



# SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT

## MONTHLY FORECAST

### MARCH 2007



1 March 2007

This report is available online and can be viewed together with Update Reports on developments during the month at [www.securitycouncilreport.org](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org)

## OVERVIEW FOR MARCH

South Africa will have the presidency of the Council in March.

No thematic debates are currently planned—although some event to mark International Women’s Day is possible and a thematic discussion later in the month cannot be ruled out. Other planned open meetings of the Council include:

- the monthly meeting on the **Middle East**;
- adoption of a resolution on **Afghanistan**, extending UNAMA; and
- adoption of a resolution on **Liberia**, extending UNMIL

Consultations are expected on:

- **Sudan/Darfur**
- **Chad**
- **Somalia**
- **Lebanon** (UNIIC and implementation of resolution 1701)
- **Iraq** and UNMOVIC
- **Guinea-Bissau**

- The Council relationship with the Peacebuilding Commission
- **Côte d’Ivoire** (including the proposal for a Council mission)

Behind the scenes two very serious issues are also likely to be pre-occupying Council members. These include **Kosovo** and **Iran**.

### Kosovo

The Ahtisaari report is expected to be finalised and submitted to the Council in March. However, in view of the complex issues it will raise and the sensitivity of the matter for many Council members, it is not expected to be scheduled for consultations or open Council meetings until April at the earliest.

We have prepared an initial brief on the issues for this *Forecast* and will cover it in more detail once the final report is available.

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## Aide-Memoire

Important matters pending before the Council include:

- The 2005 World Summit requested reforms relating to the **Military Staff Committee**. This has yet to be addressed.
- Implementation of the phased approach for **Darfur** as agreed in Abuja in November 2006 is lagging. Sudan has not responded to the heavy support package proposal contained in the Secretary-General’s 24 January letter. AU-UN agreement on details of a hybrid operation as endorsed by the Council on 19 December is still pending.
- No action as envisaged in resolution 1706 on **Darfur** has been taken to impose “strong effective measures, such as asset freeze or travel ban, against any individual or group that violates or attempts to block the imple-

mentation of the [Darfur Peace] Agreement or commits human rights violations.”

- On **Somalia**, the Council is still to act on its “intention to consider taking measures against those who seek to prevent or block a peaceful dialogue process, overthrow the Transitional Federal Institutions by force, or take action that further threatens regional stability” expressed in resolution 1744.
- On the **DRC**, the Council is still to consider imposing individual sanctions under resolutions 1649 and 1698 against armed groups’ commanders that recruit children and/or refuse to disarm.
- The draft resolution on **small arms** circulated by Argentina in March seems to have lapsed. The issue is no longer included as a footnote on the Council’s calendar. The absence of a Council decision on this matter

leaves future periodic Secretary-General’s reports in abeyance. Because of the absence of a request from the Council, the Secretariat has no mandate to proceed to produce the report.

- The Secretary-General’s report on **cross border issues and inter-mission cooperation in West Africa**, originally due by 31 December 2006, is still overdue though it may be issued in March.
- The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in **Côte d’Ivoire**, requested by a presidential statement, has still not been made public. Also on Côte d’Ivoire, the December 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not been published.

## Iran

On 22 February Mohammed ElBaradei, the Director-General of the IAEA, confirmed what was already common knowledge—Iran has not complied with resolution 1737 and refuses to suspend enrichment-related activities. Instead Iran seems to be expanding its enrichment activities. However, it also continues to insist that it is ready for meaningful negotiations, but without preconditions.

For its part the US continues to say that it wishes for a diplomatic solution. However, anxiety levels have increased with the arrival in the region of a US naval task force and in light of the increasingly tough stance being taken by the US military in the region, both in public statements and in action against Iranian personnel in Iraq. Initiatives to promote the possibility of a negotiated solution have been discouraged. The US turned down ElBaradei's proposal last month for a "timeout".

Russia seems to be less publicly supportive of Iran than in the past—perhaps because its advice that an incremental approach would be more productive has not borne any fruit as yet. Also it seems to have slowed down progress with the new Bushehr nuclear reactor, which it is helping to construct in Iran. But it is strongly advocating that both Iran and the US should make compromises to permit the resumption of negotiations.

At press time the five permanent members of the Council plus Germany were meeting in London to discuss their response to Iran's non-compliance. The US has made it clear that it will be seeking stronger sanctions against Iran. But the US has also said that this time around it is unwilling to indulge in the extended negotiations which characterised the discussions on draft resolutions in 2006. Nevertheless, it seems likely that several weeks at least will be required to arrive at a draft resolution for Council consideration. In the meantime, it seems likely that the US will want to raise the Iran issue in informal consultations under "other business", so that elected Council members are fully aware of the seriousness with which they are taking the issue. It is possible that this will take place at the beginning of the month. Subsequent briefings on progress with a new draft resolution are also likely. However, at this stage it is unclear whether any actual Council meetings or consultations on Iran will be scheduled during

March. Also it is unclear whether any of the new elected members will seek to play a larger role in the discussions.

## Sudan and Chad

The conflicts in eastern Chad and western Sudan are linked, not only by the cross-border activities of the protagonists, but also in many other ways. Both involve many of the same players. Both involve horrific use of violence against civilians. Both have precipitated large flows of refugees and displaced persons. And there are in both cases firm proposals on the table for UN forces to provide the backbone for operations to protect civilians, build processes for political reconciliation and establish security. The Council is dealing with each country as a separate agenda item, but it has a close appreciation of the regional dimension and is trying to keep that in mind.

One other factor which now characterises both situations is the fact that while they are enemies, both Chad and Sudan are resisting the deployment of UN personnel. This reluctance to give consent, in the face of almost universal international opinion that a UN presence is both appropriate and necessary, seems to stem from concern that an impartial and independent presence will in the long run result in changed political and military realities on the ground. In this regard, it probably reflects also a belief in N'Djamena and Khartoum that their opportunities for using military means to achieve their objectives are not yet exhausted.

Neither government seems ready for a genuine national reconciliation process—and especially not one in which the leadership, skills and experience of the UN can be brought into play. There is one important difference, however. Chad shows some concern for the plight of the refugees and seems ready to envisage some international protection—but is withholding consent for the robust kind of operation which the UN believes is essential.

The Council faces very difficult challenges on both issues during March. Frustration levels are building. If signs of real progress are not seen soon, powerful Council members seem likely to be looking at other options to increase the costs for the players in other ways.

The International Criminal Court indictments are also an important part of the backdrop. In addition, the recent genocide decision by the International Court of Justice is also

extremely relevant. Although the Court held that technically Serbia was not responsible for the genocide in Bosnia, its findings that genocide did occur in Srebrenica and that the former Republic of Yugoslavia failed in its obligation to prevent it, are very important. On the facts in Sudan, it seems unlikely that the state of Sudan and its leadership would be similarly absolved. And the Court's criticism of those who could have done something but failed to act perhaps sends a message of much wider application.

## Somalia

Although not formally on the agenda in March it is inevitable that Council members will be watching the situation in Somalia very closely. Consultations are expected, not only because of the apparent ongoing deterioration in the security situation, but also with a view to keeping the political reconciliation process on a respectable track.

It is not clear that the window of opportunity that was seen in January and February will stay open indefinitely. Progress with the deployment of the AMISOM force is therefore likely to be an important issue. However, it seems that at this stage most Council members are not ready to take up discussion of the proposed UN operation to take over from AMISOM. It remains to be seen whether the Council will be active in urging an enhanced UN role in the political process.

## Lebanon

The Council will have two different aspects of the Lebanon issue on its agenda. The first is a report from Commissioner Serge Brammertz on progress with the UNIIIC investigation into the Hariri assassination and an associated request from Lebanon to extend the Commission for 12 months. This should be straightforward, but may reopen a sensitive discussion from January about who is cooperating with UNIIIC and who is not.

The second aspect is the wider situation in Lebanon, set against the backdrop of much enhanced political tension. Different elements will be on the table, including the future role of the Council under resolution 1701 to advance a long-term solution, alleged violations of 1701, the implementation of the arms embargo and the implementation of recommendations regarding the Sheb'a Farms. It may be necessary to touch on all of these issues in a balanced way in order to maintain the Council's influence and respect by all parties. ■


## Annual Statistics on Security Council Activity

Security Council Report has received many suggestions that it would be helpful to produce annually an overview of Council activity.

During 2007 we will develop a publication or publications which respond to this interest. However, as a small initial contribution in this area, we have prepared the following chart graphing the annual output of the Council, in terms of resolutions and presidential statements adopted from 1990 to 2006.

Statistics on the numbers of Council resolutions and presidential statements do not by themselves give a full picture of the Council's activity. Accordingly, it will be our goal to present annually a wider range of indicators as well.

**Annual Statistics on Security Council Resolutions and Presidential Statements (1990-2006)**



The chart shows clearly the huge spike in Council output from 1992-94. From 1995 the level of activity drops sharply and remains flat until 2005.

It is clear that in 2005 and 2006 we have witnessed another dramatic rise in output by the Security Council.

It is important to note that the rise in Council activity is matched

by an equally dramatic rise in the number of peace operations approved by the Council and being deployed to the field. For a detailed commentary on the growth in peacekeeping in 2006, please see our Special Research Report, *Twenty Days in August: The Security Council Sets Massive New Challenges for UN Peacekeeping*, 8 September 2006.

## Status Update since our February Forecast

Recent developments on the situations covered in our February *Forecast* are covered in the relevant briefs in this issue. However, other interesting Council developments in February included:

- **Democratic Republic of Congo:** On 15 February the Council adopted resolution 1742 rolling over MONUC's mandate until 15 April 2007. It requested recommendations by mid-March on MONUC's future mandate. The Council also received a report on the potential impact of sanctions on the country's population. (S/2007/68)
- **Haiti:** On 15 February the Council extended MINUSTAH's mandate until 15 October 2007. (S/RES/1743)
- **Security Sector Reform:** On 20 February, the Council held an open debate on security sector reform. (See our 14 February *Update*.) The Council adopted a presidential statement and called on the Secretary-General to make concrete recommendations. (S/PRST/2007/3)
- **Iran:** On 22 February the IAEA report on Iran's non-compliance with resolution 1737 was transmitted to the Council. (S/2007/100)
- **Timor-Leste:** On 22 February the Council adopted resolution 1745 extending UNMIT's mandate until 26 February 2008 and increasing its police personnel as recommended by the 1 February Secretary-General's report. (S/2007/50)
- **Terrorism & WMDs: Resolution 1540:** On 23 February, the Council held an open debate (S/PV.5635), chaired by Slovakia's

Foreign Minister Ján Kubiš, and adopted a presidential statement (S/PRST/2007/4) promoting cooperation between the Council and international organisations to enhance states' implementation of resolution 1540. (See our 20 February *Update*.)

- **Great Lakes Region:** The Office of the Secretary-General's Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region is scheduled to close at the end of March. As indicated in our January 2007 *Forecast*, the Council in December renewed the mandate of the Special Representative for a final period, pending the establishment of a regional secretariat (S/PRST/2006/57). So far, there are no indications or likelihood that the mandate of the Special Representative will be renewed for a further period.

## Chad/Central African Republic

### Expected Council Action

Discussions on a robust protection force for eastern Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) will continue. The level of momentum suggests a final decision will be reached in March.

A key factor will be Chad's response to the Secretary-General's proposals. (Chadian President Idriss Deby opposes the proposed military component, preferring a "civilian" presence. There seems to be agreement from the CAR on an operation as proposed by the Secretary-General.) A further issue is disagreement about the priority to be accorded to a political reconciliation process.

### Key Recent Developments

Chad now has 120,000 internally displaced persons and 230,000 Sudanese refugees. Fighting between Chadian forces and rebels (some reportedly supported by Khartoum) presents serious risks to those civilians. Direct attacks against civilians by Sudanese *Janjaweed* have increased. Darfurian rebels are engaged in forcible recruitment in camps and intra-communal violence.

The situation in the CAR improved with the signing of a peace agreement between the government and two rebel groups on 2 February in Libya. This provides for hostilities to cease, rebel integration into the army and a process of national dialogue. But considerable insecurity remains, particularly in the northwest.

In a communiqué on 12 February, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) urged inclusive dialogue in Chad, offered AU assistance and decided to send a mission to assess implementation of the February 2006 Tripoli Agreement and make recommendations. On 22 February, Libya hosted a Sudan-Chad-CAR summit. But in the absence of progress on the ground, deep scepticism remains.

The Secretary-General's report does not condition deployment in eastern Chad on a political process. However, it cautions that "eastern Chad is not a conventional peace-keeping environment" and that deployment would "carry distinct and serious risks [including] the possibility that armed groups

may view a United Nations force as interfering with their military agenda and decide to attack it". The clear inference is that, if the Council is to respond to the humanitarian protection imperative, key questions are:

- Chadian rebels recognising the mission's impartial nature;
- consent from the Chadian government; and
- readiness from troop contributors.

The report offers two options. But both are dependent on critical military assets, high-quality troops and credible impartiality:

- option A, largely relying on air assets, would require 6,000 troops; and
- option B, preferred by the Secretary-General and with more reliance on infantry, would require 10,900 troops.

Under either option, there would be 260 UN police supported by 800 local gendarmes and police in Chad, with critical backstopping from the military component, and twenty UN police advisors in the CAR.

The mission would be headed by a special representative, headquartered in N'Djamena, with a regional office in Abeché, Chad headed by a deputy special representative and field offices. The mandate would include:

- assistance in civilian protection and law and order;
- deployment along the borders to reduce tensions;
- liaison with governments, the AU, and the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) (but curiously not the rebels, which is strange given the proposed role of the mission in supporting political dialogue);
- facilitating regional relations, especially with respect to the Tripoli Agreement;
- support, as necessary, for dialogue efforts with unarmed groups in Chad and coordination with the UN Peacebuilding Office in the CAR (BONUCA);
- assistance, as necessary, on a framework for a ceasefire and reconciliation with armed groups in both countries; and
- preliminary investigations on human rights violations.

The report states that the advance mission (*Mission des Nations Unies au Tchad et en République Centrafricaine*, or MiNUTAC) will be headed by a Secretary-General's representative for Chad and consist of 35 military and 39 UN police, plus a civilian component.

### Options

Council consultations on 27 February suggest that a large UN protection force seems to be emerging as the most likely option. (The light monitoring option canvassed in December now seems to be excluded.) Other options for discussion will include:

- giving the mission a strong enforcement mandate with the robustness and assets recommended by the Secretary-General, including a presence in northwestern CAR;
- providing proactive assistance to the Secretariat with encouraging potential troop contributors; and
- firmly engaging Chad to provide consent to the robust military component.

The option of running an operation without a political process (either established or being set up in parallel) seems to have receded in light of the risks.

The Secretary-General's report speaks of relying on perceptions of the mission's impartiality and seems to envisage only a light facilitation role (which curiously does not include initiating contact with either Chadian or Darfurian rebels). An option, therefore, is for the Council to specify this aspect of the mandate in more detail, which could involve:

- a political mandate to directly engage Chadian rebels and government, perhaps in coordination with the AU PSC initiative, as well as coordinating with key regional players within the Tripoli framework;
- signalling in the resolution that the establishment of a political process is an important step towards regional and domestic stability and for the mission's exit strategy; and
- prioritising that role by mandating the early deployment of the civilian component.

### Key Issues

The key issue for Council members is agreeing on the various elements of the proposed protection mission, including size and mandate.

But the first issue is consent. Deby's reluctance to accept a strong military component bears some resemblance to the Sudan precedent and could potentially cause huge problems for the timing of the mission's deployment. A related issue is whether



Khartoum and regional players, such as Libya, will also oppose a robust deployment.

A related issue will be whether key Council members—France in particular—will be willing to push N'Djamena to accept the force with the robustness recommended by the Secretary-General. The alternative would be to accept substantial limitations on the force's effectiveness and much higher risks.

A second major issue will be securing sufficient troop and police contributions, given current demands on peacekeeping resources. Mixed signals about consent and disagreement in the Council on mandate and size are likely to deter troop and police contributors. A related question is whether Council members will be prepared collectively to play a larger role in energising the force-generation process.

The final issue is that the political reconciliation dimension seems to be lagging. The Secretary-General's proposals only envisage a light facilitation role for the operation combined with a hoped-for reliance on recognition of the UN's impartial nature. Given that this light political role may affect both military effectiveness and a credible exit strategy, this raises the questions of:

- whether more work is needed to clarify the political environment in which the mission would operate, as well as the political objectives; and
- whether the Secretary-General's recommendations are too soft on the political side and may require strengthening.

### Council Dynamics

During the 27 February consultations, there was wide support for a robust protection operation in eastern Chad and in the CAR. France and African members may present a draft soon, after consultations with Chad and the CAR.

Positions on the specifics of an eventual mission have not yet been tested. Several members have expressed concern with the lack of clarity on:

- the political and security environment, in particular the degree of realism in relying on perceptions of impartiality;
- the lack of troop and police pledges, especially in view of deployments in Darfur and Somalia;

- Chad's position on both the military component and a political process; and
- how the mission will fit in the Tripoli framework.

Most seem to believe that the mission should be approved soon, despite those concerns. There is some expectation of difficulty in crafting the mandate, especially given Chad's reluctance on a political process and the military component, but there seems to be resolve that robustness is non-negotiable.

There is also wide support for language on political reconciliation. Members traditionally sympathetic to Deby—in particular France and the Congo—may be unsympathetic to overt criticism and pressure and are likely to be sensitive to options which are more attractive to N'Djamena. By contrast, Russia, China and Qatar, mindful of Sudan's position, may be more sympathetic to the opposite position.

### UN Documents

#### Selected Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1706 (31 August 2006) mandated a multidimensional UN presence in Chad and the CAR and requested recommendations.

#### Selected Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2007/2 (16 January 2007) requested further recommendations on peacekeeping in Chad and the CAR by mid-February and the immediate establishment of an advance mission.
- S/PRST/2006/47 (22 November 2006) renewed BONUS.

#### Selected Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2007/97 (23 February 2007) was the new report on UN peacekeeping in Chad and the CAR.
- S/2006/1034 (28 December 2006) was the latest report on the CAR.
- S/2006/1019 (22 December 2006) was the first report on UN peacekeeping in Chad and the CAR.

#### Other

- S/2006/934 (30 November 2006) contained the new modalities for BONUS.

For the full historical background, please see our July and December 2006 and February 2007 *Forecasts*.



### Other Relevant Facts

#### CAR: Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Lamine Cissé (Senegal)

#### BONUS: Size and Composition

Strength as of 30 September 2006: 19 internationals, five military, six police

#### BONUS: Duration

15 February 2000 to present; mandate expires 31 December 2007

#### Force multinationale en Centrafrique (FOMUC): Size and Composition

- Current strength: 380 troops
- Contributors: Gabon, Republic of Congo and Chad

#### FOMUC: Duration

October 2002 to present; mandate expires 30 June 2007

## Sudan (Darfur)

### Expected Council Action

With the crisis in Darfur reaching more serious proportions each month, the Council is expected to take up the question again in March, particularly Khartoum's delayed response to the Secretary-General's heavy support proposal. It will also be pushing for prompt AU-UN agreement on the hybrid operation. Renewed focus on the political reconciliation process is possible.

The Secretary-General's envoy Jan Eliasson and AU envoy Salim A. Salim may brief the Council.

The sanctions Panel of Experts' mid-term briefing is due by 29 March.

### Key Recent Developments

Attacks against civilians in February increased the numbers of displaced persons to a record two million internally displaced, underlining the intensification of the continuing crisis in Darfur.

On 14 February, Khartoum refused visas for the Human Rights Council-mandated high-level mission.

On 27 February, International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-

Ocampo presented the charges against former Sudanese interior minister (and current state humanitarian affairs minister) Ahmed Haroun and *Janjaweed* commander Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-al-Rahman (alias Ali Kushayb).

In a Council briefing on 6 February the Secretary-General reported that Khartoum had not yet responded on the heavy package and that next steps would be considered when Eliasson and Salim returned from Sudan.

The package would include 2,250 military force “enablers” (logistical/engineering), 300 UN police advisors and three formed police units (about 375 police) to patrol camps and protect civilians. To be effective, the package depends on the deployment of two AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) battalions—already authorised but never generated—to facilitate AMIS’ deployment in three sectors. There seem to be real difficulties with generating the necessary AMIS troops without simultaneously addressing the lack of funding and facilities for the troops.

Sudan seems to object to the placing of overall operational command and control over the military component with the UN, with delegation to the AMIS force commander.

Council members seem to be increasingly losing patience. The US appears to be developing a broad package of sanctions. Measures could include blocking Khartoum-related banking transactions in the US. (Some observers note that Sudan has already started to modify export contracts previously in US dollars.)

Eliasson and Salim’s mission to re-energise the peace process in mid-February addressed key points of contention such as re-opening the peace agreement and rebel unity. On the other hand, there are concerns that since Jan Pronk’s departure in December 2006, there has been no special representative of the Secretary-General and head of the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in Khartoum to lead for the UN on a day-to-day basis.

Libya convened its latest regional peace initiative on 20 February. Eritrea (as a facilitator), Chad, Sudan and rebel groups attended. Eritrea and Libya also reportedly met with the rebels separately to encourage a unified negotiating position.

On 13 February, Sudanese aircraft bombed rebel groups preparing for a conference on a unified negotiating platform. At press time, a new conference appeared to be underway.

### Related Developments in the Human Rights Council

In late January, the Human Rights Council president appointed a five-member high-level mission to assess human rights conditions in Darfur, following the Council’s December decision. The mission is headed by Nobel laureate Jody Williams.

In mid-February, the mission met with AU representatives in Addis Ababa and was then to proceed to Khartoum. However, the Sudanese government reneged on its earlier promise to issue visas to the delegation. Widespread international criticism ensued. The Secretary-General, mentioning his “disappointment”, recalled that Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir had personally promised him to receive the mission.

The mission then decided to collect information from locations outside Sudan, including Chad. A final report is expected before the end of the Human Rights Council’s fourth regular session on 30 March.

### Options

Available options—perhaps through a presidential statement after the briefing from Eliasson and Salim—include:

- setting a deadline for Sudan’s response on the heavy package;
- providing proactive assistance to the AU and the UN with key aspects of the heavy package, such as funding and airlift for new AMIS troops;
- encouraging prompt finalisation of the hybrid operation proposal;
- pressuring Sudan to realise in practice its commitments to the operation;
- making clear to the Secretary-General that concessions that could compromise the force’s effectiveness should not be made; and
- showing Council support for reactivation of the Darfur peace process.

Council-imposed sanctions against Khartoum are less likely, so long as it appears to cooperate in the phased approach and in the absence of clear evidence of prevarication. On the other hand, as time passes, unilateral sanctions are increasingly likely.

Private advice to the Secretary-General about the urgent need to fill the UNMIS leadership position quickly is also a likely option.

### Key Issues

The key issue for the Council is how to make progress to implement the phased approach towards a hybrid operation. There is a possibility that Sudan now intends to obstruct the phased approach indefinitely. The issue for the Council may therefore be how long to tolerate deliberate delays in providing responses to the heavy package and the hybrid operation.

The issue of sanctions is again looming as Sudan’s resistance to Council demands continues. The issue seems to be whether there are still sufficient concrete indications that the phased approach has some hope of being implemented.

A parallel issue is how to re-establish a peace process in Darfur, and whether to focus on this dimension as a means to make progress with the phased approach. (However, some members will recall that, in 2005, the same was being said about the Abuja peace negotiations.)

There are also a number of open issues on the phased approach:

- the linkage between the heavy support package and the need to deploy the additional AMIS troops and the associated funding issues;
- finalising the hybrid operation proposal, including AU-UN agreement on mandate, size, cost and command and control;
- stimulating UN-troop generation for the heavy support (2,250 troops and 675 police) and the hybrid operation (17,300 military and 5,000 police), given the projected UN operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (10,900 troops recommended) and the AU mission in Somalia (8,000 troops); and
- ensuring that AMIS accountability, procurement and managerial standards comply with UN rules, particularly in view of the need to secure funding commitment from the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee.

### Council Dynamics

While there is consensus within the Council on the need to press ahead rapidly with the phased approach, significant divisions remain on how to deal with Sudan.

China, Russia, Qatar and Indonesia seem to favour a cautious, quieter approach

taking into account Khartoum's concerns. Those members appear to prefer a step-by-step approach notwithstanding the increasing humanitarian costs as a result of delays. They consider that detailed agreement should be secured on each of the support packages before moving to the hybrid operation.

The US and the UK seem to be looking for new options, including fine-tuned unilateral sanctions. They also want to increase the pressure to finalise the hybrid operation plan and push for a final response from Khartoum.

Among African members, there is irritation with the damage that the current situation has done to the AU's reputation and concern about the safety of AMIS troops. There is scepticism on whether sanctions would have positive effects. Some, especially Congo, are disinclined to openly pressure Khartoum. Nonetheless, there seems to be a readiness to notch up African pressure on Sudan.

Most members have welcomed the Secretary-General's efforts including the moves to re-energise the political track. There is increasing support for the view that concrete progress on peace talks will help achieve progress in the negotiations on the peacekeeping operation.

China's apparent inability to use its economic influence to persuade Sudan is not understood by many Council members. The US openly criticised the "mixed signals" sent during Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit in early February to Khartoum, in which he reportedly urged a solution to Darfur but also signed an aid package.

## UN Documents

### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1714 (6 October 2006) extended UNMIS until 30 April 2007.
- S/RES/1706 (31 August 2006) set a mandate for UNMIS in Darfur.
- S/RES/1591 (29 March 2005) and 1556 (30 July 2004) imposed sanctions in Darfur.
- S/RES/1590 (24 March 2005) established UNMIS.

### Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2006/55 (19 December 2006) endorsed the phased approach.

### Selected Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2006/1041 (28 December 2006) was the latest monthly report on Darfur at press time.

- S/2006/591 (28 July 2006) and Add. 1 (28 August 2006) and S/2006/645 (10 August 2006) made recommendations for UNMIS' mandate in Darfur and for UN assistance to AMIS.

### Other

- S-4/101 (13 December 2006) was the Human Rights Council Darfur decision.
- S/2006/961 (6 December 2006) contained the 30 November AU Peace and Security Council communiqué.
- S/2006/795 (2 October 2006) was the latest Panel of Experts' report.

For the full historical background, please see our February and July 2006 and February 2007 *Forecasts*.

## Other Relevant Facts

### UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Vacant

### Special Envoy of the Secretary-General

Jan Eliasson (Sweden)

### UNMIS: Size, Composition and Cost

- Maximum authorised strength: up to 27,300 military and 6,015 police
- Strength as of 31 December 2006: 9,317 military and 660 police
- Key troop contributors: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh
- Cost: 1 July 2006-30 June 2007 \$1,126.30 million (excludes Darfur)

### UNMIS: Duration

24 March 2005 to present; mandate expires 30 April 2007

### AU Special Envoy

Salim A. Salim

### AMIS: Size and Composition

- Total authorised strength: about 10,000 military and 1,500 police
- Strength as of 1 September 2006: 5,703 military and 1,425 police
- Key troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda and Senegal

### AMIS: Duration

25 May 2004 to present; mandate expires 1 July 2007

### Human Rights Council High-Level Mission

- Jody Williams (US) (head)
- Mart Nutt (Estonia)
- Bertrand Ramcharan (Guyana)
- Patrice Tonda (Gabon)
- Marakim Wibisono (Indonesia)



## Useful Additional Sources

- Conciliation Resources, *Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan's Conflicts*, 2006, <http://www.c-r.org/our-ork/accord/sudan/contents.php>

## Somalia

### Expected Council Action

Council members, encouraged in February by what they saw as a window of opportunity in Somalia, will be looking anxiously at developments in the country, particularly the slow progress with the deployment of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The findings of the UN assessment mission will also be a focus. The regular report of the Secretary-General, which is due by 28 February, is likely to precipitate a discussion of progress, particularly whether meaningful steps are underway with a political reconciliation process. A Council statement is possible.

The sanctions committee may discuss applications for exemptions to provide support for Somali government forces in line with resolution 1744.

### Key Recent Developments

The security situation has deteriorated, with growing factional violence and almost daily attacks against Ethiopian forces and Transitional Federal Government (TFG) officials in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kismayo and other cities. Civilians bear the brunt of the violence, and an estimated 1.1 million face a humanitarian crisis in the south. Fighting continues between Ethiopian troops and Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) remnants in the south.

On 20 February, the Council adopted resolution 1744, stressing the "need for broad-based and representative institutions reached through an all-inclusive political process" and requested the Secretary-General to assist actively. The resolution also reiterated the Council's intention to consider sanctions against peace spoilers.

Resolution 1744 also:

- authorised AMISOM to use all necessary means to provide security for all involved



- in the reconciliation process, protection for the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), assistance in particular for the formation of national security forces and security for humanitarian assistance;
- provided exemptions from the arms embargo for AMISOM and to external technical assistance for Somali security forces; and
- requested a UN assessment mission to report on the possibility of replacing AMISOM with a UN mission and recommendations on the UN's future role in support of peace and security in Somalia. (An earlier draft contained a request for recommendations *including* a peacekeeping operation. Some members seem to have been uncomfortable with specifying at this stage that UN peacekeeping was an option.)

The resolution also welcomes Ethiopia's decision to withdraw and calls for contributions to AMISOM to create conditions for the "withdrawal of all foreign forces." This was seen as a message separating the Ethiopian intervention from AMISOM in order to safeguard the impartiality of the AU force.

Responding to international pressure, Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi announced on 22 February that he will convene a national reconciliation conference within weeks.

The TFG has sent mixed signals on its willingness to negotiate. Some reports suggest that President Abdullahi Yusuf has ruled out any UIC inclusion and that many in his administration are reluctant to relinquish positions for a power-sharing arrangement.

Uganda, Nigeria, Burundi, Ghana and Malawi have pledged half of the planned 8,000 troops for AMISOM. Two Ugandan battalions will be the first to arrive in Mogadishu, following clearance from the Ugandan parliament on 13 February.

The AU hopes that Uganda's deployment will create positive momentum for more pledges. Concerns about funding are high, with pledges from the EU, US and UK amounting only to approximately US\$40 million.

### Options

Options for the Council in March include:

- reviewing progress with the political reconciliation process and expressing

stronger support for it, perhaps through a statement;

- supporting a standing "international working group," perhaps based in Nairobi and co-chaired by the UN and the AU, to support the national reconciliation process; and
- imposing targeted sanctions on peace spoilers.

### Key Issues

The key issues are:

- energising the political reconciliation process and encouraging it to be more inclusive;
- important aspects of the general framework for any Yusuf-led reconciliation process are still unclear, including the role of international facilitators and advisors, participation (especially whether the UIC or some successor organisation will be allowed to participate as a group or only individuals such as Sheikh Ahmed) and the desired outcome (particularly whether it should include a power-sharing deal);
- improving the security situation in Somalia and ensuring that the TFIs remain a viable political framework through the deployment of AMISOM and future national security forces;
- guaranteeing delivery of humanitarian assistance;
- addressing the regional impact of the situation in Somalia, especially regarding refugees, arms and combatants; and
- how soon to begin discussion of a possible transition from AMISOM to the UN.

Questions remain on AMISOM's troop generation and funding, and on the AU's capacity to shoulder simultaneous commitments in Darfur and Somalia.

### Council Dynamics

Members seem agreed on a strategy for Somalia around an inclusive reconciliation process, with support from AMISOM in the short-term.

However, for many members there is a recognition that the TFG is not representative and that this is contributing to the current violence. There is emerging consensus that the process should include all key players, especially moderate Islamic individuals. Members have publicly welcomed Yusuf's initiative, but scepticism remains.

The US is likely to be cautious over which UIC members could be included in the

process and how they are included. (US Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer recently stated that "we suggest the TFG reach out to moderate Islamists. We do not believe that the Courts should be reconstituted as a political entity" and that the US will "take strong measures to deny terrorists safe haven in Somalia.")

On replacing AMISOM with a UN operation, views range from those very supportive of a speedy transfer (such as the US and African members) to those (such as France) seemingly concerned with UN peacekeeping priorities elsewhere. Others seem open to the idea, but prefer as a first step careful assessment of progress with national reconciliation and AMISOM's deployment.

## UN Documents

### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1744 (20 February 2007) authorised AMISOM.
- S/RES/733 (23 January 1992) imposed the arms embargo.

### Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2006/59 (22 December 2006) expressed the Council's concern over intensified fighting and called upon all parties to draw back from conflict.

### Selected Press Statement

- SC/8947 (2 February 2007) signalled support for AMISOM and an all-inclusive reconciliation.

### Latest Secretary-General's Report

- S/2006/838 (23 October 2006)

### Latest Monitoring Group's Report

- S/2006/913 (21 November 2006)

## Historical Background

*December 2006-January 2007* Ethiopian and TFG forces overrun the UIC.

*October-November 2006* The UIC encircled the TFG at its sole outpost, Baidoa. Ethiopian troops began amassing along the border.

*25 September 2006* The UIC took control of Kismayo.

*13 September 2006* The AU formally endorsed the IGAD Mission in Somalia (IGASOM).

*Early June 2006* The UIC seized control of Mogadishu and Jowhar.

*10 October 2004* The TFG was established.



April 1995 UNPOS was established.

November 1994 The Council decided to terminate UNOSOM II by March 1995.

October 1993 18 US Rangers were killed and mutilated, 75 were wounded. The US announced withdrawal from Somalia by March 1994.

June 1993 Pakistani troops were attacked, 24 were killed.

March 1993 UNOSOM II was established.

December 1992 The Council authorised UNITAF.

April 1992 UNOSOM I and a sanctions committee were established.

January 1992 The Council imposed an arms embargo.

1991 Civil war broke out; Somaliland declared independence.

## Other Relevant Facts

### Special Representative of the Secretary-General

François Lonseny Fall (Guinea)

### Chairman of the Sanctions Committee

Dumisani S. Kumalo (South Africa)

## Kosovo

### Expected Council Action

The final report by Maarti Ahtisaari, the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo, is expected to be transmitted to the Council during March. No Council action is expected during the month though there will be active bilateral discussions. The Council may meet on the issue in April and a draft resolution on Kosovo is likely to emerge before long.

The Secretary-General's periodic report on the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) is also expected in March. UNMIK has already downsized significantly. Its future awaits the Council's decision on Kosovo's status.

### Key Recent Developments

Kosovo has been under UN administration, as defined in resolution 1244, since 1999 when a NATO bombing campaign brought to a halt a prolonged conflict between ethnic Albanian separatists and Serbian forces.

After a year of status negotiations, Ahtisaari presented an outline of the much-anticipated proposal for Kosovo's status to Belgrade and Pristina on 2 February.

Ahtisaari's outline does not mention the word independence. It is silent and ambiguous as to whether Kosovo would remain part of the state of Serbia in terms of international law. It does however give Kosovo many of the symbols traditionally associated with statehood including a flag, anthem, and army and some elements of international legal personality such as the right to conduct certain aspects of foreign policy. However, none of these are definitive in the sense that in many federal systems territorial sub-units enjoy similar symbols. And there are examples of associated states that enjoy separate treaty-making power and rights to join international organisations

Ahtisaari has hinted that his final report, following the conclusion of the last round of consultations with the parties, will remove some of these uncertainties.

The 58-page proposal contains 14 articles which form its key principles. These are expanded in 12 annexes. One key provision is a future international presence that would include an International Civilian Representative (ICR) who would also be the EU Special Representative, a European Security and Defence Policy Mission and a NATO-led International Military Presence.

In terms of governance, the proposal would replace the current transitional constitutional framework of UN administration, which was imposed by the Council, with a new framework, also to be imposed by the Council, returning the sovereign powers of law-making and administration to the people, but retaining a much looser form of international oversight.

The proposed settlement provides a 120-day transition period during which UNMIK's mandate would continue. During this time the Kosovo Assembly, in consultation with the ICR, would approve a constitution and legislation necessary to implement the final status. Nine months later, elections would be held.

The proposed settlement envisages:

- a multi-ethnic society with democratic government, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms;
- the right to conclude international



agreements and seek membership in international organisations;

- protection of the rights of members of communities;
- decentralisation and transparency in public service;
- an integrated, independent, impartial, inclusive justice system;
- protection and promotion of religious and cultural heritage;
- the rights of refugees and displaced persons to return and reclaim property and possessions; and
- a professional, multi-ethnic and democratic Kosovo security sector.

Two-thirds of the proposal focuses on strengthening protection for the Serb minority with specific provisions for the protection of Kosovo's non-Albanian communities, including guaranteed representation in the Kosovo Assembly, government and the judiciary.

In the weeks since the presentation of Ahtisaari's proposal there has been dissent on both sides. On 9 February, 10,000 Serbs in Mitrovica demonstrated against it. In Belgrade all parties in the Serbian parliament have opposed the proposal. On 10 February ethnic Albanians in Kosovo rioted in protest that the proposal fell short of full independence. Police responded with tear gas and rubber bullets. Two people were killed and Kosovo's interior minister and the UNMIK police commissioner resigned over the deaths.

On 19 February a bomb attack in Pristina damaged three UN vehicles. The Kosovo Liberation Army has claimed responsibility in retaliation for the deaths of the two Albanian protestors. On 26 February a hand-grenade exploded near OSCE premises in western Kosovo. There was a major demonstration in Belgrade on 27 February.

On 21 February, a final round of talks between the two sides commenced in Vienna. Ahtisaari made it clear he was open to constructive amendments and compromise. The Kosovo Albanian side accepted the proposal without major changes. The Serbians opposed most of the plan,

believing it violated the territorial integrity of Serbia. It asked for Kosovo to be clearly designated as an autonomous region within Serbia. The talks are expected to end by 10 March.

Elections in Serbia on 21 January did not produce a working majority in parliament. A coalition government, with pro-democracy parties leading the new government, is expected. However, both Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica and pro-Western President Boris Tadic denounced the Ahtisaari plan. The Serb Radical Party, which seems likely to be the opposition, demanded that parliament adopt a resolution opposing independence for Kosovo. The Serbian Orthodox Church also opposed Ahtisaari's plan.

On 12 February EU foreign ministers backed Ahtisaari's proposal and said the EU was ready to play a significant role in implementing a status settlement. The EU also offered Serbia the incentive of early resumption of talks on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement—the first step towards EU membership—if it fully cooperated with the UN war crimes tribunal. The EU suspended talks last year because Serbia failed to hand over Bosnian Serb commander Ratko Mladic.

On 2 February the Contact Group on Kosovo (the US, the UK, France, Italy, Russia and Germany), which Ahtisaari has closely consulted at every step, issued a short statement urging the parties to engage constructively. A more definitive position remained elusive due to differences between the five Western members and Russia.

## Options

It is unlikely that the Council will consider any options in March.

## Key Issues

The first key issue for the Council will be timing. Council members will be concerned that rushing into a decision could destabilise the region. But equally there will be deep concern that too much delay could also trigger serious violence. Tensions have increased since the presentation of the proposal and the Council will be very conscious of the spill-over risk into neighbouring countries.

A second and related issue is the risk that the Albanian Kosovars will unilaterally declare independence if the Council stalls on the issue too long. Without the frame-

work of protections of minorities and international oversight envisaged by Ahtisaari, this could create a complicated and potentially volatile situation. UNMIK would still be the interim administrator of Kosovo, and conflict might arise should the government want to take over UNMIK's functions. A situation could emerge in which hostilities were directed at UNMIK by both Serbian and Albanian factions.

Another issue that carries huge concerns for a number of Council members (and many outside the Council) is the impact that a Council decision imposed without Belgrade's consent would have on situations elsewhere in the world where other break-away regions seeking independence would use Kosovo as a precedent.

At this stage, another major issue is the fundamental ambiguity underlying Ahtisaari's plan. As indicated above, this may be clarified in his final report, but at present while the principles of governance are clearly stated, what they mean for Kosovo's status remains unclear.

For some Council members, the proposed solution raises important legal issues. There are very few precedents.

## Council and Wider Dynamics

While the Council has supported Ahtisaari, it is clearly divided on what to do next. Most of the Western members, together with the Latin Americans, seem open to the Council imposing a solution without Serbia's consent if necessary. For many of them there is no willingness to consider any plan B. Moreover, they are convinced that it is essential to achieve a solution in the near future to maintain stability.

The EU position is more complicated. Slovakia, which has a key role as an elected Council member, may be handicapped in supporting an EU consensus because Ahtisaari's plan has sparked strong adverse reactions from almost all members of Slovakia's governing coalition. It is possible that Slovakia will find it difficult to support independence for Kosovo against the will of Serbia.

Russia and China oppose an imposed solution and would prefer that more time be given for the talks. Russia argues that granting Kosovo independence could spark a chain reaction creating a precedent for separatist regions such as Georgia's Abkhazia

and South Ossetia and Moldova's Transdniestria. But the reasons for Russia's position also seem likely to go much deeper and reflect traditional ties with Serbia and orthodox communities. It is unclear at this stage whether this opposition would be strong enough to attract a veto, or under what conditions an abstention might be possible.

In the past the elected Council members, essentially excluded from input on the Kosovo issue because of the Contact Group processes, were not unduly concerned because it was seen as a largely European issue. But as a final decision point approaches, a number of the elected members, including Indonesia and South Africa, are taking very close interest because of the implications for territorial integrity. Strong ties in the Non-Aligned Movement will be relevant.

Finally, it remains to be seen whether the Secretary-General will take a position on the issue. He has a number of potential ways of doing so; including in his letter of transmittal of the Ahtisaari report to the Council.

## Underlying Problems

Some believe that the short transition time envisaged by the Ahtisaari plan will create problems and that UNMIK may find it difficult to complete all the necessary tasks in 120 days.

Kosovo's economic situation is dire. If its status continues to be unresolved, this will delay membership in international financial organisations cutting it off from much needed international aid.

## UN Documents

### Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) authorised NATO to secure and enforce the withdrawal of Yugoslav (FRY) forces from Kosovo and established UNMIK.

### Selected Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2005/51 (24 October 2005) declared it was time to begin the political process to determine the future status of Kosovo.
- S/PRST/2004/13 (30 April 2004) reaffirmed strong support for the policy of "standards before status."

### Selected Secretary-General's Reports/Letters

- S/2007/53 (1 February 2007) was the letter reporting on the operations of the Kosovo Force from 1 to 30 November 2006.

The political impasse in Lebanon continues (please see our December 2006 *Forecast* for more details). In February, violence left four people dead and about 200 injured. Lebanon's Hezbollah-led opposition recently threatened a campaign of civil disobedience.

The international tribunal for the trial of murderers of Rafik Hariri is one of the issues at the core of the crisis. On 6 February, the Lebanese government and the UN signed an agreement for the tribunal. However, ratification by the Lebanese parliament is being blocked by Nabih Berri, the Shi'a president of parliament. The next parliamentary session is scheduled for mid-March. On 16 February, Saad Hariri, the son of late Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and the current leader of the pro-government March 14 coalition, proposed that the Security Council override local objections and impose the tribunal through a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

On 25 January, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon attended an international donors' conference for Lebanon in Paris. Saudi Arabia, the US and France, along with forty other countries plus the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, pledged \$7.6 billion in grants and soft loans to help rebuild Lebanon.

Lebanese and Israeli forces on 7 February exchanged fire across the Blue Line separating the two countries. A tripartite investigation commission, including the Lebanese and Israeli forces and UNIFIL, was set up to determine the sequence of events and whether Israeli forces crossed the Blue Line before the Lebanese army fired. The Council issued a press statement expressing concern and said it looked forward to receiving the results of the investigation.

Israel reported that the Lebanese army on 8 February intercepted a truck transporting arms east of Beirut. Israel also said that there had been other reports of arms destined for Hezbollah being smuggled from Syria to Lebanon.

### Useful Additional Sources

- Joint Contact Group statement published upon presentation by the Special Envoy of his draft comprehensive proposal, 2 February 2007
- Statement of the Contact Group after meeting held at ministerial level in New York, 20 September 2007
- *Kosovo's Status: Difficult Months Ahead*, International Crisis Group, Europe Briefing No. 45, 20 December 2006

## Lebanon

### Expected Council Action

On 12 March the Council is due to receive the quarterly report on resolution 1701, which brought about the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. Recommendations on the status of the Sheb'a Farms are also expected. A presidential statement is possible.

The International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIC) on the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri is also expected to report in March. Following a Lebanese request, the Council will consider renewing the Commission's mandate for one year.

### Key Recent Developments

The Council adopted a presidential statement on 12 December following the Secretary-General's report on implementation of resolution 1701. (For background see our 8 December 2006 *Update*.)

The last UNIIC report was presented to the Council by Commissioner Serge Brammertz on 18 December. He noted that the investigation was approaching a sensitive and complicated phase, and that there were significant links between the Hariri murder and other bombings in Lebanon. He noted that Syria's cooperation with the commission had been satisfactory, but that ten states had not responded to his request for cooperation.

On 5 January, Russia proposed a formal request to Brammertz for the names of countries that were not cooperating with his investigation. Most members preferred an alternate proposal, expressing readiness to assist the Commission further, leaving it to Brammertz to decide if and when to disclose names. However, Russia was reluctant to compromise, and on 22 January the Council decided to defer discussion of the draft letter.

- S/2007/39 (26 January 2007) was the letter reporting on the operations of the Kosovo Force from 1 to 31 October 2006.
- S/2006/906 (20 November 2006) was the latest report of the Secretary-General on UNMIK.
- S/2006/657 (16 August 2006) and S/2006/656 (14 August 2006) were letters between the Secretary-General and the president of the Security Council regarding the appointment of Joachim Rucker as the Special Representative and head of UNMIK.
- S/2006/45 (25 January 2006) noted that progress in the implementation of the standards was slower than all other reporting periods.

### Other Relevant Facts

#### Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Joachim Rucker (Germany)

#### UNMIK

- Size of UNMIK mission: 504 international staff, 2,001 local staff; 142 UN volunteers
- Size of OSCE mission: 252 international staff, 768 local staff
- Size of EU mission: 125 international staff, 336 local staff

#### Cost

US\$2.218 billion for fiscal year 2006/2007 (not including OSCE, EU and NATO expenditures)

#### KFOR (NATO FORCE)

General Roland Kather (Germany)

#### Size and Composition of Mission

- Size: 16,300 troops
- NATO Countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, UK, US
- Non-NATO Countries: Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Mongolia, Morocco, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine

#### UNMIK Civilian Police

- Total of 1,374 officers from 42 countries
- Key contributors: Pakistan, Rumania, Ukraine, US



The Council issued a press statement on 13 February condemning terrorist attacks on two public buses in Ain Aaleq, in northeast Beirut, which killed three people. After a request from the Lebanese prime minister, the Council agreed to allow UNIIIC to provide technical assistance to Lebanese authorities investigating these attacks (similar to the case of the November 2006 assassination of Pierre Gemayel).

On 22 February the Lebanese government asked the Security Council to extend the mandate of UNIIIC, due to expire on 15 June 2007, for up to one year.

In February, the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General in Lebanon was upgraded to Special Coordinator of all UN agencies in Lebanon.

### Options

On the Investigation Commission, the Council could respond to the UNIIIC report by:

- renewing the UNIIIC mandate for either six months or one year;
- expressing readiness to assist Brammertz, particularly if states are not cooperating in a satisfactory manner; and
- deferring a decision since the mandate does not expire until June.

On the 1701 report, the Council may adopt a presidential statement. It could begin to address the broader issues of long-term stability in Lebanon as promised in resolution 1701. The statement could also respond to alleged violations of resolution 1701 in a balanced way so as to address both the 7 February “Blue Line” incident and better monitoring of the arms embargo and calling on Syria to cooperate with such monitoring efforts.

In addition, a presidential statement could respond in a preliminary way to the Secretary-General’s recommendations on the Sheb’a Farms, although it is likely that Council members may want time to consider these and a more detailed discussion in April may be possible

Measures to reinforce the arms embargo such as a sanctions committee seem unlikely at this stage in the absence of more concrete evidence.

### Key Issues

- **Recommendations on the Sheb’a Farms:** In its December presidential statement, the Council reminded the Secretary-General that it was looking forward to receiving

recommendations on the cartographic, legal and political implications of placing the Sheb’a Farms under UN jurisdiction until border delineation and Lebanese sovereignty over them are fully settled. This involves determining the precise geographic scope of the Sheb’a Farms. The substantive issue the Council will have to decide is whether to request that Syria proceed to delineate its border with Lebanon on the basis of the recommendations. In addition to Syria’s position, Hezbollah’s position on the territorial definition of the Farms may become an issue. Hezbollah considers the farms Lebanese, and their occupation by Israel as the justification for their armed status. However, tactically, at this time it may not suit Hezbollah for this issue to be resolved because it would reduce the justification for operating as a militia. They may therefore raise objections. Also it is possible that Israel will have tactical objections to resolving the status of the Farms, thereby further complicating the issue.

- **Violations of the Blue Line:** In addition to the 7 February incident, there is the issue of continuing reports of violations of the Blue Line by Israeli aircraft.
- **Arms Embargo:** A major issue is the question of alleged movements of weapons across the Syrian-Lebanese border. For Israel, the absence of satisfactory assurances on this front is the rationale for the surveillance over-flights. The Council said in December that it was ready to adopt further measures on this aspect.
- **Monitoring the Syrian-Lebanese Border:** This is a related issue and the Council may discuss progress toward reinforcing bilateral cooperation with the Lebanese army, as well as the Secretary-General’s technical evaluation of the situation along the border.
- **Israeli Prisoners:** The Council is keen to hear the views of the Secretary-General on Hezbollah’s engagement on this issue.

On UNIIIC, the main issues are the Lebanese request for an extension of UNIIIC for twelve months and whether there has been progress between UNIIIC and the states previously mentioned by Brammertz as non-cooperative. Brammertz may address the cooperation issue in his report, perhaps by explaining that in all or some cases the lack of cooperation was of a technical or legal nature rather than a political one, and

that he anticipates technical resolution in due course. Asking him to be more specific is likely to continue to be a sensitive issue. On the other hand, the discussion will become more complex if he advises that the non-cooperation was of a political nature or if cooperation was withheld even if it was legally possible.

Regarding the issue of the Council possibly moving to impose the tribunal under Chapter VII, some members may prefer the latter outcome, as a robust indication of support for the Lebanese government. But most members seem likely to prefer a decision giving a 12-month extension of UNIIIC as a satisfactory commitment of support to the Lebanese government at this stage.

### Council Dynamics

Russia seems to be increasingly responsive to Syria’s concerns about the situation in Lebanon. It seems that Syria in January was behind the proposal to name the states that did not cooperate with the Brammertz investigation. A significant majority of members opposed this Russian initiative as they believed that the Council should not interfere in the commissioner’s work. Most members consider that naming the countries could be disruptive to the investigation.

South Africa and Indonesia seem to agree that while the Council should not override Brammertz’s judgement on this issue, it should still be possible to agree on language which asserts the importance of wide cooperation with the investigation, not only by Syria.

Panama and South Africa have expressed concern about systematically adding to UNIIIC’s tasks by asking it to assist Lebanese authorities investigating new bombings. France, on the other hand, strongly believes the Commission’s capacities should be used, since it contributes to support for stability in Lebanon.

Consensus on reinforcing the arms embargo through the creation of a sanctions committee may be hard to reach. It would be resisted by Russia.

There is much support within the Council that the issue of ratification of the tribunal should remain in the hands of the Lebanese. Hence there is reluctance about any Chapter VII initiative. Also, as the Council has always acted in response to Lebanese requests, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora

would have to ask for the Council's help. This seems unlikely at this stage as it would probably undermine any chance of negotiating a solution to the current political crisis. (The League of Arab States is hoping to mediate a political solution.)

### Underlying Problems

By 14 February, thirty fatalities and 186 injuries due to mines or unexploded ordnance had been reported since the end of the conflict. (Israel's use of cluster munitions in south Lebanon was criticised by the US on 29 January as it violated an export agreement between the two countries.)

### Selected UN Documents on UNIIIC

#### Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1686 (15 June 2006) extended UNIIIC's mandate by one year.
- S/RES/1664 (29 March 2006) requested negotiation with Lebanon on a tribunal of international character.
- S/RES/1644 (15 December 2005) authorised expanded technical assistance to Lebanon and extended UNIIIC's mandate until 15 June 2006.
- S/RES/1636 (31 October 2005) urged Syria to cooperate with the investigation and established sanctions against suspects in the Hariri assassination.
- S/RES/1595 (7 April 2005) established UNIIIC.

#### Last UNIIIC Report

- S/2006/962 (12 December 2006)

#### Letter

- S/2007/90 (13 February 2007) and S/2007/91 (15 February 2007) was an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Council authorising the extension of UNIIIC's technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities in the investigation of the Ain Aaleq bombings.

### Selected UN Documents on Implementation of Resolution 1701

#### Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, authorised a reinforcement of UNIFIL and extended the mandate until 31 August 2007.

#### Last Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2006/52 (12 December 2006) welcomed the Secretary-General's

report on resolution 1701 and reiterated its support for the current Lebanese government.

#### Last Report of the Secretary-General on Resolution 1701

- S/2006/933 (1 December 2006)

#### Letters

- S/2007/85 (8 February 2007) and S/2007/86 (13 February 2007) was an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Council on the new appointment of Geir Pedersen as the Secretary-General's Special Coordinator for Lebanon.
- S/2007/82 (12 February 2007) was a letter from Lebanon stating that Israel had violated the Blue Line on 7 February, which triggered the Lebanese army to open fire.
- S/2007/69 (8 February 2007) was a letter from Israel stating that on 7 February the Israeli military had been operating on Israeli territory and it had returned fire in legitimate defence.
- S/2007/63 (7 February 2007) was a letter from Lebanon transmitting a statistical table of Israeli violations of Lebanese territory in January 2007.

### Other Relevant Facts

#### UNIIIC Chief Commissioner

Serge Brammertz (Belgium)

#### Secretary-General's Special Coordinator for Lebanon

Geir O. Pedersen (Norway)

#### UNIFIL Force Commander

Major-General Claudio Graziano (Italy)

#### Size and Composition of UNIFIL

- Authorized: 15,000 troops
- Current (as of 16 February 2007): 12,429 military personnel, including 178 staff officers, 10,479 troops and 1,772 maritime task force
- Troop-contributing countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nepal, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Spain, Sweden and Turkey

#### Cost (approved budget)

Commitment authority: 1 July 2006–31 March 2007: \$350.87 million (budget not yet approved)



### Useful Additional Sources

- *Lebanon in Limbo*, Eben Kaplan, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 February 2007
- Mine Action Co-ordination Centre South Lebanon, Unexploded Ordnance Fact Sheet: <http://www.mineaction.org/overview.asp?o=540>

## Liberia

### Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which expires on 31 March. Members await recommendations from the Secretary-General on UNMIL's future size. A decrease in troop levels is possible in view of the current pressure on peacekeeping resources for other proposed deployments in Africa.

(A related issue that may come up in discussions is the report on cross-border issues and inter-mission cooperation in West Africa. This is now more than eight weeks overdue.)

### Key Recent Developments

Liberia continues to be stable but fragile. The government has focused on improving governance, state control over natural resources and key infrastructure. The adoption of a national security architecture, however, is still pending. In an expression of support, some countries, including the US, Germany and the UK, announced the cancellation of part of Liberia's external debt of US\$3.7 billion at the Liberia Partners' Forum on 13 February.

The Council renewed diamond sanctions for six months in December, noting that insufficient progress had been made towards establishing a transparent, effective and internationally verifiable certificate of origin. It also renewed sanctions on arms and the travel bans on designated persons for 12 months. For the first time, the sanctions committee de-listed one individual from the travel ban.

Reconstituting the security forces—the key benchmark for UNMIL's drawdown—is underway, albeit with significant difficulties.

UN-assisted recruitment of 3,500 trained police officers is likely to be finalised by July but deployment will be hampered by logistical and management constraints. The 2,000-strong armed forces, to be recruited and trained by a private US contractor, may not be fully operational before 2008. In addition, 39,000 out of 101,495 ex-combatants have not yet been included in reintegration programmes.

Relatively minor adjustments were made in late 2006 to UNMIL's strength, which now comprises 14,875 troops and 1,240 police. The December UNMIL report stressed that "further adjustments, including the withdrawal of another infantry battalion in 2007, will be considered if the security situation in the country permits." In a message to the Liberia Partners' Forum, the new Secretary-General says he "will work with the Government to develop a carefully calibrated drawdown plan" which "requires the approval of the Security Council" and "needs to be linked to the Government's capacity to shoulder its security and law and order responsibilities."

## Options

Available options include:

- extending the mandate for six months but continuing the cautious approach to downsizing UNMIL by maintaining current levels;
- deciding on firm reductions in UNMIL's size during the six-month mandate;
- adopting a compromise approach involving an extension of the mandate for twelve months with firm reductions in UNMIL's strength from September, for example;
- adopting a phased approach involving a reduction, for example, by one battalion by mid-year and requesting recommendations on a flexible future drawdown timetable; and
- bringing in the regional dimension, perhaps by requesting a Secretariat briefing under the existing agenda item, "The situation along the borders of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone," and insisting on the report on cross-border issues being made available.

Other options include:

- considering the Secretary-General's March 2005 recommendations on UN inter-mission cooperation, including through extended areas of responsibility and a sub-regional reserve force;
- expressing support for UNMIL, UNOCI and the relevant special representatives

of the Secretary-General giving higher priority to regional aspects; and

- reverting to the small arms debate, in view of the endemic small arms problem in the region, perhaps by reintroducing elements from the March 2006 draft resolution presented by Argentina in a new regionally focused presidential statement.

## Key Issues

Deciding the term of UNMIL's mandate and its troop levels will be the key issue in March. The question involves how best to balance Liberia's needs given the absence of standing security forces and the challenging regional environment, with the emerging pressure for new peacekeeping in Africa. Members will be hard-pressed to conclude that UNMIL should continue at current levels given the projected need to generate up to nearly 40,000 new peacekeepers.

But a balancing issue is how best to approach the regional dimension, taking into account uncertainty in Guinea and the possible need to safeguard the fragile peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone.

## Council Dynamics

Positions on the future of UNMIL's size are still being formed. Members await the Secretary-General's recommendations and developments with the proposed missions in Somalia and Chad/CAR in particular.

The US (given its support for peacekeeping commitments in Liberia, Darfur and Somalia) may face strong conflicting pressures. This dilemma will be similar for African members.

A flexible approach to UNMIL's size is likely to generate support, in particular from France given its strong support for the Chad/CAR mission.

Some European and African members are interested in discussing the situation in Guinea. There is frustration with lack of leadership from the UN Office for West Africa, and with delays with the Secretary-General's report on cross-border issues. Some members, including China, Russia and Congo, are likely to be uncomfortable with Council involvement without Guinea's approval.

## Underlying Problems

Youth unemployment, disenfranchised ex-combatants and former security apparatus members pose significant threats to Liberia's stability. In early February, hun-

dreds of former soldiers protested in Monrovia about arrears in demobilisation packages, prompting action by UNMIL and Liberian police.

In neighbouring Guinea, martial law was imposed on 12 February following a general strike and violent clashes between the armed forces and protestors. Rampant corruption, economic decline, and the steady erosion of President Lansana Conté's twenty-year regime seem to be at the root of the crisis. The recent violence attracted criticism from thirty African heads of state gathered at the Africa-France summit in Cannes.

Concerns were heightened when Conté rejected mediation by ECOWAS in early February.

The risk of regional involvement is increasing. This includes potential supporters of Conté, including the former rebel Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), Côte d'Ivoire's President Laurent Gbagbo and Guinea-Bissau's President João Bernardo Vieira.

Responding to regional instability, UNMIL strengthened its border presence and in late 2006 conducted concurrent activities with UNOCI and the armed forces of Sierra Leone and Guinea.

## UN Documents

### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1731 (20 December 2006) renewed sanctions.
- S/RES/1712 (29 September 2006) renewed UNMIL's mandate until 31 March 2007.
- S/RES/1626 (19 September 2005) authorised a temporary redeployment in Sierra Leone of UNMIL troops.
- S/RES/1609 (24 June 2005) authorised inter-mission troop sharing.
- S/RES/1532 (12 March 2004) imposed an assets freeze against Charles Taylor and associates.
- S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003) imposed sanctions.
- S/RES/1509 (19 September 2003) established UNMIL.

### Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2006/38 (9 August 2006) requested the report on cross-border issues.



### Selected Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2006/958 (11 December 2006) was the latest UNMIL report.
- S/2005/135 (2 March 2005) was the report on inter-mission cooperation.

### Other

- S/2006/1044 (28 December 2006) was the latest sanctions committee report.
- S/2006/976 (13 December 2006) was the latest Panel of Experts' report.

### Historical Background

*January-February 2007* Violent clashes between police and civilian protesters led to a declaration of martial law in Guinea.

*October 2006* The Council decided not to reinstate timber sanctions.

*June 2006* The Council lifted the timber embargo.

*February 2006* The Council authorised troop sharing between UNMIL and UNOCI.

*January 2006* Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was sworn in as Liberia's new president.

*September 2005* The Council mandated UNMIL to provide security for the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

*March 2004* The Council imposed sanctions on former Liberian President Charles Taylor and his associates.

*December 2003* The Council imposed a sanctions regime.

*September 2003* UNMIL was established.

*August 2003* ECOWAS and US troops arrived, Taylor fled to Nigeria and a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed.

### Other Relevant Facts

#### Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Alan Doss (United Kingdom)

#### UNMIL: Size, Composition and Cost

- Total authorised strength: up to 14,875 military and 1,240 police
- Strength as of 31 December 2006: 13,801 military and 1,097 police
- Key troop-contributing countries: Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria and Ethiopia
- Cost: 1 July 2006 – 30 June 2007: \$745.57 million

#### UNMIL: Duration

September 2003 to present; mandate expires 31 March 2007

### Useful Additional Sources

- International Crisis Group, *Guinée: le Changement ou le Chaos*, Rapport Afrique, No. 121 (14 February 2007)

## Côte d'Ivoire

### Expected Council Action

The Secretary-General's report on the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) is due on 5 March. The Council is expected to review progress in the dialogue between Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo and the rebel *Forces Nouvelles* leader Guillaume Soro. A visit by the Council to Côte d'Ivoire may be discussed, but wider action seems unlikely.

The sanctions committee is expected to receive reports from neighbouring countries on compliance with the arms and diamonds embargo in Côte d'Ivoire.

### Key Recent Developments

On 10 January, the Council adopted resolution 1739. This extended the mandate of UNOCI and the French *Licorne* forces until 31 June 2007. UNOCI's mandate was also updated to reflect the content of resolution 1721 (reinforcing the prime minister's powers and the role of the international community in the peace process, particularly the roles of the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS], and the African Union.)

There has been no recent progress on the roadmap, especially on the most important issues including a voter-identification process, disarmament and ensuring the impartiality of the official media. The International Working Group (IWG) met on 12 January. Noting the stalemate, it urged the Chairman of ECOWAS, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, to convene a meeting of the parties, following up on a proposal made in December by President Gbagbo to start a direct dialogue with Soro. The IWG also recommended a Council mission to Côte d'Ivoire to secure commitment that the talks remain within the framework of resolution 1721.

Following a 19 January summit in Burkina Faso, ECOWAS issued a situation report on Côte d'Ivoire recognising that there was still a manifest lack of political will to implement resolution 1721. ECOWAS decided that the voter-identification and disarmament programmes had to be launched again. President Gbagbo's proposal for direct

talks was welcomed as long as they remain within the framework of resolution 1721. It also recommended a Council visit. These decisions were endorsed by the African Union on 30 January.

Preliminary talks on the dialogue are currently underway in Ouagadougou under the aegis of President Compaoré. The first meeting was held on 5 February. At the time of writing, the talks appear to be proceeding positively. The flexibility of the format, allowing both parties to present grievances, has seemed to be useful.

On 9 February the Council was briefed by Pierre Schori, the departing Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Côte d'Ivoire. He supported the direct dialogue and expressed enthusiasm for a possible Council mission. He also emphasised that targeted sanctions had been very effective in bringing spoilers back into the peace process and suggested that more names be added to the list if necessary. Following consultations, the Council issued a press statement welcoming the direct dialogue while recalling that it must take place in the framework of resolution 1721.

On 14 February, there were media reports indicating that President Gbagbo had announced his intention to incorporate into the Ivorian army some 4,000 new recruits who were supposed to be disarmed within the framework of the roadmap. It seems that this would contravene previous peace agreements and may have a negative impact on the direct dialogue.

### Options

The Council's options seem to have narrowed. It is increasingly clear that without improved confidence between the main political actors, the prospects for implementation of the roadmap are diminishing. In the short term there seems to be no option but to accept the dialogue process. However, other possibilities may include:

- developing terms of reference for a Council visit;
- endorsing the monthly IWG communiqué in a presidential statement;

- reinforcing pressure on the parties that the dialogue has to remain within the framework of resolution 1721 and that the roadmap should be implemented in parallel; and
- expanding targeted sanctions against possible spoilers.

### Key Issues

A key concern will be whether the parties have entered the dialogue in good faith and are genuinely willing to negotiate. A related issue is whether President Gbagbo truly wants an agreement to implement the roadmap or whether the dialogue is a strategy to buy time. A second issue arises from the fact that it now seems that neither Gbagbo nor Soro appear interested in holding elections in October. A third is that there is no timeframe for the dialogue.

While the Council does not need to address it in March, the issue that will arise before long is whether the Council can keep pushing for the implementation of resolution 1721 in parallel with the dialogue. (In practice, it seems that progress on the roadmap depends on results of the dialogue.)

A related issue, which cannot be delayed indefinitely, is the timeline for UNOCI and its mandate if elections are not held by 31 October. There are serious concerns that if the current stalemate continues much longer, it would not be possible for elections to be organised on time.

### Council Dynamics

Several Council members, especially the Europeans, are suspicious of President Gbagbo's intentions and are cautious about the direct dialogue initiative. However, they are also aware that there are few other options in the short-term and that the dialogue may represent a window of opportunity. There is clear consensus within the Council on the necessity to ensure that the dialogue does not replace the peace process but complements it, and that it should take place within the framework of resolution 1721.

Some members of the Non-Aligned Movement, especially new Council members like Indonesia and South Africa, tend to favour increased local ownership of the process and are therefore more comfortable with the dialogue initiative. They believe that there should be fewer outside attempts to influence the dialogue at the outset. They also think that targeted sanctions might

have a negative impact at this stage and would support them only as a last resort. However, they are also concerned with the lack of progress toward the organisation of elections and support the 1721 framework as the long-term objective.

There is still significant support for exerting Council pressure on the political actors, particularly through targeted sanctions. Belgium, as chair of the sanctions committee, is playing an active role.

Most Council members agree that, at this stage, it would be better to stop trying to micromanage the peace process. In particular, it seems that France is moving towards a less proactive role. This dynamic also plays out with respect to the proposal for a Council mission.

It seems that a majority of Council members want to see the initial results of the direct dialogue, possibly even a preliminary agreement, before sending a mission. For many, it is premature at this point to agree on a clear message to send to the parties.

As the new chairman of the African Union, Ghana will have a leading role both in the Council and on the ground. It clearly wants to be strongly involved in the peace process.

### Underlying Problems

Despite long-standing allegations that Burkina Faso participated in the conflict by providing help to the rebel forces, President Gbagbo accepted Burkina Faso as the dialogue convener. Engaging this important regional actor (and the current ECOWAS chairman) in the peace process is a positive development.

### UN Documents

#### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1739 (10 January 2007) extended the UNOCI mandate until 30 June 2007.
- S/RES/1727 (15 December 2006) renewed the sanctions regime in Côte d'Ivoire until 31 October 2007.
- S/RES/1726 (15 December 2006) renewed the mandate of UNOCI until 10 January 2007.
- S/RES/1721 (1 November 2006) prolonged by one year the transitional period in Côte d'Ivoire and reinforced the powers of the prime minister.

#### Latest Secretary-General's Report on UNOCI

- S/2006/939 (4 December 2006)

### Latest Reports by the Sanctions Committee

- S/2006/1017 (21 December 2006) was the annual report of the committee, noting violations of the arms and diamonds embargo
- S/2006/964 (8 December 2006) noted that diamonds are being smuggled out of Côte d'Ivoire via Mali and Ghana in violation of the embargo and that criminal networks are also smuggling arms into Côte d'Ivoire.

### Selected Letters

- S/2007/78 (9 February 2007) was a letter from the Secretary-General extending the mandate of the Group of Experts for an additional six months.
- S/2007/19 (18 January 2007) was a letter from the Secretary-General enclosing the twelfth IWG communiqué.

### Other Relevant Facts

#### Special Representative of the Secretary-General

To be appointed

#### High Representative for the Elections

Gérard Stoudmann (Switzerland)

#### Size and Composition of UNOCI

- Authorised strength as of 2 June 2006: Up to 8,115 military personnel and up to 1,200 police
- Strength as of 31 January 2007: 8,994 total uniformed personnel, including 7,850 troops and 954 police
- Key troop-contributing countries: Bangladesh, Morocco, Ghana and Pakistan

#### Cost

1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007 \$472.89 million

## Iraq

### Expected Council Action

No Council action is expected in response to the quarterly report of the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) due 8 March. On 15 March the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Iraq, Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, will brief the Council. The US will also give a briefing on the activities of the Multi-national Force (MNF).

Consultations are also expected on 7 March on the UN Monitoring, Inspection and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC). The Commission's Acting Executive Chairman, Demetrius Perricos, will brief the Council. It remains to be seen whether there will be any concrete proposals on a possible termination of UNMOVIC mandate.

### Key Recent Developments

On 6 December the Iraq Study Group, which was established by the US Congress and co-chaired by James Baker and Lee Hamilton, recommended a new policy approach for the US in Iraq, including:

- engaging directly with Syria and Iran;
- renewing efforts toward a comprehensive settlement of all Middle East conflicts;
- reducing support for the Iraqi government if it does not make progress toward reconciliation and security;
- establishing clear steps toward national reconciliation, security and governance, and avoiding an open-ended commitment to a large US troops presence in Iraq; and
- redeploying or increasing the number of US combat forces to stabilise Baghdad and avoiding a dramatic increase of the general number of troops in Iraq or an immediate and complete withdrawal.

In response to the last recommendation, US President George Bush decided in January to increase the number of American troops in Baghdad by 21,500.

Sectarian violence has increased, especially after the execution of Saddam Hussein on 30 December. Deadly bombings have multiplied. There is now an average of 100 civilian casualties every day.

The refugee crisis is also growing. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that there are 1.8 million internally displaced persons. In addition, because of the security situation, the food distribution system has deteriorated. Four million people in Iraq are now considered as "food insecure". The UNHCR now estimates that there are about two million Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries, mainly Syria and Jordan.

Ashraf Jehangir Qazi has sought to secure regional support for peace efforts in Iraq through visits to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria and Iran. These began at the end of January.

### Options

Although no action is expected on UNAMI or on the MNF before the next review process in June, a presidential statement supporting the regional contribution to building security in Iraq and addressing the worsening refugee crisis, as well as the humanitarian situation in Iraq, remains an option.

On UNMOVIC, the most likely scenario is that the Council will resume but not conclude its discussion of a possible termination of its mandate. Options include:

- continuing discussion on whether and how to retain UNMOVIC's expertise;
- reaching agreement on whether the conclusions of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) should be taken up in the context of the closure of the UNMOVIC mandate;
- focusing on the details of what to do with UNMOVIC's comprehensive compendium of Iraq's programmes for WMDs and examining whether and how UNMOVIC's records and archives should be transferred to the UN archive; and
- deciding to terminate UNMOVIC's mandate.

### Key Issues

While the US and the UK may be contemplating several options to close UNMOVIC, at press time there are no concrete proposals on the table. (For more information on UNMOVIC, see our June 2006 *Forecast*.)

Issues likely to arise during consultations on UNAMI and the MNF in March include the need for a regional approach to peace in Iraq (this has already been emphasised by Qazi in December), in view of an assessment of Qazi's regional tour.

The desire to find an adequate multilateral framework to address the situation in Iraq is therefore emerging and is likely to be discussed as the international compact on Iraq does not seem to be moving forward quickly. Several proposals have already been made: UNAMI suggested that the periodic meetings between Iraq and its neighbours be broadened to include the P5; and the League of Arab States has tried to organise a regional conference on Iraqi national accord. It seems that a meeting is being organised in Baghdad which will gather officials from regional states, including Syria and Iran, and US and UK envoys. It will take place in mid-March.



A second issue is the worsening humanitarian crisis and ways to address it, especially the refugee crisis and the fact that both Syria and Jordan may have to limit refugees or even close their borders.

Another issue is the initial assessments by the US of its new security plan and troop surge in Baghdad. This, however, will likely be more thoroughly considered in June, at the next MNF review process.

### Council Dynamics

Dynamics on UNMOVIC remain the same. Both the US and the UK are reluctant for the Council to take up the ISG conclusions and perhaps for related reasons seem reluctant to pursue the idea of harnessing UNMOVIC's expertise for the future. Russia, however, still seems to support a debate on the ISG conclusions as a necessary step for the closure of UNMOVIC. During consultations in December, Japan and Slovakia proposed to reallocate UNMOVIC experts to the 1718 Committee on North Korea and the 1540 Committee on the non-proliferation of WMDs. These proposals will likely come up again in March.

The idea of a possible presidential statement on the Iraqi refugee crisis has attractions for a number of members but it remains to be seen who would be willing to take the lead and what the US and the UK's positions would be.

Any new dynamics on the activities of the UN and the MNF in Iraq might only arise during the June MNF review process.

### Underlying Problems

There have been allegations by the US, the UK and Saudi Arabia that Iran is arming groups in Iraq, and a number of Iranians have been detained by US forces in Iraq. Iran stated at the end of January that it was planning to expand military and economic ties with Iraq.

Criticism is mounting over the Iraqi government's ability to lead the country toward reconciliation. The government appears



increasingly divided. The division of the country along sectarian lines seems to be increasingly becoming a reality, with the multiplication of sectarian enclaves. On the other hand, the recent approval by the Iraqi cabinet of a draft law to equitably share oil revenues among Iraq's 18 provinces may foster sectarian unity as it would remove a bone of contention between factions. The law remains to be approved by the Iraqi parliament.

## Selected UN Documents

### Latest Resolutions

- S/RES/1723 (28 November 2006) extended the MNF mandate until 31 December 2007.
- S/RES/1700 (10 August 2006) extended the UNAMI mandate for another 12 months.

### Latest UNAMI Report

- S/2006/945 (5 December 2006)

### Selected UNMOVIC Reports

- S/2007/106 (26 February 2007) was the latest UNMOVIC report.
- S/2006/420 (21 June 2006) was the summary of the compendium of Iraq's proscribed WMD programmes.

### Selected Letters

- S/2006/987 and S/2006/988 (15 December 2006) was an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Council on an Iraqi request to transfer \$40 million from the UNMOVIC account to the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the UN.
- S/2006/963 (7 December 2006) was a letter from League of Arab States enclosing a statement by the Ministerial Committee on Iraq.

## Other Relevant Facts

### Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq

Ashraf Jehangir Qazi (Pakistan)

### Deputy Special Representative for Iraq

Jean-Marie Fakhouri (Lebanon)

### Deputy Special Representative for Political Affairs in Iraq

Michael von der Schulenburg (Germany)

## Useful Additional Sources

- *War and Occupation in Iraq*, Global Policy Forum Special Report
- *Iraq's New Political Map*, Phebe Marr, US Institute of Peace, Special Report 179, January 2007
- Iraqi Refugees: Resettle the Most Vulnerable, *Refugees International*, 16 January 2007
- *Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War*, Daniel L. Byman, Kenneth M. Pollack, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, Analysis Paper No. 11, January 2007
- UNAMI Human Rights Report, 1 November – 31 December 2006 <http://www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/HR%20Report%20Nov%20Dec%202006%20EN.pdf>
- *After Baker-Hamilton: What to Do in Iraq*, International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 60, 19 December 2006
- Report of the Special Advisor to the Director of the CIA on Iraq's WMDs, 30 September 2004 [https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq\\_wmd\\_2004/index.html](https://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/index.html)

## Guinea-Bissau

### Expected Council Action

In March the Council will receive the Secretary-General's quarterly report on the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS), mandated by resolution 1580. The Council in December renewed the UNOGBIS mandate for 12 months through an exchange of letters with the Secretary-General.

Guinea-Bissau had a low priority in the Council last year but events in the country in January and the situation in neighbouring Guinea may trigger greater interest. The UNOGBIS mandate expires on 31 December. Formal Council action on the Secretary-General's report is not required, but depending on the conclusions of the International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau, some Council members could seek a heightened level of Council attention.

### Key Recent Developments

Recent events suggest that deep-rooted political problems have not been resolved. On 6 January the assassination of the former head of the navy, Mohamed Lamine Sanhá, led to fighting between protestors and security forces leaving one dead and several injured.

Former Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior sought refuge in the UNOGBIS compound on 10 January, claiming that his life was in danger. The government had issued a warrant for his arrest after he accused President João Bernardo Vieira of being involved in Sanhá's assassination. Gomes also claimed that Vieira was systematically killing those who overthrew him in 1999. (Vieira fled to Portugal and remained in exile for six years until 2005 when he came back and won the national election.)

Gomes remained under UN protection for 17 days and left only after the Secretary-General's representative in Guinea-Bissau, Shola Omoregie, persuaded the government to drop the arrest warrant against him.

Some members of the International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau (made up of France, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, the Executive Secretariat of the Economic Community of West African States, and the Executive Secretariat of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries) met on 23 January in Guinea-Bissau. The next Contact Group meeting is scheduled to be held in March in Lisbon.

### Options

Options for the Council could include:

- Adopting a wait-and-see position. Given the Council's past approach this is perhaps most likely.
- Issuing a press statement expressing concern and stressing the importance of political stability. This is possible if Council members feel that the situation has not improved since January.
- Issuing a presidential statement is also possible should the Council be persuaded by the Contact Group to take a stronger position.
- Asking the Secretary-General to prepare recommendations on what more UNOGBIS can do to support national reconciliation and security sector reform, especially taking into account the outcome of the Council debate on security sector reform on 20 February.

### Key Issues

The flare-up between Gomes and Vieira is a clear indication that political reconciliation remains fragile. There seems to be a possibility of further violence unless these issues are dealt with.

Members will also be mindful of recent instability in Guinea. Regional repercussions are possible. Vieira is a long-time ally of Lansana Conté, the Guinean president. Guinea-Bissau has denied it has any forces in Guinea, although there have been reports of Portuguese-speaking troops in the country.

A future issue is whether the \$460 million requested at the donor roundtable on Guinea-Bissau, held in Geneva in November, is actually being delivered. So far the donors include the European Union, Spain, Portugal and Japan. Investor confidence, already shaky, is likely to be further affected by the events in January.

### Council Dynamics

Guinea-Bissau has been low on the Council's radar screen since Brazil left the Council at the end of 2005. No member has wanted to take a lead role. Urgent demands from other parts of Africa, especially the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, Chad and Somalia, have kept the Council focused on these situations rather than on countries in the peacebuilding phase like Guinea-Bissau. During 2006 some members attempted to change the reporting cycle from three to six months. Resistance from Argentina and Peru and a mandate renewal that takes place through an exchange of letters made it difficult to change the cycle.

### Underlying Problems

Guinea-Bissau is one of the poorest countries in the world. Falling revenue from its only cash crop, cashew nuts, and floods that ruined 85 percent of its rice production last year could result in an agricultural crisis in 2007. With most of the population involved in farming and 85 percent of them connected to cashew cultivation, poverty among farmers could lead to political unrest.

Growing discontent among civil servants may trigger a new problem. The government has found it difficult to pay salaries and provide basic services. As a result, there were labour strikes in the education and health sectors late last year.

The growth of transnational crime is potentially destabilising. Guinea-Bissau is becoming a transit point for both cocaine and undocumented migrants to Europe.

## UN Documents

### Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1580 (22 December 2004) revised and extended the mandate of UNOGBIS.
- S/RES/1233 (6 April 1999) supported the decision of the Secretary-General to establish UNOGBIS.

### Reports and Letters of the Secretary-General

- S/2006/974 (8 December 2006) was the letter recommending extension of UNOGBIS until 31 December 2007 and detailing the activities of UNOGBIS.
- S/2006/946 (6 December 2006) was the latest report on UNOGBIS.

### Security Council President's Letter

- S/2006/975 (13 December 2006) noted the Secretary-General's intention to extend UNOGBIS until December 2007.

### Other

- SC/8910 (15 December 2006) was the press statement expressing concern over the political and economic situation.

## Other Relevant Facts

### Representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea-Bissau, Head of UNOGBIS

Shola Omoregie (Nigeria)

### Size of UNOGBIS Staff

22, including nine international civilians, two military advisers, one police adviser and ten local civilians

### Duration

6 April 1999 to present

For historical background and a more complete list of UN documents please see our 23 December 2005 *Update*, and March and December 2006 *Forecasts*.

## Peacebuilding Commission

### Expected Council Action

In March, the Council will hold consultations on the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). It intends to take stock of the remarks and discuss suggestions made at the 31 January open debate on the PBC, particularly on improving the working relationship between the Council and the PBC. No formal outcome is expected. (For background on the



lead-up to the open debate please see our January 2007 *Forecast* and 25 January *Update*.)

### Key Recent Developments in the Council

The open debate was the Council's initial review of the work of the PBC and was proposed by Russia as Council president for January. Two recurring points emerged:

- suggestions as to how the PBC may improve its work, in particular a sense of urgency to move on substantive work in the Commission's country-specific mode, and the need for integrated work plans involving key stakeholders with input and ownership from the countries in question. Some stressed the need to move beyond outstanding procedural issues and institutional competition to achieving agreement and cooperation on a comprehensive strategy for key peacebuilding gaps the PBC has identified for Burundi and Sierra Leone; and
- suggestions on how the Security Council could better harmonise its work with that of the PBC and weave the results of the PBC's work into its own discussions.

Suggestions on harmonisation between the PBC and the Council included:

- requesting PBC advice, for example, at the time of a mandate renewal, negotiations on the mandate of a new peacekeeping operation, amending an existing UN mission strategy to enhance collaboration between UN operations and PBC activities, and devising an integrated mission planning process;
- receiving early warning on potential setbacks and risk factors in countries on the Council's agenda;
- since Burundi and Sierra Leone are on the agendas of both bodies, establishing more regular and timely interaction with the PBC. This could include invitations for briefings from PBC chairpersons when the Council considers those situations and regular meetings between the presidents of the General Assembly, the Council and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); and

- issuing Council statements when PBC reports have been received, to encourage synergy and interaction with PBC country-specific strategies.

Speakers further highlighted problems with achieving sustained commitment and coordination among key players for successful peacebuilding, in particular the main UN bodies. Some participants felt the Council might encroach on the work of the PBC. Most stressed the need for a partnership approach linking the Council, the General Assembly and other parts of the UN system. This reflects the tensions that surrounded the PBC's creation and the start of its work. Russia, for example, expressed the hope that the discussions "will give additional impetus to a mutually supportive partnership between [the Council and the General Assembly] and among all those who are contributing to the peacebuilding process, and that it will facilitate the constructive work of the [PBC]."

Jamaica, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), expressed concern that "the Security Council should at this stage find it necessary to review the work of the Peacebuilding Commission. While it is no secret that the Commission has experienced some difficulties with its internal operations and processes, we think that it is both lacking in merit and premature to have the Security Council review or evaluate its activities at this juncture."

Perhaps as a response to the Russian initiative, the General Assembly held a similar debate to review progress with the PBC's work on 6 February after a request from NAM.

### Upcoming PBC Developments

The PBC has started a series of informal thematic discussions to develop integrated peacebuilding strategies for Burundi and Sierra Leone by mid-2007. The discussions will be open to relevant stakeholders (civil society, the private sector and international actors) and will focus on matters falling within the priority areas identified in the December country-specific meetings.

A Burundi donors' roundtable in Bujumbura has been scheduled for 14-15 March. The next formal country-specific meetings are expected to take place in April for Burundi and April or May for Sierra Leone.

The peacebuilding strategies for Burundi and Sierra Leone would become the principal framework for the relationship with the PBC. They will record the commitments made by the parties, and would serve as a type of compact. They will provide benchmarks by which the PBC can monitor progress and identify peacebuilding gaps at the country level. Input from participants in the informal thematic meetings will add value to strategy development.

The PBC will visit Burundi and Sierra Leone, probably in mid-March. Together with a briefing series organised by a special working group on lessons learned from post-conflict situations, these visits may assist in developing further understanding of the challenges in both countries. (The first meeting on lessons learned under the priority areas identified by Sierra Leone took place on 20 February; a meeting for Burundi is scheduled to take place on 12 March.)

The work plans suggest three interrelated phases:

- identification;
- integrated peacebuilding strategy development; and
- review, monitoring and continued implementation.

The first phase was completed in December, when good governance, rule of law and community recovery were identified as critical peacebuilding challenges for Burundi. For Sierra Leone, the challenges are youth empowerment and employment, democracy and good governance, justice and security reform, and capacity-building. The thematic discussions should catalyse progress in the second phase.

### Key Issues

The key issue emerging from the 31 January debate is how to proceed with the idea of better defining the Council's role relative to the PBC and improving the working relationship. The immediate task will be to follow up on suggestions that emerged and identify key areas where the relationship can be strengthened, such as the design of mandates of UN peacekeeping operations.

A related question is how to respond to the wider membership's concerns for a meaningful role for the General Assembly. There is general sympathy within the Council for

emphasising the complementary—rather than competitive—nature of the input that both the Council and the General Assembly can have on the PBC, and how to dispel the negativities that surrounded its inception. The issue will be to determine how far members might go, in style and substance, without reviving the controversy and suspicions of 2005.

### Council Dynamics

The Council so far has kept its distance from the work of the PBC. This seems to have been a result of awareness that some PBC members have a strong interest in demonstrating independence from the Council and in avoiding an overlap. Members have been concerned with helping create a positive working environment for the PBC's formative period and to assuage the climate of suspicion over the way decisions were taken when the PBC was established.

The idea of exploring the Council's role in relation to the PBC's country-specific work had been about for some time as the Council discussed the work of the UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) and the creation of the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB). Concerns outlined above, however, meant that only vague mentions were included in resolutions and statements.

Nonetheless, the generally positive tone during the 31 January meeting—bearing in mind the cautionary note from NAM—seems to have reinforced thinking in the Council that there are important areas in which more elaboration on the working relationship between the PBC and the Council can be helpful.

Most members seem to agree that input from PBC chairs should be sought at the time the Council discusses the renewal of the integrated offices in Burundi or Sierra Leone. For some, particularly the UK, a key aspect has been the involvement of BINUB and UNIOSIL in the preparation of PBC country strategies. There is an interest in reflecting and clarifying that role in their mandates and improving the operational coordination between the missions and the PBC. One member made the point that the PBC held its formal country-specific meetings on the same months that the Council held meetings on Burundi and Sierra Leone, including the creation of BINUB.



## UN Documents

### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1646 (20 December 2005) decided that the five permanent members and two elected members of the Council will have seats on the PBC's Organisational Committee.
- S/RES/1645 (20 December 2005) created the PBC and the Peace-building Fund.

### Security Council Resolutions with a reference to the PBC

- S/RES/1734 (22 December 2006) extended the mandate of the UNIOSIL and encouraged the government of Sierra Leone to continue its close engagement with the PBC.
- S/RES/1719 (25 October 2006) requested the Secretary-General to establish BINUB, which was requested to conduct its activities taking the role of the PBC into account.
- S/RES/1653 (27 January 2006) addressed conflict prevention and peaceful resolution of disputes in the Great Lakes Region, welcomed the establishment of the PBC and underlined its potential importance for the Council's work in the region.

### Security Council Presidential Statements with a reference to the PBC

- S/PRST/2007/1 (8 January 2007) on the Council debate on Threats to International Peace and Security underlined the importance of close interaction between the Council and the PBC.
- S/PRST/2006/42 (26 October 2006) on the Council debate on Women and Peace and Security welcomed the role the PBC can play in mainstreaming gender perspectives into the peace consolidation process.
- S/PRST/2006/39 (20 September 2006) on cooperation between the UN and regional organisations in maintaining international peace and security welcomed the intent of regional organisations to be closely associated with the work of the PBC and expressed the Council's commitment to facilitate their participation in the PBC's country-specific activities.
- S/PRST/2006/38 (9 August 2006) on peace consolidation in West Africa, underscored the importance and role of the PBC in assisting countries

emerging from conflict to achieve sustainable peace and security.

- S/PRST/2006/28 (22 June 2006) on strengthening international law emphasised the role of the PBC with respect to the promotion of justice and the rule of law.

### Selected Security Council Debate

- S/PV.5627 and resumption 1 (31 January 2007) was the Council debate on the PBC.

### Selected PBC Documents

- Chairman's summary of the second country-specific meeting on Sierra Leone (13 December 2006).
- Chairman's summary the second country-specific meeting on Burundi (12 December 2006).
- PBC/2/BUR/SR.1 (10 November 2006) were the summary records of the first country-specific meeting on Burundi.
- Chairman's summary of the first country-specific meeting on Burundi (13 October 2006).
- Chairman's summary of the first country-specific meeting on Sierra Leone (12 October 2006).
- PBC/OC/1/2 (21 June 2006) was a Council letter referring Burundi and Sierra Leone to the PBC.

### Selected General Assembly Resolutions

- A/RES/60/261 (8 May 2006) decided the General Assembly Organisational Committee seats.
- A/RES/60/1 (16 September 2005) is the 2005 World Summit Outcome.

### Other

- GA/10570 (6 February 2007) was the General Assembly debate on the PBC.
- S/2007/16 (12 January 2007) communicated the Council's election of Panama and South Africa to the Organisational Committee.
- S/2006/1050 (26 December 2006) contained summaries of the October and December 2006 country-specific meetings.
- E/2006/L.2/Rev.2 (12 April 2006) was the draft resolution adopted with the distribution of ECOSOC PBC seats.

### Selected Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2006/922 (28 November 2006) was the latest report on Sierra Leone.
- S/2006/838 (23 October 2006) was the latest report on Burundi.

## Other Relevant Facts

### PBC Organisational Committee Members (as of 22 January 2007)

- Security Council: the P5 (China, France, Russia, UK and US), Panama and South Africa
- From the top ten financial contributors: Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Norway
- From the top ten military and police contributors: Bangladesh, Ghana, India, Nigeria and Pakistan
- ECOSOC: Angola, Brazil, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia and Sri Lanka (two seats vacant)
- General Assembly: Burundi, Chile, Croatia, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji and Jamaica

### Chairman of the PBC Organisational Committee

- Ambassador Ismael Gaspar Martins (Angola)

### PBSO Head

- Carolyn McAskie (Canada)

### PBSO Budget

- US\$1.571 million

## Afghanistan

### Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to extend the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which expires on 24 March. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Afghanistan, Tom Koenigs, will likely brief the Council.

The Secretary-General's report on the situation in Afghanistan is also due in March. His report is expected to ask the Council to endorse UNAMA's expansion to all provinces, facilitation of regular cooperation between regional players, verification of civilian casualties and greater humanitarian coordination.

### Key Recent Developments

Violent attacks in Afghanistan rose steadily during 2006. Hostilities were recorded in all

but two of Afghanistan's 34 provinces. Faced with an obviously deteriorating security situation, the international community began to focus its attention on Afghanistan again. In February the US, the UK and some other NATO members committed additional troops to counter an anticipated Taliban spring offensive.

The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) held its third meeting on 30 and 31 January in Berlin. This body oversees the Afghanistan Compact, a five-year framework for reconstruction between the Afghan government and the international community that was launched on 31 January 2006. At the Berlin meeting the JCMB assessed the achievements of the Compact over the year, concluding that it had made slow but steady progress, achieving eight out of 12 benchmarks set for 2006.

Koenigs briefed the Council on 5 February in a closed-door session about the situation on the ground and outlined UNAMA's future goals.

A Council delegation led by Japan visited Afghanistan from 11 to 16 November 2006. The report of the mission was presented to the Council on 7 December.

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf announced that Pakistan would fence part of the border with Afghanistan to stop militants from crossing over. But Pakistan is coming under pressure to take more forceful measures against Al-Qaida forces in Pakistan.

## Options

Council options include:

- Adopting a resolution to renew UNAMA's mandate for 12 months, expanding its presence to all the provinces and giving it a bigger coordination role between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Operation Enduring Freedom and the UN agencies in Afghanistan.
- Adopting a resolution as above but renewing the mandate only for six months. China has recently been in favour of shorter duration mandates.
- Deciding to expand the UNAMA mandate to include specific focus on security sector reform.
- Deciding to hold more frequent meetings on Afghanistan, so as to be better informed on the security situation and UNAMA's role.

- Requesting the Secretary-General to become directly involved in coordinating regional cooperation, particularly in bringing together Afghan-Pakistani leaders. One possibility would be to develop a structure like a tripartite commission with UNAMA, Pakistan and Afghanistan to improve regional coordination.
- Addressing both drug production and impunity, which are important underlying issues in Afghanistan.

## Key Issues

The key issue is the precarious security situation and its threat to nation-building. A related issue is the continuing upsurge in illegal drug production and trafficking. The narco-economy is one of the main threats to stability in Afghanistan in that proceeds from the drug trade feed the insurgency.

A second key issue is how to demonstrate the wider commitment of the international community to Afghanistan. If UNAMA is renewed for less than a year this could send a negative signal.

A related issue is how to assist regional coordination between Afghanistan and its neighbours. The outcome of the proposed cross-border *jirgas* or assemblies between Afghanistan and Pakistan to improve security and stability will be important. But an underlying question is whether the UN can do more to help and whether the Council should actively steer the Secretariat in that direction.

Another issue is how to support the JCMB to become more effective. At its last meeting, the JCMB acknowledged that it needed to be strengthened to accelerate implementation of the Compact. Currently it does not have a full-time secretariat. While it meets quarterly there is little international engagement between meetings.

Also on the minds of Council members is the security of UN staff, particularly if UNAMA expands further into southern Afghanistan. UNAMA currently has eight regional offices outside Kabul, including one in Kandahar.

## Council and Wider Dynamics

The Council is generally in agreement on the importance of the UN's presence in Afghanistan and the need to show support for UNAMA.

Members differ on some important elements. Russia, together with most members of the Council, supports the reconstruction process but has criticised what it calls the "inertia of old approaches" which has slowed down progress in reconstruction. This could result in a tussle over language when negotiating the new resolution.

Having UNAMA verify civilian casualties may be a sensitive issue. ISAF operations last October resulted in the deaths of dozens of civilians across the country. However actual numbers were not released. Nevertheless, verifying civilian casualties is a role that the UN plays in Iraq, publishing information about casualties from both insurgent and coalition operations.

Regional cooperation could also see some interesting dynamics. Pakistan is a key player and it has in the past objected to being singled out for specific mention in cooperating with Afghanistan. It prefers more general references to regional cooperation in any resolution on Afghanistan.

Italy is now the lead country in the Council on this issue and as a member of the Contact Group on Afghanistan it is expected to play a key role. However, Afghanistan is currently a highly sensitive political domestic issue in Italy, and was in part responsible for the recent resignation of the Italian prime minister. It is unclear whether this will in any way limit Italy's leadership role.

## Underlying Problems

Despite the surge in the Taliban-led insurgency some ISAF troop contributors are reluctant to increase numbers and send troops into more dangerous areas. The weakness of the Afghan police force continues to be a major problem. As the situation deteriorates civilians are getting caught up in hostilities and reconstruction work is being disrupted.

On 29 February the Afghan parliament passed a resolution that would give amnesty to former combatants. If it becomes law, it could lead to dissatisfaction among parts of the Afghan population who have been demanding justice for war crimes for many years. An Action Plan on Peace, Reconciliation and Justice was delayed in 2005 because of the security situation. However, lack of accountability for war crimes and human rights abuses may erode the legitimacy of the government.

to protect DRC's natural resources from unlawful and foreign predators. These measures had been recommended by the Group of Experts on 18 July 2006 (S/2006/525).

The Group of Experts had recommended that the DRC's government, with the assistance of the international community, should develop an effective system of natural resources control which could be backed up by the Council by declaring illegal exploitation and commerce outside these measures to be a "sanctionable act". Violators of DRC natural resources laws could then be added to the list of individuals and entities subject to the targeted sanctions imposed under resolution 1596.

In its 31 January 2007 report (S/2007/40), the Group of Experts further elaborated its original concepts and reiterated its earlier recommendations.

The Secretary-General's report will be discussed by the Committee in conjunction with the January report of the Group of Experts.

#### **Sudan Sanctions (1591 Committee)**

The Panel of Experts mid-term briefing is due by 29 March 2007. The report is expected to be discussed in the Committee on 27 March. S/RES/1713

#### **Democratic People's Republic of Korea Sanctions (1718 Committee)**

The Committee will try to resolve outstanding issues relating to its guidelines. Some discussion of amending the lists of designated sanctioned items (including S/2006/814, 815, and 853) is also expected. The Committee's next report to the Council is in early April 2007. S/RES/1718

## **UN Documents**

### **Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1707 (12 September 2006) extended ISAF's mandate until 13 October 2007.
- S/RES/1662 (23 March 2006) revised and extended UNAMA's mandate until 24 March 2007.
- S/RES/1401 (28 March 2002) created UNAMA.
- S/RES/1267 (15 October 1999) imposed sanctions against the Taliban.

### **Selected Report of the Secretary-General**

- S/2006/727 (11 September 2006) was the latest report.

### **Other Relevant Documents**

- S/PV.5581 (7 December 2006) was the discussion on the report of the Council mission to Afghanistan.
- S/2006/935 (4 December 2006) was the report of the Council mission to Afghanistan.
- SC/8850 (9 October 2006) was a press statement expressing concern about the security situation in Afghanistan and the increase in opium cultivation and trafficking.
- S/2006/765 (26 September 2006) was the latest ISAF report.

### **Other Relevant Facts**

#### **Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAMA's Chief of Mission**

Tom Koenigs (Germany)

#### **UNAMA: Size, Composition and Duration**

- Current strength: 206 international civilians, 848 local civilians, 11 military observers, three civilian police, 34 UN volunteers
- Duration: 28 March 2002 to present; mandate expires on 24 March 2007

#### **ISAF Military Commander**

General Dan McNeill (US)

#### **ISAF: Size, Composition and Duration**

- Current strength: about 35,460 troops
- Contributors of military personnel: 37 NATO and non-NATO countries
- Current top contributors: US, UK, Germany, Canada, Italy and the Netherlands

- Duration: 20 December 2001 to present; mandate expires on 13 October 2007

#### **Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF): Size, Composition and Duration**

- Current strength: about 11,000 troops (this is an estimate as the troop numbers shift continuously)
- Top contributor: US
- Duration: 7 October 2001 to present

### **Useful Additional Sources**

- UNAMA's website <http://www.unama-afg.org/>
- ISAF's website <http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/index.htm>
- *Afghanistan's Endangered Compact*, International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing No. 59, 29 January 2007

## **Upcoming Issues in Sanctions Committees**

### **Somalia Sanctions (751 Committee)**

The Committee is likely to begin receiving shortly applications under resolution 1744 for exemptions covering supply of material to support the Transitional Federal Government. These are likely to be proposed under a "no objection" procedure. Meetings may not be needed in March. The Monitoring Group mid-term briefing is unlikely to be given to the Committee before mid-April. S/RES/1724

### **Liberia Sanctions (1521 Committee)**

The Panel of Experts briefing to the Committee in preparation for the Council's review of the diamond sanctions may occur in March. (The Council review is due after 20 April 2007.) The Kimberley Process is also expected to inform the Committee of its assessment of progress made by the Liberian government towards joining the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme before the Council's review takes place. S/RES/1731

### **DRC Sanctions (1533 Committee)**

The Committee has received the much delayed Secretary-General's report (S/2007/68 of 8 February 2007, prepared by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) on the potential economic, humanitarian and social impact of the implementation of the proposed measures



## Notable Dates for March

Reports Due for Consideration in March	Relevant Document
26 February	<i>Commissioner's quarterly UNMOVIC report (UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission)</i> <b>S/RES/1284</b>
28 February	<i>SG regular report on Somalia</i> <b>S/RES/1725</b>
early March	<i>SG regular report on UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo)</i> <b>S/RES/1244</b>
5 March	<i>SG quarterly report on UNOCI (UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire)</i> <b>S/RES/1739</b>
8 March	<i>SG quarterly report on UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission in Iraq)</i> <b>S/RES/1700</b>
12 March	<i>SG quarterly report on resolution 1701 (Lebanon), including recommendations on the status of the Sheb'a Farms</i> <b>S/PRST/2006/52</b>
15 March	<i>SG recommendations on MONUC's mandate (UN Mission in the DRC)</i> <b>S/RES/1742</b>
mid March	<i>Commissioner's quarterly UNIIC report (UN International Independent Investigation Commission)</i> <b>S/RES/1686</b>
mid March	<i>SG semi-annual report on UNAMA (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan)</i> <b>S/RES/1662</b>
mid March	<i>SG quarterly report on UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia)</i> <b>S/RES/1712</b>
mid March	<i>SG quarterly report on UNOGBIS (UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau)</i> <b>S/RES/1580</b>
mid March	<i>Neighbouring states' reports to the Côte d'Ivoire Sanctions Committee on compliance with the arms and diamonds sanctions</i> <b>S/RES/1727</b>
29 March	<i>Panel of Experts mid-term briefing to the Sudan Sanctions Committee</i> <b>S/RES/1713</b>
31 March	<i>SG monthly report on Darfur</i> <b>S/RES/1590</b>

Expiry of Mandates in March 2007	Operations	Relevant Document
24 March	UNAMA	<b>S/RES/1662</b>
31 March	UNMIL	<b>S/RES/1712</b>
31 March	SG's Special Representative for the Great Lakes (final period)	<b>S/PRST/2006/57</b>

### March 2007 Other Important Dates

5-9 March	IAEA Board of Governors meeting
14-15 March	Donors' roundtable in Bujumbura for Burundi
22 March	The Temporary International Mechanism for Assistance to the Palestinian People is due to expire, it is up to the Quartet to renew it.

Also expected in March:

- There are media reports of a mid-March meeting in Baghdad bringing together regional actors, including Iran and Syria, along with US and UK officials, to discuss stabilisation strategies for Iraq.
- A Somali national reconciliation conference is possible.
- The Peacebuilding Commission is expected to visit Burundi and Sierra Leone in mid-March.
- The preliminary proposal from the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, was submitted to the Contact Group and the parties in late January and is currently under discussion. It is expected to reach the Council in March with possible discussion in April.

## Important Dates over the Horizon

- The Council is tentatively planning visiting missions for 2007 to West Africa (including Côte d'Ivoire), Timor-Leste and Central Africa.
- The Peacebuilding Commission's next round of country-specific meetings are expected in April for Burundi and in April or May for Sierra Leone.
- Parliamentary elections in Chad are scheduled for April.
- Presidential elections in Timor-Leste are expected in April, with parliamentary elections expected in June.
- A UN Conference at the ministerial-level on Iraq will be held in Geneva on 17-18 April.
- Human Rights Council elections are scheduled for May.
- A Council open debate on Protection of Civilians is expected in June.
- The Special Court for Sierra Leone has reported that Charles Taylor's trial at The Hague will begin in June.
- Election of Nepal's constituent assembly is expected in June.
- Elections in Sierra Leone are expected in July.
- The Secretary-General's next reports on the thematic issues of Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict and Women, Peace & Security are expected by October.
- Presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire are tentatively expected by 31 October.
- Local elections in the DRC are expected in the second half of 2007.
- A workshop on security sector reform, a joint initiative of Slovakia and South Africa, is being planned for later in 2007 in Africa.

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