OVERVIEW FOR SEPTEMBER

In September France will have the presidency of the Council.

For most UN members the main focus in September is the General Debate which marks the opening of the General Assembly. As always, a very large cast of high-level delegations is expected to be in town for that purpose. This inevitably has impacts on the Security Council as well. This year France is taking the opportunity presented by having a number of heads of state in town at the same time to convene a Security Council meeting at the summit level. It is likely to be held on 25 September and President Sarkozy will preside. The subject will be Africa and the focus will be on the challenges and opportunities currently being faced in the region. The President of Ghana, current Chair of the African Union is also expected to participate. High-level participation by a number of other Council members is likely.

But the impact of the General Debate season also means that the Council tries to fit as much as possible of its September agenda in the first three weeks of the month. As a result, the programme of work may appear relatively light.

In addition to the Africa summit meeting, there will also be formal open meetings of the Council on:
- The Middle East (the regular monthly briefing);
- Sudan (renewal of the mandate for the Panel of Experts);
- Liberia (renewal of the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)); and possibly
- International Tribunals (the terms of office of the prosecutors of the tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia expire in September. Resolutions renewing the incumbents are likely—although at press time it was uncertain whether this would be in late August or early September.)

Chad is also likely to be on the formal agenda once the Council has a clear and detailed proposal from EU and UN planners regarding the proposed UN mission in Chad which is to be backed by an EU military operation. However, at this stage it is not clear whether this will be ready in September or will have to wait until October.

With respect to Afghanistan there is also some uncertainty whether the Council will take up the renewal of the authorisation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in September or October. Technically, the current authorisation expires on 13 October. But it seems that a number of troop-contributing countries are pressuring for the authorisation resolution to be brought forward, on the basis that earlier adoption would facilitate their domestic approval processes.

The Council will be following a number of potentially volatile situations which could...
OVERVIEW FOR SEPTEMBER (continued)

lead to formal meetings to adopt statements. These include:

- Sierra Leone (where tensions are high in the context of the presidential run-off election);
- Sudan (the North/South issues);
- Sudan (Darfur and implementation issues regarding the hybrid peacekeeping mission);
- Timor-Leste;
- Lebanon (developments regarding the establishment of the Hariri assassination tribunal and possibly the upcoming presidential election);
- Haiti (a major report by the Secretary-General is now on the table);
- DRC; and
- Burundi

Iran may also be taken up in consultations. A briefing in informal consultations from the Chair of the Sanctions Committee is likely. It remains unclear whether discussions between the EU3+3 (Germany, France and the UK plus China, Russia and the US) will make sufficient progress for new proposals on additional sanctions to be put before the Council in September. Discussions on this are almost certain to take place during bilaterals and in small group meetings on the margins of the General Debate.

Many Council members will be following closely developments regarding Iran at the IAEA in Vienna, where Executive Director Mohammed ElBaradei will be presenting an important report on recent progress between the organisation and Iran in clarifying uncertainties regarding the Iranian nuclear programme.

On Darfur, the Council is likely to receive a briefing from the Secretary-General, following his trip to the region at the beginning of the month.

As has been customary in September, several high-level meetings will be happening on the margins of the General Debate, some of them with high relevance to the Council agenda (but possibly meaning that the Council will be holding back on them to wait for the results of those meetings). They include Afghanistan (co-chaired by the Secretary-General and President Karzai), the Middle East (a meeting of the Quartet), Iraq and the 21 September meeting of the Enlarged Contact Group meeting on Darfur, co-chaired by the Secretary-General and AU Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare.

Status Update since our August Forecast

Recent developments on the situations covered in this Forecast are addressed in the relevant briefs. Interesting developments in the Council on other issues included:

- Sudan: The Secretary-General’s monthly report on Darfur was published on 27 July, covering the period of January through July 2007 (S/2007/462).
- Kosovo: A troika made up of the US, EU and Russia and set up by the Contact Group on Kosovo began in August. The troika was given a 120 day period to try to broker a solution to Kosovo’s status. New talks between Kosovo and Serbia are expected by the end of August. The troika is expected to report to the Secretary-General on 10 December.
- Georgia: On 8 August, Georgia called for a meeting of the Council in connection with the Russian missile found in its territory on 6 August 2007 and associated claims of airspace violations by Russian aircraft (S/2007/480). On 9 and 16 August the Council had two informal briefings on the incident. The Council is not expected to make a decision on the Georgian request until after it gets the results of on-going investigations. (Please see our 23 August Update Report for more details.)
- Iraq: On 10 August, the Council adopted resolution 1770 extending UNAMI’s mandate for twelve months and delinking UNAMI from the resolution authorising the Multinational Forces in Iraq. UNAMI now has an expanded role and it is authorised to facilitate national dialogue and reconciliation and regional talks addressing border issues; energy and refugees; work in cooperation with the Iraqi government to provide essential services; coordinate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; and aid in the implementation of the Iraq Compact. On 9 August, the Council issued a press statement condemning the 14 August attacks in the Iraqi province of Ninewa (SC/9098).
- Democratic Republic of Congo: On 10 August, the Security Council adopted resolution 1771 renewing both the DRC sanctions and the mandate of the Group of Experts until 15 February 2008. Resolution 1771 was adopted after a short technical rollover of the previous resolution enabling Council members to consider recent deterioration of the situation in the east of the country as well as a request from the government to adjust the arms embargo. The Council decided that the government be exempt from the embargo regarding arms and technical training and assistance being used by DRC army and police units, except in the districts of North and South Kivu and Ituri where only technical training and assistance was exempted. States which supply arms and technical training and assistance are still required to notify the DRC Sanctions Committee in advance of delivery. (Please see our 9 August Update Report for more details.)
- Somalia: On 20 August the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1772 authorising the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) to continue its operation for another six months. In addition, the resolution requested a contingency planning report within thirty days from the Secretary-General on the possible deployment of a UN operation to replace AMISOM, but no timeline for such a transition was specified. It called on all member states to comply fully with the arms embargo, exempting AMISOM and any assistance required for developing security sector institutions, and asked the Somalia Sanctions Committee to report within sixty days on how targeted measures could be strengthened. The Council also stated its intention in resolution 1772 to take unspecified measures against those threatening the peace process, the transitional government, AMISOM, or undermining stability in Somalia or the region.
- Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa: An open debate was held in the Security Council on 28 August to discuss conflict prevention and resolution in Africa (S/PV.5735 and resumption 1). The debate was sponsored by Congo, the president of the Council in August and the current chair of the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa. Congo’s goal for the debate was to promote discussion of a comprehensive strategy on the issue which would utilise all existing mechanisms and actors towards achieving coherent action in the field of conflict prevention (S/2007/496). A presidential statement was issued reaffirming the Council’s commitment to implement resolution 1625 on conflict prevention and asking for a report from the Secretary-General within sixty days on further options for implementation of 1625 (S/PRIST/2007/31). (Please see our 24 August Update Report for more details.)
Liberia

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) which ends on 30 September. Action on the recommendations of the Secretary-General contained in the report regarding the gradual drawdown of UNMIL over the next few years is also likely. It is unclear whether the Council will also take up outstanding issues relating to diamond sanctions.

Key Recent Developments

On 8 August, the war crimes trial of former President Charles Taylor was postponed by the Special Court for Sierra Leone until 7 January. The deferment was granted in response to a request by Taylor’s defence team to be given more time to examine new evidence at its disposal.

Also on 8 August, the Secretary-General submitted his latest report on UNMIL to the Council. He noted that formidable challenges still confront Liberia. The report acknowledged the achievements of the new government including increasing public revenue, improving human rights and meeting the sanctions committee’s criteria of appropriate state control over its diamond and timber resources before the removal of related sanctions. Lifting of timber sanctions became final in October 2006 in a Council press statement, SC/8856. Diamond sanctions were lifted in April 2007 in resolution 1753—but subject to renewal.) He also recommended that the Council extend the mandate of UNMIL for 12 months until September 2008 and encouraged its approval of his proposals contained in the report to drawdown the mission.

The Secretary-General concluded that it was premature to consider arrangements for the final withdrawal of UNMIL or to begin to consider any possible successor. He recommended a drawdown of UNMIL in stages spanning the period October 2007 to December 2010, with three initial stages for the military component and seven for the police component. Following the drawdown of the military component (i.e. the repatriation of 2,450 troops) in the first phase from October 2007 to September 2008, a three-month review period would include evaluating progress in enhancing state administration and authority in the country, developments in the sub-region and overall stability of the new force structure before possibly proceeding to implement the other phases. Regarding the support by UNMIL for the Special Court for Sierra Leone and to reinforce UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, the Secretary-General recommended that the 250-troop Mongolian military guard force deployed at the Special Court be retained during the drawdown period, unless the Court concludes its work. On the other hand, the provision in resolution 1609 for UNMIL’s future troop drawdown; the Secretary-General recommended that the 250-troop Mongolian military guard force deployed at the Special Court be retained during the drawdown period, unless the Court concludes its work. On the other hand, the provision in resolution 1609 for UNMIL’s reserve capacity to reinforce UNMIL’s reserve capacity to reinforce UNOCI is proposed to be restricted to an infantry company of about 150 troops during that period.

Regarding the much anticipated report of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), the KPCS indicated in August to the Secretariat that two letters sent earlier to the Liberia Sanctions Committee (in May and July) should jointly be treated as its report under the terms of resolution 1753 on the country’s accession to and compliance with the Kimberley diamond-certification process. That resolution encouraged the KPCS to report within ninety days to the Council, through the Liberia Sanctions Committee. This was expected to assist the Council in reviewing the termination of the diamonds embargo formerly imposed on the country. It is unclear when the Council will consider the letters and review the impact of lifting the diamonds embargo.

The Kimberley Process

The KPCS is an innovative joint initiative between government, the international diamond industry and civil society to stop the flow of conflict diamonds. This voluntary scheme imposes a number of stringent requirements on participants to certify that shipments of rough diamonds are free of conflict diamonds. It has 45 participants, which supply approximately 99.8 percent of the global production of rough diamonds. Trade can only take place among participants that have met the minimum criteria of the scheme. (For more information please see our Diamond Sanctions brief in the October 2006 Forecast.)

Issues

Key issues include:

- whether to proceed with the review of the impact of the diamonds embargo; and
- whether to accept in full the Secretary-General’s recommendations regarding UNMIL’s future troop drawdown;

Council Dynamics

There appears to be considerable consensus among Council members in support of the Secretary-General’s approach to UNMIL’s troop drawdown. The recommendations’ structured and cautious approach to the matter appears designed to meet the concern of Council members for ensuring balance in retaining a UN presence to assist in consolidating the peace while addressing the need for freeing up troops and resources for urgent peacekeeping needs elsewhere. The US and African members of the Council have been in the lead on the issue of Liberia.

Another important issue for some members of the Council is the peacebuilding needs of the country. Council members also remain mindful of the fragile stability in the country and are likely to use the review of the Kimberley Process report to assess progress and challenges in Liberian compliance with the KPCS.

Options

Possible options for the Council include:

- acceding to the Secretary-General’s recommendations with or without slight modifications;
- commencing discussion at the expert level on UNMIL drawdown based on recommendations of the Secretary-General’s report; and
- adopting a press or presidential statement on the Kimberley Process report with the Council’s comments on the country’s level of compliance with the KPCS, or incorporating this element in a resolution.

Underlying Problems

Underlying problems remain the stability of the country and its immediate neighbours. Other problems include limits on the government’s administrative capacity, youth unemployment (which now stands at about 85 percent) and associated reintegration of ex-combatants.
Congress expressing a willingness to continue to enhancing government oversight of signalling also the urgent need for progressing relations between the police.

Key contributing countries:
- Bangla
- Strength as of 8 August 2007:
  - Alan Doss (UK)
  - S/2006/1044 (28 December 2006) was the latest report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia.
  - S/2007/143 (13 March 2007) was a report on cross-border issues in West Africa.
  - S/2007/479 (8 August 2007) was the Secretary-General’s latest report on UNMIL.
  - S/RES/1509 (19 September 2003) established UNMIL.

Key Recent Developments
The situation in Timor-Leste continues to be tense. Following the announcement of the new government, a new wave of violence has so far led to the displacement of thousands more civilians, adding to the estimated 100,000 civilians (or about 12 percent of the population) displaced since the riots of April-May 2006.

On 30 July, the new parliament was sworn in, but there was much uncertainty over the makeup of the future government. The Frente Revolucionário do Timor-Leste Independente (FRETILIN) of former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri had secured 21 out of a total of 65 seats, and the Congresso Nacional da Reconstrução de Timor (CNRT) of former President Xanana Gusmão won 18 seats. CNRT and two other parties subsequently announced a coalition that would hold 57 percent of the seats.

On 6 August, after many tense days of discussion over who could command a majority in the parliament, President José Ramos-Horta announced that he had appointed CNRT’s Gusmão as prime minister. Negotiations on an all-inclusive government had failed to produce agreement. Ramos-Horta made it clear that his decision was based on constitutional presidential powers and that it was motivated by the need for a viable government.

FRETILIN objected, claiming that the Timorese constitution did not allow the formation of the government by a majority coalition. Instead, they argued it must be formed by the party that had secured the most votes. They also said the president had no powers to appoint the prime minister.

Renewed violence followed, reportedly involving FRETILIN supporters, including arson, rock throwing and an attack on an UNMIT convoy. The violence affected mostly the capital, Dili, and the FRETILIN eastern strongholds of Baucau and Viqueque. At press time, there were reports of more rioting in Ermera and Metinaro (respectively southwest and east of Dili).

UNMIT police and Australian-led International Stabilisation Force (ISF) troops intervened to contain the violence.

FRETILIN leaders subsequently pledged to work to end the violence but expressed continuing desire for an all-inclusive government.

Discussions on how to reform the security sector continue. At a ministerial-level meeting involving the UN and the Timorese government on 16 August, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative Atul Khare identified four key areas:
- improving relations between the police and the military;
- strengthening the security sector’s legal framework;
- increasing capacity; and
- enhancing government oversight of security forces.

Options
The most likely option for the Council at this stage is a statement:
- expressing a willingness to continue to provide support for Timor-Leste and work with the new government to that end;
- emphasising concern with the recent tensions, as well as calling on all political actors to refrain from violence; and
- signalling also the urgent need for progress with security sector reform and the reconstitution of the police.

Other options include:
- indicating the importance of accountability issues, and that any solution must be compatible with international standards.
- requesting a new Secretariat report in three months (after the expected August report, the next one is only due by mid-January);
- beginning consideration of UNMIT’s future size and mandate, including repatriating some of UNMIT’s police (due to the recent deterioration of the security situation this option now seems unlikely); and
- signalling that consideration of UNMIT’s size will be deferred until closer to the mission’s expiry in February 2008.
Key Issues

In the short term, the key issue for the Council is making sure that the recent tensions are controlled and that the new government and the opposition are able to coexist and cooperate, particularly as a new cabinet is appointed.

With FRETILIN having dropped its proposed legal challenge it may be that standard Council language welcoming the new government will be accepted.

Another issue is deciding whether and when to consider changes to UNMIT. Key aspects in that regard are likely to be:

- the security situation;
- in the medium term, whether and when there will be any changes to ISF; and
- lessons learned from the previous premature winding down of UN peacekeeping in Timor-Leste.

A number of other issues in UNMIT’s mandate are likely to loom large, including:

- reconstituting the Timorese police (which could take three to five years);
- drafting the comprehensive review of the security sector and the development compact for Timor-Leste; and
- the interplay between reconciliation and accountability for the 1999 and April-May 2006 violence.

Council and Wider Dynamics

South Africa, as the leading country in the Council, and the Core Group (comprising Australia, Brazil, France, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Portugal, South Africa, the UK and the US), appear ready to work on a draft Council statement to be discussed with other members in the coming days.

There is wide sympathy within the Council and the Core Group for efforts to quell the violence, reconcile political parties and establish a credible national government through political means. There is also awareness of the risks of early UN disengagement, bearing in mind the lessons learned from the hasty winding down of previous UN missions in Timor-Leste.

As a result there appears to be support for the continuation of the current UNMIT and ISF arrangements and awareness of the need for progress with implementing key aspects of UNMIT’s mandate, especially regarding the security sector. In any case, positions are still being formed and there may be interest from cost-conscious members in indicating the need for initial reductions to UNMIT, especially police elements who had been responsible for election support, and in elaborating a preliminary timetable for reduction.

On justice issues, there is also sympathy with the need to balance accountability and reconciliation, especially with respect to the 1999 violence. It seems that Indonesia sees it as a bilateral issue that does not invite Council involvement. Others see progress with rule of law and human rights issues as an important aspect of UNMIT’s mandate and Timor-Leste’s future stability, and members such as the US, the UK and France have emphasised the need for solutions compatible with international standards.

Underlying Problems

The Indonesian-Timorese Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) on 23-24 July held a fourth public hearing that included Indonesian military, Timorese militia, a former Timorese local administrator, one victim and a popular consultation international observer. It was followed by a CTF workshop on 28 July.

Civil society organisations have criticised CTF hearings for not inviting more victims and for providing an opportunity to alleged perpetrators to offer a new version of the facts blaming the UN for the violence.

On 26 July, the Secretary-General stated that UN officials would not participate in or support the CTF’s work until the Commission’s terms of reference are modified to exclude recommending amnesty for serious crimes, since the UN “cannot endorse or condone” such practices.

One CTF commissioner reportedly suggested that UN participation would be important to balance the arguments of alleged perpetrators.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda reportedly stated that the CTF’s work would continue, emphasising the Commission’s importance in offering a mutually agreed approach that could preserve bilateral ties.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1745 (22 February 2007) extended UNMIT until 26 February 2008 and increased its size by up to 140 police personnel.
- S/RES/1704 (25 August 2006) created UNMIT.

Selected Report of the Secretary-General

- S/2007/50 (1 February 2007) was the latest Secretary-General’s report.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Atul Khare (India)

Size, Composition and Cost

- Maximum authorised strength: up to 1,748 police and 34 military liaison and staff officers
- Police/military component as of 31 July 2007: 1,631 police and 33 military observers
- Civilian component as of 30 June 2007: 601 international and 938 local personnel
- Key police contributors: Portugal, Malaysia, Pakistan and Bangladesh

Duration

25 August 2006 to present; mandate expires 26 February 2008

International Stabilisation Force

- Size as of 14 May 2007: approximately 1,270 troops
- Contributors: Australia (1,100 troops) and New Zealand (170 troops)

Sierra Leone

Expected Council Action

Council members are expected to follow developments related to Sierra Leone’s run-off presidential elections, which are scheduled for 8 September. There will be heightened concern because outbreaks of political violence in both the capital, Freetown, and in the east of Sierra Leone. A further presidential statement on the elections is a possibility.

It remains unclear when the Council will take up the anticipated report from the Secretary-General on the role of the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL). While Resolution 1734 last December asked for this report to be submitted to the Council “closer to the election date” to assist it in defining an exit strategy for UNIOSIL (the mandate of UNIOSIL expires on 31
December), in his May report the Secretary-General said that he was planning to submit the report before October.

Key Recent Developments
Sierra Leone's first nationally organised elections since the civil war ended in 2001 took place on 11 August without any major disruptions. (The previous poll in 2002 was organised by the UN which then had peacekeepers in the country.) The opposition All People's Congress (APC) won a majority of 59 seats in parliament, followed by the ruling Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) with 43 seats, the People's Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC) with ten seats and the rest being won by the other four contesting political parties.

Seven candidates ran for president with three forerunners: Vice President Solomon Berewa of SLPP, parliamentarian Ernest Koroma of the APC, and former cabinet minister Charles Margai, who broke away from the SLPP to form the PMDC. None won the minimum 55 percent to be confirmed winner of the presidential election. Koroma had the highest percentage of presidential votes, with 44 percent while Berewa received 38 percent. With no candidate winning the absolute majority of votes, a run-off election is required and has been scheduled for 8 September. Margai who came in third with 14 percent has declared his support for Koroma and could play an influential role in the run-off.

On 8 August, the Special Court for Sierra Leone postponed the war crimes trial of former Liberian President Charles Taylor until 7 January. The deferment was granted in response to a request by Taylor’s defence team to be given more time to examine new evidence at its disposal.

On 27 August, the Council was briefed on the first round of elections by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Following the meeting the Council issued a press statement welcoming the results of the elections and commending the work of the Sierra Leonean National Electoral Commission as well as security arrangements put in place by the national authorities. It also congratulated the citizenry for their exemplary conduct of the 11 August elections and called on them to similarly ensure the success of the run-off presidential elections. The Council called on all parties to respect the results of the elections and resolve any differences through legal and peaceful means.

But on 27 August, a worrying development occurred in the east of Sierra Leone. Police were obliged to declare a curfew after dispersing more than a thousand demonstrators from rival political groups in the eastern mining town of Bono (a region bordering Liberia and a hub of the illegal diamond trade which fuelled Sierra Leone's 1991-2002 civil war).

On 28 August, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah threatened to impose a state of emergency across the country if the violence escalated. The unrest was reported to have spilled over to parts of Freetown that day, with supporters of SLPP and APC having reportedly taken to the streets armed with machetes. One person was killed during the violence in Freetown.

Key Issues
Key issues before the Council include:
- the security environment before and after the run-off elections;
- the future of UNIOSIL after the elections;
- effective consolidation of peace and stability, now largely in the hands of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), by tackling the root causes of the past conflict, enhancing good governance, supporting economic recovery as well as requisite security sector reforms, and promoting access to justice and human rights; and
- ensuring proper handling of the residual issues from the Special Court.

Council Dynamics
In the absence of any adverse developments, it appears that the Council was intending to await the outcome of the presidential election to inform its next move. Developments at the end of August change that equation. At time of writing, it was unclear how Council members intended to respond.

Recently, Council members have generally been less engaged in developments regarding Sierra Leone due to a relatively more stable situation over the past year and the emerging leading role of the PBC. However, the recent elections have reignited more interest because of their implications for stability and democratisation in the country and the sub-region. The UK and Ghana are the leading countries on this issue, and are likely to lead a drive to come up with a Council response either in the form of a presidential or press statement.

It seems likely at this stage that the assessment report by the Secretary-General on the role of UNIOSIL will be made available for the Council’s consideration after the elections even though the Council seemed to have initially anticipated it would receive the report before the election date.

Underlying Problems
The underlying problems remain issues relating to threats to the fragile security situation in the country including youth unemployment, poor living standards, lack of vital local institutional capacity and inadequate resources.

UN Documents

- **Selected Security Council Resolutions**
  - S/RES/1750 (30 March 2007) noted that UNMIL should continue to provide administrative and related support and security for activities in Liberia of the Special Court of Sierra Leone.
  - S/RES/1734 (22 December 2006) extended the mandate of UNIOSIL until 31 December 2007 and requested a comprehensive assessment of UNIOSIL’s role closer to the election date.
  - S/RES/1688 (16 June 2006) requested the Secretary-General to assist in the transfer of former Liberian President Charles Taylor to the Special Court’s special outpost in the Netherlands.
  - S/RES/1626 (19 September 2005) mandated UNMIL to provide security for the Special Court of Sierra Leone.
  - S/RES/1620 (31 August 2005) established UNIOSIL.

- **Selected Presidential Statement**
  - S/PRST/2007/23 (28 June 2007) was on the work of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

- **Selected Secretary-General’s Report**
  - S/2007/257 (7 May 2007) was the fourth report of the Secretary-General on UNIOSIL.

- **Other**
  - SC/9107 (27 August 2007) welcomed the results of the 11 August elections and commended the work of the Sierra Leonean National Electoral Commission.
  - S/2006/1050 (20 December 2006) was the letter from the chairman of the PBC to the president of the Council on the Burundi and Sierra Leone country-specific meetings.
Key Recent Developments
The severe humanitarian and security situation in Darfur continues. About 500,000 civilians cannot receive aid due to persistent insecurity, leading to worsening health indicators. Recent attacks have added 25,000 displaced to the existing 2.2 million, while the number of aid workers has decreased because of security risks.

On 27 August, Khartoum expelled the country director of CARE, a large humanitarian organisation. (This followed a growing number of expulsions—some more linked to Darfur, others less so—including that of the former Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Jan Pronk, in late 2006 and of the EU and Canadian top representatives in the past week. Some see the expulsions as signals from Khartoum that its tough stance vis-à-vis the international community will continue.)

On 31 July, the Council adopted resolution 1769 mandating UNAMID to:
- monitor and verify the implementation of existing and future agreements;
- assist the political process;
- contribute to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law;
- monitor and report on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR);
- monitor the presence of arms in violation of peace agreements and the sanctions regime; and
- under Chapter VII, take the necessary action to support the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and protect civilians, without prejudice to Khartoum’s responsibility.

The Council also set up a timetable for UNAMID’s deployment:
- command and control structures would be deployed immediately;
- funding recommendations finalised without delay;
- by 31 August, troop and police contributions should be finalised;
- by October, headquarters operational capability, including command and control and arrangements for AMIS troop costs, should be finalised. UNAMID should assume control over support packages and other UN/hybrid personnel;
- no later than 31 December, full AMIS-UNAMID transition; and
- full operational capability as soon as possible thereafter.

Compromise on the resolution’s language was reached after much pressure from Khartoum and sympathetic Council members. The initial draft had contained a threat of further sanctions, a mandate for the sanctions Panel of Experts to verify compliance with the resolution and UNAMID’s use of force to collect arms. These were deleted. The authorisation to use force for civilian protection now includes an ambiguous reference to the government’s responsibilities.

Khartoum “accepted” the resolution but reportedly claimed that the use of force by UNAMID would be conditioned by the government’s prerogatives, an interpretation which France and the UK reportedly rejected, noting that this is subject only to the decisions of the force commander.

In mid-August, AU Chairperson Alpha Konaré suggested that there would be no need for non-African troops. Nevertheless, it still seems that such contingents will be necessary to ensure effectiveness. Key components in aviation, transport and logistics are still missing, and the pledges made so far will need to be verified for compliance with UN standards. At press time, it was unclear whether pledges could be finalised by the 31 August deadline in resolution 1769.

Controversy surrounded the proposed appointment of Rwandan Major General Karenzi Karake as UNAMID’s Deputy Force Commander, with concern over his human rights record. On 20 August, the Secretariat indicated that it would hold conversations with Rwanda and human rights organisations.

At press time, the Secretariat appeared to be finalising funding recommendations for the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee. It seems that the Secretariat has already requested about US $50 million to cover start-up costs until December. Reports to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Fifth Committee may be ready in October.

The AU-UN mediation team and key rebel leaders held pre-negotiation talks in Arusha on 3-5 August. Rebel leaders agreed:
- a common negotiating platform on power
and wealth-sharing, land, humanitarian issues and security arrangements;
- a commitment to participate in a peace process led by the AU-UN team in two to three months, and to cease hostilities provided other parties also commit;
- to keep open the possibility that other rebel leaders that did not participate in the meeting join the platform (Abdelwahid al-Nur’s faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) refused to participate before a ceasefire and UNAMID’s deployment);
- to allow free humanitarian access; and
- to grant full cooperation with UNAMID.

After the meeting, the mediation team visited Khartoum, Darfur and Chad for follow-up discussions.

On 22 August, according to media reports, AU envoy Salim A. Salim called on al-Nur to join the peace talks, noting that negotiations can be valuable even in the absence of absolute security, which could only be ensured by peace talks. Al-Nur reportedly criticised Salim’s comments, signalling that the mediator should focus on pushing Khartoum to disarm the Janjaweed under the DPA. (Al-Nur was the main rebel leader that refused to sign the DPA at the end of the 2004-2006 Abuja talks, of which Salim A. Salim was the top mediator. The failure of the DPA seems to be a factor in the deterioration of relations between Darfur rebels and the AU.)

Options
Options include:
- monitoring the implementation of resolution 1769 closely, perhaps through a new Council working group with monthly meetings;
- a statement reinforcing support for the AU-UN mediation team;
- using the renewal of the Panel of Experts as an opportunity to emphasise that attempts by any party to impede the peace process, including the creation of obstacles to a ceasefire, could attract targeted measures under resolution 1591 which imposed sanctions in March 2005.

Key Issues
The key immediate issue for the Council is the likely practical challenges of deploying the heavy-support package and hybrid operation, including:
- generating sufficient troops and adequate assets;
- managing the continuing need for cooperation from Khartoum and coordination between the AU and the UN, especially on command and control (it appears that potential troop contributors are particularly concerned with the effectiveness of UNAMID’s unprecedented nature);
- coordinating with future deployments in Chad and the CAR;
- securing funding commitment from the Fifth Committee for the expected US $2.6 billion, which would make UNAMID the costliest UN peacekeeping operation in history;
- UNAMID’s unparalleled management, infrastructure, logistical, security and environmental challenges;
- timing, particularly since heavy-support deployments are only fully expected by the end of 2007—the hybrid operation could be fully deployed only by mid-2008 at the earliest; and
- potential differences of view on UNAMID’s mandate, especially to protect civilians, and problems with associating it too closely with the DPA, which could be seen by non-signatories as taking sides.

Another immediate issue is how best to move forward with the political process and cessation of hostilities, including:
- reaching agreement on a ceasefire;
- disarming the Janjaweed militias;
- managing existing demands from some rebels for cessation of hostilities before peace talks;
- managing rebel fragmentation and ensuring wide participation in peace talks;
- deciding on negotiation modalities, including the possible reopening of the DPA; and
- providing resources to a credible process.

An emerging issue is how best to manage the Council’s treatment of the Darfur and the north-south conflicts. The Council has opted for separate discussions on both situations, and the agreement to proceed with UNAMID as a separate operation from UNMIS underlines the important distinctions between the two situations. However, the similarities and linkages between the two situations are beginning to reassert themselves. In particular, key issues such as how best to balance new peace arrangements for Darfur with the intricate power-sharing provisions in the north-south CPA are likely to emerge. Other questions on southern Sudan, such as the CPA’s uneven implementation (as signalled in the Secretary-General’s August report) and the highly fragile security situation may also point out the need for an approach that is able to sustain Council attention to both situations.

Council Dynamics
Members seem in agreement that the unanimous adoption of resolution 1769 was an important step in showing Council unity, in view of the important challenges ahead, including the resolution’s implementation and the need for a ceasefire and a credible political process.

The traditional differences of view persist nonetheless. Some, in particular the US, are still troubled by the absence of stronger language in resolution 1769. There seems to be discontent with the concessions to Khartoum. Those members are likely to continue to prefer pressure on Sudan as resolution 1769 is implemented. China, Russia, South Africa, Indonesia and Qatar are likely to continue to prefer dialogue over confrontation.
AMIS: Duration
31 July 2007 to present; mandate expires 31 July 2008

AMIS: Size and Composition
• Total authorised strength: about 10,000 military and 1,500 police
• Strength as of 23 May 2007: 6,143 military and 1,360 police
• Key troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda and Senegal

AMIS: Duraton
25 May 2004 to present; mandate expires 31 December 2007

Chad/Central African Republic

Expected Council Action
The Council has signalled it is ready to authorise a multidimensional UN operation in eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic (CAR) and an EU military operation to provide security for civilians at risk and for UN personnel. This would be subject to agreement on details by the EU, the UN and Chad, but it is unclear whether this process can proceed quickly enough for a Council resolution in September.

Members expect feedback from the Secretary-General on his trip to Chad, especially on the issue of a future transition from EU forces to a UN military component, and from the EU planning process in the first weeks of September.

Key Recent Developments
Widespread concern about the humanitarian situation in Chad and the CAR continues. The Secretary-General’s August report noted an increase in internal displacement in Chad reaching more than 170,000 civilians.

An agreement between the government and political opposition was signed on 13 August providing for power-sharing and wide reforms in the Chadian electoral system, to be followed by parliamentary elections in two years (the polls had initially been scheduled for later this year). The EU hailed the agreement, suggesting willingness to participate as a facilitator in the implementation.

Concern about inclusiveness in the political reconciliation process continues, however. The agreement does not include rebel groups. Libyan-sponsored negotiations between the government and rebels appear deadlocked at press time, for which Chad reportedly blamed Sudan in late July.

In the CAR, there are 30,000 displaced in the northeast and 180,000 in the northwest. The situation is highly fragile particularly along the border with Cameroon, where there are about 26,000 refugees. Fears of resumption of hostilities between the government and the rebel Front démocratique pour le peuple centrafricain (FDPC) were heightened when FDPC leader Abdoulaye Miskine in early August refused the post of presidential advisor, citing lack of progress in the implementation of the peace agreement signed in February.

On 13 August, the Secretary-General produced revised recommendations on peacekeeping in Chad and the CAR, which were originally requested in August 2006 in resolution 1706. The new recommendations included the following.
• An innovative multinational presence consisting of troops under EU command, providing security together with a multidimensional UN operation comprising police officers and a civilian component working with local police and gendarmes in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR. Deployment in border areas is not foreseen.
• A mandate including protection of civilians, protection of UN personnel, deterrence of armed conflict and movement through its presence, and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance. The EU force would operate for an initial 12 months. Transition to an UN military component, would be assessed in six months.
• Three hundred UN police officers would screen, train, mentor, support and monitor about 850 Chadian gendarmes and police responsible for security in camps and associated areas, which would remain under the overall authority of the Chadian government.
• There would be air mobility capacity for the police component, plus the possible deployment of UN formed police units to work with Chadian police and gendarmes.
• The multidimensional civilian component would play a major oversight role including in coordination, monitoring and human rights dimensions.

The Secretary-General suggested that the Security Council should signal in advance its intention to authorise the proposed multidimensional presence.

UN and EU mission planners were in Chad at press time with a view to firming up the mission concept. The EU may hold initial discussions on the conclusions of the mission planners in early September.
Members held consultations on the report on 21 August, during which questions about the timing of Council authorisation surfaced. It seems that the emerging idea would be to adopt a resolution before the matter is referred to the EU Council of Ministers as a way to address both the perceived urgency of the deployments and some EU members’ preferences. EU-UN arrangements could be similar to the recent EU deployment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A Secretariat briefing to the Council with further clarifications could be arranged before the adoption of a Council resolution.

On 27 August, the Council adopted a presidential statement expressing readiness to authorise the deployments taking into account the positions of Chad and the CAR.

Options
If and when planning is finalised, a likely option is adopting a resolution under Chapter VII:
- authorising the EU deployment;
- establishing the multidimensional UN presence along the lines recommended by the Secretary-General;
- clarifying the need for coordination between the proposed presence, the mission in Darfur and regional monitors deployed along the Chad-Sudan border; and
- providing for a review after a defined period to assess possibly replacing the EU force with UN military contingents.

Other options include:
- clarifying the UN role in political reconciliation in Chad and the need for coordination with EU and Libyan efforts, and requesting a report of the Secretary-General on steps towards that end;
- addressing the insecurity in northwestern CAR by encouraging an increase in FOMUC (the Central African Economic and Monetary Community’s military operation deployed in the CAR); and
- continuing to signal the need for a national reconciliation conference in the CAR.

Key Issues
The key issue is improving security in eastern Chad and northeastern CAR and containing the spill over from Darfur. A consequential issue is how best to move forward quickly with a peacekeeping presence in the area.

The unusual nature of the proposed presence also opens a number of issues, including:
- coordination among the proposed components, in particular the relationship between the EU and the UN (the international presence in Timor-Leste and EU deployments in the DRC may offer some useful lessons);
- chain of command, especially with respect to Chadian police and gendarmes;
- size of the proposed multidimensional presence;
- mandate, in particular given the risk of being seen as taking sides by the rebels. A related issue is the absence of a sustainable political process and whether EU and Libyan political conciliation efforts will be sufficient to avoid risks of future deterioration;
- transition from EU to a UN military component (in practice, this could be accomplished by a simple re-hatting of the units—which might be the most face-saving solution for Chad); and
- accountability and financial oversight in the interim, particularly vis-à-vis UN assets used to support Chadian police and gendarmes.

Authorising deployments in northeastern CAR may raise issues about the lack of response to the instability in the northwest, which seems to have a much larger role in the displacement and attacks against civilians in that country.

Council and Wider Dynamics
It seems that the EU, in particular France, has taken a leadership role on reconciliation between the political opposition and the Chadian government, as well as on creating the conditions for the establishment of a peacekeeping presence.

Within the EU, there seems to be strong interest in having a clear understanding in advance on an exit strategy for EU troops involving a transfer of responsibilities to the UN after 12 months. Chad appears to prefer delaying the issue until the review of the proposed deployments after six months.

Council members are supportive of the proposed deployments. However, during negotiations on the recent Council statement, China and others also seemed keen on emphasising the need for consent from Chad and the CAR.

There seems to have been some differences on including language alluding to UN involvement in the political processes in both countries, especially given Chad’s possible concerns about it. But most members also seem to accept that absence of progress with political reconciliation risks repeating dangerous lessons of the past.

Almost all seem concerned with the lack of clarity with respect to mandate, coordination, command and control, size and the issue of transfer from the EU to the UN. There was strong reluctance to authorise the deployments without a firm idea as to how such issues will play out in practice.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolution
- S/RES/1706 (31 August 2006) requested recommendations on a multidimensional UN presence in Chad and the CAR.

Selected Presidential Statement

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2007/488 (10 August 2007) contained revised recommendations for peacekeeping in Chad and the CAR, including the EU component.
- S/2007/376 (22 June 2007) was the latest CAR report.

Other Relevant Facts

CAR: Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Lamine Cissé (Senegal)

BONUCA (UN Peacebuilding Office in the CAR): Size
Strength as of 30 June 2007: 28 internationals, five military, six police

BONUCA: Duration
15 February 2000 to present; mandate expires 31 December 2007

FOMUC: Size and Composition
- Current strength: 380 troops
- Contributors: Gabon, Republic of Congo and Chad

FOMUC: Duration
October 2002 to present; mandate expires 31 December 2007
Burundi

Expected Council Action
The Council may possibly hold consultations to discuss the political and security situation in Burundi. African members seem increasingly uncomfortable with the “hands off” approach of recent months. Possible formal action includes a presidential or press statement. The mandate of the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) expires on 1 January 2008.

Key Recent Developments
The overall political and security situation in the country has remained tense as a result of the stalemate in the implementation of the comprehensive ceasefire agreement between the government and the Forces nationales de libération (Palipehutu-FNL), as well as political wrangling within the ruling party, Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie–Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD).

The Council gave Burundi a considerable amount of attention in May. On 21 May it held a private debate on the situation in the country attended by the representatives of Burundi and Norway, the latter in its capacity as chair of the Peacebuilding Commission’s (PBC) country-specific configuration on Burundi. This meeting was followed by a briefing in private consultations by the Secretary-General’s Executive Representative Youssef Mahmoud on the first report of the Secretary-General on BINUB. On 30 May, the Council adopted a presidential statement welcoming the establishment of BINUB and the support it provides to the peace consolidation process. It also called on parties to endeavour to resolve outstanding issues in a spirit of cooperation and urged the government to intensify its efforts in regard to security sector reforms and address the issue of impunity and promote and protect human rights. It further called upon the Burundian government, UN agencies and donor governments to cooperate with the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict in following up on its conclusions on parties to the armed conflict in Burundi.

Some progress was achieved on the issue of accountability for past abuses. During a May visit by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, the Burundian government agreed to the creation of a truth and reconciliation commission along with a tribunal to try people who committed atrocities during the civil war. The commission and the tribunal are expected to be set up after national consultations to be spearheaded by a panel comprising members drawn from the government, the UN and civil society groups. On 31 May, Arbour briefed the Council on her trip to Burundi and other countries in the Great Lakes region.

Initial gains made in the bid to find a settlement on the implementation of the peace deal between the government and FNL, the only active rebel movement in the country, have eroded. On 17 June, talks were held between the president of Burundi and the leader of the FNL in Dar es Salaam in an attempt to break the deadlock concerning the implementation of last year’s comprehensive peace agreement. As part of the outcome of the meeting, agreement was reached on the release of prisoners.

In a 21 June press statement, the Council welcomed the resumption of talks and the agreement reached by the parties and expressed confidence that the agreement will be implemented in the framework of the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM), which is a joint team monitoring the ceasefire between the government and the FNL rebels. The FNL has, however, since withdrawn from the JVMM. A spokesperson for the rebel movement is reported to have cited security concerns as the reason for its delegation’s withdrawal from the mechanism. The FNL has, among other things, been demanding negotiations on the modalities of its inclusion in national institutions before disarming and demobilising its fighters.

A PBC delegation visited Burundi from 11 to 14 April. The visit was to afford the Commission a first-hand understanding of the challenges facing the peace consolidation effort in the country and to deliberate on the outline of a strategic framework for peace consolidation to be adopted by the Burundian government and the Commission.

On 30 May, Arbour briefed the PBC for the first time on the country-specific issue of Burundi. The briefing included highlights on the prevailing issues of impunity in the country, human rights and the understanding reached with the government on the creation of a truth and reconciliation commission.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is how to maintain a careful balance in closely following developments in the country, while in the first instance allowing the PBC to address issues. Another issue relates to closely monitoring the benchmarks of BINUB’s mandate, as set out in the 14 August 2006 addendum to the Secretary General’s June 2006 report on the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB). The benchmarks span the areas of peace consolidation and democratic governance, security sector reform and civilian disarmament, human rights and justice, information and communications, and reconstruction and socioeconomic development.
Council Dynamics

France and Belgium, with strong collaboration from the African group in the Council, have taken the lead on Burundi and are likely to call for prompt Council action through a possible presidential statement conveying concerns if the security situation deteriorates further.

As for the appropriate balance vis-à-vis the PBC, there is general agreement among members on the need to leave space for the PBC to play its complementary role in addressing relevant issues. However, the African members seem to be increasing concerned about the Council’s initial hands-off approach which appears to be wearing thin in light of the tense situation in the country.

Options

The Council’s options include:

- requesting a briefing by the UN Department of Political Affairs or the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations on the situation in the country;
- awaiting the upcoming report of the Secretary-General to inform its next line of action;
- urging the FNL, either by a resolution, a presidential statement or a press statement to re-engage in the JVMM and with the government in political and other confidence-building incentives, as part of the wider strategy to end the impasse and consolidate peace in Burundi; and
- utilising the report of the PBC fact-finding mission to inform its deliberations.

Underlying Problems

The continual refusal of the FNL to join the ceasefire monitoring team constitutes the chief underlying problem. Burundi is also faced with formidable resettlement and reintegration challenges relating to former combatants, as well as fundamental peace-building issues such as security sector reform, human rights and judicial reform, economic issues, basic social services and infrastructure difficulties.

UN Documents

Selected Resolutions

- S/RES/1719 (25 October 2006) established BINUB.
- S/RES/1606 (20 June 2005) requested the Secretary-General to start negotiations on the transitional justice mechanisms in Burundi.

Selected Security Council Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2007/16 (30 May 2007) was a statement in which the Council welcomed the establishment of BINUB and called on parties to resolve outstanding issues in a spirit of cooperation.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2007/287 (17 May 2007) was the first report on BINUB.
- S/2006/994 (18 December 2006) was the last report on ONUB.

Selected Letters

- S/2006/1020 (18 December 2006) was a letter from the Secretary-General appointing Youssef Mahmoud as his Executive Representative and head of BINUB.

Other Relevant Facts

Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and head of BINUB

Youssef Mahmoud (Tunisia)

Size and Composition of Mission

- Proposed strength: 448 personnel (including 141 international civilians, 235 local civilians, four military observers, 11 police, 51 UN volunteers)
- Strength as of July 2007: 314 personnel (including 77 international civilians, 164 local civilians, four military observers, 11 police, 58 UN volunteers)

Duration

January 2007 to present; mandate expires 1 January 2008

Recommended Budget

US $33.1 million

Useful Additional Sources


Afghanistan

Expected Council Action

The mandate of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) expires on 13 October, but the Council may renew ISAF’s mandate in September. (As in 2006, early consideration is possible in order to accommodate Germany’s desire that a Council resolution be in place before its parliament in October considers extending the mandate of its troops in ISAF). The ISAF renewal resolution has been uncontroversial in the past. This year there may be interest in including some new elements because of the changing situation on the ground.

The mandate of the UN Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) expires on 23 March 2008.

The Secretary-General’s next report on the situation in Afghanistan is expected in late September. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Tom Koenigs, will most likely brief the Council in October on the report.

A high-level meeting, largely of members of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), is expected to meet on 23 September on the margins of the 62nd General Assembly.

Key Recent Developments

On 15 August the most recent ISAF report was circulated to the Council.

While there has been an upsurge in violence the main features are hostage-taking, assassinations and suicide bombings. Greater civilian casualties are an important feature. In addition, the violence has spread to Kabul and the northern provinces.

The Council received a closed-door briefing from Koenigs on 17 July, after which it issued a presidential statement welcoming recent international initiatives to improve security, stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan and reiterating support for the Afghan government. The Council also condemned all suicide attacks against civilians and the Afghan and international forces.
The Secretary-General has been actively involved. On 20 June he voiced his concern over the rising number of civilian deaths. He visited to Afghanistan on 29 June and met with top government and UNAMA officials. On 3 June he spoke at a conference in Rome on the rule of law in Afghanistan, which was co-chaired by the UN and the governments of Afghanistan and Italy.

On 21 June a conference focused on the disbandment of illegal armed groups in Afghanistan and police reform was held in Tokyo. The meeting was organised under the co-chairmanship of Japan, Afghanistan and UNAMA.

The Afghanistan Development Forum and the JCMB met at the end of April. One year after its inauguration the JCMB assessed that it was on track in implementing the Afghanistan Compact between the Afghan government and the international community.

Turkish president Ahmet Necdet Sezer hosted Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai and Pakistan’s President General Pervez Musharraf at a meeting in Ankara at the end of April. Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan had deteriorated with each blaming the other for the resurgence of the insurgency in Afghanistan. At the end of this summit meeting, the leaders issued the Ankara Declaration in which they agreed to deny “sanctuary, training and financing to terrorists” and agreed to establish a working group of high-level representatives of the three countries.

The peace jirga held in August in Kabul was a significant event. It brought together the presidents of Pakistan and Afghanistan for a further meeting at which parliamentarians and tribal leaders also participated. There is now agreement to hold a follow-up meeting in Pakistan on border regions.

The EU’s European Security and Defence Policy initiative was launched in June and will send 160 police officers to train the Afghan police force and help establish rule of law.

Options
In considering the ISAF resolution, the Council has the following options:

- adopt a similar resolution to the 2006 one to renew ISAF’s mandate; and
- agree to a stronger resolution reinforcing elements from the July presidential statement such as a comprehensive approach to security, governance and development of Afghanistan, concern over civilian casualties and the link between the insurgency and opium.

The Council also has the option of requesting more timely reports on ISAF’s activities and agreeing to discuss the reports. (The latest report came out in August, covering activities from February to April.)

Although it appears likely that the Council will consider the ISAF resolution in September, it also has the option of delaying consideration since ISAF mandate doesn’t expire until 13 October.

Key Issues
A key issue is the volatile security situation and its heavy humanitarian and political toll. Closely connected is the growing concern about links between the Taliban and the narcotics trade. This is seen as an increasing threat to the future stability of Afghanistan. This year’s record poppy crop highlights the urgent need for a more effective strategy.

A related issue is the importance of judicial and police reform. This is key to apprehending and prosecuting those involved in the drug trade and to combating corruption. Establishing a well-trained Afghan National Police force is also an important issue for the long-term security of Afghanistan.

A potential issue is the possible reluctance of some ISAF countries to keep providing troops. The Council is conscious of the need to ensure that NATO governments remain engaged.

An issue which is of increasing concern is the number of civilian deaths, both as a result of Taliban as well as ISAF operations. While there are no official figures, groups monitoring civilian deaths estimate that the 2007 figures will be higher than the figure given by Human Rights Watch of about 1,000 civilians killed in 2006. A related issue is how the increasing number of civilian deaths may have affected public support for ISAF, particularly given the press stories of international forces killing more civilians than the Taliban.

Another issue is how the Council can help encourage greater dialogue between governments in the region, in particular on a strategy to secure Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran’s borders.

A further issue is coherence in the UN’s efforts in Afghanistan. Council members are aware that better coordination is needed among UN agencies and other international bodies in Afghanistan. Among the possibilities being floated is the appointment of a high-level representative to take on this role.

Council and Wider Dynamics
This year, as a result of the deteriorating situation on the ground and the interest shown by some of the elected members, the Council has given Afghanistan more attention than previously.

Italy has assumed the lead in the Council and has organised regular briefings providing opportunities for Council members to discuss Afghanistan outside of the content of the semi-annual UNAMA reports. Qatar has pushed for more attention to civilian deaths while Indonesia is interested in increasing dialogue with relevant parties.

There are some sensitive areas among the P5. Russia continues to oppose dialogue with ex-Taliban who were formerly on sanctions lists, while China remains guarded on how far the Council should push the issue of regional cooperation. The big troop-contributing countries like the US and UK are cautious on the issue of civilian casualties, but so far it has been possible to find acceptable language that has made them comfortable about including the issue in Council statements. These members are also showing increased interest in a more comprehensive approach and better coordination of UN activities.

Underlying Problems
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees has warned that the closure of several camps in Afghanistan this year could lead to Afghan refugees returning from Pakistan at a pace exceeding its expectations and resources. This could lead to a need for additional funds to improve security, raise living standards and create employment opportunities.
The Human Cost: Consequences of ISAF’s website http://UNAMA’s website http://

- Current top contributors: US, UK,
- Contributors of military personnel: General Dan McNeill (US)
- Duration: 28 March 2002 to present;
- Current strength: about 11,000 troops (this is an estimate as the troop numbers shift continuously)
- Top contributor: US
- Duration: 7 October 2001 to present

Useful Additional Sources
- UNAMA’s website http://www.unama-afg.org/
- ISAF’s website http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/index.htm

International Criminal Tribunals

Expected Council Action
At the time of writing drafting had begun on a resolution to extend Carla Del Ponte’s term as prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) until 31 December. Del Ponte’s term ends on 15 September 2007 and the Secretary-General has informally indicated that he will be asking the Council to extend Del Ponte’s term to the end of the year. Del Ponte was appointed through resolution 1504 as the prosecutor of the ICTY for a second four-year term from 15 September 2003. The Council is also expected to ask the Secretary-General to nominate Del Ponte’s successor by the end of the year.

The Council is also expected to renew Hassan Jallow’s term as prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Resolution 1505 appointed Hassan Jallow as Chief Prosecutor of the ICTR for four years from 15 September 2003. The Secretary-General is expected to submit a request for a renewal of his term for another four years.

Background
Both the prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR are appointed by the Security Council on nomination by the Secretary-General for a four-year term. The position is eligible for reappointment.

In August 1999 Carla Del Ponte was appointed prosecutor for the ICTY and ICTR. In 2003, at the same time that the Council came up with the Completion Strategies (that all investigations be completed by 2004, investigations by 2008 and all work by 2010), the Council in resolution 1503 created a separate position for the ICTR prosecutor in order to speed up the work of the International Tribunals.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1503 (28 August 2003) set out the Completion Strategies and created the position of ICTR prosecutor.

Lebanon

Expected Council Action
Council members are likely to follow closely the Lebanese presidential elections, due to take place on 25 September. But in terms of scheduled Council activity the only focus in September will be the special tribunal to try those suspected in the Hariri murder and other linked assassinations. A progress report from the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 1757 (establishing the tribunal under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) is expected by 5 September.

Because resolution 1773 changed the reporting cycle for reports on implementation of resolution 1701 from every three months to every four months, the next report is now expected in October.

Key Recent Developments
On 3 August the Council adopted a presidential statement welcoming the latest report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 1701. The statement addressed several issues connected to implementation of resolution 1701, and in particular it:
expressed concern at the increase of Israeli air violations of the Blue Line;
expressed concern at reports of illegal transfer of weapons across the Syrian-Lebanese border in breach of the arms embargo;
welcomed the recommendations of the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT) and stated it looked forward to their implementation, to be reported in the next 1701 reports;
called for the immediate and unconditional release of the Israeli soldiers detained by Hezbollah and on settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel;
expressed deep concern at the presence of unexploded ordnance in south Lebanon and requested Israel to provide data on its use of cluster munitions in southern Lebanon;
took note of progress made by the UN cartographer on a provisional geographical definition of the Sheb’a Farms and the diplomatic process underway; and
stated it looked forward to the re-activation of the Syrian-Lebanese boundary committee.

On 24 August, following a request by the Lebanese government and the recommendation by the Secretary-General, the Council extended the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for one year. There were no changes to the mandate. However, contrary to expectations, resolution 1773 contained significant political content. In particular, it
again called for the immediate and unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers—a cause of the conflict—and encouraged efforts to settle the issue of Lebanese prisoners in Israel;
called on all parties to support efforts to clear unexploded ordnance from southern Lebanon;
encouraged the Lebanese government to continue to extend its authority over its territory; and
reiterated its intention to consider further steps toward a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution and called on all parties to cooperate in that regard.

On 3 August, UN Legal Counsel Nicolas Michel invited all UN member states to submit by 24 September names of candidates for international judges. A selection panel comprising two judges sitting in or retired from an international tribunal will then be set up by the Secretary-General to make recommendations for the appointments.

On 17 August, it was announced that the Netherlands had in principle agreed to host the tribunal. A condition seems to be that other countries volunteer to incarcerate anyone convicted. At press time, details were still under discussion between the UN and the Netherlands.

In Lebanon, the political deadlock between the government and the opposition continues. On 5 August, in a special election to replace assassinated lawmakers Pierre Gemayel and Walid Eido, the opposition captured one of two open seats in Lebanon’s parliament from the governing party.

Options
The Council may consider the following options:
- a press statement welcoming the progress on the tribunal; and
- a presidential statement welcoming more formally the progress report on the tribunal and calling on member states to support the tribunal financially.

Key Issues
Discussions on the tribunal are likely to be straightforward and technical. The only issue may be the timing of any statement.

A more substantial issue that may arise is financing. At press time it remained to be determined whether the tribunal would be able to use facilities in the Netherlands which are already in place or whether a new structure was needed. The latter would increase the cost. This is an important matter as the tribunal cannot be established unless there are sufficient financial contributions available to run it for a year and enough pledges to meet its expenses for another two years. The report may provide a rough estimate. It may be that the Council will consider encouraging UN members to participate (51 percent of the expenses are to be borne by voluntary contributions from member states).

The report may also focus on organisational matters, i.e. the tribunal’s organs, the composition of the chambers, whether there should be a pre-trial judge, the defence, appointments of the judges and the prosecutor and the duration of their appointment. But these are unlikely to become issues in the Council.

An important issue which may also arise is the safety of witnesses and other people who cooperate with the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC).

The upcoming Lebanese presidential elections will be a very important issue in their own right which will be very closely watched by many Council members. In 2004, in resolution 1559, the Council had declared its support for a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon, according to Lebanese constitutional rules and without foreign interference. At that time Lebanese President Emile Lahoud’s term in office was due to expire in November 2004. According to the Lebanese constitution, the parliament should have elected a successor at least a month before the expiration of the president’s term, and the constitution allowed for a single six-year term. Contrary to resolution 1559, however, the parliament approved a law extending President Lahoud’s term by three years, “for one and exceptional time” (until 23 November 2007). Although the Lebanese government at that time said that it was in accordance with Lebanese constitutional rules, it was widely alleged that this outcome was the result of Syrian intervention. In the aftermath of this, the Hariri assassination, the “cedar revolution” and subsequent events in Lebanon unfolded. Since then the Council has often reiterated in presidential statements on implementation of resolution 1559 its commitment to free and fair presidential elections in Lebanon and that these needed to take place for resolution 1559 to be fully implemented.

Council Dynamics
Scepticism about the UN role in establishing the tribunal remains, especially for members who abstained on resolution 1757 (China, Indonesia, Qatar, Russia and South Africa). Others, in addition to the ones who had abstained, seem to prefer that the composition of the tribunal be strictly Lebanese and have doubts about the tribunal’s ability to produce positive impacts in terms of the overall situation in Lebanon. But there now seems to be little disagreement on the various stages to establish the tribunal.
Increasingly, the non-European elected members seem concerned that the Council’s approach to Lebanon is too unfocused with too many different initiatives. For example, some believe that the recent presidential statements adopted in response to the Secretary-General’s reports on 1701 and the latest UNIFIL resolution are too long and that, as a consequence, the Council’s message is diluted. In light of these concerns and the views of many members earlier in August that there was merit in delinking the UNIFIL renewal from substantive political issues, it is curious that in the end resolution 1773 ended up including so much political material. It seems this may have been the result of an initial US desire to include various political issues which it considers a priority, and the response of other members also wanting their own concerns reflected in the draft.

The negotiations on the 3 August presidential statement were to some extent repeated on resolution 1773. They shed light on divisions among Council members. For the US the top priority issues are the abducted Israeli prisoners and Hezbollah disarmament and rearmament. France believes that the priority should be to focus on steps that have potential to impact the situation positively, such as settlement of the Sheb’a Farms issue. It prefers that disarmament be dealt with in the context of the Lebanese national dialogue. Other delegations (South Africa and Indonesia in particular) see the Israeli over-flights as a major problem along with humanitarian issues remaining from the 2006 war, including Israel’s failure to provide details on landmines and cluster bombs locations.

Underlying Problems
According to the Lebanese constitution, the parliament must convene by 23 October to elect the new president. Nabih Berri, the parliament president, had stated that he would convene a session on 25 September but he also has recently said that he would only do so if at least two thirds of deputies were present. Therefore, it is still uncertain whether those elections will take place in September. The election seems likely to become a focus of intense political activity for both the government majority and the opposition. The risk therefore exists for further destabilisation in Lebanon.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1757 (30 May 2007) established the tribunal under Chapter VII.
- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, authorised a reinforcement of UNIFIL and extended the mandate until 31 August 2007.

Latest Presidential Statement


Latest Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2007/424 (12 July 2007) was the latest UNIIIC report.
- S/2007/392 (28 June 2007) was the latest report on resolution 1701.
- S/2007/382 (26 June 2007) was the LIBAT report.

Selected Letters

- S/2007/477 and S/2007/478 (8 August 2007) were letters from Lebanon on Israeli violations in July.
- S/2007/470 (2 August 2007) was the Secretary-General’s letter recommending a one year extension of UNIFIL with no change in the mandate.
- S/2007/396 (29 June 2007) was a letter from the Secretary-General enclosing a Lebanese request for a one-year extension of UNIFIL without amendment.

Other Relevant Facts

Secretary-General’s Special Coordinator for Lebanon
Geir O. Pedersen (Norway)

UNIFIL Force Commander
Major General Claudio Graziano (Italy)

Size and Composition of UNIFIL

- Authorised: 15,000 troops
- Current (as of 24 July 2007) 13,633 military personnel, including 11,428 ground troops and 2,000 personnel in the Maritime Task Force, in addition to 189 staff officers at the Naqoura headquarters and twenty national support elements, assisted by 51 UNTSO military observers, and 748 UNIFIL civilian staff.
- Troop-contributing countries: Belgium, China, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, FYR of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Tanzania and Turkey.

Cost (approved budget)
1 July 2007 - 30 June 2008: US $748.20 million

Useful Additional Sources

- The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: The UN on Trial? Nadim Shehadi and Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Chatham House, Middle East/International Law Briefing Paper, July 2007

Haiti

Expected Council Action

The Secretary-General’s report on the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is before the Council. The mandate of MINUSTAH expires on 15 October. Before then, the Group of Friends of Haiti (Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Peru and the US) is expected to review the report and discuss options for a draft resolution. Council discussions on the report seem unlikely in September.

Key Recent Developments

On 23 August, the report of the Secretary-General on MINUSTAH was submitted to Council members. It made the following recommendations:

- foster links between institutions at the local level, promote decentralisation, transparency and fight against corruption, particularly through complementary bilateral support;
- improve land and maritime border security through assistance to the Haitian government with international expertise and a redeployment of MINUSTAH’s military and police personnel to the borders;
- retain MINUSTAH’s troop level but replace 140 military troops with 140 policemen, reduce the military’s presence in rural areas and obtain 16 small crafts for coastal patrolling—to reflect changing circumstances and priorities;
- strengthen the community violence reduction programme through labor intensive projects; and
- extend MINUSTAH’s mandate for 12 months.

On 1 and 2 August, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Haiti and met with President
René Préval, Prime Minister Jacques-Édouard Alexis and Justice Minister René Magloire. During a 1 August press conference, Ban said it was necessary to “consolidate achievements on the security front including by making progress in establishing the rule of law” by fighting corruption and reforming the judicial system. He added that the police vetting process currently underway was also a key element in the reform of the Haitian National Police.

The Secretary-General also supported a one-year extension of MINUSTAH, and he added that the UN should remain involved in Haiti as long as necessary. Finally, he said that international donors had to renew efforts to implement the national development strategy and that MINUSTAH’s role was to create necessary conditions for development in the poorest urban areas. President Préval called for reinforcing MINUSTAH’s help to reform the justice sector and improve basic infrastructure.

On 30 May the Security Council held consultations on Haiti after a briefing from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Edmond Mulet. Several countries expressed their support for Haiti remaining on the agenda. The Council adopted a press statement expressing appreciation of the fight against gang violence and encouraging further efforts to reform the justice system.

In late April, the third and last round of local, municipal and legislative elections was held. They were peaceful, but turnout was very low.

The Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) sent a team to Haiti in late April. This Group (composed of representatives from Benin, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Spain, Haiti and Trinidad and Tobago) was established in 1999 to help coordinate and develop a long-term assistance program to Haiti. It was reactivated in 2004 and has been chaired by the Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN. It submitted on 13 June its latest report, with several recommendations for the economic and social sector, such as:

- boosting the sectors in which Haiti has a comparative advantage: tourism, agriculture and the textile industry;
- investing international aid in capacity-building for Haitian institutions; and
- reinforcing development planning and aid coordination.

In February the Council renewed the mandate of MINUSTAH for eight months. It emphasised a range of priorities for MINUSTAH:

- supporting the Haitian government in strengthening state institutions at all levels;
- reorienting the disarmament programme towards a comprehensive community violence-reduction programme;
- preventing cross-border illicit trafficking;
- increasing momentum for and synchronisation between the reform of the national police and of the justice sector; and
- increasing coordination with development and humanitarian actors, especially to complement security operations.

The Council also recognised “the interconnected nature of the challenges in Haiti,” thereby reconciling different views on which areas should be prioritised for UN involvement. Gender issues and sexual exploitation of children, including by MINUSTAH personnel, also emerged as important issues within the resolution. Finally, the Council encouraged MINUSTAH to increase operations against armed gangs.

In light of the strengthened mandate, MINUSTAH and the national police carried out numerous operations against gangs responsible for kidnappings, thefts, rapes and drug trafficking in Cité Soleil and Martissant, two of the most densely populated, insecure slums in the capital Port-au-Prince. Between January and March, more than 400 people were arrested including gang leaders in both urban and rural areas. Some areas have therefore been brought under control. However, the Haitian judiciary and penal systems remain weak and the prisons overcrowded.

Options

Council members have the option to begin discussions of the report in September or wait until the Group of Friends have considered the recommendations and perhaps have prepared elements for a draft resolution.

Key Issues

The increase in drug trafficking has become an important issue, with Haiti being a busy transhipment point for Colombian drugs bound for the US. Smugglers may be contributing to instability and aggravating corruption in the judicial and executive branches.

Making MINUSTAH more effective in justice and police reforms may also become an important issue. It was certainly highlighted by the Secretary-General as a priority during his trip to Haiti. A central issue in this regard is persuading the Haitian parliament to pass the necessary legislation to reform the judicial system. (Laws on the judiciary have been adopted by the senate but await action in the chamber of deputies).

MINUSTAH’s transition from a military to a police mission and whether the Council should follow the Secretary-General’s recommendations to revisit the current balance between military troops and police units to meet increasing needs in civilian security and border control are related issues.

A recurrent key issue is whether MINUSTAH’s role in development-related issues should be further enhanced. The last resolution encouraged greater coordination with development agencies. Consequently, the budget for the civilian component of MINUSTAH increased, but it was largely viewed as a balance to a strengthened security mandate.

In February, the Council had expressly requested from the Secretary-General a comprehensive assessment of the security risks, challenges and priorities facing Haiti. How to accelerate the peacebuilding process will also be an important issue.

At press time the political question that arose in February over Haiti’s diplomatic recognition of Taiwan seemed quiet. In February, China had been reluctant to renew the MINUSTAH mandate for that reason.

Council Dynamics

Council members seem to be pleased with recent progress in security but believe that continued vigilance is important. There is also general agreement that MINUSTAH should progressively be given a more prominent police role.

An ongoing divergence within the Group of Friends, which could impact dynamics within the Council, is that Latin American countries consider that development should be an integral feature of the stabilisation
effort in Haiti and believe that peacekeepers should be involved in development projects. Most, however, recognise the practical limits of this approach. The US and Canada, on the other hand, are reluctant, being inclined to focus in the Security Council principally on security issues and institution-building. There is increasing awareness on all sides, however, that these issues are interconnected.

Because 80 percent of MINUSTAH’s troops are from Latin America, Latin American members of the Council (Peru and Panama) and of the Group of Friends (Brazil and Chile) seek to play an important role in decision-making for MINUSTAH. A common position for the Latin American members of the Group of Friends ahead of the MINUSTAH mandate renewal is likely to be discussed at the next meeting of the foreign and defence ministers of the nine Latin American troop-contributing countries due to take place in Guatemala on 31 August. President Préval and the Secretary-General’s Special Representative will participate as well. In addition Panama (although not a troop contributing country) will participate in its capacity as a Council member. A meeting of defence ministers will follow to tackle more technical issues.

Underlying Problems
The task of bringing security to the people of Haiti is huge. Violent crime and illicit trafficking are still on the rise. There are an estimated 250,000 guns in private hands, hence the necessity to combine security operations with disarmament programmes.

The Secretary-General’s report noted that at least four more years were necessary to reach a minimum figure of 14,000 Haitian officers for basic policing duties. In addition to the reform of the judicial system, prison reform is a necessity. Prisons are overcrowded and the recent arrests as well as prolonged pre-trial detentions have aggravated the situation. A five-year prison reform plan was approved by the prime minister on 7 August.

UN Documents
Selected Security Council Resolution
• S/RES/1743 (15 February 2007) renewed MINUSTAH until 15 October.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report
• S/2007/503 (22 August 2007)

Report of ECOSOC’s Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti
• E/2007/78 (13 June 2007)

Latest Letters
• S/2007/466 (26 July 2007) and S/2007/467 (30 July 2007) was an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Council on the appointment of Hédi Annabi as Special Representative in Haiti.

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Edmond Mulet (Guatemala), to be replaced by Hédi Annabi on 31 August

Force Commander
Major General Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz (Brazil)

Size and Composition of Mission
• Authorised strength (15 August 2006): military component of up to 7,200 troops including a police component of up to 1,951 officers.
• Current strength (30 June 2007): 8,825 total uniformed personnel, including 7,065 troops and 1,760 police.
• Key troop-contributing countries: Brazil, Uruguay, Sri Lanka, Jordan, Nepal, Argentina, Chile

Cost
1 July 2007 - 30 June 2008: US $561.34 million

Useful Additional Sources
■ MINUSTAH Website (in French): http://www.minustah.org/

Iran
Expected Council Action
Council action on Iran in September seems unlikely. However, senior officers from the EU3-1+3 (France, Germany and the UK plus China, Russia and the US) may discuss Iran in New York in late September during the high-level section of the UN General Assembly in order to define a common position on the way forward regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. The US and the Europeans seem to remain convinced that it is necessary to move toward a new Council resolution imposing further sanctions against Iran for its non-compliance with previous resolutions.

A briefing on the activities of the 1737 Sanctions Committee is also likely in informal consultations in mid-September.

In mid-September the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will convene. An assessment of the recent work of the Agency’s inspectors in Iran, to be included in a report by the Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei to the Board, will be awaited with interest by Council members. (A list of the outstanding issues between Iran and the IAEA is included below.)

Key Recent Developments
The IAEA reported in May that Iran had not complied with its obligations regarding the suspension of uranium-enrichment activities. However, the Council has preferred to wait until there was a clearer outcome from the discussions between the EU foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, and the Iranian negotiator Ali Larijani. It seems at this point, however, that the talks are stalled.

On 22 June, on a separate track, ElBaradei and Larijani met in Vienna. They agreed to draw up an action plan for resolving the outstanding issues between the IAEA and Iran. The plan was prepared during an IAEA visit to Iran on 11 and 12 July, and on 31 July IAEA inspectors visited Iran’s Arak research nuclear reactor which is designed for producing plutonium. On 20 and 21 August, another round of talks was held between the IAEA and Iranian officials in Tehran. A timetable and modalities for Iran to respond to questions about its nuclear activities and to provide for more effective inspections of facilities was agreed.

On 21 August, Iran released on bail the Iranian-American academic Haleh Esfandiari who had been arrested in May in Iran on espionage charges.

Tensions between the US and Iran remain despite another meeting between the US and Iranian ambassadors to Baghdad on 24 July focusing on Iraq’s security situation. The US administration seems to be adopting a more confrontational approach, perhaps reflecting frustration at the current situation. On 31 July, an arms deal was signed between the US and various Arab allies. US officials have said that one goal was to counter the growing power of Iran.
On 15 August, the US administration decided to proceed with the designation of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a foreign terrorist organisation.

Meanwhile, following a strong lobbying campaign by the US Treasury, more banks (such as Deutsche Bank on 31 July) have announced their decision to cease doing business involving Iran.

**Options**
The EU3+3 may discuss US proposals for a new resolution toughening sanctions—following the logic of incremental pressure. But it seems unlikely that any draft would be ready to share with the rest of the Council in September.

**Key Issues**
The main issue is whether or not to proceed with additional sanctions against Iran. On the one hand, the agreement between the IAEA and Iran does not address the issue of suspension of uranium-enrichment—which the Council has demanded. On the other hand, the IAEA track does have the potential to address some of the other underlying issues. It is unclear whether ElBaradei’s report will be able to persuade the P3 (France, the UK and the US) that the agreement is a satisfactory alternative that has the potential over time to build confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.

**Council Dynamics**
The US, the UK and France seem unconvinced about the IAEA track and seem convinced that it is essential to toughen UN sanctions against Iran. They consider that Iran is in breach of its obligations and that because the suspension of uranium enrichment is not included in the recent agreement with the IAEA, the agreement does not take the issue forward.

Russia and China, on the other hand, seem very reluctant to move in the direction of new sanctions. China recently reiterated that it still considers diplomacy as the best way to settle the dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme and that the recent agreement with the IAEA does represent a useful step forward. It seems that both countries believe that it would be unwise to risk jeopardising the progress which has been achieved.

South Africa also seems to believe that additional sanctions would increase tensions. Although it seems to accept that steps to encourage Iran to comply with its international obligations may be appropriate at some time, it still believes that diplomacy is currently the right choice and that it is necessary to deescalate political tensions to encourage a negotiated solution.

**UN Documents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Council Resolutions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1747 (24 March 2007) imposed additional measures against Iran and reinforced the existing ones.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1737 (23 December 2006) imposed measures against Iran under Chapter VII, article 41, of the UN Charter and expressed its intention to adopt further measures under article 41 in case of Iranian non-compliance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1696 (31 July 2006) demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and expressed its intention to adopt measures under article 41 in case of Iranian non-compliance.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Latest IAEA Board Resolution</th>
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<tr>
<td>• GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006) underlined the necessary steps that Iran should take to re-establish confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme and reported the issue to the Security Council.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Understandings of Iran and the IAEA</th>
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<tr>
<td>• INFIRC/711 (27 August 2007)</td>
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<th>Selected Letters</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/2007/378 (21 June 2007) was a letter from Iran rejecting allegations made by Nicholas Burns, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, implicating Iran in terrorist attacks.</td>
</tr>
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**Other Relevant Facts**

- Measures requested by the IAEA to re-establish confidence
  - Full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development.
  - Reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water.
  - Ratify and implement in full the Additional Protocol.
  - Pending ratification, continue to act in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol which Iran signed on 18 December 2003.

**Useful Additional Sources**


- Implement transparency measures which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include such access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military-owned workshops and research and development as the Agency may request in support of its ongoing investigations.

- Enrichment Programme at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant
- Heavy water research reactor in Arak
- Designation of new IAEA inspectors and granting of multiple entry visas for them
### Notable Dates for September

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<th>Reports Due for Consideration in August</th>
<th>Document Requesting Report</th>
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<tr>
<td>16 August</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on the UN Mission in Liberia including drawdown plans (UNMIL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 August</td>
<td>SG report on the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 August</td>
<td>SG post-election report with recommendations on the future of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 August</td>
<td>Sudan Sanctions Committee’s Panel of Experts report</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 August</td>
<td>SG monthly report on the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 September</td>
<td>SG progress report on the implementation of resolution 1757 (Lebanon, international tribunal), delayed from 28 August</td>
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<tr>
<td>mid September</td>
<td>SG assessment report on the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), delayed from mid August</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 September</td>
<td>SG contingency planning report for a possible UN operation to replace AMISOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 September</td>
<td>SG semi-annual report on the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)</td>
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<tr>
<th>September 2007 Mandates Expire</th>
<th>Document Requesting Report</th>
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<tr>
<td>29 September</td>
<td>Panel of Experts of the 1591 Sanctions Committee concerning Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 September</td>
<td>UNMIL</td>
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#### September 2007 Other Important Dates

- **5 September**
  - Greek Cypriot leader H.E. Tassos Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat will meet in the UN Protected Area in Nicosia.
- **8 September**
  - A run-off presidential election in Sierra Leone is scheduled.
- **10-14 September**
  - John Holmes, Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, will be in the DRC where will travel to the Kivus and possibly also Ituri.
- **10-14 September**
  - The IAEA Board of Governors will meet in Vienna. They will discuss North Korea’s nuclear programme and the IAEA’s most recent progress report on Iran, due in early September.
- **10-28 September**
  - Sixth session of the Human Rights Council
- **15 September**
  - Carla Del Ponte’s term as Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is scheduled to expire.
- **18 September**
  - The General Assembly will convene its 62nd session and the general debate will begin on 25 September.
- **21 September**
  - A meeting of the enlarged Darfur Contact Group, co-chaired by the UN Secretary-General and AU Chairperson, is expected on the sidelines of the General Assembly.
- **22-23 September**
  - The Secretary-General has tentatively planned for a conference on the future of Iraq and a meeting of the Quartet on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
- **23 September**
  - A high-level meeting on Afghanistan is expected on the margins of the General Assembly.
- **25 September**
  - A summit-level Security Council meeting on Africa is expected.

Also expected in September:
- The Secretary-General is expected to visit Sudan in the first week of September to help expedite the deployment of the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Libya and Chad are also expected to be included on his itinerary.
- There are media reports that Nabih Berri, the parliamentary president, will convene the Lebanese parliament on 28 September to elect a new president of Lebanon as President Emile Lahoud’s term ends on 23 November and a new president has to be elected at least one month before.

#### Important Dates over the Horizon

- A US-initiated international meeting on peace in the Middle East is being planned for later in the year.
- The Secretary-General’s next reports on the thematic issues of Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict and Women, Peace & Security are expected by October.
- The election of new members to the Security Council is scheduled for 16 October.
- The constituent assembly elections in Nepal are expected 22 November, postponed from 20 June.
- Parliamentary elections in Kosovo are expected in late 2007.
- A workshop on security sector reform, a joint initiative of Slovakia and South Africa, is being planned for later in 2007 in Africa.
- Presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire are now expected in January 2008, postponed from 31 October.

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