The Qatar presidency in December will be a challenging one. December is a short month because Council members usually strive to finish their work by Christmas. However, there are a near record-high number of issues on the December calendar. These include formally scheduled “housekeeping items” such as:

- renewal of mandates of three peacekeeping operations in Cyprus, Côte d’Ivoire and the Golan Heights;
- consideration of the performance and mandate of two UN political offices, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau; and
- renewal of four sanctions regimes and/or sanctions monitoring bodies.

In addition, the Council has on its plate four very large political issues:

- **Darfur**, where an unprecedented proposal for a hybrid AU-UN operation is being explored—with significant implications for management and accountability as well as the use of UN funding, which will need input from other UN organs, not least the powerful budgetary body, the ACABQ;
- **Lebanon**, where the resurgence of the crisis has raised questions about whether the Council’s promised focus in resolution 1701 on “long-term solutions” has been left to drift for too long;
- **Somalia**, where as this Forecast goes to print, Council members were divided on the merits of a proposed regional military intervention; and
- **Sudan (Darfur)/Chad/CAR**, where an unprecedented proposal is still to be submitted.

Aide-Memoire

Important matters pending for the Council are:

- Three requests from the 2005 World Summit related to the Council’s work have seen no recent progress. The Summit requested “fair and clear procedures for listing and de-listing individuals for targeted sanctions”. Action is still awaited. Reforms to the Military Staff Committee have yet to be addressed. Council members established in May an ad hoc committee on mandate review to conduct the review of Security Council mandates called for by the Summit. By end of June, the committee made several minor recommendations on some preliminary issues but they are still to be considered by the Council, and the Committee has not yet made progress on the major issues.
- The Secretary-General’s proposals for a long term solution in **Lebanon** under resolution 1701 are still awaited. Recommendations on the status of the Sheb’a Farms are also still to be submitted.
- The Secretary-General’s report on the protection of civilians in camps in Chad and on improving security along the border with Sudan requested in August in resolution 1706 is still pending. (The report is now expected to be issued in mid-December, incorporating the results of the Central African Republic/Chad assessment mission.)
- The Council is still to consider possible individual sanctions under resolutions 1649 and 1698, as envisaged in the Secretary-General’s 22 May report on foreign armed groups in the DRC. The Secretary-General’s observations on sanctions against individuals obstructing action by MONUC, requested in resolution 1698, are still pending. (It is possible that they will be presented in the next reports from MONUC in January and the Group of Experts in December.)
- On **Uganda**, the Special Envoy is still to be appointed.
- A draft resolution on Small Arms circulated by Argentina in March 2006 has not been adopted and due to lack of consensus despite vigorous efforts by Argentina to bring this matter to fruition before the country leaves the Council at the end of the month.

In October 2004 the Council requested a report on the practical steps the UN could take to strengthen its action in support of transitional justice and the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict situations. This has not been submitted.

The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in **Côte d’Ivoire**, requested by a presidential statement, has still not been made public. Also on Côte d’Ivoire, the December 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not been published.
Iran, whose nuclear programme and the nature of any Chapter VII response to it continues to divide the P5 and loom over the Council.

In addition, the monthly Council focus on the Middle East is likely to take on enhanced importance, not only because of recent developments in the region, but also because Qatar has been a leading player on the issue during its term on the Council.

The Darfur crisis worsens and the 31 December expiry date for the current UN mission AMIS is looming. Most Council members are uncomfortable with anything short of a UN mission to replace AMIS. They are likely, however, at the end of the day to acquiesce in a compromise “hybrid operation” along the lines of the proposal that came out of the Secretary-General’s high level meeting in Addis Ababa on 18 November. But the details will be critically important—including on the amount of UN “spine”. It is not only Council will be critically important—including on the amount of UN “spine”. It is not only Council members that will have to be persuaded. Commitment authority for UN expenditure from the ACABQ will not be easily obtained unless there is clarity on how UN management, accountability and standards can be complied with. If, in the end, Khartoum causes this proposal to fail as well, it seems the question of sanctions will be back on the agenda.

On Somalia, many observers and some Council members worry about the implications of the Council perhaps authorising a military operation in Baidoa, to protect one of the parties, in the absence of consent of the other party, when in the case of Darfur, it had allowed the need for consent from Khartoum to dictate the fate of thousands of civilians. At press time, the conditions under which any IGASOM force would be deployed continued to divide Council members. This issue is, however, only one of many which are being addressed against the backdrop of a possible wider conflict involving regional neighbours such as Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Iran and the nuclear proliferation issue will continue to be on members’ minds. A draft resolution, prepared by the UK, France and Germany, that would impose sanctions on Iran for its non-compliance with resolution 1696, which demands that the country suspend all nuclear enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, was presented to the P5. Subsequently the ten elected members were briefed and given copies. However, as previously, the draft is not being negotiated in the Council. Lack of agreement on the text between the P5 means that the issue is back again in the P5 capitals. It is hard to predict whether the issue will be formally on the Council table before the end of the year.

The situation in Fiji deteriorated following increased tensions between the military and the prime minister, including the possibility of a coup. This led to a Council press statement calling upon the military to exercise restraint and encouraging a solution based on the constitution. The Council is likely to closely monitor the situation in December.

It is unlikely that there will be much public focus on the Council regarding the adoption of the Council’s annual report to the General Assembly. (The report has been much delayed in 2006.) Qatar, as president, will present the report to the Assembly. As in the past, a series of critical statements from the wider UN membership about the Council, its working methods and its relationship to other UN organs are likely in the General Assembly debate.

At the time of going to press only one thematic open debate in the Council was envisioned during December. This is likely to be on 4 December and will focus on civilians in armed conflict. The Council will be briefed by Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, who is shortly to leave the UN. This will probably be his last report to the Council and it will perhaps reflect on the breadth of the tragic humanitarian crises he has had to deal with and give his reflections on the overall response of the international community. In a departure from recent practice, the adoption of a presidential or press statement seems unlikely.

The Council will conduct a review of the functioning of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) in December and is likely to renew the mandate of the Monitoring Team established under resolution 1267 (the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions).

The Council is expected to renew two of its longest-standing operations.

It will renew, most likely for six months, the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), in place since 1964.

It is also expected to follow its practice of over thirty years and extend for six months the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights, originally created in 1974.

Also up for renewal is the mandate of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, which expires on 15 December. Renewal is expected, but the consideration of Côte d’Ivoire will certainly be far from routine. It involves several complex issues and a peace process which is in a very fragile state. In October, the country missed, for the second time, the deadline set by the Council for holding the elections and ending the transitional process. The length of the renewal period, the strength of the UN forces, whether or not to conduct mid-term review of the operation in six months, will be among the issues likely to be discussed. In addition, the Council will have before it the question of extension of sanctions and of the mandate of the sanctions monitoring body.

The mandates of two UN political offices also require renewal in December.

On Sierra Leone, the Council is expected to adopt a resolution renewing the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) for 12 months from 1 January 2007.

The mandate of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) also expires at the end of December. The Council is most likely to note, perhaps in a letter, the Secretary-General’s intention to renew UNOGBIS for 12 months, possibly with some adjustments to the mandate.

The Council will consider the future of Liberia diamond sanctions in December. The arms embargo, the travel ban and the mandate of the Panel of Experts are expected to be renewed.

On Burundi, the Council will mark the end of the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) and the start of the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB). Burundi was also one of the first two countries taken up by the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). During December, the government is expected to present peacebuilding strategies and plans to the PBC, which may visit Burundi that month.

The Council will be paying close attention to the post-election climate and developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
**Somalia**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council seems likely to continue to be divided about the merits of a regional military mission (IGASOM) of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) being deployed in Somalia to support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

At press time it seemed possible that a US draft resolution giving IGASOM a mandate to support the TFG could be circulated soon. It is unclear whether agreement within the Council can be reached on such a proposal. There seems to be reluctance based on concerns that an IGASOM presence may further destabilise the region and lock the Council into supporting one side of the conflict.

The Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Somalia, François Lonseny Fall, is likely to brief the Council in December.

The Somalia Sanctions Committee is likely to hold an unprecedented exchange of views in late November or early December between the Monitoring Group and states mentioned as having violated the arms embargo in the Group’s latest report. Council action in response to reportedly widespread embargo violations seems unlikely in December.

**Key Recent Developments**

The tense military stand-off involving the TFG and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) continues, with fears of an impending regional war engulfing Ethiopia and Eritrea as well as extremist Islamic elements. Insecurity and prolonged drought followed by floods have resulted in 160,000 Somali refugees in northern Kenya alone and 400,000 internally displaced in Somalia.

The UIC has indicated that it would view any IGASOM deployment as a hostile foreign intervention. It has also denounced Ethiopian support for the TFG. Ethiopia accuses the UIC of expansionism and harbouring extremists.

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**Status Update since our November Forecast**

Recent developments on the situations covered in our November Forecast are covered in the relevant briefs in this issue. However, other interesting Council developments in November included:

- **Uganda**: The Council issued a presidential statement on 16 November acknowledging the mediation efforts of southern Sudan’s government in the Juba peace talks and encouraged Uganda and the LRA to commit to a long-term and peaceful solution. The Council demanded the release of women, children and non-combatants as required by resolution 1612. The Council also called on member states to ensure that serious violators of human rights and international humanitarian law are brought to justice. (S/PRST/2006/45)

- **Myanmar**: Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs Ibrahim Gambari briefed the Council on 27 November on his recent visit to Myanmar. At press time, a US-sponsored resolution on Myanmar was being drafted with the possibility of being tabled in the coming weeks.

- **Middle East**: A Qatar-sponsored Security Council draft resolution on Israeli military actions in Gaza was vetoed by the US on 11 November. (S/2006/878). In an emergency session on 17 November the General Assembly adopted a similar resolution, also introduced by Qatar, which called on the Secretary-General to send a fact-finding mission to Gaza.

- **Afghanistan**: A Council delegation led by Ambassador Kenzo Oshima of Japan visited Afghanistan from 11-16 November and the Council was briefed on 22 November. The Council issued a press statement indicating that without sustained international support there was no guarantee that Afghanistan would not once again become a failed state. A report on the mission is being prepared in advance of an expected open meeting on Afghanistan in early December. (SC/8874)

- **Ethiopia/Eritrea**: The Council was expected to consider the Secretary-General’s report on the options for the future of UNMEE by the end of November. However, the EEBC proposed in a letter to the Council president that the Commission conclude its work by demarcating the border on maps and leave it to the parties to put in place the physical markers on the ground at a later date. Ethiopia and Eritrea have both challenged the proposal. (S/2006/905) Given these new developments, it is likely that the Secretary-General’s report will only come out in December for Council consideration early in the month.

- **North Korea**: The Sanctions Committee has begun to receive reporting from member states. Lists of banned materials were issued in documents S/2006/814, 815 and 853.

- **Children and Armed Conflict**: The Council issued a presidential statement after its open debate on Children and Armed Conflict on 28 November and briefing by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Radhika Coomaraswamy. The statement condemned the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict and requested mainstreaming child protection in peacekeeping. (S/PRST/2006/48) The Secretary-General’s most recent report on the issue was considered and the monitoring and reporting mechanism was discussed. (S/2006/826)

- **Haiti**: The death of two Jordanian MINUSTAH peacekeepers prompted the Council to hold consultations on 16 November. The Council issued a press statement expressing its condolences and continued support for Haiti and its expectation for peaceful municipal and local elections on 3 December. (SC/8868)

- **Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions**: The Working Group was originally expected to present its recommendations on improving the effectiveness of sanctions by the end of November. However, further amendments are currently under discussion and it is unclear when the recommendations will be presented to the Council.

- **Bosnia and Herzegovina**: the Council extended the mandate of EUFOR to 21 December 2007 in resolution 1722.

- **Nepal**: The Secretary-General sent a letter to the Council requesting that it respond positively to Nepal's request for assistance in support of its peace process by monitoring arms and armed personnel and to help create conditions for free and fair elections.
The UIC appears to be consolidating its grip in central and southern Somalia, and is possibly advancing in Puntland and Somaliland. The Transitional Federal Institutions (or TFIs, which comprise the TFG and parliament) are plagued by internal divisions and confined to Baidoa, which is steadily being encircled by UIC forces.

Tensions recently increased after reported calls by the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, for support from domestic leaders for his plans to fight the UIC. UIC leader Sheikh Sharif Ahmed reportedly equated Zenawi’s comments to a “declaration of war”, and some TFI members declared support for the UIC. Addis Ababa now acknowledges having deployed a few hundred military trainers to assist the TFG. Independent observers estimate that Ethiopia has in fact sent thousands of troops and amassed thousands more on its side of the border. At the time of writing, there were fresh reports of increased military movement among UIC, TFG and Ethiopian contingents near Baidoa.

During briefings to the Council in November, Lonseny Fall and the Sanctions Monitoring Group warned the Council against authorising a military deployment by IGAD, given its strong destabilising potential. The Secretary-General has said publicly that any IGASOM role should only be in support of an agreed political process and enjoy the consent of all major parties. He has also strongly urged regional players not to interfere.

Lonseny Fall underscored that an IGASOM deployment may in fact step up the TFG’s fragmentation and collapse. He also warned that:
- IGASOM’s mission plan does not meet Council demands, particularly a ceasefire;
- there was no consensus among key players including IGAD itself; and
- the mandate, composition, funding and logistics remained vague.

The plan seems to envision deploying thousands of troops from regional countries across Somalia costing US$335 million for the first year, and seems predicated on the belief that international donors will fund it. Interestingly, IGASOM military planners also seem to assume that the mission will be deployed in a consensual environment.

Fall urged the Council to focus instead on reinvigorating a political process, engaging the UIC and addressing regional concerns.

The latest Monitoring Group report says illegal outside support is “life-sustaining” for the TFG and UIC. It said that Djibouti, Eritrea, Libya, Egypt, Hezbollah, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria provided arms, funds and/or training for the UIC, and notes the presence of Eritrean military, Ethiopian rebels and foreign volunteers. Ethiopia, Uganda and Yemen allegedly provided arms, funding and/or troops to the TFG and warlords. (At press time, Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea, Libya and Egypt had denied the violations.)

The Group recommended sea, air and land surveillance with interdiction to enforce the embargo, including a UN observer mission, and assets freezes. It also recommended a high-level, region-wide diplomatic effort to increase dialogue with a view to a solution to the conflict. UIC-TFG talks scheduled for 30 October were cancelled due to disagreement on co-mediation by Kenya and the Arab League and by UIC demands that Ethiopia withdraw from Somalia. Talks in mid-December are possible, but there is little optimism about progress.

Options
Options include:
- authorising an IGASOM deployment (comprising non-neighbouring states) and perhaps only in Baidoa, and/or limited exemptions from the arms embargo for IGASOM and training of TFG forces;
- deciding that IGASOM’s mandate should be restricted to monitoring compliance with the August ceasefire;
- deciding that IGASOM’s deployment should be put on hold pending agreement on a sustainable peace process, consent from all key players and guarantees that neighbours who have taken sides (or are perceived as partial) will not be involved;
- follow-up on the recommendations of the Monitoring Group regarding sanctions violations (this would leave the TFG very exposed in the short term, and many believe it is technically impossible to enforce sanctions in Somalia); and
- encouraging a region-wide conference in conjunction with a UIC-TFG peace process.

Key Issues
Key issues include:
- whether, by authorising IGASOM’s deployment, the Council would in effect be taking sides and committing to a strategic policy of support for militarily containing the UIC’s expansion and protecting the TFG (a consequential issue is IGASOM’s mandate, composition and funding);
- whether, as an alternative, to seek to reinvigorate peace negotiations, and, instead of increasing the risks associated with an IGASOM military deployment, find some alternatives for ensuring that the TFG is able to survive and remain a viable negotiating partner;
- whether to focus on the regional dimensions; and
- whether to address violations of the embargo.

Time is also a key issue given the fast pace of developments.

A related issue is whether a coherent, unified Council view on the acceptable future scenario for Somalia can be achieved—especially whether this includes UIC/TFG power-sharing. The issue is key since some believe that the UIC is a potential danger, as it is reportedly affiliated with terrorist networks. Others believe that the UIC is now an undeniable reality in Somalia and that any solution to the widespread security concerns involves some form of accommodation with the UIC. And associated with this issue is the fear that a Council position which is perceived to be anti-UIC could exacerbate ideological or religious overtones in dynamics on the ground.
Council and Wider Dynamics
The Council appears divided on how best to respond.

There seems to be support for the US approach from China. Russia, who initially was opposed, may now also be in agreement. The other two permanent members, France and the UK, and the other EU Council members are among those who have been concerned about the US approach. There seems to be an emerging French leadership in finding alternatives to the US approach.

Strong pressure from the US and China for quick agreement on IGASOM is possible given a concern with containing the UIC and protecting the TFI. But the uncertainties (not least the costs and who will contribute to them, and the lack of clarity about troop contributors) and the risks associated with a deployment plan designed for a consensual environment being implemented in the face of clear opposition from the UIC leave some doubt as to the expected outcome.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolution
• S/RES/733 (23 January 1992) imposed the arms embargo.

Selected Presidential Statement
• S/PRST/2006/31 (13 July 2006) expressed willingness to consider exemptions to the arms embargo and support for the TFIs.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report
• S/2006/838 (23 October 2006)

Latest Monitoring Group’s Report
• S/2006/913 (22 November 2006)

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General
François Lonseny Fall (Guinea)

Chairman of the Sanctions Committee
Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser (Qatar)

For a full historical background, please see our January and September 2006 Monthly Forecasts.

Sudan (Darfur)/Chad/CAR

Expected Council Action
Council members are likely to support the proposed hybrid force in Darfur, but without enthusiasm and only as a last resort if it’s essential in negotiating an agreement with Sudan. At press time, the outcome of the 30 November AU Summit on this issue was still unknown.

In light of the recent UN assessment mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), the Council may also address a possible UN peacekeeping presence in both countries, but discussions may have to be left for January. A Secretary-General’s report on the CAR is also expected.

A briefing by the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on investigations into Darfur is expected. (The chief prosecutor has signalled that the investigations are near completion and that he has sufficient evidence to prepare the first charges against individuals considered most responsible for serious crimes committed in Darfur. He also stated that, by the beginning of December, his Office expected to have enough information on the cases’ admissibility in light of Sudan’s own proceedings vis-à-vis those cases).

An interim report by the Panel of Experts on sanctions is also expected, but no formal action is likely.

Key Recent Developments
The situation in Darfur deteriorated to unprecedented levels in November, with increasing attacks against civilians and aid workers as well as general lawlessness and chaos. While visiting Darfur in mid-November, Under Secretary-General Jan Egeland was prevented from travelling to some areas.

The spillover into Chad and the CAR is increasing. There are now 68,000 displaced Chadian persons and 218,000 Darfuri refugees in Chad, and an unknown number in the CAR. Rebel activity has increased sharply, with Chad declaring a state of emergency and reports at press time indicate that rebels may attempt to attack N’Djamena. In the CAR, rebels have taken over at least three cities in the north, and have requested talks on power-sharing.

On 10 November, the Secretary-General proposed a phased approach comprising sequential packages of “lighter” and “heavier” UN assistance for AMIS and, finally, a hybrid AU-UN operation that would include:

- leadership from a joint AU-UN special representative;
- substantial UN involvement in command and control;
- sustainable funding and logistics (the Secretary-General will recommend full UN financing provided that the mission is based on the general parameters outlined in his July report, including robust protection of civilians and support for the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, or DPA);
- strength and capacities similar to those in resolution 1706.

A series of AU-UN sponsored meetings followed in mid-November, culminating in an unprecedented meeting in Addis Ababa on 18 November with the Secretary-General, the P5 members, AU Commissioner Alpha Oumar Konaré, the Arab League, the EU, the Republic of Congo, Egypt, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa and Sudan. Agreement in principle was reached on a hybrid operation involving the following:

- a renewed political process under AU-UN leadership. The DPA would be the only basis and should not be renegotiated. (But clearly there would need to be new elements of some kind if an accommodation is to be reached.) The UN and the AU will call a meeting of signatories and non-signatories in the next weeks;
- the parties should cease hostilities immediately, and regional mechanisms need to be reinvigorated; and
- the military operation should contribute to restoring security and protecting civilians through the implementation of the DPA, with UN funding and logistics pending clarification of the force size. The
operation would have a predominantly African character and free movement, with UN backstopping and command-and-control structures.

The detailed mandate, command structures, strength and robustness of the operation remain unclear. Sudan has expressed resistance to a joint force, as opposed to an operation. Negotiations are also continuing on the proposed size of 17,000 military and 3,000 police.

The Secretary-General stated that the UN “must have confidence that what is being proposed is effective, is workable.”

The AU seems also to be considering a fall back position under which the international community would focus on strengthening AMIS. But it is unclear how much support such an approach would attract. (It was firmly rejected by the donor community in the past.)

Chad and the CAR continued to denounce rebel attacks launched from Darfur and appealed for a tri-border UN presence. Sudan seems to reject deployments on its side of the border. A UN assessment mission departed on 18 November, and, on 22 November, the Council renewed the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic’s (BONUCA) mandate until the end of 2007.

The CAR also requested increased military assistance from France and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). CEMAC, Chad (a CEMAC member) and France responded positively. (CEMAC has deployed a military operation in the CAR (FOMUC), and France already provides military assistance to both the CAR and Chad.)

Options
On the regional dimension, options for Chad and the CAR range from a small monitoring presence to a multidimensional operation, perhaps comprising mostly civilian police. A smaller presence in Chad would raise questions of inadequate civilian protection, while a large operation would face difficulties in force generation, financing and its relationship to the political process. For the CAR, a related, likely option is to increase BONUCA’s mandate and resources to encompass particularly the situation in the north, as well as enhanced coordination with FOMUC.

Council members may urge the Secretary-General to invite the parties to UN-led peace talks in both the CAR and Chad. Another possibility is to call for regional coordination involving the UN, Chad, the CAR, Sudan and regional players, or to mandate UN support for current regional efforts.

Key Issues
The key issue is whether agreement can be reached on a Darfur presence that balances credibility and effectiveness as well as acceptability to Khartoum. The outcome of the current negotiations among the UN, the AU and Sudan needs to be acceptable to Council members. This includes aspects relating to:

- the hybrid operation’s mandate, composition, size and cost (and in particular how similar the hybrid operation will be to the mission created in resolution 1706);
- command and control, management and accountability, and especially whether it includes a strong UN “spine”;
- the appointment of a special representative and a force commander;
- reporting mechanisms to both the UN and the AU, and improvements on the current lack of clarity on the chain of command and future decision-making; and
- funding. An important element will be securing commitment authority for expenditure from the ACABQ and eventually approval from the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee. This is likely to involve questions about UN procedures on mandate, procurement, control, management and accountability for UN assessed contributions. Strong UN participation will therefore be important.

The format of the Council’s endorsement may be a significant issue. Ensuring that the final outcome should not undermine resolution 1706 may be important to some members. This would point in favour of not reopening the Council’s formal decision on the matter. On the other hand, the absence of an explicit decision may create an issue about setting dangerous management precedents and undermining the conventional wisdom about clarity in mandates of command and control.

The practical meaning of such unprecedented, large-scale AU-UN cooperation and its effectiveness remains a major issue in its own right.

Another key issue is how to re-establish a peace process and end hostilities. The rebels’ position is unclear on AU-UN leadership in the talks on the basis of the DPA (given their opposition to the agreement), and regional players seem to insist on regional (Eritrean) mediation.

On the regional dimension, an emerging issue is how to approach the spill-over effects and civilian protection without upsetting the domestic political balance. Members are mindful of Chadian rebels’ opposition to a UN mission. Additional issues are:

- the need to devise a ceasefire and a political process in Chad and the CAR (the Secretariat has indicated that it would be looking into the CAR process through its Department of Political Affairs);
- the inherent difficulties in monitoring the proposed mission areas;
- the relationship of a new UN presence with French military assistance to Chad and the CAR, as well as FOMUC;
- the future of BONUCA;
- troop generation and costs (compounded by the potentially huge costs of peacekeeping in Darfur); and
- coordination with the deployment of the Darfur hybrid operation.

Council and Wider Dynamics
It is unclear whether Council members will be able to accept a hybrid operation proposal. Members are nonetheless conscious of the potential for pressure to accept it if indeed it has broad agreement from Sudan and is endorsed by the Secretary-General and the AU.

There remains a spectrum of views inside the Council on the optimum shape of a hybrid force, ranging from some more sympathetic to Sudan’s position and AU command (Russia, China and Qatar) to others (such as the US, the UK and other
European members) supportive of an outcome closer to the parameters established in resolution 1706.

Most members seem concerned with a deal or final Council endorsement that could:

- undermine previous Council decisions (especially resolution 1706) and create a precedent; or
- undermine the UN’s central role in overall control and particularly management of UN resources, applicable policies and good practices or create confusion over the chain of command.

Some oppose a new resolution under Chapter VIII and prefer a different form of endorsement. The Council’s recent method of endorsing the draft UN/Lebanon agreement on the international tribunal may set an interesting precedent.

France, the UK and the Republic of Congo are increasingly vocal about the need to address the regional dimension and respond soon to the calls from Chad and the CAR. There is support for including this of endorsing the draft UN/Lebanon agreement firmer positions on the subject.

Some members await the results of the assessment mission prior to presenting firmer positions on the subject.

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**UN Documents**

- **Selected Security Council Resolutions**
  - S/RES/1706 (31 August 2006) set a mandate for UNMIS in Darfur.
  - S/RES/1590 (24 March 2005) established UNMIS.

- **Selected Presidential Statement**

- **Selected Meeting Records**
  - S/PV/5519 (31 August 2006) was the adoption of resolution 1706.

- **Selected Secretary-General’s Reports**
  - S/2006/870 (8 November 2006) was the latest monthly report on Darfur.

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- **S/2006/591 (28 July 2006) and Add. 1 (28 August 2006) made recommendations for UNMIS’ mandate in Darfur and for UN assistance to AMIS. The report was complemented by an update, S/2006/645.**

**Latest Panel of Experts’ Report**

- **S/2006/795 (3 October 2006)**

**Other Relevant Facts**

**UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General**

Jan Pronk (Netherlands)

**UNMIS: Size, Composition and Cost**

- Maximum authorised strength: up to 27,300 military and 6,015 police
- Strength as of 30 September 2006: 9,619 military and 665 police
- Key troop contributors: Bangladesh, India and Pakistan
- Cost: 1 July 2006—30 June 2007 $1,126.30 million (excludes Darfur)

**UNMIS: Duration**

24 March 2005 to present; mandate expires 30 April 2007

**Head of AMIS**

Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe (Nigeria)

**AMIS: Size and Composition**

- Total authorised strength: about 10,000 military and 1,500 police
- Strength as of 1 September 2006: 5,703 military and 1,425 police
- Key troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda and Senegal

**AMIS: Duration**

25 May 2004 to present; mandate expires 31 December

**CAR: Special Representative of the Secretary-General**

Lamine Cissé (Senegal)

**BONUCA: Size and Composition**

Strength as of 30 June 2006: 19 international civilians, 5 military advisers, 6 police

**BONUCA: Duration**

15 February 2000 to present; mandate expires 31 December 2007

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**FOMUC: Size and Composition**

- Current strength: 380 troops
- Contributors: Gabon, Republic of Congo and Chad

**FOMUC: Duration**

October 2002 to present; mandate expires 30 June 2007

For the full historical background, please see our February, July and October Monthly Forecasts.

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**Lebanon**

**Expected Council Action**

In December the Council is expected to intensify its focus on the fragile situation in Lebanon. The report of the International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) on the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri will be of heightened interest given the assassination of Lebanese cabinet minister Pierre Gemayel on 21 November.

The Council will also receive the second Secretary-General’s report on implementation of resolution 1701, which in August called for a cessation of hostilities during the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, authorised a reinforcement of the UN Interim Mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and extended its mandate. Set against the background of withdrawal of Hezbollah ministers from the cabinet and threats of street violence, this report will also feed into a very tense and evolving situation.

**Key Recent Developments**

The troop level of UNIFIL reached 10,480 military personnel from 21 countries on 24 November. Force Commander Major-General Alain Pellegrini said that UNIFIL is nearly at sufficient strength. Several caches of illegal weapons have been seized.

Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace, considered a breach of resolution 1701, have continued. The Israeli government claims
that its over-flights are justified until the arms embargo is fully implemented.

Following consultations on the last Secretary-General’s report on implementation of resolution 1559, which urged Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon and the disbanding of militias, the Council adopted a presidential statement on 30 October welcoming the report. The Council noted that important progress had been made and that it was looking forward to the Secretary-General’s next report on implementation of resolution 1701 and his further recommendations on the relevant outstanding issues. However, some Council members expressed concern over the lack of details regarding the reported allegations of continued arms shipments to Lebanon. Syria has protested vigorously against observations made in the report.

Political tensions increased in Lebanon between the anti-Syrian March 14 Coalition (comprising Sunni Muslim, Druze and Christian parties led by Saad Hariri, the son of ex-Prime Minister Rafik Hariri) and the Shi’a parties Hezbollah and Amal along with their Maronite ally, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) led by Michel Aoun. On 1 November, Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Seyed Hassan Nasrallah, called on Prime Minister Fouad Siniora’s government to resign and allow the formation of a national unity government. In effect, this would provide Hezbollah with a blocking minority power over cabinet decisions. Hezbollah said street demonstrations and other “random actions” would cause the government to collapse if the demand was not met.

On 6 November, Lebanese political leaders started negotiations on Hezbollah’s demands. The talks collapsed after several days and, on 12 and 13 November, six ministers (out of 24) from Hezbollah, Amal and the FPM resigned.

Opposition to the proposed international tribunal to try perpetrators of the attack that killed Rafik Hariri became one of the symbols of Hezbollah opposition to the government. After the withdrawal of Hezbollah cabinet ministers from the government, the Lebanese government in an extraordinary session of the cabinet approved the draft UN framework for the creation of an international tribunal. Syria recently stated its opposition to the tribunal.

On 14 November, the Lebanese president sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General opposing the cabinet’s approval of the tribunal on the grounds that it was unconstitutional. This action seems to have been interpreted by the government and within the Security Council as political rather than founded in constitutional law.

The Secretary-General’s report on the establishment of a special tribunal for Lebanon was submitted to the Council on 15 November. It contains the agreement between the UN and Lebanon on the creation of the tribunal and its statute. The tribunal will be competent to prosecute the perpetrators of other attacks with “similar characteristics” to the Hariri assassination (criminal intent, purpose behind the attacks, nature of the victims targeted, pattern of the attacks and perpetrators are all elements necessary to establish the connection) that occurred in Lebanon from 1 October 2004 to 12 December 2005. The Council considered the Secretary-General’s proposals for the tribunal on 21 November and expressed support for its establishment. The agreement will now have to go through constitutional processes in Lebanon. It has already been approved by an emergency session of the cabinet held after the resignation of the six ministers.

On 21 November, Pierre Gemayel, Lebanon’s industry minister and a Christian member of the March 14 Coalition, was shot dead in Beirut, further heightening tensions between pro- and anti-Syrian Lebanese. The Council immediately adopted a presidential statement condemning Gemayel’s assassination. The Lebanese prime minister requested UNIIIC to provide technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities in investigating this assassination (S/2006/914). This request was granted by the Security Council (S/2006/915).

Options
In light of the political situation in Lebanon, the Council seems likely to be looking for options arising from the UNIIIC report and the next 1701 report. These may include:

- reinforcing the arms embargo by establishing a sanctions committee;
- increasing the role of international monitors at the border;
- addressing the issue of Israeli over-flights; and
- urging the Secretary-General to intensify his efforts under resolution 1701.

Key Issues
The main issues related to the next UNIIIC report are:

- whether the report will provide new information on the degree of linkage between the Hariri assassination and other attacks in Lebanon (to avoid prejudicing future legal cases, the report may need to remain somewhat vague on specific cases);
- the degree of Syrian cooperation with the investigation;
- the time remaining for the investigation to be completed, as this will have an impact on the beginning of the tribunal’s activities; and
- whether Serge Brammertz’s mandate as Chief Commissioner will be prolonged for an additional six months (until the end of the mandate of UNIIIC) before his appointment expires on 31 December.

The broader issues arising in respect to Lebanon include the Secretary-General’s proposals under resolution 1701, paragraph 9 (on reaching an agreement between Lebanon and Israel on a long-term solution) and paragraph 10 (making proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords regarding disarmament and the delineation of the border with Syria). The Council has had interim updates on the Sheb’a Farms aspect but as yet nothing on the wider issues, and it is still unclear whether the next 1701 report will contain such information.

Defining the status of the Sheb’a farms is a major concern. Many Council members think that Syria’s contradictory behaviour, declaring that the area belongs to Lebanon but refusing to delineate the border, is part of the problem. Some think that a form of temporary international administration over the land, until legal and cartographic work
is complete to enable transfer to Lebanon, would be a satisfactory transitional decision and would eliminate Hezbollah’s pretext for remaining an armed movement.

Allegations of arms shipments from Syria to Lebanon in violation of the arms embargo are a key issue. In his last 1559 report, the Secretary-General did not provide details. However, the reports have since been denied by both the Lebanese and the Syrian governments. Since the allegations could provide the Israeli Defense Forces with reasons to continue over-flights of Lebanese air space, Council members may want to hear additional details. If they are verified, the question of whether and how the arms embargo should be reinforced would arise.

Council Dynamics

Some members seem to consider that, in the absence of recommendations and information on progress toward implementation of resolutions 1559 and 1701, the role of the Council is limited. In the short term, because a permanent settlement needs long-term political efforts and the current Secretary-General clearly cannot carry this through during his last month in office, detailed input from the UN in December is unlikely. Second, there is a growing view in the Council that bilateral and regional diplomacy needs to be re-energised especially to promote Israeli-Palestinian peace, which some consider as vital for resolving the underlying Israeli-Lebanese problems. On the other hand, some members believe that political stability should be re-established in Lebanon before moving forward on implementation of resolutions 1559 and 1701.

The idea of initiating contacts with Syria and Iran in order to address the Lebanese, Israeli, and Palestinian issues has been raised in a number of quarters. However, it has been resisted to date, apparently on the basis that there was no sign that Syria and Iran were seriously ready to negotiate.

For some Council members, the security of UNIFIL troops remains a major issue. Perhaps there are also growing concerns about the implications for forces in Lebanon arising from Iran’s possible reaction to the adoption of sanctions against its nuclear programme. France is also concerned about the Israeli over-flights as they contribute to tensions and provide Hezbollah a pretext to backtrack on 1701.

Underlying Problems

The Lebanese issue remains strongly linked to many minds to other issues in the region, especially Iran and Israel/Palestine. The Secretary-General indeed recently urged both Iran and Syria to contribute to promoting stability in Lebanon.

The possibility that pro-Syrian forces will seek to delay the Lebanese parliament’s approval of the agreement on the tribunal is a potential further issue. The president—who already said that he would not sign the agreement arguing the cabinet session that approved it was unconstitutional—has the right to request from parliament a reconsideration of any measure. But the Council of Ministers has to approve any such request and even if it does, the law would become legally operative if the request has not been acted on after a month (article 57 of the Lebanese constitution). However, only the Speaker of the House, Nabih Berry (a member of Amal), can call a parliamentary session; he has also stated that the cabinet approval was unconstitutional.

Selected UN Documents

Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities, authorised a reinforcement of UNIFIL and extended the mandate until 31 August 2007.
- S/RES/1680 (17 May 2006) encouraged Syria to delineate its common border with Lebanon and called for further efforts to disarm and disband militias.
- S/RES/1664 (29 March 2006) requested negotiation with Lebanon on a tribunal of an international character.
- S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) urged Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon and the disbanding of militias.

Latest Presidential Statements


Reports

- S/2006/893/Add.1 (21 November 2006) was a statement by Nicolas Michel, Under Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, at informal consultations.
- S/2006/893 (15 November 2006) was the report on the agreement between Lebanon and the UN for the establishment of the international tribunal.
- S/2006/832 (19 October 2006) was the last Secretary-General’s report on implementation of resolution 1559.
- S/2006/730 (12 September 2006) was the last report on implementation of resolution 1701.
- S/2006/176 (21 March 2006) was the Secretary-General’s report on the establishment of a tribunal of an international character.

Letters

- S/2006/915 (22 November 2006) was a letter from the Council inviting UNIIIC to extend its technical assistance to the investigation of the Gemayel murder.
- S/2006/914 (22 November 2006) was a letter from the Secretary-General on a Lebanese request to for technical assistance by UNIIIC on the Gemayel investigation.
- S/2006/909 (22 November 2006) was a letter from Syria expressing its view that the tribunal should not be established before completion of UNIIIC’s work.
- S/2006/911 (21 November 2006) confirmed Council support for the international tribunal.
- S/2006/910 (21 November 2006) was a letter from Qatar noting the Lebanese constitutional requirements for the tribunal to come into force.
- S/2006/865 (6 November 2006) was a letter from Syria denying the reports of arms shipments from Syria into Lebanon.
At press time, members seemed agreed on augmenting the UN Operation in the DRC (MONUC) until February, when it expires, by re-hatting troops borrowed from the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB).

The Group of Experts’ midterm report is due by 20 December. It will include recommendations on curbing the illegal use of natural resources to finance militias in the eastern DRC. It is unclear whether it will be discussed in December. Nor is it clear whether progress will be made on targeted sanctions.

Key Recent Developments
Results of the 29 October presidential elections indicated Joseph Kabila’s victory with 58 percent of the votes, but a continuing east-west divide. The coalition of his opponent, Jean-Pierre Bemba, coalition made several accusations of fraud, filing a challenge before the Supreme Court on 18 November. The Supreme Court decided on 27 November against Bemba’s complaints, thus maintaining the provisional results.

Tension marked the lead up to the decision, with an attack against the Court building on 21 November and an ultimatum from Kabila that Bemba’s forces withdraw from Kinshasa. But Bemba’s acknowledgement of defeat seems to have improved the situation. There were also clashes resulting in the displacement of about 2,000 civilians in western DRC alone and the take over of the eastern town of Sake by Congolese army deserters now loyal to rebel general Laurent Nkunda, promptly pushed off by MONUC.

The new government will not be fully in place until the prime minister is appointed by the parliament and the cabinet formed. Kabila has the support of the majority coalition in the National Assembly, but Bemba seems to have emerged as a political force with national projection. Accommodation among significant political actors following the positive example in Liberia earlier this year may emerge as a key theme in the months ahead.

Uncertainty surrounds the timing of the prime minister’s appointment. It is unclear whether it can be made by the National Assembly alone, or whether it requires the full parliament, including the Senate, which will be elected by provincial assemblies on 29 December.

Options
Should the situation deteriorate quickly, members may consider renewing EUFOR RD Congo, perhaps with a limited operational mandate beyond its withdrawal date in December.

Other options for December include:
- further work on sanctions; and
- continuing with preliminary, informal discussions on the longer term, post-election role for MONUC ahead of more in-depth discussions in January and February.

Key Issues
The key issue is still how best to ensure that the elections and the transitional process are finalised.

A consequential issue is how best to deal with the potential for violence until the new government is seated. Members are conscious of the difficult timing of EUFOR RD Congo’s withdrawal as well as the potential need for reinforcements.

Other issues in the minds of Council members include:
- the future relationship among key Congolese political players;
- the new government’s position vis-à-vis MONUC (there is concern about the Burundian precedent, where the new government opposed the continuation of ONUB); and
- the targeted sanctions list and the possibility of sanctions over natural resources.

Council and Wider Dynamics
There is unity within the Council on the need to keep the situation under close scrutiny given the huge potential for violence. As a result, agreement on re-hatting ONUB forces seems to have been fast, even from those traditionally concerned with MONUC’s size and cost.
Some members are already considering MONUC’s future, but divisions are unlikely to emerge until members prepare for wider discussions in February.

On sanctions lists, most members seem to expect in particular the UK, the US and France to propose names, but it is unclear if and when a proposal will come forward.

**UN Documents**

**Latest Security Council Resolutions**

**Latest Secretary-General’s Report**
- S/2006/892 (15 November 2006) was the latest report of the Group of Experts.

For full historical background, please refer to our April, September and November Monthly Forecasts.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission**
William Lacy Swing (US)

**Size, Composition and Cost of Mission**
- Authorised strength: 17,000 military and 1,316 police
- Strength as of 30 September 2006: 17,390 military and 1,107 police
- Main troop contributors: Pakistan, India, Uruguay and South Africa

**Duration**
- 30 November 1999 to present, mandate expires on 15 February 2007

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### Iran

**Expected Council Action**

It remains unclear when the draft resolution currently being considered by the P5 plus Germany (P5+1) will be formally presented to the Council. This draft resolution would impose sanctions against Iran because of its non-compliance with resolution 1696, which demands that Iran suspend all nuclear enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.

**Key Recent Developments**

On 24 October, the EU3 (France, Germany and the UK) presented a draft resolution to the P5. The draft envisages the Council:
- acting under Chapter VII of the UN charter and taking measures under article 41 (the use of armed force);
- requiring Iran to implement the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol and to suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including the construction of a heavy-water reactor;
- establishing an embargo on the supply of all items, technical and financial assistance and training that could contribute to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic programmes;
- imposing a travel ban and asset freeze on companies, individuals and organisations involved in those programs;
- providing conditions for exemptions to these provisions;
- exempting the Bushehr nuclear power plant being built by Russia, but not the nuclear fuel needed for the reactor;
- establishing a sanctions committee;
- encouraging Iran to re-engage with the international community; and
- expressing its intention to adopt further measures under article 41 if Iran does not comply.

While the US had been consulted about the draft, it seems that the US has not endorsed it, preferring more extensive and more punitive sanctions. On 3 November, Russia proposed major amendments removing many of the sanctions’ measures, leaving only prohibitions on nuclear and ballistic items that could be used for Iran’s nuclear programme.

Russia’s amendments seem to assume that the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) and the voluntary Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) will be effective to prevent the sale and supply to Iran of items, materials, goods and technologies related to nuclear and ballistic programmes. Russia rejected provisions for travel bans, asset freezes and training prohibitions, as well as restrictions on the Bushehr project. China supported Russia’s amendments.

The ten elected members of the Council were briefed with copies of the draft resolution on 7 November.

Several P5+1 expert meetings followed without reaching any result. At press time the issue is back to the EU3 capitals and political directors are considering a way to break the deadlock. Russia does not seem ready to abandon its amendments.

On 15 November, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei submitted his latest report to the Board of Governors on the Implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement in Iran, focusing on Iran’s activities since 31 August. The report noted that enrichment related activities have continued, that there are still traces of unexplained plutonium in Iran and that Iran had not provided the Agency with full access to the pilot fuel enrichment plant. The report was considered by the IAEA Board’s regular meeting on 23 and 24 November.

**Options**

At press time, the options seem to be:
- UK, France and Germany put the current draft “in blue” without including the Russian amendments, risking a Russian veto; and
- high-level negotiations to achieve a P5 compromise probably involving limited sanctions.
Key Issues
The main issue is whether the P5 can regain what was previously thought to be a consensus on the measures which would follow if Iran rejected resolution 1696. Confusion seems to have arisen on interpretation of previous P5+1 understanding. The EU3 and the US consider that they already extended the timeline for compliance with resolution 1696 and took extraordinary steps to explore ways of initiating diplomatic negotiations. But in the end, they felt that the Iranian position, not only on suspension or enrichment, was just too negative. They therefore see no alternative to the threat of sanctions. Russia and China still favour an incremental approach, and stand ready to adopt measures as long as they remain reasonable, proportional and gradual.

A related issue is timing. Iran claims it is accelerating its acquisition of nuclear capabilities. Also the Council’s new composition in January is perhaps a factor that will influence timing. The presence of more Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries (with Panama and Indonesia replacing Argentina and Japan, non-NAM members) may have some impact, as might the presence of South Africa, a strong player on this issue in discussions at the IAEA. However, the impact may possibly be limited, since the elected ten members are effectively not involved in the P5+1 discussions on the issue.

A major issue, at the time of writing, is how the current deadlock can be broken. The P5+1 have to decide whether the issue should now be discussed at the ministerial level of the “EU3 + 3” (EU3 plus the US, Russia and China), or whether it should remain among political directors. It seems that at this stage little more can be achieved in New York.

Council Dynamics
Russia argues that the EU3 draft appeared not to match positions agreed among the P5+1 foreign ministers in London in June 2006. Russia’s commercial interests in Iran may also explain its preference for approaching a sanctions regime more gradually.

For its part, the US appears to want to further toughen the draft resolution, for instance by including a provision that Iran’s nuclear ambitions pose a threat to international peace and security.

Because the US and the Russian-Chinese positions are at the opposite side of the spectrum, the EU3 were expected to play a balancing role—although, in practice, their position tends to be closer to the US. However, there seems to be much uncertainty among the EU3 on the way to proceed.

Doubts about US intentions have also contributed to the confusion. At this stage, it is uncertain whether the US will be pushing for a vote before the end of the year, risking a Russian veto.

Underlying Problems
In the past weeks, commentators have been suggesting that the US should engage directly with Iran on a variety of issues. Indeed, some see Iranian links to US interests in Iraq and in Lebanon and suggest that discussion with Iran would help. Others see little prospect that this would help achieve a solution on Iran’s nuclear programme.

The IAEA oversight of Iran’s nuclear activities has considerably decreased. Iran succeeded in building two cascades of 164 centrifuges each for uranium enrichment, which could be used to make nuclear fuel or, in much higher grades, the core of an atom bomb. Iran has also stated its intention to install another 3,000 centrifuges for uranium enrichment by March 2007.

-most recent documents-

Security Council Resolution
• S/RES/1696 (31 July 2006) demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, requested a report from the IAEA, and expressed its intention to adopt measures under article 41 of the UN Charter in case of Iranian non-compliance.

Security Council Presidential Statement
• S/PRST/2006/15 (29 March 2006)

Useful Additional Sources
Nuclear Suppliers Group http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NSG.asp

Established in 1975, the NSG consists of 45 nuclear supplier states (including China, Russia, and the United States) that have voluntarily agreed to coordinate their export controls governing transfers of civilian nuclear material and nuclear-related equipment and technology to non-nuclear-weapon states. The NSG aims to prevent nuclear exports for commercial and peaceful purposes from being used to make nuclear weapons. NSG members are expected to forgo nuclear trade with governments that do not subject themselves to international measures and inspections designed to provide confidence that their nuclear imports are not used to develop nuclear arms. The NSG has two sets of guidelines listing the specific nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies that are subject to export controls.
Security Council Report

For historical background and other relevant facts, please refer to our February Monthly Forecast.

Côte d’Ivoire

Expected Council Action

The Council will renew the mandate of the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), which expires on 15 December.

It is expected also to renew the sanctions regime under resolution 1643, which also expires on 15 December. The next report on sanctions by the Côte d’Ivoire Group of Experts is due by 1 December and its mandate—which also expires on 15 December—is expected to be prolonged for an additional six months.

Key Recent Developments

Tensions between the presidential side and the rebel New Forces (Forces Nouvelles) have continued, though overall, the situation has been calmer than some observers expected, especially around the missed deadline of 31 October for holding elections at the end of the transitional period.

On 1 November, the Council in resolution 1721 endorsed the decision by the AU Peace and Security Council to extend by one final year, until 31 October 2007, the mandate of the Ivorian president and the prime minister. The resolution also reinforced the prime minister’s powers and the role of the international community in the Ivorian peace process.

Critics claimed that the resolution had a degree of ambiguity that Ivorian political actors would exploit. Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo warned that he would not fully implement the resolution and announced that he would soon propose his own framework for resolving the crisis. Tensions between him and Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny have also increased recently.

Options

Options that the Council may consider include:
- a simple resolution extending the mandate of the international forces (UNOCI and the French Licorne forces) as well as the sanctions regime by 12 months and reinforcing the UNOCI mandate to meet the requirements of resolution 1721;
- a more extensive resolution, renewing in addition the mandate of the Group of Experts for six months;
- alternatively, renewing the mandate of the international forces and the sanctions regime only until the end of the transitional period (31 October 2007), perhaps with a review process in June; and
- boosting force levels as a deterrent by approving the Secretary-General’s requests to increase UNOCI’s troop level by three battalions, or expressing willingness to authorise a transfer of troops from the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to UNOCI when necessary.

Key Issues

On the renewal of the mandate, several issues will need to be addressed by Council members. Members will need to decide whether the renewal period should be until 31 October 2007 at the end of the transition in order to send a strong signal to Ivorian political actors that there will be no other transition and to use the spectre of withdrawal to obtain compliance. The mandate could also be renewed until a few months after the elections in order to provide extra security guarantees after the results of the elections.

A related issue is whether a mandate review in June should be considered in order to maintain pressure.

The question of the UNOCI troop level will come up as the Secretary-General seems likely to again recommend an increase by three battalions. A possibility may be for UNOCI to redeploy internally as weapons are confiscates within the zone of confidence that divides the rebel- and government-held areas. This strategy may allow the Council to consider a smaller overall increase. Another possibility would be for the Council to consider provisions authorising a further transfer of soldiers from UNMIL to UNOCI. This could be used for emergency transfers if increased security becomes necessary. However, this will largely depend on the agenda for troop withdrawal from Liberia and it seems that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia is reluctant to recommend further withdrawals. The Council will also have to decide whether the previous troop-level increase (as in resolution 1682) should be renewed.

Another issue is how the UNOCI mandate should be altered to adapt to the requirements of resolution 1721, especially to provide additional security guarantees around areas where roadmap activities are conducted, and to better help the government conduct these activities, which include voter identification, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), and the organisation of elections.

The Council will also need to look at the question of how to finance the activities of the High Representative for Elections and DDR, as current funding seems insufficient.

By the time the Council meets to adopt the resolution, it will also have received a first assessment by the International Working Group on progress toward implementing resolution 1721. This may shed light on the underlying situation and suggest additional issues that need to be addressed in the resolution.

Established in April 1987, the voluntary MTCR aims to limit the spread of ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems that could be used for chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks. The regime urges its 34 members, which include most of the world’s key missile manufacturers, to restrict their exports of missiles and related technologies capable of carrying a 500-kilogram payload at least 300 kilometres or delivering any type of weapon of mass destruction.

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Council Dynamics
Members were divided on several issues prior to the adoption of resolution 1721. Russia, China, the US and Tanzania (with strong support from outside the Council by South Africa) believed that the original draft was too prejudicial to Ivorian sovereignty. Therefore, the final draft did not include provisions for the prime minister to appoint civilian or military officials, and it dropped a provision on the precedence of Security Council decisions over the Ivorian constitution.

France seems increasingly frustrated with the Council’s inability to act against spoilers in Côte d’Ivoire by adopting sanctions, and it is starting to seriously question whether its presence should continue in absence of political progress. The prospect of France withdrawing its troops from Côte d’Ivoire (which would increase the risk of the country sliding into a civil war) seems to be becoming an increasingly important factor.

The US, along with Japan, favours maintaining the current UNOCI troop level. Japan, however, is willing to push for troop transfers from UNMIL to UNOCI, while the US remains reluctant to explore that option as long as the situation in Liberia remains fragile.

Dynamics within the Council on Côte d’Ivoire may change in January when South Africa, previously opposed to sanctions and more sympathetic to Ivorian President Gbagbo, will join the Council.

Underlying Problems
The problem of impunity—failure to bring to justice those responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law—especially for militia members has been raised again recently following violent clashes between civilians and pro-government militias.

If President Gbagbo presents his own framework for the peace process, which would inevitably contradict the terms of resolution 1721, there is a risk that the process will collapse.

UN Documents

**Most Recent Security Council Resolution**
- S/RES/1721 (1 November 2006) prolonged by one year the transitional period in Côte d’Ivoire and reinforced the powers of the prime minister.
- S/RES/1643 (15 December 2005) extended for one year the sanctions regime established under resolution 1572 (2004), established an embargo on the export of Ivorian diamonds and created a new Group of Experts of five members.

**Secretary-General’s Report**
- S/2006/821 (17 October 2006) was the last UNOCI report.

**Latest report by the Sanctions Committee**
- S/2006/735 (13 September 2006)

**Selected Letters**
- S/2006/855 (27 October 2006) was a letter from Côte d’Ivoire including the statement delivered by President Gbagbo at the ECOWAS summit on 6 October 2006.
- S/2006/820 (16 October 2006) was the letter from the Secretary-General on the lack of financial contributions to support the activities of the High Representative for the Elections in Côte d’Ivoire.
- PSC/AHG/Comm (LXIV) Rev. 1 (17 October 2006) was the AU Peace and Security Council decision on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General**
Pierre Schori (Sweden)

**High Representative for the Elections**
Gérard Stoudmann (Switzerland)

**Size and Composition of UNOCI**
- Authorised strength since 2 June 2006: up to 1,500 additional personnel
- Strength as of 30 September 2006: 8,986 total uniformed personnel

**Golan Heights (UNDOF)**

**Expected Council Action**
The Council is expected to follow its thirty year practice and extend for six months the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights, which expires on 31 December.

The Council traditionally also calls for implementation of resolution 338 of 22 October 1973. This refers to resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied territories. The Council president is also expected to issue a complementary statement on how the Middle East situation will remain tense until a comprehensive settlement is reached. This has been the practice on the renewal of UNDOF’s mandate since 1976.

**Key Recent Developments**
The Secretary-General announced in his October report on the implementation of resolution 1559 that he was continuing to “investigate carefully the complicated cartographic, legal and political implications” of recognising the Sheb’a Farms as part of Lebanon in light of Syrian and Lebanese statements. Such an adjustment of the border would have consequences for UNDOF as the Sheb’a Farms currently falls within its area of operations. If the territory becomes Lebanese, it would logically move to the area of control of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Developing proposals for demarcation will take some time and these are not expected to be an issue for the Council when it considers renewing UNDOF’s mandate.
Key Recent Developments
The Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari, in July brought together Greek Cypriot leader Tassos Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat for the first time since April 2002. On 8 July, they agreed that technical committees would commence work by the end of the month on matters affecting daily life and that they would exchange a list of substantive issues. They agreed to meet occasionally to direct working groups and review the work of technical committees. In August the Council welcomed this and called for prompt full implementation. For more details please consult our 28 August 2006 Update Report.

At press time, neither technical committees nor working groups have commenced. Both sides disagree on several issues, including which steps should be taken first to reach a comprehensive settlement and the level of involvement of leaders in working groups.

On 15 November, Gambari wrote to leaders recommending a timetable to implement the 8 July agreement, including that they meet within seven days of the start of working groups and meet with a senior representative of the Secretary-General during the first quarter of 2007 to assess progress and the prospect of full resumption of his good offices. Both responded positively.

Options
The Council is likely to extend UNFICYP’s mandate for another six months. An option is to press the parties to meet their commitments under the 8 July agreement.

Key Issues
The 8 July agreement is a key issue. The Secretary-General’s UNFICYP report is expected to appear in early December. It is likely to address recent political developments and urge parties to implement the agreement.

Underlying Problems
Stagnating endeavours towards a comprehensive settlement may finally exhaust UNFICYP support. Options for presently downsizing UNFICYP seem limited. Council members are mindful of the political signals of such a move.

UN Documents
Selected Security Council Resolutions
• S/RES/1685 (13 June 2006) extended UNDOF’s mandate until 31 December 2006.
• S/2006/832 (19 October 2006) was the last Secretary-General’s report on implementation of resolution 1559.
• S/2006/333 (1 June 2006) recommended extending the mandate of UNDOF for six months.
• S/2006/333 (1 June 2006) recommended extending the mandate of UNDOF for six months.

Selected Presidential Statement
• S/PRST/2006/26 (13 June 2006)
• S/PRST/2006/26 (13 June 2006)

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
• S/RES/1687 (15 June 2006) extended the mandate of UNFICYP until 15 December 2006 and urged for the resumption of negotiations for a comprehensive settlement.

Other Relevant Facts
UNDOF Force Commander
Lieutenant General Bala Nanda Sharma (Nepal)

Size and Composition of Mission
• Total authorised strength as of 30 September 2006: 1,047 troops assisted by 57 military observers of UNTSO’s Observer Group Golan; and supported by 34 international civilian personnel and 107 local civilian staff
• Key military contributors: Austria, Poland, India, Slovakia and Japan.

Approved Budget
1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007: $41.59 million (gross)

Duration
May 1974 to present

Historical Background
For historical background and a more comprehensive list of documents relating to UNDOF, please see our December 2005 and June 2006 Monthly Forecasts. On the issue of the Sheba Farms, please see our May 2006 Update Report on Lebanon and our November 2006 Monthly Forecast.

Cyprus
Expected Council Action
The mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) expires on 15 December. It is expected to be renewed for six months.

Selected UN Documents
Latest Security Council Resolution
• S/RES/1687 (15 June 2006) extended the mandate of UNFICYP until 15 December 2006 and urged for the resumption of negotiations for a comprehensive settlement.

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission
Michael Møller (Denmark)

Selected Press Statement
• SC/8820 (29 August 2006) expressed support for the Secretary-General’s efforts aimed at reaching a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, welcomed the agreement reached on 8 July 2006 and called for its full implementation without further delay.

Selected Press Statement
• SC/8820 (29 August 2006) expressed support for the Secretary-General’s efforts aimed at reaching a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, welcomed the agreement reached on 8 July 2006 and called for its full implementation without further delay.

Size and Composition of Mission
Total authorised strength as of 30 September 2006: 913 total uniformed personnel, including 851 troops and 65 police; supported by 34 international civilian personnel and 109 local civilian staff.

Cost (approved budget)
1 July 2006 – 30 June 2007: $46.77 million (gross), including voluntary contributions of a one-third share from Cyprus and $6.5 million from Greece
Liberia

Expected Council Action
The Council will consider the future of Liberia diamond sanctions by 20 December. The arms embargo, the travel ban and the mandate of the Panel of Experts (whose final report is due by 15 December) are expected to be renewed. Modifications to the Panel’s mandate in light of recent changes in the sanctions regime are possible.

Members are also expected to approve the Secretary-General’s assessment of progress with the downsizing benchmarks for the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

It is unlikely that the Secretary-General will suggest further repatriations of UNMIL troops in early 2007. Additional replacement of UNMIL troops with police is possible. However, decisions on UNMIL’s troop levels and troop-sharing between UNMIL and the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) seem unlikely until March 2007, when UNMIL’s current mandate expires.

A report on cross-border issues and inter-mission cooperation in West Africa is due, but Council consideration may be left for January.

Key Recent Developments
In September, the Council renewed UNMIL’s mandate until 31 March and endorsed the Secretary-General’s proposed downsizing benchmarks. These include in particular security sector reform and the reintegration of ex-combatants.

In line with this plan, UNMIL was downsized by one battalion in November. Additional repatriations may be considered as the situation permits and in accordance with the benchmarks. Serious drawdown is nonetheless only expected after an initial two-year consolidation phase.

On 20 October, the Council decided not to reinstate sanctions on timber. Members acknowledged, however, that further measures in the diamond sector are still required pending Liberia joining the Kimberley process.

Options
One option is to renew the diamond measures if members consider that there is no sufficient progress. Another is a temporary lift of diamond sanctions (similar to the Council’s approach to timber sanctions) and a review in early 2007 if Liberia is seen to be fairly close to meeting Council expectations.

On troop levels, members are likely to prefer the option of a cautious approach to downsizing UNMIL. Other options include: continuing to replace troop contingents with police, while simultaneously re-hatting downsized troops as UNOCI; expressing support for joint border operations involving UNMIL, UNOCI, Sierra Leone and Guinea; and addressing cross-border issues and inter-mission cooperation more seriously, perhaps considering the Secretary-General’s March 2005 recommendations on extended areas of responsibility and a sub-regional reserve force, _inter alia._

Key Issues
On sanctions, the key issue is diamonds and the establishment of a transparent and verifiable certificate of origin regime that will allow Liberia to join the Kimberley process. The Panel of Experts’ views are likely to be key.

Regarding the targeted sanctions against individuals (assets freeze and travel ban), the question of whether there should be the de-listing of some individuals is an issue given the recent progress in Liberia.

UNMIL’s troop levels are a key issue, but members are aware of the risks from downsizing too quickly without due regard to security benchmarks.

How best to approach the regional dimension is another. Members are conscious of the challenges from maintaining an appropriate UNMIL strength while addressing UNOCI’s shortfalls, particularly given the current surge in UN peacekeeping. This may also require a longer-term perspective on cross-border issues and inter-mission cooperation.

Council Dynamics
Members seem in agreement that clear evidence of Liberia’s fulfilment of Council requirements will be needed for the lifting of diamond sanctions. Some, however, are concerned that political pressure could lead others to favour a premature lifting.

France has a particular interest in regional troop-sharing, but there is awareness that decisions in that regard will need to await further developments on Côte d’Ivoire’s peace process and UNMIL’s mandate renewal in March 2007.

UN Documents

Recent Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1689 (20 June 2006) lifted the timber embargo and renewed the diamond embargo for six months.
- S/RES/1647 (20 December 2005) renewed the arms embargo and the travel ban for twelve months.
- S/RES/1509 (19 September 2003) established UNMIL.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2006/743 (12 September 2006) was the latest UNMIL report.
- S/2005/135 (2 March 2005) was the report on inter-mission cooperation.

Other
- SC/8856 (20 October 2006) concluded that there is no basis for reinstating timber sanctions.
- S/2006/379 (7 June 2006) was the latest Panel of Experts’ report.
Sierra Leone

Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to adopt a resolution renewing the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) for 12 months from 1 January.

Key Recent Developments
The Sierra Leone parliament approved the composition of the National Human Rights Commission on 4 October.

On 12 October the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) recommended support for Sierra Leone from the Peacebuilding Fund. At a PBC meeting in December, Sierra Leone is expected to present an outline of strategies to address four critical issues: social and youth empowerment and employment, consolidation of democracy and good governance, justice and security sector reform, and capacity building in the public sector and social services.

The government, the UN and the World Bank held the first annual review of implementation of the Sierra Leone Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) with development partners in Freetown from 29-30 November.

Options
The most likely option is a 12-month renewal of UNIOSIL’s mandate.

A possible option is to renew the mandate for 12 months with a review in June to allow for a possible adjustment in the run-up to the July elections.

Key Issues
The key issue is whether any security issues are likely to arise which would impact a free, fair and credible process for the 28 July 2007 elections.

Related is the amount of UN assistance and Council involvement needed in preparing for elections. One of UNIOSIL’s priorities is support for the National Electoral Commission.

A future issue is how much involvement the Council should undertake once the PBC starts active work. Some Council members may argue that Council time could be better used elsewhere if the PBC is also supporting key activities in the country.

Underlying Problems
Youth unemployment, corruption and a weak infrastructure continue to be potential destabilising factors. Extreme poverty and slow economic development are major stumbling blocks in creating a stable security environment.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1712 (29 September 2006) reiterated the continuing need for UNMIL’s support for the security of the Special Court in Sierra Leone.
- S/RES/1688 (16 June 2006) requested the Secretary-General to assist in the transfer of former Liberian President Charles Taylor to the Special Court's special outpost in the Netherlands.
- S/RES/1626 (19 September 2005) mandated UNMIL to provide security for the Special Court.
- S/RES/1620 (31 August 2005) established UNIOSIL.

Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict

Expected Council Action
On 4 December, the Council will receive an open briefing from Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, followed by an open debate. No formal Council action is expected.

Egeland is expected to address a number of conflicts with a sustained high level of violence and the need to optimise the role of peacekeeping missions in protecting civilians. He is likely to call for more prompt action by the Council, without differentiation on the basis of political considerations. He may also stress that momentum should not be lost on the responsibility to protect.

Options
In a departure from recent practice, the adoption of a presidential or press statement seems unlikely.
Key Issues
An ongoing issue for the Council has been the practical incorporation into country-specific resolutions of general principles concerning protection of civilians. Generally, although not consistently, the Council has tried to include them when establishing or revising mandates.

A related issue is ensuring that the updated and comprehensive framework of past resolutions is always at the fore. Resolution 1674, which reaffirmed the responsibility to protect, on 28 April consolidated previous resolutions 1265 and 1296, but all three resolutions remain important. A further issue is the status of the principle “the responsibility to protect.” How to best implement this principle remains an important question. Not all members were keen on affirming it in a Council resolution, but interest in clarifying or elaborating the principle continues to be expressed. For more details on resolution 1674, please refer to our December 2005 Monthly Forecast and 13 January, 8 March and 20 April 2006 Update Reports.

Council Dynamics
There is broad agreement at the thematic level on the importance of the protection of civilians in armed conflict, but sharp differences have emerged in terms of the issue in specific situations during 2006, notably the conflicts in Lebanon and Gaza. However, some members are not keen on thematic debates.

UN Documents
Security Council Resolutions
• S/RES/1674 (28 April 2006) reaffirmed the responsibility to protect as formulated in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.
• S/RES/1296 (19 April 2000) emphasised the importance for humanitarian organisations to uphold the principles of neutrality and humanity in their humanitarian activities.
• S/RES/1265 (17 September 1999) expressed the Council’s willingness to take measures to protect civilians in armed conflict and to consider how peacekeeping mandates might better address the negative impact of conflict on civilians.

Latest Secretary-General’s Report
• S/2005/740 (28 November 2005) recommended the Council adopt a new resolution to reflect the new challenges to the protection of civilians.

Selected Presidential Statements
• S/PRST/2005/25 (21 June 2005) expressed the Council’s concern about limited progress on the ground to ensure the effective protection of civilians in situations of armed conflict.

Guinea-Bissau

Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to consider the report of the Secretary-General on the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS). Its mandate expires on 31 December.

Key Recent Developments
A donors’ roundtable in November pledged US$262.5 million for development projects. Another $178.5 million for reform of the security sector will be unlocked once the government presents its good governance programme.

The International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau (France, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea and the Executive Secretariat of the Economic Community of West African States, or ECOWAS, and the Executive Secretariat of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries) held its first meeting in New York on 21 September. Its goal is to help strengthen national institutions, mobilise funds, and assist with security and judicial sectors and public administration reforms.

In October, Shola Omorogie of Nigeria replaced João Bernardo Honwana of Mozambique as the Secretary-General’s Representative in Guinea-Bissau.

Options
The most likely option is for the Council to note, perhaps in a letter, the Secretary-General’s intention to renew UNOGBIS for 12 months with an adjusted mandate. Most members are open to a mandate renewal for another year. An option, which may be raised, is to extend the mandate for a more limited term.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is adjustment of the mandate. The Secretary-General is expected to suggest streamlining, focusing on political mediation, institutional capacity building and security sector reform. Many Council members will want to be satisfied that this is sufficient for peacebuilding.

Another issue is the frequency of UNOGBIS reporting. Some members, including Japan, the US and Denmark, support a semi-annual report. Argentina and the African members prefer three months so that Guinea-Bissau stays on the radar screen.

Council Dynamics
Guinea-Bissau is not a high priority. Since Brazil left the Council, no other member has strongly advocated greater attention. Council involvement may decline further next year, particularly as the Group of Friends plays a more active role.

Underlying Problems
Guinea-Bissau’s main crop, cashew nuts, had a poor harvest this year, which threatens an already weak economy.

There is also growing evidence that organised crime gangs are trafficking drugs, arms and undocumented migrants through Guinea-Bissau, raising concerns that the country could become a centre for transnational crime.

UN Documents
Security Council Resolutions
• S/RES/1580 (22 December 2004) revised and extended the mandate of UNOGBIS.
• S/RES/1233 (6 April 1999) supported the decision of the Secretary-General to establish UNOGBIS.

Reports and Letters of the Secretary-General
• S/2006/790 (2 October 2006) was the letter informing the Council that Shola Omorogie would be the new representative.
Monthly Forecasts

(FNL), signed on 7 September, before the Forces for National Liberation assist with tasks of the Ceasefire Agreement.

Priorities include peace consolidation and reform of the security sector, reconciliation and reform of the security sector, promotion and protection of human rights, and the coordination of donors and UN agencies.

On 6 November, the withdrawal of ONUB contingents was adjusted to allow them to assist with tasks of the Ceasefire Agreement with the Forces for National Liberation (FNL), signed on 7 September, before the AU Special Task Force is put in place.

In November, parliament granted provisional immunity to FNL members with the exception of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. At press time, seven suspects from the alleged coup attempt in August remain in jail having been refused bail.

The Secretary-General in November released a report on Children and Armed Conflict in Burundi, which identified possible violators.

Burundi was one of the first two countries taken up by the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). During December, the government is expected to present peacebuilding strategies and plans to the PBC, which may visit Burundi that month.

Options

The Council is likely to issue a presidential statement marking the end of ONUB and the start of BINUB.

Key Issues

The key issue is internal stability. Friction has increased between the government and opposition parties, media and civil society.

Another issue is alleged human rights violations. BINUB’s human rights mandate means the new mission will have to play an important role on sensitive issues.

Related is the establishment of the truth and reconciliation tribunal and special chamber called for by the Council in resolution 1606 in 2005. In light of the lack of progress, resolution 1719 restated these calls.

A future issue is the possible need for ongoing supplementary security assistance for the AU Special Task Force after 31 December if there are delays in implementing the timetable of the Ceasefire Agreement.

A related concern is compliance with the Ceasefire Agreement. The FNL’s refusal to attend the launch of the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism may signal difficulties ahead.

Council Dynamics

Council members did not have difficulty agreeing on BINUB’s mandate, and they expect a smooth transition from ONUB to BINUB. However, many members will carefully monitor BINUB’s progress in meeting expected benchmarks.

UN Documents

Selected Resolutions

- S/RES/1719 (25 October 2006) established BINUB.
- S/RES/1711 (29 September 2006) extended until 31 December the temporary redeployment of ONUB personnel to MONUC.
- S/RES/1606 (20 June 2005) requested the Secretary-General to start negotiations on transitional justice mechanisms in Burundi.
- S/RES/1545 (21 May 2004) established ONUB.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2006/851 (27 October 2006) and Corr. 1 (6 November 2006) was the report on Children and Armed Conflict in Burundi.
- S/2006/842 (25 October 2006) was the latest report.

Selected Letters

- S/2006/867 (6 November 2006) noted the new withdrawal schedule.
- S/2006/866 (1 November 2006) was from the Secretary-General on the adjustment to the withdrawal schedule.

For background and a more complete list of documents, please consult our March, June and September 2006 Monthly Forecasts and our 23 October Update Report.

For historical background and a more complete list of UN documents please see our 23 December 2005 Update and March 2006 Forecast.

Security Council President’s Letters

- S/2005/796 (15 December 2005) took note of the Secretary-General’s intention to extend UNOGBIS till 31 December 2006.

Burundi

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to welcome the Secretary-General’s report marking the end of the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) and the start of the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (Bureau intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi, or BINUB).

Key Recent Developments

On 25 October the Council adopted resolution 1719 setting up BINUB and establishing its mandate. Priorities include peace consolidation and democratic governance, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and reform of the security sector, promotion and protection of human rights, and the coordination of donors and UN agencies.

On 6 November, the withdrawal of ONUB contingents was adjusted to allow them to assist with tasks of the Ceasefire Agreement with the Forces for National Liberation (FNL), signed on 7 September, before the AU Special Task Force is put in place.

For background and a more complete list of documents, please consult our March, June and September 2006 Monthly Forecasts and our 23 October Update Report.
Iraq

Expected Council Action

The quarterly report of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) is due on 7 December, with a briefing from the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Iraq, Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, and the regular briefing by the US on the activities of the Multinational Force (MNF).

The Council will receive the quarterly report of the UN Monitoring, Inspection and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC) in late November. No action is expected.

Council members will also be briefed by Yuli M. Vorontsov, the High-Level Coordinator for Iraq’s compliance with its obligations regarding Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property. The next report is due in December.

Key Recent Developments

The International Compact for Iraq was launched on 27 July with a joint statement from the government of Iraq and the UN. This new partnership is designed to support national reconciliation, consolidate peace and pursue political, economic and social development over the next five years. The framework agreement is expected to be finalised in December.

Violence continues in Iraq, however. The last UNAMI human rights report lists 3,700 civilian deaths in October, the highest in any month to date, thus averaging more than 100 deaths per day. More than 14,000 civilians are being wounded per month.

The Constitutional Review Committee was formed in September, comprising Shi’a, Sunni Arab and Kurdish political leaders. The review process is expected to take a year, when a referendum would be held. A chairman had yet to be appointed at press time.

Iraq recently renewed diplomatic relations with Syria, and the Iraqi President Jalal Talabani has been invited by his Iranian counterpart to discuss ways of addressing the violence in Iraq. These are important regional developments as the US has accused Iran of arming Shi’a militia in Iraq and Syria of failing to prevent insurgents crossing the border with Iraq.

After a request for extension of the MNF mandate by the Iraqi and US governments, the Council adopted resolution 1723 on 28 November which extended until 31 December 2007 the mandate of the MNF and of the Development Fund for Iraq and its International Advisory Monitoring Board, with a review process no later than 15 June 2007. The mandate was due to expire on 31 December 2006. The Council said it looked forward to the day when Iraqi forces would assume full responsibility for the maintenance of security and stability, “thus allowing the completion of the multinational force mandate and the end of its presence in Iraq.” It also stressed the responsibility of the Iraqi authorities to prevent attacks on diplomatic personnel.

Options

The Council has a few options for UNMOVIC but no action is expected in December. Please see our June 2006 Monthly Forecast on UNMOVIC.

On the issue of Iraq/Kuwait missing persons and property, the Council will likely adopt a press statement expressing concern at the plight of the families of those missing persons, and welcoming any progress on the issue of the missing property.

Key Issues

In June, the Security Council’s Mandate Review Committee agreed in principle that UNMOVIC’s mandate should be terminated. However, the Council has yet to find the right time to address this matter. There are still unresolved practical questions including when the mandate should be terminated, whether the know-how and archives should be retained and whether the end of the mandate should be accomplished by a formal recognition that weapons of mass destruction were not found.

For more information on the issues and dynamics relating to UNMOVIC, see our June 2006 Monthly Forecast.

There has been some progress on Iraq/Kuwait missing property. In April, Tunisia agreed to return spare engine parts to Kuwait Airways. There have been no developments on the repatriation or return of Kuwaiti and third-country nationals or their remains. Reporting frequency was reduced to semi-annual intervals and linked with missing persons.

Council Dynamics

There was consensus on the renewal of the MNF mandate as Council members were unwilling to discuss the substance.

Underlying Problems

The Iraqi police force is still largely unable to operate on its own. Officers retain strong allegiances to their own sects while some belong to militias. There are fears the Iraqi government may play the sectarian card.

Selected UN Documents

Latest Resolutions

• S/RES/1700 (10 August 2006) extended the UNAMI mandate for another 12 months.

Latest Report on UNAMI

• S/2006/706 (1 September 2006)

Latest UNMOVIC Report

• S/2006/701 (30 August 2006)

Latest Report on Iraq/Kuwait Missing Property

• S/2006/428 (21 June 2006)

Selected Letters

• S/2006/899 (17 November 2006) was the letter from the US on the extension of the MNF mandate.
• S/2006/888 (14 November 2006) was the letter from the Iraqi government requesting a renewal of the MNF, Development Fund for Iraq and International Advisory and Monitoring Board for Iraq mandates.
• S/2006/614 (1 August 2006) was a letter from the Arab League including the outcome of the meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Iraqi National Reconciliation Conference.
• S/2006/221 (5 April 2006) was the letter from Tunisia on the return to Kuwait of Kuwaiti property.

For key facts and historical background on Iraq, please refer to our February 2006 Monthly Forecast.
The Security Council established the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) in resolution 1535 to enhance the Counter-Terrorism Committee’s (CTC) ability to monitor the implementation of resolution 1373, which imposed obligations on all states to combat international terrorism. The CTED was set up as “a special political mission, under the policy guidance of the Plenary (the CTC)”, emphasising that the CTC had the sole responsibility for providing policy guidance.

Partly in response to concerns of member states that the Council was imposing a subsidiary body on the UN with unprecedented responsibility, the CTED was established for an initial period ending 31 December 2007 with the Council to conduct a comprehensive review by December 2005. However, in light of the extended delays between the adoption of resolution 1535 in March 2004 and the CTED becoming operational only on 15 December 2005, the review was reset to take place before 31 December 2006.

The Council highlighted the following areas in which the CTED would provide support to the CTC:
- addressing the difficulties encountered by the CTC in its monitoring functions and enhancing its capacity-building work;
- reminding states that they must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular human rights, refugee and humanitarian law;
- cooperating and collaborating with international, regional and sub-regional organisations and other UN bodies in developing and delivering programmes for capacity-building assistance in the fight against terrorism;
- facilitating assistance to states that require assistance in implementing resolution 1373; and
- conducting country visits to enhance monitoring of a state’s implementation of resolution 1373 and identifying areas where a state would benefit from receiving technical assistance and facilitating such assistance.

In resolution 1566, the Council also asked that the CTC, in consultation with relevant international, regional and sub-regional organisations and other UN bodies, develop a set of best practices to assist states in implementing the provisions of resolution 1373. Also, the Council assigned the CTC responsibility to monitor implementation of resolution 1624 dealing with the prohibition of incitement to terrorism.

In its preliminary report to the Council in December 2005, the CTC relied on the original goals set for the CTED to establish the benchmarks and criteria for the December 2006 review. These required the CTED to develop and follow specific plans approved by the CTC for implementing its policy guidance, including targets for achieving specific goals within an appropriate timeframe.

However, the review in December will be measured against the following criteria, in line with the priority areas established by the CTC:
- Providing the CTC with in-depth analysis of states’ implementation of resolution 1373. This is expected to assess states’ efforts to satisfy various aspects of the resolution, as well as specific issues in a sub-regional, regional or international context, and provide proposals for how the CTC can do more to help states in overcoming specific challenges.
- Developing best practices for implementing resolution 1373, including in collaboration with relevant international organisations, and make them available to states.
- Capacity-building by helping states obtain such technical assistance required to achieve measurable, concrete results.
- Strengthening contacts and coordination with other UN bodies, greater cooperation between the CTED and these bodies, including with the UNDP and UN Coordinators in the various states, as well as with other counterterrorism-related subsidiary organs.
- Developing an action plan for enhanced cooperation and coordination among international organisations in the fight against terrorism, including the objectives set out as well as implementing commitments contained in the outcome documents agreed by the three previous CTC special meetings with international, regional and sub-regional organisations. Also, the CTED is required to develop proposals to support regional organisations to develop counter-terrorism programmes and to help their members meet international responsibilities.
- Enhancing dialogue with states, including a more tailored approach to states’ individual circumstances, a more flexible approach to visits to monitor implementation of resolution 1373 and facilitating technical assistance. The CTED was asked to provide the CTC with more substantial information in advance of each visit to ensure the efficient use of resources, and to coordinate these visits with the 1267 Committee’s Monitoring Team and experts of the 1540 Committee to reduce duplication of effort and to maximise efficient use of resources. The CTED is required to ensure proper
follow-up to each visit and report on implementation of recommendations that arise.

The CTED is expected to review and make proposals to update the reporting regime taking into account the World Summit Outcome Document recommendation on consolidating reporting requirements in cooperation with other counter-terrorism related subsidiary organs of the Security Council. Also, it is expected to enhance close cooperation with the other relevant subsidiary bodies of the Council, specifically the 1267 and the 1540 Committees and their experts, including on information sharing, visits and technical assistance, as appropriate.

The CTED was expected to adopt a communications strategy to promote transparency in its work and provide states with a clear picture of the work of the CTC and the CTED.

The CTC will also take into account the extent to which the CTED’s support to it must provide the foundation for it to take decisions that lead to the most efficient and effective steps to further implement resolution 1373.

The 2006 review of the CTED is not expected to have an immediate impact on its future. However, it will provide an indication to the Council and the wider UN community on whether the CTED is meeting the original expectations of providing effective support for the work of the CTC in its central role in the UN in combating terrorism. Effective implementation by the CTC of its two primary responsibilities—monitoring implementation of resolution 1373 and other related resolutions and facilitating capacity-building assistance—are the benchmarks by which the CTED’s role will be measured. The review should offer the Council the opportunity to carry out any course correction considered necessary to enhance the CTED’s structural and operational capability. It should also provide the UN community as a whole an opportunity to provide feedback as to whether the CTED is meeting expectations.

### Selected UN Documents

#### Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1624 (14 September 2005) established the prohibition of incitement to terrorism.
- S/RES/1566 (8 October 2004) asked the CTC to develop best practices for implementing resolution 1373.
- S/RES/1535 (26 March 2004) adopted the CTC revitalisation plan and established the CTED.
- S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001) imposed obligations on all states to combat international terrorism and established the CTC to monitor implementation of the resolution.

#### Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2005/64 (21 December 2005) reset the comprehensive review of the CTED to December 2006 and accepted the CTED’s benchmarks for the review.

#### Selected Reports

- S/2005/800 (15 December 2005) was the preliminary report of the CTC for the review of the CTED.
- S/2004/124 (19 February 2004) was the report of the CTC on its revitalisation plan and setting out the goals for the CTED.

#### Selected General Assembly Documents

- A/60/825 (27 April 2006) was the Secretary-General’s report Uniting Against Terrorism: Recommendations for Global Counterterrorism Strategy.
- A/RES/60/1 (24 October 2005) 2005 World Summit Outcome Document
- A/59/565 (2 December 2004) was a note by the Secretary-General transmitting the report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.

### Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee

The mandates of the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee (known as the 1267 Committee) and its Monitoring Team are set to expire on 29 December. The Monitoring Team assists the Committee in monitoring implementation of the measures imposed by resolutions 1267, 1333, 1390 and 1617 on Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them.

In establishing its mandate, the Council set specific tasks for the team, including the submission of recommendations on the improvement of the monitoring and the effectiveness of the sanctions regime. Some of these recommendations have already been implemented, while others are still pending in the Committee. The Council indicated in resolution 1617 that its review at the end of the current mandate would include consideration of ways to possibly strengthen further the sanctions measures. An important underlying issue is that, despite the request from the 2005 World Summit more than a year ago, the Committee has still not approved new guidelines for the de-listing process.

Other issues raised over the past several months and expected to be considered by the Council in extending the mandate is the duplication and overlapping in the work of the three terrorism-related committees: the 1267, Counter-Terrorism and 1540 (non-proliferation) Committees. Also to be considered is the reporting burden, which many small states have complained about. It is expected that these issues will be taken up in the context of enhancing collaboration between the three committees during the consideration of a new resolution, expected by 29 December, extending the mandates of the 1267 Committee and its Monitoring Team.

### Selected Security Resolution

- S/RES/1617 (29 July 2005) renewed the sanctions against Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them; extended the mandate of the Committee and the Monitoring Team.
## Notable Dates for December

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<tr>
<th>Reports due for Consideration in December</th>
<th>Relevant Document</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>30 November</strong> SG report on new modalities for BONUCA (UN Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic)</td>
<td>S/PRST/2006/47</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>30 November</strong> Commissioner’s report on UNMOVIC (UN Monitoring, Inspection and Verification Commission) (quarterly)</td>
<td>S/RES/1284</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1 December</strong> SG report on UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) (semi-annual)</td>
<td>S/RES/1687</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>6 December</strong> SG report on UNOGIS (UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau)</td>
<td>S/RES/1580</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>7 December</strong> SG report on UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq) (quarterly)</td>
<td>S/RES/1700</td>
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<tr>
<td>early December SG report on the options for downsizing the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE); postponed from 20 November</td>
<td>S/RES/1710</td>
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<tr>
<td>early December SG report on UNOCI (UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire) (quarterly)</td>
<td>S/RES/1652</td>
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<tr>
<td>early December SG report on UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo)</td>
<td>S/RES/1244</td>
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<tr>
<td>mid December SG report on UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia) (quarterly)</td>
<td>S/RES/1712</td>
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<tr>
<td>mid December SG regular report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (Lebanon)</td>
<td>S/RES/1701</td>
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<tr>
<td>mid December Commissioner’s report on UNIIIC (UN International Independent Investigation Commission) (quarterly)</td>
<td>S/RES/1686</td>
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<tr>
<td>mid December SG report on Iraq/Kuwait: Missing Persons and Property (semi-annual)</td>
<td>S/RES/1284</td>
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<tr>
<td>mid December SG report on UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force) (semi-annual)</td>
<td>S/RES/1685</td>
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<tr>
<td>mid December SG report on Chad incorporating the results of the CAR/Chad fact-finding mission</td>
<td>S/RES/1706</td>
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<tr>
<td>mid December SG end of mandate report on ONUB (UN Operation in Burundi)</td>
<td>S/RES/1692</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 December 1521 Committee concerning Liberia Panel of Experts report</td>
<td>S/RES/1689</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 December 1533 Committee concerning the DRC Group of Experts mid-term report</td>
<td>S/RES/1698</td>
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<tr>
<td>late December SG report on UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Georgia) (quarterly)</td>
<td>S/RES/1716</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 December 1591 Committee concerning the Sudan Panel of Experts interim report</td>
<td>S/RES/1713</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 December SG report on the implementation of MINUSTAH’s mandate (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti)</td>
<td>S/RES/1702</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 December SG report on cooperation between UN Missions in West Africa</td>
<td>S/PRST/2006/38</td>
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<td>31 December SG report on Darfur (monthly)</td>
<td>S/RES/1590</td>
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<th>December 2006 Mandates Expire</th>
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<tr>
<td>15 December UNOCI</td>
<td>S/RES/1652</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 December UNOCI personnel increase</td>
<td>S/RES/1682</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 December Sanctions as per the 1572 Committee concerning Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>S/RES/1643</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 December Group of Experts of the 1572 Committee concerning Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>S/RES/1708</td>
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<td>15 December UNFICYP</td>
<td>S/RES/1687</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 December Travel sanctions and arms embargo as per the 1521 Committee concerning Liberia</td>
<td>S/RES/1647</td>
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<td>20 December Diamond sanctions as per the 1521 Committee concerning Liberia</td>
<td>S/RES/1689</td>
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**Notable Dates for December continued**

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<th>December 2006</th>
<th>Mandates Expire</th>
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<tr>
<td>21 December</td>
<td>Panel of Experts of the 1521 Committee concerning Liberia</td>
<td>S/RES/1689</td>
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<td>29 December</td>
<td>Monitoring Team of the 1267 Committee concerning Al-Qaeda/Taliban</td>
<td>S/RES/1617</td>
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<td>31 December</td>
<td>UNOGGIS</td>
<td>S/2005/795</td>
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<td>31 December</td>
<td>UNDOF</td>
<td>S/RES/1685</td>
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<td>31 December</td>
<td>UNIIIC Commissioner</td>
<td>S/2006/541</td>
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<td>31 December</td>
<td>AMIS (AU Mission in the Sudan)</td>
<td>PSC/MIN/Comm (LXIII)</td>
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<td>31 December</td>
<td>UNOB</td>
<td>S/RES/1692</td>
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<td>31 December</td>
<td>SG’s Special Representative for the Great Lakes</td>
<td>S/2006/812</td>
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<td>31 December</td>
<td>Informal Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions</td>
<td>S/2006/811</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 December</td>
<td>Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa</td>
<td>S/2005/841</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**December 2006 Other Important Dates**

- Local and municipal elections in Haiti
- Open debate on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict
- 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu, Philippines
- The Annual Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly
- 2nd Great Lakes Summit in Nairobi
- Security Council comprehensive review of the CTED (S/RES/1535)
- Denmark and Tanzania’s term on the Peacebuilding Commission ends (S/2006/25)
- The second term of Secretary-General Kofi Annan ends and Ban Ki-moon of South Korea will begin his term as Secretary-General on 1 January 2007.

Also expected in December:

- Talks mediated by the southern Sudanese government between Somalia’s transitional government and the Union of Islamic Courts are expected in mid-December, postponed from 30 October.
- A briefing by the ICC chief prosecutor on investigations regarding Darfur is expected.
- The 751 Committee concerning Somalia is likely to hold an unprecedented meeting between the Monitoring Group and states mentioned as having violated the arms embargo in the Group’s latest report (S/2006/913).
- An open Council meeting on Afghanistan is expected in early December following the Council visiting mission which concluded its assessment on 16 November.
- In mid to late December the DRC will hold its presidential inauguration, election of the senate is expected on 29 December.
- The first annual report of the Peacebuilding Commission is due in December; it will be subject to a Council debate. (S/RES/1645 and 1646) The Chairman of the PBC has also called for ongoing discussion of its work in Burundi during December.
- The framework agreement for the International Compact for Iraq is expected to be finalised in December.
- The semi-annual reports of the ICTR and ICTY are expected. (S/RES/1534)

**Important Dates over the Horizon**

- UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) will commence on 1 January 2007. (S/RES/1719)
- The next AU Summit will take place in January 2007 and a new AU chairperson is expected to be chosen.
- A session of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations is being planned for late February or early March 2007.
- The Council is tentatively planning visiting missions for 2007 to West Africa (including Côte d’Ivoire), Timor-Leste and Central Africa.
- The Special Court for Sierra Leone has reported that Charles Taylor’s trial at The Hague will begin in April 2007.
- The Secretary-General’s next report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict is due October 2007.