary-General to take measures to achieve compliance of the UN “zero-tolerance” policy on sexual exploitation and abuse within field missions, including mechanisms to respond to misconduct and training for UN personnel. Progress in the field remains fairly weak, however, as gender issues are still not automatically addressed by all troop-contributing countries.

UN Documents
Security Council Resolution
• S/RES/1325 (31 October 2000) urged member states to ensure women’s representation at all decision-making levels for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict, expressed the Council’s willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping missions, urged the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special representatives and envos and in field operations, and called on all parties to a conflict to adopt a gender perspective when implementing peace agreements and to protect women from gender-based violence and called on states to end impunity.

Latest Presidential Statements
• S/PRST/2007/5 (7 March 2007)
• S/PRST/2006/42 (26 October 2006)

Latest Secretary-General’s Report
• S/2006/770 (27 September 2006)

Other
• S/PV.5556 and resumption 1 (26 October 2006) was the 2006 debate on women, peace and security.

Useful Additional Sources
• Women, Peace and Security portal http://www.womenwarpeace.org/
• UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women www.un-instraw.org/en/
• Security Council 1325 Monitor www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/1325Monitor/index.htm
• UN Action www.stoprapenow.org

Afghanistan

Expected Council Action
The Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Tom Koenigs, is expected to brief the Council on the Secretary-General’s semi-annual report on Afghanistan published on 21 September.

The mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) expires on 23 March 2008.

Key Recent Developments
Kidnappings and suicide bombings continued in September as a key Taliban strategy.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Afghan President Hamid Karzai co-chaired a high-level meeting on Afghanistan on the margins of the 62nd General Assembly. In a communiqué issued after the meeting participants called for “sustained international efforts to support Afghanistan” and greater coordination in the areas of security, counternarcotics, governance and regional cooperation. The participants also asked for two areas of UN involvement to be strengthened: the coordination of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) (which the UN co-chairs) and the role of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative.

On 19 September the Council renewed the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) until 13 October 2008 but only after protracted discussions at the expert level. The expanded ISAF resolution did not change ISAF’s mandate but was intended to highlight the Council’s attention to current issues including the need for a comprehensive approach to Afghanistan. Russia abstained making this the first time the ISAF resolution failed to obtain unanimous support.

In a press conference on 21 September, Koenigs said that peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban should be encouraged as the insurgency could not be won just by military means. He also called for neighbouring countries to support peace initiatives.

On 21 September, at the urging of UNAMA, civil society, the Afghan government and the people of Afghanistan participated in activities to mark International Peace Day. In the days leading up to International Peace Day there was a period of tranquility which also allowed the World Health Organisation and UNICEF to provide vaccinations.

(Please see our September 2007 Forecast for earlier developments.)

Options
If Council members prefer to retain the current level of limited engagement, the options seem to include:
• take no action; or
• approve a presidential or press statement responding to Koenigs’ briefing and the Secretary-General’s report.

If Council members wish to increase the current level of Council and UN engagement, as suggested by participants at the recent high-level meeting, the options include:
• request the Secretary-General to present the Council with proposals for increasing cooperation between the UN and other actors affecting the situation in Afghanistan;
• explore possibilities for widening UNAMA’s role in the JCMB;
• suggest ways in which the Secretary-General’s Special Representative’s role can be strengthened; and
• canvass the possibility of appointing a high-level representative who might in time play a role in the kinds of negotiations envisaged by Koenigs in his 21 September statement.
Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is whether to respond to the sense of the high-level meeting that the current level of UN engagement should be increased, and developing a positive role for the Council in this regard.

On the ground the key issues are the deteriorating security situation and poppy cultivation for opium, which finances the Taliban. (In its annual report on poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime reported that opium production increased by 34 percent over 2006. Production in the Taliban-controlled southwest increased while it fell in more stable areas.) Other issues include alleged corruption in Afghan security forces and the need for judicial reform. Both impinge on efforts to control the opium trade.

Another issue is that ISAF’s mandate does not allow international forces to have direct involvement in poppy eradication. As a result, NATO seems to prefer to tackle the problem through training as well as sharing information and logistics.

An issue for some ISAF contributors, and perhaps linked to the growing interest in a wider UN umbrella over the Afghanistan situation, is the domestic political cost of keeping troops in Afghanistan. In Italy, Japan and Canada this issue has proved sensitive.

Council and Wider Dynamics
In recent months, in part due to energetic leadership by the lead country, Italy, there have been more presidential statements and more substantive content in the recent ISAF resolution on Afghanistan. But in practice, most other members seem to have been unready for real expansion of UN involvement. The presence of troops from three P5 members (UK, France and US) coupled with history (including Russia’s past involvement) and regional interests (notably China’s) have made it difficult to discuss the ambit of the Council’s role.

The preamble of the ISAF resolution adopted in September resulted in lengthy negotiations, particularly in light of new elements that addressed politically sensitive issues. Russia abstained from voting on the resolution as it was uncomfortable with a reference to Operation Enduring Freedom’s maritime interdiction component.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1401 (28 March 2002) created UNAMA.

Selected Presidential Statement


Selected Report of the Secretary-General

- S/2007/555 (21 September 2007) was the latest report.

Other Relevant Documents

- S/2007/494 (15 August 2007) was the latest ISAF report.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAMA’s Chief of Mission

Tom Koenigs (Germany)

UNAMA: Size, Composition and Duration

- Current strength: 210 international civilians, 957 local civilians, 16 military observers, two civilian police, 29 UN volunteers
- Duration: 28 March 2002 to present; mandate expires on 23 March 2008

ISAF Military Commander

General Dan McNeill (US)

ISAF: Size, Composition and Duration

- Current strength: about 41,000 troops
- Contributors of military personnel: 37 NATO and non-NATO countries
- Current top contributors: US, UK, Germany, Canada, Italy and Canada
- Duration: 20 December 2001 to present; mandate expires on 13 October 2008

Useful Additional Sources

- Afghanistan, 2007 Annual Opium Poppy Survey, Executive Summary, UN Office on Drugs and Crime, August 2007
- Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan, UNAMA, 9 September 2007
- Afghan Government and people want talks with Taliban, UN envoy says, UN News Centre, 21 September 2007

Côte d’Ivoire

Expected Council Action
By 15 October, the Council is expected to review the mandate of the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and the French Licorne forces, as well as UNOCI troop levels. A report by the Secretary-General on progress towards implementing the Ouagadougou agreement is expected to be submitted ahead of the Council’s deliberations. Also, the Council is expected to renew the mandates of the current sanctions regime and the mandate of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire, which are both due to expire on 31 October. The Group’s report on the implementation of the sanctions measures is due before 15 October. UNOCI’s mandate expires on 15 January 2008.

Recent Developments

Parties to the Ouagadougou agreement, signed in March, worked on mending the rift between the government-controlled south and the Forces Nouvelles-held north, particularly by taking steps to fulfill the requirements of the pact to enable the holding of credible elections.

A major disarmament ceremony was held on 30 July, when a “flame of peace” was lit in the northern town of Bouaké, a stronghold of the former Forces Nouvelles rebel group. President Laurent Gbagbo and the Forces Nouvelles leader, Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, officially launched the process by setting fire to stockpiled weapons. President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, the facilitator of the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire, was present along with the heads of state of South Africa, Togo, Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Benin, and representatives of Angola, Ghana, Niger, Senegal and other international partners. Beyond the symbolic event, however, the pace of actual disarmament is apparently slow.

Following a meeting of the Evaluation and Implementation Committee of the Ouaggedougou agreement on 4 September in Ouagadougou, it was announced that the voter-identification process had been scheduled to commence before the end of September. Public identity hearings were later reported to have commenced in the week of 24 September. Also, in line with the
Ouagadougou agreement, on 16 September the last international checkpoint in the “zone of confidence” separating belligerents from the northern and southern parts of the country was reported to have been dismantled. It has been replaced by a “green line” to be monitored by UNOCI.

In early September a UN team travelled to Côte d’Ivoire to follow up the international investigation into an attack in Bouaké on 29 June against an aircraft transporting Prime Minister Soro. After the attack, the Ivorian government had asked the Secretary-General to launch an independent investigation.

Allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse surfaced in mid July against members of the Moroccan peacekeeping contingent in Bouaké. On 20 July, after an internal investigation by UNOCI, the contingent’s activities were suspended and it was confined to base. The UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services subsequently announced a full investigation. However, a joint UN-Moroccan team is reported to have met with difficulties. Some alleged victims have declined to come forward. The UN’s code of conduct has a zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse.

The Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Radhika Coomaraswamy, visited Côte d’Ivoire in September. This followed the Secretary-General’s recent report to the Security Council on Children and Armed Conflict in Côte d’Ivoire. Among other things, the report notes that a persistent culture of impunity for crimes against children exists and identifies sexual violence as being of particular concern among six categories of grave violations highlighted by the report.

On 16 July the Council adopted resolution 1765. This extended the mandate of UNOCI and endorsed the Secretary-General’s recommendations on the role of the UN in the Ivorian peace process and requested a progress report on the implementation of the Ouagadougou agreement by 15 October. (For more details see our 13 July Update Report.)

On 26 September, in his speech to the General Assembly, President Gbagbo called for a partial lifting of the weapons embargo and the current Council sanctions on three Ivorian individuals. He also called for a downward revision of the country’s UN security ratings from phase III since it “no longer reflected the reality” of the prevailing situation.

Gbagbo had requested the Council to convene a meeting on Côte d’Ivoire at which he could speak during his visit. However, the Council did not accede to this request.

**Key Issues**

One key issue before the Council is the success of the Ouagadougou agreement. Some of its elements, including creation of a new transitional government and replacing the “zone of confidence” separating north and south with a green line to be monitored by UNOCI, are being realised. However, major issues remain. These include dismantling militias, disarming ex-combatants and enrolling them in civil services programmes, merging the Forces Nouvelles and the national defence and security forces into an integrated command centre, and organising free and fair presidential elections.

Another important issue is the request for an arms embargo exemption for light weapons for law and order purposes. So far no official request has been received. The nature of such a request and whether it includes lethal or non-lethal equipment is likely to also be an issue.

A final issue is whether the Sanctions Committee will also receive a request to lift individual sanctions as mentioned in the Ouagadougou agreement.

Under resolution 1727 the sanctions imposed under resolutions 1572 and 1643 expire on 31 October. Renewal of the sanctions seems not to be in question. However, modification to respond to the request seems likely to be an issue.

**Options**

Options for the Council include:
- utilising the recommendations of the Secretary-General’s progress report on the implementation of the Ouagadougou agreement in its deliberations and decisions;
- issuing a statement reiterating the Council’s support for the Ouagadougou agreement, as well as urging the parties to commit themselves to the terms of the pact; and
- renewing the current sanctions regime and the mandate of the Group of Experts.

**Council Dynamics**

The Secretary-General’s report on progress is likely to be influential in shaping the Council’s next line of action. Most members feel that if actual progress on the ground in Côte d’Ivoire is slight there will be no justification to change UNOCI’s mandate or review its troop level. This is likely to be considered substantively during deliberations in January ahead of the expiry of the mandate. By then, ample time would have elapsed between the signing of the agreement and attempts at implementation to give a better sense of developments in the country. France and the African members of the Council are the lead countries on the matter.

Council members appear to have no major reservations about renewing the sanctions regime and the mandate of the Group of Experts. As indicated in our July 2007 Forecast, interest in a request by the Ouagadougou facilitator for a partial lifting of sanctions on light weapons appears to have waned following consultations with relevant stakeholders during the Council’s recent visit.

The Council has been traditionally cautious about premature lifting of sanctions to avert potential relapse into violent conflict. At press time, no formal request had yet been received from Côte d’Ivoire by the Council on the matter. However, exemption from the arms embargo seems to be a preferred option for Council members rather than lifting the embargo. The sanctions regime currently in place includes an arms embargo, targeted travel ban, assets freeze, as well as a diamond trade restriction.

**Underlying Problems**

Questions of citizenship and the status of foreign nationals remain a central flashpoint in the conflict and previously fomented nationalist sentiments. This impeded the registration of voters and led to interethnic violence. Tensions still exist regarding the voter-identification process, and the Ouagadougou agreement is not very clear on which process—identification or disarmament—must be completed first. However, it is unlikely that the rebels will fully disarm without a proper identification programme as this remains one of their key demands and an oft-cited reason for initially taking up arms.

Political actors are also yet to reach a compromise on integrating former rebels into the national army. Security challenges continue to threaten the western part of the country, which borders Liberia. Killings and rapes have increased in the west, and banditry is rife.

Socioeconomic hardships emanating from the civil strife, including deteriorated national institutional structures, lack of basic health care, deficient infrastructure, unemployment,
human rights violations and rule of law problems, continue to persist in Côte d’Ivoire.

**UN Documents**

**Latest Security Council Resolutions**
- S/RES/1761 (20 June 2007) extended the mandate of the Group of Experts until 31 October.
- S/RES/1727 (15 December 2006) renewed the sanctions regime until 31 October.
- S/RES/1721 (1 November 2006) prolonged by one year the transitional period in Côte d’Ivoire and reinforced the powers of the prime minister.

**Latest Presidential Statement**
- S/PRST/2007/8 (28 March 2007) endorsed the Ouagadougou agreement, supported the appointment of Soro as prime minister and requested a report from the Secretary-General on the UN’s future role in the peace process.

**Latest Secretary-General’s Report**

**Other UN Documents**
- S/2007/515 (30 August 2007) was the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire.
- S/2007/223 (19 April 2007) was the latest International Working Group’s communiqué, requesting its two co-chairs to consult with ECOWAS and the AU on its future role and recommendations to Security Council.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General**
To be appointed

**Principal Deputy Special Representative**
Abou Moussa (Chad)

**Group of Experts**
- Oumar Dieye Sidi, Niger (customs/Coordinator of the Group)
- Grégoire Bafouatika, Congo (aviation)
- Lipika Majumdar Roy Choudhury, India (finance)
- Abdoul Wahab Diakhaby, Guinea (diamonds)
- Claudio Gramizzi, Italy (arms)

The mediation team appears to be making progress with its preparations. Civil society participation seems to be an important element. A chief negotiator could be appointed soon, and a preparatory workshop for rebels on 17-27 October is possible. The team is now working on format and structure, especially the modalities for participation of key international partners.

### Size and Composition of UNOCI

- **Strength as of 30 August 2007:** 9,192 total uniformed personnel, including 7,871 troops, 188 military observers and 1,133 police
- **Key troop-contributing countries:** Bangladesh, Ghana, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan

#### Approved UNOCI Budget
1 July 2007 - 30 June 2008 $493.70 million

### Sudan/Darfur

#### Expected Council Action
Council members are expected to pay close attention to progress in deploying the UN-AU Mission in the Sudan (UNAMID) and the peace process.

An Arria formula meeting on women in armed conflict in Africa organised by France will take place on 1 October. Discussions will include former High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson, Council members and NGOs, and are expected to intensify focus on ongoing violence in Darfur.

#### Key Recent Developments
The Darfur security environment seemed to worsen during September with bombings and clashes involving government and rebel forces only days after the visit by the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.

The AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) reported that the clashes involved heavy weapons including government helicopter gunships. AMIS said that the scale and nature of the attacks was astonishing given the critical stage of the peace process, forthcoming negotiations in Libya and commitments to the ceasefire by all parties. Observers note the attacks might represent an attempt to change military realities on the ground ahead of the talks.

The Secretary-General announced that Darfur peace talks would take place on 27 October in Tripoli. In a joint communiqué, Sudan pledged to facilitate UNAMID’s deployment and to participate constructively in the peace talks. Khartoum also pledged to fulfil its commitment to a full cessation of hostilities in Darfur.

On 12 September, the Secretary-General briefed the Council on his trip, outlining major aspects of his three-track strategy (including the humanitarian situation, peace talks and peacekeeping) and unveiled plans for a trust fund for the political process.

In New York on 21 September, a high-level meeting on Darfur was held on the margins of the UN General Assembly to mobilise support for the three tracks. It seems that the meeting got sidetracked onto discussion of technical issues regarding UNAMID’s composition. The joint AU-UN communiqué that followed carefully appealed “for support [to] ensure deployment of a force that would be able to effectively fulfil its mandate,” while reiterating UNAMID’s predominantly African character.

On 25 September a Council summit-level meeting on Africa led many to re-emphasise the importance of the Darfur issue.

The Secretary-General has noted that plans for the transfer from AMIS to UNAMID by 31 December include deployment of an “early effect capability” comprising one formed police unit and forty police officers, as well as one brigade, four reserve companies, sixty liaison officers and one aviation unit. Five troop contributors appear to have been identified for this initial phase. Aviation, transport and logistics assets are still missing for the long-run, as well as about 1,200 police.

Deployment of the heavy support package appeared to have made progress by mid-September. About 290 police advisers and nearly half the international civilian staff are still to be sent.
On 20 September, the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno-Ocampo, noted with concern that Khartoum was likely to interpret silence on justice issues as a weakening of international resolve; and that, if justice was ignored, crimes would continue, affecting humanitarian and security operations. (Sudan recently appointed ICC indictee Ahmad Harun, currently a minister with responsibility over civilian camps in Darfur, as head of a human rights commission of inquiry.)

On 21 September, the Secretary-General observed that “justice is a part of the peace process, and these should go hand in hand.”

Options
Options include:
- developing a plan for active Council support for the AU-UN mediation team, perhaps starting by calling on member states to contribute to the trust fund;
- demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities and mandating the Secretary-General to work vigorously to this end;
- signalling that it may determine a date and time for a ceasefire if the parties do not comply;
- raising the stakes for those tempted to be spoilers by threatening that attempts to impede the peace process, including raising obstacles to a ceasefire, would attract enhanced measures under resolution 1591; and
- reminding the parties that justice issues remain on the table and perhaps recalling the potential synergies between peace processes and justice and accountability.

Key Issues
A key issue now appears to be how to ensure that a ceasefire can be in place ahead of the peace talks, and how best to revive monitoring mechanisms. A major issue for the Council is whether to become engaged in the ceasefire question and the challenges facing the peace talks. The peace talks face a number of key issues:
- Participation in the Tripoli Talks: how best to ensure legitimacy and the representation of key groups, while managing rebel fragmentation and suspicion against Khartoum;
- Participation of Key Constituencies: how best to incorporate the views of civil society, the internally displaced and Arab communities;
- Negotiation Modalities: how best to manage the peace process and avoid past mistakes, in particular regarding timing (such as whether to rely on deadlines) and substance (including critical issues such as land, previously included simply as one aspect in wealth-sharing but now increasingly seen to be much more complex, given the realities in Darfur); and
- Sufficient Resources: both human and financial, for the peace talks.

On peacekeeping, an emerging issue is whether Khartoum is now using the composition issue as an excuse to delay UNAMID’s deployment. Others include:
- generating sufficient high-quality troops and adequate assets;
- managing the continuing need for cooperation from Khartoum and coordination between the AU and the UN;
- coordination with deployments in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) and outcomes from the Tripoli peace talks;
- UNAMID’s cooperation with the sanctions Panel of Experts;
- securing funding commitment from the General Assembly for the expected $2.6 billion;
- UNAMID’s unparalleled management, infrastructure, logistical, security and environmental challenges; and
- potential differences of view on UNAMID’s mandate to protect civilians.

Further issues include:
- justice and accountability, notably whether inaction may send unwanted signals to Khartoum; and
- similarly, how best to address violations of the arms embargo and whether the threat of sanctions could have a role in support of the peace talks.

Council Dynamics
Council members generally agree on the need to make progress with the peace process and the deployment of UNAMID. Most now appear to appreciate the difficulties of generating adequate troops and assets, despite the Council’s August 31 deadline for finalising troop pledges. Underlying differences on how best to ensure Khartoum’s cooperation continue. The US, the UK and France have reportedly signalled the possible need to threaten targeted measures against spoiler behaviour, perhaps as a means of ensuring cooperation from the parties, particularly with the peace talks.

On justice and accountability, some members seem reluctant to increase the Council’s involvement in the issue, at least until the peace process bears fruit. Others have been more outspoken. It remains to be seen if a compromise can be built around a low-key approach while preserving the Court’s credibility and potential for deterring spoiler behaviour.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1778 (25 September 2007) authorised EU and UN deployments in Chad and the CAR.

Related Developments in the Human Rights Council

The midterm report of the group of experts noted that Khartoum has only partially implemented the group’s recommendations, and that it could not verify concrete impact on the ground. (For more details see our July Forecast.) The group now recommended a call upon Sudan to intensify efforts and address impunity issues, and on the parties to cease attacks against civilians. The group’s final report is expected in December.

Discussions largely reflected longstanding positions, with Egypt, on behalf of the African Group and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, emphasising Sudan’s efforts so far. The EU expressed concern. The African Group then defended the termination of the mandate for the special rapporteur on human rights in Sudan, given Khartoum’s “high level of cooperation”, the “positive developments witnessed on the ground in all parts of Sudan” and that Darfur would best be dealt with through the experts group.

Related Developments in the Sanctions Committee

In September, the Chairman of the Sudan Sanctions Committee briefed the Council, apparently noting wide divisions among members on a proper follow-up to the midterm report of the sanctions Panel of Experts. These included whether to strengthen the embargo and how best to address complaints against Sudan for lack of cooperation with the Panel. The Panel’s final report was presented on 19 September and may be published in October. It apparently notes persistent violations of the embargo from all sides. At press time, the Council was expected to renew the Panel’s mandate by 28 September.
Sudan: North-South

Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), which expires on 31 October. It is unclear whether members will want to use this opportunity to convey key messages regarding challenges surrounding the north-south Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

Key Recent Developments
On 7 September, members held consultations on CPA implementation and the north-south situation. At the meeting, most members seemed to prefer keeping an open mind about the outlook, although most were mindful of the challenging picture from the latest report of the Secretary-General. They decided not to take any action in the hope that the situation would improve.

On 12 September, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon briefed the Council on his trip to the region. On the CPA, Ban noted that, “unless this milestone achievement [is] implemented, hopes for sustained peace in Sudan would suffer a serious blow.” (For background details, please see our 5 September Update Report.)

September has been tense in relations between north and south. Early in the month, about sixty troops associated with southern forces were encircled by the northern army while crossing the contested area of Southern Kordofan. The situation was apparently resolved with agreement on UNIMIS monitoring withdrawal of the troops. Tensions deepened after Khartoum police reportedly raided three offices maintained by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement.

On 10 September the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, painted an alarming picture of the relations between north and south and the CPA’s status. Kiir reportedly said that when the CPA was signed, “our feeling was that Sudan had entered into a new dawn of peace and hope for our people. Today [the] feeling is not the same. I am alarmed, worried and deeply concerned about the status of CPA implementation… I am worried that it is likely that Sudan will reverse again to war if we do not act now with our partner [Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party].”

Kiir also apparently criticised Khartoum for back-peddalling on key CPA commitments, including:

- the status of Abyei, a deeply contested and oil rich area between north and south;
- border demarcation (and its impact on “oil-revenue allocations, redeployment of forces, population census, and demarcation of geographical consistencies, general elections and referendum in 2011”);
- northern troop redeployment; and
- the national census.

Options
Options available to the Council include:

- maintaining the current “optimistic” approach and keeping southern Sudan issues carefully separated from Darfur issues;
- moving towards some expression of concern about delays in CPA implementation and calling on parties to abide scrupulously by their commitments on Abyei’s status, border demarcation, the national census and preparations for the elections;
- reviewing the Council’s overall approach, including a wider, forward-looking strategy integrating the Council’s involvement in south Sudan and Darfur;
- requesting a Secretariat briefing in a month’s time; and
- encouraging the Secretariat to be alert to potential risk scenarios, especially regarding the outcome of the Darfur peace talks (currently scheduled for 27 October in Tripoli) bearing in mind their possible linkage with issues affecting the south’s stability, including the CPA’s provisions on power and wealth-sharing.

Key Issues
The Council has so far managed its involvement in Darfur and southern Sudan separately. Members are aware of the key issues surrounding the CPA, but the immediate issues for the Council have largely been centred on Darfur.

An emerging issue arises from the fact that mounting problems with CPA implementation are increasingly raising questions about whether the Council should devote more attention to the north-south situation and how best to ensure that the agreement is implemented.

The issue is not so much that deployment of two separate UN peacekeeping operations in the same country, with distinct chains of
command and civilian leadership, will pose major challenges and may require a cohesive approach. Rather, at the political level, the issue is how best to:

- structure commitments under a new Darfur peace agreement in light of experience with the same implementation issues in the CPA; and
- manage the potential linkages between the CPA and a new Darfur agreement, in particular new power-sharing structures. (The CPA provides for a power-sharing structure with representation for the south and the north in fixed proportions at almost all levels of government.)

Council Dynamics
Council members are aware of the dangers surrounding the CPA’s implementation and the linkages with the peace talks in Darfur. Members have nonetheless preferred a low-key approach, in part given the Council’s focus on Darfur, especially by those members most keen on greater UN involvement in the situations in Sudan.

It is unclear whether members will want to revisit this strategy. Major changes in the Council’s approach and a broader involvement in southern issues seem unlikely at this stage.

Status of CPA Implementation
There are significant delays in setting up various commissions and developing legislation, especially regarding elections, land, national security, armed forces and human rights.

On power-sharing, there is particular concern with delays and major controversies.

- The north-south border has not been demarcated. This may not start until next year.
- The national census has been postponed and is now scheduled for 2-16 February 2008 (Khartoum has failed to channel mandated funding).
- The draft electoral bill may be submitted to the national assembly in October. Delays in adoption may lead to postponement of the CPA-mandated elections in 2008.
- Despite a final and binding ruling by the Abyei Boundaries Commission in July 2005, the National Congress Party has refused to demarcate the border. UNMIS has faced continuing restrictions of movement.

On wealth-sharing, there is continuing disagreement between the south and Khartoum over:

- oil revenues, the boundaries of oil producing areas, and oil contracts; and
- how best to establish mechanisms to begin sharing non-oil revenues.

The south Sudan government seems to be facing a looming fiscal crisis. Reconstruction has been slow given decreasing oil revenue transfers from Khartoum and reported slowness of disbursements by international donors, including through the CPA-mandated multi-donor trust funds. Other factors have been: increases in military spending due to the incorporation into the southern army of 31,000 troops associated with other armed groups and problems with corruption and lack of capacity.

On security arrangements, implementation is behind schedule, and has been marked by considerable tensions:

- the deadline for northern troop redeployment from the south has been missed;
- little progress has been made with practical integration in the joint units comprising northern and southern troops mandated by the CPA for contested areas (this has delayed troop redeployment away from contested areas such as the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states); and
- disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes have not yet commenced.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1706 (31 August 2006) set a mandate for UNMIS in Darfur.
- S/RES/1590 (24 March 2005) established UNMIS.
- S/RES/1574 (19 November 2004) was adopted in Nairobi and expressed support for the Sudanese peace processes.

**Selected Secretary-General’s Reports**

- S/2007/500 (20 August 2007) was the latest quarterly report on Sudan.

**Other**

- S/2005/78 (8 February 2005) contained the CPA.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General**

Ashraf Qazi (Pakistan)

**UNMIS: Size, Composition and Cost**

- Maximum authorised strength: up to 10,000 military and 715 police
- Strength as of 31 August 2007: 8,809 troops, 607 observers and 660 police
- Key troop contributors: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Egypt and China
- Civilian staff as of 30 August 2007: 904 international civilians; 2,523 local civilians; 248 UN volunteers
- Cost: Approved budget July 2007-June 2008: $887,332,000

**Useful Additional Sources**


**Ethiopia-Eritrea**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council is expected to receive the Secretary-General’s report on the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), and may subsequently issue either a presidential or press statement. UNMEE’s mandate expires on 31 January 2008.

**Recent Developments**

On 31 July the Council adopted resolution 1767 which, among other things, reiterated its demand that Eritrea immediately withdraw its troops from the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) and reverse all restrictions on UNMEE. It also called on Ethiopia to reduce the number of additional forces introduced in areas adjacent to the Zone. It expressed regret at the lack of progress on demarcation, and called upon the parties to implement the delimitation decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) and to participate constructively in the 6 September meeting to be convened by that body in New York.

The EEBC meeting on 6 September was moved to The Hague after objections by Ethiopia. It was convened to advance the demarcation process but failed to make any progress. The Commission subsequently stated that it will announce the demarcation of the borders by map coordinates at the end of November. Ethiopia said this was unacceptable.

Tensions increased in September following reports that Ethiopian and Eritrean troops were face to face in the TSZ. The high-profile meeting in Asmara of Somali factions threatening to forcibly eject Ethiopian forces...
from Mogadishu further highlighted the regional dimensions of the tensions.

On 25 September there were reports of an Ethiopian notification to Asmara, declaring Eritrea in material breach of the 2000 Algiers agreement pursuant to which the EEBC was established; subsequently, Ethiopia said this allowed it to terminate or suspend the agreement.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is how best to steer Ethiopia and Eritrea towards reduced tensions, mindful of the November deadline set by the EEBC.

Other issues include links between bilateral tensions and instability in the wider region, especially Somalia, and the failure of past alternatives for resolving the deadlock.

Options
The Council’s options include:
- deciding to reassess the situation soon—and certainly well before the EEBC’s November deadline—because of the possible impact and implications if the current stalemate persists;
- working to deter Ethiopia from further threats vis-à-vis the Algiers agreement;
- maintaining its earlier position by simply repeating its demands for Ethiopia to accept fully and without delay the boundary decision and for the immediate withdrawal of Eritrea’s troops from the TSZ and for lifting restrictions on UNMEE;
- encouraging the appointment of a new Special Representative (the post has been vacant since May 2006) to head UNMEE to facilitate the process of finding a solution to the impasse; and
- mandating its working group on peacekeeping operations to take up the issue as a matter of urgency and encouraging the working group to meet regularly with the two countries.

Council Dynamics
Some Council members see the value of early action to address the implications of the approaching EEBC November deadline and the tensions resulting from the lack of progress.

But until now, most members seem to have preferred the cautious approach of repeating calls for restraint and expressions of concern with the ongoing tensions.

Despite challenges posed to the implementation of UNMEE’s monitoring mandate, its deterrent role has been generally recognised by the Council and serves to demonstrate its commitment to peaceful resolution of the dispute.

Belgium is the lead country in the Council on the issue.

Underlying Problems
The prospect of violent conflict remains if the deterrent effect of UNMEE is removed and if the Algiers commitment collapses. The ongoing combination of smaller troop size and restrictions imposed on UNMEE could lead to more difficulties in maintaining the security of the TSZ between the parties.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1312 (31 July 2000) established UNMEE.

Selected Letters
- S/2006/1036 (28 December 2006) contained Eritrea’s position on the appointment of a Special Representative.
- S/2006/890 (15 November 2006) and 905 (20 November 2006) contained respectively Ethiopia’s and Eritrea’s position on the EEBC’s intention to convene a meeting on options for moving the demarcation process forward.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2007/440 (18 July 2007) was the latest UNMEE report.
- S/2006/992 (15 December 2006) contained options for UNMEE and the November EEBC decision.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission
Vacant, pending appointment; acting representative Azouz Ennifar (Tunisia)

Size and Composition
- Authorised maximum strength:

Georgia

Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), which expires on 15 October.

On 11 October the Council will be briefed by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Georgia, Jean Arnault, on the report (expected in early October) of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia.

The Council was also scheduled to be briefed by the chairman of Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on 28 September. The OSCE briefs the Council annually but this year there will be added interest in its report on the 6 August missile incident in Georgia. (Please see our Update Report of 23 August 2007.)

Key Recent Developments
The situation between Russia and Georgia deteriorated in August after Georgia claimed that a Russian aircraft had violated its airspace and a Russian-made missile was discovered in an area in Georgia near South Ossetia. The Georgian authorities claimed that their radar tracks showed the aircraft as having entered the airspace from Russia. Separate investigations by international and Russian experts yielded conflicting conclusions. The international experts concluded that while the missile was Russian-made, it was not possible to identify the aircraft from which it came. However, they confirmed that the aircraft had flown from Russian airspace. Russia suggested that Georgia had planted the missile.
The OSCE also conducted its own investigation. On 6 September it decided that it was difficult to determine what happened given the conflicting accounts. The OSCE proposed appointing a special envoy so that it could anticipate and respond quickly to any future incidents.

Internal tensions rose in September. On 20 September a clash between the Georgian Ministry of the Interior units and an Abkhaz military unit, led by Russian instructors, which reportedly left two dead, several wounded and a number taken prisoner, is being investigated by a Joint Fact-Finding Group led by UNOMIG. The Secretary-General has called for maximum restraint to avoid escalation of the situation. Russia raised this issue in the Council on 26 September.

On 5 September, Georgia complained to the Council about military exercises conducted by Abkhaz troops in Abkhazia. Its letter highlighted Russia’s role in training the troops and supplying their military equipment.

It seems that Georgia wants the Secretary-General to replace the current Group of Friends on Georgia with another mechanism. At the time of writing, the Group of Friends was expected meet in early October.

**Options**

One option is a simple six-month renewal of UNOMIG’s mandate. Given the lack of progress in the political process since the July 2006 upper Kodori Gorge incident, when Tbilisi sent troops into this region, and more recent incidents, like the March rocket firing and the August missile mystery, another option would be to renew UNOMIG but also include language designed to address the growing tension. In this regard, the following options could be considered:

- asking the Secretary-General for recommendations on strengthening UNOMIG’s technical capability so that it can better respond to future incidents;
- requesting the Secretary-General to suggest new mechanisms to lead the political process; and
- encouraging the appointment of a high-level envoy to bring together the parties, and put in place more effective confidence-building mechanisms.

**Key Issues**

A key issue for the Council is whether to try to play an active role in defusing the rising tensions between Tbilisi and Moscow. This is complicated given Russia’s status in the Council as a permanent member.

A related issue is how to handle Tbilisi’s apparent request to the Secretary-General for replacing the Group of Friends with a new mechanism. A continuing issue from last year is Georgia’s calls to replace the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping forces by international contingents.

And related to both these issues is how best to restart the political process. The Coordinating Council made up of Abkhaz and Georgian representatives has not met since before the upper Kodori Gorge incident in July 2006.

Connections with the Kosovo issue continue to hover as possible linkages. Hints by Kosovo that it could declare independence by the end of the year are seen as an issue that could lead to parallel action by the Abkhaz authorities.

A key procedural issue is the format of the Council’s formal meeting to adopt the resolution. In July, when the last report was discussed, it took three days of discussions before the Council agreed to meet in a closed session after Russia objected to a normal open session on the basis that only one party to the conflict, Georgia (as a UN member), would have been able to participate.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

There are clear divisions in the Council on this issue. The US has generally been very supportive of Georgia’s position while Russia tends to underpin the Abkhaz case. Widening of the Council’s focus on Georgia could meet with resistance from Russia unless it is accompanied by real balance in the approach. When Georgia asked the Council to meet to discuss the 6 August missile incident, some members including the US and UK were keen to take it up. However, it was decided that the Council should wait until all investigations were complete. Georgia is expected to pursue the issue vigorously.

**UN Documents**

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<th>Latest Security Council Resolution</th>
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<th>Selected Secretary-General’s Report</th>
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<td>• S/2007/439 (18 July 2007) was the latest Secretary-General’s report on the situation in Abkhazia</td>
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**Useful Additional Sources**


**Guinea-Bissau**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council is expected to receive the Secretary-General’s quarterly report on the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) and a possible briefing by the Secretary-General’s Representative in Guinea-Bissau, Shola Omoregie. A formal decision aimed at intensifying international engagement with the situation in the country may be taken by the Council, possibly in the form of a presidential statement. The mandate of UNOGBIS expires on 31 December.

**Key Recent Developments**

The political and social situation in Guinea-Bissau continues to be difficult. The country has been plagued by rampant drug trafficking with Latin American cartels using it as a transit point for drugs on their way to Europe and taking advantage of the desperate economic situation (for example, the unpaid members of the military and public service), the country’s relative proximity to South America, porous borders and weak state security institutions. On 31 August, following the confiscation of a truckload of aviation fuel in a forest on the outskirts of the city of Bubu and in an attempt to stem the drug trade, the government announced that aircraft suspected of carrying drugs will be shot down. But reports also indicated intimidation of those opposing and publicising the drug problem, with Amnesty International in mid-August expressing concern about harassment of human rights activists and journalists focusing on drug trafficking in the country.

On 18 July President João Bernardo Vieira announced that parliamentary elections would be postponed from March 2008 to March 2009, when they will be held along-
side presidential elections, reputedly to save costs.

The Council was last briefed by the Secretary-General’s Representative on the situation in Guinea-Bissau in July. A Council press statement highlighted concern over the continuing deterioration of the socioeconomic situation as well as the alarming increase in organised crime, and the trafficking of drugs and arms. It also welcomed the formation of the new government, commended it for efforts to re-establish constructive relations with international financial institutions and appealed to them to continue to support Guinea-Bissau.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is maintenance of the fragile peace in the country, especially in light of potential unrest in the military related to unpaid salaries.

A related issue is the country’s weak economy, including its dependence on cashew nuts, which accounts for 85 percent of export earnings. The government reduced the price of cashew nuts in April in an effort to boost export sales, but as yet no impact on exports has been reported.

An issue linked with economic vulnerability is the growing drug trafficking problem and the risk of a gradual slide by Guinea-Bissau into a “narco-state”.

Options
Options for the Council include:
- issuing a press or presidential statement to urge enhanced international engagement; a presidential statement seems more likely as African members of the Council are becoming increasingly concerned at the lack of significant progress in the situation; or
- taking no action.

A separate option is to adjust the frequency of UNOGBIS reports. Previously, the Council’s Ad Hoc Committee on Mandate Review had considered changing the reporting cycle from three to six months. However, given the deteriorating situation the Council may consider the option of retaining the cycle of three months.

Council Dynamics
For most Council members, Guinea-Bissau is not a high priority. It is possible that Ghana, which is the lead country on this issue, may initiate a presidential statement to send a stronger message from the Council on the need to intensify international support for a country perceived to be tottering on the brink of chaos.

Former non-permanent members like Brazil and Angola took the lead on Guinea-Bissau in the past. However, Guinea-Bissau’s case has lacked support from influential members. Observers contrast for example US support for Liberia, UK support for Sierra Leone, and French support for Côte d’Ivoire.

Underlying Problems
Problems include the tense political climate, the continuing socioeconomic deterioration, an alarming increase in organised crime, drug trafficking and the proliferation of illicit small arms. Guinea-Bissau’s lack of economic diversity has impaired the government’s capacity to deal with these issues as it lacks adequate funding.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1580 (22 December 2004) revised and extended the mandate of UNOGBIS.
- S/RES/1233 (6 April 1999) supported the Secretary-General’s decision to establish UNOGBIS.

Reports and Letters of the Secretary-General

- S/2007/401 (3 July 2007) was the latest report on UNOGBIS.
- S/2006/975 (13 December 2006) and S/2006/974 (8 December 2006) was an exchange of letters recommending extension of UNOGBIS until 31 December 2007 and noting the activities of UNOGBIS.

Other

- SC/9075 (10 July 2007) was the latest press statement by the Security Council.

Other Relevant Facts

Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNOGBIS
Shola Omorogie (Nigeria)

Size of UNOGBIS Staff
29, including international civilians, military advisers, police advisers and local civilians

Duration
6 April 1999 to present; mandate expires on 31 December 2007

Expected Council Action
The Council will discuss a draft resolution presented by the Group of Friends of Haiti (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Peru and the US). It is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which is due to expire on 15 October.

Key Recent Developments
At press time the Group of Friends was preparing the draft resolution. It is likely to endorse the Secretary-General’s recommendations (please visit our September Forecast for details) and:
- extend the mandate for one year without change;
- reduce troop strength, increase the police component, and authorise a change in operational procedures to tackle the trafficking of drugs and arms, including by strengthening coastal patrols; and
- strengthen the language on MINUSTAH’s coordination efforts between the UN country team and development actors.

The draft may also:
- request the Secretary-General to report to the Council every six months using indicators to measure and track MINUSTAH’s progress for each field of activity; and
- recognise the importance of the protection of the environment and express support to the government in building appropriate capacity.

On 12 September the Secretary-General briefed the Council on his recent trip to Haiti, and emphasised fighting corruption and illicit trafficking as key issues.

On 31 August foreign and defence vice ministers of the nine Latin American troop-contributing countries (the 2x3 mechanism) plus Panama, met in Guatemala. They agreed that sustaining achievements in security, institutional strengthening and socioeconomic development required MINUSTAH to remain in Haiti until all goals were met. The nine defence ministers and military officers then met in Port-au-Prince on 4 September. They also emphasised the necessity of strengthening cooperation.
between all actors involved in Haiti’s stabilization. Argentina said it would organise a meeting to that effect in October.

During his speech to the General Assembly on 27 September, Haitian President René Préval said that MINUSTAH was the “only formula that is realistic and available at this time that enables Haitians to restore freedom and live in peace.”

Options

Options include adopting the Group’s draft without changes, but the Council could also:

- renew MINUSTAH’s mandate for six months (with the intention to renew it for further periods) instead of renewing it for one year; and
- strengthen language on benchmarks.

Other options include:

- giving MINUSTAH a greater role in quick-impact projects aimed at creating jobs and providing basic social services; and
- requesting the UN Secretariat to provide more details on the MINUSTAH maritime component and adjusting the mandate accordingly.

Key Issues

A key issue is whether the Council will challenge the draft resolution from the Group of Friends on the basis of the possible benchmarks to measure progress. It seems that this was already an issue for the Group of Friends. The Council may want to discuss it further. Perhaps some may argue for strengthening the language and bringing it closer to the Secretary-General’s proposal.

A related issue is whether the Council will bring to bear, in the discussion of possible benchmarks, some of the language now being used in this context by the Peacebuilding Commission.

Another possible issue that may be reopened is a need to clarify the specific tasks and rules of engagement for the coastal patrol teams that will be made up by national and MINUSTAH police.

It is unclear whether issues will arise regarding police and judicial reform or development issues.

And the basic issue of China’s overall hesitation about the operation could play into a number of the above issues as well as the question of the actual length of the MINUSTAH extension.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Peru has the lead and usually circulates the Group of Friends’ draft within the Council.

There seems to be consensus on most of the Secretary-General’s recommendations, particularly on MINUSTAH’s composition, border security and the need to support the reforms. However, some members may want clarification on coastal patrolling.

Some controversial issues within the Group may spill over into the Council. While the US and Canada seemed to favour benchmarks in the draft, Latin American countries seemed hesitant, hence the compromise “indicators.” There is also the issue of whether to reinforce language on development. France and the US are usually reluctant to involve peacekeepers in development, while Latin Americans are very supportive.

It remains to be seen whether some Council members outside the Group of Friends (including China, Belgium, Italy, Russia and the UK) will want to reopen various issues. Some favour the idea of benchmarks and may advocate for stronger language, noting the fact that the Peacebuilding Commission now uses detailed benchmarks in its work. References to the environment may meet opposition from members usually reluctant to have the Council address this theme (e.g. China and Russia). Finally, it also remains to be seen whether China would support a one year renewal.

It seems that Uruguay, the second largest troop contributor after Brazil, would like to become a member of the Group of Friends.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1743 (15 February 2007) renewed MINUSTAH until 15 October.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report

- S/2007/503 (22 August 2007)

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Hédi Annabi (Tunisia)

Force Commander

Major General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz (Brazil)

Size and Composition of Mission

- Authorised strength as of 15 August 2006: military component of up to 7,200 troops and police component of up to 1,951 officers.
- Current strength as of 30 August 2007: 8,825 uniformed personnel, including 7,054 troops and 1,771 police.
- Key troop-contributing countries: Brazil, Uruguay, Sri Lanka, Jordan, Nepal, Argentina, Chile

Cost

1 July 2007-30 June 2008: $561.34 million

Iran

Expected Council Action

At press time, the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme and its non-compliance with international obligations under resolutions 1696, 1737 and 1747 to suspend uranium enrichment was being discussed among the EU3+3 (France, Germany and the UK plus China, Russia and the US). It seems unlikely that there will be sufficient agreement for a draft resolution intensifying sanctions against Iran to be introduced in October.

Key Recent Developments

The report of the Director General of the IAEA on implementation of the Non Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement in Iran and resolutions 1737 and 1747 was published on 30 August. It covers developments since May 2007 and noted that:

- a “work plan” agreed between Iran and the IAEA in order to resolve the outstanding issues was “a significant step forward” (INFIRC/711);
- the IAEA remained unable to verify certain aspects relevant to the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear programme; and
- Iran had not suspended uranium enrichment as requested by the Security Council, but enrichment levels were below what Iran had previously announced.

The IAEA Board met from 10 to 14 September in Vienna. IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei asked Iran to allow wider-ranging inspections and to go beyond the implementation of the agreement to resolve the outstanding issues and suspend uranium enrichment activities. He also reiterated his call for a “double time-out” suspending all enrichment-related activities and sanctions simultaneously in order to create space for negotiations.

Tensions appeared between the US and ElBaradei over his approach to the Iranian nuclear programme. The US seemed
Concerned that the new work plan’s timetable would provide Iran with more time to build nuclear capability and did not address suspension of uranium enrichment. The US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that the IAEA’s role was not to conduct diplomacy.

Iran strongly supported the work plan approach, stating that it was a proof of its goodwill. During his speech to the UN General Assembly on 25 September, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said he considered the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program as closed and that it had “turned into an ordinary Agency [IAEA] matter”.

An EU3+3 meeting was held in Washington on 21 September. It seems that the political directors were not able to agree on a way forward at either that meeting or a subsequent one in New York. At time of writing a ministerial meeting was planned for New York on 28 September.

On 19 September, the chairman of the Iran Sanctions Committee briefed the Council and said that 81 countries had reported to the Committee on measures taken to implement resolution 1737 and 67 countries had reported on implementation of resolution 1747.

Options
In the absence of a proposed draft resolution from the EU3+3, the Council is unlikely to consider any options at this stage.

It remains to be seen whether the EU3+3 are prepared to consider any other options, on an interim basis. One possibility might be to present to the Council a draft presidential statement:
- welcoming the agreement on the work plan; but
- recalling that the plan does not address other confidence building measures previously demanded by the IAEA and made obligatory by Council resolutions;
- reaffirming that suspension of uranium enrichment remains a legal obligation on Iran under Council resolutions; and
- deciding to revert to the issue in November to review the outcome of the work plan.

Key Issues
A key issue between the US on the one hand, and China and Russia on the other, seems likely to be one of timing—whether to pursue the issue now or wait until the next IAEA Board report due on 22 November which will include information on whether or not Iran has complied with the work plan and satisfactorily resolved questions related to outstanding issues. Non-compliance would provide arguments in favour of additional sanctions.

But another issue, especially for the US, is the growing perception that Iran is getting away with flouting unanimously agreed binding Security Council decisions. This seems to be a factor driving the pressure to force Iran to suspend enrichment activities.

A related issue also seems to be differing interpretations of the status of the confidence-building measures which were originally demanded by the IAEA. (IAEA resolution GOV/2006/14 of 4 February 2006, had requested Iran to implement a series of measures to reestablish confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, because of the history of concealment and the existence of outstanding issues arising from the Agency’s review of declarations made by Iran since September 2002, i.e. the outstanding issues.) But suspension of uranium enrichment was only one of those measures. The full set of confidence-building measures sought was:
- full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development;
- reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water;
- ratify and implement in full the Additional Protocol; and
- pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol which Iran signed on 18 December 2003.

In practice this also meant implementing transparency measures which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual-use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and development. But as an IAEA resolution, the measures were not legally binding.

IAEA resolution GOV/2006/14 also reported the matter to the UN Security Council, which then took up the matter. Council resolutions 1696, 1737 and 1747 were actually cast as decisions imposing a legal obligation on Iran to implement the full set of confidence-building measures and resolve the outstanding issues. In this sense, at least as the US and EU3 seem to see it, under the resolution resolving the outstanding issues (i.e. the work plan matters) and implementing the confidence-building measures are two different requirements.

It seems, however, that a view may be emerging by others that because the confidence-building measures were requested because of the existence of the doubts created by the unresolved issues, if the questions about the outstanding issues are resolved, there is no technical need for any of the confidence-building measures. And in this regard, the interpretation of the language in the Council resolutions may also become an issue—given the linkage built into the text between the two aspects.

EU3+3 and Council Dynamics
It seems that Russia and China remain reluctant to proceed with additional sanctions at this stage to avoid compromising the work plan. It remains to be seen whether they believe that its full implementation would in effect close the Iran file at the Security Council.

France, Germany and the UK remain determined to secure compliance with the Council requirements. Although they acknowledge that the work plan is a positive and necessary step, they do not seem satisfied with it. They seem to believe that suspension of enrichment remains a necessary step to build confidence. But they also strongly emphasise that a diplomatic solution remains their preferred outcome and there is a sense that they are less insistent on the need for action in advance of the November report on the work plan outcome.

The US favours further Council action as soon as possible and will be pushing firmly in that direction.

The US and some Europeans, especially France and the UK, seem ready to strengthen measures on a bilateral basis, such as preventing their companies from launching new businesses in Iran and adopting sanctions against the ones that do not respect that. There also seems to be some willingness to strengthen the EU’s current sanctions regime toward Iran, which already goes beyond the Council’s resolutions.
strict control.” It asked him to report within
three months on these arrangements, and
to transfer remaining unencumbered funds
to the Iraqi government through the Devel-
opment Fund for Iraq within three months.
Annexed to the resolution was a letter from
the US and the UK stating that all steps had
been taken to remove all Iraqi weapons of
mass destruction (WMD). The letter also
drew attention to the Iraq Survey Group’s
Duelffer Report, which reviewed Iraq’s WMD
programmes. Another letter from the Iraqi
government stated that there were no lon-
ger legal or political grounds for UNMOVIC
to continue its mandate with respect to Iraq,
and that the government was committed to
respect its international obligations regard-
ing non-proliferation.
On 27 June, the comprehensive UMVIC
compendium of the former Iraqi regime’s
WMD programmes, including observations
and lessons learned from UN inspections,
was published after the removal of sensitive
information. During his briefing to the Coun-
cil on 29 June, UNMOVIC’s Acting Executive
Chairman Demetrius Perricos emphasised
that the team had followed two principles
while drafting the compendium:
■ information related to technology, research
and production that may assist in the devel-
opment of WMDs should be excluded; and
■ confidentiality of certain information
should be protected.
He said that the same principles would
apply for the classification of UNMOVIC’s
archives.
On 30 August, concerns were raised that
potentially hazardous chemical materials
had been discovered at the UN in New York,
apparently having been removed by
UNMOVIC from Iraq in 1996. Subsequent
information suggested that the initial
concerns may have been exaggerated.
However, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
launched an investigation. A fact-finding
panel was appointed on 10 September and
is expected to report to the Secretary-Gen-
eral by the end of October.
Options
The most likely outcome is an exchange of
views—either during consultations and/or
in the form of letters—between the Council
and the Secretariat on how to proceed fur-
ther with archiving. An option is for Council
to emphasise its concern for safety issues
regarding the archiving of dangerous
chemical agents, as well as the underlying
principles for the protection of sensitive
information and confidentiality.
Key Issues
Security risks highlighted by the August
event may be a major issue, not only regard-
ing physical material but also sensitive
information. The Council will be looking for
clear proposals from the Secretary-General
on how to handle this.
Another major issue is whether the remain-
ing funds have been transferred to the
Development Fund for Iraq. Most UNMOVIC
funds were transferred earlier but resolution
1762, which in June terminated UNMOVIC,
required the final transfer to be completed
within three months. A related issue is
whetherarchiving, which may require several
months, should be financed by these funds
before the final balance is transferred.
Whether some of UNMOVIC’s archive—
which include paper documents, videotapes,
equipment, chemical agents, photographs and
CDs—should be destroyed and whether the general public
may have access to any of it are two potent-
ially sensitive issues.
Finally, ongoing funding for personnel
remains an important issue. It seems that
some contracts were extended for three
months for archiving, but they may need to
be further extended. A related issue is how
to preserve UNMOVIC expertise within the
UN system.
Council Dynamics
Russia abstained on resolution 1762
because it considered that “it did not pro-
vide for UNMOVIC certification regarding
the closing of the Iraq disarmament file.” It
criticised the refusal by the resolution’s
sponsors, the UK and the US, to include
information regarding the presence of
WMDs in Iraq in March 2003.
UN Documents
Security Council Resolution
• S/RES/1762 (29 June 2007)
terminated UNMOVIC.
• S/RES/1546 (8 June 2004) reiterated
the Council’s intention to revisit
UNMOVIC mandate.
• S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003) decided
to revisit UNMOVIC mandate.
• S/RES/1284 (17 December 1999)
replaced the UN Special Commission
(UNSCOM) by UNMOVIC.
• S/RES/687 (8 April 1991) created
UNSCOM and established WMD
prohibitions on Iraq.
Last UNMOVIC Report
• S/2007/314 (29 May 2007)
On 31 August, Rucker announced that municipal, assembly and mayoral elections would be held on 17 November. He reserved the right to postpone elections if there is conflict or if they are used as an excuse to delay status.

The EU foreign ministers discussed Kosovo in early September in Portugal and admitted that there were differences on Kosovo among the 27 members. However, since the Council failed to come to a decision on Kosovo’s final status the EU has been forced to seriously consider alternative scenarios. Some see this as a test of the credibility of a common EU foreign policy.

UNMIK said on 5 September that the leader of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, former Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj, can participate in the 17 November elections in Kosovo even though he is currently on trial at The Hague. UNMIK has said that as Haradinaj voluntarily surrendered and cooperated with the ICTY there is nothing to prohibit him from running.

In early July, ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, told the European parliament that the ICTY faced obstructions from the intimidation of witnesses in the trial of Haradinaj. She said there were 15 witnesses who were refusing to testify because they were afraid for their safety. It seems a major problem is that the Kosovo Police Service does not want to protect witnesses whom they regard as traitors.

Options
The Council has the following options:
- choose to take no action at this point;
- issue a statement encouraging the work of the troika and encouraging the parties to work at finding a solution;
- resolve the differences on the witness protection issue; and
- request a briefing by the Secretary-General in December after he receives the report on the troika’s negotiations.

Key Issues
An immediate key issue is whether the elections can be held in November. The short lead time for the elections is expected to make it difficult to meet voter registration deadlines. Another is the prospect of increased tension in the lead-up to the elections, especially if campaigning stirs nationalist sentiments. Related is the risk of retaliation against the government if elections are postponed because the status issue remains unresolved.

A pressing issue is whether UNMIK, which was drawn-down earlier this year in anticipation of a Council decision giving Kosovo independence by the middle of 2007, will be able to effectively carry out its mandate, particularly during the lead-up to the elections. A future issue is what to do with UNMIK if Kosovo declares independence or alternatively if the status quo continues indefinitely.

Another issue is witness safety in trials involving Albanian indictees at the ICTY. With Haradinaj running in the November election, prosecutors fear an increase in witness intimidation. The perception that UNMIK has facilitated his candidacy may impact potential witnesses. The unresolved issue of Kosovo’s status has slowed down previous hopes for progress in the area of witness relocation from Kosovo.

The big issue on most minds, however, will be what to do if the current talks fail to bring about a negotiated solution by 10 December and the related issue of a possible unilateral declaration of independence.

Related issues include possible secession moves by Serbs in the north and the possible impact on break-away entities in other regions.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Kosovo was a high-priority agenda item from March to July. By then, intense activity and pressure to make a decision had begun to wear down some members. Some members were relieved, therefore, when the issue moved away in July.

The mood is now more pessimistic. Many acknowledge that consensus on a status resolution (either pro-Kosovo independence or pro-the status quo) is now unlikely.

The US and Russia are participating constructively in the troika. However, fundamental differences remain. US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Kramer has voiced opposition to an extended process while Russia has made it clear it wants negotiations to be open-ended.

Members also differ over how to deal with a unilateral declaration of independence. The US has made it clear that it will recognize such a declaration. Most of the EU
members also seem likely to recognise unilateral independence. Russia, recognising that its veto only carries weight within the Council, is advocating the return of the issue to the Council.

**UN Documents**

**Security Council Resolution**
- S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) authorised NATO to secure and enforce the withdrawal of Yugoslav (FRY) forces from Kosovo and established UNMIK.
- S/2007/168 and Add. 1 (26 March 2007) was the letter transmitting Ahtisaari’s report on Kosovo’s future status and the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.
- S/PRST/2005/51 (24 October 2005) declared it was time to begin the political process to determine the future status of Kosovo.
- S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) established UNMIK.

**Selected Presidential Statement**
- S/2007/437 (17 July 2007) was the letter reporting on KFOR operations from 1 to 31 May 2007.
- S/2007/414 (6 July 2007) was the letter reporting on KFOR operations from 1 to 30 April 2007.
- S/2007/168 and Add. 1 (26 March 2007) was the letter transmitting Ahtisaari’s report on Kosovo’s future status and the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.

**Selected Letters**
- S/2007/427 (10 July 2007) was the letter from the Permanent Representative of Serbia containing comments on the Secretary-General’s June UNMIK report.
- S/2007/414 (6 July 2007) was the letter reporting on KFOR operations from 1 to 31 May 2007.
- S/2007/403 (2 July 2007) was the letter reporting on KFOR operations from 1 to 30 April 2007.
- S/2007/168 and Add. 1 (26 March 2007) was the letter transmitting Ahtisaari’s report on Kosovo’s future status and the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.

**Selected Reports**
- S/2007/395 (29 June 2007) was the latest report of the Secretary-General on UNMIK.

**Others**
- Statement issued on 20 July 2007 by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, UK and the US, co-sponsors of the draft resolution on Kosovo presented to the Council on 17 July.
- S/2007/437 (17 July 2007) was the draft resolution on Kosovo.

**Other Relevant Facts**
- Martti Ahtisaari (Finland)
- Joachim Rucker (Germany)

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General**

**UNMIK**
- Size of UNMIK mission: 483 international, 1967 national, 142 UN volunteers as of 30 March
- Size of OSCE mission: 1300 staff (310 international and 990 local as of 30 September 2006) (Pillar 3) and 447 (114 international and 333 local staff as of 31 March 2007) (Pillar 4)
- Size of EU mission: 125 international staff, 336 local staff

**Cost**
- $217.9 million for fiscal year 2006-2007 (not including OSCE, EU and NATO expenditures)

**KFOR (NATO FORCE)**
- General Roland Kather (Germany)

**Size and Composition of Mission**
- Size: 16,000 troops
- NATO countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, UK, US
- Non-NATO countries: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Morocco, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine

**Useful Additional Sources**

**North Korea**

**Expected Council Action**

The Chairman of the Sanctions Committee on the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, Ambassador Marcello Spatara of Italy, will brief the Council in October.

**Options**

The Council has the following options.
- receive the briefing and take no action; and
- issue a press statement welcoming progress made through the six-party talks and other negotiations; and
- request from the chair of the Sanctions Committee a review that assesses member state compliance and options for future work. (There might be both carrot-and-stick elements in such an approach because it could allow the Committee to calibrate its report in light of actual progress.)

**Key Issues**

A key issue is how the Council can facilitate
recent momentum. A related issue is how the Council should signal readiness to make adjustments to its previous approach by modifying the sanctions regime and moving to less punitive strategies to encourage further cooperation while at the same time maintaining vigilance.

Council Dynamics
In light of recent events, no members seem to be advocating the intensification of sanctions against North Korea. Some Council members suspect that robust activity by the Sanctions Committee could hinder the positive developments that have recently been made in the context of the six-party talks.

UN Documents

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<tr>
<th>Selected Security Council Resolutions</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1718 (14 October 2006) expressed grave concern over North Korea’s nuclear test, imposed sanctions and set up a Sanctions Committee.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1695 (15 July 2006) condemned North Korea’s launch of ballistic missiles.</td>
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<th>Selected Presidential Statement</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/PRST/2006/41 (6 October 2006) was the statement expressing concern over North Korea’s declaration that it would conduct a nuclear test.</td>
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<th>Selected Letter</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/2006/481 (4 July 2006) was the letter from Japan requesting a meeting of the Security Council after North Korea launched a ballistic missile.</td>
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<td>• Letters submitted from UN member-states on implementing resolution 1718 <a href="http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/mstatesreports.shtml">http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/mstatesreports.shtml</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Briefing to the Security Council by the Chair of the Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Marcello Spatafora, 10 July 2007 <a href="http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/sec_docs.shtml">http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/sec_docs.shtml</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Briefing to the Security Council by the Chair of the Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Marcello Spatafora, 16 April 2007 <a href="http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/sec_docs.shtml">http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/sec_docs.shtml</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/P.5618 (11 January 2007) was a briefing to the Council by Ambassador Peter Burian of Slovakia, the 2006 chair of the Sanctions Committee.</td>
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Nepal

Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to discuss the Secretary-General’s latest report on Nepal and to receive a briefing by Ian Martin, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Nepal. Discussions are expected to focus on the latest political developments, the security situation and preparations for constituent assembly elections scheduled for 22 November.

While no formal political action is required at this stage, the recent turbulence in the political situation is impacting the UN Mission in Nepal’s (UNMIN) ability to carry out its mandate. The Council may choose to respond to the developments in either a presidential or press statement. UNMIN’s mandate expires on 23 January 2008.

Recent Key Developments
On 18 September the Maoist faction left the coalition government dissatisfied with progress on meeting their demands to abolish the monarchy before the 22 November elections. Other coalition partners prefer that a democratically elected special assembly decide the future of the monarchy. The Maoists fear that free and fair elections are not possible as long as the monarchy remains and plan to disrupt the polls if Nepal is not declared a republic before the elections.

In a telephone call with the government and the Maoists on 19 September, B. Lynn Pascoe, the head of the UN Department of Political Affairs, acting for the Secretary-General, urged compromise. Both parties renewed their commitment to the peace process.

On 26 September the Nepali Congress party, Nepal’s largest political party, passed a resolution calling on the special assembly to be elected in November to order the king to give up his throne. This brings it in line with the Maoist position on the subject although there are still differences on the issue of timing.

On 14 September, 5000 Maoist soldiers left their camp to protest wages lower than those paid to soldiers in the Nepali army. UNMIN issued a statement saying this violated the peace agreement.

Options
The Council has the following options:
- take no action at this stage; or
- adopt a press or a presidential statement on the importance of adhering to the peace agreement, expressing concern about the continuing violence in the south and the importance of both the Nepalese government and Maoists continuing to work with UNMIN.

Given the need to watch the situation more closely in the lead up to the 22 November election, the Council might also consider options such as:
- request a briefing from the Secretariat in early November on election preparations and potential threats during the elections; and
- request the Secretary-General to provide an assessment in December after the election of progress made by UNMIN and whether it can complete its work by the end of its mandate in January.

Key Issues
The immediate issue is whether Council action now could help ensure that the peace process is not derailed. In this regard, the departure of the Maoists from the government, if continued, may call into question the effectiveness of the peace process. A related issue is that divisions in the government generally raise questions about its ability to handle pressing problems, including claims of marginalised groups.

Security problems are also a key issue, particularly the continuing violence in the Terai region. These pose a serious threat to the elections and the overall peace process. If the Maoists remain outside the government and intensify their threatened disruptions, the security environment could deteriorate further, especially if this leads to violence.
A connected issue is how this is affecting UNMIN’s ability to operate in the changed political environment. The second stage of voter registration has not gone smoothly. In the current political climate it seems likely that UNMIN may find the Maoists less willing to cooperate. Their departure from camp in mid-September suggests underlying discontent.

The risk that the constituent assembly elections may need to be postponed to 2008 raises another major issue. Since UNMIN’s mandate includes supporting the peace process through electoral assistance, the Council may have to decide whether to extend UNMIN or close it before it can fulfill its mandate. A closely connected issue that could affect this decision is whether Nepal wants UNMIN to continue and for how long.

Council and Wider Dynamics
While Council members were in broad agreement on setting up UNMIN, some divisions have emerged. After the last briefing in July, a proposed presidential or press statement had to be abandoned in the face of opposition, primarily from China.

China holds strongly to its position that UNMIN should be of limited duration. It sees Nepal as a “special case” and does not want the UN involved in facilitating the political process beyond the current mandate. Others, like the UK (the lead country on Nepal) and the US, are uncomfortable with UNMIN shutting down before completing its mandate.

The geopolitics of the region adds a layer of complexity. India has long had a strong interest in Nepal’s stability. The Indian government recently made statements about the critical importance of holding the November elections on schedule and offered support and material help for the elections. Increased Maoist activity in the Terai area and a possible spillover of violence across their shared border could result in a security problem for India. There is also concern about possible arms smuggling and movement of insurgents across the relatively porous border between Nepal and India.

As it stands, Vietnam, Libya and Burkina Faso are almost assured of being elected to the Council as they are all endorsed candidates and are in a “clean slate” situation with no other candidates. However, because these are elections to a “Principal Organ” of the United Nations, formal balloting and a two-thirds majority are required. (Please see our 12 September 2007 Special Research Report for more details about regional groups, seat allocation and voting procedure.)

There will be a contest for the remaining two seats between Croatia and the Czech Republic for the Eastern European seat and Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic for the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States seat.

Recent Developments
Until last month it looked like three candidates would contest the two African seats. Mauritania unexpectedly challenged Burkina Faso and Libya in April despite the fact that they had been endorsed by the African Union Summit in January 2007 and June 2006 respectively. However, in September Mauritania announced its withdrawal on the understanding that Libya would support its candidature for the period 2012-13.

Croatia and the Czech Republic are both strongly canvassing support to persuade countries that are undecided. Most observers expect this election to be close and to go to several rounds before a winner emerges.

Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic are still both in the race. But most observers believe it will not develop into multiple rounds of voting like last year’s contest between Venezuela and Guatemala.

Key Issues of Interest to the Candidates
Countries assured of election have already signalled issues of interest once they are on the Council.

Vietnam seems interested in comprehensive Council reform including more efficient working methods, the interests of developing countries and wider participation of non-permanent members. As a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Vietnam is likely to take up issues of interest to the two organisations. Since Indonesia, also an ASEAN and NAM member, will overlap with Vietnam in the Council in 2008 there might be scope for the two countries to work together on areas of common interest.

Libya is hoping to contribute substantively to discussions on key Council issues like Darfur and Chad and feels it can play a role in bringing the parties together. It is also interested in becoming involved in issues related to Iran.

A key issue of Burkina Faso as a Council member is likely to be Côte d’Ivoire and...
other West African issues. This year as Chair of the Economic Community of West African States it showed a keen interest in playing a role in the peace process by facilitating the Ouagadougou agreement in March 2007.

**UN Documents**

**Selected General Assembly Documents**

- A/61/PV.49 (7 November 2006), A/61/PV.45 (2 November 2006), and A/61/PV.37 (19 October 2006) were the plenary records of the most recent elections of non-permanent members.
- A/RES 1991 A(XVIII) (17 December 1963) was the resolution adopting amendments to the Charter on the composition of the Council and establishing the allocation of seats to various regions.

**Other**

- UN Charter

Useful Additional Sources

Circular Third Person Note from Mauritania on its decision to withdraw its candidature for the Security Council, 8 September 2007

### Somalia

**Expected Council Action**

In October, consultations are likely and expected to review the forthcoming Secretary-General’s report, which is anticipated to cover:

- status of the political process;
- steps for an increased UN role in that regard, including the recent appointment of the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, with reinforced status;
- the humanitarian and security situation;
- recommendations on UN support for AMISOM; and
- an update on contingency planning for a UN mission in Somalia.


**Key Recent Developments**

Heavy fighting continued through August and September. Tens of thousands of civilians are newly displaced. There are reports of increasing attacks and intimidation of journalists by all parties. Humanitarian indicators continue to fall because of insecurity. France has offered military assistance to escort humanitarian shipments to Mogadishu’s port given the large-scale piracy off the Somali coast. (A multinational naval coalition currently patrols activity in areas adjacent to Somalia’s territorial waters.)

The National Reconciliation Conference wound up its work on 30 August, after weeks of negotiation under persistent insurgent attacks. It reached agreement on an outcome document that included provisions for social reconciliation and the preparation of a roadmap to elections in 2009, in fulfillment of the Transitional Federal Charter.

It seems unclear how far the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) will go with meaningful power and wealth sharing and reaching out to the opposition. Key figures in the opposition and the insurgency movement, particularly from the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and the Hawiye clan, refused to attend.

The departing Special Representative François Lonseny Fall noted that the end of the conference “does not signify the end of the reconciliation process” and urged the TFG to reach out to all opposition groups inside and outside Somalia.

The opposition held its own meeting in Asmara under Eritrean facilitation in early September. Some 400 key opposition leaders attended, including UIC’s Sheikh Sharif Ahmed and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aways as well as former parliament speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden. EU, UN and Arab League observers also attended.

The “Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia” was then established, headed by Ahmed and Aden. Its central committee would include the UIC, with 40 percent of the seats, former MPs with 25 percent and the diaspora with 16 percent. It is unclear what role more extremist UIC elements will have. The Alliance vowed to fight TFG and Ethiopian troops in Somalia, and criticised AMISOM for taking sides.

Following the Asmara meeting, TFG officials and many clan leaders met in Jeddah under Saudi Arabian auspices to sign the Reconciliation Conference’s outcome. The EU welcomed the Jeddah agreement. The meeting also called for the deployment of an Arab-African force under UN aegis to replace Ethiopian troops and reinforce peacekeeping in Somalia.

On 20 August, when the Council renewed AMISOM in resolution 1772 it also:

- reiterated its calls for an all-inclusive process towards the formation of broad-based, representative institutions, also including a ceasefire, a peace process roadmap and elections;
- signalled a larger future UN role in the political process;
- stated its intention to impose further measures against those threatening political reconciliation and stability in Somalia; and
- requested the Secretary-General to continue with contingency planning for a UN peacekeeping mission.

AMISOM continues to face troop shortages, with no additional contributions as of late September. Burundi pledged 1,700 by October and Uganda offered 250 troops outside AMISOM to train a new Somali army. (This would require a request to the Sanctions Committee under resolution 1772.)

**Related Developments in the Sanctions Committee**

Activity in the Sanctions Committee has been low-key and focused on negotiating a letter inviting the TFG to take reasonable steps to ensure compliance with the embargo. The Committee Chairman briefed the Council on 11 September, covering the general aspects of its recent work.

Council members expect a briefing by the Chairman by 20 October on measures to strengthen the arms embargo and how they could be implemented as requested in resolution 1772. It seems that preparations may start in the following weeks, including discussions within the Committee on how best to respond to the request. Given existing divisions on matters of principle regarding sanctions, and some members’ mixed interests in Somalia, it seems unlikely that there will be appetite for major measures.

The formal appointment of the sanctions Monitoring Group, requested by resolution 1766 in July has been delayed which means that its interim report will not come before January 2008.
Options

Options include:
- continuing to signal the need for all-inclusive reconciliation;
- demanding a ceasefire, possibly including monitoring by UN observers;
- requesting concrete steps from the TFG to implement the conference’s outcome, perhaps including an invitation to TFG officials to brief the Council in that regard;
- expressing support for a broader UN role in political reconciliation;
- deciding to dispatch a small UN contingent to provide security for the relocation of the UN Political Office to Mogadishu;
- considering any new options from the Secretary-General on peacekeeping in Somalia;
- in the meantime, authorising the provision of an initial package of UN logistical and technical assistance to AMISOM; and
- addressing the regional dimension more comprehensively, in particular by actively managing the connection with the Ethiopia-Eritrea situation.

Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is ensuring that meaningful progress is made on political reconciliation. Related issues are:
- ensuring that the TFG implements commitments from the National Reconciliation Conference, particularly by adopting a peace process roadmap with timetables and a new constitution, leading to elections in 2009; since the conference’s outcome does not specify steps for implementation, the issue is largely left to the TFG’s discretion; and
- establishing a broad, all-inclusive process including the moderate opposition and finding ways to respond constructively to the Asmara Alliance.

A parallel issue is how best to improve the security situation, especially regarding a ceasefire. Related issues are:
- how best to react to the Jeddah initiative referring to a possible Arab-African force, AMISOM’s difficulties and the lack of conditions for UN peacekeeping;
- troop generation problems given existing safety concerns from potential contributors and peacekeeping commitments elsewhere, such as Darfur; and
- whether new initiatives can effectively improve the security situation and allow Ethiopian withdrawal.

Council Dynamics

There was increasing impatience among members with the lack of progress with political reconciliation, even among those most sympathetic to the TFG and Ethiopia’s presence. This was largely reflected in the messages in resolution 1772.

African members were keen for UN financial support for AMISOM and its eventual transfer to a UN mission. Others, including the US and UK, seemingly did not feel UN assessed resources can be used at this stage. Still others continue to be uncomfortable with the presence of AMISOM and Ethiopian troops. The middle ground found was to request recommendations for UN support for AMISOM and insisting on contingency planning in resolution 1772 as a stopgap measure in the hope of improvements on the ground.

Most now seem sympathetic to the recent efforts in Saudi Arabia to consolidate results from the national conference, while remaining cautious over the absence of concrete progress notably over the insurgent groups that did not participate.

Most also seem sympathetic to options that could allow Ethiopian withdrawal, protect the TFG, respond to the concerns of the AU and create an environment conducive to reconciliation. The US has indicated that it supports the Arab-African force option. The AU position remains uncertain. Most Council members seem cautious, perceiving a need for more details ahead of concrete discussions. Others also worry about how to respond to the establishment of the Asmara Alliance. (The US has indicated it could include Eritrea in its list of states that sponsor terrorism.)

Expected Council Action

The mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) is due to expire on 31 October. The Secretary-General is expected to recommend renewal for a further six months, and the Council is likely to agree.

Discussions are also likely on the current negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario. However, further substantive input from the Council is not expected at this stage. A third round is likely in November in Europe, though the exact date and location are yet to be determined.

Key Recent Developments

The second round of negotiations was held on 10 and 11 August in Manhasset, New York, under the same format as the previous round (see our July Forecast for details). The atmosphere seemed to have been less cordial. The parties focused on ways to implement the conference’s outcome, particularly by adopting a peace process roadmap with timetables for the conclusion of an initial package of UN logistical and technical assistance to AMISOM; and
- addressing the regional dimension more comprehensively, in particular by actively managing the connection with the Ethiopia-Eritrea situation.

The second round of negotiations was held on 10 and 11 August in Manhasset, New York, under the same format as the previous round (see our July Forecast for details). The atmosphere seemed to have been less cordial. The parties focused on ways to reinforce confidence-building measures such as contacts between Sahrawi refugees in the Algerian border area of Tindouf and their relatives in Western Sahara. These are now underway, supervised by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
The Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Peter van Walsum, tried unsuccessfully to extend discussions to other confidence-building measures. The parties also discussed the implementation of resolution 1754 of 30 April 2007, which called for negotiations without preconditions in good faith with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution that would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

Differences in interpretation of the resolution remain. It seems that Morocco considers that its autonomy plan is a good basis for negotiations, since the resolution qualified the Moroccan efforts as “serious and credible.” The Polisario believes that the autonomy plan is only one option, and that the Council did not show its preference for any plan in resolution 1754. Van Walsum proposed focusing on other themes such as natural resources and local administration. But it seems that at this stage each party wanted to focus on its own national or community experience.

On 27 June, the Secretary-General submitted a report on the status and progress of the first round of negotiations. He noted that the two parties remained far apart on the definition of self-determination, despite having accepted resolution 1754. The Secretary-General had originally made recommendations in his report, including that the Council call on all member states to urge “both parties to make every effort to maintain the momentum and to impress upon them that a final resolution of the conflict will require flexibility and sacrifice from both of them.” He also made specific recommendations to Morocco and the Polisario. But because of concerns from both parties that this might negatively influence the next round, the report was reissued without this paragraph.

On 11 July the Council held consultations and issued a press statement supporting the confidence-building measures (especially since UNHCR in September signalled financial difficulties for this programme); and expressing concern for the situation of human rights in Western Sahara, and perhaps including a human rights mandate for MINUSRO.

Key Issues
At this stage, the main issue is whether the Council should actively comment on the substantive issues. A related issue is whether it would be productive or unproductive to apply further pressure to the parties to start negotiating the substance of how to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, providing for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Although at press time the Group of Friends (France, Russia, Spain, the UK and the US), which has the lead on Western Sahara, had not yet formally met to discuss the matter, there seems to be consensus that MINURSO should be renewed for at least six months. The Group also seems to agree that there is value in reinforcing confidence-building measures.

Some members of the Group of Friends also seem to be willing to include language encouraging the parties to continue negotiations in good faith on the substance. They believe that being seen to maintain international pressure on the parties will be helpful as this is likely to have the effect that neither Morocco nor the Polisario will want to be seen as the one breaking the negotiations.

The US indicated in July that from its perspective “meaningful autonomy” with a referendum was consistent with the principle of self-determination and would be a realistic outcome. Because the US had previously been more ambiguous in its statements, this seemed to some to signal a shift which Morocco saw as support for its autonomy plan. However, the US also made it clear that autonomy was just one solution. Whether France’s new president, Nicolas Sarkozy, will maintain the same level of French support for Morocco remains to be seen. The UK favours neither side.

South Africa and Panama strongly support the principle of self-determination for the people of Western Sahara, with independence as an option. South Africa has criticised the Group of Friends for leaving too little time before MINURSO expires for the rest of the Council to adopt a position on the Group’s draft resolution and insists that the rest of the Council is entitled to form its own assessment of the situation.

UN Documents
Selected Resolutions
- S/RES/1754 (30 April 2007) called for negotiations without preconditions and extended MINURSO’s mandate by six months.

Secretary-General’s Latest Report
- S/2007/385 (27 June 2007) was on the first round of negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario.

Selected Letters
- S/2007/509 (22 August 2007) and S/2007/510 (27 August 2007) was an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Council on the appointment of General Zhao Jingmin as MINURSO’s new force commander.
- S/2007/210 (16 April 2007) was a letter from South Africa to the Council transmitting the Polisario plan.
- S/2007/206 (11 April 2007) was a letter from Morocco to the Council transmitting the Moroccan plan.

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Julian Harston (UK)

Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy
Peter van Walsum (Netherlands)

MINURSO Force Commander
Major General Zhao Jingmin (China)

Size and Composition of Mission
- Authorised strength: 231 military personnel and six police officers
- Strength as of 30 August 2007: 229 total uniformed personnel, including 28 troops, six police officers, 195 military observers

Key Troop Contributing Countries
Malaysia, Egypt, Russia, France, Ghana, China, Honduras

Cost
## Upcoming Issues in Sanctions and Counter-Terrorism Committees

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<td><strong>Counter-Terrorism Committee</strong></td>
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| S/RES/1373         | Resolution 1373 established obligations on all states to:  
  • prevent and suppress international terrorism;  
  • establish cooperation between states;  
  • implement mutual legal assistance;  
  • share intelligence;  
  • assist in tracing and freezing of assets related to terrorists and terrorism;  
  • implement border control measures to prevent the movement of terrorists and access to weapons;  
  • deny safe haven to terrorists; and  
  • become parties to the then 12 international anti-terrorism conventions and protocols and to implement them fully.  
Resolution 1624 called on all states to prohibit and prevent incitement to terrorism. States are required to comply with all of their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law, refugee law and humanitarian law.  |
| **1540 Committee** |
| S/RES/1540         | Resolution 1540 established obligations on all states to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems, in particular for terrorist purposes.  
Resolution 1673 called on all states to report to the Committee and decided that the Committee should intensify its efforts to promote full implementation of the resolution, including by outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation.  |
| **Al-Qaida and Taliban** |
| S/RES/1267         | assets freeze; travel ban; arms embargo |
| **Reports Review:** The Committee with its Group of Experts will continue to evaluate states’ level of implementation of the resolution’s provisions and engage those states who fail to comply with the reporting requirements. The Committee’s mandate and the mandate of the Group of Experts will expire 27 April 2008. (See reference to UNODC project above.)  |
| **Listing/De-listing:** The Committee will continue the review it began at the end of March of all designated individuals and entities that have been on the Designated List for four years as required by paragraph 6(i) of the Committee Guidelines.  
Resolution 1735 asked the Committee to continue to develop, adopt and apply guidelines regarding de-listing of individuals and entities on the List, and extended the Monitoring Team’s mandate for an additional 18 months.  
(See reference to UNODC project above.)  |
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<td>arms embargo; assets freeze; travel ban; export of rough diamonds</td>
<td>Designated individuals, including persons impeding the peace process, committing violations of human rights, violating the arms embargo, inciting public violence, and obstructing the activities of UNOCI. There are three individuals on the list (last updated 18 December 2006).</td>
<td>Report: The Group of Experts is to report with recommendations to the Council through the Committee before 15 October 2007. The Group’s mandate will expire on 31 October 2007. The report will be taken up by the committee and the Council in mid- to late October.</td>
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<td>Mandate: The sanctions, established by resolution 1572 and renewed and amended by resolutions 1643 and 1727 will expire 31 October 2007. The Council will decide whether to renew and/or amend the sanctions.</td>
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| Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) | Arms Embargo: supply, sale, transfer or transit of:  
• any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missile or missile systems or related materiel including spare parts;  
• items on designated lists determined by the Committee or the Council which could contribute to DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction programmes; and  
• technical training, service, etc., related to the embargoed items.  
Luxury Goods: not defined by the resolution.  
Assets Freeze: funds and other financial assets and economic resources of persons designated by the Committee or by the Council.  
Travel Ban: persons designated by the Committee or the Council. | The DPRK and persons named to a designated list. | The measures imposed and the level of compliance will continue to be under periodic review by the Security Council.  
The ninety-day report of the Committee to the Council is due in October. |
| S/RES/1718                | Resolutions                                                              |                                                                                               |                                                                                       |
| S/RES/1718 (14 Oct 2006)  |                                                                           |                                                                                               |                                                                                       |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo | arms embargo; targeted travel and financial measures                       |                                                                                               |                                                                                       |
| S/RES/1533                | Resolutions                                                              |                                                                                               |                                                                                       |
| S/RES/1771 (10 Aug 2007)  |                                                                           |                                                                                               |                                                                                       |
# Upcoming Issues in Sanctions and Counter-Terrorism Committees

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| **Islamic Republic of Iran** | **Embargo**: sale or transfer of nuclear and ballistic missile programmes-related materiel, equipment, goods and technology to or from Iran (listed in S/2006/814 and S/2006/815).  
**Travel Restrictions**: individuals engaged in directly, or associated with, Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities.  
**Assets Freeze**: individuals and entities listed in Annex I to resolutions 1737 and 1747.  
**Other Restrictions**: on technical cooperation, except for humanitarian purposes; calls on states and international financial institutions not to enter into new financial commitments with Iran. | Government of Iran; individuals and entities listed in annexes to resolutions 1737 and 1747. | **Review/Action**: Council will continue to review Iran’s actions in light of the IAEA’s reports and it may consider in October whether to modify the sanctions regime. |
| **Iraq** | arms embargo; assets freeze | **Arms Embargo**: Iraqi territory.  
**Assets Freeze**: Designated individuals and entities associated with the former regime of Saddam Hussein. As of 27 July 2005 there were 89 individuals, and as of 12 May 2006 there were 208 entities listed. | No Committee action is expected. |
| **Liberia** | arms embargo; travel ban; assets freeze; export of rough diamonds  
Resolution 1683 modified the arms embargo to exempt sale of certain arms to the government. | **Arms Embargo**: any recipient in Liberian territory.  
**Travel Ban**: peace spoilers, violators of the embargo as designated by the Committee. As of 15 December 2006 there were 58 individuals listed.  
**Assets Freeze**: Charles Taylor and designated associates. As of 3 April 2006, the last date for which information is available, there were 28 individuals and thirty entities listed. | **Mandate Review**: Arms embargo and travel ban in effect until December 2007.  
**Diamond Sanctions**: The Council will continue to review Liberia’s adherence to the requirements of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.  
**Report**: The next report of the Panel of Experts is due by 6 December 2007, and will include assessments of the effectiveness of the measures against Charles Taylor; implementation of the forestry legislation; and compliance with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. |
| **Rwanda** | arms embargo | **Arms Embargo**: non-governmental forces in Rwandan territory or in neighbouring states; restrictions on arms transfers by the Government of Rwanda.  
Resolution 1749 removed the requirement that Rwanda marks and registers all weapons. | No Committee action is expected. |
| **Sierra Leone** | arms embargo; travel ban | **Arms Embargo**: non-governmental forces and restrictions on arms transfers.  
**Travel Ban**: Leading members of the former military junta and the Revolutionary United Front, as designated by the Committee. | No Committee action is expected. |
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Arms Embargo: all parties to the N’Djamena Ceasefire Agreement and any other belligerents in Darfur; all non-governmental entities and individuals.

Assets Freeze and Travel Ban: as designated by the Committee, individual peace spoilers and violators of the arms embargo. Four individuals were designated by resolution 1672.

Aviation Restrictions: ban on government flights into and over the Darfur region.

At press time the Council was preparing to adopt a resolution to re-establish the Panel of Experts and to renew its mandate.

Assets Freeze and Travel Ban: individuals suspected of involvement in the Hariri murder designated by UNIIIC and/or the Government of Lebanon and agreed by the Committee (nobody has been designated as of this writing).

No Committee action is expected prior to the next UNIIIC report.
Notable Dates for October

Reports Due for Consideration in October

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Document Requesting Report</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 September</td>
<td>SG semi-annual report on the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 September</td>
<td>SG report on the progress toward the disposition of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) archiv</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 September</td>
<td>SG monthly report on the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 September</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 September</td>
<td>SG report on the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 October</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 October</td>
<td>Report of the Group of Experts of the 1572 Sanctions Committee concerning Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 October</td>
<td>SG report on the implementation of the Ouagadougou agreement (Côte d’Ivoire)</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 October</td>
<td>SG semi-annual 1559 report (Lebanon)</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 October</td>
<td>SG report on Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 October</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 October</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 October</td>
<td>SG semi-annual report on the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 October</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)</td>
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October 2007 Mandates Expire

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<th>Date</th>
<th>Document Requesting Report</th>
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<tr>
<td>15 October</td>
<td>UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) S/RES/1743</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 October</td>
<td>UNOMIG S/RES/1752</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 October</td>
<td>MINURSO S/RES/1754</td>
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<td>UNMIS SRES/1755</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 October</td>
<td>Group of Experts of the 1572 Sanctions Committee concerning Côte d’Ivoire S/RES/1761</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 October</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire sanctions regime S/RES/1727</td>
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October 2007 Other Important Dates

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>16 October</td>
<td>The election of new members to the Security Council is scheduled.</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 October</td>
<td>A briefing by the chairman of the 751 Committee concerning the Somalia arms embargo is expected by this date (S/RES/1772).</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 October</td>
<td>The Security Council will hold an open debate on Women, Peace and Security. The Secretary-General’s report on this thematic issue is expected prior to the debate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 October</td>
<td>Darfur peace talks are scheduled to be held in Libya jointly mediated by the UN and AU.</td>
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<tr>
<td>29-31 October</td>
<td>The Counter-Terrorism Committee will hold a meeting in Nairobi on the prevention of terrorist movement and effective border security.</td>
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Important Dates over the Horizon

- The second round of UN-sponsored talks on Western Sahara between Morocco and Frente Polisario are expected to resume in Europe in November, the venue and exact dates are yet to be determined.
- A workshop on security sector reform, a joint initiative of Slovakia and South Africa, is being planned for 7-8 November in Cape Town, South Africa.
- A US-initiated international meeting on peace in the Middle East is being planned for 15 November in Washington DC.
- Parliamentary elections in Kosovo are expected on 17 November 2007.
- The constituent assembly elections in Nepal are expected 22 November, postponed from 20 June.
- Presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire are now expected in January 2008, postponed from 31 October.

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