



# SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT

## MONTHLY FORECAST

### JUNE 2007



31 May 2007

This report is available online and can be viewed together with Update Reports on developments during the month at [www.securitycouncilreport.org](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org)

## OVERVIEW FOR JUNE

Belgium will have the Council presidency in June.

June is traditionally a month with a very heavy work schedule for the Council. This year is no exception. Moreover, Council members have scheduled a mission to Africa with visits to the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa and the current AU presidency in Ghana. In addition a smaller Council delegation is likely to visit Côte d'Ivoire and Sudan.

There are four mandates which expire and renewal will need to be considered:

- **Cyprus** (UNFICYP);
- **Liberia** (Panel of Experts);

- **Côte d'Ivoire** (UNOCI); and
- **Golan Heights** (UNDOF).

In addition to these four renewals, formal meetings of the Council are also expected on four general or thematic issues:

- **Middle East** (the standard monthly meeting);
- **Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict** (the regular semi-annual briefing);
- **International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda** (ICTY and ICTR); and

>> page 2

### CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUE

#### Status Update since our May

<i>Forecast</i> .....	3
<b>Kosovo</b> .....	4
<b>Darfur/Sudan</b> .....	5
<b>Chad/Central African Republic</b> .....	7
<b>Lebanon</b> .....	9
<b>Golan Heights (UNDOF)</b> .....	11
<b>Somalia</b> .....	12
<b>Iran</b> .....	13
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b> .....	14
<b>Cyprus</b> .....	16
<b>Iraq</b> .....	18
<b>Liberia</b> .....	20
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b> .....	20
<b>Peacebuilding Commission</b> .....	21
<b>International Criminal Tribunals</b> .....	22
<b>Notable Dates for June</b> .....	24
<b>Important Dates over the Horizon</b> .....	24

## Aide-Memoire

Important matters pending before the Council include:

- The draft resolution on **small arms** circulated by Argentina in March 2006 seems to have lapsed. South Africa circulated a draft presidential statement in March 2007. After disappearing in January and February, the issue has been reinstated as a footnote on the Council's calendar since March, but it has not yet been taken up. The absence of a Council decision on this matter leaves future periodic Secretary-General's reports in abeyance.
- Implementation of the phased approach for **Darfur** as agreed in Abuja in November 2006 is lagging. A more detailed AU-UN agreement on the hybrid operation as endorsed by the Council on 19 December had just been finalised at press time.
- Action, as envisaged in **resolution 1706 in Darfur**, has not been taken to impose "strong effective measures, such as assets freeze or travel ban, against any individual or group that violates or attempts to block the implementation of the [Darfur Peace] Agreement or commits human rights violations." A number of proposals are being considered

but divisions remain.

- Action on the Secretary-General's recommendations for a peacekeeping force in **Chad and the Central African Republic** is still awaited, because of Chad's hesitation about both the proposed robust military component and a credible political reconciliation process. Consultations between Chad and the Secretariat are underway.
- On the **DRC**, the Council is still to consider imposing individual sanctions under resolution 1698 against armed groups that recruit children.
- On **West Africa**, the Council held consultations on the Secretary-General's report on cross-border issues on 16 March but no follow-up has been considered, which may put future reports in that regard in abeyance.
- The Council is waiting for the Secretary-General's recommendations on the status of the **Sheb'a Farms**. In his last report on implementation of resolution 1701 (issued on 14 March), the Secretary-General mentioned good progress on the cartographic analysis of the status of the Farms, and said that the technical work would be completed by the next reporting period in mid-June.

- The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in **Côte d'Ivoire**, requested by a presidential statement, has still not been made public. Also on Côte d'Ivoire, the December 2005 report by the Secretary-General's Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not been published.
- The 2005 World Summit requested reforms relating to the **Military Staff Committee**. This has yet to be addressed.
- On **Somalia**, the Council is still to consider taking measures against those who seek to prevent or block a peaceful political process, threaten the Transitional Federal Institutions by force, or take action that undermines stability in Somalia or the region as set in resolution 1744.
- The Council, through resolutions 1483 and 1546, had expressed its intention to revisit the mandate of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (**UNMOVIC**), and Iraq had also made that request. A draft resolution to terminate the mandate of UNMOVIC sponsored by the US and the UK is currently being discussed among the P5.

- a new thematic agenda item initiated by Belgium dealing with the **contribution that natural resources can make to initiating and sustaining conflict**.

**Guinea-Bissau** and **Iraq** are expected to be discussed, but probably only in informal consultations.

Despite this already long list, the key focus for most members of the Council during June is likely to be the six other major issues facing the Council at this time:

- **Kosovo**;
- **Darfur**;
- **Chad/CAR**;
- **Iran**;
- **Somalia**; and
- **Lebanon**

Discussion of these issues is likely to be concentrated in meetings of experts from Council delegations or informal consultations at the Permanent Representative level. However, it seems probable that some or all of these issues will also be the subject of formal meetings of the Council to adopt decisions.

## **Kosovo**

The Council mission to Kosovo in April seems to have crystallised views and there is now a much wider acceptance that maintaining the status quo is not a viable option. As a result the Russian position that action should be delayed to allow further negotiation is attracting much less support. Elected Council members seem also to be giving weight to the fact that in June three months will have passed since Ahtisaari's recommendations became known and it is not unreasonable to now put the issue up for decision one way or the other. That said there is also a strong sense that it is a European issue and some frustration that Russia and the Europeans should still be unable to sort it out.

The G8 Summit in early June offers an opportunity for high-level discussions. It is unclear whether Russia prefers to negotiate a compromise to be decided by the Council which will mean accepting independence in some form or other, or whether it would prefer to continue to reserve its position by vetoing the adoption of the draft resolution on the table. This option would not block independence since it seems likely in such circumstances that independence will occur unilaterally—with all the attendant administrative and technical problems that it will cause for the UN, the EU and NATO. The worst case scenario in this situation could

involve outbreaks of violence and possibly parallel unilateral attempts at secession by Serb sections of Kosovo.

At this stage it seems that exploration of compromise possibilities in the text in return for a Russian abstention is difficult because of the firm attachment by Russia to its three basic points. Perhaps the G8 meetings will provide an opportunity to receive authoritative steer from Moscow on the kinds of elements which might make a constructive compromise. The Summit between Presidents Putin and Bush on 1-2 July may also be a factor. It could produce a determination to resolve the issue before the Summit or alternatively become an issue reserved for final resolution at the Summit.

## **Darfur/Sudan**

June is likely to be the critical month in terms of the way ahead on Darfur.

Khartoum has inched forward in terms of accepting the packages of support from the UN to AMIS, the beleaguered African Union peacekeeping mission. And there is now firm agreement between the UN and the AU on the details for the "Hybrid AU/UN" mission. But there are real concerns that Sudan will again drag its feet on the hybrid mission. (The fact that the support packages and the hybrid mission were given high-level approval by the AU in December and it is now June and the humanitarian crisis has continued to worsen during that period leaves some Council members convinced that a tougher posture towards Sudan is required. Hence the talk of sanctions as an alternative has grown louder and the US has already put in place some domestic measures as a warning to Sudan.)

In June the Council is likely to be considering a resolution to authorise the funding for the hybrid mission. In addition it will be very actively following the progress between the Secretariat and Sudan regarding agreement for early implementation and deployment.

It is possible that the Council will also consider what can be done to reinforce the political reconciliation track and whether there are incentives or disincentives that can be brought to bear on the disparate players in addition to the government.

## **Lebanon**

It remains to be seen whether the decision of the Security Council on 30 May to implement the special tribunal to try suspects in the

Hariri assassination will have the adverse effects on the situation in Lebanon that some had feared.

At press time, it seemed that the reaction on the ground was more low-key than the tribunal's opponents had predicted. Looming much more largely in many minds is the uncomfortable reality that the anniversary of the events which led to the 2006 Israel/Lebanon war is now just a month away. While the reinforced UNIFIL has achieved a significant amount on the peacekeeping front, the wider issues in the mandate established in resolution 1701 largely remain unaddressed.

The Council will have a report on 1701 from the Secretary-General and possibly some recommendations on border issues, both the security of the Lebanon/Syria border in the north, to prevent arms smuggling, and the delineation of the Lebanon border in the South, in the Sheb'a Farms area. Council members will be considering action on these aspects. And, in order to pre-empt as far as possible fallout from the war anniversary, some may be very keen to see the Council taking a higher profile in reenergising the other aspects of the 1701 mandate.

## **Iran**

The standoff seems likely to continue with Iran insisting that there should be no pre conditions for negotiation on its nuclear programme and the P5 committed to a track on which negotiations could only commence if there were a token of good faith in the form of suspension of current enrichment activity. Unless the discussions between the envoys of the EU (Solana) and Iran (Larijani), which had just commenced at press time, lead to some unexpected positive developments, it seems likely that the Council will be negotiating a further sanctions resolution in June.

If the EU and the US follow the same logic of steadily increased incremental pressure, it seems likely that consensus will be obtained in the P5. It is unclear whether the elected Council members will again assert a wider role in the drafting. However, the history of the last few months suggests that many of them (not just Indonesia and South Africa who presented amendments to the March resolution) will want to be seen to be playing a full role in the decision process.

## **Somalia**

The Council seems likely to continue to take a cautious approach to the AU request that

the UN should take over the peacekeeping role in Somalia. This flows not just from ongoing concern that there is no peace to keep, but also from an anxiety that the political reconciliation process may not be fully inclusive and may result in a distorted outcome.

However, dynamics in the Council will keep the issue on the agenda, not only because the African members remain concerned about support for the Ugandan peacekeepers, but also because the US remains concerned about an exit strategy for the Ethiopian forces.

It is unclear if the Council will pick up any of the options that may be available to reinforce the political reconciliation process. Discussions during the mission to Addis Ababa and Ghana may encourage a more active approach.

## Status Update since our May Forecast

Several of the recent developments on the situations covered in our May Forecast are addressed in the relevant briefs in this issue. Other interesting Council developments in May included:

- **Nepal:** The Council considered the first Secretary-General's report on the UN Mission in Nepal on 4 May (S/2007/235) and was briefed by the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Nepal and head of UNMIN, Ian Martin, on the mission's activities. On 1 May, Martin conveyed that the constituent assembly elections scheduled for June would be delayed, most likely until mid-November.
- **Ethiopia/Eritrea:** On 8 May the Council considered the Secretary-General's most recent UNMEE report (S/2007/250) and issued a press statement expressing concern over the impasse between the two countries and reaffirming the integrity of the Temporary Security Zone (SC/9014). The Council was also briefed on the situation by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Hedi Annabi, on 29 May.
- **Peacebuilding Commission:** On 10 May, the Security Council (with the General Assembly) received the report of the Commission's field mission to Sierra Leone (S/2007/269).
- **Sierra Leone:** On 11 May the Council held consultations on Sierra Leone and the Secretary-General's report on UNIOSIL's post-election role (S/2007/257). The Secretary-General praised preparations for the national elections which are now expected to take place on 11 August. However, his report also noted that Sierra Leone still required the support of the international community and close work with the Peacebuilding Commission to consolidate peace and make progress on combating corruption and promoting accountability. No formal Council action was taken.
- **Children and Armed Conflict:** On 11 May the Council's Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict met to review the Secretary-General's reports on children caught up in conflict in Somalia (S/2007/259) and Uganda (S/2007/260). The Group also called for the immediate demobilisation of all child soldiers in Sri Lanka and Nepal.
- **Democratic Republic of the Congo:** On 15 May, the Council adopted resolution 1756 extending MONUC's mandate to 31 December 2007 and maintaining the mission's personnel strength. The resolution also requested that the Secretary-General submit a report by 15 November which would include drawdown benchmarks for MONUC.
- **Bosnia and Herzegovina:** On 16 May the Council was briefed by the High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Christian Schwarz-Schilling, on his most recent report (S/2007/253). He emphasised the need for Bosnia and Herzegovina to make progress on constitutional reform, a unified police force and cooperation with the ICTY so that the EU Association Agreement could be implemented (SC/9018). (Please see our 14 May Update for more details.)
- **Burundi:** The Council considered the Secretary-General's first report on the UN Integrated Office in Burundi on 21 May (S/2007/287) which praised the country's cooperation with the Peacebuilding Commission. The Secretary-General also called on the government to establish a truth and reconciliation commission and a tribunal as originally stipulated in resolution 1606. On 30 May the Council adopted a presidential statement welcoming, *inter alia*, steps taken by the government to promote dialogue and reconciliation, but also urged increased efforts in the promotion and protection of human rights and in combating impunity (S/PRST/2007/16).
- **Humanitarian and Human Rights Situation in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa:** On 21 May, Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes briefed the Council on his visit to Somalia and northern Uganda (SC/9020). At press time, the Council was also set to be briefed by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, on 31 May. The briefing was expected to deal with the human rights situation in the DRC and to update the Council on the steps taken by the High Commissioner and MONUC to address it. (Please see our 29 May Update for more details.)
- **Sanctions Committees:** On 22 May, the Council received its semi-annual briefing from the chairmen of the 1373 (Counter-terrorism), the 1267 (Al-Qaida/Taliban), and the 1540 (WMDs) Committees (S/PV.5679). The Counter-terrorism Committee reported on the assistance needed for improved state compliance (S/2007/254). The 1540 Committee noted as its main concern the need to achieve improvement in states fulfilling their reporting responsibility (S/2007/257). The chairman of the 1267 Committee said that improving the Committee's procedures and list of targeted persons and organisations was a priority (S/2007/229).
- **Afghanistan:** On 23 May the Secretary-General's Special Representative and head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan briefed the Council on the situation there in a private debate. An official communiqué of the meeting was issued as S/PV.5680.
- **Timor-Leste:** On 23 May the Council issued a presidential statement (S/PRST/2007/14) after the successful conclusion of the 8 May runoff elections in Timor-Leste congratulating the Timorese people and President-elect Jose Ramos Horta and calling for free, fair and peaceful elections in the upcoming parliamentary poll, scheduled for 30 June. The statement also expressed concern over the country's fragile security situation and emphasised continued cooperation between all parties. The Council also held consultations on Timor-Leste on 30 May.
- **Haiti:** On 30 May the Council held consultations on Haiti and recent gains in the country's security situation and the completion of local elections.
- **Middle East:** On 30 May the Council issued a press statement expressing grave concern over the breakdown of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip (SC/9028).

## Expected Council Action

The endgame in the Council over Kosovo's final status is expected in June. At press time there have been two expert-level meetings on the draft resolution circulated by the EU5 (France, the UK, Italy, Belgium and Slovakia) and US. A decision in June seems inevitable, bringing to a conclusion the debate over the report released in March by Martti Ahtisaari, the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo.

The Secretary-General's periodic report on the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is also expected in June.

## Key Recent Developments

In late April and May momentum on the Kosovo issue picked up. The Council mission from 25 to 28 April was a major development. On 24 April, Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno briefed the Council on resolution 1244, which in 1999 authorised NATO to secure and enforce the withdrawal of Yugoslav (FRY) forces from Kosovo and also established UNMIK.

The mission visited Belgrade, Pristina, Brussels and Vienna and met key players. The head of the mission, Ambassador Johan Verbeke of Belgium, gave an oral briefing to the Council on 2 May. The formal mission report followed on 10 May.

On 4 May the EU and the US circulated initial elements of a draft resolution to repeal resolution 1244 and implement the Ahtisaari proposals. This was followed on 7 May by a Russian paper containing its proposal elements which reaffirmed 1244, focused on the implementation of standards and suggested phased implementation of Ahtisaari's proposal. On 11 May the EU and the US circulated a draft resolution.

The Contact Group on Kosovo—the US, the UK, France, Italy, Russia and Germany—has played a smaller role than expected. Traditionally discussions of the draft resolution would have been managed in the Contact Drafting Group. However, two other Council members wanted discussions brought into the Council. This suited Russia, which has little support in the Contact Group.

Kosovo was also discussed at high-level meetings involving Russia, the EU and the

US. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in mid-May but failed to find common ground on Kosovo. The EU-Russia summit ended on 18 May and was unsuccessful in bringing the European and Russian positions any closer.

On 11 May in Serbia, a government was formed after four months of delay, just in time to prevent a new election being called. The EU has shown support for the new government and signalled that if it cooperates with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on the arrest and extradition of suspects, negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU will follow.

At press time Council members were expecting a pause in discussions in New York because of the pending G8 Summit taking place from 6-8 June. High-level discussion of Kosovo is expected in the wings.

## Options

The Council has the following options.

- Adopting the current draft without change. This is unlikely given that Russia has said that it cannot support this draft.
- Agreeing with the Russian proposal for a substantively different approach from the current draft. Among the possible versions are:
  - "Ahtisaari Plus," which supersedes resolution 1244 but substantially strengthens international oversight and minority rights protection.
  - "Ahtisaari Light," which retains resolution 1244 but starts implementing the decentralisation and protection of minority recommendations;
  - "Ahtisaari minus Status," which supersedes resolution 1244, accepts key elements of the plan, including replacement of the UN by the EU but puts off determination of Kosovo's final status subject to review.
- Voting on a resolution which retains the key elements of the EU/US draft, but making some modifications designed to meet some of Russia's concerns, e.g., the precedential effort of the resolution.

## Key Issues

The key issue seems to be the risk of Kosovo unilaterally declaring independence if the Council does not make a decision by the end of June. A unilateral declaration of independence could lead to violence. It could lead to a parallel declaration of secession

from Kosovo by the Serbian population. A related issue is that UNMIK would be left in an extremely difficult position as the *de facto* legal authority. Another issue is EU unity. Some believe that without a binding Chapter VII resolution the fragile EU position will not hold.

Within the Council a growing issue is a kind of "Kosovo fatigue." Some members see this as essentially a European issue and are beginning to resent being caught in a tussle between the Russia, EU and the US.

## Council and Wider Dynamics

There has been a shift in Council dynamics since the mission. Discussions moved from the philosophical to the practical. Having experienced realities on the ground many members seem ready to accept that the *status quo* cannot be maintained. Council members witnessed first-hand the gulf between the two parties during meetings with key players from the Albanian and Serbian communities. Discussions with NATO and the EU in Brussels seem to have satisfied them that there would not be a security void once UNMIK left.

The mission also enabled members to spend prolonged periods together discussing the issue. Over time, the atmosphere between the elected and permanent Council members has improved as effort has been made to include all 15 members of the Council in the issue. European members continue to play a key role in explaining the importance of the issue to Europe.

In May more countries openly endorsed Ahtisaari's proposal and it seems that there are now sufficient votes for the draft resolution to pass comfortably. While Indonesia and South Africa have not made their final positions public, they have indicated that they do not want to rush the process and need to have a clear idea of the final picture before making a decision. However, this does not seem inconsistent with making a decision by the end of June.

Russia still maintains that there should be further negotiations and a study of 1244. It has now openly referred to the possibility of a veto. It has said its three top concerns are that it cannot agree to a resolution that endorses Ahtisaari's recommendations, 1244 must remain in place, and Kosovo must not be able to be a precedent.

By the end of May, the sense in the Council was that it was up to Russia, the EU and the

US to try and sort out a solution at a high level at the G8 Summit. Many believed that this might still, at best, require a voted resolution with some abstentions.



The mandate of the AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) is likely to be renewed by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) by 1 July.

### Key Recent Developments

Limited humanitarian access and attacks against civilians and humanitarian workers have continued unabated in Darfur. Reports suggest that Sudan carried out aerial bombardments, which the government denies. The High Commissioner for Human Rights also reported that Sudanese forces had indiscriminately attacked villages. The situation is compounded by tribal and rebel in-fighting and critical shortages of AMIS funding leading to troubling salary arrears.

The Council received the AU-UN report on the hybrid operation on 23 May. This was the culmination of months of difficult AU-UN negotiations on the mandate and structure of the proposed operation. It is envisaged that both the Security Council and the AU PSC establish the hybrid operation, with a mandate to:

- contribute to security for humanitarian assistance;
- contribute to protection of civilians under imminent threat and prevention of attacks against civilians;
- monitor and verify the implementation of existing and future agreements;
- assist the political process to ensure that it is inclusive;
- contribute to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law; and
- monitor and report on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR).

To implement the mandate, its tasks would include:

- actively providing security and robust patrolling;
- monitoring violations of agreements and *Janjaweed* disarmament;
- ensuring the complementary implementation of all peace agreements in Sudan;
- capacity-building, monitoring and supporting law enforcement; and
- assisting all stakeholders, especially in efforts to transfer federal resources to the Darfur states, and implement reconstruction plans and agreements on land use and compensation issues.

international and 990 local as of 30 September 2006) (Pillar 3) and 447(114 international and 333 local staff as of 31 March 2007) (Pillar 4)

- Size of EU mission: 125 international staff, 336 local staff

### Cost

\$2.17 billion for fiscal year 2006-2007 (not including OSCE, EU and NATO expenditures)

### KFOR (NATO FORCE)

General Roland Kather (Germany)

### Size and Composition of Mission

- Size: 16,000 troops
- NATO countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, UK, US
- Non-NATO countries: Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Morocco, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine

### Useful Additional Sources

*Kosovo: No Good Alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan*, International Crisis Group, Europe Report No.182, 14 May 2007

## Darfur/Sudan

### Expected Council Action

Darfur is likely to keep the Council extremely busy in June with:

- discussions on AU-UN proposals for a hybrid operation and Sudan's position;
- a Council mission to Africa, including Addis Ababa and Accra (Sudan has invited the mission to visit Khartoum);
- an interim report by the sanctions Panel of Experts; and
- a briefing by the International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo.

It is unclear how discussions will progress on the hybrid operation proposal. A new Council resolution seems likely. Tolerance for further delays or obstruction from Sudan seems to be diminishing. In particular, the US on 29 May tightened domestic financial measures against Sudan and will want to sponsor wider measures in the Council if there is not rapid progress.

## UN Documents

### Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) authorised NATO to secure and enforce the withdrawal of Yugoslav (FRY) forces from Kosovo and established UNMIK.

### Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2005/51 (24 October 2005) declared it was time to begin the political process to determine the future status of Kosovo.

### Selected Letters

- S/2007/248 (30 April 2007) was the letter from the Secretary-General on the international security presence in Kosovo.
- S/2007/220 (19 April 2007) was the letter from the Council president to the Secretary-General with the terms of reference and composition of the mission to Kosovo.
- S/2007/168 and Add. 1 (26 March 2007) was the letter transmitting Ahtisaari's report on Kosovo's future status and the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.
- S/2007/130 (6 March 2007) was the letter reporting on the operations of the Kosovo Force from 1 to 31 December 2006.

### Selected Reports

- S/2007/256 (4 May 2007) was the report of the Security Council on the Kosovo mission.
- S/2007/134 (9 March 2007) was the latest report of the Secretary-General on UNMIK.

## Other Relevant Facts

### Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Future Status Process

Martti Ahtisaari (Finland)

### Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Joachim Rucker (Germany)

### UNMIK

- Size of UNMIK mission: 483 international, 1967 national, 142 UN volunteers as of 30 March
- Size of OSCE mission: 1300 staff (310

The report said clarity is needed on command and control by troop and police contributors as well as UN financial bodies and that unity “of UN command and control...would be required given the Security Council’s primary responsibility for authorising, and the UN’s direct responsibility for implementing the mandate.”

The military component, focusing on protection, liaison, monitoring and verification, would need to be sufficiently robust to deter violence, pre-emptively with sufficient capabilities to deal with significant logistical challenges.

While a military concept of operations is still being finalised, two options were presented in addition to the units deployed under the heavy support package:

- the first calls for 19,055 troops, 120 liaison officers, 240 observers and significant air assets; and
- the second, more dependent on the availability of rapid reaction capabilities and more air assets, calls for 17,065 troops. The report notes that this option would have less capacity to provide security and would be more vulnerable to weather conditions.

Police would focus on training, capacity-building and law enforcement reform, protection and monitoring in camps, requiring 3,772 officers and 19 formed police units (about 2,375 police).

Priority would be given to African personnel in force and police generation. The final list of contributors would be agreed by the UN and the AU in consultation with Sudan. Financial management and oversight mechanisms consistent with UN regulations would be put in place, and a Secretary-General’s recommendation on costs to the General Assembly would follow the Security Council’s establishment of the operation.

On 25 May, the Council adopted a statement welcoming the AU-UN report and calling for it to be considered and taken forward immediately.

Force-generation consultations are underway for the heavy support package with significant challenges, including the need for Sudanese agreement on land and water-drilling in Darfur, reconfiguring and strengthening AMIS, and funds for new AMIS facilities and camps. Full deployment may take up to six months.

Libya hosted a conference in late April with Sudan, AU and UN envoys Salim A. Salim and Jan Eliasson, and representatives from the UN, the AU, permanent Council members, the Arab League, Chad, Eritrea, Egypt, the EU, Canada, the Netherlands and Norway. The conference reached an important consensus including the need for convergence of all peace initiatives under the AU-UN lead.

Eliasson and Salim are preparing a detailed political process roadmap. This would require an end to violence, a strengthened ceasefire supported by effective peacekeeping, and improvements in the humanitarian situation. It would comprise three phases.

- Phase 1 (ongoing): convergence of various peace initiatives, strengthening of the mediation team and consultations. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement is currently facilitating a common rebel negotiating position, but efforts have reportedly been hampered by government aerial bombardments.
- Phase 2: preparations for negotiations, including a mediation strategy, including format, participation, and venue as well as upholding the ceasefire.
- Phase 3: negotiations.

On 27 April, the ICC issued arrest warrants in connection with the case against former Sudanese interior minister Ahmed Haroun and *Janjaweed* commander Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-al-Rahman. ICC Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo also signalled a second wave of investigations on the border with Chad and the CAR.

### Related Developments in the Human Rights Council

The human rights expert group on Darfur met with Sudanese government officials on 24 May to discuss practical ways to improve the human rights situation in Darfur. There seems to have been only limited agreement on future steps. The group is expected to present its report during the June session of the Human Rights Council.

### Options

On the peace process, an option is for the Council to intensify its support for the efforts of Salim and Eliasson.

Should progress prove elusive, another option is threatening targeted sanctions against all those who “impede the peace

process, constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and the region, commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities, violate the [arms embargo], or are responsible for offensive military overflights” pursuant to resolution 1591.

Available peacekeeping options include:

- authorising the hybrid operation as recommended in the AU-UN report. (given the need for funding commitment from the Fifth Committee, and the need for Chapter VII for the proposed mission’s protection mandate, a new resolution seems necessary);
- delaying a decision until firm agreement from Sudan is obtained;
- actively engaging Sudan to consent to the operation; and
- encouraging regional players to support the hybrid operation.

The sanctions option is also likely to loom in the background as the heavy support package is implemented and discussions on the AU-UN proposals develop.

### Key Issues

The key issues are ensuring that:

- a peace process in Darfur is re-established;
- the phased approach already agreed by all parties is implemented and Sudan honours its commitments;
- humanitarian access improves, and violence and attacks against civilians cease;
- the regional dimension does not present problems; and
- AMIS has sufficient resources until the hybrid operation is deployed.

Related issues are:

- **political process:** supporting the efforts of Salim and Eliasson, including securing a comprehensive ceasefire. There are several major questions, including rebel unity, negotiation modalities (how much the failed Darfur Peace Agreement should be reopened, participation, and resources for mediation), and the relationship with the north-south Comprehensive Peace Agreement;
- **hybrid operation:** how best to address AU-UN recommendations and ensure compliance by Sudan. Time is critical. Negotiations are likely to be difficult, especially on command and control, size, robustness, protection of civilians and involvement in key issues such as law enforcement and governance. Other key aspects are full implementation of the

support packages ahead of the operation; and funding commitment by the General Assembly's Fifth Committee.

Generating a substantial number of troops and police will be a significant issue. Costs are likely to be huge. The heavy support package requires 2,250 troops and 675 police, while the hybrid operation involves at least 17,065 troops and 6,147 police, particularly if current AMIS troops are not re-hatted. AMIS involves two battalions (1,600 troops).

All combined, the hybrid operation would be the largest UN operation after UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia and UNOSOM II in Somalia in the 1990s and possibly the most expensive operation ever authorised. This is compounded by the substantial practical challenges in implementing an unprecedented hybrid peacekeeping concept.

### Council and Wider Dynamics

Prior to the release of the report, however, permanent members appear increasingly unified. There was agreement on the text of a demarche to Sudan on the need to uphold commitments to the phased approach as agreed in November 2006. China recently appointed a special envoy responsible for Darfur.

At press time, divisions remained on how to respond to Khartoum's invitation to the Council mission. Some prefer a more cautious approach, with acceptance dependent on whether Sudan shows unequivocal signs of cooperation on the heavy support package and the hybrid operation.

There is also greater willingness to focus on the political process, particularly with increased prospects of a formal contact group using the format of the Tripoli conference.

### UN Documents

#### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1755 (30 April 2007) extended UNMIS until 31 October 2007.
- S/RES/1706 (31 August 2006) set a mandate for UNMIS in Darfur.
- S/RES/1591 (29 March 2005) and 1556 (30 July 2004) imposed sanctions in Darfur.
- S/RES/1590 (24 March 2005) established UNMIS.

#### Selected Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2007/15 (25 May 2007) welcomed the AU-UN report and

called for it to be considered and taken forward immediately.

- S/PRST/2006/55 (19 December 2006) endorsed the phased approach.

#### Selected Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2007/213 (17 April 2007) was the latest quarterly report on Sudan.
- S/2007/104 (23 February 2007) was the latest monthly report on Darfur at press time.

#### Other

- S/2007/284 (15 May 2007) was a Sudanese letter following up on existing commitments to increase humanitarian access.
- S/2007/251 (1 May 2007) was a Libyan letter with the Tripoli consensus.
- S/2007/212 (17 April 2007) was a Council letter in response to Sudan's agreement to the heavy support package.
- A/HRC/4/L.7/Rev.2 (30 March 2007) was the recent Human Rights Council resolution on Darfur.
- A/HRC/4/80 (9 March 2007) was the report of the Human Rights Council's high-level mission to Darfur.

#### Other Relevant Facts

##### Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur

Rodolphe Adada (Congo)

##### Special Envoy of the Secretary-General

Jan Eliasson (Sweden)

##### UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Vacant

##### UNMIS: Size, Composition and Cost

- Maximum authorised strength: up to 27,300 military and 6,015 police
- Strength as of 30 April 2007: 9,398 military and 613 police
- Key troop contributors: Bangladesh, China, Egypt, India, Kenya and Pakistan
- Cost: 1 July 2006-30 June 2007 \$1,126.30 million (excludes Darfur)

##### UNMIS: Duration

24 March 2005 to present; mandate expires 31 October 2007.

##### AU Special Envoy

Salim A. Salim

##### AMIS: Size and Composition

- Total authorised strength: about 10,000 military and 1,500 police



- Strength as of 23 May 2007: 6,143 military and 1,360 police
- Key troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda and Senegal

##### AMIS: Duration

25 May 2004 to present; mandate expires 1 July 2007

## Chad/Central African Republic

### Expected Council Action

Members expect the results of the Secretariat's consultations with Chad seeking consent to deploy a proposed UN peacekeeping operation in eastern Chad and in the Central African Republic (CAR). At press time, a briefing by Assistant Secretary-General Hédi Annabi on progress with consultations had been scheduled for 31 May. It is unclear whether agreement will be reached. It is possible that there will be further consultations in June.

The issue may also arise during the Council mission in June to the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa and Accra (given Ghana's AU chairmanship).

In late June, the regular report of the Secretary-General on the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in the CAR (BONUCA) is due and the mandate of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community's military operation deployed in the CAR (FOMUC) expires.

### Key Recent Developments

The humanitarian crisis in Chad and the CAR continues to be acute, with a continuing flood of refugees and internally displaced persons. The situation is compounded by large shortfalls in funding for humanitarian assistance. In Chad alone, only about a third of the appeals for funding seem to have been met. Chad has 140,000 internally displaced plus 235,000 Darfuri and 46,000 CAR refugees. In the CAR, there are 300,000 displaced.

A Secretariat team is now in Chad to consult with the government on the Secretary-General's proposals for UN

peacekeeping in eastern Chad. The team is expected to clarify the rationale and the need for a military component as a security backup for the proposed mission's police component which will be tasked with providing security for camps of displaced persons and refugees. It is possible that some UN personnel will continue in N'Djamena as the nucleus of an advance UN mission, which would pave the way for the deployment of the proposed UN operation, if ultimately approved.

It seems earlier proposals that the mission be deployed along the border are now in abeyance.

With Saudi Arabia's facilitation, Sudan and Chad in early May signed yet another agreement. Both pledged to respect each other's sovereignty; to prevent the use of their respective territories by armed groups; and refuse support for such groups. In addition, both parties seemingly committed to:

- implement the February 2006 Tripoli Agreement and a joint military commission based in Tripoli to report on border violations;
- support AU political and security efforts to stabilise Darfur and the border areas through the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement; and
- adhere to working with AU and UN to end conflict in Darfur and eastern Chad.

High-level contacts on the situation in the region ensued, including talks between Egypt and Sudan and a visit to Libya by the presidents of Egypt and Chad on 8 May. After the meeting, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi reportedly criticised the Saudi-brokered deal (making the point that it largely only repeats previous Libyan-brokered agreements). The Sudanese parliament ratified a separate agreement on economic cooperation with Chad in mid-May. There are reports that Chadian President Idriss Deby may visit Sudan in early June.

Despite the series of agreements brokered by regional players since February 2006 to dissipate border tensions, scepticism remains because of the absence of improvements on the ground and the failure of previous agreements. The Chadian rebel group Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) says it will continue its insurgency against Deby.

An AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) mission visited Sudan, Chad and the CAR on 21-29 May. The mission, headed by Nigeria, was expected to assess the situation in the region and report back to the PSC with recommendations.

International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo announced on 22 May that he would start investigations into crimes committed in the CAR. Investigations will cover the 2002-2003 conflict in which the government of Ange-Félix Patassé was overthrown by a rebel movement led by current president François Bozizé. Moreno-Ocampo also signalled that investigations would also include crimes committed since the end of 2005. The decision followed a referral by the CAR government of the situation to the ICC in December 2004.

### Options

Maintaining the wait-and-see approach continues to be the most likely option, at least until the results of consultations between Chad and the Secretariat are known. Additional options include:

- becoming more actively involved in the issue of political reconciliation in Chad by encouraging the Secretary-General to send a UN Department of Political Affairs mission, or by perhaps extending the June Council mission to include N'Djamena, or sending a smaller "side" mission (perhaps headed by the chair of the Council's Working Group on Peacekeeping or of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa);
- highlighting the options for cooperation between the Tripoli Agreement mechanisms and the UN; and
- authorising early deployment in the CAR.

### Key Issues

The key issue is how best to encourage regional stability and contain the conflict in Darfur. The immediate issue is whether to proceed toward a UN operation in Chad and the CAR, which in turn raises a number of open questions, including:

- how to address Chad's reluctance;
- the absence of any sort of meaningful political reconciliation process;
- whether concessions on the military component's size and deployment can be considered, and how far the Council is prepared to go without putting UN personnel at unnecessary risk;

- whether to authorise deployment in the CAR first;
- whether constructive support from regional players for UN peacekeeping in Chad and Darfur, particularly from Libya, Sudan and Eritrea can be garnered; and
- wider questions that Sudan and Chad's position regarding consent for UN operations in the region may pose.

A major related issue, as progress continues with peacekeeping in Darfur, is that there may not be resources for a UN mission in Chad and the CAR.

### Council and Wider Dynamics

Council members seem to prefer the wait-and-see approach, deferring to the Secretariat consultations with Chad for the time being. There is nonetheless strong interest by the US, the UK and France in closely monitoring developments.

Members are aware that Chad's position will be influenced by the views of regional players, in particular Libya and Sudan. Some members seem to be informally encouraging neighbours to support the proposed UN force.

### UN Documents

#### Selected Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1706 (31 August 2006) mandated a multidimensional UN presence in Chad and the CAR and requested recommendations.

#### Selected Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2007/2 (16 January 2007) requested further recommendations on peacekeeping in Chad and the CAR and on an advance mission.
- S/PRST/2006/47 (22 November 2006) renewed BONUS.

#### Selected Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2007/97 (23 February 2007) was the report on UN peacekeeping in Chad and the CAR.
- S/2006/1034 (28 December 2006) was the latest report on BONUS.
- S/2006/1019 (22 December 2006) was the first report on UN peacekeeping in Chad and the CAR.

#### Other

- S/2007/201 (11 April 2007) was the Sudanese letter on certain cross-border attacks.
- S/PV.5655 (4 April 2007) was the record of Under Secretary-General

John Holmes' latest briefing.

- S/2007/135 (7 March 2007) was a letter from Libya forwarding the Chad-Sudan statement on re-energising the Tripoli Agreement.
- S/2006/103 (14 February 2006) was the Chad-Sudan Tripoli Agreement.

### Other Relevant Facts

#### CAR: Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Lamine Cissé (Senegal)

#### BONUCA: Size and Composition

Strength as of 30 September 2006: 19 internationals, five military, six police

#### BONUCA: Duration

15 February 2000 to present; mandate expires 31 December 2007

#### FOMUC: Size and Composition

- Current strength: 380 troops
- Contributors: Gabon, Republic of Congo and Chad

#### FOMUC: Duration

October 2002 to present; mandate expires 30 June 2007

## Lebanon

### Expected Council Action

In June, recommendations from the Secretary-General on improved monitoring of the Syria-Lebanon border and a report on implementation of resolution 1701 are expected to be discussed. In addition, the issue of Sheb'a Farms is likely to be high on the agenda. Recommendations are expected in the 1701 report, together with a geographical definition of the area. The Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT) was delayed, and it is possible that as a result consultations on this issue will need to be deferred until July.

### Key Recent Developments

In May the Lebanese parliament remained deadlocked over ratification of the agreement for the special tribunal.

Under Secretary-General for Legal Affairs Nicolas Michel briefed the Council on 2 May after his visit to Lebanon. His assessment was that a political solution was unlikely, and that the UN should consider other options since several suspects are in detention awaiting trial and further delays were detrimental to the rule of law and the efficacy of the current investigation. He also

noted that all parliamentary leaders have supported the tribunal. (However, clearly some were opposed to it being imposed by the Security Council.)

On 14 May Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora sent a letter to the Secretary-General requesting that the Council take binding action to establish the tribunal. The next day, the Secretary-General said all diplomatic efforts had been exhausted and that the Council should "take necessary action."

On 15 May Lebanon's pro-Syrian president, Émile Lahoud, reiterated what he had already said in a similar letter to the Secretary-General on 5 February, that approval of the tribunal by the Council would override Lebanese constitutional mechanisms and would contribute to further destabilising Lebanon.

The Syrian government said that the tribunal should enter into force only with the consent of all Lebanese parties.

The Council adopted on 30 May a resolution sponsored by Belgium, Italy, France, Slovakia, the UK and the US under Chapter VII bringing into force on 10 June the special tribunal to try, under Lebanese criminal law, the alleged murderers of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and others. The resolution applied the terms of the agreement signed between the UN and Lebanon, but not ratified due to the parliamentary impasse in Beirut. There were five abstentions (China, Indonesia, Qatar, Russia and South Africa).

The fifth report on implementation of resolution 1559, issued on 7 May, noted that:

- there was no progress in the establishment of full diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon;
- Syrian President Bashar al-Assad agreed to reactivate the Border Committee to delineate the border with Lebanon, but demarcation in the Sheb'a Farms area would only follow an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights;
- Israeli overflights continued in violation of Lebanese sovereignty, as well as Israel's presence in the Ghajar village;
- there were still detailed and substantial reports from Israel and other states of regular illegal transfers of arms across the Syrian-Lebanese border;
- there was a growing threat from extremist Islamist groups to the UN presence in Lebanon;

- there was no progress on disbanding and disarming militias; and
- media speculation that Lebanese groups were acquiring weapons which could actually accelerate a domestic arms race.

The Council was to hold consultations on this report before the end of May and at time of writing was expected to adopt a presidential statement.

In Lebanon, the presidential election set for 25 September has become a focus of attention. The six-year term of President Lahoud ended in September 2004 but was renewed without election for three years under Syrian pressure.

Since 20 May, the Lebanese army has been clashing with militants from Fatah al-Islam, a pro-Syrian Islamist group around the Palestinian refugee camp Nahr al-Bared near Tripoli, after the militants allegedly attacked army posts at the camp. Thousands of refugees fled the fighting, many civilians were killed and humanitarian assistance was hampered by shellings. The Council adopted a press statement on 23 May condemning the attacks by the militants on the Lebanese Armed Forces, saying they constitute "an unacceptable attack on Lebanon's stability, security and sovereignty". The Council also underlined the need to assist the Palestinian refugees.

### Options

The Council could decide to combine elements relating to the 1559, 1701 and LIBAT reports into one single decision, or could address them separately, depending on when the individual reports are available.

On Sheb'a Farms, action will depend in part on whether the Secretary-General actually provides a geographical definition of the area as well as recommendations on the political and legal options.

- The Council can adopt a soft approach and request the Secretary-General to provide details on the next steps, while urging Syria to finalise an agreement with Lebanon bilaterally. Or the Council could adopt a more proactive approach which could consist of endorsing the Lebanese government's seven-point plan and

perhaps placing Sheb'a Farms under interim UN jurisdiction.

- If more time is needed to complete the cartographical work, the Council could note the progress achieved, invite all parties to cooperate with the cartographer, and set a target date for completion of work.

On the Syria/Lebanon border, the Council could adopt LIBAT's recommendations on measures and assistance strategies aimed at enhancing border monitoring. A call for more bilateral assistance to the Lebanese is a likely option. A further option, in light of the increasing arms race in Lebanon, could be to empower the 1636 Sanctions Committee to play a role, perhaps assisted by an expert panel, to help verify issues regarding movements of arms across the Syrian-Lebanese border.

A related—and balancing option—would be to take action regarding Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace or even call on Israel to stop them.

Finally, in order to help keep the momentum on the 1559 and 1701 processes, the Council could reinvigorate the Secretary-General's role, especially on the long-term peace process and the issue of the abducted Israeli prisoners.

### Key Issues

A critical issue is how to promote a return to a consensual political framework, reflected in the 1989 Taif Agreements that ended Lebanon's civil war.

A related issue is whether the Council can salvage the political process initiated by resolution 1701, essentially by providing strategic guidance to the parties and to the UN Secretariat to remain engaged on all Lebanese issues.

**Sheb'a Farms:** It is not clear yet whether the Secretary-General will provide in June a detailed geographical definition of the area. Further cartographical work may be necessary. If a definition is provided, a logical issue is whether to engage with Lebanon, Syria and Israel with a view of achieving at least provisionally agreed demarcation and implementing Siniora's seven-point plan. An issue for Lebanon is that it may have to agree to defer actual control over the Farms in the immediate future. An issue for Syria would be to accept solving the Sheb'a Farms issue independently from the rest of the Golan. For Israel, the issue would be to

withdraw from the Farms, most probably in exchange for security guarantees (and probably involving UNIFIL's presence). At this stage, the issue for the Council is whether it is ready to encourage the Secretary-General to explore such options.

**Cross border weapons transfers** are still a major issue. Disarmament of militias as envisaged in resolution 1701 would most probably end the alleged arms race, but it seems to be related to progress in the inter-Lebanese political process.

**Abducted Israeli Soldiers:** This remains an important issue because their release might help remove one of Israel's justifications for remaining in Sheb'a Farms and for continuing violations of Lebanese airspace.

**Border Control:** The issue is now to provide technical assistance to the Lebanese army stationed along the border with Syria to enhance border security. Without evidence of weapons transfers, it remains difficult for the Council to adopt additional measures reinforcing the embargo.

### Council Dynamics

Disagreements arose during May on the issue of the tribunal. Although there was consensus on the desirability of the entry into force of the tribunal, some members—China, Congo, Ghana, Indonesia, Russia, Qatar and South Africa—were concerned that imposing it via the Council may be counter-productive and seemed to prefer to give the diplomatic option another chance. The inclusion of a provision in the Chapter VII resolution allowing some extra time before the tribunal enters into force (a so called "sunrise clause") seems to have helped to reduce these concerns somewhat.

The P3 (France, UK and the US) remained committed to supporting the Lebanese government. They accepted Prime Minister Siniora's judgement—and that of the Secretary-General—that all diplomatic options had been exhausted. They also asserted that a continuation of the deadlock would have challenged the credibility of the Council and actually exacerbated tensions in Lebanon.

France remains closely engaged on the issue of Sheb'a Farms as a cornerstone of resolution 1701. The US seems to take the view that any progress on Sheb'a Farms needs to be accompanied with progress on disarmament. In addition, the US may be unwilling to press Israel to withdraw.

## UN Documents

### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1757 (30 May 2007) established the Tribunal under Chapter VII.
- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah and authorised a reinforcement of UNIFIL.
- S/RES/1664 (29 March 2006) requested negotiation with Lebanon on a tribunal of international character.
- S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) urged all foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon and all militias to be disarmed. It supported the extension of the Government of Lebanon's control over all Lebanese territory and a free and fair electoral process.

### Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2007/12 (17 April 2007) requested a Syrian-Lebanese border assessment mission.

### Selected Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2007/262 (7 May 2007) was the latest report on resolution 1559.
- S/2007/147 (14 March 2007) was the latest report on resolution 1701.
- S/2006/893 (15 November 2006) and Add.1 (21 November 2006) was the report on the negotiations between Lebanon and the UN on the tribunal, enclosing the tribunal's statute.

### Selected Letters

- S/2007/286 (16 May 2007) was the letter from President Lahoud opposing the involvement of the Security Council in Lebanese internal affairs with the establishment of the tribunal under Chapter VII.
- S/2007/281 (15 May 2007) was the letter from Siniora requesting a binding action by the Council to establish the tribunal.
- S/2007/278 (14 May 2007) was a letter from Lebanon on Israeli acts of aggression during March.

## Other Relevant Facts

### Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Implementation of Resolution 1559

Terje Røed-Larsen (Norway)

### Secretary-General's Special Coordinator for Lebanon

Geir O. Pedersen (Norway)

### UNIFIL Force Commander

Major-General Claudio Graziano (Italy)

### Size and Composition of UNIFIL

- Authorised: 15,000 troops
- Current (as of 15 March 2007): 12,764 military personnel, including 176 staff officers, 10,828 troops and 1,474 maritime task force
- Troop-contributing countries: Belgium, China, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Tanzania and Turkey

### Cost (approved budget)

1 July 2006 – 31 March 2007: \$350.87 million

### Useful Additional Sources

- *Fatah al-Islam Background*, Rebecca Bloom, Council on Foreign Relations, 22 May 2007

## Golan Heights (UNDOF)

### Expected Council Action

In June, the Council is expected to continue its usual practice and extend for six months the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights. It expires on 30 June. In renewing the mandate, the Council traditionally calls for implementation of resolution 338 of 22 October 1973, which refers to resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied territories.

The Council president is expected to issue a statement that the Middle East will remain tense until a comprehensive settlement is reached. Again, this has been the practice on the renewal of UNDOF since 1976. Substantive discussion of the underlying issues seems unlikely.

### Key Recent Developments

In a report on the Middle East, outgoing UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 11 December expressed disappointment that there had been no movement in the return of the occupied Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for peace between Syria and Israel during his ten years in office. He also criticised complacency on the need to resolve this problem as the Golan Heights is relatively calm compared with the rest of the region. However, he acknowledged that the issue was “intrinsicly connected to prog-

ress on other tracks in the Middle East peace process.”

After the 2006 Lebanon war, President Bashar Al-Assad signalled Syria’s readiness to resume the peace negotiations with Israel which were interrupted in 2000. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert rejected the offer because of Syria’s ongoing support of “terrorist groups”.

On 3 May, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem during a conference on Iraq. This was the first high-level meeting between the US and Syria since January 2005. It is unclear whether this may lead to some change in US relations with Syria.

### Options

The most likely option is a further repetition of the now formulaic renewal of the UNDOF mandate.

The Council has yet to discuss the impact on UNDOF if there is a new border demarcation in the Sheb’a Farms region, located in the Golan. If the Secretary-General’s report providing a geographical definition of the Farms finally appears in June, as currently planned, an option may be for the Council to request a report on how UNDOF would be affected by new borders.

### Key Issues

One possible issue is the border demarcation in the Sheb’a Farms area, as the Council has repeatedly asked for (in resolutions 1559, 1680 and 1701). UNDOF’s area of operations includes the Sheb’a Farms. Cartographical work on the border is due to be completed in June and this may prompt discussions.

An issue could arise if the US pursued its earlier questioning of the language of the customary presidential statement. If this happened it is likely to become a serious issue; for many Council members the resolution and statement are seen as an integral package.

### Council Dynamics

There is wide consensus that UNDOF remains useful in the absence of a peace agreement between Israel and Syria.

### UN Documents

#### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1729 (15 December 2006) renewed UNDOF for six months.
- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called

for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel and authorised a reinforcement of UNIFIL.

- S/RES/1680 (17 May 2006) encouraged Syria to respond positively to the Lebanese request to delineate their common border and called for further efforts to disarm Hezbollah and to restore Lebanon’s control over all Lebanese territory.
- S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) urged Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon and the disarmament of all militias.

### Selected Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2007/12 (17 April 2007) noted progress on the issue of Sheb’a Farms.
- S/PRST/2006/54 (15 December 2006) was the last statement following the renewal of UNDOF.
- S/PRST/2006/51 (12 December 2006) reiterated the importance of achieving a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on resolutions 242 and 338.

### Selected Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2007/262 (7 May 2007) was the latest 1559 report.
- S/2007/147 (14 March 2007) was the latest 1701 report.
- S/2006/956 (11 December 2006) was the report on the Middle East.
- S/2006/938 (4 December 2006) was the latest UNDOF report.

### Other Relevant Facts

#### UNDOF Force Commander

Major-General Wolfgang Jilke (Austria)

#### Size and Composition of Mission (30 April 2007)

- 1,043 troops, assisted by some 57 military observers of UNTSO’s Observer Group Golan
- Troop contributors: Austria, Canada, India, Japan, Nepal, Poland and Slovakia

#### Approved Budget

1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007: \$39.87 million

Please visit our December 2005 *Forecast* for a list of documents and historical background.

### Useful Additional Sources

- *Restarting Israeli-Syrian Negotiations*, International Crisis Group Report, No. 63, 10 April 2007

## Somalia

### Expected Council Action

In late June the Secretary-General is expected to report on progress with Somalia's national reconciliation process, including a broad ceasefire. The reconciliation congress is currently scheduled for mid-June, but it is unclear whether it will be held. The report will also discuss contingency planning for a possible UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia, but Council action on that seems unlikely at this stage.

The Council mission to Africa, also scheduled for June, is likely to include visits to Accra (in light of Ghana's current AU chairmanship) as well as the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. Some discussions on Somalia seem likely.

### Key Recent Developments

The situation in Somalia remains extremely volatile. Reports of major displacement and indiscriminate attacks against civilians prompted an unusual call from UN human rights experts on 1 May for respect of international humanitarian law and for humanitarian access and safe passage for civilians.

A major offensive by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ethiopian troops to stabilise Mogadishu began in late April. A ceasefire was subsequently agreed between the TFG and the largest clan in Mogadishu. The TFG then announced that most of Mogadishu had been secured, although media reports suggested that fighting was ongoing.

At a Council briefing in late April, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Ato Seyoum Mesfin argued that the situation had improved, that two-thirds of Ethiopian troops had already withdrawn, and that the remainder would follow once AMISOM was reinforced. He further emphasised the need for a political solution, especially through an inclusive and credible national congress.

The Council on 30 April adopted a presidential statement that:

- called on all parties to immediately end the hostilities and agree to a comprehensive ceasefire;
- demanded that all parties in Somalia comply fully with international humanitarian law, protect the civilian population, and guarantee complete, unhindered and secure access for humanitarian assistance; and
- called on the Transitional Federal Institutions to ensure that the national reconciliation congress is convened as soon as possible, and is truly representative of all segments of Somali society.

As anticipated in our May 2007 *Forecast*, the presidential statement largely accepted the Secretary-General's recommendation that, in light of the open warfare in Mogadishu, the situation was not amenable to a UN peacekeeping mission at present. The statement requested the Secretary-General to instead begin contingency planning for a possible UN peacekeeping mission.

Events in May, including the killing of four AMISOM troops and the partial cancellation of Under Secretary-General John Holmes' trip after attacks in mid-May, suggest that the insurgency is still very active. The former leader of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), Sheik Sharif Ahmed, and ousted parliament speaker Sheik Sharif Hassan Aden have reportedly urged insurgents to continue fighting Ethiopian troops. The conflict in Mogadishu seems to involve clan militias, UIC remnants and foreign fighters pitted against Ethiopian and TFG forces.

Meanwhile, AMISOM continues to struggle with difficulties with troop generation, logistics, funding and lack of security. So far, Uganda has contributed 1,500 troops but an estimated 8,000 are needed for AMISOM. It does not seem likely that troop reinforcements will materialise soon.

In Mogadishu on 11 May, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, François Lonseny Fall, met with the TFG to discuss preparations for the national congress and to convey the need for inclusiveness and a broad cessation of hostilities.

Lack of access and safety for aid deliveries—seemingly in part due to TFG policies—have severely obstructed the provision of humanitarian assistance to the majority of those in need. In a briefing to the Council on

21 May, Under Secretary-General Holmes underlined further concerns, including disagreements with the TFG on:

- the severity of the crisis, as the TFG maintains that only 30,000 to 40,000 have been displaced, as opposed to UN reports estimating 365,000; and
- reports of TFG forces violating international humanitarian law. (It seems that the TFG has agreed to an investigation by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.)

The Sanctions Committee held meetings in early May. States cited in the reports of the Monitoring Group as having violated the arms embargo were invited to an exchange of views with the Group and Council members. The Committee met Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Syria. It seems that all denied having violated the embargo.

### Options

In the absence of improvements with the reconciliation process and the security situation, options at present include the following.

- Requesting a strengthening of the UN's political involvement in Somalia, possibly through establishment of an advance political mission in Mogadishu. This option could both increase the levels of information on the conflict and strengthen important UN leadership in efforts to foster the national reconciliation process.
- Decide that the Council itself should take a more leading role in consulting with key stakeholders, including regional players, on progress with the reconciliation process and outcome. This could include a small Council mission to the region, perhaps at the time of the Council's visit to Africa, composed of two or three elected members and perhaps headed by the chair of the Council's Working Group on Peacekeeping or of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa.
- Act to support AMISOM by encouraging troop pledges, including through consultations with the AU during the Council visit to Addis Ababa. It seems that the AU is already getting ready to request a renewal of AMISOM's mandate after it expires in August, given that a transfer to a UN operation is unlikely in the near future.

## Key Issues

The key issue seems to be progress with national reconciliation thereby creating improved security conditions. Related issues include:

- the degree of inclusiveness in the national reconciliation congress and in a future Somali unity government. Participation in the national congress is expected to be largely clan-based and may exclude independent participation by civil society groups and especially religious groups such as the UIC;
- the lack of clarity on the upcoming national conference's agenda, especially on power-sharing, and the outcome particularly vis-à-vis the future composition of the TFG;
- the question of balance and impartiality in the process and whether increased UN participation in and assistance to the political process is necessary, particularly in light of the TFG's apparent resistance to reopening certain aspects of the congress, especially regarding inclusiveness;
- how to improve the security situation on the ground and encourage Ethiopia's withdrawal. This includes the lack of prospects for a broad ceasefire in addition to troop and financial contributions to AMISOM. A related issue is the absence of mediators to encourage a wide cessation of hostilities; and
- the regional dimension of the situation in Somalia, especially the movement of refugees, arms and combatants, and related violations of the arms embargo.

## Council Dynamics

Most members agree that the security situation in Somalia is dire and that considerable progress with the national reconciliation process is needed. Members also seem to agree that strong international support for AMISOM is needed so that Ethiopian troops can withdraw soon.

The presidential statement of 30 April seems to have crystallised positions, especially about the need for progress with reconciliation and security if there is ever to be a transfer from AMISOM to a UN operation.

However, some significant divisions remain. Most members are very resistant about any transition to a UN peacekeeping mission and want to see considerable progress before any decision is reached. Some African members are strongly concerned with the lack of support for AMISOM and for future prospects to transfer peacekeeping

responsibilities to the UN. Other members are supportive of Ethiopia's intervention, especially the US. Those members are likely to be more flexible on this issue and seem ready to support transition sooner rather than later.

There remains a lack of clarity on how to address the difficulties with the national reconciliation process. Support for Somali ownership of the process seems at odds with the goal of inclusiveness. Interest in broader UN (including the Council's) involvement in the reconciliation process seems mixed. Some are concerned about an excessive focus on peacekeeping. There is concern about the TFG and the issue of UIC participation.

## UN Documents

### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1744 (20 February 2007) authorised AMISOM.
- S/RES/733 (23 January 1992) imposed the arms embargo.

### Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2007/13 (30 April 2007) requested contingency planning for transition to UN peacekeeping in Somalia.

### Latest Secretary-General's Report

- S/2007/204 (20 April 2007)

### Other

- S/PV.5677 (21 May 2007) was the recent briefing by Under Secretary-General John Holmes.
- S/2006/913 (21 November 2006) was the latest Monitoring Group report.

## Other Relevant Facts

### Special Representative of the Secretary-General

François Lonseny Fall (Guinea)

### Chairman of the Sanctions Committee

Dumisani S. Kumalo (South Africa)

## Iran

### Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to adopt a resolution further expanding sanctions against Iran, in light of the 23 May report of the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohammed ElBaradei that Iran had not complied with resolution 1747.



The 1737 Sanctions Committee is also expected to submit a report on its activities, followed by a briefing around 21 June.

## Key Recent Developments

The EU3+3 (France, Germany, the UK and China, Russia and the US) met in London on 2 May and Berlin on 10 May to determine the way forward and prepare a common position ahead of the next IAEA report. They reaffirmed that a negotiated solution was their goal but agreed to start work on a third resolution imposing additional sanctions if, as seemed likely, the IAEA would report non compliance.

The second round of talks between EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana and Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, scheduled in Switzerland in mid-May, was postponed to 31 May in Berlin. The initial round had concluded with some hints of possible progress. However, Larijani announced on 14 May that suspension of uranium enrichment would not be negotiated.

On 15 May, ElBaradei told the media that Iran's progress in enriching uranium meant that it was unrealistic to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear expertise. For him, "the purpose of suspension—keeping them from getting the knowledge—has been overtaken by events." It would be more useful to restrict enrichment short of an industrial scale rather than try to freeze it altogether, he said.

These remarks were sharply criticised by the US and its European allies. They said that letting Iran operate a small number of centrifuges was out of the question.

The 23 May IAEA report on implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Council resolutions in Iran concluded that:

- Iran had not complied with resolutions 1737 and 1747 requiring suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, and work on all heavy water-related projects;
- Iran was operating eight cascades of 164 centrifuges at an underground site in Natanz, producing fuel suitable for nuclear reactors, and it was in the process of installing five more; and

- The IAEA's ability to monitor Iran's nuclear programme had deteriorated.

By 16 May, 67 countries had submitted reports to the Sanctions Committee on steps taken to implement resolution 1737. Some also submitted reports on implementing resolution 1747, although this is not mandatory.

In the run-up to the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the first of three Preparatory Committee sessions took place in Vienna from 30 April to 11 May. Participants considered substantive and procedural issues to strengthen implementing the NPT. Germany suggested building a uranium enrichment facility run by the IAEA so that all interested states have access to nuclear fuel for energy generation, while reducing the risk of weapons proliferation.

### Options

A third resolution following the logic of incremental pressure seems to be the main option if the Solana-Larjani meeting fails to produce positive results. The resolution could:

- replace "calls upon" with "decide" in several provisions;
- impose a travel ban on Iranian officials involved in the nuclear programme;
- include additional names in the list of people and entities subject to asset freeze;
- toughen current financial sanctions through restricting or even banning export credits to Iran;
- ban certain arms sales to Iran; and
- request the IAEA Director-General to report to the Council again within sixty days.

A further option for the Council is to delay action if Solana and Larjani make some progress in a positive direction.

### Key Issues

A key issue is how much longer the incremental pressure approach will be viable, and whether it will convince Iran to suspend enrichment. For many—including the US and the Europeans—the core issue remains the lack of confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

Members are mindful, though, of the equally important issue of keeping the doors of negotiation open even if the next Solana-Larjani meeting fails.

### Council Dynamics

The EU3 and the US seem determined to prepare a third resolution toughening sanctions. They remain convinced this is the best approach. While sanctions have some impact on Iran's economy and on the degree of internal support for the regime, they sense, more importantly, a building groundswell of international opinion generated by cohesion within the Council which is likely to have an impact in Tehran. For them, suspending uranium enrichment is an incontrovertible measure to rebuild confidence. Consequently, they oppose the ElBaradei alternative because, by definition, it requires trust in Iran's good faith. The new French President Nicolas Sarkozy appears more supportive of sanctions than his predecessor Jacques Chirac.

The EU3+3 will probably wait for the Solana-Larjani meeting and for the G8 meeting scheduled for 6-8 June before tabling a resolution.

An important challenge will be finding a balance between a credible increment and the need for unanimity. Russia and China will want more graduated steps. Some elected members remain sceptical about the EU3+3 approach, especially Indonesia and South Africa who, while concerned about Iran's behaviour, believe that negotiations are the best way to solve the crisis, and that preconditions should be avoided.

### Underlying Problems

Tensions between the US and Iran are increasing with more arrests and detentions of Iranian-American scholars in Iran. The US moved two aircraft carriers and seven other ships into the Persian Gulf in a show of force.

The financial sector seems to be increasingly reluctant to do business with Iran because of restrictions on trade of proliferation sensitive and ballistic equipment stipulated in resolution 1737, the call upon states and international institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance and loans to Iran stipulated in resolution 1747 and bilateral initiatives from the EU and the US.

### Selected Documents

#### Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1747 (24 March 2007) imposed additional measures against Iran and reinforced the existing ones.

- S/RES/1737 (23 December 2006) imposed measures against Iran under Chapter VII, article 41, of the UN Charter and expressed its intention to adopt further measures under article 41 in case of Iranian non-compliance.
- S/RES/1696 (31 July 2006) demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and expressed its intention to adopt measures under article 41 in case of Iranian non-compliance.

#### Latest IAEA Board Resolution

- GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006) underlined the necessary steps that Iran should take to re-establish confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme and reported the issue to the Security Council.

#### Latest IAEA Report

- The circulation of the 23 May report is currently restricted and will be considered at the IAEA Board of Directors 11 June meeting.

#### Iran Reports to the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT

- NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/14 (9 May 2007) was on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.
- NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/13 (9 May 2007) was on implementation of article VI of the NPT.

### Useful Additional Sources

- *Iran: Another Iranian-American Scholar Detained—Crackdown Against Iranian Civil Society Intensifies*, Human Rights Watch, 24 May 2007
- *Iran's Nuclear Programme: Can Diplomacy Succeed?*, Gary Samore and Maurice R. Greenberg, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Volume 13, Issue 3, April 2007

### Côte d'Ivoire

#### Expected Council Action

The Council plans to visit Côte d'Ivoire on 19 June as part of a regional trip for relationship-building with regional organisations, in particular the African Union. In late June the Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) which expires on 30 June. Some mandate adjustment in light of the Ouagadougou Agreement and recent recommendations from the Secretary-General are expected.

The Council is also expecting recommendations from the African Union on the future of the International Working Group (IWG).

The next report of the Sanctions Committee's Group of Experts is due in early June. The Group's mandate expires on 15 June. The Council is expected to adopt a resolution renewing it for six months. The Committee may also consider an Ivorian request for an exemption to the arms embargo to allow the government to import light arms.

### Key Recent Developments

The Secretary-General's report on the future UN role in Côte d'Ivoire in light of the Ouagadougou Agreement was published on 14 May. The report noted that implementation of the agreement started on schedule with establishment of the integrated command centre, formation of a new government, issuing an ordinance granting amnesty for national security crimes committed since September 2000, lifting of the zone of confidence and deployment of mixed police units in the buffer zone. However, the 23 April deadline for dismantling militias, re-deploying state officials in the country and launching mobile court hearings for national identification was missed.

The report did note the determination of the parties to implement the Ouagadougou Agreement, resulting in a more relaxed political atmosphere and a significant decrease in hate speeches in the media. In light of this positive political security climate, it suggested that there was no longer a need for UNOCI reinforcements as originally requested by rebel *Forces nouvelles* leader Guillaume Soro to ensure security of key political leaders.

The Secretary-General also reported that national stakeholders had stressed that continued UN assistance for the peace process was essential. He recommended that UNOCI:

- support all tasks of the integrated command centre, including disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR), the voter identification process and security-sector reform;
- reinforce its presence in the west;
- support the restoration of state administration in the country;
- support the identification and registration of voters and the electoral processes, especially through security and technical assistance, and adjust its current elec-

toral mandate to include coordination of international observers;

- continue to promote and protect human rights and assist the government in the formulation and implementation of a national human rights action plan; and
- be extended for an additional six months with a troop-level review process in September in light of progress toward DDR and administration redeployment.

The report also recommended that the UN elections certification role be given to the Secretary-General's Special Representative instead of the High Representative for the Elections, while not replacing the certification prerogatives of national institutions.

The report was welcomed by both parties in Côte d'Ivoire. Council consultations were held on 18 May, following a briefing by Djibrill Bassolé, Minister for National Security of Burkina Faso, on behalf of the peace process facilitator, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso. He attributed the delays in April to technical challenges.

Government militias started to disarm on 17 May. Three collection sites were set up in the west and Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo said that around 1,000 weapons had already been collected. Also in April the World Bank promised \$100 million for disarmament of ex-combatants.

In late May, the Secretary-General received from the Burkina Faso facilitator a request to exempt light weapons from the Côte d'Ivoire arms embargo. At press time, the request had not yet been submitted to the Sanctions Committee or the Security Council. The Ivorian government had already requested an exemption in December but it had not been approved.

### Options

The Council will most likely renew the UNOCI mandate for six months. As part of this renewal, it has the following options:

- strictly follow the Secretary-General's recommendations regarding the force's mandate;
- use broader language allowing room for interpretation, thereby providing flexibility;
- reaffirm the Ouagadougou timetable but not specify an elections deadline;
- request the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 30 September for a review of the UNOCI troop level;
- endorse the African Union's recommendations on the IWG;
- agree to grant a special authorisation for



the import of light weapons; or

- require that conditions and deadlines be met before granting the authorisation.

### Key Issues

The main issue is how to transform current UN tasks established in resolutions 1721 and 1739 to fit into a peace consolidation framework based on the Ouagadougou Agreement. (See our December 2006 *Forecast* for details of the 1721 mandate and our 2 April *Update* on the Ouagadougou Agreement.)

Although there is considerable support for the Secretary-General's recommendations, the main challenge is how to incorporate them into the upcoming resolution. The role of UNOCI and that of the Secretary-General's Special Representative now has to be balanced to reflect the parties' greater ownership of the peace process, but remain sufficiently involved at all stages to ensure that peace and security are maintained and that free and fair elections will be conducted in a timely manner. Related issues concerning detailed aspects of the UNOCI mandate covering human rights and protection of civilians may also arise. However, it seems unlikely that these would be changed.

A connected and major issue is the role of the UN in the electoral process. Because the High Representative for the Elections was a substitute for Ivorian authorities on electoral matters, the Secretary-General recommended that the post be abolished and that the certification responsibility for all stages of the electoral process be transferred to his Special Representative. This was the most divisive issue between the parties.

Another issue is whether the IWG, previously monitoring the peace process at the local level, should be disbanded.

At press time the Council is discussing the terms of reference for its visit. The issue here is to signal to Côte d'Ivoire that the Council is ready to support its efforts. Because a draft resolution may be ready beforehand, the visit may also be an occasion to incorporate Ivorian concerns into the draft.

Another important issue is the request for an arms embargo exemption for light weapons for law and order purposes. No official request from Côte d'Ivoire has been received yet. But the nature of the request—whether it includes lethal or non-lethal equipment—is likely to also be an issue.

A final issue is whether the Sanctions Committee will also receive a request to immediately lift individual sanctions as mentioned in the Ouagadougou Agreement.

### Council Dynamics

There seems to be wide consensus that the Council should follow the recommendations of the Secretary-General on the role of the UN in the peace process. The general view is that the UN should be available to help on the road to peace and remain committed to overseeing the electoral process in a free and fair manner. Some Council members, during the 18 May consultations, also expressed the need for vigilance if there are further delays in implementing the Ouagadougou timetable.

It is unclear at press time whether all members would agree to the arms embargo exemption. The parties and the facilitator seem to believe this is necessary to fight armed bandits and would also be a token of the Council's willingness to help implement the peace process. On the other hand, few if any Council members believe that the presence of more weapons in the country will be helpful. Indeed, the DDR process is already complicated by large quantities of weapons. Some Council members are reluctant to authorise the import of lethal weapons.

At press time there is no official request for an immediate lifting of individual sanctions, and the matter has not been discussed.

### Underlying Problems

Some militias based in the west have expressed dissatisfaction at not being included in the peace process. This may pose problems for disarmament.

Serious violations of human rights continue and were not addressed in the Ouagadougou Agreement. A 22 May UNOCI statement condemned the pillage and extortion of two Ivorian human rights organisations.

The main security challenge currently comes from the western part of the country, where killings and rapes have increased since the zone of confidence

was dismantled. It is a mountainous and heavily forested region where gangs of armed bandits thrive.

### Selected UN Documents

#### Latest Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1739 (10 January 2007) extended the UNOCI mandate until 30 June 2007 with increased troop levels.
- S/RES/1721 (1 November 2006) prolonged by one year the transitional period in Côte d'Ivoire and reinforced the powers of the prime minister.

#### Latest Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2007/8 (28 March 2007) endorsed the Ouagadougou Agreement, supported the appointment of Soro as prime minister and requested a report from the Secretary-General on the UN's future role in the peace process.

#### Latest Secretary-General's Report

- S/2007/275 (14 May 2007)

#### Other UN Documents

- S/2007/223 (19 April 2007) was the latest IWG communiqué, requesting its two co-chairs to consult with ECOWAS and the African Union on its future role and make recommendations to the Security Council.

### Other Relevant Facts

#### Special Representative of the Secretary-General

To be appointed

#### Principal Deputy Special Representative

Abou Moussa (Chad)

#### High Representative for Elections

Gérard Stoudmann (Switzerland)

#### Size and Composition of UNOCI

- Authorised strength as of 2 June 2006: up to 8,115 military personnel and up to 1,200 police
- Strength as of 30 April 2007: 9,211 total uniformed personnel, including 7,854 troops, 200 military observers and 1,157 police
- Key troop-contributing countries: Bangladesh, Pakistan, Jordan, Morocco, Ghana

#### Cost

- 1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007 \$472.89 million

## Cyprus

### Expected Council Action

The Secretary-General's next report on Cyprus is due by 1 June. The mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) expires on 15 June. The Council is expected to renew it for an additional six months. Significant Council action on the Cyprus situation remains unlikely. However, members may be keen to quietly encourage some intensification of action by the Secretary-General.

### Key Recent Developments

The political stalemate in Cyprus continues. At press time, none of the committees and working groups planned in the 8 July agreement has been established. This agreement was signed last year by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders in the presence of then Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs Ibrahim Gambari.

In his last report to the Council in December, former Secretary-General Kofi Annan blamed both Turkish and Greek Cypriots for the impasse. He said that the two sides had to "show the necessary good will and determination to overcome their apparent deep mutual distrust and suspicion of each other's true motives." (See our December *Forecast* for more details.)

On 8 March, Greek Cypriots dismantled a part of the wall on the "green line" at the southern end of Ledra Street in the capital Nicosia. On 27 March, a Council press statement welcomed this decision and urged the immediate implementation of the 2006 agreement on the bi-communal working groups and technical committees. This had no impact on the ground. Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos made it clear that the Ledra Street crossing would not be opened unless Turkish troops stationed on the other side withdrew.

According to an intercommunal survey conducted by UNFICYP on 24 April, a federal settlement is the only proposal that would have majority support in both communities, and they both accept the 8 July 2006 agreement. However, mutual suspicions between the leadership of the communities continue to be the core problem for a political solution, despite the opening of crossing points. The poll also found that a majority of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots believe that the UN favours the other community.

## Options

The Council has the following options:

- renewing UNFICYP for another six months and urging the parties to implement the 8 July agreement;
- requesting the Secretary-General to proceed with a review of the UNFICYP mandate with a view of a future troop-downsizing; and
- requesting the Secretary-General to appoint a mediator, as suggested by Kofi Annan during his last press conference while in office.

## Key Issues

The main issue is for the Council to find ways to break the current political stalemate while being perceived as neutral by both sides. Council action will be influenced by whether the Secretary-General in his report considers that the process agreed in July is still a viable option or whether he recommends another initiative. His position was unknown at press time.

An important issue is the negative perceptions harboured by both sides which hamper implementation of the 8 July agreement. Greek Cypriots attach importance to the issue of territorial property in Northern Cyprus and want to address it in technical committees. On the other hand, they seem to believe that Turkish Cypriots are delaying the process on purpose because of their wish to resume negotiations on the basis of the 2004 “comprehensive settlement plan”—a bi-zonal, bi-communal solution rejected by the Greek Cypriots in a referendum.

This stalled process is a key obstacle especially since Council members insist that the responsibility to move the process forward lies primarily with Cypriots themselves. As a result there are few instruments of leverage over the parties to resume negotiations.

The issue of further reducing UNFICYP's troop strength has been discussed in the past but seems unlikely to be explored again at this time.

## Council and Wider Dynamics

France and Russia are viewed as traditional supporters of the Greek Cypriots, whereas the UK and the US seem to want a better balance for the Turkish Cypriots. Downsizing UNFICYP, which is seen as detrimental by the Greek Cypriots, is not supported by France and Russia. Moreover, the UN Sec-

retariat seems to have concerns that a further shrinking of UNFICYP would hamper its ability to fulfil its mandate.

There is a wide consensus that the 8 July agreement should be implemented, as it is the only political process currently available.

## Underlying Problems

After Cyprus joined the EU in 2004, Turkey signed a protocol extending its EU customs union agreement to the ten new EU member states, but stressed that this did not amount to a formal recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, and refused to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriots.

The political situation in both Cyprus and Turkey may be contributing factors which will make it difficult to open negotiations. Greek Cypriot presidential elections will take place in February 2008. Current political difficulties in Turkey will not make it easy for leaders to devote time and political capital to solutions.

## Selected UN Documents

### Latest Council Resolution

- S/RES/1728 (15 December 2006) extended the mandate of UNFICYP until 15 June 2007 and called for the completion of a preparatory phase for a good offices process.

### Selected Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2006/931 (1 December 2006) was the last report on Cyprus.
- S/2004/437 (28 May 2004) was the last report on the Secretary-General's good offices in Cyprus.

### Selected Letter

- S/2006/572 (25 July 2006) was the letter from the Secretary-General transmitting the 8 July agreement.

## Historical Background

*December 2006* Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed the appointment of a high-level mediator.

*15 November 2006* Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs Ibrahim Gambari wrote to leaders recommending a timetable to implement the 8 July agreement.

*8 July 2006* UN-sponsored talks between Cyprus President Tassos Papadopolous and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat led to an agreement on confidence-build-



ing measures and contacts between the two communities.

*3 October 2005* Turkey's accession negotiations to the European Union began.

*1 May 2004* The Republic of Cyprus, without its Turkish northern part, joined the EU. The Secretary-General ceased its good offices.

*24 April 2004* The Annan settlement plan on uniting the island was subject to a twin-referendum. The Turkish north accepted the plan by 64.9 percent while the Greek south rejected it by 75.8 percent.

*April 2003* The “green line” opened between the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

*November 2002* Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented a comprehensive settlement plan for Cyprus that envisaged a federation with two constituent parts.

*1983* The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was self-proclaimed and immediately declared illegal by the Council in resolution 541. It was only recognised by Turkey.

*1974* A coup d'état by Greek army officers overthrew the president of Cyprus. A subsequent Turkish military intervention led to a division of Cyprus into a Turkish Cypriot north and a Greek Cypriot south. The “green line” became impassable.

*4 March 1964* Resolution 186 established UNFICYP with a mandate to prevent a recurrence of fighting between the two communities. A “green line” of demarcation dividing Nicosia was established.

*1963* Constitutional rule in Cyprus collapsed in the wake of inter-communal strife.

*1960* Cyprus gained independence from the UK after Greek and Turkish communities agreed to share power. A Treaty of Guarantee gave the UK, Greece and Turkey the right to intervene.

## Other Relevant Facts

### Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission

Michael Møller (Denmark)

### Force Commander

Major General Rafael José Barni (Argentina)

### Size and Composition of Mission (as of 31 March 2007)

- 915 total uniformed personnel, including 850 troops and 65 police; supported by 36 international civilian personnel and 104 local civilian staff
- Key contributors: Argentina, Austria, Canada, Croatia, Hungary, Slovakia and UK
- Police contributors: Argentina, Australia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, El Salvador, India, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands

### Cost (approved budget)

1 July 2006-30 June 2007: \$46.27 million (gross), including voluntary contributions of a one-third share from Cyprus and \$6.5 million from Greece

## Useful Additional Sources

- *The Cyprus Stalemate: What Next?* International Crisis Group, Europe Report No. 171, 8 March 2006

## Iraq

### Expected Council Action

In June the Council will review the mandates of the Multinational Force (MNF), the Development Fund for Iraq and the International Advisory and Monitoring Board. There will be briefings by the US on MNF activities and by the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Iraq (the quarterly report of the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) is due early in the month). The Council is expected to adopt a press statement or perhaps a presidential statement.

The report on the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) is due by 1 June. The Council will hold consultations in June and may adopt a resolution closing the UNMOVIC mandate.

The Council will be briefed by Yuli Vorontsov, High-Level Coordinator for Iraq's compliance with its obligations regarding Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property, as the next report is due in June. A press statement is expected.

## Key Recent Developments

Several political initiatives were launched in the past three months in a renewed international effort to stabilise the country. A ministerial meeting was held in Baghdad on 10 March involving foreign ministers of the P5, the UN, regional organisations and Iraq's neighbouring countries. The meeting launched committees in charge of security cooperation, Iraqi refugees and energy supplies—at press time none had been set up.

A follow-up conference in Sharm el-Sheikh on 3 and 4 May ended with a joint statement reaffirming Iraq's national unity. It expressed readiness to support the Iraqi government. During the conference, the International Compact with Iraq (ICI) was formally launched. The Compact is an agreement between the Iraqi government and the UN to consolidate peace and pursue political, economic and social development over the next five years. Iraq received pledges of \$30 billion in debt relief. Saudi Arabia separately agreed to forgive 80 percent of the Iraqi debt to the kingdom.

The refugee crisis continues to worsen. But at a ministerial-level conference, organised by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva on 17 and 18 April, Iraq promised \$25 million to help Syria and Jordan, currently hosting about 2 million refugees. The US agreed to accept 20,000 Iraqi refugees.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon travelled to Baghdad on 22 March to meet Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki. In May, he attended the Sharm el-Sheikh meeting.

On 16 April six Shi'a Sadrist ministers withdrew from the government protesting the prime minister's refusal to set a timetable for a MNF troop withdrawal.

On 10 May the media reported that a majority of Iraqi lawmakers in the National Assembly endorsed a draft bill prepared by the Sadrist bloc calling on a scheduled withdrawal of the MNF and requiring the Iraqi government to obtain parliamentary approval before requesting an extension of the UN mandate for the MNF. While the Sadrist bloc had promoted similar bills before, this was the first time it secured a majority of supporters.

A draft law approved by the Iraqi cabinet on 26 February allowing the central government to distribute oil revenues to provinces

and granting regional oil companies or governments the power to sign contracts with foreign companies could not be adopted because of Kurdish and Sunni opposition.

US contacts with Syrian and Iranian officials at the March meeting in Baghdad have been interpreted as a shift in the US diplomatic approach to the region. The US Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration, Ellen Sauerbrey, visited Syria on 12 March to assess the refugee situation.

The last UNAMI human rights report underlined the growing violence and described a rapidly worsening humanitarian crisis, fuelled by "growing intolerance toward minorities". The report also deplored that the Iraqi government had stopped providing casualty figures. On 22 February, the Council issued a press statement condemning all terrorist attacks in Iraq and reminding states of their obligation to prevent them, especially by thwarting the transit of weapons and terrorists to and from Iraq. Despite initiatives to include a reference to the humanitarian situation, it was not in the statement.

## Options

The Council has in recent years taken a low key approach to these regular reports. On this occasion, however, a wider range of options seems possible.

- Adopting a presidential statement supporting regional contributions to building security in Iraq, encouraging a broader UN role in the political process, and encouraging political dialogue.
- Adopting a statement focusing on the worsening humanitarian and refugee crisis, urging all parties to respect humanitarian law and possibly urging greater transparency regarding casualties.

In the absence of a formal request by the Iraqi government, any change in the MNF mandate is unlikely.

A draft resolution sponsored by the UK and US to terminate the UNMOVIC mandate is currently being discussed among the P5. Options include:

- simple termination of its mandate;
- inclusion of compromise language on the absence of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq; and
- transfer of UNMOVIC's records and archives to the UN archives.

On the Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property, the Council will likely adopt a press statement expressing concern at the plight of families, and welcoming any progress on the issue of missing property.

### Key Issues

A developing key issue is whether and how to strengthen the UN role in the political reconciliation process. Iraq has requested it. The US would welcome it and the Secretary-General seems open to it. The difficult security environment, however, is the key obstacle to a bigger UN presence. In light of this, some Council members may prefer to emphasise the existence of other tracks such as participation in the ICI and increasing assistance to the constitutional review process.

The humanitarian crisis could play a key role in discussions. So far, the Council has not addressed this in any formal statement, concentrating instead on terrorist attacks. It is unclear whether this would attract support from the MNF powers.

Finally, there is the issue of “benchmarks” adopted by the US Congress on 24 May which the Iraqi government has to meet as a condition for receiving further reconstruction aid. It remains to be seen whether and how this will play out on the UN stage.

On UNMOVIC, the challenge is to find language on the absence of WMDs in Iraq, which will be satisfactory to China, France and Russia on the one hand and for the US and the UK on the other. The questions of UNMOVIC’s know-how and the role of the UN in archiving the Commission’s work are also on the table. (For more information on UNMOVIC, see our June 2006 *Forecast*.)

### Council Dynamics

During consultations on 15 March China, France, Ghana, Indonesia, Panama, Peru, Qatar and South Africa all made statements raising humanitarian concerns. South Africa said that the powers granted to the MNF by the Council had to be exercised in a manner consistent with international law by all parties, while Indonesia said that insurgent activities may be a direct result of the presence of foreign forces. Many called for a timetable for troop withdrawal.

While the UK seems to be favourable to the Council addressing the humanitarian and refugee crisis (although not as a separate issue), the US appears more reluctant.

### Underlying Problems

Sectarian violence is increasingly targeting minorities. The 15,000 Palestinians remaining in Iraq are particularly affected by the humanitarian crisis as they have nowhere to flee. Their enclaves in Baghdad have been the target of militia attacks and raids by the Iraq Security Forces. Violence against Christians in Baghdad is also mounting.

The security situation in Kirkuk, an ethnically mixed and oil-rich region in the north with a Kurdish majority, is also deteriorating. Neighbouring Turkey, with its own Kurdish issues, has threatened cross-border operations to fight the Turkish-Kurd militias, especially after Kurdish militants were accused of a suicide bombing in Ankara on 22 May.

Iraq’s Constitutional Review Committee is preparing to submit the results of its deliberation to the parliament. The 15 May deadline was not met and leaders from the Sunni Arab minority have threatened to quit the government.

### Selected UN Documents

#### Latest Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1723 (28 November 2006) extended the MNF mandate until 31 December 2007.
- S/RES/1700 (10 August 2006) extended the UNAMI mandate for another 12 months.

#### Latest Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2007/11 (13 April 2007) condemned the terrorist attack that targeted the Iraqi Council of Representatives.

#### Selected Reports

- S/2007/106 (23 February 2007) was the latest UNMOVIC report.
- S/2007/126 (7 March 2007) was the latest UNAMI report.
- S/2006/948 (6 December 2006) was the latest report on Iraq/Kuwait missing persons/property pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1284.

#### Selected Letters

- S/2007/300 and S/2007/301 (7 May 2007) was the exchange of letters on the transfer of money from the UNMOVIC account to settle Iraq’s arrears to the UN.
- S/2007/274 (8 May 2007) was the letter from Egypt enclosing the final statement of the Sharm el-Sheikh meeting.



- S/2007/236 (24 April 2007) was the letter from Iraq requesting the conclusion of the mandate of UNMOVIC and the IAEA Iraq action team.
- S/2007/224 (20 April 2007) was the letter from Iraq enclosing a summary of the 10 March Baghdad conference.
- S/2007/218 (19 April 2007) and S/2007/245 (30 April 2007) was the exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the president of the Council on a letter from the IAEA Director-General noting that the IAEA had not been able to implement its mandate in Iraq.
- S/2007/184 (31 March 2007) was the letter from Iran complaining about the firing of shots by the British military forces at the Iranian Consulate General in Iraq.

### Other Relevant Facts

#### Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq

Ashraf Jehangir Qazi (Pakistan)

#### Secretary-General’s Special Advisor on the International Compact with Iraq

Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria)

#### Composition of the MNF (as of 17 January 2007)

Albania, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, Ukraine, UK, US (both Latvia and South Korea are to withdraw their troops by June)

### Useful Additional Sources

- International Compact with Iraq website: <http://www.iraqcompact.org/>
- *Accepting Realities in Iraq*, Gareth Stansfield, Chatham House and University of Exeter, Middle East Programme Briefing Paper, May 2007
- *War and Occupation in Iraq*, Global Policy Forum and Partners, May 2007
- *Iraq Humanitarian Crisis Situation and NGO Responses*, NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq, 14 May 2007

- *Iraq and the Kurds: Resolving the Kirkuk Crisis*, International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 64, 19 April 2007
- *Civilians Without Protection: The Ever-Worsening Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq*, International Committee of the Red Cross, 11 April 2007
- UNAMI Human Rights Report, 1 January - 31 March 2007

## Liberia

### Expected Council Action

The Council awaits the Secretary-General's quarterly report on the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Resolution 1750 renewed UNMIL's mandate until 30 September. This interim report is expected to propose a drawdown plan, including "specific recommendations on force levels and options". At press time, it seems unlikely that members will want to revise UNMIL's size before 30 September.

The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the sanctions Panel of Experts by 20 June. The Panel is scheduled to submit its final report by 6 June.

### Key Recent Developments

The Council lifted the embargo on Liberian diamond exports in late April. On 27 April, resolution 1753 also signalled that the decision would be reviewed after reports from the Kimberley Process and the Panel of Experts on Liberia's accession to and compliance with the Kimberley certification scheme. (For more details, see our 26 April Update.)

The March Secretary-General's report underlined that some progress has been made concerning benchmarks for UNMIL's drawdown. There is concern nonetheless with the slow pace in some key areas, including:

- the reconstitution of the armed forces;
- the adoption of a national security strategy;
- the completion of reintegration programmes for ex-combatants; and
- the consolidation of state authority throughout Liberia.

The Special Court for Sierra Leone announced that the trial of former Liberian president Charles Taylor is scheduled to begin on 4 June at the Court's outpost in The Hague. The trial is expected to take up to 18 months to complete.

### Key Issues

The key issue in June will be whether to begin considering UNMIL's future troop levels. This has been postponed for some time in view of Liberia's huge reconstruction and peacebuilding needs, and the challenging regional environment. However, ongoing pressure to free up peacekeeping resources for other missions makes it likely that at least some initial views on this issue will be laid out.

### Council Dynamics

There is sympathy among most Council members regarding Liberia's peacebuilding needs. There is also concern that regional developments, particularly in Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, may threaten peacebuilding achievements in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

There is nonetheless awareness that if reasonable progress is being made on drawdown benchmarks, the time will come soon to address UNMIL's size given the increased peacekeeping demand and related costs.

### Underlying Problems

The situation in neighbouring Guinea had been a related concern. However, it seems to have improved this year with the appointment of a new prime minister and cabinet and the apparently successful defusing of a planned army mutiny in May. In addition, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea in late April unveiled plans to revive the regional bloc known as the Mano River Union, largely dormant since the early 1990s due to the conflicts in the region.

### UN Documents

#### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1753 (27 April 2007) lifted the diamonds embargo.
- S/RES/1750 (30 March 2007) renewed UNMIL until 30 September and requested detailed drawdown plans.
- S/RES/1731 (20 December 2006) renewed sanctions.
- S/RES/1532 (12 March 2004) imposed an assets freeze against former President Charles Taylor and associates.
- S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003) imposed sanctions.
- S/RES/1509 (19 September 2003) established UNMIL.

### Selected Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2007/151 (15 March 2007) was the latest UNMIL report.
- S/2007/143 (13 March 2007) was a report on cross-border issues in West Africa.

### Other

- S/2006/1044 (28 December 2006) was the latest sanctions committee report.
- S/2006/976 (13 December 2006) was the latest report of the Panel of Experts.

### Other Relevant Facts

#### Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Alan Doss (United Kingdom)

#### UNMIL: Size, Composition and Cost

- Total authorised strength: up to 14,875 military and 1,240 police
- Strength as of 30 April 2007: 14,060 military and 1,202 police
- Key troop-contributing countries: Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Pakistan
- Cost: 1 July 2006 – 30 June 2007: \$745.57 million

#### UNMIL: Duration

September 2003 to present; mandate expires 30 September 2007

## Guinea-Bissau

### Expected Council Action

In June the Council will receive the Secretary-General's quarterly report on the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) and a briefing by the Secretary-General's Representative in Guinea-Bissau, Shola Omoregie. The UNOGBIS mandate expires on 31 December.

No formal decision is expected although a press statement is possible. (The Council issued a press statement after the last two UNOGBIS reports.)

### Key Recent Developments

In March many of President João Bernardo Vieira's supporters defected to a new coalition which then passed a no-confidence motion in parliament against Prime Minister Aristides Gomes. On 20 March, Vieira was given 72 hours to agree to demands to appoint a new prime minister or dissolve parliament.

On 29 March, Gomes announced his resignation. Demonstrators from the three leading political parties took to the streets on 30 March demanding that Vieira accept the resignation.

Further demonstrations were averted when Vieira appointed Martinho N'Dafa Cabi as prime minister on 9 April. Cabi put national reconciliation high on his agenda and plans to hold legislative elections next year. A new cabinet was named on 17 April made up of an alliance of political parties.

The International Monetary Fund visited Guinea-Bissau from 23 May to 6 June to conduct annual consultations with the government and discuss post-conflict assistance.

### Options

The Council has the following options.

- Choosing not to take any action. This is the most likely option as long as the situation does not significantly deteriorate by the time the Council meets.
- Issuing a press statement. This is possible if members want to stress the importance of political stability and signal their ongoing engagement to the new cabinet.
- Issuing a presidential statement. This is unlikely but possible if the Council wants to take a stronger stand.
- Requesting the Secretary-General to include in his next report practical benchmarks and an exit timetable to guide Council discussions on an exit strategy for UNOGBIS.

### Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is maintenance of the fragile peace. Recent developments seem promising but there are concerns that in time the parties in the cabinet will find it difficult to work together and with Vieira.

A key related issue is the military's reaction. Senior army officers are still receiving salaries but low-ranking officers have not been paid for months. Conditions are worse than in 1998 when the army rose up against Vieira during his earlier term as president, triggering a civil war. The army, or elements in it, may be tempted to take advantage of opportunities that may arise.

Another issue is the lack of diversity in Guinea-Bissau's economy. Cashew nuts account for 85 percent of export earnings. Last year the government raised the price

of cashew nuts scaring away foreign merchants. Farmers who failed to sell their crops were unable to buy food. In April, shortly after the appointment of the new prime minister, the government reduced the price of cashew nuts. It remains to be seen if lower prices will boost production and exports. A long-term solution needs to be found to avoid widespread poverty and instability.

Winning donor and investor confidence is another crucial issue. The \$460 million pledged at the donor roundtable conference on Guinea-Bissau, held in Geneva in November 2006 has not been delivered. Investors, shaken by events in the first few months of the year, are slowly beginning to show interest in Guinea-Bissau again.

One issue that may return is the frequency of the UNOGBIS reports. The Ad Hoc Committee on Mandate Review has agreed to consider the suggestion of reports every six rather than three months.

### Council and Wider Dynamics

Guinea-Bissau remains a low priority for most members. Ghana is the lead country. The International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau remains quiescent.

The Council may be divided regarding the reporting cycle with countries like the US urging six months and others like Peru and Belgium preferring three months.

### Underlying Problems

Guinea-Bissau is growing as a transit point for cocaine-smuggling. Over the last two years there have been fifty known drug seizures. Without adequate funding the government has been unable to build capacity to control the narcotics trade. There is little coordination between the police, the border patrol, customs and the army in addition to the lack of proper prisons. With salaries unpaid in many government ministries, reports suggest that some officials are turning to the drug smugglers for extra income.

### UN Documents

#### Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1580 (22 December 2004) revised and extended the mandate of UNOGBIS.
- S/RES/1233 (6 April 1999) supported the decision of the Secretary-General to establish UNOGBIS.



#### Reports and Letters of the Secretary-General

- S/2007/158 (20 March 2007) was the latest report on UNOGBIS.
- S/2006/974 (8 December 2006) and S/2006/975 (13 December 2006) was an exchange of letters recommending extension of UNOGBIS until 31 December 2007 and noting the activities of UNOGBIS.

#### Other

- SC/8988 (29 March 2007) was the press statement expressing concern over the continuing political tensions.

#### Other Relevant Facts

##### Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNOGBIS

Shola Omoregie (Nigeria)

##### Size of UNOGBIS Staff

Twenty, including international civilians, military advisers, police advisers and local civilians

##### Duration

6 April 1999 to present

For historical background and a more complete list of UN documents please see our 23 December 2005 *Update*, and March and December 2006 *Forecasts* and March 2007 *Forecast*.

### Peacebuilding Commission

#### Expected PBC Action

In June the Organisational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is expected to select a new chair and two vice-chairs. The PBC's annual report should be finalised by the end of the month, along with integrated peacebuilding strategies for Burundi and Sierra Leone.

#### Key Recent Developments

A new chair and vice chair will be elected before the PBC session ends in June. Not all candidates are currently known. Japan may seek the chair while the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC) wants to retain one of the vice-chairs.

On 22 May, Jamaica was re-elected and Georgia replaced Croatia for two of the General Assembly seats on the Organisational Committee. This maintains the geographical balance following General Assembly resolution 60/261.

Luxembourg and the Czech Republic replaced Belgium and Poland for two of the ECOSOC seats on the Organisational Committee in February.

The membership of the top financial contributors seems likely to remain unchanged for another year.

### PBC Annual Report

The PBC's annual report is due by the end of June. After endorsement by the Organisational Committee, it will be submitted to the General Assembly and the Council.

PBC members agreed on the report's contents in principle in early May. Along with a description of PBC activities and country-specific meetings, it may include a section on rules of procedure and the relationship of the PBC with the General Assembly and the Council.

### Country-Specific Developments

Reports of the field missions to Sierra Leone and Burundi were submitted in May. Integrated peacebuilding strategy drafts are currently under discussion. For more details on the PBC's country-specific work, please see our April *Forecast* for Burundi and our May *Forecast* for Sierra Leone.

### Key Issues

Relations with the Council and the General Assembly remain a critical underlying issue. In January and February, during the debates on the PBC in the Council and General Assembly, there were many suggestions on harmonisation. (For more details, please see our March *Forecast*.) A key issue is how to proceed in a way that will allow both the General Assembly and the Council to have input in the PBC's activities without reviving the tensions surrounding the PBC's creation.

Publication of the PBC's annual report may give rise to similar issues. General Assembly resolution 60/180, which established the PBC, requires that it be submitted to the General Assembly for debate. Resolution 1646 requests that the report also be submitted to the Council.

### PBC Dynamics

There appears to be agreement that the Organisational Committee chair should go to an Asian country and one of the vice-chairs to a Western member.

### Underlying Problems

Some progress appears to have been made on modalities for civil society participation in the PBC. The ad hoc working group is expected to come up with concrete proposals early June.

### UN Documents

#### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1646 (20 December 2005) decided that the five permanent members and two elected members of the Council will have seats on the PBC's Organisational Committee.
- S/RES/1645 (20 December 2005) created the PBC and the Peace-building Fund.

#### Selected Security Council Debate

- S/PV.5627 and resumption 1 (31 January 2007) was the Council debate on the PBC.

#### Selected PBC Related Documents

- PBC/1/BDI/2 (21 May 2007) was the letter from the chair of the PBC's Organisational Committee transmitting the report of the country visit to Burundi.
- A/61/901-S/2007/269 (10 May 2007) was the letter from the chair of the PBC's Organisational Committee transmitting the report of the country visit to Sierra Leone.
- S/2006/1050 (26 December 2006) contained summaries of the October and December 2006 country-specific meetings.

#### Selected General Assembly Resolutions

- A/RES/60/261 (8 May 2006) decided the General Assembly seats on the PBC's Organisational Committee.

#### Other

- GA/10570 (6 February 2007) was the General Assembly debate on the PBC.
- E/2006/L.2/Rev.2 (12 April 2006) was the draft resolution adopted with the distribution of ECOSOC's seats on the Organisational Committee.

### Other Relevant Facts

#### PBC Organisational Committee Members (as of June 2007)

- Security Council: the P5 (China, France, Russia, UK and US), Panama and South Africa
- From the top ten financial contributors: Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Norway
- From the top ten military and police contributors: Bangladesh, Ghana, India, Nigeria and Pakistan
- ECOSOC: Angola, Brazil, Czech Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Luxembourg and Sri Lanka
- General Assembly: Burundi, Chile, Croatia, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji and Jamaica

#### Chairman of the PBC Organisational Committee

- Ambassador Ismael Gaspar Martins (Angola)

#### PBSO Head

- Carolyn McAskie (Canada)

#### PBSO Budget

- \$1.571 million

## International Criminal Tribunals

### Expected Council Action

The Council in mid June will receive briefings from the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR). By then, the Council should have received progress reports on the respective completion strategies of the ICTY and ICTR, due every six months. No substantive Council action is expected.

### Key Recent Developments

In December 2006, the Council received a briefing from the presidents and prosecutors of both tribunals on their completion strategy reports submitted in November. ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte asked the Council for "fresh guidance" about whether the tribunal should close its doors by 2010, the date indicated in resolutions 1503 and 1534 for both tribunals to complete all work. Remaining open until former Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadžić and military commander Ratko Mladic, both still at large, are tried was the alternative.

Hassan Bubacar Jallow, Prosecutor of the ICTR, said that the ICTR remained committed to the deadlines set by the Council and that major cases were expected to conclude during 2007 and 2008. However, ICTR President Erik Mose noted that with 18 indictees still at large, the court would not be able to complete all trials by the end of 2008. He made special mention of the efforts to apprehend Félicien Kabuga, a businessman accused of propelling the Rwandan massacres. According to Mose, the option of transferring cases to African countries other than Rwanda does not seem viable due to capacity and resource constraints, and the risk of overloading national judicial systems.

### Key Issues

A key issue is what will happen after 2010—referred to as the “legacy” issue. Aspects to be resolved include:

- trials for suspects still at large, principally Karadžić, Mladic and Kabuga;
- the handling of extant appeals and requests for suspension of serving sentence and pardons; and
- administrative issues, including maintaining archives of the tribunals’ work.

A key underlying issue is the current operating costs for the tribunals (approximately \$270 million for each tribunal in 2006-2007) and the financial implications of legacy related work.

### Council Dynamics

Council members seem to agree on the need to make progress on the legacy issues, but consensus on how to proceed after December 2010 is lacking. Russia considers the term set by resolutions 1503 and 1534 a fixed deadline, while European members see it as an indicative date. Developments over the year or so, particularly regarding the main fugitives, will likely shape Council members’ standpoints.

Differences over the costs of the possible modalities for the legacy issues are also likely. There may need to be discussion of the trade-off between costs and accessibility in terms of the tribunals’ archives.

The Council Working Group on Tribunals, an informal working group consisting of all Council members, is expected to explore options for the tribunals’ future in the coming months. It is likely that the tribunals themselves will provide considerable input.

### Options

The Council is not expected to address options for the tribunals beyond 2010 at this point. However, it is likely that this will have to be explored in more detail before the end of the year.

### Underlying Problems

The emerging reality is that the 2010 deadline is unlikely to be met by either tribunal because of the high number of appeals. The ICTY has indicated that it will probably not complete trials at first instance before late 2009. NGOs have appealed to the Council to extend the tribunals’ mandates if necessary to ensure that the remaining accused are apprehended and prosecuted.

### UN Documents

#### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1534 (26 March 2004) called on the ICTY and ICTR to review their respective caseloads and requested both tribunals to provide the Council with a progress assessment of their completion strategies every six months.
- S/RES/1503 (28 August 2003) called on the ICTY and ICTR to complete all trial activities in the first instance by the end of 2008 and to complete all work in 2010.
- S/RES/955 (8 November 1994) established the ICTR and contained its statute in the annex.
- S/RES/827 (25 May 1993) established the ICTY and approved the statute as proposed by the Secretary-General in his report S/25704.

#### Selected Reports of the Secretary-General

- S/25704 (3 May 1993) contained the statute of the ICTY, as requested by resolution 808 of 22 February 1993.

#### Selected Letters

- S/2006/951 (30 November 2006) was the letter from the ICTR president to the Council president containing the latest progress report on the implementation of the completion strategy.
- S/2006/898 (15 November 2006) was the letter from the ICTY president to the Council president containing the latest progress report on the implementation of the completion strategy.
- S/2006/358 (29 May 2006) was the letter from the ICTR president to the



Council president containing a revised version and assessment of the ICTR completion strategy.

- S/2006/353 (29 May 2006) was the letter from the ICTY president to the Council president containing the assessment of and report on the ICTY completion strategy.

#### Other Relevant Documents

- A/61/271-S/2006/666 (21 August 2006) was the last annual report of the ICTY.
- A/61/265-S/2006/658 (16 August 2006) was the last annual report of the ICTR.
- S/PV.5594 (15 December 2006) is the transcript of the last Security Council briefing by the presidents and prosecutors of the ICTY and ICTR.

#### Other Relevant Facts

##### ICTY

- Six accused at large, including former Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadžić and his military commander Ratko Mladic
- 15 accused at the pre-trial stage; 11 referred to a national jurisdiction; 23 on trial; 29 at the appeal stage

##### ICTR

- 18 accused at large, including Félicien Kabuga, a businessman accused of propelling the Rwandan massacres
- 11 accused awaiting trial; 25 on trial; six at the appeal stage

## Notable Dates for June

Reports Due for Consideration in June	Relevant Document
1 June	<i>Commissioner's quarterly UNMOVIC report (UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission)</i> <b>S/RES/1284</b>
1 June	<i>SG semi-annual UNFICYP report (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus)</i> <b>S/RES/1728</b>
early June	<i>SG semi-annual report on Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property</i> <b>S/RES/1284</b>
6 June	<i>Report of the Liberia Sanctions Committee's Panel of Experts</i> <b>S/RES/1731</b>
8 June	<i>SG quarterly UNAMI report (UN Assistance Mission in Iraq)</i> <b>S/RES/1700</b>
early June	<i>The Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT) report and recommendations are due before the 1701 report. However, the assessment will take two to three weeks to complete and its report, along with the 1701 report, are likely to be delayed.</i> <b>S/PRST/2007/12</b>
12 June	<i>SG quarterly report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (Lebanon)</i> <b>S/PRST/2006/52</b>
mid June	<i>SG quarterly UNMIK report (UN Mission in Kosovo)</i> <b>S/RES/1244</b>
mid June	<i>Semi-Annual progress reports on the respective completion strategies of the ICTY and ICTR</i> <b>S/RES/1534</b>
15 June	<i>Report of the Côte d'Ivoire Sanctions Committee's Group of Experts</i> <b>S/RES/1727</b>
20 June	<i>SG semi-annual UNDOF report (UN Disengagement Observer Force)</i> <b>S/RES/1729</b>
22 June	<i>SG quarterly UNOGBIS report (UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau)</i> <b>S/RES/1580</b>
26 June	<i>SG semi-annual BONUCA report (UN Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic)</i> <b>S/PRST/2006/47</b>
late June	<i>Interim report of the Sudan Sanction Committee's Panel of Experts</i> <b>S/RES/1713</b>
30 June	<i>SG quarterly UNMIL report including drawdown plans (UN Mission in Liberia)</i> <b>S/RES/1750</b>
30 June	<i>SG report on Somalia including progress on a national reconciliation conference and contingency planning for a possible UN peacekeeping mission</i> <b>S/PRST/2007/13</b>
30 June	<i>SG monthly report on Darfur</i> <b>S/RES/1590</b>

June 2007	Mandates Expire	Relevant Document
15 June	UNFICYP	<b>S/RES/1728</b>
15 June	Group of Experts of the Côte d'Ivoire Sanctions Committee	<b>S/RES/1727</b>
20 June	Panel of Experts of the Liberia Sanctions Committee	<b>S/RES/1731</b>
30 June	UNOCI	<b>S/RES/1739</b>
30 June	UNDOF	<b>S/RES/1729</b>

### June 2007 Other Important Dates

30 May-11 June	A UN delegation will visit Darfur to assess the possibility of starting peace talks. The delegation will also visit Khartoum, Chad and Eritrea.
4 June	The Special Court for Sierra Leone has reported that Charles Taylor's trial at the Court's outpost in The Hague will begin.
6-8 June	G8 Summit in Germany
11 June	The IAEA Board of Governors will meet in Vienna regarding Iran.
11-18 June	Fifth Session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva
15 June	Resolution 1723 called for a review of the Multinational Force, the Development Fund for Iraq and International Advisory and Monitoring Board in Iraq.
15 June	Serge Brammertz's appointment as the UNIIIC Commissioner expires (S/2006/998 and 999).
20 June	The previously scheduled constituent assembly elections in Nepal will likely be delayed until mid-November.
22 June	The Council will likely hold an open debate on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.
25 June	The Council will likely hold an open debate on natural resources and conflict.
30 June	Parliamentary elections are scheduled in Timor-Leste.

Also expected in June:

- The Council is planning a visiting mission in late June to Addis Ababa and Ghana in advance of July's AU Summit. They will also be traveling to the DRC, Côte d'Ivoire and Sudan.
- The Organisational Committee of the Peacebuilding Commission is expected to select a new chair and two vice-chairs. Its annual report is also expected to be finalised by the end of the month.
- The ICC Chief Prosecutor is likely to brief the Council on the Darfur case.
- A Somali national reconciliation conference in Mogadishu is tentatively scheduled for mid-June, postponed from 16 April.

## Important Dates over the Horizon

- An AU Summit is scheduled for 1-3 July in Ghana.
- A rebel unity conference in South Sudan this July has been agreed to in principle ahead of possible peace talks with the Sudanese government.
- There are media reports that the Government of Sudan has promised demarcation of the north-south border, perhaps as early as July, well in advance of the 14 November census, delayed from 30 June.
- Presidential and legislative elections in Sierra Leone are expected 11 August.
- A high-level meeting on climate change is being planned on the sidelines of this September's General Assembly with a view to a UN conference in Bali in December.
- There are media reports that the Nabih Berri will convene the Lebanese parliament on 25 September to elect a new president.
- The Secretary-General's next reports on the thematic issues of Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict and Women, Peace & Security are expected by October.
- Local elections in the DRC are expected in the second half of 2007.
- Parliamentary elections in Kosovo are expected in late 2007.
- A workshop on security sector reform, a joint initiative of Slovakia and South Africa, is being planned for later in 2007 in Africa.
- Presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire are now expected by January 2008, postponed from 31 October.

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