The United States will have the Council presidency in May. At this stage, no thematic debates are planned. The new US Permanent Representative, Zalmay Khalilzad, who comes to the UN with recent experience as an ambassador in two countries on the Council agenda, will be the chair.

Open meetings of the Council expected in May include:
- a debate on Bosnia and Herzegovina will include a briefing by the High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement;
- there will be an open briefing by the chairs of the three committees dealing with terrorist issues, the Al-Qaeda and Taliban (1267), the Counter-terrorism (1373) and the Weapons of Mass Destruction (1540) Committees;
- adoption of a resolution extending the mandate of the operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUC (the only mandate renewal envisaged for May); and
- the regular monthly briefing on the Middle East.

Additional open meetings are likely to be added to the programme of work as various situations evolve. The Council is also likely to be briefed in May on the humanitarian situation in the Great Lakes region of Africa and Somalia by Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

Important matters pending before the Council include:
- the formation of the tribunal of international character to prosecute the suspects in the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri is still pending. On 6 February, Lebanon and the UN, with approval from the Security Council, signed an agreement for the establishment of the tribunal. But the ratification process is blocked by political factions in Beirut.
- the draft resolution on small arms circulated by Argentina in March 2006 seems to have lapsed. South Africa circulated a draft presidential statement in March 2007. The issue was included as a footnote on the Council’s calendar in March and April but it has not yet been taken up. The absence of a Council decision on this matter leaves future periodic Secretary-General’s reports in abeyance.
- on Darfur, has been taken to impose “strong effective measures, such as assets freeze or travel ban, against any individual or group that violates or attempts to block the implementation of the [Darfur Peace] Agreement or commits human rights violations.” A number of proposals are being considered but divisions remain.
- Action on the Secretary-General’s recommendations for a peacekeeping force in Chad and the Central African Republic is still awaited, because of Chad’s hesitation about both the proposed robust military component and a credible political reconciliation process.
- on the DRC, the Council is still to consider imposing individual sanctions under resolution 1698 against armed groups that recruit children.
- On West Africa, the Council held consultations on the Secretary-General’s report on cross-border issues on 16 March but no follow-up has been considered, which may put future reports in that regard in abeyance.
- The Council is still waiting for the Secretary-General’s recommendations on the status of the Sheb’a Farms. In his last report on implementation of resolution 1701 (issued on 14 March), the Secretary-General mentioned good progress on the cartographic analysis of the status of the farms, and said that the technical work would be completed by the next reporting period in mid-June.
- The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire, requested by a presidential statement, has still not been made public. Also on Côte d’Ivoire, the December 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not been published.
- Since the beginning of the year, the Council has had difficulty agreeing on the plans for its visiting missions. Under discussion were trips to West Africa (including Côte d’Ivoire), Timor-Leste, Central Africa and the Middle East. So far, only one mission, to Kosovo, was agreed by all members, and it is underway at press time. A Council mission to meet with AU leadership (in Addis Ababa and Accra) is another possibility.
- The 2005 World Summit requested reforms relating to the Military Staff Committee. This has yet to be addressed.
Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes following his trips to those areas.

Consultations are expected on:
- Kosovo (on the establishment of an international tribunal; on the mission to the Syrian-Lebanese border; and on resolution 1559, respectively);
- Kosovo;
- Nepal;
- Ethiopia/Eritrea;
- Sierra Leone;
- Burundi (possibly just a briefing by the head of BINUB, the UN political office there);
- Sudan;
- Côte d’Ivoire; and
- Haiti.

Kosovo:

Sudan:

Haiti:

Expected Council Action

In early May the Council is expected to consider the report from its April mission to Kosovo and move closer to deciding how to handle the report released in March by Martti Ahtisaari, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo. Ahtisaari recommended independence for Kosovo supervised by the international community.

There is still great uncertainty on how far Council discussions will progress in May on a new resolution to replace 1244, which in 1999 authorised NATO to enforce the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and established the legal framework for UN administration by the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

Key Recent Developments

Kosovo was considered in the Council in April during procedural discussions on the programme of work. It took hours to reconcile the various positions regarding the format for the presentation of Ahtisaari’s report and status package. Russia wanted an open debate, while the US and UK wanted closed informal consultations. Eventually, the Council agreed to hold a closed formal meeting, which allowed Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica to participate. To allow Kosovo’s President, Fatmir Sejdiu, to speak, an Arria formula meeting was held immediately afterwards. The Council members then moved to closed informal consultations on Ahtisaari’s
status package and Russia’s proposal for a Council mission to Kosovo and Serbia.

On 13 April the Council agreed to Russia’s proposal to send a mission to Kosovo and Serbia. The mission, led by Ambassador Johan Verbekle of Belgium, took place from 25–29 April visiting Belgrade, Pristina and Mitrovica, with stops en route in Brussels and Vienna. The members met with EU and NATO representatives, senior officials in Serbia and Kosovo as well as with civil society and religious leaders. The objectives of the mission were to obtain first-hand information on progress in Kosovo and receive information directly from local actors in Belgrade and Kosovo.

Throughout April there was a flurry of diplomatic activity. The Chinese deputy premier and Russia’s foreign minister made separate visits to Serbia in mid-April. Serbia began its own diplomatic offensive with visits to South Africa, Indonesia and Qatar to court the non-permanent members of the Council. The EU and members of the Contact Group on Kosovo (the US, the UK, France, Italy, Russia and Germany) met in Moscow on 20 April and held several meetings at different levels at the end of April.

Options
The Council has a range of options spanning a spectrum from deciding to begin to draft a resolution implementing the Ahtisaari recommendations, to deciding to re-start negotiations with a new mediator. At this stage, neither of these looks likely. Other possibilities may include:
- waiting while efforts are made in the Contact Group to reach agreement between the US, Europeans and Russians;
- seeking to find an accommodation with Russia based on greater protection for the Serbian minority (in effect picking up Russia’s point about better implementation of resolution 1244);
- a group of members preparing a draft resolution with a view to formally introducing it with co-sponsors and pressing for a vote;
- deciding to request a briefing on alternative models other than independence, including the wider UN experience in this context; or
- adopting an “interim” resolution that does not decide on final status and specifically reserves that for a later date but puts in place the bulk of the legislative and administrative machinery recommended by Ahtisaari.

Key Issues
A key issue will be whether the Council mission to the region changes members’ positions or reinforces their previous views. While the discussions in April were essentially only procedural they revealed that not enough members were convinced that Ahtisaari’s option is the only solution leaving the Council without the necessary nine votes to adopt a resolution.

If there continues to be significant opposition, a related key issue will be how to minimise the risk of violence while the Council decides how to proceed. If it appears that the issue is losing momentum in the Council, those eager to create instability in either Kosovo or Serbia could trigger acts of violence as time passes. In this context there is also the issue of a possible unilateral declaration of independence.

Another issue is public perceptions of Council unity. There seem to be growing concerns about legitimacy if any Council decision on Kosovo’s status is taken by a narrow majority.

The key substantive issues, which are at the heart of the divisions in the Council, are getting little discussion. The first is the question of the Council’s legal authority to impose a solution on Kosovo and the potential precedent in doing so. The other is whether the negotiations are really exhausted and whether all alternatives have been sufficiently addressed. Related to both these issues is the question of whether a little time spent on these aspects may make it easier, in the end, for a larger number of elected members to justify voting in support of a resolution.

A possible issue that could impact the Council is EU unity. Initially EU members had a relatively firm common position. However, there are recent signs of possible differentiation. It remains to be seen whether this will have any meaningful impact.

Council Dynamics
Council unity on this issue is under strain. European members and the US advocate moving quickly towards a decision on Kosovo’s status. The US and the UK are

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<table>
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<th>Status Update since our April Forecast</th>
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<td><strong>Recent developments on the situations covered in our April Forecast are covered in the relevant briefs in this issue. However, other interesting Council developments in April included:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Threats to International Peace and Security:</strong> On 12 and 13 April the Council condemned three terrorist attacks in Algeria (S/PRST/2007/10) and Iraq (S/PRST/2007/11).</td>
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<td><strong>Georgia:</strong> On 13 April the Council adopted resolution 1752 extending UNOMIG’s mandate until 15 October and encouraging the resumption of dialogue and the implementation of confidence-building measures as recommended in the Secretary-General’s most recent report (S/2007/182).</td>
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<td><strong>North Korea:</strong> On 16 April, Ambassador Marcello Spatafora of Italy, chair of the 1718 Sanctions Committee, reported to the Council that the implementation of sanctions on North Korea was proceeding smoothly.</td>
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<td><strong>Energy, Security and Climate:</strong> On 17 April the Council held a ministerial-level debate on the relationship between energy, security and climate, initiated by the April presidency of the UK and chaired by its Foreign Secretary (S/PV.5663 and Res. 1). It was the first time the Council addressed the potential impact of climate change on security. There was no formal outcome (SC/9000). Both NAM (S/2007/203) and the G77+China (S/2007/211) sent letters to the Security Council expressing concern about Council encroachment on prerogatives of the General Assembly and ECOSOC. (Please see our 12 April Update.)</td>
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<td><strong>Liberia:</strong> The Council reviewed the Liberian diamond sanctions on 18 April. On 27 April the Council adopted resolution 1753 ending the six-year ban and calling for a review of its decision in ninety days to ensure that Liberia continues to meet the requirements of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. (Please see our 26 April Update.)</td>
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<td><strong>Western Sahara:</strong> In April both Morocco (S/2007/206) and the Polisario Front (S/2007/210) transmitted their respective proposals to the Security Council for a solution for Western Sahara. At press time, the Council was expected to renew MINURSO’s mandate, which expires on 30 April, for a further six months and possibly support negotiations between the two sides as recommended by the Secretary-General in his latest report (S/2007/202). (Please see our 18 April Update.)</td>
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the principal champions for a speedy resolution. European members are arguing that this is a priority issue for Europe and that the issue is being driven by the facts on the ground. Russia is against an imposed solution and is advocating further negotiations with the parties.

There is a sense amongst the Europeans that Russia was accommodated over two important issues, procedural rights for Serbia to address the Council and the mission to the region, and that in return it should now begin negotiations on a resolution. Russia is hinting, however, that there remain unfulfilled elements of resolution 1244 which justify further delay.

Many of the non-permanent members feel a more thorough assessment of the substantive issues is required before a decision is made. Russia’s proposal for a mission to Kosovo provided many with a convenient way out in the short-term. But it remains to be seen whether the picture looks easier upon their return. It seems many of the non-permanent members have still not decided if they would endorse Ahtisaari’s recommendation if it were put to a vote. Although supporters of Ahtisaari’s recommendation argue that Kosovo is a unique case, many members find it hard to believe that it will not become a precedent.

For Indonesia, territorial integrity is a fundamental principle based in its own constitution. South Africa feels that the Council would be overreaching if it were to implement Ahtisaari’s package.

Latin American members Panama and Peru, who may be the swing votes necessary to secure a majority, will play an important role in May and their impressions after the visit to the region seem likely to be influential.

Council dynamics are also likely to be impacted by the fact that significant discussions will be going on, bilaterally, in capitals and no doubt at progressively higher levels.

### UN Documents

#### Security Council Resolution
- **S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999)** authorised NATO to secure and enforce the withdrawal of Yugoslav (FRY) forces from Kosovo and established UNMIK.

#### Selected Presidential Statement
- **S/PRES/2005/51 (24 October 2005)**

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declared it was time to begin the political process to determine the future status of Kosovo.

### Selected Secretary-General’s Reports/Letters
- **S/2007/168 and Add. 1 (26 March 2007)** was the letter transmitting Ahtisaari’s report on Kosovo’s future status and the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.
- **S/2007/134 (9 March 2007)** was the latest report of the Secretary-General on UNMIK.
- **S/2007/130 (6 March 2007)** was the letter reporting on the operations of the Kosovo Force from 1 to 31 December 2006.

### Other Relevant Facts

#### Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Future Status Process
- Martti Ahtisaari (Finland)

#### Special Representative of the Secretary-General
- Joachim Rucker (Germany)

#### UNMIK
- **Size of UNMIK mission**: 36 military observers, 1,984 police, 506 international staff, 2,001 local staff, 143 UN volunteers as of 30 September 2006
- **Size of OSCE mission**: 1020 (Pillar 3) and 461 (Pillar 4), 252 international staff, 768 local staff
- **Size of EU mission**: 125 international staff, 336 local staff

### Cost
- US$2.218 billion for fiscal year 2006/2007 (not including OSCE, EU and NATO expenditures)

#### KFOR (NATO FORCE)
- **General Roland Kathner (Germany)**

### Size and Composition of Mission
- **Size**: 16,000 troops
- **NATO countries**: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, UK, US
- **Non-NATO countries**: Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Morocco, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine

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### Lebanon

#### Expected Council Action
The fifth semi-annual report on the implementation of resolution 1559, due 19 April, was postponed because the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy Terje Roed-Larsen was in Syria with the Secretary-General. Consultations previously scheduled for 30 April were delayed. These are likely to take place in early May. A presidential statement is likely.

The Council is also likely in May to consider recommendations by the Under Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, Nicolas Michel, on the next steps for the establishment of the special tribunal for the alleged murderers of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and others.

The Council also expects a report from the Secretary-General following the independent mission to assess monitoring of the Syrian-Lebanese border. This could lead the Council to consider further steps to implement the arms embargo.

#### Key Recent Developments
The Arab League Summit of 28 and 29 March in Riyadh did not produce progress on political reconciliation as had been hoped.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Lebanon on 29 March and said that dialogue and compromise remained the key to national unity.

On 4 April, Ban Ki-moon received a memorandum from seventy Lebanese parliamentarians calling for a Chapter VII resolution to establish the tribunal for the alleged Hariri murderers, since its ratification by the parliament was still being blocked by the opposition. This was supported by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora.

On 17 April, the Council adopted a presidential statement sponsored by France, the UK, and the US:
- reiterating concern at Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace and “mounting information by Israel” of illegal movement of arms across the Syrian-Lebanese border;
- supporting an independent mission to assess the monitoring of the border and report back to the Council before the next 1701 report due mid-June, and expressing its intention to consider reinforcing the arms embargo; and
- expressing concern at statements by Hezbollah of various armed activities.
The statement touched upon all other 1701 issues, but the issue of political reconciliation received relatively limited space.

Following a request by opposition leader Nabih Berri, the Secretary-General sent Nicolas Michel to Lebanon on 17 April to offer legal assistance for the tribunal. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Sultanov, who also met with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, was in Syria at the same time. Michel stated that it may become necessary for the Council to move to a Chapter VII resolution.

The Secretary-General met with President Al-Assad on 24 April. The Syrian president assured Ban of his cooperation in all matters relating to peace and security in the Middle East, including on border delineation with Lebanon. The Secretary-General noted that the basis for comprehensive peace in the Middle East involved an end to the occupation of Arab territory. He also said that it was important to establish the tribunal based on a national consensus, and that Syria could promote such consensus.

Options
The Council has the following options:

- take up the outstanding political reconciliation issues (perhaps following up on the 1559 report), or wait until the next 1701 reporting period and combine relevant elements;
- initiate a Chapter VII resolution establishing the tribunal, or wait until the next UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) reporting period (in June) to provide a last chance for a domestic parliamentary solution; or
- after receiving the report on the border assessment mission, consider options for reinforcement of monitoring assistance.

Key Issues
The first issue is whether the 1559 report (and the Secretary-General’s observations following his visit to Syria) will suggest encouraging openings for Council action to reinforce the political negotiation track. There are some expectations that the report will clarify the key significance of the current political crisis in Lebanon for making progress on the disarmament process.

Another issue is whether to establish the tribunal under Chapter VII now, or whether there is still a chance for a domestic political solution. The Council’s credibility is at risk, along with rule of law in Lebanon. A resolution could provide the necessary impetus for ending the current standoff. However, a Chapter VII resolution could also upset the already fragile political balance.

Council Dynamics
Lengthy negotiations preceded the adoption of the April presidential statement. The draft was challenged by Russia, Congo, South Africa, Indonesia and Qatar. It seems that Russia was initially opposed to the border assessment mission, saying it was premature and could open a Pandora’s box of sanctions. The Secretary-General, in a letter, reassured Council members that the Lebanese government welcomed the idea and that the mission would be small and complete its work within a limited period of time.

There was much redrafting, especially on the issue of arms smuggling, to ensure an appropriately balanced text.

It seems unlikely that the Council is ready at this point to support a significant reinforcement of the arms embargo through an enhanced sanctions regime. Many, including Russia and Indonesia, would prefer an increase in technical assistance as a first step.

While France, the UK and the US may be ready to consider giving the tribunal a Chapter VII mandate, it is not clear whether Russia and Indonesia would support this option. They, and others, think it would further polarise the political crisis in Lebanon. They still hope the current standoff can be resolved through dialogue.

The new US Ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, has identified Lebanon as one of his priorities and this is likely to influence Council dynamics to some extent, especially during the US presidency in May.

Most Recent UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

Presidential Statements
- S/PRST/2007/12 (17 April 2007) welcomed the report of the Secretary-General on resolution 1701 and welcomed his intention to dispatch a border assessment mission.

Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2007/147 (14 March 2007) was the latest report on resolution 1701.
- S/2006/832 (19 October 2006) was the latest report on resolution 1559.

Letters
- S/2007/207 (13 April 2007) was the letter of the Secretary-General with details on the border assessment mission.
- S/2007/199 (11 April 2007) was the letter from Israel responding to the latest 1701 report.
- S/2007/159 (20 March 2007) was the letter from Lebanon requesting a one year renewal of the UNIIIC mandate.

For other relevant facts, please refer to our April Forecast.

Useful Additional Sources
- The Shi’a in the Arab World, Middle East Report, Spring 2007, No. 242
- Restarting Israeli-Syrian Negotiations, International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 63, 10 April 2007

Expected Council Action
In May, Council members will turn increased attention to securing Khartoum’s compliance with its commitments on the hybrid AU-UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur. It remains to be seen whether the Council will also put weight behind the political process, including a Libya-sponsored initiative on re-establishing a peace process in Darfur involving representatives of Sudan, Chad, Libya, Eritrea, the United Nations, the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union and the African Union. It seems likely that the sanctions proposal will continue to hover in the wings as a counterweight to further stalling.

At press time, members were negotiating a US draft renewing UNMIS for three months but also addressing Darfur and expressing the Council’s intention to establish the hybrid operation and requesting the Secretary-General to:

- ensure that the future hybrid force arrangements allow for robust protection, and provide for UN command and control in accordance with the Addis Ababa agreement as well as UN financial management and oversight mechanisms; and
- conclude the arrangements and submit recommendations to the Council on the hybrid force promptly.
Russia, China, Qatar and Indonesia initially expressed some concern with the inclusion of language on Darfur in the UNMIS draft. At press time, it seems that members are keen on finding compromise language on the Darfur issue and adopting the resolution by 30 April, when UNMIS expires.

Key Recent Developments

The humanitarian situation in Darfur remains dire, with regular attacks against civilians, humanitarian workers and troops of the AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS).

Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes briefed the Council on 4 April on his visit to the region, stressing that, despite some improvement, “[i]f things do not get better…the [humanitarian] operation could start to unravel”.

Seven AMIS troops were killed in April. On 5 April the AU Peace and Security Council demanded an investigation, stressed the need for robust peacekeeping in Darfur, including the deployment of six additional AMIS battalions as authorised last September, and urged lifting restrictions on the freedom of movement of AMIS.

On the political front the AU and UN envoys on Darfur, Salim A. Salim and Jan Eliasson respectively, continued developing regional contacts to build momentum for peace talks. Some encouraging developments were seen but unprecedented fragmentation seems to be developing among rebel groups, communities and government-sponsored Janjaweed militias.

In late March, meetings were held on the sidelines of the Arab League’s summit in Riyadh to encourage Sudan to agree to the heavy support package. The meetings included UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, AU Chairman Alpha Konaré, Arab League head Amr Moussa, Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki and Saudi King Abdullah.

Pressure on Sudan increased in early April, including repeated threats of sanctions from the US, the UK and Germany and unprecedented strong signals from China. South African President Thabo Mbeki visited Sudan in early April.

The US and the UK had begun preparing a draft resolution strengthening sanctions.

Following the Riyadh meetings, however, the Secretary-General urged delay to allow for more consultations with Sudan. These were held on 9 April in Addis Ababa, and Khartoum confirmed acceptance of the package in a 16 April letter.

Follow-up informal meetings involving Council members, the Secretary-General, Konaré, Salim and Eliasson took place on 16-17 April. The Secretary-General said that the next steps would involve the preparation of a road map for the political process and a development pact; and moving on with troop generation and financing for peacekeeping.

In a 17 April letter, the Council confirmed endorsement of the heavy package and the provision of existing and additional UN resources for this purpose.

Efforts to gain regional support for robust peacekeeping also continued in April, with a visit by US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte to Sudan, Chad and Libya.

The Secretariat met prospective troop and police contributors for the heavy package deployment on 19 April. Initial pledges were apparently made by Ethiopia, Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Jordan, Bolivia, Thailand, Sweden and Norway. There seem to be as well some initial pledges for the hybrid operation, but troop contributors seem to prefer waiting for a Council resolution setting the terms of the operation before coming forward.

On the sanctions front, the latest report of the Panel of Experts was leaked to the press. The Panel apparently found continuing violations of the arms embargo and evidence that Sudanese aircraft had been painted white to resemble UN equipment. The US requested that the report be issued as a document, but it seems that China, Russia and Qatar objected. The committee operates by consensus.

Related Developments in the Human Rights Council

After lengthy negotiations, the Human Rights Council adopted by consensus on 30 March a resolution on the human rights situation in Darfur.

The resolution, a compromise between the EU and the African Group, established a seven-person group to be chaired by the special rapporteur on human rights in Sudan to work with Khartoum and the AU to “foster the implementation of resolutions and recommendations on Darfur”, and to “contribute to monitoring the human rights situation on the ground”. The group is expected to report by the time the Human Rights Council meets on 11-18 June.

Options

The sanctions option has not been taken off the table, but in light of recent developments is likely to be put on hold pending further developments on the hybrid mission.

The most likely options for Council action are to:

- press for the speedy conclusion of AU-UN arrangements on the hybrid force;
- encourage constructive engagement of regional actors such as Libya;
- advocate provision of increased resources for the peace process, and an enlarged support team for Eliasson and Salim; and
- endorse the reactivation of the Darfur peace process, perhaps with a deadline for an immediate ceasefire and increases in humanitarian access to be verified by the Panel of Experts.

Key Issues

The key issue is ensuring that:

- the phased approach already agreed by all parties is implemented and that Sudan honours its commitments without raising new impediments;
- a peace process in Darfur is re-established;
- humanitarian access improves; and
- AMIS has sufficient resources until the UN accepts responsibility for operations and funding with the hybrid operation.

Time is also an issue. Progress with peace talks may be protracted, particularly given fragmentation among rebels. Furthermore, the deployment of the heavy package is likely to take six months and the hybrid operation about ten. Key issues arising here are:

- the hybrid operation’s mandate, size and command and control;
- ensuring that UN accountability, procurement and managerial standards are in place;
- securing funding commitment from the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee;
- generating troops for the heavy support (2,250 troops and 675 police) and the hybrid operation (17,300 military and 5,000 police). The package also depends on the deployment of two additional AMIS battalions, which AU commissioner Konaré reportedly said would depend on funding; and
- the continuing delays in appointing a new Special Representative of the Secretary-General and head of UNMIS.
Council and Wider Dynamics

Wide international pressure, including sanctions looming in the background, and increased Chinese and regional involvement seem to have been instrumental in securing Sudan’s agreement. Khartoum’s prevarication seems to have encouraged some coordination between the US and China on pressuring Sudan. Despite apparent recent progress, however, the possibility that Khartoum may continue to flout its commitments remains.

The US and the UK in particular have stressed the importance of the hybrid force. US President George W. Bush signalled on 19 April that sanctions had been put off for the moment but would be pursued again should Sudan continue to prevaricate.

China, Russia, South Africa, Qatar and Indonesia are likely to continue to oppose sanctions and prefer allowing more time for dialogue. China has nonetheless come under some pressure, including most recently a proposed boycott of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, if the crisis in Sudan is not addressed.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1706 (31 August 2006) set a mandate for UNMIS in Darfur.
- S/RES/1591 (29 March 2005) and 1556 (30 July 2004) imposed sanctions in Darfur.
- S/RES/1590 (24 March 2005) established UNMIS.

Selected Presidential Statement

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2007/213 (17 April 2007) was the latest quarterly report on Sudan.
- S/2007/104 (23 February 2007) was the latest monthly report on Darfur at press time.
- S/2006/591 (28 July 2006) and Add. 1 (28 August 2006) and S/2006/645 (10 August 2006) made recommendations for the UNMIS mandate in Darfur and for UN assistance to AMIS.

Other Relevant Facts

UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Vacant

Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
Jan Eliasson (Sweden)

UNMIS: Size, Composition and Cost
- Maximum authorised strength: up to 27,300 military and 6,015 police
- Strength as of 31 March 2007: 9,365 military and 662 police
- Key troop contributors: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Egypt and China
- Cost: 1 July 2006-30 June 2007 $1,126.30 million (excludes Darfur)

UNMIS: Duration
24 March 2005 to present; mandate expires 30 April 2007 at press time.

AU Special Envoy
Salim A. Salim

AMIS: Size and Composition
- Total authorised strength: about 10,000 military and 1,500 police
- Strength as of 1 September 2006: 5,703 military and 1,425 police
- Key troop contributors: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Senegal

AMIS: Duration
25 May 2004 to present; mandate expires 1 July 2007

Iran

Expected Council Action
By 23 May the Council expects to receive the report of the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohammad ElBaradei, on Iran’s compliance with resolution 1747, which in March imposed additional measures against Iran. A negative report from the IAEA is expected. However, Council action is unlikely in May, especially if the initial signs of progress in talks between EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana and Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, being reported as we went to press, continue to bear fruit.

Key Recent Developments
On 22 February, ElBaradei confirmed that Iran had not complied with resolution 1737, which in December imposed measures against Iran under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. He noted that, instead, Iran seemed to be expanding its enrichment activities.

In response, on 24 March the Council adopted resolution 1747 unanimously. It represented a relatively small escalation beyond earlier measures by:

- toughening language on travel restrictions (but did not establish a travel ban);
- establishing a ban on Iran’s export of arms and called upon states to exercise restraint in the supply of heavy conventional weapons to Iran;
- tightening financial measures by calling upon states not to enter into new commitments for financial assistance to Iran and by adding new names to the list of individuals and entities subject to asset freeze; and
- reaffirming that all measures would be suspended if Iran suspends uranium enrichment and would be terminated when Iran fully complies with its obligations. In case of non-compliance, the Council would adopt further measures under article 41 of Chapter VII.

The EU3+3—consisting of France, Germany and the UK, plus China, Russia and the US—seem to have agreed that trading substance for speed would be preferable, producing smaller increments but allowing an easier and quicker consensus. However, several elected Council members proposed amendments to the EU3+3 draft resolution.

- South Africa proposed to revive Moham med ElBaradei’s “timeout” offer of mid-January involving a simultaneous suspension of both Iranian nuclear work and UN sanctions to allow space for discussions. However, in South Africa’s proposal, the Council would unilaterally decide to suspend all measures against Iran for a period of ninety days, which amounted to a sequential timeout. South Africa also suggested deletion of the weapons ban and names included in the annex (in particular, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and Bank Sepah).
Indonesia and Qatar proposed recalling the goal of a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction.

Indonesia suggested language relating to nuclear disarmament by nuclear-weapon states, in conformity with article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Some of these amendments were accepted. Language was included relating to the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, explanations for each individual and entity subject to sanctions and a new annex containing the EU3+3’s incentives for a long-term solution.

Iran responded with further restrictions on its cooperation with the IAEA. On 10 April, Iran announced that it had completed the nuclear fuel cycle and that it had plans to install 50,000 centrifuges. The EU has recently agreed to impose bilateral sanctions beyond the scope of resolution 1747: a total arms embargo, additional names of individuals and entities subject to assets freeze and a travel ban to the EU.

On 25 April, the EU’s Javier Solana and Iran’s Ali Larijani held talks in Ankara, the first face-to-face meeting since 11 February. Larijani said that they were approaching “a united view”. Another round of talks is scheduled in mid-May.

Options

Options include:

- commencing negotiations on a further draft resolution following the logic of incremental pressure within article 41 of the UN Charter; this could include travel bans on individuals already subject to assets freeze, additional names, the replacement of “calls upon” with “decide” for several provisions, etc.;
- reconsidering the “timeout” proposal; and
- discussing whether there is scope for adjusting the current preconditions for resuming negotiations.

Key Issues

At this stage the main issue is whether the process of incremental pressure will continue, or whether the EU3+3 will adopt a different path.

A related issue is how much longer the incremental pressure approach will be viable. A succession of small increments until all measures under article 41 of Chapter VII are exhausted could take quite some time. Meanwhile, Iran is developing its nuclear programme—apparently quite rapidly. The question therefore is whether, or when, the current strategy will reach the point of diminishing returns.

A further issue is whether, in light of the tensions in the Council in March over the amendment proposals from elected members, a different approach will be followed in terms of securing the support of the wider Council membership.

Council Dynamics

Despite the apparently positive first round of talks between Solana and Larijani, there are concerns that Iran may use its claims of recent technological advances to raise the stakes at the next round of talks. Because the NPT additional protocol is not being implemented by Iran, thus limiting access by IAEA inspectors to nuclear sites, it is difficult to fully verify Iran’s statements.

There seems to be a wide assumption, not just among Council members, that a new resolution will follow in the event of continued Iranian obduracy. The March process would likely repeat itself, with the US and the Europeans pushing for significant additional measures and Russia and China preferring small increments. A common position will however be found.

Indonesia, South Africa and Qatar all share a concern with Iran’s increasing lack of cooperation with the IAEA. This concern was significant enough for them to vote in favour of resolution 1747, even though their amendments were not all included in the draft.

But they also believe that the Council should limit itself to measures strictly related to non-proliferation and always signal that the door to negotiations is still open. In that regard, South Africa may be reluctant to support further financial measures on individuals and entities for which the proliferation-sensitive link is not clearly established, or with obligatory measures related to conventional weapons. For the US and the Europeans, the goal will be to apply genuine pressure on Iran to obtain compliance, even if that means measures going beyond the nuclear industry.

The potential for agreement among the P5 remains high. Consensus was quickly achieved in March on the substance of resolution 1747, and the amendment proposals from elected members did not unravel that agreement. Russia seems to be adopting a steadily more cautious stance about Iran’s intentions. Also, as Iran becomes less responsive to IAEA inspectors, China and the elected members become more open to article 41 measures.

By 4 April, 61 countries had reported to the Sanctions Committee on steps taken to comply with resolution 1737.

Underlying Problems

Iran’s reduced cooperation with the IAEA is becoming increasingly problematic. Transparency on Iran’s nuclear programme is diminishing.

The underlying problem about Iran’s real intentions regarding its nuclear programme remains: whether it aims at acquiring civilian nuclear energy or nuclear weapons, or whether it is playing up supposed technical progress to raise the stakes in future negotiations.

Wider US concerns about Iranian support for Shi’a militias fighting the Multinational Force in Iraq, as well as Taliban fighters fighting NATO in Afghanistan and its involvement in Lebanon are also major underlying complications.

Selected Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1747 (24 March 2007) imposed additional measures against Iran and reinforced the existing ones.
- S/RES/1737 (23 December 2006) imposed measures against Iran under Chapter VII, article 41, of the UN Charter and expressed its intention to adopt further measures under article 41 in case of Iranian non-compliance.
- S/RES/1696 (31 July 2006) demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and expressed its intention to adopt measures under article 41 in case of Iranian non-compliance.

Latest IAEA Reports

- GOV/2007/8 (22 February 2007) was on Iran’s compliance with resolution 1737.
Nepal

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to discuss the first report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) and be briefed by Ian Martin, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Nepal. The report is expected to focus on preparations for and feasibility of the constituent assembly elections in mid-June and update the Council on progress made since UNMIN was set up in January for 12 months.

It seems likely that the growing gap between realities on the ground (in terms of meeting the June deadline for elections) and Council expectations will be discussed delicately. However, they will possibly not be the subject of formal Council action at this stage.

Key Recent Developments

The establishment of an interim government on 1 April made up of eight political parties, including the Maoists, marked a significant step in the consolidation of the peace process in Nepal. The interim constitution establishing a framework for constitutional change was approved in January.

Pre-election preparation has been slow. There has been difficulty registering voters particularly in the south given continuing unrest. On 13 April the National Election Commission said it would not be ready to hold elections in June. It has asked for more time to draft electoral legislation and will need 110 days to prepare for the polls after the laws are enacted. Some observers believe that practical realities mean that elections may need to be postponed for five to six months.

Also likely to affect the elections are protests, transport stoppages and strikes in the south. Ethnic minority groups demanding greater representation in government are behind these disturbances. Although parliament recently amended the interim constitution to give more seats to ethnic minorities, protests have continued. The main groups involved are the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum and the Terai People’s Liberation Front (JTLF). In April the JTLF called for a general strike in June to disrupt the elections.

On 20 April the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights said that the deaths of 27 people in clashes between the Maoists and another political party during a rally in central Nepal in March could have been prevented by stronger law enforcement.

UNMIN completed registering and storing the weapons of Maoist forces on 7 March and Nepalese army weapons on 12 April, concluding the registration phase. Some 3,500 weapons have been stored and 31,000 guerrillas confined in camps. The next phase will be verification of Maoists combatants.

The Maoists took one of the final steps in transforming from rebel army to mainstream political party by registering the Communist Party of Nepal as a political party in April.

Options

The Council has the following options.

- Issue a press statement, which is possible if the Council chooses not to formally address at this stage whether the elections can be held in June as scheduled.
- Adopt a presidential statement calling on all parties to find a solution to the problems in the south and to work towards holding elections in mid-June—which is possible if Council members decide to put weight behind having elections as scheduled.
- Take no formal action at this stage and simply request the Secretary-General to provide updated briefings on progress regarding the lead up to the elections.
- Decide to review UNMIN’s mandate later in the year in light of developments.

Key Issues

The key issue is whether the elections for the constituent assembly can be held on 20 June, and whether the risks of a flawed and possibly controversial election exceed the risks of an unravelling of the peace process due to delay.

The election date was not set by the Council and therefore the Council does not need to approve any change. However, there are immediate implications for wider issues within the Council’s responsibility and also the 12-month term set for UNMIN’s existence.

Another issue is whether the interim government will be able to come to an agreement with the ethnic groups in the south. The Council will be concerned about the consequences of prolonged unrest in the south for the peace process and the emergence of peace-spoilers.

Related to that is the issue of fragile trust between the other parties and the Maoists. Some members of the interim government believe Maoists who still have weapons should be arrested, while others are calling on them to renounce violence.

The largest practical issue for the Council is that UNMIN was set up as a focused mission of limited duration to provide arms monitoring and verification, electoral assistance, and human rights monitoring and assistance in monitoring the Comprehensive Peace Accord. But if it becomes necessary to extend the election schedule, UNMIN may find itself also drawn into wider issues of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR).

Finally, the Council in May will be looking at recommendations from the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict on the situation of children and armed conflict in Nepal. A possible recommendation could be for UNMIN to play a role in the DDR of children who have been involved in armed conflict.

Council and Wider Dynamics

From the outset, Council members have shared a wide level of agreement on UNMIN. In January there was strong consensus for a focused mission limited to 12 months. With this in mind many members are still keen that the elections be held in mid-June. Some are concerned about the security situation and would like to see more regular updates in the next few months. India also seems to prefer that elections proceed in mid-June if possible.

Useful Additional Sources


Selected Letters

- S/2007/180 (29 March 2007) was the letter from Iran claiming the violation of Iranian territorial waters by two British naval vessels.
was not amenable to a UN peacekeeping mission at this time).

Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s foreign minister had also asked to brief the Council informally on Somalia. An Arria-style meeting to accommodate this is possible. In addition, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs may visit the country in May and, should this visit take place, he is also likely to brief the Council about his trip.

Key Recent Developments

Fighting in Mogadishu seems to involve clan militia, remnants of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and foreign fighters ranged against Ethiopian and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces. Insurgents have also targeted troops of the under-funded, under-staffed and poorly organised AMISOM.

Continued heavy shelling has killed thousands and left about 320,000 displaced. Widespread gross violations of international law are suspected on all sides with concerns about the lack of humanitarian access.

Eritrea suspended its membership in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) comprising Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Sudan, Djibouti and Kenya, over the Ethiopian military presence in Somalia and, specifically, a 13 April IGAD communiqué expressing appreciation for Ethiopia’s actions. An alliance of groups opposed to the TFG, including a UIC leader, was launched in Asmara in mid-April.

The Secretary-General unveiled his Somalia report on 13 April. Noting the volatility of the security situation and the lack of clear support from major Somali stakeholders, he indicated that Somalia was no place for a UN peacekeeping operation at this time when there was no peace to keep.

On national reconciliation and stability, the report noted that significant open questions remain, including:
- uncertainty regarding the level of inclusiveness and the modalities of participation in the planned national congress, in particular for moderate former members of the UIC (the conference has been delayed until 14 June due to lack of security);
- uncertainty on security arrangements, logistics and the independence of the congress’ preparatory team;
- lack of clarity on the congress’ desired outcome; and

- the need for reinforcements and support for AMISOM and for a negotiated cessation of hostilities to improve security and allow for the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops.

The report offered two future scenarios:
- hostilities cease: in this case, conditions for multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping would exist, albeit with significant security risks and logistical challenges; and
- hostilities continue and the political process is faltering or has collapsed altogether: there would be no environment for peacekeeping. In these circumstances, enforcement action through a Council authorisation for a “coalition of the willing” would be the only viable option.

The report recommended that the Council:
- revisit the issue of feasibility of UN peace keeping in Somalia again by mid-June 2007, subject to progress with reconciliation and developments on the ground; and
- authorise the Secretariat to begin contingency planning on a future operation to reduce the lead time ahead of deployment. Planning would include allocation of funds and initial contacts with troop and police contributors.

Council Dynamics

At a briefing by the Secretariat and the AU on Somalia on 24 April, members generally agreed with the Secretary-General’s findings and supported his recommendations. There seems to be only a shaky consensus at present. Most are extremely worried about a transition to a UN operation. Some are more inclined to downplay the security situation. Others want more focus on national reconciliation. There seems to be a strong underlying interest by the US (and perhaps some African members) in authorising the transition as soon as possible.

Somalia

Expected Council Action

At press time, Council members were negotiating a possible presidential statement expressing grave concern about the humanitarian situation and calling for support for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It was unclear if or when the statement will be adopted. The statement may also request contingency planning for a possible UN operation in the future (essentially accepting the Secretary-General’s recommendation that, in light of the open warfare in Mogadishu, the situation...
**Expected Council Action**

The Council will pay close attention to developments as the runoff elections in Timor-Leste, scheduled for 8 May, approach.

A report of the Secretary-General or a Secretariat briefing is possible after the presidential run-off elections. A Council statement is also possible, particularly if the security situation deteriorates. The mandate of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) expires on 26 February 2008.

**Key Recent Developments**

Timor-Leste remains fragile, with an estimated 100,000 (about 12 percent of the population) internally displaced persons (IDPs) still living in camps. The Secretary-General’s report on 1 February noted that the IDP crisis is unlikely to be solved in the short run, especially “until the underlying causes of the situation of insecurity and political crisis are resolved, the potential for durable solutions will remain uncertain.” Weapons belonging to Timorese security forces are still missing, and frequent outbursts of violence continue, including among supporters of presidential candidates.

The first round of presidential elections was held on 9 April, observed by international monitors. There were complaints of irregularities, including one by the independent National Electoral Commission against the government’s technical electoral secretariat for large discrepancies between the number of votes cast and registered voters. Parliament leader Francisco Lu’oilo Guterres and Prime Minister José Ramos-Horta, who obtained respectively 28 and 22 percent of the votes, will face each other in the May runoff.

On 22 February, the Council renewed UNMIT for 12 months and increased its police size by 140 ahead of the presidential elections, after a request by the Timorese leadership and recommendations of the Secretary-General. The renewal followed a 12 February open debate, when members stressed the need for long-term international commitment to support Timor-Leste and highlighted key issues of concern, including completion of the election timetable and accountability.

Accountability issues continue to loom large. Judicial proceedings into the April-May 2006 violence led to the conviction of former Interior Minister Rogério Lobato in early March. Rebel leader Alfredo Reinado remains at large and there are concerns with the slow pace of implementing the recommendations of the Independent Special Commission of Inquiry (ICI) on the 2006 violence.

The Timor-Indonesia Truth and Friendship Commission resumed hearings in March, including, inter alia, of former Indonesian President B.J. Habibie, Bishop Carlos Belo and militia leader Eurico Guterres. However, concerns with the potential for impunity continue despite the Commission’s work. The former Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Timor-Leste, Ian Martin, may testify before the Commission in early May.

**Key Issues**

The immediate issue for the Council is ensuring a peaceful, free and fair conclusion of the presidential election process.

Longer-term issues include:

- completing the election timetable and containing the potential for violence, especially during the parliamentary elections, which have yet to be scheduled;
- addressing the future of the Australian-led military presence and UNMIT after the elections (The Secretary-General says about 600 UNMIT police could be phased out following the elections, but the pace would depend on a post-election assessment including progress with reconstituting the Timorese police);
- reforming the Timorese police (by February, only 409 out of about 3,200 had completed UNMIT’s screening and training process, full reconstitution may take three to five years);
- making progress with drafting the comprehensive review of the security sector, especially the relationship between police and military, and the development compact for Timor-Leste as envisaged in resolution 1704, which created UNMIT;
- addressing shortfalls in UNMIT’s police and civilian component, particularly investigators on serious crimes committed in 1999; and

For more details, please see our May, August and October 2006 as well as February 2007 Forecasts.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General**

Atul Khare (India)

**Size, Composition and Cost**

- Maximum authorised strength: up to 1,748 police and 34 military liaison and staff officers
- Size as of 31 March 2006: 1,555 police and 33 military observers
- Key police contributors: Malaysia, Portugal, Pakistan and Bangladesh
- Cost: 1 July 2006–1 June 2007: US$170.2 million (commitment authority for 25 August 2006 to 31 March 2007)

**Duration**

25 August 2006 to present; mandate expires 26 February 2008.
**Expected Council Action**

The Council is expected to receive recommendations from its Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict regarding children affected by conflict in Sri Lanka and Nepal. The chairman of the Working Group is expected to convey the Working Group’s recommendations, including suggestions for possible Council action, and to brief the Council in informal consultations. As Sri Lanka is not on the Council’s formal agenda, this will likely be under “other matters”.

**Key Recent Developments**

Over the last year the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, set up under resolution 1612, has considered the Secretary-General’s reports on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi, Nepal and Sri Lanka. It has made recommendations to the Council on the first four. On 10 May the Working Group is due to discuss reports on Somalia and Uganda. Recommendations for Somalia and Uganda are likely to be made to the Council only in July as the Working Group usually takes two months to agree on what should be done.

On 9 February the Working Group discussed the reports on Nepal and Sri Lanka, which were released in December. The report on Sri Lanka was the first situation in Annex 2 (which lists the parties that recruit or use children in situations not on the Council’s agenda) to be considered by the Working Group. The report recommended targeted measures against the Liberation Tigers of Eelam’s (LTTE) political and military leadership and highlighted Sri Lankan military involvement in the recruitment of children for armed conflict by the Karuna group.

In February the Working Group agreed on a work plan which will take the Group through to February 2008. It will consider the remaining situations in Annex 2—Chad, Philippines, Myanmar and Colombia—and review progress in situations already covered.

**Options**

One option, if the Working Group recommends possible targeted sanctions against the LTTE, is for the Council, having discussed it in informal consultations, to task experts with preparing a draft resolution bearing in mind the novel situation of applying sanctions based on a thematic situation in a country not on its formal agenda.

If the Council wishes to move more cautiously there are several options for a phased approach.

- Council members could agree to hold off a decision for a defined period and ask, in the interim, the chair of the Working Group to communicate a warning to the LTTE that unless progress was made Council action would follow.
- A warning could be issued by way of a Council press statement.
- If a stronger warning is desired, members could agree to open a formal agenda item, perhaps using the device of a letter from the chair of the Working Group as the title. They could couple that with communication of a warning by:
  - issuing a presidential statement; or
  - holding a public meeting of the Council at which the chair of the Working Group could give an introduction of the recommendations.

**Key Issues**

The immediate issue is procedural: how to handle recommendations from the Working Group that allow the Council to discuss a matter which comes within a thematic item on its agenda, but is not covered by a country-specific situation agenda item.

Although Sri Lanka is unlikely to oppose Council action directed at the LTTE, a second issue is whether the unusual nature of the situation—combined with the reluctance of some members to support sanctions—may lead to a desire to proceed in a phased way.

Another issue is highlighted by a joint letter dated 9 April in which Myanmar, Nepal, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Uganda stressed that any dialogue between the UN and non-state armed groups on this issue needed to be within the context of peace processes.

A longer term issue is ensuring that recommendations have been implemented and their effectiveness measured. There is no system to monitor follow-up action. A related issue is what sort of “carrot” should be offered if there is progress.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

The change in composition of the Council in January produced new dynamics. Africa, which used to have a united position on this issue, is now more divided, with South Africa urging caution.

European members continue to be active, particularly France which has led the process from the beginning. Having the Working Group chaired by a member of the P5 appears to have given impetus to the process.

Differences continue over procedure. Past concerns that issues not on the Council’s agenda are slipping through the backdoor remain. However, members of the Working Group have been able to find enough common ground to keep the process going.

**UN Documents**

**Security Council Resolutions**


**Selected Presidential Statements**


**Secretary-General’s Reports**

- S/2006/1007 (20 December 2006) was the Secretary-General’s report on children and armed conflict in Nepal.
- S/2006/1006 (20 December 2006) was the Secretary-General’s report on children and armed conflict in Sri Lanka.
- S/2006/851 (27 October 2006) was the Secretary-General’s report on children and armed conflict in Burundi.
- S/2006/835 (25 October 2006) was the Secretary-General’s report on children and armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire.

**Selected Letters**

- S/2007/189 (9 April 2007) was the letter from the Permanent Representatives of Myanmar, Nepal, the Philippines, the Sudan and Uganda urging the Secretary-General to ensure the monitoring and reporting mechanism on children and armed conflict abided by the provisions of resolution 1612.
- S/2007/93 (15 February 2007) contained the conclusions to the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Côte d’Ivoire.
- S/2007/82 (15 February 2007) contained the conclusions to the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Burundi.
Security Council Elections

In October the General Assembly will hold elections for five seats on the Security Council to replace Congo, Ghana, Peru, Qatar and Slovakia. Please see our 2006 Special Research Report (14 August 2006) for a detailed description of Council election procedures and processes.

Currently it appears that three seats—two for Africa and one for Asia—will be uncontested, with candidates having obtained regional endorsement. Only two seats seem likely to involve contested elections: one for Latin America and the other for Eastern Europe. The elections seem unlikely to be as dramatic as last year when the battle for the Latin American seat saw Venezuela and Guatemala contesting 47 ballots, the third highest in the history of Council elections, before Panama emerged as a compromise candidate.

In the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (GRULAC), Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic both seek the regional seat. Colombia and the Czech Republic will contest the Eastern European seat.

In the African Group, Burkina Faso and Libya are running for two seats. Both were endorsed at the African Union Summit last June and are therefore virtually assured of being in the Council next year.

In the Asian Group, Vietnam is the sole candidate and at this stage seems virtually assured of election.

However, even when seats are uncontested formal balloting is required with two-thirds of the present members of the General Assembly voting in favour.

Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Libya and Burkina Faso have all served on the Council previously. However, Vietnam and Croatia are running for the first time. Assuming Vietnam is elected, the Council for the first time would have two members of ASEAN at the same time.

Background

Ten of the 15 seats on the Council are held by elected members that serve two-year terms with five seats up for election each year. The five new members will join Belgium, Indonesia, Italy, Panama and South Africa, which serve until the end of 2008.

The regional groups are governed by a formula set out in General Assembly resolution 1991 A (XVII) of 17 December 1963. The number of seats is as follows:

- five from the African and Asian States (which was subsequently subdivided in practice into two from Asian Group and three from the African Group);
- one for Eastern European States;
- two from Latin American States (includes the Caribbean); and
- two from Western European States and Other States (includes Australia, Canada and New Zealand).

While the number of seats for each group and the voting processes are regulated by the Rules of Procedure and decisions of the General Assembly, some regional groups have developed distinct practices. The African Group generally follows a practice of strict rotation between North, West and East Africa. Libya will occupy the North African seat and Burkina Faso the West African one. This allows for a “clean slate” (i.e., endorsement by the regional grouping). In the Asian Group there is an understanding that a country from the Arab members of the Group will be elected every four years and that ASEAN countries do not run against each other.

UN Documents

Selected General Assembly Documents

- A/60/PV.29 (10 October 2005) was the plenary record of the most recent elections of non-permanent members.
- A/RES 1991 A (XVIII) (17 December 1963) was the resolution adopting amendments to the Charter on the composition of the Council and establishing the allocation of seats to various regions.

Other

- UN Charter
- A/520/Rev.15 and Amendment 1 and Amendment 2 are the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly including amendments and additions.

Please see our 14 August 2006 Special Research Report and the October 2006 Forecast for more details about the background and history of Security Council elections.

Useful Additional Source


Chad/Central African Republic

Expected Council Action

The Council is likely to maintain a wait-and-see approach while the Secretariat and some Council members try to engage Chad about consent for the proposed UN peacekeeping operation. A Secretariat team may visit Chad in May. However, the momentum seems to have waned and agreement is unlikely anytime soon.

It is unclear if and when the Secretariat will propose more detailed modalities for the mandate of the advance mission authorised in January.

It is unclear whether members will want to consider the possibility of authorising deployment in the Central African Republic (CAR) ahead of Chad.

Key Recent Developments

In Chad, there are now 140,000 internally displaced persons plus 235,000 Darfuri and 46,000 CAR refugees. A cross-border assault by Janjaweed and Chadian militia in late March killed 400 civilians. Former Chadian President Goukouni Weddeye, currently living in Libya, is expected to lead a new peace initiative between N’Djamena and Chadian rebels.
In the CAR, there are now 300,000 civilians displaced by conflict. While the presence of humanitarian organisations is steadily increasing, apparently no camps have yet been set up for the displaced at press time. Both rebels and government forces have been accused of abuses against civilians.

The CAR government and the rebel faction Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement (UFDR) signed a peace deal on 13 April including a ceasefire and amnesty for the UFDR faction. However, conflict continues with other factions.

On 4 April Under Secretary-General John Holmes briefed the Council on the humanitarian situation in the region. Underlining the need to improve security and humanitarian access, Holmes suggested that, given Chad’s reluctance, alternative options would be deploying a UN mission solely in the CAR for the time being, or strengthening of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community’s (CEMAC) military operation deployed in the CAR (FOMUC).

Holmes further underscored that various “representatives have commented on… the regional nature of the conflict and how resolving the conflict in Darfur is the key… but… there are in each case national conflicts and national political issues which need to be resolved independently of whether there is a resolution in Darfur. We must not lose sight of that and the need to tackle those issues as well.”

Relations between Chad and Sudan seem to have soured further. Chadian armed forces carried out an operation into Sudanese territory in early April, arguing the right to repel cross-border rebel attacks. Sudan denounced the operation and, in an 11 April letter to the Council president, requested an immediate investigation and “the necessary measures within the framework of [the Council’s] responsibilities”.

However, during a visit by South African President Thabo Mbeki on 11 April, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir reportedly took a more conciliatory tone by saying that Khartoum hoped both countries will reach an understanding.

Libya subsequently announced that Libyan and Eritrean observers would deploy along the border, and that a joint regional military committee had been created. The committee is due to meet for the first time in early May in Tripoli.

International efforts to gain regional support for robust peacekeeping included a visit by US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte to Sudan, Chad and Libya in mid-April.

**Options**

The likely option is continuing with the wait-and-see approach. This could perhaps include adopting a statement:

- supporting the effort by key players, especially some of the P5 and the Secretariat to engage with Chad;
- encouraging Chad to allow the deployment of the advance mission;
- calling on regional neighbours to support the proposed UN deployment;
- becoming more actively involved perhaps through a visiting mission by one or two Council members; and
- taking up more actively the political reconciliation issues.

Another option is to take on Holmes’ suggestion that an operation in the CAR be authorised first, for which there seems to be support from Bangui.

**Key Issues**

The key issue is how best to proceed toward a UN operation in Chad and the CAR, which in turn raises a number of related questions:

- how to address Chad’s reluctance;
- whether concessions on the military component’s size and deployment can be considered, and how far the Council is prepared to go without putting UN personnel at unnecessary risk;
- whether to authorise deployment in the CAR first;
- whether constructive support from regional players for UN peacekeeping in Chad and Darfur, particularly from Libya, Sudan and Eritrea can be garnered; and
- the wider questions that the precedents in Darfur and Chad may create for future UN peacekeeping.

One key issue that seems to have become sidelined is how to maintain momentum for firmly encouraging a domestic political process in Chad.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

Council activism in deploying robust UN peacekeeping in Chad and the CAR seems to have decreased in April with members adopting a wait-and-see approach. Observers note that in particular France, with its presidential elections, may prefer a low-key approach for now.

The US seems to be more involved on the ground by supporting efforts to convince N’Djamena to accept the proposed operation.

Developments in Darfur also seem to have consumed much of the Council’s attention in April. This may be partially due to perceptions that one of the keys to solving the situations in Chad and the CAR is solving the Darfur issue. Members are nonetheless conscious that there are important domestic dimensions in Chad and the CAR that also need to be addressed.

It is unclear whether members would support alternatives such as authorising the CAR operation first or making compromises on robustness.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolution**

- S/RES/1706 (31 August 2006) mandated a multidimensional UN presence in Chad and the CAR and requested recommendations.

**Selected Presidential Statements**

- S/PRST/2006/47 (22 November 2006) renewed the UN Peacebuilding Office in the CAR (BONUCA).

**Selected Secretary-General’s Reports**

- S/2007/97 (23 February 2007) was the report on UN peacekeeping in Chad and the CAR.
- S/2006/1034 (28 December 2006) was the latest report on BONUCA.
- S/2006/1019 (22 December 2006) was the first report on UN peacekeeping in Chad and the CAR.

**Other**

- S/2007/201 (11 April 2007) was the Sudanese letter on recent cross-border attacks.
- S/PV.5655 (4 April 2007) was the record of Under Secretary-General John Holmes’ briefing.
- S/2007/135 (7 March 2007) was a letter from Libya forwarding the Chad-Sudan statement on re-energising the Tripoli Agreement.
- S/2006/103 (14 February 2006) was the Chad-Sudan Tripoli Agreement.
Côte d’Ivoire

Expected Council Action
By 15 May the Council will receive recommendations from the Secretary-General on the UN’s role in supporting the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire. Discussions are expected to focus on how to help implement the recent Ouagadougou peace agreement and, more broadly, on the degree of international involvement in the process leading to the elections.

It seems likely that the Council will wait until June for any formal action, when the current mandate of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) expires.

Key Recent Developments
In our April Update, we described an initiative, led by France, to adopt a resolution amending the terms of resolution 1721 in line with the Ouagadougou agreement endorsed by the Council in a presidential statement on 28 March. Eventually, the idea of a resolution was deferred because of increasing scepticism about underpinning the Ouagadougou agreement with a Council resolution before any initial assessment of the prospects for its genuine implementation.

Early in April new Ivorian Prime Minister Guillaume Soro formed a government comprising thirty-one ministers, including eleven ministers from President Laurent Gbagbo’s Ivorian Popular Front (FPI), seven from the rebel Forces Nouvelles and five from each of the two leading opposition parties (the Rally of Republicans of Alassane Ouattara, and the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire of Henri Bédié).

On 11 April, the Defence and Security Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FDS-CI), the Armed Forces of the Forces Nouvelles (FAFN) and the commanders of UNOCI and the of French Licorne forces signed a quadripartite agreement to eliminate the buffer zone known as the zone of confidence as of 16 April.

From 10 to 20 April, a UN technical assessment mission visited Côte d’Ivoire to determine expectations of the UN role in implementing the Ouagadougou agreement, how the UN could respond to those expectations, and develop recommendations for a possible new concept of operations and future drawdown of UNOCI.

On 13 April, the International Working Group (IWG) met in Abidjan and expressed readiness to support the Ouagadougou agreement. It also called for consultations on its future status with ECOWAS and the African Union with a view to making recommendations to the Security Council.

On 16 April, Medecins Sans Frontieres reported almost daily attacks against civilians in the former “zone of confidence” and serious concern that civilians are now left defenceless by the redeployment of the impartial forces.

Options
The Council has the following options:
- initiating discussions in May on the future international presence in Côte d’Ivoire in view of the Secretary-General’s recommendations and assessment of the situation;
- combining into one resolution a technical adjustment of previous Council decisions for conformity with the Ouagadougou agreement and a new mandate for UNOCI; or
- deciding to adopt in May a resolution with the technical adjustment (changing the date of the election and the name of the prime minister) but deferring wider issues until June.

Key Issues
The Council faces a difficult task balancing two conflicting requirements: President Gbagbo’s preference for very limited international involvement in Côte d’Ivoire and a much more significant degree of international oversight over the electoral process preferred by Soro.

The Ouagadougou agreement foresees only three areas where roles remain for the international community:

- supervision by the impartial forces of the National Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Programme;
- placement of impartial forces’ observation posts along the “green line”;
- obligation for the Evaluation and Monitoring Committee (set up by the Ivorian parties) to keep the Special Representative of the Secretary-General informed of progress in implementation of the agreement.

However, the international community until now has been broadly involved and the Council will have to decide:

- whether the impartial forces will only have an observer role or whether they will provide military support to the joint units to be deployed within the zone of confidence;
- UNOCI’s role in securing the identification process, as the Ouagadougou agreement specifies that security for the mobile courts, identification operations and the electoral process should now be provided by the Ivorian parties jointly;
- whether and when a UNOCI drawdown should begin; and
- the future of the IWG and the High Representative for Elections (not mentioned in the Ouagadougou agreement).

A related issue is whether there is a need for a new mandate for the impartial forces that are being redeployed from the zone of confidence to other parts of the country.

Still outstanding is the parties’ demand to add African troops to participate in peacekeeping operations. Since this seems to stem from Soro’s desire to obtain troops from Burkina Faso to ensure his own security, the issue is whether those troops should be incorporated into UNOCI, or whether they should be independent. And there is still an issue of underlying uncertainty, whether the Council should wait and see and take substantive decisions only after the implications of the Secretary-General’s report have been absorbed and perhaps after it has sent a mission to get first-hand impressions.
Council Dynamics

There is agreement on the necessity to adjust the international framework for the peace process in Côte d’Ivoire to the Ouagadougou agreement. However, action was postponed as most members thought it was necessary to receive an assessment of the situation.

On the one hand, there is a feeling that the will of the parties as embodied in the Ouagadougou agreement cannot be opposed. On the other hand, many see the need for close monitoring of the process leading to the elections to prevent the risk of renewed conflict.

There seems to be very limited support for an immediate lifting of targeted sanctions or a partial lifting of the arms embargo to allow the entry of light weapons. At press time there is no initiative from the sanctions committee to consider those issues. Many believe that it would be too risky before the elections. Also, in the absence of an official request from the parties or a recommendation by the Secretary-General, it seems that sanctions will not be on the agenda.

Selected UN Documents

Latest Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1739 (10 January 2007) extended the UNOCI mandate until 30 June 2007 with increased troop levels.
- S/RES/1721 (1 November 2006) prolonged by one year the transitional period in Côte d’Ivoire and reinforced the powers of the prime minister.

Latest Presidential Statement

- S/PRES/2007/8 (28 March 2007) endorsed the Ouagadougou agreement, supported the appointment of Soro as prime minister and requested a report from the Secretary-General on the UN’s future role in the peace process.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report

- S/2007/133 (9 March 2007)

Other UN Documents

- S/2007/216 (17 April 2007) was the letter from the Secretary-General on the extension of the mandate of the Group of Experts.
- S/2007/181 (31 March 2007) was the letter from Ghana transmitting a communique by the AU Peace and Security Council.
- S/2007/144 (13 March 2007) was the letter from the Secretary-General transmitting the Ouagadougou Agreement.

Other Relevant Facts

The Zone of Confidence

Patrols within the Zone before 16 April

Two-thirds of UNOCI troops are based either within the Zone (at check-points) or within close proximity of the Zone. They conduct daily patrols within the Zone. This will continue until all observation posts are dismantled.

Ouagadougou Agreement

(4 March 2007)

- In order to allow the free movement of people and goods, the impartial forces will dismantle the zone.
- A “green line” going from east to west along the median line of the zone of confidence will be temporarily established and punctuated by observation posts occupied by the impartial forces.
- The number of impartial forces occupying these posts will be reduced by half every two months until all of them are removed. Those not in the observation posts will be redeployed elsewhere on national territory.
- Joint units of equal numbers of FAFN and FDS-CI members and with responsibility for conducting police and security missions will be deployed in the zone of confidence.

Quadripartite Agreement

(11 April 2007)

- The dismantlement will start 16 April and last until December 2007 (when all observation posts will have been dismantled).
- The “green line” will be delineated by 32 points corresponding to villages and towns in the region.
- The impartial forces (UNOCI only) will be temporarily installed in 17 observation posts across this green line. Those posts will start to be dismantled after two months. At press time, only one Ivorian mixed unit has been deployed in the Zone.

UN and Impartial Forces

Special Representative of the Secretary-General

To be appointed

Principal Deputy Special Representative

Abou Moussa (Chad)

High Representative for Elections

Gérard Stoudmann (Switzerland)

Size and Composition of UNOCI

(55 countries)

- Authorised strength as of 2 June 2006: up to 8,115 military personnel and up to 1,200 police
- Strength as of 31 March 2007: 9,241 total uniformed personnel, including 7,854 troops, 200 military observers and 1,187 police
- Key troop-contributing countries: Bangladesh, Pakistan, Jordan, Morocco, Ghana

Cost

- 1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007
  $472.89 million

French Licorne Force

Currently being reduced from 3,400 to 2,900 troops.

Useful Additional Sources

- www.onuci.org (official UNOCI website)

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) by 15 May.

Key Recent Developments

Heavy fighting between supporters of President Joseph Kabila and opposition leader and Senator Jean-Pierre Bemba erupted in late March after a government ultimatum that Bemba’s supporters disarm. MONUC intervened and quelled the fighting. There were strong international calls for a negotiated solution. About 200 of Bemba’s fighters reportedly agreed to lay down arms and integrate into the army.

In mid-April, Bemba flew to Portugal and the Congolese public prosecutor reportedly requested the senate to lift Bemba’s immunity. This incident seems to have intensified concerns about the future of democratic institutions in the DRC.

The security situation continues to be extremely volatile in the east. Fighting in April left about 65,000 displaced in the province of North Kivu alone, and is largely attributed to the activities of Congolese militia and the Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR).

On sanctions, the Council on 29 March sanctioned two individuals and five entities found to have either violated the arms embargo or refused to disarm.
On 15 April, the Council rolled over MONUC’s mandate for one month. Members seem to have agreed that additional time was needed to finalise technical aspects of the draft, with no major differences of opinion on MONUC’s future size or mandate. The US also requested time to allow for congressional approval, a required step under US law.

The current draft extends MONUC’s mandate until 31 December 2007. Agreement has been secured on 17,030 troops, 760 observers, 391 police trainers and 750 police. MONUC’s future mandate is likely to maintain current key tasks, including deterring the use of force by armed groups, with some additions such as providing basic training for the Congolese armed forces. The mandate as envisaged in the draft includes:

- protection of civilians, and humanitarian and UN personnel;
- monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo and seizing arms found in the DRC in violation of the embargo;
- deterring the use of force by armed groups;
- providing operational and logistical support, and short-term basic training to Congolese armed forces to forcibly disarm irregular armed groups and prevent support to militia including through illegal economic activities;
- contributing to the implementation of the national programme for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration;
- providing capacity-building for the police;
- assisting with initial planning for security sector reform;
- providing advice on strengthening democratic institutions, promoting the rule of law and human rights;
- assisting Congolese authorities with preliminary arrangements for the local elections; and
- assisting in establishing a peaceful environment for the elections.

The draft requests the government to develop a plan to ensure security in the east, particularly by carrying out disarmament, demobilisation and repatriation or resettlement of Congolese and foreign combatants. It also urges regional states to take appropriate steps to end the illicit trade in natural resources and, where necessary, to report to the Council. It calls upon international financial institutions to assist the government in establishing effective and transparent control over those resources.

The draft resolution requests the heads of UN Missions in the DRC, Sudan and Burundi to:

- share military information;
- pool logistic and administrative resources to ensure efficiency and cost-effectiveness; and
- coordinate implementation of disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement programmes.

It requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 15 November on benchmarks and a timetable for MONUC’s gradual drawdown.

**UN Documents**

- **Selected Security Council Resolutions**
  - S/RES/1751 (13 April 2007) renewed MONUC until 15 May.

- **Selected Presidential Statement**
  - S/PRST/2007/9 (3 April 2007) deployed the March violence and called on the government to respect the role conferred on political parties by the Congolese constitution.

- **Selected Secretary-General’s Reports**
  - S/2007/156 (22 March 2007) was the latest MONUC report.

- **Other Relevant Facts**

  **Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission**

  William Lacy Swing (US)

  **MONUC: Size, Composition and Cost of Mission**

  - Authorised strength: about 18,000 military and 3,116 police
  - Strength as of 31 March 2007: 17,307 military and 1,029 police
  - Main troop contributors: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Uruguay
  - Cost: 1 July 2006 – 30 June 2007 $1.138 billion

  **MONUC: Duration**

  - 30 November 1999 to present, mandate expires on 15 May 2007

**Ethiopia/Eritrea**

**Expected Council Action**

In May the Council is expected to consider the regular report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, which is due by 30 April.

It is unclear whether members will pursue a further drawdown of UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) troops at this stage or wait until the mandate’s expiry date on 31 July. At press time, substantive Council action seems unlikely in May.

**Key Recent Developments**

There has been no apparent progress with border demarcation, nor has there been any opening from Ethiopia on that issue. Eritrea’s restrictions on UNMEE’s freedom of movement and operations have increased. The mission has been unable to monitor a significant portion of the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ, a buffer area between both countries). Asmara has refused to accept Azouz Ennifar of Tunisia as Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and it has criticised the Secretariat and the Council for not taking into consideration its concerns and appointing a new Special Representative.

Routine troop movements near the border on both sides have heightened tensions. There have also been exchanges of accusations.

Developments in Somalia have also increased regional tensions. Eritrea denounced Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia and the deployment of an AU mission (AMISOM). It also suspended its membership in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, a regional bloc also comprising Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Sudan, Djibouti and Kenya. An alliance of groups opposed to the Transitional Federal Government, including a Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) leader, was launched in Asmara in mid-April.

On 30 January, the Council renewed UNMEE but reduced the force size by 600 military personnel. Resolution 1741 also reiterated Council demands, in particular that:
Ethiopia accepts fully and without pre conditions the 2002 delimitation decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) and take steps to allow the demarcation of the border; and

Eritrea immediately withdraws its troops from the TSZ and reverses all restrictions on UNMEE, including vis-à-vis the Secretary-General’s Acting Special Representative.

The resolution also called upon the Secretary-General and the international community to help the parties normalise relations. This is linked particularly to the EEBC’s deadline of November 2007 for agreement on the border issue, in the absence of which the Commission would determine the border demarcated by the boundary points listed in its November 2006 decision.

It seems that, in response to this call, the Secretariat has contacted a number of members on suitable and desirable responses to the stalemate. Meetings with a similar objective were also organised by the US.

Options
Options bearing on UNMEE’s size and structure do not seem likely to be on the table at this point. Given increasing bilateral and regional tensions, other options may include:

- providing positive feedback and suggestions to the Secretariat on its efforts to relieve tensions; and
- taking the lead in restarting a diplomatic process, by perhaps reviving a role for the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations.

Key Issues
The key issue is how best to normalise relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea, mindful of the November 2007 EEBC deadline and the relationship between bilateral tensions and instability in Somalia.

Related significant issues include the lack of alternatives to the deadlock and an acceptable mediator. Another related issue is the need to avoid dangerous precedents in restricting the freedom of movement and operations of UN missions while maintaining a force capable of diminishing the prospects of renewed conflict.

Council Dynamics
Having chosen in January an option that decreases UNMEE’s numbers while maintaining its presence and mandate, members now seem focused on how best to normalise relations between the countries within that framework.

However, members seem divided on what this actually means. The US, having openly supported Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia and the deployment of AMISOM, seems less well-placed to exercise neutral leadership on this issue than in the past. Russia, the UK and some African members who have strong ties with Addis Ababa seem reluctant to openly pressure Ethiopia to demarcate the boundary. Possibly in response, Eritrea now appears to pursue ties of its own with other players such as Sudan and Libya.

Other members seem convinced that the key to solving the border and UNMEE issues is to pressure Ethiopia to abide by the EEBC decision.

Given the perception that more substantive diplomatic initiatives may be ineffective if not counterproductive, most members seem to prefer a cautious approach for now by keeping the parties engaged through calls for restraint and expressions of concern with current tensions.

Underlying Problems
There are renewed concerns that UNMEE is now overstretched to carry out its current mandate.

Further UNMEE reductions may require a significant mandate downgrade and may encourage Eritrea to deploy more troops in the TSZ. Ethiopia, with its commitments in Somalia, is likely to continue its historical opposition to decreases in UNMEE.

Sierra Leone

Expected Council Action
In May the Council is expected to discuss the first periodic report on the UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) and receive a briefing from the Secretary-General's Executive Representative, Victor Angelo. The report is expected to focus on recent developments and progress made on election preparations. UNIOSIL’s mandate expires on 31 December.

Key Recent Developments
Preparations for the presidential and parliamentary elections on 28 July are progressing.

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1741 (30 January 2007) extended UNMEE until 31 July and approved the drawdown.
- S/RES/1312 (31 July 2000) established UNMEE.

Selected Letters
- S/2007/4 (4 January 2007) contained Eritrea’s position on certain points in the December special report of the Secretary-General.
well, with voter registration completed on schedule. At the end of March the National Electoral Commission announced that 91 percent of voters aged 18 and over had registered. This high level of participation is viewed as an encouraging sign given the importance of voter registration to the overall credibility of the elections.

A recent governmental proposal to hold a parallel constitutional referendum to update the 1991 constitution has raised concerns about possible confusion with the election itself, as well as questions about who will bear the cost.

Resolution 1734, which on 22 December extended the mandate of UNIOSIL, asked for a comprehensive assessment, close to the election date, on UNIOSIL’s role including an exit strategy. The Secretariat believes, based on experience in other similar situations, that it will be better placed to provide an accurate picture of a possible exit strategy after the elections.

PBC Developments

The first field mission of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) took place in Sierra Leone from 20 to 25 March 2007. The 12-member delegation, led by the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the UN, discussed gaps in priority areas for peacebuilding with key stakeholders. Agreed priorities included justice and security reform. During the mission the PBC and the government of Sierra Leone reached an understanding on the importance to develop a framework or “compact” for an integrated peacebuilding strategy. The framework is expected to be ready by June. This is envisaged as an umbrella framework under which partners can pledge their mutual commitment to taking action.

The PBC will next meet on 2 May for a discussion on youth unemployment. On 8 May it will brief NGOs before its 9 May country-specific meeting on Sierra Leone.

Options

The most likely option is that Council members will want to issue a statement reinforcing progress to date, encouraging the election process, perhaps commending the PBC “compact” and looking forward to working through the next stage of UNIOSIL’s mandate with the incoming elected government.

Key Issues

The key issue on the ground is ensuring successful free and fair elections in July within a stable security environment. A related future issue is the timely establishment of a mechanism for electoral disputes.

An emerging issue is the relationship between the Council and the PBC. In the January open debate on the PBC, the Council indicated that it was willing to become more involved in the PBC’s work. Any adjustment in UNIOSIL’s mandate after the election could depend on the level of Council confidence in progress by the PBC. Possibilities include increased cooperation and information sharing.

Council Dynamics

Relative stability has led most members to devote less attention to Sierra Leone in the past six months. However, some are beginning to take more interest in the role the Council needs to play in coordinating with the PBC in the lead-up to future decisions on the UNIOSIL mandate.

Underlying Problems

The greatest threats to security now include youth unemployment and marginalisation and poor living conditions. The government has launched a youth employment and empowerment scheme but lacks the resources and institutional capacity for proper implementation.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1750 (30 March 2007) noted that UNMIL should continue to provide administrative and related support and security for activities in Liberia of the Special Court of Sierra Leone.
- S/RES/1688 (16 June 2006) requested the Secretary-General to assist in the transfer of former Liberian President Charles Taylor to the Special Court’s special outpost in the Netherlands.
- S/RES/1626 (19 September 2005) mandated UNMIL to provide security for the Special Court of Sierra Leone.
- S/RES/1620 (31 August 2005) established UNOSIL.
### Upcoming Issues in Sanctions Committees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsidiary Bodies</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Target(s)/Designated Lists</th>
<th>Committees Forecast</th>
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</table>
| **Counter-Terrorism Committee**  
S/RES/1373  
**Resolutions**  
S/RES/1373 (28 Sep 2001)  
S/RES/1377 (12 Nov 2001)  
S/RES/1456 (20 Jan 2003)  
S/RES/1535 (26 Mar 2004)  
S/RES/1566 (8 Oct 2004)  
S/RES/1624 (14 Sep 2005) | Resolution 1373 established obligations on all states to:  
• prevent and suppress international terrorism;  
• establish cooperation between states;  
• implement mutual legal assistance;  
• share intelligence;  
• assist in tracing and freezing of assets related to terrorists and terrorism;  
• implement border control measures to prevent the movement of terrorists and access to weapons;  
• deny safe haven to terrorists; and  
• become parties to the then 12 international anti-terrorism conventions and protocols and to implement them fully. | The measures mandated by resolution 1373, unlike sanctions, did not target individuals or specific entities. | The CTC/CTED is expected to follow-up with non-reporting states on implementation of resolution 1624, and continue assessing each state’s implementation of resolution 1373.  
The mandate—created by resolution 1535—will expire 31 December 2007, unless extended by the Security Council. |
| **1540 Committee**  
S/RES/1540  
**Resolutions**  
S/RES/1540 (28 Apr 2004)  
S/RES/1673 (27 Apr 2006) | Resolution 1540 established obligations on all states to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems, in particular for terrorist purposes.  
Resolution 1673 called on all states to report to the Committee and decided that the Committee should intensify its efforts to promote full implementation of the resolution, including by outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation. | While sanctions did not target individuals or specific entities, resolution 1540 required all states to prevent non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. | **Reports Review:** The Committee with its Group of Experts will continue to evaluate states' level of implementation of the resolution's provisions and engage those states who fail to comply with the reporting requirements. The Committee’s mandate and the mandate of the Group of Experts will expire 27 April 2008. |
| **Al-Qaida and Taliban**  
S/RES/1267  
**Resolutions**  
S/RES/1267 (15 Oct 1999)  
S/RES/1333 (19 Dec 2000)  
S/RES/1390 (16 Jan 2002)  
S/RES/1455 (17 Jan 2003)  
S/RES/1526 (30 Jan 2004)  
S/RES/1617 (29 Jul 2005)  
S/RES/1735 (22 Dec 2006) | assets freeze; travel ban; arms embargo | Usama bin Laden, the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, designated by the Committee on the Consolidated List. As of 12 December 2006, there were 362 individuals and 125 entities on the List. | **Listing/De-listing:** The Committee will continue the review it began at the end of March of all designated individuals and entities that have been on the Designated List for four years as required by paragraph 6(i) of the Committee Guidelines.  
Resolution 1735 asked the Committee to continue to develop, adopt and apply guidelines regarding de-listing of individuals and entities on the List, and extended the Monitoring Team’s mandate for an additional 18 months. |
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<tr>
<td><strong>Côte d'Ivoire</strong></td>
<td>arms embargo; assets freeze; travel ban; export of rough diamonds</td>
<td>Designated individuals, including persons impeding the peace process, committing violations of human rights, violating the arms embargo, inciting public violence, and obstructing the activities of UNOCI. There are three individuals on the list (last updated 18 December 2006).</td>
<td>Report: The Group of Experts is to report to the Council through the Committee before 15 June 2007. The Group’s mandate will expire on or about 8 August 2007. Mandate: The sanctions, established by resolution 1572 and renewed and amended by resolutions 1643 and 1727, will expire 31 October 2007.</td>
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<td>S/RES/1572 (15 Nov 2004)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1584 (1 Feb 2005)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1632 (18 Oct 2005)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1643 (15 Dec 2005)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1708 (14 Sep 2006)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1727 (15 Dec 2006)</td>
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<td><strong>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)</strong></td>
<td>Arms Embargo: supply, sale, transfer or transit of: • any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missile or missile systems or related materiel including spare parts; • items on designated lists determined by the Committee or the Council which could contribute to DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction programmes; and • technical training, service, etc., related to the embargoed items.</td>
<td>The DPRK and persons named to a designated list.</td>
<td>The measures imposed will be under constant review by the Security Council and may be strengthened, modified, suspended or lifted depending on the level of compliance by the DPRK with the provisions of the resolution.</td>
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<td>S/RES/1718 (14 Oct 2006)</td>
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<td><strong>Democratic Republic of the Congo</strong></td>
<td>arms embargo; targeted travel and financial measures</td>
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<td>S/RES/1533</td>
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<td>S/RES/1493 (28 Jul 2003)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1533 (12 Mar 2004)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1596 (18 Apr 2005)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1616 (29 Jul 2005)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1649 (21 Dec 2005)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1654 (31 Jan 2006)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1698 (31 Jul 2006)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Islamic Republic of Iran</strong></td>
<td><strong>Embargo</strong>: sale or transfer of nuclear and ballistic missile programmes -related materiels, equipment, goods and technology to or from Iran (listed in S/2006/814 and S/2006/815).</td>
<td>Government of Iran; individuals and entities listed in annexes to resolutions 1737 and 1747.</td>
<td>Reports: Committee to report every ninety days to the Council; IAEA to report by 24 May 2007. Review/Action: Council to review Iran’s actions in light of the IAEA’s report and decide whether to suspend or terminate measures or consider further measures.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Resolution</strong></td>
<td><strong>Travel Restrictions</strong>: individuals engaged in directly, or associated with Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities.</td>
<td>Assets Freeze: individuals and entities listed in Annex I to resolutions 1737 and 1747.</td>
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<td>S/RES/1696 (31 Jul 2006)</td>
<td><strong>Assets Freeze</strong>: Designated individuals and entities associated with the former regime of Saddam Hussein. As of 27 July 2005 there were 89 individuals, and as of 12 May 2006 there were 208 entities listed.</td>
<td><strong>Other Restrictions</strong>: on technical cooperation, except for humanitarian purposes; calls on states and international financial institutions not to enter into new financial commitments with Iran.</td>
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<td>S/RES/1737 (23 Dec 2006)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1747 (24 Mar 2007)</td>
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<td><strong>Iraq</strong></td>
<td><strong>Arms Embargo</strong>: Iraqi territory. <strong>Assets Freeze</strong>: Designated individuals and entities associated with the former regime of Saddam Hussein. As of 27 July 2005 there were 89 individuals, and as of 12 May 2006 there were 208 entities listed.</td>
<td>No Committee action is expected.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Resolutions</strong></td>
<td><strong>Travel Ban</strong>: peace spoilers, violators of the embargo as designated by the Committee. As of 30 November 2005 there were 59 individuals listed. <strong>Assets Freeze</strong>: Charles Taylor and designated associates. As of 30 November 2005 there were 28 individuals and thirty entities listed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/RES/661 (6 Aug 1990)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1518 (24 Nov 2003)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Liberia</strong></td>
<td><strong>Arms Embargo</strong>: any recipient in Liberian territory. <strong>Travel Ban</strong>: peace spoilers, violators of the embargo as designated by the Committee. As of 30 November 2005 there were 59 individuals listed. <strong>Assets Freeze</strong>: Charles Taylor and designated associates. As of 30 November 2005 there were 28 individuals and thirty entities listed.</td>
<td>No Committee action is expected.</td>
<td><strong>Mandate Review</strong>: Arms embargo and travel ban in effect until December 2007. <strong>Diamond Sanctions</strong>: The Council lifted the diamond sanctions but will review its decision in ninety days to see if Liberia continues to meet the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme requirements. <strong>Report</strong>: The next report of the Panel of Experts is due by 6 June 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resolutions</strong></td>
<td><strong>Arms Embargo</strong>: any recipient in Liberian territory. <strong>Travel Ban</strong>: peace spoilers, violators of the embargo as designated by the Committee. As of 30 November 2005 there were 59 individuals listed. <strong>Assets Freeze</strong>: Charles Taylor and designated associates. As of 30 November 2005 there were 28 individuals and thirty entities listed.</td>
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<td>S/RES/1521 (22 Dec 2003)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1532 (12 Mar 2004)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1607 (21 Jun 2005)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1647 (20 Dec 2005)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1683 (13 Jun 2006)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1689 (20 Jun 2006)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1731 (20 Dec 2006)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1753 (27 Apr 2007)</td>
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<td><strong>Rwanda</strong></td>
<td><strong>Arms Embargo</strong>: non-governmental forces in Rwandan territory or in neighbouring states; restrictions on arms transfers by the Government of Rwanda. Resolution 1749 removed the requirement that Rwanda marks and registers all weapons.</td>
<td>No Committee action is expected.</td>
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<td><strong>Resolutions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>S/RES/918 (17 May 1994)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1011 (16 Aug 1995)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1161 (9 Apr 1998)</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/RES/1749 (28 Mar 2007)</td>
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<td><strong>Sierra Leone</strong></td>
<td><strong>Arms Embargo</strong>: non-governmental forces and restrictions on arms transfers by the Government of Sierra Leone. <strong>Travel Ban</strong>: Leading members of the former military junta and the Revolutionary United Front, as designated by the Committee.</td>
<td>No Committee action is expected.</td>
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<td><strong>Resolutions</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>S/RES/1132 (8 Oct 1997)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1171 (5 Jun 1998)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subsidiary Bodies</td>
<td>Mandate</td>
<td>Target(s)/Designated Lists</td>
<td>Committees Forecast</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>Any recipient in Somali territory, except for AMISOM and for states engaged in development of security sector institutions in Somalia.</td>
<td>Reports: The Monitoring Group is to provide monthly progress reports to the Committee and a final report no later than 15 days before end of its mandate on 15 June 2007. Action Pending: The Council has not yet taken action as it said it would in resolution 1676, including on the recommendations made in the Group’s last report (S/2006/229 of 4 May) to strengthen the sanctions regime to prevent violations of the arms embargo. This included a recommendation for the Council to impose an integrated arms embargo that would serve to reduce the availability of funds for the violators.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resolutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/RES/733 (23 Jan 1992)</td>
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<td>S/RES/751 (24 Apr 1992)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1519 (16 Mar 2001)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1587 (15 Mar 2005)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1630 (14 Oct 2005)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1676 (10 May 2006)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1724 (29 Nov 2006)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1744 (20 Feb 2007)</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>S/RES/1591</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resolutions</td>
<td>arms embargo; travel ban; assets freeze</td>
<td>Arms Embargo: all parties to the N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement and any other belligerents in Darfur; all non-governmental entities and individuals. Assets Freeze and Travel Ban: as designated by the Committee, individual peace spoilers and violators of the arms embargo. Four individuals were designated by resolution 1672. Aviation Restrictions: ban on government flights into and over the Darfur region.</td>
<td>Report: The final report by the Panel of Experts is due by 30 August 2007 and the Panel’s mandate will expire 29 September 2007. Action Pending: Action by the Council is still pending on the recommendations made by the Panel in its last report (S/2006/250 of 19 April 2006). Resolution 1713 extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts.</td>
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<td>S/RES/1556 (30 Jul 2004)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1591 (29 Mar 2005)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1665 (29 Mar 2006)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1672 (25 Apr 2006)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1679 (16 May 2006)</td>
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<td>S/RES/1713 (29 Sep 2006)</td>
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<td>Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/RES/1636</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resolutions</td>
<td>travel ban; assets freeze</td>
<td>Assets Freeze and Travel Ban: individuals suspected of involvement in the Hariri murder designated by UNIIIC and/or the Government of Lebanon and agreed by the Committee (nobody has been designated as of this writing).</td>
<td>No Committee action is expected prior to the next UNIIIC report.</td>
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<td>S/RES/1636 (31 Oct 2005)</td>
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</table>
### Notable Dates for May

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Relevant Document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 April</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on UNMIN (UN Mission in Nepal)</td>
<td>S/RES/1740</td>
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<tr>
<td>late April</td>
<td>SG semi-annual report on resolution 1559 (Lebanon/Syria), delayed from 19 April</td>
<td>S/PRST/2004/36</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 April</td>
<td>SG regular report on UNMEE (UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea)</td>
<td>S/RES/1741</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 May</td>
<td>SG regular report on BINUB (UN Integrated Office in Burundi)</td>
<td>S/RES/1719</td>
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<td>15 May</td>
<td>SG report on the UN’s new role in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>S/PRST/2007/8</td>
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<td>23 May</td>
<td>IAEA report on Iran</td>
<td>S/RES/1747</td>
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<tr>
<td>late May</td>
<td>SG report on UNIOSIL’s post-election role (UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone)</td>
<td>S/RES/1734</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 May</td>
<td>SG monthly report on Darfur</td>
<td>S/RES/1590</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Important Dates over the Horizon
- A Council open debate on Protection of Civilians is expected in June.
- The Special Court for Sierra Leone has reported that Charles Taylor’s trial at The Hague will begin in June.
- Election of Nepal’s constituent assembly is scheduled for mid-June but may possibly be delayed.
- A Somalian reconciliation congress in Mogadishu is being planned for mid-June, postponed from 16 April.
- Presidential and legislative elections in Sierra Leone are expected 28 July.
- Parliamentary elections in Timor-Leste are yet to be scheduled but the inauguration of the government is expected by September.
- There are media reports that the Nabih Berri will convene the Lebanese parliament on 25 September to elect a new president.
- The Secretary-General’s next reports on the thematic issues of Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict and Women, Peace & Security are expected by October.
- Local elections in the DRC are expected in the second half of 2007.
- Parliamentary elections in Kosovo are expected in late 2007.
- A workshop on security sector reform, a joint initiative of Slovakia and South Africa, is being planned for later in 2007 in Africa.
- Presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire are now expected by January 2008, postponed from 31 October.

### Reports Due for Consideration in May

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Reports Due for Consideration</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 May</td>
<td>Launch of the International Compact for Iraq in Egypt, with participation of the Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>3-4 May</td>
<td>Egypt will host an international conference on the situation in Iraq attended by the P5, G8 and Iraq’s neighbours (possibly including Iran).</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 May</td>
<td>Run-off presidential elections in Timor-Leste</td>
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<td>9 May</td>
<td>PBC country-specific meeting on Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>14-26 May</td>
<td>The High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, will be travelling the Great Lakes region (DRC, Burundi and Rwanda)</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 May</td>
<td>EU-Russia Summit</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Also expected in May:
- The Council is expected to receive its semi-annual briefing from the 1373 (Counter-terrorism), the 1267 (Al-Qaida/Taliban), and the 1540 Committees.
- Human Rights Council elections are scheduled for May and its fifth session is scheduled for 11-18 June.
- The Council is expected to receive recommendations from its Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict regarding children affected by conflict in Sri Lanka and Nepal.

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